M S SHERIFF versus THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 18 March 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1144 | 1954 INSC 32
Key facts
- Decided
- 18 March 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 281/1951
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1144
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 32
Text of the judgment
1144
1954
Hem Raj
v.
The State of
Ajmer.
Mahajan C. J.
[1954]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
in holding that this evidence by itself was insufficient
to uphold his conviction and that Hukum Singh was
entitled to the benefit of the doubt in respect of both
the charges found against him. There is hardly any
material on the record to justify our interference
with an order of acquittal in an appeal by special
leave. In the result both these appeals fail and are
dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
1954
M. S. SHERIFF
March 18.
f/.
THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHuLAM HASAN JJ.]
CTiminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 476B-Whether
appeal competent to the Suprenie Court from aT?_ order of Division
Bench of High Court directing the filing of a complaint for
perjury.
Held that an appe~l is competent to the Supreme Court under
s. 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure from an order of
a Division Bench of a High Court directing the filing of a complaint for perjury.
Also held. that the simultaneous prosecution of civil and
criminal proceedings regarding the same matter is likely to
embarrass the accused and so ord£narily, and in the absence of
special circumstances, the criminal proceedings should be given
precedence and the civil proceedings should be stayed pending
the termination of the criminal.
CRIMINAL
of 1951.
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Case
No. 281
Appeal under article 132 of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated the 1st
August, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at
Madras in Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 1261
and 1263 of 1951.
K. Rajah Iyer (R. Ganapathy Iyer and M. S. K.
Aiyangar, with him) for the appellant/petitioners.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
H. J. Umrigar and S. Subramaniam
for
1145
respon-
dent No. 2.
1954. March 18. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
BoSE J.-The question in this case is whether an
appeal lies to this court under section 476B of the
Criminal Procedure Code from an order of a Division
Bench of a High Court directing the filing of a complaint for perjury.
Two persons, Govindan and Damodaran, filed petitions under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code
for release claimii;ig that they had been illegally
detained by two Sub-Inspectors of Police who are the
appellants before us. Govindan said he was being
detained by one Sub-Inspector and Damodaran said
he was being detained by the other. Both the Sub.
Inspectors said that the petitioners were not in their
custody. The first Sub-Inspector, who was concerned
with Govindan, said that Govindan had never been
arrested by him and had not been in his custody at
any time. The other denied that Damodaran was in
his custody. He admitted that he had arrested him
at one time but said that he had been released long
before the petition. Each swore an affidavit in support
of his return. In view of this conflict between the two
sets of statements the High Court directed the
District Judge to make an enquiry.
Considerable evidence was recorded and documents
were filed and the District Judge reported that in his
opinion the statements made by the two Suh-Inspectors were correct. The High Court disagreed and,
after an elaborate examination of the evidence, reached the conclusion that the petitioners were telling the
truth and not the Sub-Inspectors. The petitioners
were however regularly arrested after their petitions
and before the High Court's order; one was released
on bail and the other was remanded to jail custody by
an order of a Magistrate. Accordingly their petitions
became infructuous and were dismissed.
After this, the petitioners applied to the High Court
under section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code and
1954
M. S. S"'7if/
v.
T!w State ef
Madras
and Othe1's.
Bose].
1146
1954
M. S. Sheriff
v.
Th< State of
Madras
and Others.
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
asked that the Sub-Inspectors be prosecuted for
Penal Code.
perjury under section 193, Indian
The applications
were granted and the Deputy
Registrar of the High Court was directed to make the
necessary complaints.
The Sub-Inspectors thereupon asked for leave to
appeal to this court. Leave was refused on the
ground that no appeal lies, but leave was granted
under article 132 as an interpretation of article 134
(1) and 372 of the Constitution was involved. The SubInspectors have appealed here against that order as
also against the order under section 476. In addition,
as an added precaution, they have filed a petition for
special leave to appeal under article 136 ( 1).
The first question we have to decide is whether
there is a right of appeal. That turns on the true
meaning of section 476B of the Criminal Procedure
Code read with section 195 (3). The relevant portion
of the former reads thus :"Any person .......... against whom ........ a complaint has been made" [under section 476] "may
appeal to the court to which such former court is
subordinate within the meaning of section 195 (3) .... "
The latter section reads"For the purposes of this section, a court shall
be deemed to be subordinate to the court to which
appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or
sentences of such former court. ....... "
The rest of the, section does not concern us.
Two things are evident. First, that a right of appeal
has been expressly conferred by section 476B provided there is a higher forum to which an appeal can
be made; and second, that the appellate forum has
been designated in an artificial way. The appeal lies
to the court to which the former court is subordinate
within the meaning of section 195 (3). But "subordinate" does not bear its ordinary meaning. It 1s
used as a term of art and has been given a special
meaning by reason of the definition in section 195 (3) :
a fiction has been imposed by the use of the word
"deemed". We have accordingly next to examine
the content of the fiction.
S.C.R.
.'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1147
The section says that the court making the order
under section 476 shall be deemed to be subordinate
to the court
(a) to which appeals ordinarily lie
(b) from the appealable decrees or sentences of
such former court.
Now the former court in this case is a Division
Bench of the High Court. The only court to which
an appeal ordinarily lies from the appealable decrees
and sentences of a Division Bench of a High Court is
this court. Therefore, a Division Bench of a High
court is a court "subordinate" to this court within
the meaning of section 195 (3); accordingly an appeal
lies to this court from an order of a Division Bench
under section 476.
It was contended that there is no ordinary right of
appeal to this court and that such rights as there are
are those expressly conferred by the Constitution in a
very limited and circumscribed set of circumstances,
therefore, such appeals as lie to this court cannot be
said to lie "ordinarily".
We do not agree. Such an argument concentrates
attention on the word "ordinarily" and ignores the
words "appealable decrees or sentences". Before we
can apply the definition we have first to see whether
there is a class of decrees or sentences in the court
under consideration which are at all open to appeal.
If there are not, the matter ends and there is no right
of appeal under section 476-B. If there are, then we
we have to see to which court those appeais wia
"ordinarily" lie. It is evident that the only court to
which the appealable decrees and sentences of a Division Bench of a High Court can lie is the Supreme
Court. There is no other court to which an appeal
can be made. It follows that that is the ordinary
course in the case of all appealable decrees and
sentences and that consequently this is the court to
which such appeals will ordinarily lie.
As there is a right of appeal we have next to
consider the matter on its merits and there the only
relevant consideration is whether "it is expedient in
the interests of justice" that an enquiry should be
1954
M. 8. Shnif!
v.
The State ef
Madras
and Otlurs
B.,.J.
1148
1954
M. S. Sheriff
v.
The State of
Madras
and Others.
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
made and a complaint filed. That involves a careful
balancing of many factors.
The High Court has scrutinised the evidence
minutely and has disclosed ample material on which
a judicial mind could reasonably reach the conclusion
that there is matter here which requires investigation in a criminal court and that it is expedient in
the interests of justice to have it enquired into. We
have not examined the evidence for ourselves and we
express no opinion on the merits of the respective
cases but after a careful reading of the judgment of
the High Court and the report of the District Judge
we can find no reason for interfering with the High
Court's discretion on that score. We do not intend to
say more than this about the merits as we are anxious
not to prejudge or prejudice the case of either side.
The learned Judges of the High Court have also very
rightly observed in their order under section 476 that
they were not expressing any opinion on the guilt or
innocence of the appellants.
We were informed at the hearing that two further
sets of proceedings arising out of the same facts are
now pending against the appellants. One is two civil
suits for damages for wrongful confinement. The
other is two criminal prosecutions under section 344,
Indian Penal Code, for wrongful confinement, one
against each Sub-Inspector. It was said that the
simultaneous prosecution
of these
matters
will
embarrass the accused. But after the hearing of the
appeal we received information that the two criminal
prosecutions have been closed with liberty to file fresh
complaints when the papers are ready, as the High
Court records were not available on the application of
the accused. As these prosecutions are not pending
at the moment, the objection regarding them does not
arise but we can see that the simultaneous prosecution
of the present criminal proceedings out of which this
appeal arises and the civil suits will embarrass the
accused. We have therefore to determine which should
be stayed.
As between the civil and the criminal proceedings
we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should
.....
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1149
be given precedence. There is some difference of
opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No
hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not
consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in
the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when
it expressly refrains from making the decision of one
court binding on the other, or even relevant, except
for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or
damages. The only relevant consideration here is the
likelihood of embarrassment.
Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil
suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that
a criminal prosecution
should wait till everybody
concerned has forgotton all about the crime. The
public interests demand that criminal justice should
be swift and sure ; that the guilty should be punished
while the events are still fresh in the public mind and
that the innocent should be absolved as early as is
consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another
reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till
memories have grown too dim to trust. This, however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make
some other course more expedient and just. For
example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient
to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution
ordered under section 476. But in this case we are of
the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the
criminal proceedings have finished.
The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed
but with no order about costs. Civil Suits Nos. 311
of 1951 to 314 of 1951, in the Court of the Subordistayed till the
nate Judge, Coimbatore, will be
conclusion of the prosecution under section 193, Indian
Penal Code. As the plaintiffs there are parties here,
there is no difficulty about making such an order.
The petition for special leave is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Petition for special leave dismissed.
1954
M. S. Sheri.If
v.
The Stale of
Madras
and others.
Bose].
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