VIRENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 April 1954 | [1955] 1 S.C.R. 415 | 1954 INSC 56
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 April 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 37/1953
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Citation
- [1955] 1 S.C.R. 415
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 56
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
415
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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and with the help of the Chamba police seize the goods
and attempt to take them to Jammu by a letter of
request written by the District Magistrate of Jammu
to the District Magistrate of Chamba.
Lastly it was argued that the petitioner made an
application under section 523, Criminal Procedure Code,
to the magistrate and that application was dismissed
_... and that a petition for revision against that order was
still pending, and that when another remedy had been
taken, article 226 could not be availed of. This contention cannot be sustained, firstly in view of the fact
that section 523 has no application to the facts and
circumstances of this case, and the magistrate had no
jurisdiction to return these goods to the petitioner.
Secondly, the revision application has been dismissed
on the ground that there was no jurisdiction in this
case to grant relief to the petitioner under section 523.
For the reasons given above we allow this appeal,
set aside the order of the Judicial Commissioner and
direct an appropriate writ to issue directing the restoration to the petitioner · of the goods seized by the police.
The appellant will have his costs of the appeals and
r those incurred by him m the Court of Judicial
• Commissioner.
1c54
W azir C!zaiid
v.
Ti.e State of
Himac.\al
Pradesh.
Mehr chand
ilJahajan C. ].
.J(
Appeal allowed.
-
VIRENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS
1954
1/.
April 29.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.
[MEHR
CHAND
MAHAJAN
C.J., MuKHF.RJEA, VIVIAN
BosE, BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, arts. 5, 19(f), 31(1), proviso to art. 131
and art. 363-Efject of the Constitution-Erst-while Indian
States-Forming part of India-Any State Government-Whether
can do anything in the nature of act of State-Sovereign-Whether
can plead act of State against the citizen-Jagirs and Muafis by
Rulers of Indian States having full autonomy and sovereignty prior
.,..to the Constitution-Whether can be avoided afte1· the Constitution
when not challenged up to the date of the Constitution-Courtsfurisdiction of-To question the accessions and such grants.
--0
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
.,.
The petitioners were granted in January, 1948, Jagirs and
Muafis by the Ruler of Sarila State in one village and by the Ruler
V irendra Singh
of Charkhari State in three villages. In March, 1948, a Union of 35
and Others
States including the States of Sarila and Charkhari was formed
<
v.
The State of Ullar into the United State of Vindhya Pradesh. The Vindhya Pradesh
Pradesh.
Government confirmed these grants in December, 1948, when its
H.evenue Officers interfered with them questioning their validity.
The integration of States ho\vever did not work well and the same .>
35 Rulers entered into an . agreement in December, 1949, and..,.
dissolved the newly created State as from 1st January, 1950, each'
Ruler acceding to the Government of India all authority and
jurisdiction in relation to the Government of that State, the
Instrument being called the Vindhya Pradesh Merger agreement.
Article VIII of the Instrument stated :1 954
"No enquiry shall be made by or under the authority of the
Government of India, and no proceeding shall be taken in any
Court against the Ruler of any covenanting State, whether in a
personal capacity or otherwise in respect of anything done or._
omitted to be done by him or under his authority during the
period of his administration of that State." The States which
formed Vindhya Pradesh were transformed into a Chief Commissioner's Province on 23rd January, 1950. The four villages (called
enclaves) were taken out of this Province on 25th January, 1950,
and absorbed into the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) by
an Order of the Governor-General under the provisions of the
Government of India Act, 1935. The grant of the four villages
made in favour of the petitioners in January, 1948, was revoked in --f
August, 1952, by the Government of Uttar Pradesh in consultation
with the Government of India, the operative part of the revocation
order being made by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh.
Held (i) that the petitioners were entitled to a writ under art.
32(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as the order revoking the
grant of Jagirs and Muafis in the four villages violated art. 31 (!)
and art. 19(f) of the Constitution.
(ii) No State Government has the right to do anything in the
nature of an act of State.
(iii) The accessions by the Rulers of States and their accept:;/
ance by the Dominion of India were acts of State and no Municipal Court could question their competency. Article 363 and the
proviso to art. 131 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of
Courts in India after the Constitution to settle any dispute arising out of the accessions and their acceptance. All that the Courts
can do is to register the factum of such accessions.
(iv) The properties 1n question \Vere properties over which
the Rulers had absolute right of disposition at the date of the
grants. The grants were absolute in character and would under
any civilised system of law pass an absolute and indefeasible titl~
to the grantees. Assuming (but not deciding) that they were
defeasible at the mere will of the soverign the fact remained that
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S.C.R.
417
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1954
they were neither resumed by the Former Rulers nor confiscated
by the Dominion of India as an act of State and up to the 25th of V irtndra Singh
January, 1950, the right and title of the petitioners to continue in
and Othm
possession was good. The Constitution by reason of the authority
·V•
derived from and conferred by the people of India destroyed all T ht Statnf Uttar
Prad~sh,
vestiges of arbitrary and despotic power in the territories of India
and over its citizens and lands and prohibited just such acts of
arbitrary power as the State in the present case was seeking to
uphold. The Dominion of India and all those who were invited
there sat in the Constituent Assembly not as conquerors and conquered, not as those who ceded and as those who absorbed but as
the soverign peoples of India, free democratic equals. Every
vestige of sovereignty was abandoned by the Dominion of India
and the States and surrendered to the peoples of the land who
framed the new Constitution of India.
(v) Under art. 5 of the Constitution all the residents of the
then Indian States including the Rulers and people of Sarila and
Charkhari, viz., those who made the grants and those who received
them and those who were seeking to make the confiscation as an
act of State, became citizens of India.
(vi) No sovereign can exercise an act of State against its own
subjects and an act of State can never be exercised against one
who has always been a citizen from the beginning in territory
which has from its inception belonged to the State seeking to
exercise that right.
Case law reviewed.
ORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Petition No. 37 of 1953.
Under article 32 of the Constitution of India,
praying that the Order of the Governor of Uttar
Pradesh dated the 29th August, 1952, revoking the
grants made by the Rulers of Charkhari and Sarila in
favour of the petitioners be declared void.
K. S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar, and S. P. Sinha
(Bishan Singh and S. S. Shukla, with them) for the
petitioners.
Gopalji Mehrotra and C. P. Lal for the respondent.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India ( G. N.
foshi, Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for
the Intervener.
1954. April 29. The Order of the Court was
pronounced by
BosE J.-This is a petition under article 32 of the
Constitution. It raises an important question about
the post-Constitutional rights to property situate in
IS
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[195,5]
·1254
' Indian States that were not part of British India before
the Constitution but which acceded to the Dominion
of India shortly before the Constitution and became'
an integral part of the Indian Republic after it.
The \')t(llr"'of· UUar
·Pradesh.
The States in question here are Charkhari and Sarila.
/JoJe J.
In British days they were independent States under
. the paramountcy of the British Crown. They acknowkdged the British Crown as the suzerain power and
owed a modified allegiani:e to it, but none to the
Government of India.
Vire11dra .Singh·
and tJtJ11tf
In 1947 India obtained Independence and became a
Dominion by reason of the Indian Independence Act
of 1947. The suzerainty of the British Crown over the
Indian States lapsed at the same time because · of
section 7 of that Act. Immediately after, all but three
of the Indian States acceded to the new Dominion .by
executing Instruments of Accession. Among them were
the two States with which we are concerned. The new
Dominion of India was empowered to accept these
accessions by a su'table amendment in the Government.
of India Act, 1935. The sovereignty of the acceding
States was expressly recognised and safeguarded. The
operative words of the Instrument of Accession which
each Ruler signed were"Now Therefore 1. ........... Ruler of. ........... in
the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said
my Instrument of
State do hereby execute this
Accession."
And clause 8 provided that"Nothing in this Instrument affects the conti·
nuance of my sovereignty in and over this State, or,
save as provided by or under this Instrument, the
exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed
by me as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law
at present in force in this State."
Broadly speaking, the effect of the accession was to
retain to the Rulers their full autonomy and sovereignty
except on three subiects : Defence, External Affairs and
Communications. These were transferred to the Central
Government of the new Dominion.
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S~C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
One other clause is important, clause 6, which provided that-"Nothing 111 this Instrument shall empower the
Dominion Legislature to make any law for the State
authorising the compulsory acquisition of land for any
purpose ......... . "
About the same time, each acceding Ruler entered
into a standstill agreement with the Dominion of India.
The following clause is relevant :
"Nothing in this agreement includes the exercise
of any paramountcy functions."
The alienations now 111 question were made in
January, 1948. On 5th January, 1948, the Ruler of
Sarila granted the village Rigwara to the petitioners
and on 28th January, 1948, the Ruler of Charkhari
granted the villages Patha, Kua and Aichana, also to
the petitioners.
After this, on 13th March, 1948, thirty five States in
Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand (including Charkhari
and Sarila) agreed to unite themselves into one State
which was to be called the United State of Vindhya
Pradesh. In pursuance of this agreement each of the
thirty five Rulers signed a covenant on 18th March, 1948,
which brought the new State into being. It is important
to note that this was a purely domestic arrangement
between themselves and not a treaty with the Dominion of India. Each Ruler necessarily surrendered a
fraction of his sovereignty to the whole but there was
no forther surrender of sovereign powers to the
Dominion of India beyond those already surrendered
in 1947, namely Defence, External Affairs and Communications. Despite the readjustment, the sum total
of the sovereignties which had resided in each before
the covenant now resided in the whole and its component parts : none of it was lost to the Dominion of India.
Soon after this, the Revenue Officers of the newly
formed Vindhya Pradesh Union tried to interfere with
the grants made by certain Rulers of the integrating
States before the integration ; among them were the
grants in question here. This occasioned complaints
to the Vindhya
Pradesh
Government and
that
1954
Virendra Singh
and Othm
v.
The State of Uttar
Prad.,h.
Bose].
420
1 954
Virendra Singt'i
and Others
v.
TM State of Uttar
Pradesh.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPO).lTS
(1955}
Government decided on 7th December, 1948, to respect
the impugned grants. The Revenue Minister's order of
that date runs"After considering over the whole question it has
been decided that such grants made by the Rulers
before signing the covenant should be respected,
because constitutionally the V. P. Government should
not refuse. recognition to such grants unless they are
directed otherwise by the State Ministry."
Orders were accordingly issued to the Revenue
Officers concerned to "abstain from interfering in such
grants." This decision was communicated to the
Rulers of Charkhari and Sarila on 13th March, 1949.
They were told that their grants would be respected.
The integration did not work satisfactorily, so, on
26th December, 1949, the same thirty five Rulers
entered into another agreement abrogating their
covenant and dissolving the newly created State as
from 1st January, 1950. By the same instrument each
Ruler ceded to the Government of the Indian Dominion
as from the same date "full and exclusive authority,
jurisdiction and powers for, and in relation to1 the
governance of that State." Article II provided that"As from the aforesaid day, the United State of
Vindhya Pradesh shall cease to exist, and all the
property, assets and liabilities of that State, as well
as its rights, duties and obligations, shall be those of
the Government of India."
This Instrument was called the Vindhya Pradesh
Merger Agreement. The Government of the Indian
Dominion was also a party and its Secretary in the
Ministry of States appended his signature to the
document. Each Ruler was guaranteed a privy purse
and all the personal privileges, dignities and titles
enjoyed by him at the date of the Agreement. Immediately after the clause guaranteeing the privy purse
comes the followingArticle IV
...................................................
(2) The said amount is intended to cover all the
expenses of the Ruler and his family ........ and shall
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
neither be increased nor reduced for any reason whatsoever."
The following clauses are also relevant :
Article VI
"The Government of India guarantees the success10n, according to law and custom, to the gaddi of
each Covenanting State, and to the personal rights,
privileges, dignities and titles of the Ruler thereof.
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Article VII
(1) The Ruler of each . Covenanting State shall be
entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of
all private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him on the date of his making over
the administration of that State to the Raj Pramukh in
pursuance of the Covenant.
(2) If any dispute arises as to whether any item
of property 1s the private property of the Ruler or
State property, it shall be referred to a judicial officer
to be nominated by the Government of India, and the
decision of that officer shall be final and binding on all
parties concerned.
Article VIII
No enquiry shall be made by or under the
authority of the Government of India, and no proceeding shall lie in any Court, against the Ruler of any
Covenanting State, whether in a personal capacity or
otherwise, in respect of anything done or omitted to be
done by him or under his authority during the period
of his administration of that State."
The Dominion Government took over the administration of the States which formed Vindhya Pradesh
on 1st January, 1950, and decided to form them into
a Chief Commissioner's Province. It did this by a
Notification of the Governor-General dated 22nd
January, 1950, and brought the new Province into
being on 23rd January, 1950. But the four villages
we are concerned with (called enclaves) were taken
out of this Province on 25th January, 1950, and
absorbed into the United Provinces (now Uttar
Pradesh) by an Order of the Governor-General entitled
Virendra Singh
and Others
v.
The State of Uttar
Pradesh.
Bose].
422
1
~ 54
V irendra Sfo.t:!i
a11d Others
. v.
The Sto.te of Uttar
Pradesh.
Buse].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the Provinces an<l States (Absorption of Enclaves)
Order, 1950. This Order was made under sections
290, 290-A and 290-B of the Government of India Act,
1935.
The portions of that Order relevant for the present
purpose are these :
"3 (1) As from the appointed day, every enclave
specified in the First Schedule shall cease to form part
of the surrendering unit, and shall be included in, and
form part of, the absorbing unit .......... "
"6. All property and assets within an enclave
which, immediately before the appointed day, vested
in the Government of the surrendering unit shall, as
from that day, vest in the Government of the absorbing unit.
7. All rights, liabilities and obligations, whether
arising out of contract or otherwise, of the Government of a surrending unit in relation to an enclave
shall, as from the appointed day, be the rights, liabilities and obligations, respectively, of the Government
of the absorbing unit.
8. All laws in force in an enclave immediately
before the appointed day shall, as from that day, cease
to be force in that enclave, and all laws in force in
the absorbing unit shall, as from that day, extend to,
and be in force in, that enclave."
The Constitution came into force on 26th January,
1950. Later that vear the Uttar Pradesh Government
decided to reopen ·the question of revocation which the
Vindhya Pradesh Government had settled on 7th
December, 1948, and on 29th August, 1952, more than
two and a half years after the Constitution and four
and a half years after the grants, the Uttar Pradesh
Government, in consultation with the Government of
India, revoked the grants with which we are concerned.
The Governor of Uttar Pradesh issued the following
order on 29th August, 1952 :
"Subject : Voidable grants of Jagirs and Muafis
made by the Rulers of Charkhari and Sarila before the
integration.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
423
With reference to your endorsement No. 3885/XV
110-1950 d~ted September 30, 1950, on the above
sub:,ect, I am directed to say that, in consultation
with the Government of India, the Governor has
decided to revoke the grants made by the rulers of
Charkhari and Sarila on or after January 1, 1948, to
the members of their families relations and others
,,
Copies of this order were forwarded to the Rulers of
Charkhari and Sarila on 29th January, 1953.
This occasioned the present petition under article
32 of the Constitution against the State of Utta1
Pradesh. The Union Government was ailowed to
intnvene. The State of Uttar Pradesh made the
following affidavit in reply :
-
"(3) That immediately before or after the signing
of the agreement some Rulers of the Indian States
constituting the Vindhya Pradesh Union, whose territories
were
subsequently
absorbed in the Uttar
Pradesh, had granted jagirs and muafis of land to their
ma!a fide
and thereby indirectly
near
relations
increased their privy purse.
( 4) That it appears that Vindhya Pradesh Government opened the case of mala fide grants made by the
rulers of integrating States and at their instance the
Government of India issued instructions to the Uttar
Pra<lesh Government to do the same.
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(9) .. ·.. The effect of these grants is to increase the
privy purse of the 'ruler. ... whose responsibility it was
to :mpport the grantees."
The operative order of revocation was made by the
Governor of Uttar Pradesh and under the Constitution it is clear that no State Government has the right
to do anything in the nature of an act of State, but
in view of the fact that the revocation was made in
consultation with the Government of India, we were
asked to treat the Uttar Pradesh Governor as a delegate of the sovereign authority whose act has been
approved and ratified by that authority, along the
V irendra Sing.~1
and Others
v.
Ti.• Stateof Ulla•
Prades!1.
Bose].
424
1954
Virendra Singh
and Others
v.
T f,e State of Uttar
Pradesh.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
lines of Buron v. Denman('), the Secretary of State in
Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba( '), and
fohnstone v. Pedlar( 3 ), and to decide on that basi<
whether the Union Government had the right and
power to revoke these grants as an act of. State.
Jurists hold divergent views on this matter. At one
extreme is the view of the Privy Council in a series of
cases. Their effect was summarised in Vajesingii
foravarsi11gji v. Secretary of State for India in Council(')
and again in Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustam
Khan(') in the following words :
"A summary of the matter is this : when a territory is acquired by a sovereign State for the first time
that 1s an act of State. It matters not how the
acqms1t10n has been brought about. It may be by
conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it
may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied
by a recognised ruler. In all cases the result is the
same. Any inhabitant of the territory can make good
in the municipal Courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through
his officers, recognised. Such rights as he had under
the rule of predecessors avail him nothing. Nay more.
even if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that
certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights, that
does not give a title to those inhabitants to enforce
these stipulations in the municipal Courts. The right
to enforce remains only with the high contracting
parties ;" also in the Secretary of State in Council of
India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba(') and in fohnstone v.
Pedlar (') as follows :
"Of the propriety or justice of that act, neither
the Court below nor the Judicial Committee have the
means of forming, or the right of expressing, if they
had formed, any opinion. It may have been just or
unjust, politic or impolitic beneficial or injurious, taken
as a whole, to those whose interests are affected. These
are considerations into which their Lordships cannot
enter. It is sufficient to say that, even if a wrong has
(I) Exch. Rep. 167.
(2) 7 M.I.A. 476 at 540.
(3) [1921] 2 A.C. 262 at 279.
(4) 51 I.A. 357 at 36c.
(5) 68 I.A. 109 at 124.
(6) [1921] 2 A.C. 262 at 280.
...
,
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
been done, it is a wrong for which no Municipal Court
.of justice can afford a remedy."
According to the Privy Council in Secretary of State
for India in Council v. Bai Rajbai ( 1 ) and also in
Vajesingji foravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India
in Counci/(6), the burden of proving that the new
sovereign has recognised the old rights lies on the party
asserting it. The learned Solicitor-General relies on
these cases.
At the other extreme is the view of Chief Jus::ice
John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court.
He said in the United States v. Percheman( 3 ) in the
year 1833:
-
"It may not be unworthy of remark that is very
unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror
to do more than to displace the soverign and assume
dominion over the country. The modern usage of
nations, which has become law, would be violated ;
that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilised world would be
outraged, if private property should
be generally
confiscated, and private rights annulled. The people
change their allegiance ; their relation to their ancient
sovereign is dissolved ; but their relations to each
other, and their rights of property, remain undisturb·ed. If this be the modern rule even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the case of an
amicable cession of territory ? ........ A cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the property
belonging to its inhabitants. The king cede~ that only
which belonged to him. Lands he had previously
granted were not his to cede. Neither party could so
understand the cession. Neither party could consider
itself as attempting a wrong to individuals, condemned
by the practice of the whole civilised world. The
cession of a territory by its name from one sovereign
to another, conveying the compound idea of surrendering at the same time the lands and the people who
inhabit them, would be necessarily understood to pass
(I) 42 I.A. 229 at 239.
(2) 51 I.A. 357 at 361.
(3) 32 U.S. 51 at 86,87.
Virentlra Sing.'1
and Others
v.
The Stale ef lJitar
Prad,,lt.
Bose].
426
IS54
Virmdra Sinp,h
and Others
v.
The State of Uttar
Pradesh.
Rose J-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1955]
the sovereignty only, an<l not to interfere with private
property."
This view was followed by Cardozo J. in 1937 in
Shapleigh v. Mier(1 ). He said :"Sovereignty was
thus transferred, but private
ownership remained the same ................ To find the
the title to the land today we must know where title
stood while the land was yet in Mexico."
We gather from Hyde's International Law, Volume
I, second edition, page 433, that the same principle
was laid down by the Permanent Court of International
Justice. The learned author quotes the Court as saying in its Sixth Advisory Opinion of September 10,
1923, on certain questions relating to settlers of
German origin in the territory ceded by Germany to
Polana-
-
"Private rights acquired under existing law do not
cease on a change of sovereignty. No one denies that
the German Civil Law, both substantive and adjective,
has continued without 'interruption to operate in the
territory in question. It can hardly be maintained that,
although the law survives, private rights acquired
under it have perished. Such a contention is bo<ed on
no principle and would be contrary to an almost
universal opinion and prectice .............. It suffices for
the purposes of the present opinion to say that even
those who contest the existence in international law of
a general principle of State succession do not go so far
as to maintain that private rights including those
acquired from the State as the owner of the property
are invalid as against a successor in sovereignty."
The learned counsel for the petitioners relies on this
class of case and derives this much support for it from
the Privy Council in Mayor or Lyons v. East India
Campany( 2 ) where Lord Brougham said :"It is agreed, on all hands, that (when) a foreign
settlement (is) obtained in an inhabited country, hy
conquest, or hy cession'........ the law of the country
continues until the Crown, or the Legislature, change it."
(1) 299 U.S. 468 at 470.
(2) 1 M.l.A. 175 at 270,271 .•
•
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S;C.R;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
It is right however to point out that Hyde places
limitations on the doctrine at page 432 and that the
learned authors of Corpus Juris : International Law,
Volume 33, page 415, place the limitation that in the
absence of express understanding a conqueror assumes
no obligations of the conquered state. This distinction
was also drawn by Lord Alverstone C.J. in West Rand
Central Gold Mining Company v. Rex( 1 ) where, commenting on the American cases, he said that there is
a difference between the private rights of individuals in
private property and contractual rights which are
sought to be enforced against the new sovereign. He
said:"It 'must not be forgotten that the obligations of
conquering States with regard to private property of
private individuals, particularly land as to which the
title had already been perfected before the conquest or
annexation, are altogether different from the obligations which arise in respect of personal rights by
contract. As is said in more cases than one, cession of
territory does
not mean the
confiscation of the
property of individuals in that territory. If a particular
piece of property has been conveyed to a private
owner or has been pledged, or a lien has been cre~tecl
upon it, considerations arise which are different from
those which have to be consiclerecl when the question
is whether the contractual obligation of the conquered
State towards individuals is to be undertaken by the
conquering State."
Lord Alverstone also pointed out that in the
Americ.1n cases, on which the international jurists have
based their views, the treaties of cession as well as the
subsequent legislation of the United States protected the
rights of owners of private property as they existed at
the time of cession and so the only question for
decision in each of those cases was wether any private
rights of property actually existed at the relevant date.
Now that is also the English law, for the Privy Council
and the House of Lords have also held that the new
sovereign can choose to waive his rights and recognise
titles and rights as they existed at the elate of cession.
(1) [1905] 2 K. B. 391at411.
9--87 S. C. India/59
V irendra Singh
and Otheis
v.
T ht State of Uttar
Praduh.
Bou J.
428
l!J54
Virtndra Si'ng~
iind Ot.i#s,
v •.
Tiu State of Uttar
Prade•h.
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
This recognition can be given either by legislation or
by proclamation and it can ·even be inferred from the
mode of dealing with the property after the cession :
Forester v. Secretary of State for India in Counci/( 1 )
(legislation) ; Secretary of State v. Bai Rajbai(2 ) (agreement, legislation and mode of dealing) ; Mayor of Lyons
v. East India Company(') (waiver) and at page 285
(relinquishment) ; also Vajesinghji /oravarsinghji v.
Secretary of State for India(') and Secretary of State
v. Sardar Rustam Khan(').
In dealing with the views of international jurists,
Lord Halsbury insisted that they were . only enunciations of what in their opinion the law ought to be and
had no binding force. He said in the House of Lords
in Cook v. Sorigg(') :
~
"It is no answer to say that by the ordinary
principles of international law private · property is
respected by the sovereign which accepts the cession
and assumes the duties and legal obligations of the
former sovereign with respect to such private property
within the ceded territory. All that can be properly
meant by such a. proposition is that according to the
well-understood rules of international law a change of
sovereignty by cession ought not to affect private
property, but no municipal tribunal has authority to
enforce such an obligation. And if there is either an
express or a well-understood bargain between the
ceding potentage and the Government to which the
cession is made that private property shall be respected, that is only a bargain which can be enforced by
sovereign against sovereign in the ordinary course of
diplomatic pressure."
-
His view was endorsed by the Privy Council in
Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustam Khan(') and again
in the House of Lords in /ohnstone v. Pedlar( 7 ) . Lord
Alverstone C. J. analysed in detail how far international law can be accepted and applied in municipal
(IJ 1872-73 I.A. Supplt. to at 17)
(2) 42 I.A. 229 at 237.
(3) 1 M.l.A. 175 at 281.
(4) 51 I. A. 357 at 361.
(S) 68 I.A. 109 at 123.
(6) [18Bgl A.G. 572 at ;,7B.
{7) (1921] 2 A.C. 262 at 281.
"*
S.C.R.
'
..
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
Courts of justice in West Rand Central Gold Mining
Company v. Rex( 1 ) and set out reasons for the above
conclusion.
The learned counsel for the petitioners also relies on
another limitation which the English Courts have placed
on an act of State. He says that even if the right to confiscate be .conceded it must be taken to have been
-; '
waived if either the Crown or its officers purport to act
un<ler colour of a legal title and not arbitrarily. He
contended that arbitrariness was of the essence in an
act of State. He relied on Secretary of State in Council
of India v. Kamachee Boye Sehaba( 2 ), Forester v. Secretary of State for India in Council( 3 ) and Johnstone v.
Pedlar(4 ~. He pointed out that the affidavit of the
" respondent shows tl1at Government decided to confirm
all grants except those which were mala fide. Therefore,
this was no arbitrary act of annexation but an attempt
to exercise what was thought to be a legal right.
We do not intend to discuss any of this because, in our
opinion, none of these decisions has any bearing on the
problem which confronts us, namely, the impact of
the Constitution on the peoples and territories which
joined the Indian Union and brought the Constitution
into being. The flow of events up to the date of final
accession, 1st January, 1950, are only of historical
interest in the present matter. The Rulers of Charkhari
and Sarila retained, at the moment of final cession,
whatever measure of sovereignty tliey had when
pararnountcy lapsed, less the portion given to the
Indian Dominion by their Instruments of Accession in
1947 ; they lost none of it during the interlude when they
"" toyed with the experiment of integration. There was
then redistribution of some of its aspects but the whole
of· whatever they possessed before the integration
returned to each when the United State of Vindhya
Pr:idesh was brought to an end and ceased to exist.
Thereafter each acceded to the Dominion of India in
bis own right.
Now it is undoubted that the accessions and the
,,_ :1cceptance of them by tl1e Dominion of India were
(1) [1.905] 2 K.~. 391 at 401-408.
(2) 7 M.I.A. 476 at 531.
(3) 1872-73 I.A. Supplt.10 at 17.
(4) [1921) 2 A.C. 262 at Q81.
1
~54
Virendra Singh
and Others
...
The State ef Uttar
Praduh.
Bose].
430
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l 1955 r
. )-
Virtmfrn Singh
1<ni Otlur.s
...
Tfr Slule of LUttar
P1adesh.
B11seJ.
acts of State into whose competency no municip;1l
Court could enquire ; nor can any Court in lndia, after
the
Constitution, accept jurisdiction to settle any
dispute arising out of them because of article 363 and
the proviso to article 131 ; all they can do is to register
the fact of accession ; see section 6 of the Government
of India Act, 1935, relating to the Accession of States.
But what then ? Whether the Privy Council view is
correct or that put forward by Chief Justice Marshall
in its broadest outlines is more proper, all authorities
are agreed that it is within the competence of the new
sovereign to accord recognition to existing rights in the
conquered or ceded territories and, by legislation or
otherwise, to apply its own laws to them ; and these
laws can, and indeed when the occasion arises must, be
examined and interpreted by the municipal Courts of
the absorbing State.
Now in the present case, what happened after the
final accession ? There was already in existence in 1949
section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935,
which provided as follows :
"Administration of certain Acceding States as a
Chief Commissioner's Province ....... .
( 1) Where full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction
and powers for and in relation to the Government of
any Indian State or of any group of such States are
for. the time being exercisable by the Dominion
Government, the Governor-General may by Order
direct
(a) that the State or the group of States shall be
administered in all respects as if the State or the group
of States were a Chief Commissioner's Province ....... ·.. .
(2) Upon the issue of an Order under clause (a) of
sub-section ( 1) of this section, all the provisions of this
Act applicable to the Chief Commissioner's Province
of Delhi shall apply to the State or the group of
States in respect of which tlie Order is made."
The final Instrument of Accession complies with
sub-section (1) above. The necessary Order was made
and the Chief Commissioner's Provin-ce of. Vindhya
;
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
431
Pradesh, which at that date included the property in
dispute, came into being on 23rd January, 1950. Now
it is beyond dispute that there neither can, nor could,
be. confiscation of property as an act· of State in the
Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi. It is difficult
to see how there could be in an area which was being
administered by the Dominion Government in all
respects as a Chief Commissioner's Province even if the
person in possession was not, at the time, a national of
the country, an assumption which is by no means
indisputable ; indeed that is the effect of the decision of
the Privy Council in Mayor of Lyons v. East India
Company( 1 ). There would appear to have been a clear
election by the sovereign authority expressed in its
own legislation to waive its rights of confiscation even
if they were there (a point we do not decide) ; and the
same consequences followed when the properties -in
dispute were incorporated into the State of Uttar
Pradesh, two days later, on 25th January, 1950. The
Privy Council go even further in Mayor of Lyons v.
East India Company at page 285 and say that the
waiver or relinquishment can be established from the
treaty itself.
" .... it cannot be denied that the Crown may
relinquish its prerogative ; indeed, whenever the inhabitants of conquered provinces are held to obtain the
rights of subjects by treaty, (and even Sir F. Norton
has no doubt of this being possible) those who hold the
doctrine · the most vigorously must say that the treaty
is a voluntary abandonment of a right of the Crown.
It evidences the will of the sovereign to exempt the
conquered territory from this branch of his prerogative.
But the same will of the sovereign may be collected
from other circumstances, and the like abandonment
of the prerogative be thus evidenced."
But however that may be, the fact remains that the
titles of these petitioners to the disputed lands had not
been repudiated up to the 26th of January, 1950. It is
immaterial whether or not the right of the Dominion
Government to do so remained in abeyance till
exercised . despite the agreement embodied m the
(1) M. I fl. 175 at 0.71 0 ~75·
V irendra Sing 11
iind Ot'zers
v.
T /ze State of Ut/ar
Pradesi1.
Bose J.
432
J1 fren Ira Singh
a11d Ot/au5.
v.
7" 1,,. State of lhfar
Pt(1d:sh.
Bose .7.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I 1955]
Instruments of Accession and the legislation and
notification quoted above because, in fact, it was not
exercised.
Now what was the effect of the non-exerci~e of those
rights ? Even on the English view, the person in de facto
possession is not without rights in the land, nor is he
altogether without remedy. It is just a question of the
means of redress. In Johnstone v. Pedlar(') Lord
Atkinson, speaking in the House of Lords, said :"It is on the authorities quite dear that the injury
inflicted upon an individual by the act of State of a
sovereign authority does not by reason of the nature
of the act by which the injury is inflicted cease to be
a wrong. What these authorities do establish is that a
remedy for the ·wrong cannot be sought for in the
Courts of the sovereign authority which inflicts the
injury, and that the aggrieved party must depend for
redress upon the diplomatic action of the State, of
which he is a subject."
So also in Forester v. Secretary of State for India(•),
the Begum, whose estate Government sought to confiscate as an act of State, was only in de facto possession :
see page 16. The Privy Council held that the Government had purported to act under colour of a legal title,
so its attempt at resumption was not an act of State
and consequently could be reviewed in the Courts.
Their Lordships thereupon proceeded . to investigate
the Begum's title, not under the British Government,
but as derived from the sovereign power which preceded it (page 18). So also in Mayor of Lyons v. East
India Company('), the title of a foreign alien to land
was upheld, not under the English law (because if that
had applied there would have been an escheat), but
under the law in India derived from non-British
sources, that is to say, under the laws of the land before
cession. It was held that those laws continued until
changed and for that reason a title which would have
been bad Uf!der the English law was upheld. At page
274 their Lordships say :(I) [1921]2 A.C. 262 at 278.
(2) 1872-73 I.A. Supplt. 10.
(3) 1M.I.A175 at 274-275.
-
S.C.R.
)
•
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•133
"It follows from what has been observed, not only
that Calcutta was a district acquired in a country
peopled, and having a Government of its own, but that,
for a long course of tifi:\e no such law as that which incapacitates aliens, could be introduced, any more than
it could now be introduced into such part of the Asiatic
or Portuguese territory .... "
and at page 271 they had already said :"In the former case, it is allowed, that the law of
the country continues until the Crown, or the Legislature, change it."
Lord Atkinson's view in Johnstone v. Pedlar (1) at
page 281 appears to point to the same conclusion. He
said:"And even where the person aggrieved was an
independent rajah, against whom the East India Company made war, and having made him prisoner, seized
his property, it was apparently considered by Sir
John Romilly M. R. in Ex-Rajah of Coor'< v. East
India Company( 2 ) that the company, notwithstanding
that this act was an act of State, could have been
sued in respect of any property seized by them which
belonged to the rajah in his private capacity as his
personal property and not in his character of rajah."
We think it is dear on a review of these authorities
that whichever view be taken, that of the Privy Council
and the House of Lords, or that of Chief Justice
Marshall, these petitioners, who were in de facto possession of the disputed lands, had rights in them which
they could have enforced up to 26th January, 1950, in
the Dominion Courts against all persons except possibly
the Rulers who granted the land and except possibly
the State. We do not by any means intend to suggest
that they could not have enforced them against the
Rulers and the Dominion of India as well, but for
reasons which we shall presently disclose it is not
necessary to enter into that particular controversy.
It is enough for the purposes of this case to hold that
the petitioners had, at any rate, the rights defined
above.
(t) (1921) 2 A.C. 262.
(2J (1860) 29 Be
-·-
V irendra Singh
and 01/ztrs
v.
The.State of Utt~r ·
Pr,adesh.·
Bost J.
434
Vir111drn Singh
· aw:l Ot.~ers
.,,
Tfie Slate of Uttar
Pradesh.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
Now what was the extent of the petitioners' rights ?
These properties were not State properties in the sense
of public buildings and so forth. They were indisputably properties over which the Rulers had absolute
rights of disposition at the date of the grants. The
grants are absolute in ,character and would under any
civilised svstem of law pass ari absolute and indefeasible
title to the grantee. Let it be conceded, as was argued
(though we do not so decide), that they were defeasible
at the mere will of a sovereign who held absolute and
despotic sway over his subjects in all domestic concerns.
The fact remains that up till that time they were
neither resumed by the former rulers nor confiscated
bv the Dominion of India as an act of State. Theref~re, up to the 25th of January, 1950, the right and title
of the petitioners to continue in possession was good,
at any rate, against all but the Rulers and the
Dominion of India.
Now what effect did the Constitution have on that?
In our opinion, the Constitution, by reason of the
authority derived from, and conferred by, the peoples
of this land, blotted out in one magnificient sweep all
vestiges of arbitrary and despotic power in the
territories of India and over its citizens and lands and
prohibited just such acts of arbitrary power as the
State now seeks to uphold. Let it be conceded (without admitting or deciding the point) that the Dominion
of India once had the powers for which the Union
Government now contends. The self-same authorities
which appear to concede that power also admit that it
can be waived or relinquished. What then was the
attitude of the Dominion towards those States which
it sought to draw into the Republic of India which was
yet to be free, sovereign, democratic, as its Constitution
later proclaimed it to be ? We quote from the mouthpiece of that Government as disclosed in the White
Paper on Indian States published by official authority.
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's statement (he was then in
charge of the States Department) 5th July, 1947, is
reproduced at page 157. He said at page 158 :'This country with its institutions is the proud
heritage of the people who inhabit it. It is an accident
-
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
435
that some live in the States an<l some in British India,
but all alike partake of its culture an<l character. We
are all knit together by bonds of blood and feeling no
less than of self-interest. None can segregate us into
segments ; no impassable barriers can be set up between
us. I suggest that it is therefore better for us to make
laws sitting together as friends than to make treaties
as aliens. I invite my friends, the Rulers of States and
their people to the Councils of Constituent Assembly
in this spirit of friendliness and co-operation in a joint
endeavour, inspired by common allegiance to our
motherland for the common good of us all."
This invitation was accepted on 19th May, 1949.
Page 109 of the White Paper says :"As the States came closer to the Centre it became
dear that the idea of separate Constitutions being
framed for different constituent units of the Indian
Union was a legacy from the Rulers' polity which could
have no place in a democratic set-up. The matter was,
therefore, further discussed by the Ministry of States
with the Premiers of Unions and States on May .19,
1949, and it was decided, with their concurrence, that
the Constitution of the States should also be framed
by the Constituent Assembly of India and should form
part of the Constitution of India."
It is impossible to think of those who sat down
together in the Constituent Assembly, and of those
who sent representatives there, as conqueror and
conquered, as those who ceded and as those who
absorbed, as sovereigns or their plenipotentiaries, contracting alliances and entering into treaties as high
contracting parties to an act of State. They were not
there as sovereign and subject, as citizen and alien,
but as the sovereign peoples of India, free democratic
equals, forging the pattern of a new life for the common weal. Every vestige of sovereignty was abandoned by the Dominion of India an<l by the States and
surrenderd, to the peoples of the land who through
their representatives in
the
Constituent Assembly
ha!Dmered out for themselves a new Constitution in
which all were citizens in a new order having but one
Virendra Si11~h
and Ot.'.ers •
v.
Ti« State of Uttar
Pradesh.
Bose]"
436
1 954
V irtn,lra Singh
and OtT1trs
v.
T!te State of Uttar
Pradesh.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955J
tie, and owing but one allegiance : devotion, loyalty,
fidelity, to the Sovereign Democratic Republic that is
India. At one stroke all other territorial allegiances
were wiped out and the past was obliterated except
where express! y preserved ; at one moment of time the
new order was born with its new allegiance springing
from the same source for all, grounded on the same
basis : the sovereign will of the peoples of India with
no class, no ca~te, no race, no creed, no distinction, no
reservation.
The Preamble to the Constitution recites in its
magnificient prelude"We, The People of India, having solemnly
resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens :
Justice,
Liberty,
Equality,
Fraternity ;
In our Constituent Assembly this 26th day of
November 1949, do hereby Adopt, Enact and Give to
Ourselves This Constitution."
Article 1( 1) sets out that India shall be a Union of
States and clauses (2) and (3) define the territories of
which India shall be composed. They include the
territories in which the disputed lands are situate.
Article 5 defines Indian citizens. They include in their
wide embrace the Rulers of Charkhari and Sarila who
made the grants, the petitioners who received them
and those who now seek as an act of State to make the
confiscation. It is impossible for a sovereign to exercise
an act of State against its own subjects. However
disputable the proposition may be that an act of State
can be exercised against a citizen who was once an alien
the right being only in abeyance till exercised, there
has never been any doubt that it can never be exercised
against one who has always been a citizen from the
beginning in territory which has from its' inception
belonged to the State seeking to exercise the right.
This is so even on the English authorities which claim
.•
-
-.
-
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
437
far higher rights for the State than other laws seem to
allow. Lord Atkinson said in Johnstone v. Pedlar(1 )
at page 281 :"The last words of Lord Halsbury's judgment
clearly suggest that the Government of this country
cannot assert as a defence against one of their own
subjects that an act done to the latter's injury was an
act of State, since such a subject clearly could not rely
on his own sovereign bringing diplomatic pressure
against himself to right the subject's wrong. In conformity with this principle it was held in Walker v.
Baird (2), that where the plaintiffs are British subjects
in ·an action for trespass committed within British
territory in time of peace it is no answer that the trespass was an act of State, and that thereby the jurisdiction of the municipal Courts was ousted."
And so Lord Phillimore said at page 295 :"Because between Her Majesty and one of her
subjects there can be no such thing as an act of State."
Lord Brougham went further in Mayor of Lyons v.
East India Company( 3 ), and extended the principle to
aliens who later became citizens. He said at pages 284
and 285 :"But this position seems wholly untenable, for all
the authorities lay it down that upon a conquest the
inhabitants ante nati, as well as post nati, of the
conquered country become denizens of the conqueror's
country ; and to maintain that the conquered people
become aliens to their new soverignty upon his accession to the dominion over them, seems extremely
absurd ...... ,, . The Court below, it must be observed,
distinctly admit that conquest operates what they
term a virtual naturalization."
But however that may be, there is no question of
conquest or cession here. The new Republic was born
on 26th January, 1950, and all derived their rights of
citizenship from the same source and from the same
moment of time ; so also, at the same instant and for
the same reason, all territory within its boundaries
(1) [1921] 2 A.C. 262.
(2) [1892] A.C. 491.
(3) I ?vi.I.A. 175. -
195.1
Virendra Singh
and Otlurs
v.
The State of Utta1'
Pradesh.
Bose].
438
Virendra Sing,
and Ot'U!rJ
v.
·r.i.e State of [Jttar
PraJesf..
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955}
became the territory of India. There is, as it · were
from the point of view of the new State, Unity of
Possession, Unity of Interest, Unity of Title and Unity
of Time.
This was also quite clearly the will of the Union
Government as expressed in its White Paper, so even
if the· case was still one of cession there is clear evidence of relinquishment and waiver. At page 115 it
is said:"With the inaugnration of the new Constitution,
the merged States have lost all vestiges of existence as
,
-
separate entities" ;
and at page 130 :"The new Constitution of India gives expression
to the changed conception of Indian unity brought
abut by ............ the 'unionisation' of states ....... .
"
and at page 131 :"Unlike the scheme of 1935 the new Constitution
is not an alliance between democracies and dynasties
but a real union of the Indian people built on the concept of the soverignty of the people .......... All the
citizens of India, whether residing in States or Provinces, will enjoy the same fundamental rights and the
same legal remedies to enforce them. In the matter
of their constitutional relationship with the Centre and
in their internal set-up, the States will be on a par with
the Provinces. The new . Constitution therefore finally
eradicates all artificial barriers which separated the
States from Provinces and achieves for the first time
the objective of a strong, united and democratic India
built on the true foundations of a co-operative enterprise on the part of the peoples of the Provinces and
the States alike."
But we do not found on the will of the Government.
We are no longer concerned with principalities and
powers. V./e have upon us the whole armour of the
Constitution and walk from henceforth in its enlightened ways, wearing the breastplate of its protecting
provisions and flashing tbe flaming sword of '· its
inspiration.
,
S.C.R.
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
439
It was not denied that if the present action of the
State cannot be defended as an act of State it cannot
be saved under any provision of law. Whether the
State would have the right to set aside these grants in
the ordinary Courts of the land, or whether it can
deprive the petitioners of these properties by legislative
process, is a matter on which we express no opinion,
It is enough to say that its present action cannot be
defended. Article 31 ( 1) of the Constitution is attracted
as also article 19(f). The pet1t1oners are accordingly
entitled to a writ under article 32(2). A writ will
accordingly
issue
restraining
the State of U tta r
Pradesh from. giving efl:ect to the orders complained of
and directing it to restore possession to the petitioners
if possession has been taken.
Virendra ,)'ing/,
and Ot..er.r
v.
The State of Uttar
Pn·des/J.
Bose}.
The petitioners will be paid their costs by the State
of Uttar Pradesh. The intervener will bear its own.
Writ allowed.
KISHAN LAL AND ANOTHER
ti.
.Ha;· 12.
BHANWAR LAL.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR
JJ.]
Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 222-Contract of agency
-Agent's right of indemnity against principal-Whether hit by the
notification prohibiting forward contracts of purchase and sale of
bullion.
The respondent '" principal entered into several forward
contracts for the purchase and sale of bullion through the appellant's firm at Indore who worked as commission agents for the
respondent. The transactions resulted in a loss and the appellants
who had to pay the amount of loss to third parties on behalf of
the respondent as the agents brought the suit for recovery of the
amount in the Court in Jodhpur where the respondent resided.
It was pleaded by the respondent that according to the law prevalent there as contained in the notification of the Marwar Government dated the 3rd June, 1943, all forward business contracts in
bullion in which the date fixed for delivery exceeded 12 days were
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