THE STATE OF BOMBAY versus BOMBAY EDUCATION SOCIETY AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 26 May 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 568 | 1954 INSC 75
Key facts
- Decided
- 26 May 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, GHULAM HASAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 64/1954
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 568
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 75
Text of the judgment
.568
1954
~atya
Div
Bushahri
v.
PadamDev
.and Others.
Jlenkatarama
AJ)'ar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
Act. To hold that Government servants are, as such
and as a class, disqualified to act as polling agents
would be to engraft an exception to the statute,
which is not there.
Accordingly, we reaffirm the view taken by us that
the appointment of a Government servant as poll~ng
agent does not, without more, contravene sect10n
123(8). It is scarcely necessary to repeat our observation in the original judgment that "if it is made out
that the candidate or his agent had abused the right to
appoint a Government servant as polling · agent by
exploiting the situation for furthering his election
prospects, then the. matter can be dealt with as an
infringement of ·section 123(8)." In the result, this
petition is dismissed ; but under the circumstances,
without costs.
-
Petition dismissed.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
v.
1954
May 26.
BOMBAY EDUCATION SOCIETY AND OTHERS.
(With COnnected Appeals)
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., S. R. DAs, GHULAM
HASAN, BHAGWATI and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.J
Constitution of India-Articles 29, 30(1), 337 Second ProvisaGovernment Circular-Prohibiting admission into Schools main·
tained or aided by State on the ground of language of citizensSuch circular whether ultra vires of Articles 29(2) and 337 Second
Provisa-Article 29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution-Word
"Namely"-Meaning of.
The Education Society of Bombay (respondent No. I) has been
running a recognised Anglo-Indian School called Barnes High
School at Deolali which receives aid from the State of Bombay.
J and G are its Directors. English is used in the said school as the
medium of instruction. The mother tongue of the Anglo-Indians is
English. The State of Bombay issued a circular order on 6th
January, 1954, headed "Admission to Schools teaching through
the medium of English." The operative portion of the order
·enjoined that no primary or secondary school shall from the date
·Of the order admit t~ a class where English is used as the medium
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·s.c.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
569
1954
_..,f instruction any pupil other than a pupil belonging to a section
nf citizens the language of which is English namely, Anglo-Indians
The Stat qf
and citizens of non-Asiatic descent. One P, a citizen of India and
mbay
member of Indian Christian Community alleging English to be the
v.
mother tongue of his daughter, and one: M, a citizen of India and Bombay Education
Society and
,member of Gugrati Hindu Community alleging Gujrati to be the
Others.
mother tongue of his son, were refused admission to the school for
their respective wards on the basis of the aforesaid order dated
6th January, 1954. The Society and its two Directors presented an
application under article 226 of the Comtitution in the High Court
-<Jf Bombay praying for the issue of a Writ in the nature of
Mandamus restraining the State of Bombay and its officers
from enforcing the said order and to allow the petitioners to admit
In the school any children of non-Anglo-Indian citizens or citizens
of the Asiatic descent and to educate them through the medium of
English. Similar applications were made by P and hii daughter
and by M and his son. All these applications were consolidated,
beard together and accepted by the High Court which made an
-order as prayed. The State of Bombay came in appeal before the
-Supreme Court. Held: (1) that the impugned order denying the
·right of students who are not Anglo-Indians or are of Asiatic
1iescent to be admitted to a recognised Anglo-Indian School (in this
-case the Barnes High School) which receives aid from the State and
which imparts education through the medium of English is void
and unenforceable as it offends against the fundamental right
guaranteed to all citizens by article 29(2) of the Constitution,
because
(a) The language of article 29(2) pf the Constitution is wide
-and unqualified and covers all citizens whether they belong to the
:majority or minority group.
(b) The protection given by the said article extends against
'the State or anybody who denies the right conferred by it.
( c) The said article confers a special right on citizens for
admission into the educational institutions maintained or aided by
-the State.
(d) The marginal note referring t:o minorities does not
control the plain meaning of the language in which article 29(2)
has been couched.
The word "namely'' imports enumeration of what is comprised
in the preceding clause. In other words it equates what follows
·with the clause described before.
·
-
(2) Barnes High School at Deolali and other Anglo-Indian
·Schools have a right to admit non-Anglo-Indian students and
~tudents of ".'-sia.tic descent inasmu~h as article 337 proviso 2
imposes an obligation on the Anglo-Indian Schools to make. available
at least 40 per cent. of the annual admissions to non-Anglo-Indian
students as a condition precedent of their receiving grant from
'the Government and the impugned order is UFlconstitutional as it
570
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1954
prevents the Anglo-Indian schools from perforn1ing their con.stitutional obligation and exposes them to the risk of forfeiting their
·The State of
constitutional right to the special grant.
Bombay '
v.
In view of the fundamental right guaranteed to a minority
Bombay Education
like the Anglo-Indian community under article 29( I) to conserve
Society and
its own language, script and culture and the right to establish and
Others.
administer educational institutions of its own choice under
article 30( 1) there is implicit therein the right to impart instruction in its own institutions to the children of its O'i'Vn community
in its O\Vn language and the State by its police power cannot determine the medium of instruction in opposition to such fundamental
right.
Bhola Prasad v. The King-Emperor ([1942] F.C.R. 17, 25), The
Queen v. Burah (L.R. 1878 3 App. Cas. 859), The State of Madras
v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan ([1951] S.C.R. 525), Pierce v.
Society of Sisters of Holy Names (268 U.S. 508), Yusuf Abdul Aziz
v. State (A.LR. 1951 Born. 470), Sm. Anjali Roy v. State of
West Bengal (A.l.R. 1952 Cal. 825), The State of Bombay v. Narasu
Appal Mali (A.LR. 1952 Born. 84), Srinivasa Aiyar v. Sarastvathi Ammal (A.LR. 1952 Mad. 193), Dattatraya Motiram More v.
State of Bombay (A.LR. 1953 Born. 311), Punjab Province v. Daulat
Singh (1946 L.R. 73 I.A. 59), Robert T. Meyei· v. State of Nebraska
(262 U.S. 390), August Bartels v. State of Iowa (262 U.S. 404) and
Ottawa Separate Schools Trustees v. Mackell (L.R. 1917 A.C. 62)
referred to.
C1v1L APPELLATE JuR1so1cT10N : Civil Appeals
Nos. 64 to 66 of 1954.
Appeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th
February, 1954, of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Special Applications Nos. 259, 288 and 289
of 1954 respectively.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India ( G. N. Joshi,
_ M. M. Desai, Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with
them) for the appellant in all the appeals.
N. A. Palkhivala, /. B. Dadachanji, /. K. Munshi
and Rajinder Narain for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in
C. A. No. 64.
Frank Anthony, /. B. Dadachanji, /. K. Munshi
and Rajinder Narain for respondent No. 3.
N. A. Palkhivala, /. B. Dadachanji, /. K. Munshi
and Rajinder Narain for the respondent No. 1 in C. A.
No. 65.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
571
Frank Anthony and Rajinder Narain for respondent ·No. 2.
N. A. Palkhivala, Frank Anthony, /. B. Dadachanji,
]. K. Munshi and Rajinder Narain for respondent
No. l in C. A. No. 66.
Frank Anthony, /. B. Dadachanji, /. K. Munshi
and Rajinder Narain for respondent No. 2.
1954. May 26. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
DAs J.-These three appeals, filed by the State of
Bombay, with a certificate granted by the Bombay
High Court, are directed against the Judgment and
,.. · • • Order pronounced by that High Court on the 15th February, 1954, on three Civil Applications under article
226. By that Judgment and Order the High Court
held that the circular order No. SSN 2054(a) issued by
the State of Bomb~y, Education Department, on the
6th January, 1954, was bad in that it contravened the
provisions of article 29(2) and article 337 and directed
the issue of a writ prohibiting the State from enforcing the order against the authorities of Barnes High
School established and run by the Education Society
of Bombay (hereinafter referred as the Society).
The Society, ~hich is the first respondent in Appeal
No. 64 of· 1954, is a Joint Stock Company incorporated
under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. The other two
respondents in
that
appeal-Ven'ble
Archdeacon
A. S. H. Johnson and Mrs. Glynne Howell are members
;. .. and Directors of the Society. The Ven'ble Archdeacon
A. S. H. Johnson is also the Secretary of the Society.
Both of them are citizens of India and are members of
the Anglo-Indian Community. The mother tongue of
these respondents as of other members of the Anglo- Indian Community is English.
In the State of Bombay there are in all 1403
Secondary Schools. 1285 of these Schools import education through the medium of some language other than
At
English. Th.:: remaining ll8 Schools have adopted
English as the medium of instruction. Thirty out of
these ll8 Schools are Anglo-Indian Schools. In these
thirty Schools there are three thousand Anglo-Indian
18-87 s. C. India/59
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1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bombay Eduration
Society and
Others•
572
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bombay Education
Society and
Others.
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
.1
students forming 37 per cent. of the total number of
students recemng instruction in those Anglo-Indian
Schools. The rest 63 per cent. consist of non-AngloIndian students.
In furtherance of its object the Society in 1925
established and since then has been conducting and
running a School known as Barnes High School at
Deolali in Nasik District in the State of Bombay. The
School is a recognized Anglo-Indian School having
Primary, Secondary and High School classes. The School
receives considerable aid from the State. The total
number of students in the School in December, 1953,
was 415, out of which 212 were Anglo-Indians and the
remaining 203 belonged to other Indian Communities.
In all the classes in the said School English is used as the ... •
medium of instruction and has been so used since the
inception of the School. The entire staff of the School
consist of 17 teachers who, with the exception of one,
are trained and qualified to teach o!ily in English, the
exception being the teacher who teaches Hindi which
is the second language taught in that School.
On the 16th December, 1953, the Inspector of AngloIndian
Schools,
Bombay State, and Educational
Inspector, Greater Bombay, sent a circular letter to the
Headmaster of Barnes High School intimating that the
Government had under consideration the issue of
orders regulating admissions to Schools in which the
medium of instruction was English. The orders under
consideration were stated to be on the following lines,
namely, (1) that from the next School year admissions
to English medium School should only be confined to• •
children belonging to the Anglo-Indian and European
Communities, and (2) that those pupils who, prior to '
the issue of the orders, were studying in recognized
Primary or Secondary English medium Schools, could
continue to do so. The letter in conclusion advised_
the Headmaster not to make any admission for the
'
academic year beginning from January, 1954, of pupils
other than Anglo-Indians or Europeans
pending y.
further orders which, it was said, would issue shortly.
The contemplated order came on the 6th January,
1954, in the shape of circular No. SSN 2054(a) headed
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
"Admi.5sions to Schools teaching through the medium
of English". In paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this circular
- reference was made to the development of the policy
of the Government regarding the medium of instruction
at the Primary and Secondary stages of education. It
was pointed out that since 1926--27 the University of
Bombay permitted pupils to answer questions in
modern Indian languages at the Matriculation examination in all subjects except English and other foreign
languages and that this had resulted in 1285 out of
1403 schools in the State ceasing· to use English as the
medium of instruction. It was then stated that in
1948 instructions were issued to all English teaching
schools that admissions to such
Schools
should
_.., 4ordinarily be restricted to pupils who did not speak any
of the regional languages of the State or whose mother
tongue was English. It was said that in 1951, after a
review of the position, a general policy had been laid
down to the effect that admission to such schools
should be restricted only to four categories of children
therein mentioned. Reference was then made to the
recommendations of the Secondary Education Commis• sion that the mother tongue or the regional
~ language should generally be the medium of instruction throughout the Secondary school stage, subject
to the provision for special facilities for linguistic
minorities. In paragraph 4 of the Circular order it
was stated that the Government felt that the stage
had then been reached for the discontinuance of
English as a medium of instruction and that the
Government had c;lecided that subject to the facilities
.·~ ~to be given to linguistic minorities all special and
interim concessions in respect of admission to Schools
(including Anglo-Indian Schools) using English as the
medium of instruction, should thereafter be withdrawn.
Then came the operative part of the order, the relevant
portion of which is set out below :
"5. Government has accordingly decided as
follows:
""'Subject to the exceptions hereinafter provided, no
primary or secondary school · shall from the date of
these orders admit to a class where English is used as
1954
The Stat• of
Bombay
v.
Bombay Education
Society and
Others.
Das].
574
1954
The Stat' of
Bombay
v.
Bombay Education
Socfrty and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
.'
a medium of instruction any pupil other than. a. pupil
belonging to a section of citizens the language of which
is English namely, Anglo-Indians and citizens of nonAsiatic descent."
There were three exceptions made to this general
order in favour of three categories of students who,
prior to the date of the order, were studying through
the medium of English. Provision was made for
admission of foreign pupils, other than those of Asiatic
descent, belonging to foreign possessions in India, to
Schools using English as a medium of instruction or to
any other School of their choice. The concluding paragraph of the Order was in the following terms :"?. All Schools (including Anglo-Indian Schools)
using, English as a medium of instruction
should • '
<cgulate admissions according to this circular. With a
view to facilitating the admission of pupils who under
these orders are not intended to be educated through
the medium of English, these schools are advised to
open progressively divisions of Standards using Hindi
or an Indian language as the medium of instruction,
starting from Standard I in 1954. Government will
be prepared to consider the payment of additional
grant on merits for this purpose."
The above order was followed by another Circular
No. SSN 2054(b) issued on the same date drawing the
attention of the heads of all Anglo-Indians Schools to
the Circular No. SSN 2054( a) of the same date, and
requesting them to regulate thereafter admissions to
their Schools in accordance with that circular. It was
,i
stated that the orders in that circular were not
intended to affect the total grant available for distribu- '
tion to Anglo-Indian Schools under the Constitution
but that the Government would be prepared to
consider, in cor\sultation with the State Board of
Anglo-Indian Education, whether in consequence of
this order, any change was necessary in the existing ·
procedure for the equitable distribution. of the total
grant among individual Anglo-Indian
Schools. In
conclusion the .attention of the Headmasters was parti- ."4
cularly invited to the concluding sentence of paragraph
7 of that circular order, and it was pointed out that
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
575
A •
therein were intended
the
grants
contemplated
to be in addition to the grants available under
article 337.
•
Major Pinto, who is a citizen of India, belongs to
the Indian Christian Community. He claims that his
mother tongue, as that of a section of the Indian
Christian Community, is English and that his entire
family speak and use English at home. Two of his
sons were then studying in the Barnes High School and
were being educated through the medium of English.
On 2nd February, 1954, Major Pinto accompanied by
his daughter Brenda approached the Headmaster of
Barnes High School seeking admission for her to the
said School. He was informed by the Headmaster
Y •about the order issued by the State of Bombay on the
6th January, 1954, and was told that, in view of the
said order, the Headmaster was compelled i:o refuse
admission to her since she did not belong to the AngloIndian Community nor was she of non-Asiatic descent,
although she had all the necessary qualifications for
admission to the said School.
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Dr. Mahadeo Eknath Gujar is also a citizen of India
and is a member of the Guzrati Hindu Community.
His mother tongue is Guzrati. He desires that his
son Gopal Mahadeo Gujar should become a medical
practitioner and go abroad for higher medical studies
and qualifications and thought that his son should be
educated through the medium of English. He found
the Barnes High School, which teaches through the
~ medium of English, as suitable for the needs of his son.
'Accordingly on the lst February, 1954, Dr. Gujar
accompanied by his son approached the Headmaster
of Barnes High School seeking admission for his son to
the said School but the Headmaster, in view of the
Government Circular Order, felt bound to turn down
such request as the boy did not belong to the AngloIndian Community and was not of non-Asiatic descent,
although he had all the necessary qualifications for
"'< ,admission to the school. There have been similar
other applications for admission which have had to be
rejected on similar grounds.
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bombay Education
Society and
Others.
Das].
'
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576
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
.
)..
Thereupon the Society and Ven'ble Archdeacon
A.S.H. Johnson and Mrs. Glynne Howell in February,
,
1954, presented before the High Court of Bombay the
v.
Special Civil Application No. 259 of 1954 under article
Bombay Education
Society and
226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ
Others.
in the nature of mandamus restraining the State of
Das].
Bombay, its Officers, servants and agents from enforc- >·
ing the said order and from taking any steps or
proceedings in enforcement of the same and compelling
the respondent to withdraw or cancel the said purported order and to allow the petitioner to admit to
any standard in the said school any children of nonAnglo-Indian citizens or citizens of Asiatic descent and
to educate them through the medium of English
language. Likewise Major Pinto and his daughter 'Brenda and Dr. Gujar and his son Gopal made similar
applications, being Nos. 288 and 289 of 1954 respective! y, praying for similar reliefs. The three applications
were consolidated on 11th February, 1954, and were
heard together and were disposed of by the same Judgment and Order pronounced on the 15th February,
1954. The High Court accepted the petitions and
made an order as prayed. The State of Bombay has
now come up in appeal against the said Orders.
~
On the facts of these cases two questions arise
namely (1) as to the right of students who are not
Anglo-Indians or who are -of Asiatic descent to be
admitted to Barnes High School which is a recognized
Anglo-Indian School which imparts education tprough
the medium of English, and (2) as to the right of the
said Barnes High School to admit non-Anglo-Indiai; ;
students and students of Asiatic descent. The questions, thus . confined to the particular facts of these
.cases, appear to us to admit of a very simple solution,
as will be presently explained.
Re (1) : As already indicated Barnes High School is
a recognized Anglo-Indian School which has all along
been imparting education through the medium of
English. It receives aid out of State funds. The
<laughter of Major Pinto and the son of Dr. Gujar are, .,,,.
citizens of India and they claim admission to Barnes
High School in exercise of the fundamental right said
1954
The State of
Bombay
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•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
577
to have been guaranteed to them by article 29(2) of
the Constitution. The School has declined to admit
either of them in view of the circular order of the
State of Bombay. The provisions of the circular order,
issued by the State of Bombay on the 6th January,
1954, have already
been summarised
above. The
operative portion of the order, set forth in clause 5
thereof, dearly forbids all Primary or Secondary
Schools, where English is used as a medium of instruction, to admit to any class any pupil other than a
pupil belonging to a section of citizens, the language
of which is English namely Anglo-Indians and citizens
of non-Asiatic descent. The learned Attorney-General
contends that this clause does not limit admission
only to Anglo-Indians and citizens of non-Asiatic
descent, but permits admission of pupils belonging to
any other section of citizens the language of which is
English. He points out that one of the meanings of the
word "namely" as given in Oxford English Dictionary,
Volume VII, p. 16 is "that is to say" and he then
refers us to the decision of the Federal Court in Bhola
Prasad v. The King-Emperor(1), where it was stated
that the words "that is to say" were explanatory or
illustrative words and not words. either of amplification
or limitation. It should, however, be remembered that
those observations were made in connection with one
of the Legislative heads, namely entry No. 31 of the
Provincial Legislative List. The fundamental proposition . enunciated in The Qu~en v. Burah(2 ) was that
Indian Legislatures within their own sphere had
plenary powers of legislation as large and of the same
nature as those of Parliament itself. In that view of
the matter every entry in the legislative list had to be
given the widest connotation and it was in that context
that the worods "that is to say," relied upon by the
learned Attorney-General,. were interpreted in that way
by the Federal Court. To do otherwise would have
been to cut down the generality of the legislative head
itself. The same reason cannot apply to the cop.struction of the Government order in the present case for the
considerations that applied in the case before the
(1) [1942] F.C.R. 17 at p. 25.
(2) L.R. (1878) 3 App. Cas. 859.
1 954
The State of
Bombay •
v.
Bombvy Eduction
Society and
Others.
Das].
•
578
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1954
State of
llJiThe
·• Bombay
v.
Bombay Education
Society and
Othtrs.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Federal Court have no application here. Ordinarily
the word "namely" imports enumeration of what is
comprised in the preceding clause. In other words it
ordinarily serves the purpose of equating what follows
with the clause described before. There is good deal of
force, therefore, in the argument that the order restricts
admission only to Anglo-Indians and citizens of nonAsiatic descent whose language is English. This interpretation finds support from the decision mentioned
in clause 4 to withdraw all special and interim concessions in respect of admission to Schools referred to in
clause 4. Facilities to linguistic minorities provided for
in the circular order, therefore, may be read as contemplating facilities to be given only to the Anglo-Indians
and citizens of non-Asiatic descent.
Assuming, however, that under the impugned order
a section of citizens, other than Anglo-Indians and
citizens of non-Asiatic descent, whose language is
English, may also get admission, even then citizens,
whose language is not English, are certainly debarred
by the order from admission to a School where English
is used as a medium of instruction in all the classes.
Article 29(2) ex facie puts no limitation or qualification
on the expression "citizen". Therefore, the construction sought to be put upon clause 5 does not apparently
help the learned Attorney-General, for even on· that
construction the order will contravene the provisions
of article 29(2).
The learned Attorney-General then falls back upon
two contentions to avoid the applicability of article 29(2). In the first place he contends that article 29(2)
does not confer any fundamental right on all citizens
generally but guarantees the rights of citizens of minority groups by providing that they must not be denied
admission to educational institutions maintained by
the State or receiving aid out 9£ State funds on grounds
only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them
and he refers us to the marginal note to the article.
This is certainly' a new contention put forward before
us for the first time. It does not appear to have been
specifically taken in the affidavits in opposition filed in
the High Court and there is no indication in the
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
Ju<lgment under appeal that it was advanced in this
form before the High Court. Nor was this point specifically made a ground of appeal in the petition for leave to
appeal to this Court. Apart from this, the contention
appears to us to be devoid of merit. Article 29(1) gives
protection to any section of the citizens having a
distinct language, script or culture by guaranteeing
their right to conserve the same. Article 30(1) secures
to all minorities, whether based on religion or language,
the right to establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice. Now suppose the State
maintains an educational institution to help conserving
the distinct language, script or culture of a section of
the citizens or makes grants in aid of an educational
institution established by a minority community based
on religion or language to conserve their distinct
language, script or culture, who can claim the protection of article 29(2) in the matter of admission into any
such institution ? Surely the citizens of the very section whose language, script or culture is sought to be
conserved by the institution or the citizens who belong
to the very minority group which has established and
is administering the institution, do not need any protection against themselves and therefore article 29(2) is
not designed for the protection of this section or this
minority. Nor do we see any reason to limit article 29(2)
to citizens belonging to a minority group other than
the section or the minorities referred to in article 29(1)
or article 30(1), for the citizens, who do not belong to
any minority group, may quite conceivably need this
protection just as much as the citizens of such other
minority groups. If it is urged that the citizens of the
majority group are amply protected by article 15 and
do not require the protection of article 29(2), then there
are several obvious answers to that argument. The
language of artice 29(2) is wide and unqualified and
may well cover all citizens whether they belong to the
majority or minority group. Article 15 protects all
citizens against the State whereas the protection of
article 29(2) extends against the State or any body who
denies the right conferred by it. Further article 15
protects all citizens against discrimination generally
but article 29(2) is a protection against . a particular
1954
The Stale
of
Bombay
v.
Bombay Education
Society and
Others.
Dasj.
580
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
species of wrong namely denial of admission into educational institutions of the specified kind. In the next
place article 15 is quite general and wide in its terms
••
and applies to all citizens, whether they belong to the
Bombay Eclucation
Society and
majority
or minority groups, and gives protection to
Others.
all the citizens against discrimination by the State on
Das].
certain specific grounds. Article 29(2) confers a special
right on citizens for admission into educational institutions maintained or aided by the State. To limit this
right only to citizens belonging to minority groups will
be to provide a double protection for such citizens and
to hold that the citizens of the majority group have no
special educational rights in the nature of a right to be
admitted into an educational institution for the maintenance of which they make contributions by way of
taxes. We· see no cogent reason for such discrimination. The heading under which articles 29 and 30 are
grouped together-namely "Cultural and Educational
Rights"-is quite general and does not in terms
contemplate such differentiation. If the fact that the
·institution is maintained or aided out of State funds is
the basis of this guaranteed right then all citizens,
irrespective of whether they belong to the majority or
minority groups, are alike entitled to the protection of
this fundamental right. In view of all these considerations the marginal note alone, on which the AttorneyGeneral relies, cannot be read as controlling the plain
meaning of the language in which article 29(2) has been
couched. Indeed in The State of Madras v. Srimathi
Champakam Dorairajan( 1 ), this Court has already held
as follows :
"It will be noticed that while clause (1) protects
the language, script or culture of a section of the
citizens, clause (2) guarantees the fundamental right
of an individual citizen. The right to get admission
into any educational institution of the kind mentioned
in clause (2) is a right which an individual citizen has
as a citizen and not as a member of any community or
class of citizens."
In our judgment this part of the contention of the
learned Attorney-General cannot be sustained.
1954
'
.....
The Siok of
Bombay
(1) [1951) S.C.R. 525 at p. 530.
•
'
)
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
581
The second part of the arguments of the learned
Attorney-General hinges upon the word "only" to be
found in article 29(2). His contention is that the
impugned order does not deny admission to any citizen
on the ground only of religion, race, caste, language or
any of them. He maintains with considerable emphasis
that it is incumbent on the State to secure the advancement of Hindu which is ultimately to be our National
language and he stresses the desirability of or even the
necessity, generally ac~nowiedged by educationalists, for
imparting education through the medium of the pupil's
mother tongue. We have had equally emphatic rejoinder
from learned counsel appearing for the different respondents. Characterising the impugned circular as an
unwarranted and wanton encroachment on the liberty
of the parents and guardians to direct the education and
upbringing of their children and wards reliance has been
placed on the following observations of McReynolds J.
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names( 1 ) : ''The fundamental theory of liberty upon which
all Governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the state to standardize its children
by forcing them · to accept instruction frot11 public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
state ; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations."
It is also urged that the main, if not the sole, object
of the impugned order is to discriminate against, and
if possible to stifle the language of the Anglo-Indian
Community in utter disregard of the constitutional
inhibition. It is pointed out that to compel the AngloIndian Schools to open parallel classes in any Indian
language will not necessarily facilitate the advancement of the Hindi language for the language adopted
for such parallel classes may not be Hindi. Further the
opening of parallel classes in the same School with an
Indian language as the medium of instruction while the
pupils iii the other classes are taught in English will
certainly not be conducive to or promote the conservation of the distinct language, script or culture which
(1) 268 U.S. 508; 69 L. Ed. w70 at p. 1078.
1954
The State of
Bombay
,..
Bombay Education
Society and
Others.
Das].
582
1954
T/te State of
Bombay
,y.
Bombay Education
Society and
Others.
Das :J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1s guaranteed by article 29( 1) to the Anglo-Indian
Community as a section of the ouzens. It is equally
difficult, it is said, to appreciate why the salutory
principle of imparting education through the medium
of the pupil's mother tongue should require that a pupil
whose mother tongue is not English but is, say, Guzrati,
should be debarred from getting admission only into
an Anglo-Indian School where the medium of instruction 1s English but not from being admitted into a
School where the, medium of i.nstruction 1s a regional
language, say Konkani, which is not the mother tongue
of the pupil. The rival arguments thus formulated on
both sides involve questions of State policy 011 education with which the Court has no concern. The
American decisions founded on the 14th amendment
which refers to due process of law may not be quite
helpful in interpretation of our article 29. We must,
therefore, evaluate the argument of the
learned
Attorney-General on purely legal considerations bearing
on the question of constructioq of article 29(2).
The learned Attorney-General submits that the
impugned.. order does not deny to pupils who are not
Anglo-Indians or citizens of non Asiatic
descent,
admission into an Anglo-Indian School only on the
ground of religion, race, caste, language or any of them
but on the ground that such denial will promote the
advancement of tbe national language and facilitate
the imparting of education through the medium of the
pupil's mother tongue. He relies on a number of
decisions of the High Courts, e.g., Yusuf Abdul Aziz v.
State( 1 ), Sm. Anjali Roy v. State of West Bengal(•),
Tlze Stute of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali ("), Srinivasa
Ayyar v. Saraswatlii
Ammal('),
and
Dattatraya
Motiram More v. State of Bombay('). These decisions,
it should be noted, were concerned with discrimination
prohibited by article 15 which deals witb discrimination generally and not with denial of admission into
educational institutions of certain kinds prohibited by
article 29(2). It may also be mentioned that this
(1) A.I.R. 1951 Bon1. 470.
(2) A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 825.
(3) A.LR. 1952 Hom. 84.
(4) A.LR. 1952 Mad. 193.
(5) A.LR. 1953 Bom. 311.
•
•
>
-
S.C.R.
-
•
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
583
Court upheld the actual decision in the first mentioned
Bombay case not on clause (1) but on clause (3) of
article 15. These cases, therefore, have no direct bearing on article 29(2). The arguments advanced by the
learned Attorney-General overlook the distinction
between the object or motive underlying the impugned
order. and the mode and manner adopted therein for
achieving that object. The object or motive attributed
by the learned Attorney-General to the impugned order
is undoubtedly a laudable one but its validity has to
be judged by the method of its operation and its effect
on the fundamental right guaranteed by article 29~2).
A similar question of construction arose in the case of
Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh(1 ). One of the questions in that case was whether the provision of the new
section 13-A of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act was
ultra vires the Provincial Legislature as contravening
sub-section (I) of section 298 of the Government of
In<lia Act, 1935, in that in some cases that section
would operate as a prohibition on the ground of descent
alone. Beaumont J. in his dissenting judgment took
the view that it was necessary for the Court to consider
the scope and object of the Act which was impugned
so ::is to determine the ground on which such Act was
based, and that if the only basis for the Act was
discrimination on one or more of the grounds specified
in section 298 sub-section ( 1) then the Act was bad but
that if the true basis of the Act was something different
the Act was not invalidated because one of its effects
might be to invoke such discrimination. In delivering
the Judgment of the Board Lord Thankerton at page
74 rejected this view in the words following :
"Their Lordships are unable to accept this as the
correct test. In their view, it is not a question of
whether the impugned Act is based only on one or more
of the grounds specified in section 298 sub-section (I),
but whether its operation may result in a prohibition
only on these grounds. The proper test as to whether
there is a contravention of the sub-section is to ascertain the reaction of the impugned Act on the personal
right conferred by the sub-section, and, while the scope
(1) [1946] LR. 73 I. A. 59•
•
1954
The State
of
Bombay
y.
Bombay Education
Society and
Others.
Das].
584
1954
The Slate of
.Bombay
••
Bombay Education
Socie!Y and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
and object of ·the Act may be of assistance in determining the effect of the operation of the Act on a
proper" construction of its provisions, if the effect of the
Act so determined involves an infringement of such
personal right, the object of the Act, however laudable,
will not obvite the prohibition of sub-section ( 1) ."
Granting that the object of the impugned order
before us was what is claimed for it by the learned
Attorney-General, the question still remains as to how
that object has been sought to be achieved. Obviously
that is sought to be done by denying to al\ pupils,
whose mother tongue is not English, admission into
any School were the medium of instruction is English.
Whatever the object, the immediate ground and direct
cause for the denial is that the mother tongue of the
pupil is not English. Adapting the language of Lord
Thankerton, it may be said that the laudable object of
the impugned order does not obviate the prohibition of
article 29(2) because the effect of the order involves an
infringement of this fundamental right, and 'that effect
is brought about by denying admission only on the
ground of language. The same principle is implicit in
the . decision of this Court in The State of Madras v.
Srimathi Clzampakam Dorairajan ('). There
also
the object of the impugned communal G. 0. was to
advance the interest of educationally backward classes
of citizens but, that object notwithstanding, this Court
~truck down the order as un-constitutional because the
modus operandi to achieve that object was directly
based only on one of the forbidden grounds specified
in the article. In our opinion the impugned order
offends against the fundamental right guaranteed to
all citizens by article 29(2).
Re 2 :-Coming to the second question as to whether the impugned order infringes any constitutional
right of Barnes High School, the learned AttorneyGeneral contends that although any section of the
citizens having distinct language, script or culture of
its own, has under article 29(1) the right to conserve
the same and although all minorities, whether based on
religion or language, have, under article 30(1), the right
(1)
1951] S.C.R. 525 at p. 530.
••
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•
-
)I
S.C.R.
•
...,
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
to establish and administer educational institutions of
their choice, nevertheless such sections or minorities
cannot question the power of the State to make
reasonable regulations for all Schools including a
requirement that they should give instruction in a
particular language which is regarded as the national
language or to prescribe a curriculum for institutions
which it supports. Undoubtedly the powers of the
State in this behalf cannot be lightly questioned and
certainly not in so far as their exercise is not inconsistent with or contrary to the
fundamental rights
guaranteed to the citizens. Indeed m the cases of
Robert T. Meyer v. State of Nebraska( 1 ) and August
Bartelf v. State of Iowa (") the Supreme Court of the
United States definitely held that the State's police
power in regard to education could not be permitted
to override the liberty protected by the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution. That is how those
cases have been understood by writers on American
[See
Cooley's
Constitutional
Constitutional Law.
Limitations, Volume II, page 1345, and ·Willis, page
64.] The statutes impugned in these cases provided :
( 1) That no person should teach any subject to
any person in any language other than the English
language, and
'
(2) That languages other than English may be
taught only after the pupil had passed the 8th grade.
A contravention of those two sections was made
punishable. In the first mentioned case only the first
part of the prohibition was challenged and struck down
and in the second case both the provisions were declared invalid. The
learned Attorney-General informed
us that in 29 States m U.S.A. legislation had made
compulsory provision for English as the medium of
instruction. Those statutes do not appear to have
been tested in Court and the Attorney-General cannot,
therefore, derive much comfort from the fact that 29
States have by legislation adopted English as the
medium of instruction. The learned Attorney-General
(1) 262 U.S. 390; 67 Law. Ed. 1042.
(2) 262 U.S. 404; 67 Law. Ed. 1047.
•
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bombay EducaJion
Society and
Others.
Das}.
586
1954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bombay Education
.. Society and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
also relies on the case of Ottawa Separate Schools Trustees v. Mackell('). That case does not help him either,
because in that case the schools were classified as
denominational purely on the ground of religion. They
were not classified according to race or language. It
was contended that the kind of school that the trustees
were authorised to provide was the school where education was to be given in such language as the trustees
thought fit. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee
rejected this contention with the following observations:"Their Lordships are unable to agree with this
view. The 'kind' of school referred to in sub-s. 8 of
s. 79 is, in their opinion, the grade or character
of school, for example, a girls' School,' a boys'
school,' or 'an infants' school,' and a 'kind' of
school, within the meaning of that sub-section, is not
a school where any special language is in common use."
Where, however, ·a minority like the Anglo-India11
Community, which is based, inter alia, on religion and
language, has the fundamental right to conserve its
language, script and culture under"article 29(1) and has
the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice under article 30(1), surely then
there must be implicit in such fundamental right the
right to impart instruction in their own institutions to
the children of their own Community in their own
language. To hold otherwise will be to deprive article
29(1) and article 30(1) of the greater part of their
contents. Such being the fundamental right, the police
power of the State to determine the medium of instruction must yield to this fundamental right to the extent
it is necessary to give effect to it and cannot be permitted to run counter to it.
We now pass on to article 337 which is in Part XVI
under
the heading "Special Provisions relating to
certain classes." Article 337 secures to the AngloIndian · Community certain special grants made by the
Union and by each State in respect of education. The
second paragraph of that article provides for progressive diminution of such gt:>nt until such special grant
(1) L.R. [1q17] A.C. 62.
•
.~
•
I.
•
..
•
S.C.R.
•
\
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
587
ceases at the end of ten years from the commencement
of the Constitution as mentioned in the first proviso to
that article. The second proviso runs as follows :"Provided further that no educational institution
shall be entitled to receive any grant under this article
unless at least forty per cent. of the annual admissions
therein are made available to members of communities
other than the Anglo-Indian community."
lt is clear, therefore, that the Constitution has
imposed upon the educational institution run by the
Anglo-Indian Community, as a condition of such special
grant, the duty that at least 40 per cent. of the annual
admissions therein must be made available to members of communities other than the Anglo-Indian Community. This is undoubtedly a constitutional obligation.
In so far as clause 5 of the impugned order enjoins
that no Primary or Secondary school shall from the
date of this order admit to a class where English is used
as the medium of instruction any pupil other than the
children of Anglo-Indians or of citi~ens of non-Asiatic
descent, it quite clearly prevents the Anglo-Indian
Schools including Barnes High School from performing
their constitutional obligations and exposes them to
the risk or losing the special grant. The learned
Attorney-General refers ·to clause 7 of the impugned
order and suggests that the authorities of Anglo-Indian
Schools may still discharge their constitutional obligations by following the advice given to them in that
concluding clause. The proviso to article 337 does not
impose any obligation on the Anglo-Indian Community
as a condition for receipt of the special grant other than
that at least 40 per cent. of the annual admissions
should 'oe made available to non-Anglo-Indian pupils.
The advice, tendered by the State to the Anglo-Indian
Schools by clause 7 of the impugned order, will, if the
same be followed, necessarily impose an additional
burden on the Anglo-Indian Schools to which they are
not subjected by the Constitution itself. The covering
circular No. SSN 2054(b), which was issued on the
same day, throws out the covert hint of th_!: possibility,
in consequence of the impugned order of some change
becoming necessary in the existing procedure for the
19-87 S. C. India/59
1954
Th< Stat< of
Bombay
v.
&mbay Ed11catio11
Soci.ty and
Othm.
DasJ.
•
588
1
954
The State of
Bombay
v.
Bombay Education
Soriety and
Others.
Das].
[1955 J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
equitable distribution of the total grant among AngloIndian Schools, although the impugned order was not
intended to affect the total grant available for distribution to Anglo-Indian Schools under the Constitution.
If, in the light oi the covering circular. clause 7 is to
be tre:1ted · as operative, in the se11se that a noncomp11ance with it will entail loss of the whole or part
of this grant as. a result of the change in the existing
procedure for
the
equitable distribution, then it
undoubtedly adds to article 337 of the Constitution a
further conJition for the receipt by Anglo-Indian Schools
of the special grant secured to them by that article. On
the other hand if clause 7 is to be treated merely as
ad.vice, which may or may not be accepted or acted
upon, then clause 5 will amount to an absolute prohibition against the admission of pupils who are not AngloIndians or citizens of non-Asiatic descent into AngloIndia11 Schools and will compel the authorities of such
Schools to commit a breach of their Constitutional
obligation under article 337 and thereby forfeit their
constitutional right to the special grants. In either
view of the matter the impugned order cannot but be
regarded as unconstitutional. In our opinion the second
question raised in these appeals must also, in view of
article 337, be answered agaimt the State.
The result of the foregoing discussion is that these
appeals must be dismissed and we order accordingly.
The State must pay the costs of the respondents.
)
-.
-
.'
-
Appeals dismissed.
1
954
May6
AFTAB AHMAD KHAN
"·
THE STATE OF HYDERABAD.
[MmrnERJEA, VIVIAN BosE and
GHULAM
HASAN
JJ.]
Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 233, 235-Scope
of s. 233-Law as to joinder of charges-except;on thereto enacted
jn s. 235-/oint trial of distinct oflc'nceJ.
Section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1398)
embodies the general law as to the joinder of charges and lays
down a rule that for every distinct offence there should Ge a
•
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