MORAN MAR BASSELIOS CATHOLICOS AND ANOTHER versus MOST REV. MAR POULOSE ATHANASIUS AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 May 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 520 | 1954 INSC 72
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 May 1954
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, GHULAM HASAN, B. JAGANNADHADAS
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 193/1952
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 520
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 72
Text of the judgment
520
•954
May 21
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
~
MORAN MAR BASSELIOS CATHOLICOS
AND ANOTHER
ti.
THE MOST REV. MAR POULOSE ATHANASIUS
AND OTHERS.
[S. R. DAS, GHULAM HASAN
,
and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]
Travancoi·e Code of Civil Procedure (Vlll of 1100) s. 87-Review
provisions-Similar to provisions of Order 47, rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Court's misconception of an alleged
concession by advocate of a party-Remedy in such a case-Errorl
apparent on the face of the record-Ejectment suit-Plaintiff's duty
-Travancore Regulation IV of 1099-United State of TravancoreCochin High Court Act V of 1125. s. 25-Constitution of India,
arts. 214, 225-Appeal filed before June, 1949, in Travancore High
Court-Disposal of-By the High Court of Part B State of Travan-
core-Cochin.
The provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure are
similar in terms to Order 47, rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and an application for review is circumscribed by the
definitive limits fixed by the language used therein.
The words "any other sufficient reason" mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule.
It is well settled that in an ejectment suit the plaintiff must
succeed on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness
of the defendant's case.
It is an error apparent on the face of the record if the judgment does not deal effectively and determine an important issue in
the case on which depends the title of the plaintiff and the maintainability of the suit.
To decide against a party on matters which do not come within the issues on which parties went to trial clearly amounts to an
error apparent on the face of the record.
Where the error complained of is that the Court assumed that
a concession had been made when in fact none had been made or
th2.t the Court misconceived the terms of the concession or the
scope and extent of it or the attinide taken up by the party and
has been misled by a misconception of such alleged concession,
such error must be regarded as a sufficient reason analogous to an
error on the face of the record within the meaning of Order 47,
rule I of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Such error will not generally appear on the record and will
have to be brought before the Court by means of an affidavit.
A suit filed in 1938 in the Court of the District Judge at
Kottayam {Travancore) was dismissed. The plaintiff's appeal
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
521
against the decree was allowed by a Full Bench of the High Court
of Travancore. A review application filed by the defendants
against the judgment on the ground that it contained several
mistakes or errors apparent on the face of the record was dismissed by the High Court. The High Court declined to grant a
certificate under article 133. The defendants were granted special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court. Consequent upon
political changes in India culminating in the adoption of the new
Constitution of India, there were changes in the judicial administration in the State of Travancore. Up to the end of June, 1949,
the Travancore High Court Act (Regulation IV of 1099) was in
force in the State of Travancore. Section 11 of the Regulation
provided that the judgments of a Full Bench from the decrees of
District Courts involving certain amount or value of subjectmatter in suits as well as in appeals shall be submitted to the
Maharaja for confirmation by his Sign ManuaL Section 12 of the
Regulation applied as far as may be the provisions of section 11 to
the judgments after review. In May, 1949, came the Covenant of
Merger between the rulers of Travancore and Cochin which, inter
alia, provided for a Rajpramukh. In July, 1949, came Ordinance
II of 1124 repealing Regulation IV of 1099. Clause 25 of the
Ordinance provided that a Full Bench shall hear and decide the
appeals, inter alia, from the decrees of the -District Courts etc.
involving certain amount or value of subject-matter. Clause 26
related to a review of the judgment by a Full Bench. The provisions relating to the jurisdiction and powers of High Court were
substantially reproduced in a later Act (V of 1125) and were continued by articles 214 and 225 of the Constitution of India.
The advocate for the respondents contended in the Supreme
Court that the review application, in view of the changes referred
to above, had become infructuous and should have been dismissed
in limine, because even if the review application were allowed
there would be no authority with jurisdiction and power to
pronounce an effective judgment after hearing the appeal. Again,
this case was not decided by a Full Bench under section 25 of the
Act, and- therefore no review was maintainable under section 26. And
even if the appeal be considered to have been filed under section 11
of Regulation IV of 1099, the application for review must be dealt
with under section 12 of the Regulation and a fresh judgment
after the review would have to be submitted under section 11 to
the Maharaja for confirmation by his Sign Manual; .and the
present Maharaja of Travancore did not possess the power to
consider and to confirm or reject the same.
Held, (repelling the contention) that in view of the change of
the laws if the appeal were revived after the admission of review,
it must be disposed of under section 25 of Act V of 1125 and that
section did not require any confirmation of the judgment passed on
the rehearing of the appeal by the Maharaja or Rajpramukh or
any other authority. Assuming that the appeal, if restored,
1954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius and
Others.
522
1954
ll1oran Mar
Basstlios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Alha11asius and
Othv.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
would be governed by section 12 of Regulation IV of 1099, even
then section 11 would have to be applied only "as far as may be,.
and the portion of the section 11 requiring confirmation by the
Maharaja, \vould be inapplicable in view of the events that had
happened.
Chhajju Ram v. Neki (49 I.A. 144), Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v.
Parath Nath (61 I.A. 378), Hari Shankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter
(1'1949] F.C.R. 36), Sha Mulchand & Co. Ltd. v. /awahar Mills Ltd.
([1953] S.C.R. 351) ), Reg v. Pestanji Dinsha and Another (10 Born.
H.C.R. 75), Madhu Sudan Chowdhri v. Musammat Chandrabati
Chowdhmni ( (1917) 21 C.W.N. 897) ), Rekhanti Chinna Govinda
Chettiyar v. S. Varadappa Chettiyar (A.LR. 1940 Mad. 17), and
Rex v. Northu111berland Con1pensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex Porte
Shaw ([1952] 2 K.B. 338)) referred to.
The facts leading up to the appeal, as summarised from the
are as follows. There were t\vo rival sections of the
Malankara Jacobite Syrian c.hristian co1nmunity in Malabar, who
can1e to he represented by the appellants and respondents respectively. Certain disputes had arisen bet\veen the two sections;
and each clain1ed the right to possess and administer the Church
properties to the exclusion Qf the other.
Judg1nent,
In 1938, a suit 'vas filed in the District Court of Kottayam by
the first and second respondents against the first and second
appellants. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants had committed acts of heresy and became ipso facto alien to the Malankara Ja·
cobite Syrian Church. They were, therefore, "disqualified and unfit
to be the trustees of or to hold any other position in, or enjoy any
benefit from, the Jacobite Syrian Church" (para 26 of the plaint).
The District Judge, who heard the suit, held, by his judgment
delivered on the 18th January, 1943, amongst other things, that
the acts and conduct in1puted to the defendants did not amount to
heresy or schis1n, or to voluntary separation fron1 the Church,
and that in any event, according to Canon Law, there could be no
i'pso facto going out of the Church in the absence of a decision of
an ecclesiastical authority properly arrived at. The conclusion
arrived at by the District Judge was that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to tnaintain the suit, \vhich was, therefore, dismissed.
Being aggrieved by the trial Court's dis1nissal of the -suit, the
plaintiffs appealed to the High Court of Travancore. The appeal
was heard by a Full Bench of the High Court, consisting of three
Judges, one of whom expressed a dissenting view. On the 8th of
August, 1946, the High Court held, by a majority that the defendants had repudiated the fundamental principles and tenets of
the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church and had established a new
Church and had thereby voluntarily separated from, and ceased to
be members of, the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church. The
majority held that the plaintiffs and been validly elected as
trustees and as such were entitled to posscsiion of the Church
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
523
properties. The appeal was accordingly allowed and a decree was
passed for possession and other reliefs in favour of the plaintiffs.
t954
Moran Mar
Basselios
On the 22nd August, 1946, the defendants. filed a petition for
Catholicos and
review of the High Court"s judgment on the ground that it containAnother
ed several mistakes or errors apparent on the face of the record
V1
The ivfost Rev.
and that in any event there were sufficient reasons for the rehearMar
Poulose
ing of the appeal. The application for review was ultimately dealt
' Athanasius and
with by the High Court on merits on the 21st of December, 1951.
Others.
The Court hearing the review rejected all the points urged in
favour of review and dismissed the application, holding that there
was no error apparent on the face of the record and that there
were not sufficient reasons for the rehearing of the appeal.
...
~
•
The High Court declined to grant leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court under article 133 of the Constitution, whereupon
the ddcnclants applied for, and on the 14th April, 1952, obtained,
special ieave of the Supreme Court to prefer an appeal against the
• • High Court's decision.
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil
Appeal
No. 193 of 1952.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment dated
the 21st December, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature
of Travancore-Cochin arising out of the
Judgment and Decree dated the 18th January, 1943,
of the Court of District Judge, Kottayam .
N. P. Engineer (I'. N. Bhagwati, M. Abraham and
i"V. S. K. Sastri, with him) for the appellants.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, C. K.
Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, and K. P.
A/zraham (T. R. Balakrishna Aiyar and M. R. Krishna
Pillai, with them) for respondent No. 2.
1954. May 21. The Judgment of the Court was
• delivered by
DAs J.-(After stating the circumstances which gave
rise to the present litigation, and the facts of the case,
a brief summary of which is given above, His Lordship
proceeJed as follows).
It will be convenic:nt at this stage to discuss arid
deal with a preliminary point raised by the learned
Attorney-General appearing for the plaintiffs respondents. In order to appreciate and deal with the point
so raised it will be necessary to take note of the changed
conditions that had been brought about in the
JS
87 S. C. India/59
524
1954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
A.thanasius and
OtherJ
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
matter of the judicial administration in the State by
the recent political changes culminating in the adoption
of the new Constitution of India. It will be recalled
that the present review application was made on the
22nd August, 1946, and a notice to show cause was
issued on the 4th December, 1947. The preliminary
question as to the maintainability of the review application was decided on the 29th June, 1949. During all
this period Regulation IV of 1099 was in force in the
State of Travancore. Section 11, omitting the explanations which are not material for our present purpose,
and section 12 of that Regulation provided as follows :
"11. (1) A Full Bench shall hear and decide all
appeals from the decrees of the District Courts in suits
in which the amount or value of the subject-matter. is
not less than five thousand rupees and the amount or
value of the matter in appeal is not less than that sum.
The judgment of the Full Bench or the judgment of the
majority, if there be difference of opinion, together with
the records of the case, shall be submitted to us in order
that the judgment may be confirmed by Our Sign
Manual.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the provisions of
the Civil Procedure Code, the date of the decree shall
be the date on which the judgment is declared in open
Court after being confirmed by Our Sign Manual.
Explanation I. ................... .
(a) ................... .
(b) ................... .
(c) ................... .
Explanation II. ................... .
12. In cases decided under section 11 of this
Regulation a Full Bench of the High Court may admit
a review of judgment subject to the provisions of the
Cotle of Civil Procedure. If, on review, a fresh judgment be passed,, the provisions of section 11 shall, as
far as may be, apply."
It will be seen that under section 12 if a fresh judgment be passed then the provisions of section 11 shall,
as far as possible, apply, that is to say, the judgment
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
525
shall have to be submitted to the Maharaja for
-confirmation by his Sign Manual and the judgment so
confirmed shall have to be declared in open Court after
such confirmation. This was the position until the end
of June, 1949. In the meantime on the 29th May, 1949,
came the Covenant of merger between the Rulers of
Travancore and Cochin with the concurrence and
guarantee of the then Governor-General of India for
the formation as from the 1st July, 1949, of the United
State of Travancore and Cochin with a common
Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. Article III
provided that as from the appointed day (i.e., 1st July,
1949) all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to
the Ruler of either of the covenanting States which
appertained or were incidental to the Government of
that State would vest in the United State. Article IV
enjoined that there should be a Rajpramukh of the
United State, the then Ruler of Travancore being the
first Rajpramukh during his lifetime. Broadly speaking, articles VI and XI vested the executive and
legislative authority of the United State in the
Rajpramukh subject to the conditions and for the
period therein spe.cified. Article XXI preserved the
power of the Rulers to suspend, remit or commute
death sentences. In exercise of the powers conferred
on him by article XI of the Covenant the Rajpramukh
on the 1st July, 1949, promulgated Ordinance No. I of
1124. Clause 3 of that Ordinance continued in force
for that portion of the territories of the United State
which formerly formed the territory of the State of
Travancore all existing laws until altered, amended
or repealed. Similar provision was made in clause 4
for the continuance of Cochin laws for that part of
the United State which formerly formed the State of
Cochin. On the 7th July, 1949, however, came
Ordinance No. II of 1124. Clause 4 of this Ordinance
repealed the Travancore High Court Act (Regulation
IV of 1099). The relevant part of clause 8 which is
important for the purpose of the present discussion
was in the terms following :
"8. All proceedings commenced prior to the
coming into force of , this Ordinance in either of the
1954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos and
Another•
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
•
526
1954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos and
-.Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poufo"se
Athanasius
Others.
Das].
and
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
High Courts of Travancore and Cochin, hereinafter in
this Ordinance referred to as the existing High Courts,
shall be continued and depend in the High Court as if
they had commenced in the High Court after such
date . ................. "
The jurisdiction and powers of the High Court were
defined thus :
"18. Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance,
the High Court shall have and exercise all the jurisdiction and powers vested in it by this and any other
Ordinance and under any law which may hereafter
come into force and any power or jurisdiction vested
in the existing High Courts by any Act or Proclamation
in force in the States of Travancore and Cochin
immediately prior to the con:iing into force of this
Ordinance.
Clause 25 leaving out the two Explanations which
are nor material for our present purpose and clause 26
ran as follows :"25. A Full Bench shall hear and decide all appeals
from the decrees of the District Courts or the Court of
a Subordinate Judge or of a Single Judge of the High
Court i·n Suits in which the amount or value of the
subject-matter is not less than five thousand rupees
and the amount or value of the matter in appeal is not
less than that sum.
Explanation I. ................. .
Explanation II ................. .
26. In cases decided under section ZS of this
Ordinance, a Full Bench of the High Court may admit
a review of judgment subject to the provisions of the
Travancore and Cochin Codes of Civil Procedure."
Clauses 18, 25 and 26 have been substantially reproduced in sections 18(1), 25 and 26 of the United
State of Travancore and Cochin High Court Act 1125
(Act No. V of 1125) which repealed, amongst other
things, Regulation IV of 1099 and Ordinance II of 1124.
Then came the Constitution of India in 1950 which
created a union of several States grouped in Parts A,
B and C by the First Schedule. · The United State of
Travancore-Cochin became one 'of th~ Part B St2tes.
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S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
527
Under article 214 the High Court of the United State
of Travancore and Cochin became the High Court of
the Part B State of Travancore-Cochin and article 225
<:ontinued the jurisdiction of and the laws administered
in the then existing High Court.
The contention of the learned Attorney-General is
that in view of the changes referred to above which had
the effect of setting up a common High Court for the
United State of Travancore and Cochin with jurisdiction and power defined therein, the review application
has become infructuous, for, even if it be allowed,
there will be no authority which will have jurisdiction
and power to pronounce an effective judgment after
rehearing the appeal. It is pointed out that a review
may be admitted under section 26 of the United State
of Travancore and Cochin High Court Act, 1125, oniy
in cases decided under section 25 of the Act. This
case was not decided by a Full Bench under section 25
of the Act and, therefore, no review is maintainable
under section 26. Further, if it be held that the appeal
having been filed under section 11 of the Travancore
High Court Regulation (IV of 1099), the application
for review must be dealt with under section 12 of that
Regulation then, says the Attorney-General, if after
the review is admitted a fresh judgment has to be
passed after rehearing the appeal the provisions of
section 11 would have to be complied with, namely,
the fresh judgment will, under section 11, have to be
submitted to the Maharaja to be confirmed by his Sign
Manual and the decree will have to be dated as of the
date on which the judgment will be declared in open
Court after such confirmation. It is pointed out that
the Maharaja of Travancore no longer possesses the
power to consider and to confirm or reject judicial decisions and it is submitted that such being the position
in law the review application had become infructuous
.and should have been dismissed by the Full Bench in
.limine. In our opinion, this contention is not wellfounded. The application for review was properly
made to the Travancore High Court and the Travancore
High Court had to decide whether to admit or to reject
the application. The judgment to be pronounced on
1954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catkolicos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poluo!e
Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
528
1954
Moran
Mar
Basselios
Catholicos and
Attother
V,
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius
Others.
Das].
and
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
the application for review did not require, under any
provision of law to which our attention has been drawn,
to be confirmed by the Maharaja or any other authority.
It was a proceeding properly instituted and was pending on the 1st July, 1949, and consequently under
section 8 of Ordinance No. II of 1124 had to be continued in the High Court of the United State as if it
had commenced · in the said High Court after the
coming into force of the said Ordinance. In this case,
the application for review was rejected by the High
Court. If, however, the High Court had admitted the
review then such admission would have had the effect
of reviving the original appeal whicI'. was properly
filed in the Travancore High Court under section 11 of
the Travancore High Court Regulation (IV of 1099).
That appeal, so revived, having been commenced prior
to the coming into force of Ordinance No. II of 1124
would, under section 8 of that Ordinance, have had to
be continued in the High Court of the United State as
if it had commenced in that High Court after such
date. The position will be the same if on this appeal
this Court now admits the review, for, upon such
admission the appeal filed in the Travancore High
Court will be revived and then, having been commenced
in the Travancore High Court and continued in the
High Court of the United State by virtue of section 8
of Ordinance No. II of 1124 the appeal so revived will,
under section 8 of the Act of 1125, have to be continued
in that High Court as if it had commenced in that
High Court after the coming into force of that Act. In
other words, the old appeal, if restored by this Court
on this appeal, will, by the combined operation of
section 8 of Ordinance II of 1124 and section 8 of the
Act of 1125, be an appeal pending in the High Court
of the United State. Under our present Constitution
Travancore-Cochin has become a Part B State and
under article 214 the High Court of the United State
of Travancore-Cochin has become the High Court of
the Part B State of Travancore-Cochin and shall have
the jurisdiction to exercise all the jurisdiction of and
administer the law administered by the High Court of
the United State. Such appeal must, accordingly, be
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S.£.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
529
·. disposed of under section 25 of the last mentioned Act.
That section does not require any confirmation of the
judgment passed on the rehearing of the appeal by the
Maharaja or Rajpramukh or any other authority.
Assuming, however, that the appeal, if restored, will
have to be governed by section 12 of the Travancore
High
Court Regulation (IV of 1099) even then
the provisions of section 11 would have to be
applied "as far as may be" and it may well be suggested that the portion of section 11 which requires the
confirmation by the Maharaja will, in the events that
have happened, be inapplicable.
In our opinion,
therefore, the preliminary
objection cannot prevail
and must be rejected.
Before going into the merits of the case it is as well
to bear in mind the scope of the application for review
which has given rise to the present appeal. It is
needless to emphasise that the scope of an application
for review is much more restricted than that of an
appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code
of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order
XLVII, rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the
Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language
used therein. It may allow a review on three specified
grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or
could not be produced by him at the time when the
decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on
the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient
reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee
that the words "any other sufficient reason" must
mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule." See Chhajju Ram v.
Neki(1). This conclusion was reiterated 'by the Judicial
Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath( 2 )
and was adopted by our Federal Court in Hari Shankar
Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter( 3 ). Learned counsel appearing
in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid
(1) L.R. 49 I.A. 144.
!21 L. R. 61 I. A. 378.
(3) [1949] F.C.R. 36 at pp. 47-48·
1954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most R1u.
Mar PouloSI
Athanasius and
·others.
Das].
•
530
1954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Ctitholicos and
Another
v.
T !IA Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19i5]
limitations and submits that his case comes within the
ground of "mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record" or some ground analogous thereto. As alre.£1dy
observed, out of the 99 objections taken in the grounds
of review to the judgment of the majority of the High
Court only 15 objections were urged before the High
Court on the hearing of the application for review.
Although most of those points have been referred to by
learned counsel for the appelbnts, '1e mainly stre>.sed
three of them before us. Vie n'ow proceed to examine
these objections.
The first objection relates to the validity of the
election of the first plaintiff as the Malankara Metropolitan and as such the ex officio trustee and the
"lections of plaintiffs 2 and 3 as his co-trustees at the
Karingasserai meeting. This meeting is pleaded m
paragraphs 13 and 14 of the plaint. In paragraph 18 ·
of the plaint the plaintiffs refer to the meeting said to
have been held at the M. D. Seminary in December,
1934, on which the defendants rely, the plaintiffs'
contention being that that meeting was not convened
by competent persons nor after due notice to all the
churches according to custom. In paragraph 20 of
their written statement the defendants deny the factum
or the validity of the Karingasserai meeting relied
upon by the plaintiffs. They contend that that meeting
was not convened by competent persons nor was
invitation sent to the large majority of the churches.
In paragraph 29 the defendants rupudiate the ailegations pleaded in paragraph 18 of the plaint and
maintain that their meeting was convened properly and
upon notice to all the churches in Malankara. In
paragraphs 16 and 18 of their replication the plaintiffs
reiterate the allegations in the plaint. Issue 1(b)
raises the question of validity of the Karingasserai
meeting of August, 1935, and issue 6(a) raises the
question of the validity of the M. D. Seminary meeting
of December, 1934. As the suit is for possession of the
church properties the plaintiffs, in order to succeed,
must establish their title as trustees and this they can
only do by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge
the onus that is on them under issue 1(b) irrespective
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531
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·s.C.R.
.cf whether the defendants have proved the validity of
their meeting, for it is well established that the plaintiff
in ejectment must succeed on the strength of his own
title. It will be noticed that the defendants' objection
to the Karingasserai meeting was two-fold, (i) that the
meeting had not been convened by competent persons
and (ii) that notice had not been given to all the
churches. The District Judge in paragraph 164 of the
judgment held, for reasons stated by him, that that
meeting had not been convened by competent persons
and in paragraph 165 he found that notice of the
said meeting had not been given to all the churches.
It having been conceded by the plaintiffs' advocate at
the time of the final argument before the District
Judge that there· is no evidence on the plaintiffs' side
to prove that all the churches in existence prior to
1086 had been issued notices, the position was taken
up that in the view of the plaintiffs' party the defendants and their partisans by adopting the new constitution Ex. AM had become aliens to the Church and as
such were not entitled to be invited to that meeting.
Their argument was that Karingasserai meeting was
·only a meeting of the representatives of those churches
which stood by the Patriarch Abdulla II and the
succeeding Patriarchs and as the defendants and their
partisans had become aliens to the Church no notice
to them was necessary. This argument clearly amounted
to an admission that no notice was sent to the churches
on the defendants' side .. The District Judge having held,
contrary to the submission of the plaintiffs, that the
-defendants and their partisans had not gone out of the
Church it followed, according to him, that they were
entitled to notice and as it was not proved that notices
were sent to them but on the contrary as it was contended that no notice was necessary to be sent to them
the District Judge felt it to be quite clear that the said
meeting was not duly convened. In this view of the
matter it was not necessary for the learned District
Judge to go further into the matter and enquire
whether notices had been given to churches which had
not adopted the new constitution Ex. AM.
Coming to the judgment of the High Court it appears
<that the majority of the Judges dealt with the question
1954
Maran Ma
Basselios
Catholuos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius aud
Others
Das J.
532
1954
MorariMar
Basstlios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Pou/ose
Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
of the validity of the meeting in a superficial and
summary manner. Nokes J. said :"The lower Court held that the meeting was not
duly convened, mainly because notice was not given to
the defendants' party (judgment paragraphs 166, 167).
The want of notice was not disputed, but was justified
in accordance with the Patriarchal monition (Exhibit
Z). In view of the conclusion stated above, that the
adoption of the new constitution was clear evidence of
the defendants' repudiation of the Patriarchs' church,
and of the fact that the adoption took place in 1934
about 8 months earlier than the meeting at ·Karingasserai, the want of notice was justifiable apart from
the monition. The lower Court's conclusion that the
meeting formed only a minority of the church is thus
erroneous as is the conclusion (judgment, par.agraphs
164, 167) that the meeting was not convened. by
competent persons."
Mr. Justice Sathyanesan simply observed :
'The only defect pointed out was that no invitation of the meeting was given to the churches under the
control of 1st defendant. The short answer to this is
that having already become members of a new Church,
they were not entitled to any invitation and were
rightly ignored."
It thus appears that the question as to the competency of the persons who convened the Karingasserai
meeting was disposed of by Nokes J. in one single
sentence at the end of the paragraph quoted above ..
The learned Judge does not appear to have seriously
applied his mind at all to the question of the competency of the conveners of that meeting. Sathyanesan J.
did not deal with the question and thought, quite
wrongly, that the only question raised by the defend-ants was as to whether notice was given to the
churches under the control of the defendants. It is.
pointed out by the learned Attorney-General that the·
judgment of Sathyanesan · J. was only a supplementary
judgment, for he prefaced his judgment with the
observation that he entirely agreed with the findings:
of Nokes J. This argument might have had some force
...
·;
•
.,
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
533
if Nokes J. had dealt with the point. The position,
t
-
therefore, is that neither of the Judges applied his mind
to the question of the competency of the persons who
had convened the Karingasserai meeting. As to service
of the notice on all churches, Nokes J. in the passage
quoted above held that the defendants had gone out
of the Church by reason of their adoption of the new
constitution Ex. AM. and that consequently no notice
was due to them. Sathyanesan J. also in the passage
quoted above took the view that the defendants having
become members of a new church the defendants were
not entitled to any invitation to the Karingasserai meeting. The learned Judges having reversed the finding of
the District Judge and held that the dekndants had
gone out of the Church by adopting the new constitution Ex. AM. it became incumbent on them to enquire
whether all churches not on the plaintiff's side had
adopted Ex. AM. and if not whether such of them
who had not adopted Ex. AM. had been summoned
to the meeting. It may be noted in this context that
the learned Judges of the High Court in their judgment
seem to indicate that the churches which adopted Ex. AM. did so by participation at the M. D.
Seminary meeting. Reference has been made in the
arguments to the various figures set out in the judgment of the District Judge as to the number of
Churches which according to the evidence had attended
the meeting. It is not clear how many out of 310
churches claimed by the defendants to have been
completely on their side according to Ex. 272 had
attended tl1e M. D. Seminary meeting and formally
adopted the new constitution the Ex. AM. If ad0ption of the Ex. AM. is the test for determining
whether notice is due or not, then it becomes important to consider whether all the chu'.ches which
were not with the plaintiffs but who had not adopted Ex. AM. had been served. Apart from the question of the service of the notice there was also the
question as to the competency of the persons who
had convened the Karingasserai meeting where the
plaintiffs are said to have been elected. While Mar
Geeverghese Dionysius was alive he, as President
r954
Moran Mar
Basseilios
Catholicos and'
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius and:
Others.
Das].
534
'.~54
Moran Mar
Basselios
C athfllicos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Jtt/ianasius and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
of the Malankara Association, used to convene the
meetings of the Association. vVho, after his death,
was competent to issue notice of meeting ? There
appear to be no rules on the subject. In this situation, says the learned Attorney-General, if all the
members of the Association attended the meeting the
defect of want of proper notice does not matter. But
did all members attend, even if the defendants'
party who had adopted Ex. AM be left out ? It does
not appear that either of the two majority Judges of
the High Court adverted to either of these aspects of
the matter, namely, service of notice to all churches
and competency of the persons who issued the notice of
the Karingasserai meeting and in any case did not come
to a definite finding on that question. The majority
judgments, therefore, are defective on the face of them
in that they did not effectively deal with and determine
an important issue in the case on which depends the
title of the plaintiffs and the maintainability of the
suit. This, in our opinion, is certainly an error
apparent on the face of the record.
The next point urged by learned counsel appearing
for the appellants is that the majority decision proceeds
on a misconception as to a concession said to have been
made by the defendants' advocate. It will be recalled
that issues Nos. 14 and 1'.' quoted above raise the
question of the defendants having gone out of the
Church, for having committed acts of heresy or having
voluntarily given up their allegiance to the ancient
Jacoc:te Syrian Church and establishing a new church
and framing a constitution for the same. Likewise,
issues Nos. 19 and 20 raise the question as to whethe.r
the plaintiffs and their partisans formed themselves
into a new church and separated from the old Church
by reason of the several acts and claims therein referred to. Here again the suit being one in ejectment it
is more important for the plaintiffs to establish their
own title by getting issues 19 and 20 decided in
their favour than to destroy the defendants' title
by getting issues 14 and 15 decided against the
.defendants, for a mere destruction of the defendants'
title, in the absence of establishments of their own title
.;.•
-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
535
carnes the plaintiffs nowhere. It is to be remembered
that this is a suit by the plain tiffs as the valid! y constituted trustees and not a suit under the section
analogous to section 92, Civil Procedure Code, for
removal of defendants from trusteeship or for the
framing of a scheme. In paragraph 132 of his judgment the learned District Judge found that the acts
and claims imputed to the defendants did not amount
to heresy and did not make the defendants or their
partisans heretics or aliens to the faith and that
·such acts and conduct mentioned in issue 15, even if
proved, would· not amount to heresy and would not
amount to a voluntary giving up of their allegiance to
or secession from the ancient Jacobite Church. On the
other hand, in paragraph 133 the District Judge held
that the plaintiffs and their adherents by taking up
the 'position which they adopted in 1085 and which
they had persistently maintained till then had unlawfully and unjustifiably created a split in the Malankara
Church and might in a sense be said to have pursued a
course of conduct amounting to persistent schism. He
held that, nevertheless, the plaintiffs and their parti~
sans had not become aliens to the Church or created
or formed themselves into a separate church as they
had not been found guilty and punished ~with the
removal from the Church or excommunication from
t'.1e Church by a proper ecclesiastical authority. It
will be noticed that the learned District Judge found
the facts imputed to the defendants not proved but the
facts imputed to the plaintiffs to have been proved.
He made no difference between acts of heresy and
merely voluntary separation from the Church but
treated them on the same footing. It will be recalled
that m the interpleader suit of 1913 the District
Judge had held that by accepting Abdul Messiah
as their ecclesiastical head or by denying the authority of Abdulla II, Mar Geeverghese Dionysius an<l
his co-trustees had not become aliens to the faith.
Finally, in the judgment on rehearing of the appeal
reported in 45 T.L.R. 116 from which passages have
been quoted above the acts imputed to the defendants
in that r.:ne which are similar to those imputed to the
1 954
Maran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos amt
Another
v,
The Must Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius amt
Others.
Das].
536
1954
Moran Mar
)Basselios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
..Athanasius and
Othtrs.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
defendants in the present case, with the exception of
the adoption of Ex. AM, were held not to amount
to a voluntary separation from church by the establishment of a new church and that the Free Church case( 1 )
had no application to the facts of that case. Likewise,
in the present case the District Judge dealt with issues
15, 16, 19 and 20 together, which covered issues on
both heresy and voluntary separation. Presumably
in view of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the
previous suit the learned District Judge in this case did
not make any distinction between acts of heresy and
voluntary separation from the Church ·and held that
there was "no case of ipso facto heresy or ipso facto loss
of membership of the Church or ipso facto loss of
status as Priest and prelates for ecclesiastical offences
unless the offenders were tried and punished by a competent authority." Indeed, the evidence of P.W. 17,
the Pope's delegate, is claimed as supporting this view.
It is in the light of this situation that the question as
to the misconception of the concession has to be considered. Sathyanesan J. in paragraph 4 of his judgment,
referred to the concession said to have been made by
the learned advocate for the defendants in the following terms:" ............ However the learned advocate for the
respondents clarified the situation by very fairly conceding that plaintiffs had not left the church and that
they were as good members of the original Jacobite
Syrian Church as anybody else. Another clarification
has been made by the learned advocate for the appellants that the plaintiffs, whatever might have happened in the past, do not hold that the Patriarch can at
all interfere in the internal administration of the
Malankara trust properties. Plaintiffs seem to have
made their . position clear even at the time of pleadings.
According to them, 'The Patriarch as the ecclesiastical head of the Malankara Church could exercise that
authority by awarding such spiritual punishment as he
thinks fit in cases of mismanagement or misappropriation of church properties'-Vide pleading No. 124(1).
The concession made by the learned advocate for the
(1) L.R.[1904] A.C. 515.
..,. .
'
>'
..
-
...,.
•
-
•
•
,.
'(
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
defendants has obviated the necessity of a lengthy
discussion of several matters. So it is worth pausing
a while and understanding the importance and the
implications of the concessions. It tends to mean( i) that the Patriarch is not an alien to the Church,
i.e., the Patriarch and his predecessors in question are
the true and lawful head of the original Jacobite Syrian
Church,
(ii) that the plaintiffs and their partisans, holding
that
(a) the Patriarch has only a ·spiritual supervision of the administration of the trust properties by
the trustees,
(b) the Patriarch alone can consecrate Morone,
( c) that Exhibit BP is the true Canon of the
Jacobite Church, and
properly esta( d) that the Catholicate was not
blished, cannot, on these grounds, be considered to
have become aliens to the original church.
So the question is more properly whether the defendants have seceded from the original church and
formed a new church. In the nature of the suit, the
plaintiffs can succeed only if they make out,
(A) that the defendants are using the trust
properties belonging to Malankara Jacobite Church
for the maintenance, support and benefit of another
and a different body, namely Malankara Orthodox
Syrian Church, and
(B) that the plaintiffs are the duly elected
trustees."
Likewise, Nokes J. at pp. 355-356 referred to the
concession as follows :" .......... In this court the defendants' advocate
did not seek to disturb the finding that the plaintiffs
had not become aliens to the church. Indeed, as
previously stated, he based his case on the ground
that both parties were still within the church. This
abandonment of his clients' contention in the lower
court was no doubt due to the fact that the written
statement inv9lved an admission of the plaintiffs'
1954
Moran Mar
Basseli.os
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius and
Others.
Da.rJ.
538
r954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most &v.
Mar Poulose
Athanascus and
Others.
Das],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
,
[1955!
,
:
case ; for the plaintiffs in effect said, we are the
trustees of the Patriarch's church,' while the defendants said, 'we are the trustees of a church to which
the Patriarch is an alien.' Nor was any attempt made
here on behalf of the defendants to challenge the
finding that the trust had not become altered ; for
any contention to the contrary provided no defence
and was a further admission of the 'plaintiff's case.
But the existence of this allegation on the pleadings
serves to emphasise the defendants' attitude to the
~
•..__
•
I
trust."
Further down the learned Judge said :" .... The learned Judge held against the general
allegation of separation (judgment, paragraph 133),
but in favour of the special allegation as to the plaintiffs' view on temporalities (paragraph 108). He aiso
recorded findings as to the limited scope of the
Patriarch's powers in temporal affairs (paragraphs 58,
60), which seem to be based on the erroneous view
inter alia that persons who are subject to two .systems
of law are amenable for different -aspects of the same
offence only to punishment under one system (see
paragraph 57). The general finding was challenged in
the memorandum of objection (grounds 10 and 11 ),·
but not in the argument for the defendants here, which,
as previously stated, proceeded on the basis that both
sides were still members of the church."
On a plain reading of the two judgment; it appears
that the majority Judges took the view that even if,
as held by the District Judge, the plaintiffs had been
guilty of acts and conduct imputed to them it was not
necessary for them to enquire whether those acts were
mere heresy or also amounted to a settinv, up of a new
church or whether the Canon law requirinv. the verdict
of an ecclesiastical authority applied to both or only
to acts of heresy. This attitude they adopted simply
because of what they u:1derstc::~ iv~s the concession
made by the defendants' advocate, namely, that the
plaintiffs had L>t gone out of the church. They, however, felt bound, notwithstanding the contention of
the defendants that they were also, for similar reasons,
'
I
I
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
539
within the church, to consider whether the defendants had voluntarily gone out of the church by setting
up a new church as evidenced by their aforesaid acts.
Learned counsel for the appellants contends, and we
think there is a good deal of force in such contention,
that the majority Judges do not appear to have
examined the question or considered whether voluntarily going out of the church was a concept separate
and distinct from acts of heresy and if so whether the
acts and conduct imputed to the plaintiffs apart from
being acts of heresy from an ecclesiastical point of
view, amounted also to voluntarily going out of the
church by establishing a new church. Nor do they
appear to have considered whether the Canon law
requiring verdict of an ecclesiastical authority was
req u1red in both cases. There can be no doubt, therefore, on the face of the judgment, that the decision of
the learned Judges in this behalf proceeds on what
they considered was a concession made by the defendants' advocate that the plaintiffs had not gone out of
the church. Learned counsel for the defendants
appellants contends that this was a misapprehension
and he relies on the affidavit of Sri E. J. Philipose,
advocate, with which were produced two
letters
written to him by the senior advocate. In the first
letter it is stated as follows :"I argued at length of the misconduct of the
plaintiffs in going against the basic conditions of the
Royal Courts' judgment and said that while the conduct· of each party is open to examination neither
could be said to have left the church. Their acts may
be set aside in both cases but they cannot be said to
have left the church. The Judges cannot accept it in
one case as a concession and in the other case as my
submission. Deciding one part of it as a concession
not requiring the decision of Court is unjust to my
lengthy argument on the misconduct of the plaintiffs
in regard to their diversion of property from the trust."
I 11 the second letter we find the following passages :"Throughout my argument was that the plaintiffs
had steadily and consistently set at naught the
16-87 S. C India/59
1954
Moran Ma
Basselios
Catholicos and
Another
V,
The Most Reo.
Mar Poulos.
Athanasius ~nd
Others.
Das].
540
•954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
Thi Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
fundamental principles of the charity as settled in the
judgments of the Royal Court and the Cochin Court.
As between the charge and counter charge · of
violation of the foundation rules, I expressed it as my
view that while their views may be corrected by the
Court neither party should be treated as having
become aliens to the church by reason merely of erroneous views. That is what is explained in paragraph
17 of the grounds. My opinion so expressed is not to
be treated as a concession of the one case and a
submission as to the other. If my view of the law was
not acceptable the learned Judges must decide and not
treat one part of a connected statement as a concession
not requiri1w to be considered by the Court."
In the review petition ground No. 17 is as follows :-
"Their Lordships' observation that the defend·
ants' ' Advocate based his case on the ground that
both parties were still within the Church and that the
.defendants'
Advocate conceded that the plaintiffs
have not left the church and that they were as good
members of the original Jacobite Syrian Church as
anybody else is inaccurate and
incomplete,
and
• misleading. The Advocate devoted a great part of the
argument to showing that the plaintiffs have departed
from the constitution as settled by the Royal Court
Judgment. The plaintiffs stated that the defendants
have left the Church. In reply the argument was
that there is no such thing as ipso facto secession
merely because of differences of views on the powers
of the Patriarch or about .the Canon to be followed.
It was in that sense and in that sense only that the
.:irgument was advanced that in law it must be taken
that both parties were within the Church. The Judges
were not justified in taking it out of its setting and
using part of it as an admission in support of the
plaintiffs and rejecting the other portion as a mere
argument not sustainable in law so far as the defendants are concerned. If it should be treated as an
admission at all it must have been accepted or rejected
as a whole. It must not have been torn piecemeal
and part used and part rejected.
'
-
-
-\
'
.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
541
The reasons assigned for concluding that the defend.ants have gone out of the Church apply even more
strongly to the plaintiffs and the Judges should have
·dismissed the suit in limine.
Their Lordships failed to note that the basic
·Constitution of the Church had been laid down by the
Royal Court Judgment and the plaintiffs by disownmg and repudiating it had really seceded from it.
If the view of the court was that departure from
the rules of the foundation put the parties out of the
·Church it should apply alike to both the parties and
the statement that neither party had gone out of the
Church cannot be used to sustain the plaintiffs' right
and at the same time rejected as untenable to support
the precisely similar rights of the defendants.
•
Their Lordships failed to note that the defendants'
Advocate strongly urged that it was necessary to have
the charges framed, enquiry held and due and proper
grounds made out before a person can be put out of .
the Church and there was not even a whisper of it as
having been complied with ih this case.
Their Lordships also failed to note that there can be
no such thing as an entire body of persons against whom
nothing was alleged or proved being held to have gone
·out of the Church.
Their Lordships failed to note that the so-called
admission did not m any way affect the defendants'
case that the Patriarch and the plaintiffs and their
partisans have voluntarily left the Church and had
thereby ceased to be members thereof."
Learned Attorney-General strongly objects to any
reference being made to the facts contained in the
-affidavit of E.J. Philipose or the letters produced along
with it and he refers us to the decision of this Court in
Sha Mulchand & Co. Ltd. v. fawahar Mills Ltd.(1 ), and
the cases therein referred to and to the case of Reg. v
Pestanji Dinsha and Another( 2 ). It will, however, be
noticed that what was deprecated in that case was the
fact that no affidavit had been filed before the trial
Court for the rectification of what, in the appeal Court,
(I) [1953] S.C.R. 351 at p. 366.
(2) 10 Born. H.C.R. 75 .
Moran Mar
Basse/ios
Catholicos and
Anoth<r
v.
The Most Rev,
Mar Poulos•
Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
542
1954
MManMar
Basselios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most &v.
Mar Poulose
A.thanasius and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
' .._ •
was alleged to have been wrongly recorded by the trial
Judge. The Privy Council in Madhu Sudan CltoflJdri
v. Musammat Chandrabati Chowdhrain( 1 ) also suggested
that the proper procedure was to move the Court in
whose judgment the error is alleged to have crept in.
'
In this case, as already stated, an affidavit was filed
before the appeal Court itself while the Chief Justice ~
and Nokes J. were still in office. Further, if, as laid
down in the judgment of this Court to which reference
has been made, the proper procedure is to apply to the
Court whose judgment is said to be founded on a misconception as to the concession made by the learn~d
Advocate appearing before it, by what procedure,
unless it be by way of review, could that Court be moved i' -1#
Indeed, the Madras case referred to in the judgment •· ·
of this Court freely indicates that the applicatiop
should be by way of review. Patanjali. Sastri J. (as he
then was) sitting singly in the Madras High Court
definitely took the view in Rekhanti Chinna Govinda
Chettiyar v. S. Varadappa Chettiar(') that a misconception by the Court of a concession made by the Advocate or of the attitude taken up by the party appears
to be a ground analogous to the grounds set forth in '·r
the first part of the review section and affords a good
and cogent ground for review. The learned AttorneyGeneral contends that this affidavit and the letters
accompanying it cannot be said to be part of "the
record" within the meaning of Order 47, rule 1. We
see no reason to construe the word "record" in the
very restricted sense as was done by Denning L.J. in
.(;.
Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ~
Ex Parte Shaw(') which was a case of certiorari and
include within that term only the document which
initiates the proceedings, the pleadings and the adjudication and exclude the evidence and other parts of the
record. Further, when the error complained of is that
the Court assumed that a concession had been made
when none had in fact been made or that the Court
misconceived the terms of the concession or the scope
and extent of it, it will not generally appear on the ., > 4
-
-
(1) [1917] 21 C.W,N. 897.
(2) A.LR. 1940 Mad. 17.
(3) [1952] 2 K.B. 338 at pp. 351.35._
.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
543
re.cord but will have to be brought before the Court by
way of an affidavit as suggested by' the Privy Council
as well as by this Court and this can only be done by
way of review. The cases to which reference has been
made indicate that the misconception of the Court
must be regarded as sufficient reason analogous to an
• .;,. error on the face of the record. In our opinion it is
permissible to rely on the affidavit as an additional
ground for review of the judgment.
Turning to the affidavit and the letters and the
ground No. 17 of review it is quite obvious that the
defendants had not given up their contention, upheld
by the District Judge, that the plaintiffs had been guilty
-0f the acts and conduct imputed to them. What the
"'.- . • learned Advocate for the defendants did was to accept
the Canon law as interpreted by the District Judge,
namely that nobody goes out of the church without
the verdict of an ecclesiastical' authority, whether
the acts complained of amount to acts of heresy or to
the establishment of a new church so as to make the
persons who are guilty of such conduct aliens to the
faith. If the majority Judges took the view that such
was not the Canon law and that the same acts and
conduct may have an ecclesiastical aspect in the sense
that they amount to heresy punishable as such and
may also amount to a voluntary separation from the
church which is not an ecclesiastical offence and does
not require the verdict of any ecclesiastical authority
to place the guilty person out of the church then
it was clearly incumbent upon the ma1onty Judges
..#
to consider whether the acts and conduct of which
,._. .. the plaintiffs had been found guilty had actually
been committed by them and whether such acts
and conduct also had the dual aspect, namely,
:amounted to an ecclesiastical offence requiring excommunication and also to a voluntary separation which
not being an ecclesiastical offence did not require
:an ecclesiastical verdict to place a guilty person out of
the pale of the Church. This, on the face of the judgment, the learned Judges failed to do.
Learned Attorney-General has submitted that the
allegations against the plaintiffs are five in number,
namely-
-
1954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
544
1954
Moran Mar
lJJasselios
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
(1) The Patriarch has Temporal powers over the
properties of the Malankara Church ;
(2) The Patriarch has got the power acting by
himself to excommunicate and ordain a Bishop ;
(3) Only the Patriarch may .consecrate Morone ;
( 4) The Canon of the Church is Ex. XVIII in O.S.
No. 94 of 1088 ; and
(5) The Catholicate has not been validly instituted
in the Malankara Church ;
and suggests that these charges have been gone into·
directly or indirectly by the majority Judges and that,
therefore, no prejudice has been caused. He, however,
cannot dispute that the Judges have failed to consider
and come to any definite finding on some of them. We
do not consider that the contention of the learned
Attorney-General is entirely well founded. Issue 20(1)
contains several charges against the plaintiffs and even
if charges (a) and (b) have been referred to in the
majority judgment, the charges (c), (d) and (e) have·
.certainly not been dealt with. As to the temporal
power of the Patriarch the District Judge held in paragraph 58 of his judgment that the Patriarch had no·
temporal authority or jurisdiction or control over the
Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church and its temporalities
and that the power of general supervision over spiritual
Government conceded to the Patriarch in Ex. DY
did not carry with it by necessary implication the right
to interfere in the administration of the temporalities
and properties of the Church. The decision to the
contrary in 41 T.L.R. 1 cannot be regarded as having
any bearing after that judgment was set aside subject
011ly to three points as hereinbefore mentioned. It
does not appear that the majority Judges considered
whether the plaintiffs imputed full temporal powers to
the Patriarch or the limited one as conceded to him in
Ex. DY and if they did impute to him full temporal
powers whether they had departed from a fundamental
tenet of the Church. · They do not also appear to
have considered whether, if the plaintiffs originally
pledged themselves to the tenet of full temporal power
of the Patriarch and thereby departed from a fundamental article and such departure involved their having
•
, ~. J
S.C.R .
...l. -J.
"' '."'
•
{
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
become aliens, any subsequent change in their attitude
by limiting it as in Ex. DY would make a difference.
Further, as to the power of consecrating Metropolitans
Nokes J. found that a nlidly appointed Catholicos had
the power, under both versions of the Canon, to
consecrate Metropolitans without a Synod and that by
so claiming the defendants had not become aliens to the
faith. The learned Judge, however, did not consider
the implication of this finding so far as the plaintiffs
were concerned. This finding may lead to the
implication that the claim that the Patriarch alone
has got the power of ordination and the Catholicos
has not that power cannot but be regarded as a
departure from t~1e Canon. Issue 20(1) (a) (i) which
relates to the consecration of Morone has been found in
favour of the defendants. If the defendants have not
gone out of the Church by making the claim that
Morone may be consecrated by the Catholicos or
the Metropolitan in Malankara then the learned Judge
should have considered whether a denial of such right
by the plaintiffs constituted a departure by them from
the canonical law. This the learned Judge failed to
·do. Issue 20(l)(a) (iii) related to the establishment of
the Catholicate. In "pleading" No. 124 the plaintiffs
maintained that a Catho!icate had not been established
at all. The District Judge held that Abdul Messiah
by his Kalpana Ex. 80 revived the Jacobite Catholicate. The respondents' ground of appeal No. 17
assumed that a Catholicate had been established.
Nokes J. held that Abdul Messiah was a Patriarch,
that a Patriarch had the power by himself and without
the Synod to establish a Catholicate and that a
Catholicate had been established by him although the
old Catholicate of the East had not been revived.
Sathyanesan J., however, held that the establishment
of the Catholicate in Malankara was dubious, surreptitious and uncanonical and that no Catholicate had
been established. The two judgments appear to be
somewhat at vanance m this respect. In any case,
Nokes J. has not considered whether the stand taken
by the plaintiffs that no Catholicate had been established at all amounts to a departure by them from
the injunctions of the Canon law. On a fair reading 0£
1954
Moran Mar
Basselws
Catholicos and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
546
•9541
Moran Mar
Basselios
[.. Catholicos and
Another
v..
;:_ < '
TM ·Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
.Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the majority judgments it appears to us that the
majority Judges have been misled by a misconception
as to the nature and scope of the concession alleged to
have been made by the defendants' advocate. If the
acts imputed to the defendants amounted to a voluntary
separation, the
learned Judges should have considered whether the acts imputed to the plaintiffs likewise amounted to a voluntary separation. If the
defendants had not gone out of the Church by asserting
that a Catholicate had been established, that the
Catholicos can ordain Metropolitans and consecrate
Morone then they should have considered whether by
denying these assertions the plaintiffs had not gone
out of the Church. This they failed to do. They could
not properly decline to go into the question of fact on
account of the admission of the defendants' advocate
that the plaintiffs remained in the Church. Such
admission at best was an admission a; to the canon law
and the decision that the defendants had voluntarily
gone out of the Church even in the absence of an
ecclesiastical verdict necessarily implies that the concession made by the defendants' advocate requiring an
ecclesiastical verdict as a :ondition precedent to ·
voluntary separation also was obviously wrong and an
erroneous concession of law made by the defendants'
advocate could not be relied upon for saving the
The fact,
therefore, that cross-objection
plaintiffs.
No. 11 filed in the High Court by the defendants does
not appear to have been pressed makes no difference.
In our opinion, for reasons stated above, this head of
objection raised by the learned advocate for the
appllants before us is well-founded and the judgments
of the majority Judges are vitiated by an error of a
kind
whicl1 is .sufficient reason witl1in
•
, j. •
tl1e 1neaning of
the Code of Civil Procedure for allowing the review.
The last point taken up by the learned advocate
for the appellants is that although certain matters !:'.ad
been agreed to be left out in connection with issue
No. ll(a), the learned Judges took an adverse view
against the defendants on matters which had been so
left out by agreement. Issue No. 11 relates to the
powers of the Patriarch. Clauses (b) to ( i) relate to
specific powers of the Patriarch. Clause (a) ·of that
'
•
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
547
issue is vague and is expressed in very general terms.
Paragraph 60 of the District Judge's judgment is as
follows:"60. It was stated by the advocates on both sides
.that it is unnecessary for the purpose of this suit to
determine or decide in a general and comprehensive
manner or define exhaustively all the powers that the
Patriarch may have over or in respect of the Malankara
Church as the supreme spiritual or ecclesiastical head
of the whole Jacobite Church including Malankara and
I also think it is not within the province or competency
-0£ this court to attempt to do it. Whether he is the
supreme spiritual head or whether he is the supreme
·ecclesiastical head, his powers as the Patriarch in
respect of the matters specified under clauses (b) to (h)
·of issue 11 (which have formed the subject-matter of
·dispute in this case) have been considered and defined
under these various headings under this issue 11 and
it has also been stated how far they have been determined or upheld by law courts, custom, practice and
precedent so far as Malankara is concerned and · these
.findings, it is conceded on both sides, will suffice."
It will be noticed that after this agreement issue
No. 11 related only to certain specific powers of the
Patriarch. The findings on these issues by themselves
-do not lead to any result. They were, as it were, only
introductory issues and were material for other issues,
·e.g. issues 14, 15, 19 and 20. In other words, the
general issue ll(a) being given up, the other issues
mentioned above were automatically limited to the
speCific acts relating to the specific powers of the
Patriarch. The majority Judges have, however, certainly gone into three matters which were then agreed
to have been left out, e.g., (a) obligation to obey the
'Patriarch whether canonically installed or not, (b)
extent of the right of the Patriar.ch by himself to decide
matters of faith and ( c) whether the Patriarch has the
right to approve of a Catholicos in the sense that such
approval was necessary. These matters are not averred
in pleadings and no specific issues have been raised and,
in the circumstances, should not have been gone into.
The suggestion is that these points are covered by
other issues. It is said that the learned Judges held
that the new constitution Ex. AM amounted to a
1954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos
and
Another
v.
The Most Rev.
Mar Poulose
Athanasius and
Others.
Das].
548
1954
Moran Mar
Basselios
Catholicos anti
Another
v.
The Most&v.
Mar Poulose
.A.lhanasius and
Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}'
repudiation of the authority of the Patriarch on thefollowing grounds :( 1) Installation of
Catholicos
1gnonng
the
Patriarch ;
(2) Absence of a provision for the approval by the
Patriarch or Malankara Metropolitan ;
(3) Ordination of Metropolitan and the issuing of
Staticons by the Catholicos, and
(4) the right to collect Ressissa.
These points are said to be covered by issues 11 ( b) ,.
(c), (g) and (h), and also by issues lO(b), 14, 15 and 16.
Assuming it is so, it is clear that the learned Judges·
also founded themselves on the three points hereinbefore mentioned which do not appear to fall within
any of the issues in the case except issue ll(a) which
was given up. To decide against a party on matters
which do not come within the issues on which the
parties went to trial clearly amounts to an error appa-·
rent on the face of the record. It is futile to speculate
as to the effect these matters had on the minds of the
Ju<lges in comparison with the effect of the other points.
The above discussion, in our opinion, is quite
sufficient for the purpose of disposing of this appeal
and it is not necessary to go into the several other·
minor points raised before us. In our opinion the·
appellants have made out a valid ground for allowing
their application for review. We accordingly allow this
appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and
.admit the review. As the different points involved in
this appeal are intimately interconnected we direct
the entire appeal to be reheard on all points unless
both parties accept any of the findings of the High
Court. The costs must follow the event and we order
that the appellants must get the costs of this appeal
before us and of the application for review before the·
High Court.
We need hardly add that the observations that we
have made in this judgment are only for the purpose of
this application for review and should not be taken or
read as observations on the merits of the appeal
now restored and to be reheard by the High Court.
Appeal allowed.
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