S A VENKATARAMAN versus THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 30 March 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1150 | 1954 INSC 35
Key facts
- Decided
- 30 March 1954
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 72/1954
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1150
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 35
Text of the judgment
1150
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
S.A. VENKATARAMAN
1954
v.
Mar,;h 30.
THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER.
[MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, BHAGWATI,
JAGANNADHA DAS and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, art. 20(2)-Enquiry made under Public
Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850-Whether amounts to prosecution
and punishment within the meaning of art. 20(2).
Held, that an enquiry made and concluded under the Public
Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (Act XXXVII of 1850), does not
amount to prosecution and punishment for an offence
as contem-
plated by art. 20(2) of the Constitution.
Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay ([1953] S.C.R. 703);
Willis on Constitutional Law, p. 528; and Shenton v. Smith
([1895] A.C. 229); Venkata Rao v. The Secretary of State for
India (64 I.A. 55); Government of India Act, 1935, s. 240 (3);
referred to.
CRIMINAL
No. 72 of 1954.
ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION :
Petition
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution
the enforcement of fundamental rights.
for
A. K. Basu, K. S. Jayaram and C. R. Pattabhiraman (R. Ganapathy and C. V. L. Narayan, with them)
for the petitioner.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus
A. Mehta and P. G.
Gokhale, with them) for
respondent No. 1.
1954. March 30.
delivered by
The Judgment of the Court was
MuKHERJEA J.-This is a petition under article 32
of the Constitution, praying for a writ, in the nature
of certiorari, for calling up the records of certain
criminal proceedings started against the petitioner by
the Special Judge, Sessions Court, Delhi, and for
quashing the same on the ground that these proceedings are without jurisdiction, having been commenced
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1151
in violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed under article 20(2) of the Constitution.
The petitioner was a member of the Indian Civil
Service and till lately was employed as Secretary to
the Ministry of Commerce and Industries in the
Government of India. Certain imputations of misbehaviour by the petitioner, while holding offices of
various descriptions under the Government of India,
<:ame to the notice of the Central Government ar:d the
latter being satisfied that there were prima facie good
grounds for making an enquiry directed a formal and
public enquiry to be made as to the truth or falsity of
the allegations made against the petitioner, in accordance with the provisions of the Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act of 1850. The substance of the imputations was drawn up in the form of specific charges and
Sir Arthur Trevor Harries, an ex-Chief Justice of the
Calcutta High Court, was appointed Commissioner
under section 3 of the said Act to conduct the enquiry
and report to the Government, on the result of the
same, his opinion on the several articles of charge
formulated against the petitioner. The order of the
Central Government directing the enquiry is dated the
21st February, 1953. The charges were drawn up
under six heads with various sub-heads under each
one of them. The first charge alleged that the petitioner was guilty of misbehaviour inasmuch as he
showed undue favour to Messrs. Millars Timber and
Trading Company Limited in the matter of issue of
import and export licences, by abusing his position as
a public servant in the discharge of his duties, that 1s,
by accepting illegal gratification or valuable things for
import and export licences recommended or to be
recommended by him. The second charge was to the
effect that the petitioner accepted or obtained valuable
things for himself and other members of his family,
without paying for them, on different dates from
Messrs. Millars Timber and Trading Company Limited
for recommending their applications for import licences
and export permits. The fourth and the fifth charges
1954
S. A. V""'ataraman
v.
Th. Union of
India
and Another.
Mukhtrjea J.
1152
1954
S. A. Venkata·
ram an
v.
The Union of
India
and Another.
Mukhe>jeaJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
were similar in nature to charges 1 and 2 except that
they related to the petitioner's dealings with another
firm known as Sunder Das Saw Mills.
The enquiry proceeded in the manner laid down in
the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act. The charges were
read out to the petitioner and his plea of "not guilty"
·was formally recorded. Evidence was adduced both
by the prosecutor and the defence and the witnesses
on both sides were examined on oath and crossexamined and re-examined in the usual manner. The
Commissioner found, on a consideration of the evidence, that four of the charges under various sub-heads
were proved against the petitioner and submitted a
report to that effect to the Government on the 4th of
May, 1953. By a letter dated the 15th of May, 1953,
the Government informed the petitioner that, on
careful consideration of the report, the President
accepted the opinion of the Commissioner and in view
of the findings on the several charges arrived at by the
latter, was provisionally of opinion that the petitioner
should be dismissed. Opportunity was given to the
petitioner by this letter in terms of article 311 (2) of
the Constitution to show cause against the action
proposed to be taken in regard to him and it was
stated that any representation, which he might desire
to make, would be taken into consideration before the
final order was passed. The pet1t1oner, it seems, did
make a representation which was considered by the
Government and after consultation with the Union
Public Service Commission the President finally decided
to impose the penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner.
The order of dismissal was passed on the 17th of
September, 1953. On the 23rd February, 1954, , the
police submitted a charge-sheet against the pet1t10ner
before the Special Judge, Sessions Court, Delhi, charging him with offences under sections 161/165 of the
Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act and upon that, summons were issued
by the learned Judge directing the petitioner to appear
before his court on the 11th of March, 1954. It is the
legality of this proceeding that has been challenged
,
,/
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1153
before us in this writ petition. The petitioner's case,
in substance, is that the proceedings that have been
started against him are without jurisdiction inasmuch
as they amount to fresh prosecution for offences for
which he has been prosecuted and punished already
and this comes within the prohibition of article 20(2)
of the Constitution. The sole point for our consideration is, whether in the events that have happened in
this case, there has been a violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner under article 20(2) of
the Constitution which would justify the issue of a
writ for enforcement of the same?
'
The scope and meaning of the guarantee implied in
article 20(2) of the Constitution has been indicated with
sufficient fullness in the pronouncement of this court
in M aqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay ( 1 ) • The
roots of the principle, which this clause enacts, are to
be found in the well established rule of English law
which finds expression in the maxim "Nemo debet bis
vexari"-a man must not be put twice in peril for the
same offence. If a man is indicted again for the same
offence in an English court, he can plead, as a
complete defence, his former acquittal or conv:ction, or
as it is technically expressed, take the plea of "autrefois
acquit" or "autrefois convict".
The corresponding
provision in the Federal Constitution of the U.S.A. is
contained in the Fifth Amendment, which provides
inter alia : "Nor shall any person be subjected for the
same offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life and
limb". This principle has been recognised and adopted
by the Indian Legislature and is embodied in the
provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act and
section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Although these were the materials which formed the
background of the guarantee of the fundamental right
given in article 20(2) of the Constitution, the ambit
and contents of the guarantee, as this court pointed
out in the case referred to above, are much narrower
than those of the common law rule m England or the
doctrine of "double jeopardy" in the American
(•) [1953] S.C.R. 703.
1954
S. A. Venkataraman
v.
The Unum of
India
and Another.
Mukherjea ].
1154
1954
S. A. Venkata-ram an
v.
The Union of
India
and Another.
MuldmjeaJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
Constitution. Article 20(2) of our Constitution, it is to
be noted, does not contain the principle of "autrefois
acquit" at all. It seems that our Constitution makers
did not think it necessary to raise one part of the
common law rule to the level of a fundamental right
and thus make it immune from legislative interference.
This has been left to be regulated by the general law of
the land. In order to enable a citizen to invoke the
protection of clause (2) of article 20 of the Constitution,
there must , have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The words
"prosecuted and punished" are to be taken not distributively so as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both
the factors must co-exist in order that the operation of
the clause may be attracted. The position is also
different under the American Constitution. There the
prohibition is not against a second punishment but
against the peril in which a person may be placed by
reason of a valid indictment being presented against
him, before a competent court, followed by proper
arraignment and plea and a lawful impanelling of the
jury. It is not necessary to have a verdict at ail(').
It has also been held by this court in M aq boo!
Hussain's case(' ) that the language of article 20 and the
words actually used in it afford a clear indication that
the proceedings in connection with the prosecution
and punishment of a person must be in the nature of a
criminal proceeding, before a court of law or judicial
tribunal, and not before a tribunal which entertains a
departmental or an administrative enquiry even though
set up by a statute, but which is not required by law to
try a matter judicially and on legal evidence. In that
case the proceedings were taken under the Sea Customs
Act before a Customs authority who ordered confiscation of goods. It was held that such proceedings were
not "prosecution'', nor the order of confiscation a
"punishment" within the meaning of article 20(2) inasmuch as the Customs authority was not a court or a
judicial tribunal and merely exercised administrative
powers vested in him for revenue purposes.
(I) Vide Willis on Constitutional law, p. 528.
(2) [1953] S.C.R. 703.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1155
The facts of this case are no doubt different and
the point that requires determination is, whether the
petitioner can be _said to have satisfied all the conditions that are necessary to enable him to claim the
protection of article 20(2). The charges, upon which
the petitioner is being prosecuted now, are charges
under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code
and section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
We will assume for our present purpose that the
allegations upon which these charges are based are
substantially the same which formed the subjectmatter of enquiry under the Public Servants (Inquiries)
Act of 1850. The question narrows down to this :
whether the petitioner had already been (1) prosecuted
and (2) punished _for these offences ?
Mr. Basu, appearing on behalf of the petitioner,
contends that his client was, in fact, prosecuted for
these identical offences before the
Commissioner
appointed under Act XXXVII of 1850. This, it is
argued, was not a mere departmental enquiry of the
type referred to in Maqbool Hussain's case( 1 ). The Commissioner was a judicial tribunal in the proper sense of
the expression. He had to adjudicate on the charges
judicially, on evidence, recorded on oath, which he
was authorised by law to administer. The prosecution
was conducted by a prosecutor appointed under the
Act, charges were read out to the accused person and
his plea was taken ; witnesses on both sides were
examined on oath and they were cross-examined and
re-examined. The Commissioner had all the powers
of a court; he could summon witnesses, compel production of relevant documents and punish people for
contempt. At the close of the enquiry, the Commissioner did record his finding against the petitioner on
some of the charges. He had undoubtedly no power
to impose any punishment and had only to forward his
report to the Government. Under section 22 of the
Act, however, the Government was entitled to pass
such orders within its authority, as it considered proper and in exercise of this authority the President did
impose upon the petitioner the penalty of dismissal.
(r) [1953) S.C.R. 703.
1954
S. A. Venkataraman
v.
The Union of
India
and Another.
Mukherjea J.
1156
1954
S. A. Venkataram an
v.
The Union of
India
and Anothtr.
Mukheriea ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
It is immaterial, it is argued, for the purpose of
article 20(2) of the Constitution that the prosecution
was before one authority and punishment was inflicted
by another. The petitioner was both prosecuted and
punished and he is sought to be prosecuted on the
same charges over again. This constitutes, according
to the learned counsel, a clear violation of the guarantee
implied in article 20(2) of the Constitution. The
questions raised are undoubtedly of some importance
and require to be carefully examined.
It is true that the Commissioner appointed to make
an enquiry under Act XXXVII of 1850 is invested with
some of the powers of a court, particularly in the
matter of summoning witnesses and compelling the
production of documents and the report, which he has
to make, has to be made on legal evidence adduced
under sanction of oath and tested by cross-examination.
But from these facts alone the conclusion does not
necessarily follow that an enquiry made and concluded
under Act XXXVII of 1850 amounts to prosecution
and punishment for an offence as contemplated by
article 20(2) of the Constitution. In order to arrive
at a proper decision on this point, it is necessary to
examine the entire background of the provisions relating to enquiry into the conduct of public serv.i!llts and
to ascertain the exact scope and purpose of the enquiry
as is contemplated by Act XXXVII of 1850 and the
ultimate result that flows from it.
It is a well established principle of English law that,
except where it is otherwise provided by a statute, all
public officers and . servants of the Crown hold their
appointments at the pleasure of the Crown. Their
services can be terminated without ass1gmng any
reason and even if any public servant considers that
he has been unjustly dismissed, his remedy is not by
way of a law suit but by an appeal of an official or
political character(t ). This principle of law was applied
in India ever since the advent of British rule in this
country and the servants in the employ of the East
India Company also came within the purview of this
(1) Vide Shenton v. Smith [1895] A.G. 229.
'
S.C.R.
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1157
rule. It is to be remembered that it was during the
period of the East India Company that the Public
Servants (Inquiries) Act was passed in 1850. The
object of the Act, as stated in the preamble, was to
regulate enquiry into the behaviour of public servants,
not removal from service without the sanction of the
Government. The enquiry was quite optional with the
Government and did not affect in any way the powers
of the Government to dismiss its servants at pleasure
and this was expressly provided by section 25 of the
Act, the wording of which is as follows :
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect
the authority of the Government to suspending or
removing any public servant for any cause without an
enquiry under the Act."
After assumption of the Government of India by the
Crown, this rule of English common law continued
unaltered till 1919 when section %B was introduced
by the amended Government of India Act of that year.
Sub-section ( 1) of section 96B of the Government of
India Act, 1919, runs as follows :
"Subject to the provisions of this Act and of rules
made thereunder, every person in the civil service of
the Crown in India holds office during His Majesty's
pleasure and may be employed in any manner required
by a proper authority within the scope of his duty, but
no person in that service may be dismissed by any
authority subordinate to that by which he was
appointed .................... "
Thus one restriction imposed by this section upon
the unfettered right of the Government to dismiss its
servants at its pleasure, was that no servant could be
dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by
which he was appointed. The section by its opening
words also makes the exercise of the power subject to
the rules made under the Act and it was in pursuance
of the provision of section 96-B(Z) that the Civil
Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules were
framed which with the later amendments are in force
even now. Part XII of these rules deal with Conduct
and Discipline of Civil Servants and rule 49 of this
part lays down that the different penalties provided
1954
S. A. Venka~a ..
raman
v.
Tk Union of
India
and Another.
Mukherjea J.
1158
1954
S. A. Venkata·
raman
v.
The Union of
India
and Another.
Mukhujea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954J
by the different clauses of the rule may, for good and
sufficient reasons, be imposed upon members of the
services comprised in clauses (1) to (5) in rule 14. These
penalties include, amongst others, censure, withholding of increment, dismissal, reduction in rank
and removal. Rule 55, which finds a place in the
same chapter, lays
down the
procedure to be
followed before passing an order
of dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank against any member
of the service. No such order shall be passed unless
the person concerned has been informed, in writing,
of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action
against him and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. An enquiry has to be
made regarding his conduct and this may be done
either in accordance with the provisions of the Public
servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 or in a less formal
and less public manner as is provided for in the rule
itself.
•
These rules have no statutory force and it was held
by the Privy Council that when an officer was dismissed from service without complying with the provisions
of these rules, he had no right of action against the
Crown('). In other words, the rules, which were not
incorporated in a statute, did not impose any legal
restriction upon the right of the Crown to dismiss its
servants at pleasure.
The position was altered to some extent m the
Government of India Act, 1935, and in addition to the
restriction imposed by section 96-B ( 1) of the Government of India Act, 1919, that a civil servant could not
be dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by
which he was appointed, a further statutory provision
was made( 2 ), that a civil servant could not be dismissed
or reduced in rank unless the person concerned was
given a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause
against the action proposed to be taken against him.
Article 311(2) of the present Constitution has further
added
the word "removal" after "dismissal" and
(I) Vi de Venkata Rao v. The Secretary of State for India, 64 I.A. 55.
(2) Vide section 240 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
•
S.C.R•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1159
before "reduction in rank" and thus in all the three
cases which are covered by rule 55 of the Civil Services
Rules, a civil servant has now a constitutional right to
claim a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to
him.
As the law stands at present, the only purpose, for
which an enquiry under Act XXXVII of 1850 could
be made, is to help the Government to come to a
definite conclusion regarding the misbehaviour of a
public servant and thus enable it to determine provisionally the punishment which should be imposed upon
him, prior to giving him a reasonable opportunity of
showing cause, as is required under article 311(2) of
the Constitution. An enquiry under this Act is not
at all compulsory and it is quite open to the Government to adopt any other method if it so chooses. It
is a matter of convenience merely and nothing else.
It is against this background that we will have to
examine the material provisions of the Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act of 1850 and see whether from the
nature and result of the enquiry which the Act contemplates it is at all possible to say that the proceedings taken or concluded under the Act amount to
prosecution and punishment for a criminal offence.
..
It may be pointed out that the words "prosecution"
and "punishment" have no fixed connotation and they
are susceptible of both a wider and a narrower meaning ; but in article 20(2) both these words have been
used with reference to an "offence" and the word
"offence" has to be taken in the sense in which it is used in
the General Clauses Act as meaning "an act or omission
made punishable by any law for the rime being in force."
It follows that the prosecution must be in reference to
the law which creates the offence and the punishment
must also be in accordance with what that law prescribes. The acts alleged to have been committed by
the petitioner in the present case and on the basis of
which the charges have been framed against him do
come within the d~~nition of "offences" described in
sections 161 and 16' of the Indian Penal Code and
9-98 S.C. India/59
1954
S. A. Vtnkata~
raman
v,
Tm Union of
India
and Anothtr.
MukhMjea].
,
1160
1954
S. A. Venkata~
rama11
v.
The Union of
India
and Another.
Muklurjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act does not itself create
any offence nor does it provide any punishment for it.
Rule 49 of the Civil Services Rules mentioned above
merely speaks of imposing certain p~nalties upon
public servants for good and sufficient reas<ms. The
rule does not mention any particular offence and
obviously can create none. It is to enable the Government to come to the conclusion as to whether good' '.
and sufficient reasons exist, within the meaning of rule
49 of the Civil Services Rules, for imposing the penalties
of removal, dismissal or reduction in rank upon a
public servant that an enquiry may be directed under
A Commissioner appointed
Act XXXVII of 1850.
under this Act has no duty to investigate any offence
which is punishable under the Indian Penal Code or
the
Prevention of Corruption Act and he has
absolutely no jurisdiction to do so. The subject-matter
of investigation by him is the truth or otherwise of the
imputation of misbehaviour made against a public
servant and it is only as instances of misbehaviour
that the several articles of charge are investigated,
upon which disciplinary action might be taken by the
Government if it so chooses. The mere fact that the
word "prosecution" has been used, would not make
the proceeding before the Commissioner one for prosecution of an offence. As the Commissioner has to form
his opinion upon legal evidence, he has been given the
power to summon witnesses, administer oath to them
and also to compel production of relevant documents.
These may be some of the trappings of a judicial
tribunal, but they cannot make the proceeding anything more than a mere fact finding enquiry. This is
conclusively established by the provisions of sections
21 and 22 of the Act. At the close of the enquiry, the
Commissioner has to submit a report to the Government regarding his finding on each one of the charges
made. This is a mere expression of opinion and it
lacks both finality and authoritativeness which are
the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. The
opinion is not even binding on the Government.
Under section 22 of the Act, the Government can, after
•
..
!
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1161
receipt of the report, call upon the Commissioner to
take further evidence or give further explanation of
his opinion. When Special Commissioners are appointed, their report could be referred to the court or other
authority to which the officer concerned is subordinate
for further advice and after taking the opinion
of the
different
authorities
and persons, the
Government has to decide finally what action it
should take.
Then again neither section 21 nor section 22 of the
Act says anything about punishment. There 1s no
power in the Commissioner even to express any
opinion about punishment and section 22 on! y contemplates such order as the Government can pass in its
capacity as employer in respect to servants employed
by it. As has been said already, an order of dismissal of
a servant cannot be regarded as a punishment for an
offence punishable under particular sections of the
Indian Penal Code or of the Prevention of Corruption
Act. A somewhat analogous case would be that of a
member of the Bar whose name is struck off the rolls
on grounds of professional misconduct, in exercise of
disciplinary jurisdiction
by the
proper
authority.
The professional misconduct might amount to a criminal offence, but if we are to accept the petitioner's
contention as correct, the man cannot be prosecuted
for it, even though the authority inflicting the penalty
of removal was not a competent court to investigate
auy criminal charge nor was the punishment imposed
in exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction a punishment
for an offence.
In our opinion, therefore, in an enquiry under the
Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850, there is neither
any question of investigating an offence in the sense of
an act or omission punishable by any law for the time
being in force, nor is there any question of imposing
punishment prescribed by the law which makes that
act or omission an offence. The learned AttorneyGeneral raised a point before us that the test of the
guarantee under article 20(2) is whether the person
has been tried and punished, not for the same act, but
1954
S. A. V enkata-
raman
v.
The Unionoj'
India
and Another.
Mul:/zer.iea ].
1162
1954
S.A, V.nkataram an
v.
Tho Union of
India
and Anoth<r.
Mu!;Mr.iea ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
for the same offence and his contention is that the
offences here are different, though they may arise out of
the same acts. In the view that we have taken this
question does not arise for consideration at all. It is also
not necessary to express any opinion on the question
raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner as to
whether for the purpose of attracting the operation of
article 20(2) the punishment must be imposed by the
same authority before which the prosecution was
conducted.
The result is that, in our opinion, the
petition fai1s and is dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
•
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