E. D. SASSOON AND COMPANY LTD. versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY CITY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 May 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 313 | 1954 INSC 66
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 May 1954
- Bench
- SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 3/1953
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 313
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 66
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
313
meaningless writs we must dismiss this appeal and
leave the appellant con~ent with an enunciation of the
law. But as he has m reality won his case and is
prevented from reaping the full fruits of his victory
because of circumstances for which he is not responsible, we direct that the first respondent, the State of
Mysore, and the fourth respondent, Thim_mappa, pay
the appellant his costs .here and in the High Court.
The other respondents will bear their own costs .
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•
v.
The Stat• of
Mysor1 and Others.
Appeal dismissed.
E. D. SASSOON AND COMPANY LTD.
v.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
BOMBAY CITY.
(With connected Appeals)
[S. R. DAs, BHAGWATI and ]AGANNADHADAs JJ.)
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 4(1)(a)(b)-"lncome,"
"arises",
is received"-Meaning of-" Earned"-Meanin g of-s. 10(1)-"Carried on by him"-Connotation of-Managing
Agency Agreement-Transfer of rights thereunder-Apportionment
between assignors and assignees.
The Sassoons had entered into three Managing Agency agreements as the Managing Agents of three different companies. They
transferred their Managing Agencies to three other companies by
formal deeds of assignment and transfer on several dates during
the accounting year.
The question for determination was whether in the circumstances of the case the Managing Agency commission was liable to be
apportioned between the Sassoons and their respective transferees
in the proportion of the services rendered as Managing Agents by
each of them for the respective portions of the accounting year and
the decision turned upon the question whether any income had
accrued to the Sassoons for the purpose of income-tax on the dates
of the respective transfers of the Managing Agencies to the transferees. Under clause 2(d) of the Managing Agency agreements, the
commission to the Sassoons as Managing Agents was to be due to
them yearly on the 31st of March in each and every year and was
to be payable immediately after the annual accounts of the company had been passed by the shareholders.
Held per S. R. DAs and BHAGWATI JJ. (JAGANNADHADAS J.
dissenting).-answering the question in the negative, that on, the
~'accrues",
-
1954
K. N. Guruswamy
11
Bose].
314
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
construction of the Managing Agency agreements, the contract of
service between the companies and the Managing Agents was
E. D. Sassoon anti entire and indivisible, that the remuneration or commission became
Company Ltd.
due by the companies to the Managing Agents only on the comv.
The Commissioner pletion of a definite period of service and at stated intervals, that
it was a condition precedent to the recovery of any wages or salary
of /neome.·tax,
Bombts.J c;vi.
in respect thereof that the service or duty should be completely
performed, that such debt constituted a debt only at the end of
each ·period of Service and that no remuneration or commission
was payable to the Managing Agents for broken periods.
The Sassoons had not earned any income for lh.e broke~ periods
nor had any income accrued to them in respect of the same
and what they transferred to the transferees under the respective
deeds of assignment and transfer did not include any income which
they had earned or had accrued to them during the chargeable
accounting period and which the transferees by virtue of the
assignment in their favour \Vere in a position to collect.
_
The true test under section 4(!)(a) of the Indian Income-tax
Act, for the purpose of ascertaining liability for income-tax in the
case of transfer of Managing Agency is not whether the transferors and the transferees had worked for any particular periods of
the year but whether any income had accrued to the transferors
and the transferees within the chargeable accounting period.
The word "profit" in section 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act
has a well-defined legal meaning. The term impiies a comparison
between the state of business at two specific dates usually separated by an interval of a year. The fundamental meaning is the
amount of gain made by the business during the year.
"Income" connotes a periodical monetary return "coming ·in"
with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity from definite
sources. The source is not necessarily expected to be continuously
productive but its object is the production of a definite return excluding anything in the nature of windfall. The word "income"
clearly implies the idea of receipt, actual or constructive.
The words "accrues", "arises" and "is received" are three distinct terms. The \Vord "accrues" conveys the distinct sense of
gro\ving up by \Vay of addition or increase or as an accession ·or
advantage connoting the idea of a growth or accumulation. The
word "arises" means comes into existence or notice
or presents
itself and conveys the idea of the growth or accurnulation with a
tangible shape so as to be receivable. Both the \Vords "accrues" and
"arises" are used in contradistinction to the word ' 4receive" :and
indicate a right to receive income.
The accrual of income to an assessee does not mean the actual
receipt of the same by him and it may be received later on its
being ascertained. The word "earned" does not appear in section 4 of
the Income-tax Act but it has been very often used in the course
of judgments by learned Judges. It conveys the concept of
income accruing to the assessee.
1
954
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
315'
Per JAGANNADHADAS J.-In the present case the profits and
gains of the whole year clearly related to the business carried on 'Fi:. D .Sassoon and
both by the assignor and the assignee taken together and were
CompaQ) lid.
hence taxable a.s income accruing to both and apportionable as such
v.
~
between them. The phrase "carried on by him" in section 10(1) of The '70.-nmissioner
of Income-tax,
the Indian Income-tax Act connotes the fundamental idea of the
Bombay City.
continuous exercise of an activity as an essential constituent
of that which is to produce the taxable income and that the
taxable income is that of the very assessee or the combination of assessees whose continuous activity produces the income.
Therefore the continuous and successive functioning by both the
assignor and the assignee under the Managing Agency agreement
was the effective source of the year's income. That income accrued
on the completion of the year and was the joint income of
both the assignor and the assignee. The prior assignments in the
course of the year operated as assignments of this future right to
a share of the income. It was only by virtue of inter se arrangement between the assignor and the assignee resulting from the
transaction of assignment, that the assignee had the right to collect
the entire income. But the share in this income which accrued
to the Sassoons on the completion of the year remained the
taxable income of the Sassoons and they were rightly taxed in
respect thereof.
Case-lrw discussed.
C1viL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Civil Appeals
Nos. 3, 30 and 31 of 1953.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the
12th day of September, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Income-tax Reference No. 27
of 1951 arising our of .the order dated the 23rd
day of November, 1949, of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal m Income-tax Appeal No. 122 of
1947-48.
B. /. M. Mackenna (D. H. Dwarka Das and
Rajinder Narain, with him) for the appellant in C. A.
No. 3 of 1953.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N.
Joshi and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the respondent
in C. A. No. 3 and for the appellant in C. A. Nos.
30 and 31.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (R. /.
Kolah, N. A. Palkhiwala and I. N. Shroff, with him)
for the respondent in C. A. No. 30, R. /. Kolah, N. A.
Palkhiwala and /. N. Shroff for. the . respondent in
C. A. No. 31.
'
2-87 S. C. India/59
316
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
1954. May 14. The Judgment of Das and Bhagwati
was delivered by Bhagwati J. Jagannadhadas J.
£."D. Sassoon and
Com/Jany Ltd.
delivered a separate judgment.
v.
The Commissiont.'
BHAGWATI J.-These appeals arise out of two judgof Income-tax,
ments
and orders of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay City
Bombay in Income-tax References Nos. 23, 24 and 27
BhagwaJi].
of 1951 made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act and
section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act.
E. D. Sassoon and Company Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the Sassoons) were the Managing Agents of
(1) E. D. Sassoon United Mills Ltd., under Agreements
dated the 24th February, 1920, and the 2nd October,
1934, (2) Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills
Company Ltd., under the Agreement dated 23rd May,
1922, and (3) Apollo Mills Ltd., under the Agreement
dated the 23rd May, 1922. The Sassoons agreed to
tr~sfer their Managing Agencies of the said Companies
to Messrs. Agarwal and Company, Chidambaram Mulraj
and Company Ltd., and Rajputana Textile (Agencies)
Ltd. respectively by letters dated the 3rd September,
1943, 16th April, 1943, and the 27th April, 1943. The consent of the shareholders of the respective companies to
the Agreements for transfer was duly obtained and the
Managing Agencies were ultimately transferred to the
respective transferees with effect from the 1st December, 1943, 1st June, 1943, and 1st July, 1943, respectively. The Sassoons executed in favour of Messrs. Agarwal
and Company, Chidambaram Mulrai and Company
Ltd., and Rajputana Textile (Agencies) Ltd., formal
deeds of assignment and transfer and received from them
Rs. 57,80,000, Rs. 12,50,000 and Rs. 6,00,000 respectively on transfers of the Managing Agencies, and the
net consideration, viz., Rs. 75,77,693, received by them
on such transfers was taken by them to the "Capital
Reserve Account''. The accounts of the Managing
Agency commission payable by the respective Companies to the Managing Agents for the year 1943 were made
up in the year 1944 and Messrs. Agarwal and Company
received from the E. D. Sassoon United Mills Ltd., a
sum of Rs. 27,94,504, Chidambaram Mulraj and Comfany Ltd., received from the Elphinstone Weaving and
1954
JJ.
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:S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
317
:Spinning Mills Company Ltd., a sum of Rs. 2,37,602 and
the Rajputana Textile (Agencies) Ltd., received from
the Apollo Mills Ltd., a sum of .Rs. 3,82,608 as and by
way of such commission.
For the assessment year 1944-45 and the chargeable
accounting period 1st January, 1943, to the 31st
December, 1943, the original income-tax and excess
profits tax assessments of the Sassoons were made on
the 31st May, 1945, at a total income of Rs. 46,48,483.
This income however did not include any part of the
Managing Agency commission received by the transferees. The entire amounts of the Managing Agency
comm1ss1on received by the transferees were assessed
by the Income-tax Officer for the assessment year 194546 as the income of the transferees. The transferees
:appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who
confirmed the orders of the Income-tax Officer. When
the matter was taken in further appeal to the Incometax Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal by its order
dated the 28th December, 1949, accepted the transfere's contention that the Managing Agency commission received by them should be apportioned on a proportionate basis and the transferees should be made
liable to pay tax only on the commission earned by
them during the period that they had worked as the
Managing Agents of the respective Companies.
The Income-tax Officer and the Excess Profits Tax
Officer appear to have discovered that the amounts of
the Managing Agency commission earned by the Sassoons
prior to the dates of the respective transfers were not
brought to tax and therefore issued on the 29th June,
1946, notices under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax
Act and section 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act upon
the Sassoons on the ground that their income from the
Managing Agency had escaped assessment. The
Income-tax Officer and the Excess Profits Tax Officer
wanted to include m the assessable mcome of the
Sassoons Rs. 28,51,934 made up of Rs. 25,61,629 m
respect of the Managing Agency of the E. D. Sassoon
United Mills Ltd., for the period of 11 months from the
1st January, 1943, to the 30th November, 1943,
Rs. 99,001 m respect of the Managing Agency of the
1 954
E. D. Sassoon and
ComPllf!Y Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwati].
0
318
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., for th<~
period of five months from the 1st January, 1943, t(}
E. D. Sassoon and
Compaf!,.'IJ Ltd.
the
31st May, 1943, and Rs. 1,91,304 in respect of the
~
v.
Managing Agency of the Apollo Mills Ltd., for the
Th~ Commissioner
of Incomt-tax,
period
of six months from the 1st January, 1943, to
Bombay Ci{p.
the 30th June, 1943, contending that such Managing
Bhagwati J.
Agency commission had accrued to the Sassoons for
services rendered so that on the dates on which the
Agencies were transferred the Sassoons were entitled to
such remuneration from the managed Companies in the
form of commission for services rendered up to the
dates of the transfers. In spite of the objection of the
Sassoons the Income-tax Officer and the Excess Profits
Tax Officer determined these sums as their escaped incomes and assessed them accordingly. The Sassoons
appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who
dismissed the appeals and further appeals were taken
to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Incometax Appellate Tribunal relied upon its order dated. the
28th December, 1949, in the case of the transferees ,and
confirmed the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the
Managing Agency commission was earned for services
rendered and therefore it was taxed in the hands of
the person who carried on the business of the Managing
. Agency and not in the hands of the person to whom it
was assigned, and that therefore so far as the Sassoons
were concerned the Managing Agency commission · should
be apportioned between them and their transferees.
The Sassoons applied under section 66(1) of the
Indian Income-tax· Act and section 21 of the Excess
Profits Tax Act requesting the Tribunal to draw a statement of the case and refer the question of law arising
out of the orders to the High Court for its decision. On
the 12th January, 1951, the Tribunal by its statement
of the case referred to the High Court one question of
law as arising out of its orders, viz., "whether in the
•
circumstances of the case was the Managing Agency
commission liable to be apportioned between the assessee Company and the assignee" observing that in its
opinion the question was not when the Managing
Agency commission accrued but the real question was
to whom it accrued. This reference was made by the
1954
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_-,' 1
S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
319
Tribunal in R. A. No. 474 of 1950-51, and R. A. No. 475
.-0f 1950-51 referring the question of law thus framed
in regard to the Managing Agency commission of the
E. D. Sassoon United Mills Ltd., and the Elphinstone
Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., the whole of the
Managing Agency commission having been paid respectively to Messrs. Agarwal and Company and to Chidambaram Mulraj and Company Ltd., in the year 1944.
This was Income-tax Reference No. 27 of 1951.
The Commissioner of Income-tax/Excess Profits Tax,
Bombay City, also required the Tribunal to refer to the
High Court the question of law arising out of its order
in the appeal of Messrs. Agarwal and Company in which
the Tribunal had held as above that the Managing
Agency commission should be apportioned between the
Sassoons and the transferees. The statement of the
·case was accordingly submitted by the Tribunal on the
12th January, 1951, and the same question as above
was referred to the High Court. This reference was
Income-tax Reference No. 24 of 1951.
-
A similar application was made by the Commissioner
of Income-tax/Excess Profits Tax, Bombay City, for
reference in the appeal of Chidambaram Mulraj and Company Ltd. The Tribunal submitted its statement of case
also on the same day and referred the very same ques·tion to the High Court. This reference was Income-tax
Reference No. 23 of 1951.
' .t
All these references came for hearing and final disposal before the High Court. Income-tax References
Nos. 24 and 27 of 1951 were heard together and one
judgment was delivered, answering the question submitted to the High Court in both the references in the
affirmative. Following upon this . judgment the High
·Court also answered in the affirmative the question
which had been referred to it by the Tribunal in
Income-tax Reference No. 23 of 1951. The decision
·of the High Court was thus against the contentions
-which had been urged both by the Sassoons and the
·Commissioner of Income-tax and the Sassoons as well
:as the Commissioner of Income-tax obtained leave un.der section 66A(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act and
1 954
E. D. Sassoon an
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
BhagwatiJ,
320
1 954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
The CommissioMr
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Bha.f!wati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955J
section 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution for filing appeals.
to this Court. The appeal of· the Sassoons was Civil·
Appeal No. 3 of 1953, and it was filed against theCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City. Theappeals of the Commissioner of Income-tax against
Messrs. Agarwal and Company and Chidambaram Mulraj
and Company Ltd., respectively were Civil Appeal No. 3(}
of 1953, and Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1953. These appeals.
have come for hearing and final disposal before us.
All the appeals raise one common question of law,
viz., whether ip the circumstances of the case the Managing Agency commission was liable to be apportioned·
between the Sassoons and their respective transferees
in the proportion of the services rendered as Managing
Agents by each one of them and the decision turns.
upon the question whether any income had accrued to·
the Sassoons on the dates of the respective transfers of
the Managing Agencies to the transferees or at any
time thereafter. This judgment will cover our decision·
in all the appeals.
It will be convenient at this stage to set out the
relevant clauses of the respective Managing Agency
Agreements and the deeds of assignment and transfer.
The original agreement with the E. D. Sassoon United'
Mills Ltd., was entered into on the 24th February, 1920,.
by Sir Edward Sassoon and others carrying on business:
in partnership in the style and form of Messrs. E.D ..
Sassoon and Company. The Managing Agency was:
transferred with the consent of the Company by E. D_
Sassoon and Company to the Sassoons and another
Managing Agency Agreement was executed between theCompany and the Sassoons on the 2nd October, 1934,.
appointing and recognising the latter as the Agents of theCompany from the 1st January, 1921, for the residue of
the period and upon the same terms and conditions set
out in the original Agreement dated the 24th February1920. Under clause 1 of that Agreement the Sassoons:
and their assigns were appointed the Agents of th<"
Company for a period of 30 years from the date of the~
registration thereof and thereafter until they resignect
or were removed from office by a special resolution of
,,_'
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
the Company. Under clause 2 the remuneration of
the 'Sassoons and their assigns was fixed at a commission of 7-! per cent. per annum on the annual net profits
of the Company after making all proper allowances and
deductions from revenue for working expenses chargeable against profits, provided however that if in any
year no such commission was earned or it fell short of
Rs. 1,20,000 the Company was to pay to them a sum
sufficient to make up the minimum remuneration of
Rs. 1,20,000 per annum on account of such commission.
The said commission was under clause 2(d) to be due
to them yearly on the 31st of March in each and every
year during the continuance of the Agreement and was
to be payable and to be paid immediately after the
annual accounts of the Company had been passed by
the shareholders. Under clause 3 the Sassoons and
their assigns agreed with the Company that they would
be and act as the Agents of the Company during the
said term for the said remuneration and uoon and subject to the terms and conditions therein contained.
Clause 10 of the Agreement provided as under :"It shall be lawful for the said firm to assign this
Agreement and the rights of the said firm hereunder to
any person, firm or Company having authority by its
constitution to become bound by the obligations
undertaken by the said firm hereunder and upon such
assignment being made and notified to the ·said Company the said Company shall be 'bound to recognise the
person or firm or Company aforesaid as the Agents of the
said Company in like manner as if the name of such
person, firm or Company had entered into this Agreement with the said Company and the said Company
shall forthwith upon demand by the said firm enter
into an Agreement with the person, firm or Company
aforesaid appointing such person, firm or Company the
Agents of the said Company for the then residue of the
.term outstanding under the Agreement and with the
like powers and authorities remuneration and emoluments and subject to the like terms and conditions as
are herein contained."
The letter dated the 3rd September, 1943, recording
the Agreement of transfer of the Managing Agency
E. D. Sassoon
and Company Ud.
v
The Commissio•w
of lncome-tsx,
Bombay Ci!!'
BhaJ:Wali 7.
322
1954
E. D. Sassoon
and Compnn'Y Ltd.
7 lit Commissioner
oJ Income-tax 1
B(lmbay City.
Bha:;wati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
provided that in the event of the transaction being completed in its entirety as therein stated the transferees
would be entitled to receive the commission payable by
the Company under the Managing Agency Agreement
on the profits for the calendar year 1943. The deed of
assignment and transfer executed between the Sassoons
and Messrs. Agarwal and Company in pursuance of this
Agreement on the 26th January, 1945, stated that the
Sassoons thereby transferred to Messrs. Agarwal and
Company as from the 1st December, 1943, their office
as Managing Agents of the Company for the unexpired
residue of the term created by the said Agreement
dated the 24th February, 1920, as also the said Agreements dated the 24th February, 1920, and the 2nd
October, 1934, and all their rights and benefits as
Managing Agents under the said Agreements and
Messrs. Agarwal and Company agreed to be the Managing Agents of the Company from the 1st December, 1943,
in place and stead of the Sassoons for the said unexpired residue of the term with like powers authorities
remuneration and emoluments as were coJ1J.tained in the
·said Agreements. It may be noted that even though
the letter recording the Agreement of transfer expressly
provided that the transferees would be entitled to
receive the commission payable by the Company under
the Managing Agency Agreement on the profits for the
calendar year 1943 no such term was incorporated in
the deed of assignment and transfer.
The original Agreement entered into by the Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd., was
with Messrs. Hajee Mahomed Hajee Esmail and Com-·
pany and was dated the 24th July, 1919. The Managing
Agency was transferred with the consent of the Company
by Messrs. Hajee Mahomed Hajee Esmail and Company
to the Sassoons and on the 23rd May, 1922, another
Managing Agency Agreement, was executed by the
Company in favour of the Sassoons their successors
and assigns employing them the Agents of the Company from the 1st February, 1922, for the unexpired
period of the term of 60 years commencing from the
3rd July, 1919. Under clause 3 of the Agreement the
Company was during the continuance thereof to pay to
,
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:S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
323
the Sassoons, their successors and assigns by way of
remuneration a commission of ten per cent. on the net
profits of the Company and a further sum of Rs. 1,500
per month. Under clause 6 the Sassoons, their successors and assigns were to be at liberty to retain, reimburse and pay themselves out of the moneys of the
Company inter alia all sums due to them for commission and otherwise. The deed of transfer executed by
the Sassoons in favour of Chidambaram Mulraj and
Company Ltd., on the 2nd June, 1943, stated that the
Sassoons assigned and transferred the Agreement dated
the 23rd May, 1922, between themselves and the Company for the ·unexpired residue of the term of sixty
years specified therein and the full benefit and advantage thereof together with the benefit of the Agency
and the office of the Agents thereunder and the right
to receive the remuneration thereafter to become payable by the Company under or by virtue of the said
Agreement and tqgether with the benefit of all rights,
privileges, powers and authorities given and conferred
on the Sassoons thereunder.
It is significant to observe that before the income·tax authorities as also the High Court no distinction
was drawn between the provisions of these two Agency
Agreements in regard to the right of the Managing
Agents to remuneration thereunder and the facts in so
far as they related to all the Managing Agencies were
treated as similar. The quantum also was not disput.ed in each case though the principle of apportionment
·was in dispute.
The Sassoons were assessed for this "escaped income"
·on the basis that they had earned the income by rendering services as Managing Agents to the Companies for
the respective periods that they continued to be the
Managing Agents and the transferees had rendered the
services for the balance of the periods completing the
full year of accounting and had earned the proportionate commission and therefore the amount of commission which the latter actually received included
the Sassoons' share of commission in respect of which
they were not liable to tax but the Sassoons. The High
·Court adopted this test of the services rendered by .the
:Sassoons as well as the transferees during the whole of
E. D. Sassoon
and Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of lncome-taic,
Bombay City.
Bhagwati].
324
1954
E. D. Sassoon
and Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissiontr
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19551
the year and considered the proportions of the services.
rendered by the Sassoons and the transferees as the
Managing Agents of the Companies as decisive of the
portions of the Managing Agency commission earned
respectively by each. The parenthood of the income
received by the transferees was considered to be the
real test of the apportionability of the amounts of the
Managing Agency commission and the total amount of
the Managing Agency ·commission was thus apportioned between the Sassoons and the transferees in the·
proportion of 11 to I in the case of the E. D. Sassoon·
United Mills Ltd., and 5 to 7 in the case of the Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Ltd., the
transfers of the Managing Agencies having been made
with effect from the !st December, 1943, and the 1st
June, 1943, respectively. The income was held assess-able to tax not on the basis of receipt but on the basis.
of accrual. The receipt by the transferees was considered of no consequence. What wa.s received by the·
transferees was treated as including the proportionate·
shares of the Sassoons in the income which could be·
attributed to their periods of service as the Managing:
Agents of the respective Companies and even though
actually received by the transferees they were treated!
as income which had accrued to the Sassoons by reason
of their having acted as the Managing Agents of the
respective Companies for the respective periods. The
Sassoons' shares of the income were thus considered as
having been earned by them during the year 1943 and
were held on the construction of the deeds of assign··
ment and transfer executed by the Sassoons in £avow·
of the transferees as having been assigned by them to
the transferees and even though the transferees receiv-·
ed the whole of the Managing Agency commission payable by the Companies to the Managing Agents under
the terms of the respective Managing Agency Agree··
ments, the Sassoons, the assignors, and not the trans··
ferees, the assignees, were assessed to tax in respect of
the proportionate shares of income earned by the Sassoons in the year 1943.
It was urged before us on behalf of the Sassoons that
no part . of the managing agency commission for the
broken periods of 1943 was earned by them. It did not
-
_l ,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Companies to the Sassoons
and it could not therefore be said to have accrued
to them. The contract of employment was an entire
and an indivisible contract and the remuneration payable by the Companies to the Sassoons thereunder was
payable at stated periods. It was a condition precedent to the Sassoons - earning the remuneration that
they fulfilled the terms of their employment, completed
- "- the period for which the remuneration was payable to
them and the service for the particular period was a
condition precedent to their earning the remuneration
for that period. The stated period was that of a year
and no remuneration was payable to the Sassoons till
the end of the year and unless and until they completed
the period of the year they would not be entitled to any
commission or remuneration for the year, much less for
JI'.
the broken period. It was therefore contended that
the Sassoons had not earned any commission for the
broken periods and that not having earned the same
they could not have assigned it to the transferees with
the result that when the transferees were paid the commission under the terms of the Managing Agency
Agreements, the transferees received the same in their
own right even though they had not rendered the
f...,· services to the Company for the whole of the calendar
year 1943. It was contended that in any event, whatever be the position as between the Companies and the
transferees, the Sassoons had not earned any part of
the Managing Agency commission which had been paid
by the Companies to the transferees and were not
liable to tax in respect of the same.
It was on the other hand urged on behalf of the
' -t
transferees that even though under the terms of the
deeds of assignment and transfer they were paid by the
Companies the whole of the Managing Agency commission for the calendar year 1943 they had merely earned
the commission or remuneration for the period of actual
services rendered by them to the Company and the
portions of the Managing Agency commission proportionate to the services actually rendered by the
Sassoons to the Companies had accrued to the Sassoons
~
though it had been ascertained and paid to the transferees in the year 1944. Even though the ascertainment
-
-
""'1' _ become a debt due by ·the
325
1954
E. D. Sassoon
and Compaf!Y Ltd•.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay Ciry.
BhagwatiJ.
326
E. D. Sassoon
tJnd Company Ltd.
v.
T ht Commissiontr
of Income·lax,
Bombay Cif}'.
Bha.gwati ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
and the payment came later it made no difference
to the accrual of the mcome which could be referred
back to the period during which the income was earned and accordingly whatever amount was earned by
the Sassoons during the respective periods that they
had acted as the Managing Agents of the Companies
had accrued to them during those periods and was
received by the transferees only by virtue of the respective deeds of assignment and transfer. Having been
received by the transferees by virtue of the assignment
those portions of the Managing Agency commission
received by them none the · less constituted income
which had accrued to the Sassoons and were liable to ta·~
against the Sassoons the assignors and not against them
the assignees.
The position of an employee under an entire contract of service has been thus enunciated in Halsbury's
Laws of England-Hailsham Edition-Vol. 22, page
133, paragraph 221 :"\Vhen the contract of service is an entire contract,
providing for payment on the completion of a definite
period of service, or of a definite piece of work, it is a condition precedent to the recovery of any salary or wages
m respect thereof that the service or duty shall be
completely performed, unless the employer so. alters
the contract as to entitle the servant to regard it at an
end, in which case the whole sum payable under the
.contract becomes due, or unless there is a usage that
the servant rs entitled to wages in proportion to the
time actually served. But when the contract, though
m respect of work terminating at a particular time, is
to be construed as providing that remuneration shall
accrue due and become . vested at stated periods, such
remuneration constitutes a debt recoverable at the end
.of each such period of service."
Section 219 of the Indian Contract Act also provides
that in the absence of any special contract, payment
for the performance of any act is not due to the agent
·until the completion of such act.
Our attention was drawn in this connection to the
.case of Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co. v. Ansell( 1 ) •
. (1) 39 Ch. D. 339.
-
.},
"'
S.C.R.
327
In that case the defendant was employed as the managing director of the company for 5 years at a yearly
salary. He was dismissed for misconduct befor' the
expiration of the current year and claimed against the
company damages for wrongful dismissal and the
salary for the quarter which had expired before his dismissal. His .claim for salary was disallowed and it was
held that having been dismissed for misconduct he was
not entitled to any part of the unpaid salary for the
current year of his service. Lord Justice Cotton at page
360 posed the question as under :-
-
"Can he sue for a proportionate part of the salary
for the current year ?................ What he would have
been entitled to if he continued in their service until
the end of the year would have been £800, but in my
opinion that would · give him no right of action until
the year was completed."
·
Lord Justice Bowen observed at page 364 :-
{
.•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
"As regards his current salary it is clear and
established beyond all doubt by authorities ........... .
that the servant who is dismissed for wrongful behavi·
our cannot recover his current salary, that is to say,
he cannot recover salary which is not due . and payable
at the time of his dismissal but which is only to accrue
due and become payable at some later date, and on
the condition that he had fulfilled his duty as a faithful
servant down to that later date."
The case of Moriarty v. Regents Garage & Engineering
Company Limited(1 ) was particularly relied upon by the
learned counsel for the Sassoons. No question of dismissal or removal for misconduct arose in that case, but the
director whose remuneration was fixed "at the rate
of £150 per annum" ceased to be a director on settlement of disputes between himself· and the company,
the director agreeing to accept payment of all money
due to him upon his debentures and the debentures
being paid off in the middle of the year. The director
sued the company to recover a proportionate part of
the £150 as his fees for the broken period. The Deputy
County Court Judge gave judgment for the company,
(r) [r92r] 2 K.B. 766.
1 954
E. D. Sassoon
and Company Ltd.
v.
The Commission""
of Income-tax,
Bomba;• City.
Bhagwati].
328
1 954
E. D. Sassoon
rand Compa'!Y Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
.Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
holding that the director was not entitled to remuneration for a broken part of a year. The Divisional Court
reversed the decision of the Deputy County Court
Judge and there was a further appeal. It was held by
the Court of Appeal that neither under the Agreement
nor under the articles was the director entitled to the
sum he claimed. The question of the applicability of
the Apportionment Act was sought to be raised before
the Appeal· Court but was not allowed to be raised in
appeal as it had not been done in the County Court.
In arriving at this decision Lord Sterndale M. R. stated
the position as follows at page 774 :"It seems to me that upon the construction of the
agreement it must fail. It is a payment per annum, a
payment for a year, and unless he serves for the year
he cannot get the payment."
The decision in Swabey v. Port Darwin Gold Mining
Co.('), had been cited before the Court of Appeal in
support of the proposition that the director was in
such cases entitled to his proportionate_ remuneration
for the broken period. The Learned Master of the Rolls
however observed at page 777 :"There is nothing in Swabey v. Port Darwin Gold
Mining Co.( 1 ) in my opinion to oblige us to hold that
wherever there is power, mutual or one-sided, to terminate an agreement in the middle of the year, there
must, as a matter of necessity, be inferred a right to
receive payment from day to day, and receive payment
for the broken period. I do not think in this case there
are .circumstances which oblige me or induce me to
<lraw that inference."
These authorities as well as the cases of M apleson v.
Sears('), and Sanders v. Whittle( 3 ), enunciate the well·established principle that wages and salaries are not
apportioriable upon the sudden cessation of a contract
of service, which is stated to be still the law in Batt
on the Law of Master and Servant, 4th Edn., at page
209 until a hardy litigant successfully seeks in a
higher Court a confirmation of the view of McCardie J.
expressed in Moriarty's case(') as regards the injustice
(t) I Meg. 385.
(2) 28 T. L. R. 30.
(3) 33 L.T. 816.
(4) [1921] 2 K.B. 766.
-
I
'S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
329
-0£ denying the benefit ·of the Apportionment Act to
.a man who may have been guilty of mis.conduct.
This rule applies not only when there is a sudden
-cessation of a contract of service by the unilateral
.act of the master or the servant but also when
there is such cessation by mutual consent of the
parties. In the former event the servant would be
.deprived of his proportionate wages by his own act or
I
default or he would be able to sue his master for dam.ages for wrongful dismissal, but no claim for proportionate salary or wages would survive under the contract of service. In the latter event the consensus of
·opinion between the master and the servant would be
sufficient to terminate the contract of service and no
·daim for proportionate wages or salary would survive
unless it was made an express term of the Agreement
thus arrived at between the parties. In either event
there would be no question of the servant claiming
from his master wages or salary for the broken period.
Learned counsel for the transferees attempted to
throw doubt on the correctness of the rule as enunciated above by citing a passage from Palmer's Company
Precedents-16th Edition-Vol. 1, page 583, where the
learned author discusses the question of apportionment
-in the case of director's remuneration payable at so
much per annum:"Where the clause provides that a director is to be
paid so much per annum, the words 'at the rate of'
being omitted, and he vacates office before the end of
•
:a current year, the question whether he can maintain
:a claim for an apportioned part of the remuneration
for that year has given rise to some difference of
• I.. -opinion. In Swabey v. Port Darwin Gold Mining Company(1 ), in the Court of Appeal, the article was as
follows, and not as stated in the report : 'The directors
shall each receive by way of remuneration out of
the funds of the Company in each year the sum of
£200, and the chairman in addition £100 per annum.'
'The words 'at the rate of' were not present (as appears
from the articles registered at Somerset House). A
.director resigned in the course of a current year,
.. ""
(r) (1889 )1 Meg. 385.
1 954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company lid.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
BhagwatiJ.
330
1954
E D. Sassoon and
C.mpariJ [Jd.
v.
The-Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay Ci!J.
Bha,gwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
and was held entitled to an apportioned part of
remuneration for that year.
the-
But m Salton v. New Beeston Cycle Co.(1}, wherethe article provided that 'the directors shall be entitled to receive by way of remuneration m each year
£5,000,' Cozens-Hardy J. held that a director who·
vacated office before the end of a current year was not
entitled to any apportionment. This case was followed
by Wright J. in McConnell's Claim('), the words being
'each director shall be paid the sum of £300 per annum' ;
and by Bruce J. in Inman '" Acroyd and Bert('). See
also Central de Kapp Gold Mines('). In these four cases
the Court no doubt proceeded on the assumption that
the report of Swabey's case(') was correct, and that the
article m that case contained the words 'at the rate
of.' Certainly Lord Alverstone C. J. acted on this
assumption in Harrison v. British Mutoscope, etc., Co.( 6 ) •.
There the words were 'the sum of £ 1,500 per annum' •.
In the meantime Inman v. Acroyd(') had been taken
to the Court of Appeal, and affirmed, but on the ground
that it was by the articles left to the directors to·
apportion the remuneration at the end of each year.
This case, therefore, really turned on the construction of the particular article, and as it was carefully
distinguished from Swabey's case (' ), the authority of
that case, on an article omitting the words 'at the rate
of, remams unshaken." Swabey' s case(') was referred
to by Lord Sterndale M. R. at page 777 in Moriarty's
case(') and the learned Master of the Rolls stated
that there was nothing in that case which would'
oblige the Court to hold that wherever there was
power, mutual or one-sided, to terminate an Agreement
in the middle of the year, there must, as· a matter of
necessity, be inferred a right to receive payment from
day to day, and receive payment for the broken period(•) (i898] I Ch. 775.
!2) fI901J I Ch. 728.
(3) 1900J B2 L. T. 621, on appeal [1901] r Q.B .613,
(4J (!899 W.N. 216, 235, 69 L,J. Ch. •8 (Wright].).
(5) (•889) I Meg. 385.
(6) Times, Nov .10, 1903, p.3.
(7) [tgot] i QB. 613.
(8) [!921] 2 K.B.D. 766,
...
,
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
331
It really depended on the cir.cumstances of each case
whether to draw that inference or not. In any event
we have not before us under the terms of the Managing
Agency Agreements any provision for payment of remuneration "at the rate of" any particular sum a
year and the ratio of the four cases referred to by
Palmer in the passage quoted above as also the observations of Lord Sterndale M. R. at page 777 in Moriarty's case ( 1 ) set out above are sufficient to enable us to
hold that when the remuneration or commission is expressed at so much per annum without anything more
it would amount in law to a stipulation for the payment of remuneration per year and the servant would
not be entitled to get any remuneration unless and
until he has completely perforll).ed his contract and
such performance would be a condition precedent to
the recovery of any wages or salary for that definite
pe:riod of service. That would be the position even if
the remuneration was to accrue due and becomes vested
at stated periods and unless the servant performed the
condition and fulfilled his duty as a faithful servant
down to that stipulated date or the stated period no
salary would accrue due and become payable to him
until at the end of such period of service.
We shall now examine the terms of the Managing
Agency Agreements with a view to see whether the
Sassoons were entitled thereunder to remuneration or
commission for the broken periods. · the Agreement
between the E. D. Sassoon United Mills Ltd. and the
Managing Agents was for a fixed period of 30 years
from the date of the registration of the Company and
thereafter until they resigned or were removed from
their office by a special resolution of the Company and
the appointment of the firm of E. D. Sassoon and
Company and their assigns was for the whole period.
E. D. Sassoon and Company and their assigns covenanted and agreed with the Company to be and act as
such Agents for the remuneration and upon and subject
to the terms and conditions therein contained. It was
lawful for them to assign the agreement and their
rights thereunder to any person, firm or Company
(1) (1921] 2 K. B. D. 766.
3-87 S. C. India/59
1 954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Lid.
v.
The Commissioner
of lncom1-llJJr,
Bombay Ci!J.
Bhagwali J.
332
1954
E •.n. Sas.soon· and
Co"mpany Ltd.
v.
T ht COmmi.s.sfoner
of Income·lax,
Bambay City.
.Bhagwati ]:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
having authority by its constitution to become bound
by these obligations and upon such assignment being
made and notified to the Company, the Company was
bound to recognise such person, firm or Company as
the Agents of the Company in like manner as if the
name of such person, firm or Company had appeared in
these presents in lieu of the names of the partners of
E. D. Sassoon and Company and as if such person, firm
or Company had entered into the Agreement. with the
Company and the Company agreed upon demand to
enter into an Agreement appointing such person, firm
or · Company the Agents of the Company for the then
residue of the term outstanding under the Agreement
and with the like powers and authorities remuneration
and emoluments and subject to the like terms and
conditions as therein contained. These provisions ·of
the Agreement showed the continuity of the Managing
Agents who were employed as the Agents of the Company for this specified period and under the terms and
conditions therein recorded. The new or the substituted Managing Agents were treated as if. they had
entered into' the Agreement with the Company and
their name had appeared in the original Agreement in
lieu of E. D. Sassoon and Company who were in the
f.irst instance appointed the· Agents ·of the Company.
These ·Managing Agents · described as such were to be
paid the remuneration specified· in clause 2(a) of the
Agreement which . was a commission of 7! per cent.
per annum on the annual net profits of the Company·
with a stipulation in regard to the minimum remuneration of Rs. 1,20,000 per annum. Clause 2(d) specified
when the said commission was to become due to the
Managing Agents and it provided that the commission
was to be due to them yearly on the 31st March in
each and every year during the continuance of the
Agreement. The commission was thus an annual payment calculated upon ·the annual net profits of the
Company and was to be due to the Managing Agents
ye.aFly on .the '31st March in each and every year. Unless ··and ·Until the annual net profits of the Company
were determined the 7! per cent. commission could not
be ascertained but the sum none the less becami: due ·on
•
#'- ..
~.C.R.
_1
_I
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
333
the 31st March in each- and every year following the
dose of the accounting year of the Company. The
<amount of such commission did not become a debt
<>wing by the Company to the Managing Agents until
the 31st March in each and every year and was to be
paid immediately after the annual accounts of the
Company had been passed by the shareholders. The
postponement of the date of payment in this manner
however did not prevent the amount of the commission
thus ascertained becoming due to the Managing Agents
and it was on the 31st March in each and every year
that the amount of commission thus calculated at 7t
per cent. per annum on the annual net profits of the
·Company became due by the Company to the Managing
Agents. Until and unless the accounting year of the
'Company had gone by and the Managing Agents had
served the Company as their Agents for the full period
no part of the Managing Agency commission which was
payable per year in the manner aforesaid could become
-Oue to them and the performance of the service for the
year was a condition precedent to the Managing Agents
being entitled to any part of the remuneration or commission for the accounting year of the Company. The
Managing Agency Agreement therefore was an entire
-and indivisible contract stipulating a payment of remuneration or commission per year and enjoined upon
the Managing Agents the duty and obligation of rendering the services to the Company for the whole year by
·way of condition precedent to their earning any remuneration or commission for the particular -accounting
-year.
·
It was however urged that clause 10 of the Managing
·Agency Agreement itself contemplated a broken period,
because there · was nothing therein to prevent the
Managing Agents from assigning the Agreement and
their rights thereunder at any time in a particular year
dMring the continuance of the Agreement. If the
Managing Agents therefore could assign the Agreement
and their rights thereunder it could not be suggested
that neither the transferors who could not complete
the year of service nor the transferees who had also not
·Tendered the services as the Managing Agents for the
1 954
E. D. Sassoon ana
Company lid.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay Civ.
Bhagwati].
•
334
1954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
Thi Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwati].
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
whole of the accounting year could earn any remuneration or commission which would be payable to the
Managing Agents only if they rendered the services to•
the Company for the whole year. It therefore followed
as a necessary corollary that both the transferors and'
the transferees would be paid their remuneration or·
commission and both would be entitled to the propor- _;/..
tionate commission for the respective periods during
which they rendered services as Managing Agents to the·
Company. This argument however i1tnores the fact that
whatever be the position as between the transferor and
the transferee, whatever be their arrangements inter se,.
whatever be the periods of the year during which they
might have served the Company in their capacity as the
Managing Agents, the Managing Agents as described in
the recitals and clauses I and 3 of the Managing Agency
Agreement were one entity and no severance of such
periods of service during the course of a particular·
year was ever contemplated under the Agreement. On
assignment, the transferee became the Managing·
Agent as if its name had been inserted in the Managing
Agency Agreement from the beginning. For the future
period the transferor effaced itself and the transferee· ~--"
took the place of the transferor and preserved the con-tinuity of the Managing Agency so that whoever
happened to satisfy the description of the Managing
Agents at the time when the commission for the
accounting year became due to the Managing Agents
thus described, which was expressly stated to be due
yearly on the 31st March in each and every year,.
became entitled to receive the debt which thus became
due and to the payment thereof after the annual
accounts of the Company had been passed by the
shareholders. The stipulation for the Company execut-ing in favour of the new or the substituted Managing
Agents an Agreement appointing them the Agents of
the Company for the then residue of the term outstanding under the Agreement was merely consequential upon the earlier provision therein contained which
stated in so many terms that the Company was bouncf ..;.
to recognise such new or substituted Managing Agents.
in like manner as if their names had appeared in the
-
-
-
... r.
.... "'."
>-
~- ~
__.
A
..._
:s.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
335
said Agreement in lieu of the partners of E. D. Sassoon
and Company and as if they had entered into the
Agreement with the Company. The rights of such new
-or substituted Agents were created by the very terms
of clause 10 of the Agreement and the formal embodiment thereof in the fresh Agreement to be entered
into by the Company with them merely confirmed the
rights which had already been created in them under
that clause.
It was further pointed out that at the end of the
Managing Agency Agreement if not earlier, during the
.continuance thereof there would certainly be a broken
period because the period of 30 years stipulated in
dause 1 of the Agreement would certainly expire on
some date in February, 1950. The calendar year would
,expire on the 31st December, 1949, and there would
of necessity be between the date of the expiration of
the calendar year and the date ot the expiration of
the term of the agreement a period of about 2 months
which would certainly be a broken period and not a
full year. What would happen however on the expiration of the period of the Managing Agency Agreement
cannot affect the construction of the relevant terms of
the Agreement which have reference to a year or
years during the continuance of the Agreement. It is
unnecessary to speculate as to whether by reason of
the fact that E. D. Sassoon and Company must have
received the full year's remuneration or commission
at the end of the first accounting year of the Company
ending with the 31st December, 1920, they might
just as well give up, if need be, their remuneration or
commission for the last two months on the expiration
<Jf the term of the Managing Agency Agreement. We
-see nothing in the terms of the Managing Agency
Agreement which would compel or induce us to hold
that there must as a matter of necessity be inferred
therefrom a right to receive remuneration or commission for a broken period.
Learned counsel for Chidambaram Mulraj and Company Ltd. however sought to distinguish the terms of
the Managing Agency Agreement of the :F.lphinstone
Stiinning and Weaving Company Ltd. from those of the
1954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
B/iagwatiJ.
336
1954
E. D. Sassoon and
, Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
!Jombay City.
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
Managing Agency Agreement of the E. D. Sassoon
United Mills Company Ltd. even though as stated
before no such distinction was made either before the
income-tax anthorities or the High Court. He contended that there was nothing in the Agency Agreement
with the Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving 'Company
Ltd. which corresponded with clauses 2(a), 2(d) and
clause 10 of the Agreement between the E. D. Sassoon
United Mills and their Managing Agents. The only term
which was to be found in the Agency Agreement of the
Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. was
that the Company was during the continuance of
the Agreement to pay to the Managing Agents who
were there described as E. D. Sassoon and Company
Ltd. their successors and their assigns by way of remuneration a commission of ten per cent. on the net
profits of the Company and a further sum of Rs. 1.,500
per month. There was besides clause 6 of the Agreement
which conferred upon the Managing Agents the right
of retainer, and reimbursement in connection inter alia
with all sums due to them for commission or otherwise.
These terms it was submitted did not constitute the
payment of remuneration or commission a payment per
~
annum and it was not possible to argue that the Sas- '
soons were not entitled to any remuneration or commission for a broken period thereunder.
It may however be observed that the Managing
Agency Agreement with which we are here concerned
was the Agreement dated the 23rd May, 1922, between
the Company and the Sassoons and the Managing
Agents there described were E. D.' Sassoon and Company Ltd. on behalf of themselves, their successors and
assigns. Clause l of the Agreement employed the Sassoons, their successors and assigns the Agents of the
Company from the 1st February, 1922, for the unexpired
portion of the term of 60 years commencing from the
3rd July, 1919, and it was these Managing Agents thus
described, viz., the Sassoons, their successors and assigns, who were during the continuance of the Agreement to be remunerated by a commission of 10 per
cent. on the. net profi~s of the Company and the Com·pany agreed to pay such commission to them. The
. S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
337
right of retainer and reimbursement reserved under
clause 6 of the Agreement would not carry the transferees any further because it was in respect of all sums
due to them for commission or otherwise. Unless- and
until the comm1ss1on became due to them they
had no such right of retainer. It would still have to be
determined whether any sum became due to them by
way of such commission. Whe~her any commission became due to them would depend upon the construction
of clause 3 of the Agreement an<\ under that clause the
commission calculated at 10 per fent. of the net profits
of the Company was to become due to them and was
to be paid by the Company to diem during the continuance of the Agreement. We have got .to determine
what is the full implication of this clause of the Agreernent,-"the commission of 10 per cent. on the net
profits of the Company." The word "profits" has a welldefined legal meaning as was observed by Lord Justice
Fletcher Moulton at page 98 in The Spanish Prospecting Company Limited (1) :
"The word 'profits' has in my opinion a welldefined legal meaning, and this meaning coincides with
the fundamental conception of profits in general parlance, although in mercantile phraseology the word
may at times bear meanings indicated by the 'Special
context which deviate in some respects from this fundamental signification. 'Profits' implies a comparison
between the state of a business at two specific dates·
usually separated by an interval of a year. The fundamental meaning is -the amount of gain made by the
the business during the year. This can only be ascertained by a comparison of the assets of the business at
the two dates."
This concept of the term was also adopted by Mr.
Justice Mahajan, . as he then was, in . Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Company, Bombay(') :
"Profits of a trade or business are what is gained
by the business. The term implies a comparison between the state of business at two specific dates separated by an interval of a year and the fundamental
(1)[1911] 1 Ch. D.. 901.
(11)[1950) 18 I. T. R. 472 at page502.
1954
E. D. SaJSoon anti.
Company Ltd.
v~-
T he Commissioner
of Incorne·tax,
Eombay!City.
·-!"""
Bhagwati]..
338
1 95+
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
Yo
Tiu Commissiantr
-0f Income-tax,
Bombay CitJ.
BJiagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
meaning is the amount of gain made by the business
during the year and can on! y be ascertained by a comparison of the assets of the business at the two dates,
the increase shown at a later date compared to the
earlier date represents the profits of the business."
It was urged before us that there was nothing in the
terms of the Agreement which provided that the profits
were to be ascertained at the end of every year, and
there was nothing to prevent the Company if it so
chose from casting its ,accounts and ascertaining the net
profits half yearly or quarterly or even every month by
preparing trial balance sheets in that manner. Theoretically speaking all this may be possible but we have
got to construe the Agreements arrived at between
business people in a business sense. Ordinarily in the
case of business or trading concerns accounts of profits
are not made except at stated intervals usually separated by a year. Particularly in the case of limited Companies incorporated under the Indian Companies Act
the accounts are cast every year and the net profits earned by the Company are ascertained every year both for
the declaration of dividends and for submitting the returns to the income-tax authorities. Under section 131(1) of
the Indian Companies Act of 1913 every Company was
required once at least in every year and at intervals of
not more than 15 months to cause the accounts to be
balanced and a balance sheet to be prepared which was
called the annual balance sheet. The first schedule to
the Companies Act which contained the regulations by
which unless excluded the affairs of the Company were
to be governed provided under Regulation 106 the preparation once at least every year of the profit and loss
account for the period and under the Regulation 108
for the balance sheet to be made out in every year and
laid before the~ Company in general meeting. Having
regard to the course of business which prevailed in this
Company also so far as it is evidenced by the fact that
the account of the Managing Agency commission was
made up for the calendar year 1943 and was paid to
Chidambaram Mulraj and Company Ltd., who became
the Managing· Agents in place and stead of the Sassoons
in the year 1944, it is reasonable to assume that the
-
--~·
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
339
accounts of this Company were throughout made up
at the end of every calendar year. The profit and loss E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
of the Company was then ascertained and a commission
v.
Th• Commissioner
of 10 per cent. on the net profits of the Company was
of lncome·ltl!C,
pai<l to the Managing Agents of the Company for the
Bombay City.
time being. In the case of limited Companies like those
Bhagwati].
before us we would be justified in presuming that normally the accounts are made up every year and even
though there may be a theoretical possibility of the •
. accounts being cast half yearly or quarterly .or even
every month no such procedure woul<l be adopted by
the Company. In any event it would be absurd to
suggest that the profits of the Company could accrue
from day to day or even from month to month. The
working of the Company from day to day could certainly
not indicate any profit or loss. Even the working of the
Company from month to month could not be taken as
a reliable guide for this purpose. If the profit or loss
has got to be ascertained by a comparison of the assets
at two stated periods, the most businesslike way of
doing it would be to do so at stated intervals of one
year and that would be a reasonable period to be adopt. ed for the purpose. In the case of large business concerns like these the working of the Company during a
particular month may show profits and the working
in a particular month may show loss. The working
during the earlier part of the year may show profit or
loss and working in the later part of the year may show
loss or profit which would go to counter-balance the
profit or loss as the case may be in the earlier part of
·the year. It may as well happen that the profits which
the Company may appear to have earned during the
earlier months of the year or even during the 11 months
·or the year may be considerably reduced or even
wiped out during the later months or the last months
· of the year by reason of some catastrophe or unforeseen
· events. It would be therefore · reasonable to assume
that the profit or loss as the case may be should be
determined at the end of every year so that on such
·calculation of net profits the Managing Agents may be
.paid their remuneration or commission at the percen:tage stipulated in the Managing Agency Agreement and
340
1 954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
. v.
The Commissiorier
of lncom~~taxJ
Bombay City.
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19S5J
the shareholders also be paid dividends out of the net
profits of the Company. We are sure that these were
the considerations which weighed with the Managing
Agents of this Company in not taking up any such,
contention before the Income-tax authorities and th~
High Court that the remuneration or commission payable to them under the Managing Agency Agreement
was· not payable per year and the contention put for-ward before us in this behalf was a clear after-thought ..
We would be therefore justified in treating the terms.
and conditions in regard to the payment of Managing
Agency Commission· in both these Managing Agency
Agreements as on a par with each other stipulating forsuch payment per year on the net annual profits of theCompanies.
If this be the true construction of the Managing~
Agency Agreements it follows that the contract of ser-vice between the Companies and the Managing Agents.
was entire and indivisible, that the remuneration orcommission became due by the Companies to theManaging Agents only on completion of a definite period'
of service and at stated periods, that it was a condition precedent to the recovery of any wages or salaryfo respect thereof that the service or duty should becompletely performed, that such remuneration constituted a debt only at the end of each such period oF
service and that no remuneration or commission wa"'
payable to the Managing Agents for broken periods.
The question still remains whether the remuneration
for the broken periods accrued to the Sassoons and the. contention which was strenuoUllly urged before us onbehalf of the transferees was that the Sassoons · had'
rendered the services in terms of the Managing AgencyAgreements to the respective Companies, that the ser-.
vices thus rendered were the source of income and'
whatever income could be attributed to those services..
was earned by the Sassoons and accrued to them in the chargeable accounting period though it was ascertained,'
and paid in the year 1944 to the transferees.
· The word "earned" has not been used in section 4 of:
:the Income-tax Act. The section talks of "income,.
_;.
S.C.R.
.... <
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
341
profits and gains" from whatever source derived which
(a) are received by or on behalf of the assessee, or (b)
accrue or arise to the asses see in the taxable territories
during the chargeable accounting period. Neither the
word "income" nor the words "is received," "accrues"
and "arises" have been defined in the Act. The Privy
Council in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Shaw
Wallace & Ca.( 1 ) attempted a definition of the term
"income" in the words following :-
1 954
E. D. Sassoon ani
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner·
of Income-tax,
Bombdy City.
Bhagwati J._
"Income, their Lordships think, in the Indian
lncome-tax Act, connotes a periodical monetary return
'coming in' with some sort of regularity, or expected
regularity from definite sources. The sour.ce is not
necessarily one which is expected to be continuously
productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return, excluding anything in the
nature of a mere windfall."
Mukherji J. has defined these terms in Rogers Pyatt
Shellac & Co. v. Secretary of State for India( 2 ) :
"Now what is income ? The term is nowhere
defined in the Act ...... In the absence of a statutory
definition we must take its ordinary dictionary meaning-'that which comes in as the periodical produce
of one's work, business, lands or investments (considered in reference to its amount and commonly expressed in terms of money) ; annual or periC>dical receipts
accruing to a person or corporation" (Oxford Dictionary). The word clearly implies the idea of receipt,
actual or constructive. The Policy of the Act is to
· make the amount taxable when it is paid or received
either actually
or constructively. 'Accrues,' 'arises'
and 'is received' are three distinct terms. So far as
receiving of income is concerned there can be no difficulty ; it conveys a clear and definite meaning, and I
can think of no expression which makes its meaning
plainer than the word 'receiving' itself. The words
'accrue' and 'arise' also are not defined in the Act.
The ordinary dictionary meanings of these words have
got to be taken as the meanings attaching to them ..
'Accruing' is synonymous with 'arising' in the sense
(1) I. L.R. 59 Cal. 1343 at p. 1352.
(2) 1 J.T.C. 363 at p. 371.
'
342
t954
.E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
·The Commbsioner
of lnropie-tax,
BombayCi(l',
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
of springing as a natural growth or result. The three
expressions 'accrues/ 'arises' and 'is received' l1aving been used in the section, strictly speaking 'accrues'
should not be taken as synonymous with 'arises' but
in the distinct sense of growing up by way of addition
or increase or as an accession or advantage ; while the
word 'arises' means comes into existence or notice or
presents itself. The former connotes the idea of a growth
or accumulation and the latter of the growth or
accumulation with a tangible shape so as to be receivable. It is difficult to say that this distinction has
been throughout maintained in the Act and perhaps
the two words seem to denote the same idea or ideas
very similar, and the difference only lies in this that
one is more appropriate than the other when applied
to particular cases. It is clear, however, as pointed
out by Fry L.J. in Colquhoun v. Brooks('), [this part of
the decision not having been affected by the reversal
of the decision by the House of Lords(')] that both
the words are used in contradistinction to the word
"receive" and indicate a right to receive. They represent a stage anterior to the point of time when the
income becomes receivable and connote a character of
the income which is more or less inchoate.
One other matter need be referred to in connection
with the section. What is sought to be taxed must be
income and it cannot be taxed unless it has arrived at
a stage when it can be called 'income'."
The observations of Lord Justice Fry quoted above
by Mukerji J. were made in Colquhoun v. Brooks( 1 )
while construing the provisions of 16 and 17 Victoria
Chapter 34 section 2 schedule 'D'. The words to be
construed there were 'profits or gains, arising or accruing' .and it was observed by Lord Justice Fry at page
59:
"In the first place, I would observe that the tax is
in respect of 'profits or gains arising or accruing.' I
cannot read those words as meaning 'received by.' If
the enactment were limited to profits and gains 'received
(1) (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 52 at p. 59.
(•) (1889) 14 App. Cas. 493·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
by' the person to be charged, that limitation would
apply as much to all Her Majesty's subjects as
to foreigners residing in this country. The result
would be that no income-tax would be payable
upon profits which accrued but which were not
actually received, although profits might have been
earned in the kingdom and might have accrued in the
kingdom. I think, therefore, that the words 'arising
or accruing' are gentral words descriptive of a right to
receive profits."
To the same effect are the observations of Satyanarayana Rao J. in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras
v. Anamallais Timber Trust Ltd. (1) and Mukherjea J. in
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Ahmedbhai
Umarbhai & Co., Bombay (2) where this passage from
the judgment of Mukerji J. in Rogers Pyatt Shellac
& Co. v. Secretary of State for lndia( 8 ), is approved and
adopted. It is clear therefore that income may accrue
to an assessee without the actual receipt of the same.
If the assessee acquires a right to receive the income,
the income can be said to have accrued to him though
it may be received later on its being ascertained. The
basic conception is that he must have acquired a right
to receive the income. There must be a debt owed to
him by somebody. There must be as is otherwise
expressed debitum in presenti, solvendum in futuro;
See W. S. Try Ltd. v. Johnson (Inspector of Taxes)(4 )>
and Webb v. Stenton and Others, Garnishees( 5 ). Unless
and until there is created in favour of the assessee a
debt due by somebody it cannot be said that he has
acquired a right to receive the income or that income
has accrued to him.
The word "earned" even though it does not appear
in section 4 of the Act has been very often used in the
course of the judgments by learned Judges both in the
High Courts as well as the Supreme Court. (Vide Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., Bombay( 6 ), and Commissioner of Income-tax,
Madras v. K. R. M. T. T. Thiagaraja Chetty & Co.(7).
(1) 18 I.T.R. 333 at p. 342.
(5) II Q.B.D. 518 at pp. 522 and 527 •.
(2) ('!950] S.C.R. 335 at p. 389.
(6) (1950] S.C.R. 335 at p.364.
13) I I.T.C. 363 at p. 372.
(7) 24 I.T.R. 525 at p. 533.
(4) (1946] 1 A.E.R. 532 at p. 539.
1954·
E. D. Sassoott amt·
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissionn.
of Jru;ome-tax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwatij.
344
-'954
£. -D. Sassoon and
• Company Ltd.
v.
·The Commissioner
· of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
._.Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
It has also been used by the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in Commissioners of Taxation v. Kirk (').
The concept however cannot be divorced from that of
income accruing to the assessee. If income has accrued to the assessee it is certainly earned by him in the
sense that he has contributed to its production or the
parenthood of the income can be traced to him. But
in order that the income can be said to have accrued
to or earned by the assessee it is not only necessary
that the assessee must have contributed to its accruing
or arising by rendering services or otherwise but he
must have created a debt in his favour. A debt must
have come into existence and he must have acquired -a
right to receive the payment. Unless and until his
. contribution or parenthood is effective in bringing into
. existence a debt or a right to receive the payment or
in other words a debitum in presenti, solvendum in futuro
. it cannot be said that any income has accrued to him.
:·The mere expression "earned" in the sense of rendering
. the services etc., by itself is ·of no avail.
. . If ther~foie · on . the construction of the Managing
Agency Agreements we cannot come to the conclusion
· that the Sassoons had created any debt in their favour
. or had acquired a right to receive the payments from
the Companies as at the date of the transfers of the
·Managing Agencies· in favour of the transferees no in' come can be said to have accrued to them. They had
no doubt rendered services as Managir:g Agents of the
, Companies for the broken periods. But unless aqd
. until they completed their performance, viz., the completion of the definite period of service of a year which
was , a condition precedent to their being entitled to
receive the remuneration or commission
stipulated
·-thereunder, no debt payable by the Companies was
.· created in their favour and they had no right to receive
any payment from the Companies. No remuneration
· or commission could therefore be said to have accrued
~ to them at the dates of the respective transfers. ·
· · It was · however urged that even though no mcome
. can be said to ·have ' accrued to the Sassoons at the
, date of _tile respective transfers which could be the
.
'
(•) (igooJ:A.C. 5ss at p. 592.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
345
subject-matter of any assignment by them in favour
r9s1
of the transferees,· the moment the remuneration or
d
. . was ascertame
. d at t h e end . of t h.e ca
•I en d ar E.D.Sassoonan
comm1ss10n
Company Ltd.
year and became a debt due to the l\Ianagmg Agents
v.
under the terms of the l\Ianaging Agency Agreements The Commission"
it could be referred back to the period in which it .was of Income-t~x.
·earned arid the portions of the remuneration or com- Bombay City.
mission which were,' earned by the Sassoons during the Bhagwati J.
broken period could certainly then be said to be the
income which had accrued to them during the chargeable accounting period.
Reliance was placed is support of this position· on
Commissioners of lnland'Revenue v. Gardner.ftiountain
dJ D' Ambrumenil, Ltd.('). The assessee in that case
carried on inter alia the business of underwriting Agents,
and entered into Agreements with certain underwriters
at Lloyds under which it was entitled to receive as
remuneration for.its services in conducting the Agency,
commissions on the net profits of each year's underwriting. · The Agreements provided that "accounts
should be kept for the period ending 31st December
in each year and that each such account shall be made
up and balanced at the end of the second clear year
from the expiration of the period or year to which it
relates and the amount then remaining to the credit of
the account shall be taken to represent the amount of.
the net profit of the period or year to which it relates
and the commission payable to the Company shall be
calculated and paid thereon." The accounts for the
underwriting done in the calendar year 1936 were made
up at the end of 1938 and the question that arose was
whether the assessee was liable to additional assessment
in respect of the commission on underwriter's profits
from the policies underwritten in the calendar year
1936 in the year in which the policies were underwritten or in the year when the accounts were thus made
up. The assessee contended that the contracts into
which it entered were executorycontracts, under which
its services were not completed or paid for, as regards
commission, until the conclusion of the relevant
account; that the profit in the form of commission was
(1) 29 T.c. 69.
45
•
,
'
346
.'
. SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
.
.
[1955]
not ascertairn1ble orearned, and ·did not arise,. until
that time and that the additional assessment which
E.~. 8 "" 0 ";_1~ndwas made in the year in which the policies were underomp:?
·-written should accordingly be discharged. The Special
The Commission.• Commissioner allowed the assessee's contention and
of Income-tax, discharged the ·additional assessment. The decision of
Bombay City. the Special Commissioners was confirmed on appeal by·
Macnaghten J. in the King's Bench Division of the
Bkagwati f. High Court_ The Cou.rt of Appeal however reversed
this decision and a further appeal was taken by the
assessee to the House of Lords- The House of Lords
heid that on the true construction of the Agreements,
the commissions in question were earned by the assessee in the year in which the policies were underwritten,
and must be brought into .account accordingly and
confirmed the decision of the Court of AppeaL It may
be noted that the charge was on profits arising in each
chargeable accom;1ting period and the profits were to
be taken to be the actual profits arising in the chargeable accounting period. · The ratio of the decision was
that the commission paid was remuneration for services
completely performed in the particular year, that the
assessee had at the end of the year done everything it
had to do to earn it and that it was remuneration for
work done and completely done in.the particular year
though it was ascertained and paid two years later. Vis·
count Simon in his speech at page 93 stated. that the
assessee had acquired a legal right to be paid in futuro
and that the principle was to refer back to the year in
which it was earned so far as possible remuneration
subsequently received even though it could only be
precisely calculated afterwards- Lord \Vright in
his speech at page 94 said that it was necessary to
determine in what year the eommission was earned, or
in the language of the Act, in what year the assessee's
profits arose and observed at page 96 : "l agree with the Court of Appeal in thinking that the necessary conclusion from that must be that
the right to the commission is treated as a vested right
which has accrued at the time when the risk was
underwritten. It has then been earned, though the
profits resulting from the insurance cannot be then
1954
-
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
ascertained, but in practice are not ascertained until
the end of two years beyond the date of underwriting.
The right is vested, though its valuation is postponed,
and is not merely postponed but depends on all the
contingencies which are inevitable in any insurance
risk, losses which may or may not happen, returns of
premium, premiums to be arranged for additional risks,
reinsurance, and the whole catalogue of uncertain
future factors. All these have to be brought into account according to ordinary commercial practice and
understanding. But the delays and difficulties which
there may be in any particular case, however they may
affect the profit, do not affect the right for what it
eventually proves to be worth."
Lord Simonds in his speech at page 110 stated :"It is clear to me that the commission is wholly
earned in year 1 in respect of the profits of that year's
underwriting. If so, I should have thought that it was
not arguable that that commiss!on did not accrue for
income-tax purposes in that same year though it was
not ascertainable until later."
The fact that the account of the commission could
not be made up until later did not make any difference
to the position that the commission had been wholly
earned during the chargeable accounting period and the
income had accrued to the assessee during that period.
Learned counsel for the transferees also relied upon
the decisions in Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and
Silk Mills Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Madras( 1 ), and Turner Morrison and Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal( 2 ), to show
that as and when the sale proceeds were received by
the Company the profits made by the Company were
embedded in those sale proceeds and if that was so the
percentage of the net profits which was payable by the
Companies to the Managing Agents as and by way of
.commission was similarly' embedded in those sale
proceeds. If the profits thus accrued to the Company
during the chargeable accounting period the commission payable to the Managing Agents also could be said
to have accrued to them during that period.
(1) [1950] 18 I.T.R. 423.
-17 S C I ndia/59
(2) [1953] 23 I.T.R. 152.
1 954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
1
The Comrizissioner i
of Income-tax,
Bomb.ay City.
Bhagwati].
348
1 95 ...
E. D. Sassoon and
Company l.Jd.
v,
Thi Commissioner
of Income.tax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955)
It is no doubt true that the accrual of income does
not depend upon its ascertainment or the accounts
cast by assessee. The accounts may be made up at a
much later date. That depends upon the convenience
of the assessee and also upon the exigencies of the
situation. The amount of the income, profits or gains
may thus be ascertained later on the accounts being
made up. But when the accounts are thus made up
the income, profits or gains ascertained as the r~sult of
the account are referred back to the chargeable accounting period during which they have accrued or arisen
and the assessee is liable to tax in respect of the same
during that chargeable acco11nting period. "The computation of the profits whenever it may take place
cannot possibly .be allowed to suspend their accrual. .....
. . . . . . . . . . ". "The quantification of the commission
is not a condition precedent to its accrual." (Per
Ghulam Hassan f. in Commissioner of Income-tax,
Madras v. K. R. M. T. T. Thiagaraja Chetty and
Co.X 1 ) . See also Isaac Holden and Sons, Ltd. v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue('), and Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Newcastle Breweries Ltd.(' ) .
What has however got to be determined is whether the
income, profits or gains accrued to the assessee and
in order that the same may accrue to him it is necessary that he must have acquired a right to receive the
same or that a right to the income, profits or gains has
become vested in him though its valuation may be
postponed or though its materialisation may depen<l
on the contingency that the making up of the accounts
would show income, profits or gains. The argument
that the income, profits or gains are embedded in the
sale proceeds as and when received by the Company
also does not help the transferees, because the Managing
Agents have no share or interest in the sale proceeds
received as such. They are not co-sharers with the
Company and no part of the sale proceeds belongs to
them. Nor is there any ground for saying that the
Company are the trustees for the business or any of
the assets for the Managing Agents. The Managing
Agents cannot . therefore be said to _have acquired a
(1) 24 I.T.R. 525, at p. 534.
(2) 12 Tax Cases 768.
(3j 12 Tax Cases 927.
-,.au.,•
)-
.
•
.,
-',-
•
I
)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
349
1 954
right to receive any commission unless and until the
.accounts are made up at the end of the year, the net E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
profits ascertained and the amount of commission due
v.
by the Company .to the Managing Agents thus determiThi Commissioner
1
ned. (See Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Lebus( ) ).
of Income-tax,
Bomba> City.
It is clear therefore that no part of the Managing
Bhagwati].
Agency commission had accrued to the Sassoons at
the dates of the respective transfers of the Agencies
to the transferees.
The two decisions which were sought to be distinguished by the High Court in the judgments under appeal
also support this conclusion. In the unreported decision of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner
Qf Excess Profits Tax, Bombay City v. Messrs. P. N.
Mehta and Sons(2), the Managing Agency Agreement
was .couched in the very same terms as that of the
E. D. Sassoon United Mills Company Ltd. The Managing Agents were to be paid 10,per cent. of the net annual
profits made by the Company with a guaranteed minimum commission of Rs. 15,000 per annum. The
accounting year of the Company was the calendar year.
The Tribunal had held that the annual profits could
only be ascertained when the accounts of the Company
were made up and it was then that the 10 per cent.
commission would accrue to the Managing Agents. The
contention of the Department was that as the Managing
Agents worked as such from day to day and helped the
Company to earn profits, profits accrued to them from
day to day and not at the end of the year. This contention was negatived by the High Court :"It is only on net annual profits that the Managing
Agents are entitled to any commission. A Company
may have worked for six months at a loss, for the
remaining six months it may make a large profit so as.
to wipe off the loss, and have a net profit to show. It
is only as a rnsult of the working of the Mills for the
whole year that it will be possible to ascertain whether
the Mills have worked at a loss or at a profit, and what
the profit was. Therefore, the Managing Agents are
only entitled to a commission on the result of the
(1) [1946] 1 A. E. R. 476; s.c. 27 Tax Cases 136.
(2) [1950] I. T. Ref. No. 19 of 1950.
'
•
350.
'954
1£. D. Sassoon and
Company Ud.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income~tax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwati J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
working of the Mills for a whole year. If the working
shows a net annual profit which gives them a commission of more than Rs. 15,000 on the basis of 10 per
cent., they are entitled to that amount. If, on the·
other hrnd, the working does not show a profit which
entitles them to a commission of Rs. 15,000 they are
in any case entitled to that amount. Therefore in our
opinion, the Tribunal rightly held that the accrual of
the commission was at the end of the calendar
year, which was the year maintained by the Mills and
not from time to time as contended by the Depart1nent."
In the case of Salt and Industries Agencies Ltd.,
Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City( 1 )",
the question for the consideration of the Court no
doubt was what was the place where the profits had
accrued. In determining the place where the profits
had accrued it was however necessary to find when the
profits had accrued to the assessee and it was held that
what was conclusive of the matter was the consideration as to when the right to Managing Agency commission arose and when did the Company become
liable to pay Managing Agency commission to the
Managing Agents and it was further held that it was
only when all the accounts of the working of the company were submitted to the head office in Bombay and
the profit was determined that it could be said that a
right to receive a commission at the rate specified in
the Managing Agency Agreement had arisen and the
Managing Agents became entitled to a certain specified
commission. These considerations are germane to the
question which we have to decide in these appeals and
support the conclusion which we have already arrived
at, that the right to receive the commission would arise
and the income, profits or gains would accrue to the
Managing Agents only at the end of the calendar year
which was the terminus a quo for the making up of the
accounts and ascertaining the net profits earned by the
Company. We fail to see how tl1ese cases which were
relied upon by the Revenue before the High Court could
be distinguished in the manner in which it was done.
(r) r8 I.T.R. 58.
.
\
S.C.R.
t
,.t
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
351
We were invited by the learned counsel for the
Sassoons to approach the question from another point
<Jf view and that was that what had been transferred
by the Sassoons to the transferees was a source of
income, viz., the Managing Agency which was to run for
the unexpired residue of the term. It was urged that
where a source of income was transferred any income
which accrued from that source after the date of the
transfer was the transferees' income and not of the
transferors, and that it was immaterial (a) that at the
date of the transfer there was an expectation that at a
future date income would accrue, (b) that the transferor
bv the work before the transfer had contributed to
c;eate any in.come which might eventually accrue and
( c) that because of the expectation of income a higher
price had been paid for the transfer.
Reliance was placed in this connection on the case
<Jf Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Forrest (1 ).
In that case the assessee purchased certain shares on
the 25th November, 1919, and paid an excess price "to
cover the portion of the dividend accrued to date." A
dividend of 10 per cent. for the period ending on 28th
February, 1920, was declared on the 13th May, 1920.
The contention of the assessee was that the dividend
should be treated as capital in view of the terms of the
contract of purchase and not included in the computation of his income. Under the provisions of the Incometax Act the dividends which were receivable by him
were required to be included in the computation of his
income. The learned Judges however discussed the.
legal effect of such a transaction of the purchase of
shares. Lord Ormidale observed at page 709 :"The value of the shares had to be determined as
a matter of bargain between the parties, and the purchaser thought that it was not unreasonable that he
should pay something over par for them because of the
possibility, not the certainty but the possibility, of a
dividend six months afterwards being paid upon the
shares so purchased by him."
Lord Anderson observed at page 710 :( 1) 8 Tax Cases 704.
1954
E. D. Sassoon and
C,ompany Ltd.
v.
The Commissiorur
of Income-tax,
Bombay Ci!Y.
Bhagwali].
•
352
1954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commisiontr
of Income-lax,
Bombay City.
BhagwatiJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
"He buys two things with his money. He buys,
in the first place, a share of the assets of the industrial
concern proportionate to the number of shares which
he has purchased ; and he also buys the right to participate in any profits which the Company may make . in
the future. J:'low, when a transaction of this nature is
entered into during the currency of the financial year
of the industrial concern it is obvious that what
happens is this, that not only is a part of the assets
purchased outright but that a chance is bought as
well-a chance of sharing in any profits which may be
made during the currency of that financial year."
Wigmore (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Thomas Summerson and Sons, Limited ( 1 ) was the case of a vendor
of war loan stock bearing interest payable , without
deduction of tax. The sale was effected on the 10th
April, 1923, with interest rights. The vendor was
assessed for the year 1923-24 in respect of the amount
of interest said to have accrued on the stock in the
period between the last payment of interest and the
sale of the stock, it being contended that the price
received by the vendor on sale of stock included this
interest. The purchasers said that they were not liable
to tax in respect of the income which had been accruing on the security they had purchased in a period
•anterior to the date on which they purchased. It was
observed that the truth of the matter was that- the
vendor did not receive interest and interest was the
subject-matter of the tax. But he received the price
of an expectancy of interest which was not the subject
of taxation. It was not argued that the interest accrued
de die in diem and the vendor. was held not assessable
in respect of the interest accrued at the date of the sale
of the stock.
Commissionas of Inland Revenue v. Pilcher( 2 ) was
the case of the sale of an orchard inclusive of the
year's fruit crop. The assessee had valued the cherries
which were on the trees at £ 2,500 and had put ·a man
immediately in the orchard after he had purchased it
at the auction. He commenced to pick the fruit on the
25th May, 1942, and completed the operations on the
(1) 9 Tax Cases 577.
(2) 31 T.-x Cases 314.
-
•
,l.
••
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
12th June, 1942. He realised £ 2,903 as the price of the
cherries. This sum was brought into the profit and loss
account as a trading receipt and the contention of the
assessee ·was that in computing his profits he was entitled to charge the sum of £ 2,500 being the purchase
price of the cherries sold for £ 2,903 which sum had
been brought into credit as a trading receipt. This contention was negatived and it was observed by Lord
Justice Jenkins at page 332 :"It is a well settled principle that outlay on the
purchase of an income-bearing asset is in the nature of
capital outlay, and no part of the capital so laid out
can, for income-tax purposes, be set off as expenditure
against income accruing from the asset in question."
There is a further passage in the judgment of Jenkins
L. J. at page 335 which is very instructive. It had been
contended that the revenue should look at the transaction from the assessee's point of view and should cpnsider it in a manner favourable to him. This contention
was dealt with in the manner following :"One has to remember that this transaction concerned not merely Mr. Pilcher but also the vendor of
the orchard. Mr. Pilcher was able to buy the orchard
complete with the cherries from the vendor and by
that means, according to his own calculation, the
cherries stood him in £ 2,500. It by no means follows
that if he had been minded to buy the cherries from
the vendor apart from the land, as a separate transaction, the vendor would have been willing to sell them
to him for £ 2,500, or at any price. The difference ii
obviously a material one from the vendor's point of
view because, dealing with the matter as he did, he was
selling a capital asset, and the resulting capital receipt,
prima facie, would attract no tax. If he sold the
cherries separately in the way of trade he would at
once have created an income receipt on which, prima
facie, tax would have been exigible. Therefore the
alteration in the form of the bargain required to make
it more favourable to Mr. Pilcher from the tax point
of vie'-": would have involved an alteration not merely
of form but of substance owing to its adverse effect on
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
V•
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwati ].
354
'954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
iof Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwa#J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955J
the tax situation of the vendor, and it cannot be
assumed that the bargain thus altered would have
been one to which Mr. Pilcher could have secured the
vendor's agreement."
These observations throw considerable light on the
situation obtaining in the cases before us. It will be
remembered that the total amount of Rs. 75,77,693
received by the Sassoons on the transfers of the Managing Agencies was taken by them to the "Capital Reserve
Account." No part of that amount was treated by
them as a receipt of income and it is debatable whether
any part of the same could have been allocated as a
receipt of income even though the transferees had
desired to do so. All that the transferees obtai1ml
under the deeds of assignment and transfer executed
by the Sassoons in their favour was an income bearing
asset consisting of the office of Managing Agents, the
Managing Agency Agreement and all the rights and
beriefi ts as such Managing Agents under the Agreements
and no part of the consideration paid by the transferees
to the Sassoons could be allocated as a receipt of
mcome by reason of their contribution towards the
earning of the commission in the shape of services
rendered by them as Managing Agents of the Companies for the broken periods. What the transferees
obtained under the deeds of assignment and transfer
was the expectancy of earning a commission in the
event of the condition precedent by way of complete
performance of the obligation of the Managing Agents
under the Managing Agency Agreements being fulfilled
and a debt arising in favour of the Managing Agents
at the end of the stated periods of service contingent
on the ascertainment of net profits as a result of the
working of the Company during the calendar year.
The last case to which we were referred by the
learned counsel for the Sassoons was The City of London
Contract Corporation, Limited v. Styles (Surveyor of
Taxes)('). The part of the business taken over by the
assessee in that case consisted of unexecuted and partly
executed contracts. The contracts were executed after
the date of the purchase by the assessee aad the
[r) 2 Tax Cases .239·
•
> ..
.... '
...
A
S.C.R.
•
.l
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
.assessee sought to deduct the price paid for the contracts from the profits arising from their performance.
This deduction was not allowed, because whatever
price the assessee paid for the purchase of the business
was treated as the capital which had been invested for
the purpose of acquiring that business and the assessee
could not deduct from the net profits of the working of
the business after the date of the purchase any part of
the capital which had been thus invested by it. This
result was achieved even though in the purchase of
unexecuted contracts there was included the part of
the work done towards the performance of the contracts by the vendors. The assessee derived the benefit
from such partial execution of the contracts by the
vendors ; nevertheless the value of such work was not
treated as any income which had accrued to the
vendors and which the assessee was entitled to deduct
from its profits arising from the performance by it of
those unexecuted contracts.
Learned counsel on behalf of the transferees conten<led that all these cases were concerned with the
<JUestion whether the income derived by the assessee
-out of the income bearing asset after the date of the
purc}iase could be treated as a capital expenditure so
far as it formed part of the consideration paid by the
:assessee to the vendors and in none of these cases were
the Courts concerned with the question that arises
before us, viz., whether any part of the income which
was actually received by the assessees could be said to
have accrued to the vendor. Even though the question
<lid not arise in terms it is nonetheless involved in the
consideration of the question whether the assessee was
liable to pay the income-tax on the whole of the income thus derived by him. As was pointed out by
Jenkins L. J. in Commissioner of Inland Revenue and
v. Pilcher(1), quoted above, the vendor's point of view
cannot be neglected and once you come to the conclusion that the assesse alone is liable it necessarily follows
that the vendor certainly has nothing to do with the
same. If it were otherwise the vendor would certainly
be liable to tax and no purchaser would miss the
()pportunity of avoiding his liability for that portion of
(r) 31 Tax Cases 314 at p. 335.
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
The CommiJSioner
of Income-I ax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwati].
356
1 954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
Tht Commissioner
of lncoma-tax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwati J·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
the income which can be said to have accrued to the
vendor. As a matter of fact such a contention was taken
by the purchasers in Wigmore (H. M. Inspector of
Taxes) v. Thomas Summerson and Sons Limited('),
where they declined to be assessed for tax in respect
of income which had been accruing on the securities
they had purchased in a period anterior to the date
at which they did purchase. This contention however
did not prevail and the vendors were held not assessable in respect of the interest accrued on the date of
the sale of the stock.
It is therefore clear that the Sassoons had not earned any income for the broken periods nor had any
income accrued to them in respect of the same, and
what they transferred to the transferees under the
respective deeds of assignment and transfer did not
include any income which they had earned or had
accrued to them and which the transferees by virtue
of the assignment in their favour were in a position 'to
collect. If any debt had accrued due to the Sassoons
by the respective Companies at the dates of respective
transfers of Managing Agencies such debt would certainly have been the subject-matter of assignment. But
if what was transferred' by' the Sassoons to the respective transferees were merely expectations of earning
commission and not any part of the commission actually earned by them or which had accrued to them
under the terms of the Managing Agency Agreements,
what the transferees received from the Companies
under the terms of the Managing Agency Agreements
which were thus transferred to them would be their
income and no part of such income could ever be said
to have accrued to the Sassoons, during the chargeable
accounting period.
In view of the above it is unnecessary to deal with
the contention which was urged by the learned counsel
for the Sassoons that even if there be an assignment of
income the assignee and not the assignor would be
liable to pay the tax. He referred us to the case of the
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Presidency v.
Tata Sons Ltd. ( 2 ) , in support of this contention of his
and he also referred us to note 'G' at page 209 in
(1) 9 Ta.< Cases 577.
(2) [1939] 7 I. T. R. 195.
•
.
S.C.R.
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
Simon's Income-tax, 2nd Edn., Vol. II, where the ratio
of Parkins v. Warwick (H.M. Inspector of Taxes)( 1 ),
relied upon by the High Court in the judgments under
appeal has been criticised. We do not however think it
necessary to go into this question as in our opinion
there were no debts due by the Companies to the Sassoons which were assigned under the respective deeds
of transfer and assignment.
The only question which remains to consider is whether section 36 of the Transfer of Property Act
imports the principle of apportionment in regard to the
commission received by the transferees herein. Section
36 of the Transfer of Property Act provides-"ln the
absence of a contract or local usage to the .contrary,
all rents, annuities, pensions, dividends and other
periodical payments in the nature of income shall,
upon the transfer of the interest of the person entitled
to receive such payments, be deemed, as between the
transferor and the transferee, to accrue due from day
to day, and to be apportionable accordingly, but to be
payable on the days appointed for the payment thereof." It may be noted that the section applies in the
absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary
and also applies as between the transferor and the
transferee. There is no room for the application of
these provisions. as between the subject and the Crown.
(Vide The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Henderson's Executors ( 2 ). The contract to the contrary must
of necessity be as between the transferor and the transferee and it is only when there is no such contract to
the contrary that the rents, annuities, pensions, dividends and other periodical payments in the nature of
income become apportionable as between the transferor
and transferee, deemed to accrue due from day to day
and be apportionable accordingly. The deeds of assignment and transfer executed by the Sassoons in favour
of the transferees transferred an· the rights and benefits
under the Agency Agreement to the transferees and
there was no question of apportionment of any com-
mission between the Sassoons and the transferees. In
fact the transferees claimed to retain and did retain
(1) [1943] 25 Tax Cases 419.
12) 16 Tax Cases 2B2 at p. 291.
1954
E. D. Sassoon anrl
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwati].
358
£. D. Sassoon and
Compan_i• Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Bhagwati].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the whole of the commission which had been paid by
the Companies to them in the year 1944 and the Sassoons never claimed any part of it as having been
earned by them. Whatever was their contribution
towards the earning of that commission during the
whole of the calendar year 1943 was the subjectmatter of the assignment in favour of the transferees
and that was sufficient to spell out a contract to the
contrary as provided in section 36 of the Transfer of
Property Act.
Section 26(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act also does
not help the transferees because it is only when the
person succeeded has acquired an actual share of the
income profits or gains 'Of the previous year that he is
liable to tax in respect of it and as set out herein above
no part of the commission actually accrued to or became a debt due by the Company to the Sassoons on
the dates of the respective transfers of the Managing
Agencies to the transferees. In order to attract the
operation of section 26(2) the person succeeded must
have had an actual share in the income, profits or gains
of the previous year and on the construction of the
Agreements the Sassoons cannot be said to have
acquired any share in commission for the broken
periods.
The whole difficulty has arisen because the High
Court could not reconcile itself to the situation that
the transferees had not worked for the whole calendar
year and yet they would be held entitled to the whole
income of the year of account ; whereas the transferors
had worked for the broken periods and yet they would
be held disentitled to any share in the income for the
year. If the work done by the transferors as well as the
transferees during the respective periods of the year
were taken to be the criterion the result would certainly
be anomalous. But the true test under section 4(1)(a)
of the Income-tax Act is not whether the transferors
and the transferees had worked for any particular
periods of the year but whether any income had accrued to the transferors and the transferees within the
chargeable accounting period. It is not the work done
or the services rendered by the person but the income
'
,
•
-
'
r--------------------------------
SUP.REME COURT .REP.ORTS
recei,v~d.
359
,the income which •. h~s ;iccrued to the
peqpp withii+ tli.e charge;ible accounting period that
is ~h~ .subject-l)'latter- qf·, taxation. 'f.hat is the proper
method of approacp- while ·considering the, taxability or
otherwis~ pf, .income_ and no considerations of the work
done foi; brokq1 periods oi; .C!mtribut\ou. made towards
th<; u\tima~e lnco111e .di:tixed from the .source of .inctJll;ie
no.r ,apy equitabl<; ,qonsi\terations can mak~ any <liffer~
,enc;<; , tq the pasitiol): ;.vhkh r.ests el),tirely oli 1. a $trict
iptrrpi:~il!ti_op qf tl,,e provisions ot section 4(1) (a).. pf.. the
Incoz;n<;-t'll:' Act.,
1.
1
•
oy
1 954
-J
E. D... Sassoon anti
Company Ltd.
.v.
Thi Commissiotli1'
of /ncome·tax,
Bombay Cit?.
\ Bhagwati J ~
. '.'Th~ fes\111 'theref9re ·is tliat the q~estion referred ~y
tb/ Tribunal td tbe High Court 'must' be answered 'in
the r/egadve. ~Il the appeals "will .accordingly b~
alfowej:l: 'But as r'egar'ds the costs, under the peculiar
circumstances of tltese appeals where the Commissioner
o~ Income-tax, Bo{Ilbay, has supported t)ie Sassoons in
C~vil Appeal No. 3 1of 1953· and the brunt of the attack
in Civil l}ppeals Nos. 30 of 1953 and 31 of 1953 has
been borne not by the Commissioner of the Income-tax
wh.o is the appellant in both, but by the Sassoons, th~
proper order should be that each party should bear
and pay his own costs here as well as in the Court
below.
• l
]AGANNADHADAS J.-I am unable to agree with the
judgment just delivered~on behalf of both my learned
brothers. It is with considerable regret that I feel
constrained to write a separate jiidgmen'.t expressing the reasons for my not being able to agree
":'.ith them in spite of my profound respect' for thefr
Jagannadhadas ].
Vil.CWS.
'
I
f
I
L
..
These three are appeals against a judgment of the
Bombay High Court by leave granted under section 66A (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. They adse
out of a set of facts mostly common. E. D. Sassoon
and Company, Ltd. now in voluntary liq,nidation (heteinafter referred' fo as the Sassoons) had the Managing
Agency of threB Mills (1) E. D. Sassoon United Mills
Ltd. ·(2) Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills
Company, Ltd., and (3) The Apollo Mills l;ttl, With the
•
360
1 954
E. D. Sassoon
and Company LtJ.
v.
The Commissiontt
.of Jncomt-lax,
.Bombay Ciry.
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955 J
consent of the Mill Companies and by virtue of clauses
in the Managing Agency Agreements enabling thereunto, the Sassoons transferred the Managing Agency of
the three Mills to three other· Companies during the
course of the calendar year 1943 as follows : ( 1) to
Agarwal and Company, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to
as Agarwals) on the 1st December, 1943, (2) to Chidambaram Mulraj an<l Company, Ltd. (hereinafter referred
to as Chidambarams) on the 1st June, 1943, and (3) to
Rajputana Textile (Agencies) Ltd., on the 1st July,
1943. The assessments with which we are . concerned
are those of (1) Sassoons, (2) Agarwals, and (3) Chidambarams and relate to income by way of Managing
Agency remuneration paid in the year 1944 by the Mill
Companies to the respective assignee-Companies for the
calendar year 1943. For Sassoons and Agarwals the
assessment year was 1944-45 and the accounting year
was the calendar year 1943. For Chidambarams the
assessment year was 1945-46 and
the
chargeable
accounting period was from 1st July, 1943, to 30th
June, 1944. The tax was assessed on the basis not of
receipts but of accrual. The income-tax authorities
treated the total remuneration for the entire year 1943
in each case as income which accrued to the assigneeCompanies in the respective accounting periods. The
assignee-Companies objected on the ground that part of
the remuneration, up to the date of the respective
assignments,
accrued to the assignor-Company, viz.,
Sassoons and that they were, therefore, liable to be
assessed only in respect of the balance of the remuneration referable to the portion of the calendar year 1943
subsequent to the respective dates of the assignments.
The objection was· overruled and the assessments were
made. On appeals to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, their contention was accepted and the assessments were modified. It may be mentioned that the
Rajputana Textiles (Agencies) Ltd. does not appear
to have filed any appeal to the Tribunal. Meanwhile
(presumably by way of caution) the income-tax authorities issued notices to the assignor-Company, viz.,
Sassoons, under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax
Act and assessed it in respect of the proportionate pan
,
•
)
• -fl" S.C.R.
'
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
361
-0f the year's Managing Agency commission up to the
date of the respective assignments. The Sassoons
objected to this before the income-tax authorities, .but
the objection was overruled. It has been stated to us
in the case filed by the Sassoons in this Court that the
entire net consideration for the three assignments was
taken by them into their accounts as capital reserve.
But this finds no mention in the Tribunal's statement
of the case to the High Court. How the Sassoons made
entries in their own accounts is not decisive and has
not been relied on before us. On their objection being
overruled, the Sassoons filed an appeal to the Incometax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected the
appeal in view of the decision they had already given
in the appeals filed by the two assignee-Companies,
Agarwals and Chidambarams. The three Companies
concerned obtained references to the High Court under
section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act. The question
referred by the Tribunal in each of the three cases was
the same and is as follows :
~
"Whether in the circumst'ances of the case, was
the Managing Agency commission liable to be apportioned between the assessee Company and the assignee
(or assignor, as the case may be)."
The High Court· answered the question against the
Sassoons and in favour of the other two. What th~
High Court held was in substance that ( 1) the Managing Agency remuneration for the year in question
accrued as· the joint income of both the assignor and
the assignee and was apportionable between them, and
(2) the assignee-Companies received the assignor's share
of the joint income by virtue of the assignments of the
assignor's share and hence to that extent it was not
their taxable income but continued to be the taxable
income of the assignor. There are thus three appeals,
one by the Sassoons against the Income-tax Commissioner and the other two by the Income-tax Commiss10ner against Agarwals and Chidambarams respectively. In the first of the appeals, the Income-tax
Commissioner supports the position taken up by the
Sassoons, while in the other two the Commissioner is
the appellant and contests the position taken by the
1954
E. D. Sassoon
and Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income·tax,
Bombay Ciry.
Jagannadhadas J.
362
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
.......
1 954
Agarwals and the Chidambarams. Thus it will be seen
that though in form the three appeals are each between the Income-tax Commissioner and one of the three
v.
Companies, in fact they raise a controversy between
The Commissioner
of /ncome~tax,
the assignor-Company, the Sassoons, on the one side
Bombay City.
and the two assignee-Companies, the Agarwals and the
Jagannadhadas J.
Chidambarams on the other, the Commissioner supporting the Sassoons and opposing the other two.
The arguments before us covered a wide range and
were advanced on the assumption that what the High
Court held was that the Sassoons became entitled on
the very date of the respective assignments to a proportionate share of the year's remuneration for the
Managing Agency, and that accordingly that share
accrued to the Sassoons as their taxable income, then
and there, and did not cease to be such notwithstanding the assignment thereof. The case was accordingly
debated before us as though the decision turned upon
the question whether any income could accrue to the
Sassoons on the dates of the respective transfers of the
Managing Agency to the transferees. It is necessary,~
therefore, to clarify, at the outset, what the question
was which was directly raised on the reference made
to the High Court and what, in the view of the High
Court, was the date when a share of the year's remuneration accrued to the Sassoons as its income. It appears
to me that the judgment of the High Court taken as a
whole is based only on the view that the entire Managing Agency remuneration for the year accrued on the
completion of the year, i.e., on the 31st December, 1943,
and that when it so accrued it accrued both to the
assignor and to the assignee together. This appears
from the following passage of the judgment of the High
Court.
"In order to levy, income-tax it is not enough to
enquire when a particular income accrues. What is
more ·important and what is more pertinent is to e_nquire whose income it is which is sought to be taxed.
Assuming that this particular income accrued on the
31st December and till 31st December there was nothing
earned, even so, when the income does accrue the
question still remains to be answered as to whose
E. D. Sassoon
and Company Ltd.
,
S.C.R.
.,
-
.\.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
363
rncome it 1s which has accrued on the 31st December,
1943."
It appears to me also that it is on the footing of the
accrual on the completion of the year that the High
Cou;t dealt with the question of assignment of the
income as appears from the following passage :
"And clearly one of the rights which E. D. Sassoon
and Company, Ltd. had, was to receive the Managing
Agency commission (share therein?) when it accrued on
31st December. .......... They transferred that right."
From these passages it appears to me clear that the
High Court proceeded on the view that income accrued
at the end of the year to. both together and that what
passed to the assignee under the assignment included
a future right of the assignor to a share in the remuneration, when it accrued on the completion of the year,
and not on the view that the assignment operated as
tlie transfer of a present right to such a share on the
very date of the assignment. It is in view of the
assumption that the remuneration for the year accrued
only on the 31st December, that the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal also took care to say, in making
their reference to the High Court, as follows :
"The question is not when the Managing Agency
commission accrued. The real question is to whom it
acc:_rued."
It appears to me, therefore, that it is not correct to
approach the consideration of this case as though the
decision therein turns directly upon the question whether any income had accrued to the Sassoons on the
dates of the respective transfers of the Managing
Agency to the transferees.
In the arguments before us considerable stress was
laid by learned counsel appearing for the Sassoons on the
fact that the Managing Agency Agreements with which
we are concerned provide for annual remuneration for
an year's work. It was pointed out that the remuneration payable was fixed as commission at a certain
specified percentage of the net profits of the respective
Mill Companies. So far as the Sassoons United Mills
Ltd., are concerned, whose Managing Agency had been
5-87 S. C. India/59
1954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
!;The Commissiomr
of Income-tax,
Bombay Ci(r .
Jagannadhadas J.
364
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1955]
assigned to Agarwals, the comm1ss1on was in terms
stated in the Agency Agreement to be per annum and
on the annual net profits of the Company. So far as
Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Company,
Ltd., are concerned, whose Managing Agency was a~signed to Chidambarams, the remuneration is merely statJagannadhadas J.
ed in the corresponding Agreement to be a percentage
of the net profits of the company, but is not in terms
stated to be per annum or on the annual net profits.
But there can be no reasonable doubt that as a matter
of construction, the remuneration in the latter case
•
also must be taken to be per annum and on the annual
net profits, notwithstanding some argument before us
to the contrary. Having regard to this basic fact, the
following are, in substance, the arguments put forward
before us by learned counsel for the assignor-Sassoons.
(1) The Managing Agency commission was payable m
respect of services for an entire calendar year and not
for a portion thereof and therefore no comm1ss10n became due to the Sassoons for the services rendered by
them to the respective Mill Companies for broken
periods of the year up to the dates of the respective
assignments. (2) Since no remuneration became a debt
due to the Sassoons from any of the Mill Companies on
the dates of the respective assignments, no taxable income accrued to them for the broken periods. (3) By
the dates of the respective assignments, the Sassoons
had only a bare expectancy, if any, to receive remuneration for the broken period and this expectancy could
not be the subject-matter or any assignment, and (4)
The true legal position, therefore, 1s that what was
assigned was an income bearing asset, viz., the Managing
Agency which was the source of income and which
entitled the respective assignees to receive all the ,i
remuneration for the year payable under the Managing
Agency Agreement subsequent to the respective dates
of assignment. Accordingly the same became in its
entirety taxable income in the hands of the respective
assignees and no portion of it accrued at any time as
taxable income of the assignor-Sassoons.
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
Th• Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
In the view that I take of the High Court's judgment as to the date of accrual of the income and as to ,_
•
'
,l
~
I
'
s.c..R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
365
the scope of the question presented on the_ reference,
z954
the first three of the above arguments· do not appear
-·to me to call for any examination. In the presentE·g·s;sso~~·&
case no question arises as to the enforceability of the "'" ':'.'.Y ·
claim for a proportionate share of the remuneration by TheCommissianer
the assignor from the very date of assignment. Nor of Income-tax,
does any question arise as to the non-payability of Bombay City,
remuneration on account of non-completion of the
~. aa
·work. The year's work has been completed by the 1agann a sf.
assignee-Company. in continuation of that of the
. assignor-Company. The total remuneration for the
year has in fact been paid into the hands of ·the
assignee-Company. The only questions, therefore, are .
(1) whether the money so received accrued by way of
. remuneration for the year's work and became taxable
income on the 31st December, 1943, (2) if so, whether
it was the joint income of the assignor and the assignee
or the sole income of the assignee, and (3) whether the
assignment operated to transfer the assignor's share of.·
the income on its accrual.
The answer to the first of the above questions seems
to me to admit of no doubt. The remuneration was for
the year's work. The year's work.was completed on the
expiry of ~he- year. The right to receive the remunera·
tion became;· therefore, vested on the 31st December,
1943. It is true that in Agarwal'a case there is a clause
in the original Managing Agency Agreement that
"the Managing Agency commission shall be due
yearly on the 31st day of 1\Iarch in each and every year
and shall be payable and be paid immediately after the
annual accounts of the Mill Company have been passed
by the shareholders." ·
.
.
; It has been urged, in reliance on this clause that the
accrual of the income, in so far as the case of Agarwals
is concerned, is not on the 31st December, but on the
31st 1\Iarch next. In the first place such a contention,
in so far as it relates to the date of accrual, is not permissible in view . of the clarification in the order of
reference made by the Tribunal to the High Court and
in view of the specific and ca tegor'ical language of some
of the grounds in the statements of the case filed
I
366
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
before us both by Sassoons and the Income-tax Comm1ss1oner
showing 31st December, 1943, as the date of -,_
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
accrual of the entire remuneration. ( Vide paragraphs.
v.
19(1), 26(a) and (g) of the Sassoons' statement, and
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
paragraphs 12, 15(1), (2) and (5) of the Income-tax
Bombay City.
Commissioner's statement, in Civil Appeal No. 3 of
Jagannadhadas J.
1953). But even if the contention be permissible and
granting the view strenuomly urged on behalf of the
appellant-Sassoons that there is no accrual of income
until there exists a right to receive it, I do not think
that the clause in question has any relevancy so far as
the date of accrual of income is concerned. Accrual of
income for purposes of taxation, does not depend on
the question as to when the income becomes payable.
It depends only on when a vested right to receive th<O"
income arises. (See Commissioners of Inland Revenue
v. Gardner Mountain and D' Ambrnmenil Ltd., ( 1 ). The
accrual is accordingly complete when the right to the •.
remuneration becomes vested by the occurrence of all
the events on which the remuneration depends. A
mere clause that the remuneration shall be due at a
later date, notwithstanding that all the events on
which the remune'ration depends have occurred, can
only have the effect of postponing the liability for
payment and not of postponing the vesting of the right
·•
to income. The. requirement of lapse of further time '
after the occurrence of all the qualifying events is not
in itself an additional event which imports any element of contingency in the right. It appears to me,
therefore, that the above clause which has been relied
upon-whatever the reason may be for the distinction
which the language seeks to suggest between due and
,payable-can have no bearing on the date of the accrual
and cannot have the effect of postponing the accrual ,J
from the 31st December · to 31st March. But even
otherwise, this does not at all affect the final conclusion. in this case reached by the High Court of Bombay. If the view of the High Court is correct that the
income accrued both to the assignor and to the
assignee after the completion of the year's work it
seems to matter little whether that accrual is on the
31st December or on the 31st March next.
1954
(I) 29 Tax Cas. 69.
.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
367
The further question as to whether the view taken
by the High Court that the assignments operated to
transfer to the assignee the assignor's share of the
year's remuneration after it accrued to him as his in,come and whether it continues to remain the assignor's
taxable income in spite of the assignment, may also be
shortly dealt with. If the High Court be right in its
view that the remuneration accrued both to the
.assignor and to the assignee together, whenever it may
be, then it is clear that on the respective dates of the
assignment, the assignor had a future right to a share
of the remuneration on the completion of the year. If
· so, there is ample authority for the position that the
assignment of such a future right is valid and becomes
operative by ·way of attaching itself to the right when
it springs up. (See Ba1isidhar v. Sant Lal(1 ), Misri
Lal v. Mozhar Hossain(2) Palaniappa v. Lakshmanan (3) and Baldeo v. Miller (4 ). ) The validity of such
an assignment as between the assignor and the assignee
and the effect thereof on the assignor's future right
may also be supported with reference to the principle of
cstoppel feeding title which finds recognition in section
43 of the Transfer of Property Act. For the further
position, viz., that a person continues to be liable for
tax in respect of accrued income notwithstanding
assignment thereof operating on or after such accrual, .
there is authority in Parkins v. Warwick(").
This
view is confirmed by the following passages in the
Privy Council case in Pondicherry Railivay Co. Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (6 )
-
-
"Profits 011 their coming into existence attract tax
at that point and the revenue is not concerned with
the subsequent application of the profits."
"The destination of the profits or the charge which
has been made on those profits by previous agreement
or otherwise is perfectly immaterial."
(Quoted out of an extract from the case in Gresham
Life Assurance Society v. Styles (1) .)
.
(1) I.L.R. IO All 133.
(2) I.L.R. 13 Cal. 262.
(3) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 429.
(4) I.LR. 31 Cal. 667.
(5) 25 Tax Cases 919.
(6) A.LR. 1931 P.C. 165 at 170.
(7) [1892] A. C. 309 .
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay Cify.
Jagannadlzadas J.
368
1 954
E. D. Sasso on and
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of lncom e-tax,
Bombay Ci~)'.
Jaganna dhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
[1955]
It appears to me that these passages constitute a
clear recongnition of the principle that when once income accrues to a person, an assignment operative in
respect thereof, does not affect his taxability for that
income. It may be mentioned that it is not seriously
disputed that the consideration for each assignment
included the value of the prospective advantage of collecting the remuneration for the entire year, i.e., in the
sense that the actual consideration paid was higher
than what it might have been if the assignment had
taken place at the very commencement of the year.
The only substantial question, therefore, which this
case raises is whether the view taken by the High Court,
that the remuneration for the year accrued as income
both to the assignor and the assignee, is correct. It is
apparently as an answer to this question that learned
counsel appearing for the Sassoons put forward the
argument No. 4 above enumerated, viz., that the
assignment of Managing Agency is the transfer of an
income-bearing asset and that all income received subsequent to the date of assignment is entirely the
assignee's taxable income. It is the validity of this argument that now requires examination. The cases that
have been relied on in support of this argument are the
following: The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.
Forrest (') ; Wigmore v. Thomas Summerson(') ; and
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Pilcher('). Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Forrest(') is a case of
purchase of certain shares and the income derived
therefrom and is analogous to the second head of
income chargeable to income-tax under section 6 of the
Indian Income-tax Act, viz., Securities. The income
therefrom is directly referable only to the ownership of
the shares or secunt1es. Mere lapse of time makes
income payable and the taxation depends on the receipt
of the in.come. Wigmore v. Thomas Summerson(') is
also a case similar to the above. Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Pilcher(') is the case of a sale of an
orchard inclusive of the year's fruit crop, which by the
date of the sale does not appear to have become ripe
(I) 8 Tax Cases 704.
(2) g Tax Cases 577.
(3) 3r Tax Cases 314.
·-
Q
S.C.R.
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
369
enough to be treated as a severable item of property.
This was a case of property whose ownership itself, in
the ordinary course and by lapse of time, gives rise to
income and is analogous to head No. 3 of section 6 of
the Indian Income-tax Act. It is interesting to note,
that in this case, the learned Judges make a distinction
between fructus industriales and fructus naturales and
point out that the fruits derived from the orchard
being cherries are fructus naturales and not fructus industriales. That the result might have been different if it
was frnctus industriales appears clearly, at least so far
as Lord Justice Singleton and Lord Justice Tucker are
concerned. In the case of fructus industriales the
income does not arise by niere ownership but as a result
of further investment and labour which may be the
effective source of income. These decisions refer only
to cases where the sole or effective source of income is
mere ownership and taxability depends on receipt of
the income.
Another case that has been relied on before us is the
City of London Contract Corporation v. Styles (1). That
was a case where one Company purchased as a going
concern the business carried on by another Company,
as contractors for public works. It was claimed that the
assignee-Company was entitled to deduction from their
taxable income for a portion of the purchase price which
may be attributed to the purchase of the right, title
and interest to, and the benefit of, certain building
contracts of the Company, from the execution of which,
a portion of the net profits of the Company arose. This
was negatived on the ground that the entire purchase
price was capital investment and that what all was
received later on was income derived by the execution
of the contracts so purchased. This, so far as it goes,
may seem to suggest by implication that there may be
a purchase of contracts yet to be executed and that the
benefit of the entire profits therefrom is to be treated
as income in the hands of the purchaser. The report
of this case, however, does not indicate clearly whether
the contracts, whose benefit was purchased were partially executed and if so, whether the partial execution
(•) 2 Tax Cases 239.
1954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay Cifv.
-~
Jagannadhadas J.
370
E. D. Sassoon and
Company 11..Jd.
Yo
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Jap,annadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
was substantial or negligible. The statement of the
facts of the case at page 241 of the report shows that
the business which was purchased consisted entirely
"of partially executed or wholly unexecuted contracts,
and ·of the rights thereunder and the benefits to accrue
therefrom." If the business consisted of only unexecuted contracts, this case is not an authority for the
position contended for on behalf of the Sassoons. But
in any case, even if some of the contracts were partially
executed there is nothing to show that the execution
was of any such extent as to have become a substantial source of income. It may also be noted that this
decision is a direct authority only on what is capital
expenditure and what is revenue expenditure for purposes of deduction. The point in the form relevant
for the present case was not raised there and cannot
be taken to have been decided. It is interesting to
notice that in Simon's Income-tax, Vol. 2, (1949 Edn.),
page 188, paragraph 222, the following passage appears.
"In City of London Contract Corporation Ltd. v.
Styles (•) where the Company acquired a business including a number of unexecuted contracts, it was held that
the sum paid for the contracts could not be deducted
in computing the Company's profits, on the ground
that the whole of the purchase price of the business
was a sum 'employed or intended to be employed as
capi1al in such trade'."
Similarly in Spicer and Pegler's Income-tax and
Profits-tax (20th Edn.), at page 116 it is stated as
follows :
"Cost of unexecuted contracts taken over with a
business (in arriving at the profits from the performance of the contracts)"
and the case of City of London Contract Corporation v.
Styles (') is quoted as authority. These standard textbooks elso show that this case has been treated as haying reference to u11executed contracts (and not to partially executed contracts) and as being authority for the
question as to what are permissible deductions from
taxable income of business concerns.
(1) 2 Tax Cases 239 .
•
(1955]
,;
:S.C.R.
~··
'.-'-
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
371
The above cases, therefore, cannot be treated as in
. any way ,supporting the contention put forward by
learned counsel for the appellant-Sassoons that .in the
· case of an assignment of Managing Agency the entire
remuneration for the year's work accrues as a matter
. of law to the assignee and is his sole income, on the
. ground that the Agency is the source of income and
· that in this respect it is to be treated as an income. bearing asset. No specific authority has been cited
· before us covering the case of a Managing Agency
nor can the case in City of London Contract Corporation
v. Styles( 1) be treated as an authority showing that
in the case of an assignment of partially executed
contracts the remuneration or profits relatable to
· suc.h partial execution is necessarily the income of the
assignee.
The question thus raised has, therefore, to be
. examined on principle. On such examination it appears
to me that the argument advanced in this behalf is
· based on a fundamental misconception. Income of
· the kind with which we are concerned in this case does
not arise by virtue of any mere ownership of an asset.
Vlhat produces income is not the ownership of the
Managing Agency but the actual work turned out for
the benefit of the principal. It is not the fact of a
· Company having obtained the right to work as a
Managing Agent that produces the income but it is the
· continuous functioning of the Company, as the Managing Agent, in terms of the contract of Agency, that
produces the income. Hence, it is the rendering of the
service of the Managing Agency or the carrying out of
the Managing Agency business, which is the effective
and direct source of income. This is not to say that
work or service is the subject of taxation. It is the
remuneration that is the subject of tax and work is
the source of the remuneration. Hence in such a case
service or work is the source of income and not the
· ownership of the right to work. The above legal position has been very succinctly brought out by Lord
Finlay, though in another context, in John Smith &
. Son v. Moore( 2 ) in the following passage:
(1) 2 Tax Cases 239.
(2) (1921] 2 A.C. 13 at 25,
1954
E. D. Sassoon am!
Company Lta.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City •
Jagannaa/zadas J .
372
1 954
E. D. Sassoon and
Compartv Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay Gi{v.
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
"The business makes no profits. The profits are ·
not fruits yielded by a tree spontaneously. They are
the result of the operations carried on by the owner of ·
the business for the time being."
Therefore, on principle, apart from authority, it
appears to me to be erroneous to treat the Managing
Agency Agreement as by itself the direct source of
income and to treat it as an income-producing asset.
An examination of the provisions of the Indian
Income-tax Act clearly bears out this view. Sections
3 and 4 of the Income-tax Act are the charging sections. The charge is (in so far as it is relevant for
purposes of this case) on the income of the previous
year (a) which is received by the assessee within the
taxable territory, or (b) which accrued or arose within
the taxable territory to a resident assessee. As stated
at the outset the assessment in the present case is based
on accrual and not on receipt. Computation of the
governe<l by the provisions of ·
taxable income is
Chapter III of the Act. Section 6 thereof enumerates
the following heads of income as being chargeable to
income-tax. (1) Salaries, (2) Interest on securities,
(3) Income from property, (4) Profits and gains of
business, profession or vocation, (5) Income from other ·
sources. The residual item (5) may for the present
purposes be left out. Of the other four heads, items
2 and 3 are the only items in which the taxable income
is directly related to the ownership of an asset. In
the present
case the computation of the taxable ·
income has no relation to those items but may
conceivably fall under head No. 1 or head No. 4. At this
stage, it is necessary to observe that, though, so far, in
the above discussion, the Managing Agency has been
referred to as service and the commission therefor as
remuneration, for purposes of convenience, the true
nature of the functioning of a Managing Agent, where
it is a firm or a Company, which so functions, has been
recently held by this Court in Lakshminarayan Ram
Gopal and Son, Ltd. v. The Government of Hyderabad(')
to be a business and the remuneration to be income
by way of profits or gains from ·the business. The
(1) Civil Appeals Nos. 292 and 312of1950 of the Supreme Court of India.
-
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
373
income, therefore, falls under head No. 4 and the computation thereof has to be made under section 10 of
the Income-tax Act. Sub-section ( 1) of that section runs
as follows:
"The tax shall be payable by an assessee under
the head profits and gains of business, profession or
vocation in respect of the profits or gains of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him."
Now, in computing the taxable income of the
assignee, can it reasonably be said that the remuneration for the entire year is the income of the assignee
and that it is the profits and gains of the business
carried on by the assignee, when as a fact he stepped
into the position of the Managing Agent only on some
date in the course of the year by virtue of the assignment. It appears to me that before income can be
attributed under this head to an assessee, it must
relate to the business carried on by the assessee himself. In- ·the present case, therefore, the profits and
gains ofltne whole year seem to me clearly to relate to
the business carried on both by the assignor and the
~ss1gnee taken together and are hence taxable as
mcome accruing to both and apportionable as such
between them. The importance of not overlooking the
significance of the phrase "carried on by him" in subsection ( 1) of section 10, though in a different context,
has been emphasised by the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace and
Co. (1). A recent decision of this Court in the Liquidators of Pursa Limited v. Commissioner of Incometax, Bihar (2) also emphasises this and explains that the
phrase "carried on by him" m section 10(1) of the
Indian
Income-tax Act "connotes the fundamental
idea of the continuous exercise of an activity as the
essential constituent of that which is to produce the
taxable income." This phrase appears to me also
clearly to connote the idea that the taxable income is
that of the very assessee or the combination of
assessee whose continuous activity produces the
mcome. Where, as in this case, that continuity is
kept up by two persons successively, it appears to me
(•) I.L.R. 59 Cal. 1343.
(2) Civil Appeal No. 33 of 1953.
1954
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Jagannadhadas J.
374
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Jagannadiwdas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
that under this section, the profits and gains are the
assessable income of both together.
This is in accord with the well-accepted notion,
under the normal law, that if two persons jointly
carry out a work or conduct a business, the total
remuneration in fact earned for the work or the total
gains made on that business belongs to both of them
as their joint property and that such property has to
be apportioned between them on some equitable basis.
This is quite independent of any question as to
whether the claim for remuneration for the work or for
the emoluments of the business can be individually or
jointly enforced as against the person who is liable to
pay. It cannot be disputed that in the absence of
any specific contract to the contrary between the
persons who contribute to the work or business, the
fruit of such work or of such business is the joint
property of both, when the same has in fact been
realised. Nor can it be said that this holds good only
in cases where both the persons concurrently join
together to earn the remuneration for the work or the
profits of the business. There is no reason in law why
the same principle should not be equally applicable
where the two together contribute to the total work
or to the total business in succession as in this case
and not in concurrence. If, what arises on such
continuous and successive functioning of two persons is
the joint remuneration of both, there can be no doubt
that such remuneration would
be apportionable
between them on some equitable basis on the principle
that joint property is normally severable. To such a
situation section 26(2) of the Income-tax Act would
also clearly apply. That section no doubt indicates
nothing as to the principle of apportionment. But
there is no difficulty in the present case since it is
agreed that the apportionment, if any, is to be timewise. This also prima facie is the only equitable way
of apportionment on the facts of this case.
At this stage it becomes necessary to notice certain
provisions of the relevant Managing Agency Agreements
which have been strongly relied on as supporting the
view contrary to 'what I have indicated above. Reliance
-
•
•
..
S.C.R.
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
375
J1::is been placed on · two provisions of the ·Managing
Agency Agreement between the Sassoon United Mills
Ltd. ::ind the Sassoons which are relevant only in the
appeal relating to the Agarwals. The fii"~t of these
provisions is the one already noticed · in another context, vi.z., clause 2(d) of the Agency Agreement which
rum ::is follows :
"The said commission shall be due to the said
firm yearly on the 31st day of March in each and every
year during the continuance of this Agreement ........ ".
It is urged that this term stamps the Managing
Agency Agreement with the characteristic of an incomebearing asset which vests solely in the assignee the
right to the entire income payable after the date of
assignment. But it appears to me that a term of this
kind has reference only to the payment aspect of the
money which constitutes remuneration and .has no
be::iring on the question as to whose income it is for
purposes of taxation. Taxable income must be derived
from specified sources indicated in the Indian Incometax Act. Since the mere ownership of Managing Agency
cannot ::is a m::itter of bw be treated as the source of
income, as explained above, any term in the Managing
Agency Agreement between the principal and the agent
receive the year's
entitling
only the assi~1;ee to
remuner:ition and negat1v111g to
the assignor any
direct recourse to his quondam principal for his share
of the income, cannot have the effect of denying to the
assignor a substantial right to a share in the remuneration, if otherwise he has a vested right thereto. A
distinction exists in law between the right to receive
or get payment of a certain amount of money and the
right to the money itself. The right to enforce payment
of money may belong to one person. But the beneficial
right in that money may belong wholly or partially
to another. Benami contracts
are familar examples
of such a case. Instances of joint rights in money or
money's worth enforceable only at the instance of one
out of the persons entitled, in special situations, are
easily conceivable. It may be j:rue that there is no
accrual of income unless there is a vested right to·
receive the money which constitutes income. But this;
1 954
E. D. Sassoon ant!
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay Ciry.
Jagannadhadas J.
376
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
proposition has relevance only to the factum or date
of
accrual but not necessarily to the ownership of the
E. D. Sassoon and
income on such accrual. None of the cases that have
Company Ltd.
v.
been cited 'before us in support of the proposition that
The Commissioner
there is no accrual of income unless there is a right to
of Income·tax,
Bomba;i Ciry.
receive it negative this view. In the course of the
arguments repeated stress has been laid on the proJagannadhadas J.
position that there is no accrual of income unless
there is a right to receive the income. This may be
so. But it does not follow that the very person who
has the right to receive the money which constitutes
the income is the owner of that money or that the
mcome accrues to him alone. That must depend on
the substantive rights, if any, applicable to a particular situation. A term in a Managing Agency Agreement between the principal and the agent as to the
person to whom the remuneration is payable or is to
become due can only have been meant as a protection
of the principal in respect of multiplicity of claims
against himself and cannot settle the
substantive
rights between persons who may have contributed to
earn the remuneration.
The second provision relied on is clause 10 of the
Managing Agency Agreement with which the case of
Agarwals is concerned. Clause 10 of the agreement
runs as follows :
"It shall be lawful for the said firm to assign this
agreement and the rights of the said firm hereunder to
any person, firm or Company having authority by its
constitution to become bound by the obligations undertaken by the said firm hereunder and upon .such
assignment being made and notified to the said Company shall be bound to recognise the person or firm or
Company aforesaid as the Agents of the said Company
in like manner as if the name ofi such person, firm or
Company had appeared in these presents in iieu of the
names of the partners in the said firm and as if such
person, firm or Company had entered into this Agreement
with the said Company and the said Company shall
forthwith upon demand by the said firm enter into an
Agreement with the person firm or Company aforesaid appointing such person firm of Company the
'954
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...
S.C.R.
.r
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
377
Agents of the said Company for the then residue of the
term outstanding under the Agreement and with the
like powers and authorities remuneration and emoluments and subject to the like terms and conditions
as are herein contained."
Stress has been laid on the underlined portion of the
above clause. It is urged that this as well as clauses
1 and 3 of the Managing Agency Agreement show that
the assignor and the assignee are to be treated as one
entity and that on assignment the assignee becomes
the Managing Agent as if his name had been inserted
in the Managing Agency Agreement from the beginning, and that the continuity of the Managing Agency
was preserved thereby and that whoever satisfies the
description of the Managing Agent at the time when
the commission for the year becomes due, is also the
person entitled to the amount by way of remuneration-not, as per this argument by virtue of any
mutual arrangement between the assignor and the
assignee, but-by the very terms of the Managing
Agency which is the source of income. It is urged,
therefore, that this feature stamps the Managing
In substance,
Agency as an income-bearing asset.
therefore, this argument amounts to saying that by
virtue of this clause the service of the assignee subsequent to the date of assignment can be tacked on to
the service of the assignor for the earlier portion of the
year, so as to constitute it service for the entire year
which earns the remuneration, as the sole property of
the assignee, i.e., that the assignment has to be given
retrospective operation from the commencement of the
year in respect of the work so far done. But if this
clause is to be construed as having such retrospective
operation, it must, on the very terms of the underlined
portion, become so operative from the original commencement of the Agreement itself and not from any
particular date or event thereafter. There is no reason
to confine such retrospective operation only to the
inchoate advantage for remuneration
arising from
party finished work of the year. The underlined porticn of the clause, if it is to have retrospective effect
at all, is comprehensive enough to take within its ambit
every other claim which may have accrued but remained
E. D. Sassoon and
Company Ltd.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Jagannadhadas J.
378
E. D. Sassoon
and Company Lid.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay Ci!)•.
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955 J
unpaid, commencing from the initial stage of the
Agency. On this construction, therefore, the right to·
every such claim would pass to the assignee. Such a
result would obviously be untenable and no reason
exists why the retrospective operation, to be imputed
to this clause, ,;hould be confined to the limited extent
which serves the argui_:nent put forward in this behalf
by the appellant-Sassoons. It appears to me, therefore,
quite clear on a fair reading of the entire clanse 10 of
the Managing Agency Agreement that the only effect
thereof is to bring about the result specifically stated
in the second portion of that clause (which has been
side lined) i.e. that on assignment, the assignee firm
shall be entitled to demand and obtain from the
principal Company a fresh Managing Agency Agreement
in its own favour for the residue of the term outstanding and with like powers authorities remuneration and
emoluments and subject to the like terms and conditions. In my opinion all that the clause 10 taken as
a whole means is no more than that the assignee is
entitled to demand a fresh Agreement on the same
terms and that even without a fresh Agreement being
formally executed as between the principal Mill Company and the assignee-company their mutual rights
and obligations will be governed by the old Agreement
for the residue of the term with the assignee-Company's.
name substituted for the assignor-Company's name.
Such effect can only be prospective and not
retrospective.
There can he no doubt, however, .that though any
mere clause in the Managing Agency Agreement that
the employer is to be responsible only to the assignee
for the payment of the entire year's remuneration is.
not by itself enough to vest in the assignee a beneficial
right to the remuneration of the year, such a right
may arise by virtue of a specific or implied term as.
between the transferor and the transferee, either as
part of the deed of transfer or independent thereof.
It may be mentioned that in the Agarwals' case there
was such a specific term in the Agreement preliminary
to the actual assignment. But learned counsel for the
Sassoons expressly disclaimed it on the ground that it
was not incorporated in the deed of transfer and was,
..
.
•
S.C.R.
'
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•
:71
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
379
in any case, superfluous and did not rely on it. In his
view the right of the assignee to receive the entire
remuneration did not depend on any specific term
between the assignor and the assignee, but on the fact
that what was transferred is an income-bearing asset
which carried with it a right to the entire income that
falls due after the elate of assignment. It is on account
of the insistence on this view, that, as I apprehend,
learned counsel for the Sassoons disclaimed the above
mentioned special term between the assignor and the
assignee as being superfluous. He seems to have sought
thereby to obviate the consequence of the contention
that the assignor's share of remuneration became the
assignee's by virtue of the specific assignment thereof
-operating thereon on its accrual and that hence it
remained the taxable income of the assignor.
It may be mentioned in this context that clause 10
of the Managing Agency Agreement in Agarwals' case
has been relied on by learned counsel for Agarwals to
show that while, it may be, that in the normal run of
events the contract for remuneration under the Managing Agency Agreement is an indivisible contract for a
whole year's remuneration on the completion of a
whole year's work, this clause necessarily implied
divisibility of contract and of the remuneration in the
year of assignment since the assignment necessarily took
place with the consent of the principal Mill Company.
(Vide section 87-B(c) of the Indian Companies Act).
This argument was advanced to support the contention
that the Sassoon's share of the year's income accrued
on the very date of assignment. Since, however, in my
view that was not the basis of the judgment of the
High Court as explained above and since such an
argument is not, in my opinion, open, having regard to
the statement of the case by the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal as well as of the statements of appellants and
respondents herein, I do not consider it necessary to
deal with that argument.
In my view, therefore, the continuous and successive
functioning by both the assignor and the assignee
under the Managing Agency Agreement was the effective
source of the year's income. That income accrued
on the completion of the year and was the joint income
6-87 S. C. India/59
1954
E. D. Sassoon
and Company Lid.
v.
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay City.
Jagannadhadas J.
•
380
1954
-
_,
E. D. Sassoon
arul Companj Ltd.
'"
The Commissioner
of Income-tax,
'Bomb£!_'1! Cilj!.
Jagannadhadas J.
1 954
May 14.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955j
of both the assignor and the assignee. The prior
assignments in the course of the year operated as assignments of this future right to a share of the income. It
is only by virtue of inter se arrangement between the
assignor and the assignee, resulting from the transactions of assignment, that the assignee had the right
to collect the entire income. Nevertheless, the share in
this income which accrued to the Sassoons on the
completion of the year remained the taxable income
of the Sassoons and they were rightly taxed in respect
thereof. The very strenuous arguments of learned
counsel for Sassoons to counter the above view are
based on the insistence that the Managing Agency is
like property which per se produces income and, on
ignoring the distinction between right to receive the
income and right to the ownership of the income and
on treating the former as settling the question of the
person to whom income accrues. In my opinion these
arguments are unsustainable
and
the
conclusion
reached by the learned Judges of the Bombay High
Court is correct.
The appeals are, therefore, liable to be dismissed.
l express no opinion on any of the other points raised.
Appeals allowed.
HARISHANKAR BAGLA AND ANOTHER
f!.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MUKHER)EA,
VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR JT.J
Constitution of India-Art. 19(1)(1) and (g)-Cotton Textile .f
(Control of Movement) Order, 1948, cl. 3-Promu/gated under s. 3
of Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946-PermitRequirement of-to dispose of or transport cotton textiles-Whether
violation of Art. 19(1)(1) and (g)-Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, 1946 (XXIV of 1946) ss. 3, 4, 6-Whether ultra vires
the Legislature on ground of delegation of legislative pou,1ers-s. 6Wh"ether repeals or abrogates-pre-existing laws-Effect of.the section
-Delegation-Essential power of legislation-Whetl1er can be delegated-Principles underlying it-Requirements of permit by clauses
3 and 4 of the Control Order-Whether in conflict with ss. 27, 28, 41
of the Railway Act.
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