RATILAL PANACHAND GANDHI versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 18 March 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1055 | 1954 INSC 31
Key facts
- Decided
- 18 March 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1/1954
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1055
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 31
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
••
1055
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
institutions are properly administered and their income
is duly appropriated for purposes for which they were
founded or exist. As there is no question of favouring
any particular religion or religious denomination,
article 27 could not possibly apply.
The result is that, in our opinion, the on! y sections
of the Act, which are invalid, are sections 38, 39 and
the proviso to section 46. The application under
article 32 is, therefore, allowed to this extent that a
writ in the nature of mandamus would issue restraining the Commissioner and the State Government
enforcing against the petitioners the prov!Slons of the
sections mentioned above. The other prayers of the
petlt10ners are disallowed. No separate order is
necessary in Case No. 1 of 1950, which will stand
dismissed. We make no order as to costs either in the
petition or in the appeal.
Mahant Sri
Jagannath
Ramanuj Das
and Another
v•
The State of
Orissa and
Anot,,,,..
Mukherjea J.
RATILAL PANACHAND GANDHI
1954
tJ.
March 18.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS.
(and connected appeal)
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, arts. 25 and 26-Bombay Public Trust Act,
1950 (Act XX!X of 1950), ss. 44, 47(3) (4) (5) (6), 55(c) and 56(1)
-Whether ultra vires the
Constitution-Section 58 of the
Act-
Whether ultra vires the State Legislature.
Held, that the provision of s. 44 of the Bombay Public
Trust Act, 1950, relating to the appointment of the
Charity
Commissioner as a trustee of any public trust by the court
without any reservation
in
regard to religious
institutions
Iike
ten1ples and Maths is unconstitutional and must be held to be void.
The provisions of cl. (3) to (6) of s. 47 of the Act to the extent
that they relate to the appointment of the Charity Commissioner
as a trustee of a religious trust like temple and Math are unconstitutional and must be held to be void.
A religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right
guaranteed by the Cofistitution to tnanage its own affairs in matters
of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property
or its income for religion and for
indicated
1954
religious
purposes
by the founder of the trust or established
and objects
by
usage
1056
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombay and
Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
obtaining' in a particular institution. To divert the trust property
or funds for purposes which the Charity Commissioner or the court
considers expedient or proper, although the original objects of the
founder can still be carried out, is an unwarrantable encroachment
on the freedom of religious institutions in regard to the management of their religious affairs.
Therefore cl. (3) of s. 55., which contains the
offending
provision and the corresponding provision relating to the po,vers
of the court occurring in the latter part of s. 56(1), must be held
to be void.
Section 58 of the Act is not ultra vires of the State Legislature
because the contribution imposed under the section is not a tax but
a fee which comes within the purview of entry 47 of List III in
Schedule VII of the Constitution.
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar, ([1954] S.C.R. 1005) Davis
v. Beason (133 U.S. 333), Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth
(67 C.L.R. 116, 124), and famshed Ji v. Soonabai [1919] (I.LR.
33 Born. 112) referred to. ·
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Civil Appeal
No. 1 of 1954, and Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1954.
Appeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated the 12th
September, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in Civil Application No. 880 of 1952 and
Miscellaneous Application No. 212 of 1952 respectively.
. N. C. Chatterjee and, U. M. Trivedi (H. H. Dalal
and I. N. Shroff, with them) for the appellants in
Appeal No. 1 of 1954.
Rajinder Narain for the appellants in Civil Appeal
No. 7 of 1954.
M. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (G. N. Joshi and
Porus A. Mehta, with them) for the respondents in
both the appeals.
1954. March 18. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MuKHERJEA J.-These two connected appeals are
directed against a common judgment of a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court, dated the 12th of
which the learned
Judges
September, 1952, by
dismissed two petitions under article 226 of the Constitution presented respectively by the appellants in the
two appeals.
'
•
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1057
The petitioners in both the cases assailed the constitutional validity of the Act, known as the Bombay
Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Act XXIX of 1950), which was
passed by the Bombay Legislature with a view to
regulate and make better provisions for the administration of the public and religious trusts in the State
of Bombay. By a notification, dated the 30th of
January, 1951, the Act was brought into force on and
from the 1st of March, 1951, and its provisions were
made applicable to temples, maths and all other trusts,
express or constructive, for either a public, religious or
charitable purpose or both. The State of Bombay
figures as the first respondent in both the appeals and
the second respondent is the Charity Commissioner,
appointed by the first respondent under section 3 of
the impugned Act to carry out the provisions of the
Act throughout the State of Bombay. In one of the
appeals, namely, Appeal No. I of 1954, the Assistant
Charity Commissioner for the region of Baroda has
been impleaded as the third respondent.
The appellant in Appeal No. I of 1954 is a Swetamber Murtipujak Jain and a resident of Vejalpar in the
district of Punchmahals within the State of. Bombay..
He is a Vahivatdar or manager of a Jain public temple
or Derasar situated in the same village and the endowed
properties appertaining to the temple are said to be of
the value of Rs. 5 lakhs. The petition, out of which
this appeal arises, was filed by the appellant on the
29th of May, 1952, before the High Court of Bombay,
in its Appellate Side, against the three respondents
mentioned above, praying for the issue of a writ in the
nature of mandamus or direction ordering and directing the respondents to forbear from enforcing or taking
any steps for the enforcement of the Bombay Public
Trusts Act, 1950; or of any of its provisions and particularly the provisions relating to registration of public
and religious trusts managed by the appellant and
payment of contributions levied in respect of the same.
The grounds urged in support of the petition were that
a number of provisions of the Act conflicted with the
fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under
articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and that the
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State ef
Bombq,.. and
Others.
Mukherjea J.
'
1058
1954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
contribution levied on the trust was a tax which it was
beyond the competence of the State Legislature to
impose.
A similar application under article 226 of the Constitution ana praying for almost the identical relief was
filed by the appellants in the other appeal, namely,
Appeal No. 7 of 1954 before the High Court in its
Original Side on the 4th of August, 1952. The petitioners in this case purport to be the present trustees
of the Parsi Punchayet Funds and Properties in Bombay
registered under the Parsi Public Trusts Registration
Act of 1936. These properties constitute one consolidated fund and they are administered by the trustees
for the benefit of the entire Parsi community and the
income is spent for specified religious and charitabTe
purposes of a public character as indicated by the
various donors. The petitioners challenged the validity
of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, substantially
on the grounds that they interfered. with the freedom
of conscience of the petitioners and with their right
freely to profess, practise and propagate . religion and
also with their right to manage their ~wn affairs in
matters of religion and thereby contravened the provisions of articles 25 and Z6 of the Constitution. The
levy of contribution under section 58 of the Act was
also alleged in substance and effect to be a tax on
public, religious and charitable trusts, a legislauon
upon which it was beyond the competency of the State
Legislature to enact.
As practically the same questions. were involved m
both the petitions, the learned Chief Justice of Bombay directed the transfer of the later petition from the
Original Side to the Appellate Side of the High Court
and both of them were heard together by a Division
Bench consisting of the Chief Justice himself and
Shah J. Both the petitions were disposed of by one
and the same judgment delivered on the 12th of
September, 1952, and the learned Judges rejected all
the contentions put forward on behalf of the respective
applicants and dismissed the petitions. The petitioners
in both the cases have now come before us in
appeal on the
strength
of certificates granted
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombay and
Others.
Mukhei;jea J.
•
S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1059
by the High Court under article 132(1) of the
Constitution.
To appreciate the points that have been canvassed
before us by the parties to these appeals, it may be
convenient to refer briefly to the scheme and salient
features of the impugned Act.
The object of the Act, as stated in the preamble, is
to regulate and make better provisions for the administration of public, religious and charitable trusts within
the State of Bombay. It includes, within its scope,
all public trusts created not mere! y for religious but
for purely charitable purposes as well and extends to
people of all classes and denominations in the State.
The power of superintendence and administration of
public trusts is vested, under the Act, in the Charity
Commissioner, who is to be appointed by the State
Government in the manner laid down in Chapter II.
The State Government may also appoint such number
of Deputy and Assistant Charity Commissioners as it
thinks fit and these officers would be placed in charge
of particular regions or particular trusts or classes of
trusts as may be considered necessary. Section 9, with
which Chapter III of the Act begins, defines what
'charitable purposes' are, and sections 10 and 11 lay
down that a public trust shall not be void on the
ground of uncertainty, nor shall it fail so far as a
religious and charitable purpose is concerned, even if a
non-charitable or non-religious purpose, which is included in it, cannot be given effect to. Chapter IV provides
for registration of public trusts. Section 18 makes it
obligatory upon the trustee of every public trust to
which the Act applies, to make an application for the
registration of the trust, of which he is the trustee. In
case of omission on the part of a trustee to comply with
this provision, he is debarred under section 31 of the
Act from instituting a suit to enforce any right on
behalf of sucl1 trust in a court of law. Chapter V deals
with accounts and audit. Section 32 imposes a duty
upon every trustee of a public trust, which has been
registered under the Act, to keep regular accounts.
Under section 33, these accounts are to be audited
annually in such manner as may be prescribed.
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
'"
The State of
Bombqy and
Others
Mukherjea J.
1060
1954
·Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombay and
Others.
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURTREPORTS
[1954]
Section 34 , prescribes it to be the duty of the auditor
to prepare balance-sheets and to report all irregularities in the accounts. Section 35 lays down how trust
money has to be invested, and section 36 prohibits
alienation of immovable trust property except by way
periods, without the previous
of leases for specified
sanction of the Charity Commissioner. Section 37
authorises the Charity Commissioner and his subordinate officers to enter on and inspect or cause to be
entered on and inspected any pr9perty belonging to a
public trust. A proviso is added to the section laying
down that in entering upon any such property, the
officers making the entry shall give reasonable notice
to the trustee and shall have. due regard to the religious
practices and usages. of the trust. Among other powers
and functions of the Charity Commissioner, which are
detailea in Chapter VII, section 44 enables a Charity
Commissioner to be appointed to act as a trustee of a
public trust by a court of competent jurisdiction or by
the author of the trust. Section 47 deals with the
powers of the court to appoint new trustee or trustees
and under clause (3) of this section, the court, after
making enquiry, may appoint the Charity Commissioner
or any other person as a trustee to fill up the vacancy.
Section 48 provides .for the levy of administrative
charges in cases where the Charity
Commissioner is
appointed a trustee. Section 50 appears to be a substitute for section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and
contains provisions of almost the same character in
respect to suits regarding ;public trusts. One of the
reliefs that can be claimed in such a suit is a declaration
as to what proportion of the trust property or interest
therein shall be allocated to any particular .object of
the trust. Section 55 purports to lay down the rule of
cy pres in relation to the administration of religious
and charitable trusts; but it extends that doctrine
much further than. is .warranted by the principles laid
, down by the Chancery Courts in England or recognised
by judicial pronouncements in this country. Section 56
deals .with the powers of the courts , in relation to the
application of the cy pres doctrine. Section 57 provides for the establishment . of a fund . to be called 'The
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1061
Public Trusts Administration Fund' which shall vest in
the Charity Commissioner and clause (2) lays down
what sums shall be credited to this fund. Section 58
makes it obligatory on every public trust to pay to this
fund a contribution at such time and ;n such manner
as may be prescribed. Under the rules prescribed by
the Government on this subject, the contribution has
been fixed at the rate of 2 per cent. per annum upon
the gross annual income of every public· trust. Failure
to pay this contribution will make the trustee liable to
the penalties provided for in section 66 of the Act.
Section 60· provides that the Public Trusts Administration Fund shall, subject to the provisions of the Act
and subject t<:> the general and special orders of the
State Government, be applicable to the payment of
charges for expenses incidental to the regulation of
public trusts and generally for carrying out the provisions cif the Act. Sections 62 to 66, which are comprised
in Chapter IX of the Act, deal with the appointment and
qualifications of assessors. The function of the assessors is to assist and advise the ·Charity Commissioner
or his subordinate officers in the ·matter of making
enquiries which may be necessary under the provisions
of the Act. Chapter X prescribes the penalties that
will be inilicted on trustees in case of the;r violating
any of the provisions of the Act. Chapter XI deals
with procedural matters in connection with jurisdiction
of courts and rights of appeal, and the twelfth or the
.last . chapter deals with certain miscellaneous matters.
These, in grief, are the provisions of the Act which are
material for our present purpose.
The contentions that have been raised by the learned
counsel, who appeared in support of the appeals, may
be considered under two heads. In the first place, a
number of provisions of the Act have been challenged
as invalid on the ground that they conflict with freedom of religion and the right of the religious denominations or sects, represented by the. appellants in each
case, to manage their own affairs in matter of: religion
guaranteed under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
The sections of the Act, the validity of which has been
challenged on this ground are sections 18, 31 to 37, · 44,
.1954
Ralilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombay.and
Others.
M.J;/ajea J
1062
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombay and
Others.
Mukheijea ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
47, 48, 50, clauses (e) and (g), 55, 58 and 66. The
second head of the appellants' argument relates to the
levy of contribution as laid down in sections 57 and 58
of the Act and the argument is that this being in substance the levy of a tax, it was beyond the competence
of the State Legislature to enact such a provision.
As regards the first branch of the contention, a good
deal of argument has been advanced before us relating
to the measure and extent of the fundamental rights
26 of the Constiguaranteed under articles 25 and
tution. It will be necessary to addrqs ourselves to
this question at the outset, because without a clear
appreciation of the scope and ambit of the fundamental
rights embodied in the two articles of the Constitution,
it would not be possible to decide whether there has
been a transgression of these rights by any of the
provisions of the Act. This identical question came up
for consideration before this court in Civil Appeal No. 38
of 1953 (The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar( 1 )
and it was discussed at some length in our judgment
in that case. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to refer succinctly to the main principles that this
court enunciated in that judgment.
Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees to every
person and not merely to the citizens of India the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,
practise and propagate religion. This is subject, in
every case, to public order, health and morality.
Further exceptions are engrafted upon this right by
clause (2) of the article. Sub-clause (a) of clause (2)
saves the power of the State to make laws regulating
or restricting any economic, financial, political or other
secular activity which mav be associated with religious
practice; and sub-clause (b) reserves the State's power
to make laws providing for social reform and social
welfare even though they might interefere with religious
practices. Thus, subject to the restrictions which this
article imposes, every person has a fundamental right
under our Constitution not merely to entertain such
religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment
or conscience but to exhibit his belief and ideas in such
(1)
[1954] S. C.R. ioo5.
•
'•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1063
overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion
and further to propagate his religious views for the
edification of others. It is immaterial also whether the
propagation is made by a person in his individual
capacity or on behalf of any church or institution. The
free exercise of religion by which is meant the performance of outward acts in pursuance of religious belief,
is. as stated above, subject to State regulation imposed
to secure order, public health and morals of the people.
What sub-clause (a) of clause (2) of article 25 contemplates is not State regulation of the religious practices
as such which are protected unless they rnn counter to
public health or morality but of activities which are
really
of an
economic,
commercial or political
character though they are associated with religious
practices.
So far as article 26 is concerned. it deals with a
particular aspect of the subject of religious freedom.
Under this article, any religious denomination or a
section of it has the guarnteed right to establish and
maintain institutions for religions and charitable
purposes and to manage in its own way all affairs in
matters of religion. Rights are also given to such
denomination or a section of it to acqmre and own
movable and immovable properties and to administer
such properties in accordance with law. The language
of the two clauses (b) and (d) of article 26 would at once
bring out the difference between the two. In regard
to affairs in matters of religion, the right of management given to a religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation can take away. On
the other hand, as regards administration of property
which a religious denomination is entitled to own and
acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer
such property but only in accordance with law. This
means that the State can regulate the administration
of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted ;
but here again it should be remembered that under
article 26 ( d), it is the religions denomination itself
which has been given the right to administer its property in accordance with anv law which the State may
validly impose. A law, which takes away the right of
3-98 S. C. India./59
1954
Ratila.j
Pancchand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bomba;· and
Others.
Mukherjea J.
1064
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The Stat< of
Bombay and
Others.
MuklurJea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
administration altogether from the religious denomination and vests it in any other or secular authority,
would amount to violation of the right which is
guaranteed by article 26( d) of the Constitution.
The moot point for consideration, therefore, is where
is the line to be drawn between what are matters of
religion and what are not ? Our Constitution-makers
have made no attempt to define what 'religion' is and
it is certainly not possible to frame an exhausti 1·e
definition of the word 'religion' which would be applicable to all classes of persons. As has been indicated
in the Madras case referred to above, the definition of
'religion' given by Fields J. in the American case of
Davis v. Beason (1), does not seem to us adequate or
precise. "The term 'religion' '',
thus observed the
learned Judge in the case mentioned above, "has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator and
to the obligations they impose of reverence for His
Being and character and of obedience to His Will. It is
often confounded with culttis or form of worship of a
particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter".
It may be noted that 'religion' is not necessacily
theistic and in fact there are well known religions in
India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe
in the existence of God or of any Intelligent First
Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a sys:cm
of beliefs and doctrines which are regarded by those
who profess that religion to be conducive to their
spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say,
as seems to have been suggested by one of the learned
Judges of the Bombay High Court, that matters of
religion are nothing but matters of religious faith and
religious belief. A religion is not merely an op11110n,
doctrine or belief. It has its outward expression rn
acts as well. We may quote in this connection the
observations of Latham C. J. of the High Court of
Australia in the case of Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth( 2 ), where the extent of protection given to
religious freedom by section 116 of the Australian
Constitution came up for consideration.
(1) 133U.S.333.
(2) 67 C. L. R. 116, 124·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1065
"It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the
subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil
Government should not interfere with religious opinions,
it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with any acts
which are done in pursuance of religious belief without
infringing the principle of freedom of religion. It
3ppears to me to be difficult to maintain this distinction
as relevant to the interpretation of section 116. The
section refers in express terms to the exercise of religion,
and therefore it is intended to protect from the operation of any Commonwealth laws acts which are done in
the exercise of religion. Thus the section goes far
beyond protecting liberty of opinion. It protects also
acts done in pµrsuance of religious belief as part of
religion."
In our opinion, as we have already said in the
Madras case, these observations apply fully to the
provision regarding religious freedom that is embodied
in our Constitution.
Religious practices or performances of acts in
pursuance of religious belief are as much a part of
religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines. Thus
if the tenets of the Jain or the Parsi religion lay down
that certain rites and ceremonies are to be performed
at certain times and in a particular manner, it cannot
be said that these are secular activities partaking of
commercial or economic characte_r simply because they
involve expenditure of money or employment of priests
or the use of marketable commodities. No outside
authority has any right to say that these are not
essential parts of religion and it is not open to the
secular authority of the State to restrict or prohibit
them in any manner they like under the guise of
administering the trust estate. Of course, the scale of
expenses to be incurred in connection with these
religious observances may be and is a matter of
administration of property belonging to religious institutions; and if the expenses on these heads are likely
to deplete the endowed properties or affect the stability
of the institution, proper control can certainly be
exercised by State agencies as the law provides. We
may refer in this connection to the observation of
1954
Ratilal
Paruu:l111nd
Gandhi
v.
TheStat,.f
Bombay and
Others.
Mukherjea J.
1066
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombqy and
Others.
Mukhe>-jea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
Davar J. in the case of Jamshedji v. Soonabai(' ), and
although they were made in a case where the questio!'
was whether the bequest of property by a Parsi testator
for the purpose of perpetual ce1ebration of ceremonies
like Muktad baj, Vyezashni, etc., which are sanctioned
by the Zoroastrian religion were valid charitable gifts,
the observations, we think, are quite appropriate for
our present purpose. "If this is the belief of the community" thus observed the learned Judge, "and it is
proved undoubtedly to be the belief of the Zoroastrian
community,-a secular Judge is bound to accept that
belief-it is not for him to sit in judgment on that
belief, he has no right to interfere with the conscience
of a donor who makes a gift in favour of what he
believes to be the advancement of his religion and the
welfare of his community or mankind". These observations do, in our opinion, afford an indication of the
measure of protection that 1s given by article 26(b) of
our Constitution.
The distinction between matters of religion and
those of secular administration of ;eligious properties
may, at times, appear to be a thin one. But in cases
of doubt, as Chief Justice Latham pointed out in the
case(2) referred to above, the court should take a common sense view and be actuated by considerations of
practical necessity. It is in the light of these principles that we will proceed to examine the different
provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, the
validity of which has been challenged on behalf of the
appellants.
We will first turn to the provisions of the Act which
relate to registration of trusts. Under section 18, it is
incumbent on the trustee of every public, religious or
charitable trust to get the same registered. Section 66
of the Act makes it an offence for a trustee not to
comply with this provision and prescribes punishment
for such offence. Section 31 provides for further compulsion by laying down that no suit shall lie on behalf
of a public trust to enforce its right in any court of law
unless the trust is registered. A compulsory payment
33 Born. 122.
(2/ Vide Adelaide Company v· The Commonwealthi 67 C. L. R. 116, 129.
(1)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1067
of a fee of Rs. 25 has also been prescribed by the rules
framed by the Government for registration of a trust.
The provisions of registration undoubtedly have been
made with a view to ensure due supervision of the trust
properties and the exercise of proper control over
them. These are matters relating to administration of
trust property as contemplated by article 26( d) of the
Constitution and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be held to be an attempt at interference with the
rights of religious institutions to manage their religious
affairs. The fees leviable under section 18 are credited
to the Public Truit Administration Fund constituted
under section 57 and are to be spent for meeting the
charges incurred in the regulation of public trusts and
for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. The
penalties provided are mere consequential prov1S1ons
and involve no infraction of any fundamental right.
It has been argued by the learned counsel for the
appellants that according to the tenets of the Jain
religion the property of the temple and its income exist
for one purpose only, viz., the religious purpose, and a
direction to spend money for purposes other .than
those which are considered sacred in the Jain scriptures
would constitute interference with the freedom of
religion. This contention does not appear to us to be
sound. These expenses are incidental to proper management and administration of the trust estate like payment of municipal rates and taxes, etc., and cannot
amount to diversion of trust property for purposes
·Other than those which are prescribed by any religion.
The next group of sections to which objections have
been taken comprises sections 32 to 37. Section 32
compels a trustee of a public trust to keep accounts in
such form as may be prescribed by the Charity Commissioner. Section 33 provides for the auditing of
such accounts and section 34 makes it the duty of the
auditor to prepare balance-sheets and to report irregularities, if any, that are found in the accounts. These
are certainly not matters of religion and the objection
raised with regard to the validity of these provisions
seem to be altogether baseless. Section 35 relates to
investment of money belonging to trusts. It is a well
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
Tiu Stat• of
Bombay and
Others.
Muk/uefea J.
1068
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
Tht Stat< of
Bombay and
Others.
Mukhtrjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
settled principle of law that trustees in charge of trust
properties should not keep cash money in their hands
which are not necessary for immediate expenses ; and
a list of approved securities upon which trust money
could be invested is invariably laid down in every
legislation on the subject of trust. There is nothing
wrong in section 36 of the Act. Immovable trust
properties are inalienable by their very nature and a
provision that they could be alienated only with the
preyious sanction of the Charity Commissioner seems
to us to be a perfectly salutary provision.
Section 37 has been objected to on the ground that
an unrestricted right of entry in any religious premises
might offend the sentiments of the followers of that
religion; but the section has expressly provided that
the officers making the entry shall give reasonable
notice of their intended entry to the trustees and shall
have due regard to the religious practice and usages of
the trust. Objection has next been taken to sections 44
and 47 of the Act. Section 44 lays down that the
Charity Commissioner can be appointed to act as
trustee of a public trust by a court of competent jurisdiction or by the author of the trust. If the author
of the trust chooses to appoint the Charity Commissioner a trustee, no objection can possibly be taken to
such action ; but if the court is authorised to make
such appointment, the provisions of this section in the
general form as it stands appear to us to be open to
serious objection. If we take for example the case of
a religious institution like a Math at the head of which
stands the Mathadhipati or spiritual superior. The
Mathadhipati is a trustee according to the provisions
of the Act and if the court is competent to appoint the
Charity Commissioner as a superior of a Math, the
result would be disastrous and it would amount to a
flagrant violation of the constitutional guarantee which
religions institutions have under the Constitution in
regard to the management of its religious affairs. This
is not a secular affair at all relating to the administration of the trust property. The very object of a Math
is to maintain a competent line of religious teachers
for
propagating and
strengthening the religious
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1069
doctrines of a particular order or sect and as there
could be no Math without a Mathadhipati as its
spiritual head, the substitution of the Charity Commissioner for the superior would mean a destruction of
the institution altogether. The evil is further aggravated by the provision of clause ( 4) of the sect10n
which says that the Charity Commissioner shall be the
sole trustee and it shall not be lawful to appoint him
as a trustee along with other persons. In our opinion,
the provision of section 44 relating to the appointment
of the Charity Commissioner as a trustee of any public
trust by the court without any reservation in regard to
religious institutions like temples and Maths is unconstitutional and must be held to be void. The very same
objections will apply to the provisions of clauses (3) to
(6) of section 47. The court can certainly be empowered
to appoint a trustee to fill up a vacancy caused by
any of the reasons mentioned in section 47 (I), and it is
quite a salutary principle that in making the appointment the court should have regard to matters specified
in clause (4) of sedion 47; but the provision of clause (3)
to the extent that it authorises the court to appoint
the Charity Commissioner as the trustee-and who
according to the provisions of clause (5) is to be the
sole trustee-cannot be regarded as valid in regard to
religious institutions of the type we have just indicated. To allow the Charity Commissioner to function
as the Shebait of a temple or the superior of a Math
would certainly amount to interference with the
religious affairs of this institution. We hold accordingly that the provisions of clauses (3) to (6) of
section 47 to the extent that they relate to the appointment of the Charity Commissioner as a trustee of a
religious trust like temple and Math are invalid. If
these provisions of section 47 are eliminated, no
objection can be taken to the provision of section 48
as it stands. This section will in that event be confined
only to cases where the Charity Commissioner has been
appointed a trustee by
the author of the trust
himself and the
administrative charges provided
by this section can certainly be levied on the
trust.
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bomba)' and
Others.
-=
Mukhedea J.
1070
1954
Ra ilal
;·•anachand
. Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombay and
Others.
Mukherjea J.~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
We now come to section 50 and exception has been
taken to clauses ( e) and (g) of that section. It is
difficult to see how these provisions can at all be
objected to. Section 50, as has been said above, is really
a substitute for section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code
and relates to suits in connection with public trusts.
Clause ( e) of section 50 is an exact reproduction of
clause ( e) of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code
and clause (g) also reproduces substantially the provision of clause (g) of section 92 of the Civil Procedure
Code. There is no question of infraction of any fundamental right by reason of these provisions.
A more serious objection has been taken by the
learned counsel for the appellants to the provisions of
sections 55 and 56 of the impugned Act and it appears
to us that the objections are to a great extent well
founded. These sections purport to lay down how the
doctrine of cy pres is to be applied in regard to the
administration of public trust of a religious or charitable
character. The doctrine of cy pres as developed by the
Equity Courts in England, has been adopted by our
Indian courts since a long time past. The provisions of
sections 55 and 56, however, have extended the doctrine
much beyond its recognised limits and have further
introduced certain principles which run counter to well
established rules of law regarding the administration
of charitable trusts. When the particular purpose for
which a charitable trust is created fails or by reason of
certain circumstances the trust cannot be carried into
effect either in whole or in part, or where there is a
surplus left after exhausting the purposes specified by
the senior, the court would not, when there is a general
charitable intention expressed by the settlor, allow the
trust to fail but would execute it cy pres, that is to
say, in some way as nearly as possible to that which
the author of the trust intended. In such cases, it
cannot be disputed that the court can frame a scheme
and give suitable directions regarding the objects upon
which the trust money can be spent. It is well
established, however, that where the donors' intention
can be giyen effect to, the court has no authority to
sanction any deviation from the intentions expressed
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1071
by the settlor on the grounds of expediency and the
court cannot exercise the power of applying the trust
property or its income to other purposes
simply
because it considers them to be more expedient or
more beneficial than what the settlor had directed(' ).
But this is exactly what has been done by the provision of section 55 ( c) read with section 56 of the Act.
These provisions allow a diversion of property belonging to a public trus.t or the income thereof to objects
other than those intended by the donors if the Charity
Commissioner is of opinion, and the court confirms its
opinion and decides, that carrying out wholly or
partially the original intentions of the author of the
trust or the object for which the trust was created is
not wholly or partially expedient, practicable, desirable
or necessary ; and that the property or income of the
public trust or any portion thereof should be applied
to any other charitable or religious object. Whether
a provision like this is reasonable or not is not pertinent
to our enquiry and we may assume that the legislature,
which is competent to legislate on the subject of
charitable and religious trust, is at liberty ·to make any
provision which may not be in consonance with the
existing law ; but the question before us is, whether
such
provision
invades any
fundamental right
guaranteed by our Constitution, and we have no
hesitation in holding that it does so in the case of
religious trusts. A religious sect or denomination has
the undoubted right guaranteed by the Constitution to
manage its own affairs in matters of religion and this
includes the right to spend the trust property or its
income for the religious purposes and objects indicated
by the founder of the trust or established by nsage
obtaining in a particular institution. To divert the
trust property or funds for purposes which the Charity
Commissioner or the
court considers expedient or
proper, although the original objects of the founder
can still be carried out, is to our minds an unwarrantable
encroachment on the freedom of religious
of their
institutions in regard to the management
religious affairs. It is perfectly true, as has been stated
(I) Virle Rasbury, 2nd Edn., vol. IV, p. 228.
1954
RaJilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombay and
Others.
Mukherj.a ].
1072
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombay and
Others.
Makher)oa ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
by the learned counsel for the appellants, that 1t 1s an
established maxim of the Jain religion that Divadravya
or religious property cannot be diverted to purposes
other than those which are considered sacred in the
Jain scriptures. But apart from the tenets of the Jain
religion, we consider it to be a violation of the freedom
of religion and of the right which a religious denomination has under our Constitution to manage its own
affairs in matters of religion, to allow any secular
authority to divert the trust money for purposes other
than those for which the trust was created. The State
can step in only when the trust fails or is incapable of
being carried out either in whole or in part. We hold,
therefore, that clause (3) of section 55, which contains
the offending provision and the corresponding provision
relating to the powers of the court occurring in the
latter part of section 56(1), must be held to be void.
The only other section of the Act to which objection
has been taken is section 58 and it deals with the levy
of contribution upon each public trust, at certain rates
to be fixed by the rules, in proportion to the gross
annual income of such trust. This together with the
other sums specified in clause (2) of section 57 makes
up the Public Trusts Administration Fund, which is to
be applied for payment of charges incidental to the
regulation of public trusts and for carrying into effect
the provisions of this Act. As this contribution is
levied purely for purposes of due administration of the
trust property and for defraying the expenses incurred
in connection with the same, no objection could be
taken to the provision of the section on the ground of
its infringing any fundamental rights of the appellants.
The substantial contention that has been raised in
regard to the validity of this provision comes, however,
under the second head of the appellants' arguments
indicated above. The contention is that the contribution which is made payable under this section is in
substance a tax and the Bombay State Legislature was
not competent to enact such provision within the
limits of the authority exercisable by it under the
Constitution. This raises a point of some importance
which requires to be examined carefully.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1073
It is not disputed before us that if the contribution
that is levied under section 58 is a tax, a legislation
regarding it would be beyond the competence of the
State Legislature. Entries 46 to 62 of List II in
Schedule VII of the Constitution specify the different
kinds of taxes and duties in regard to which the State
Legislature is empowered to legislate ; and a tax of the
particular type that we have here is not covered by
any one of them.. It does not come also under any
specific entry in List III or even of List. I. The position, therefore, is that if the imposition is held to be a
tax, it could come either under entry 97 of List I,
which includes taxes not mentioned in Lists II and III
or under article 248 (1) of the Constitution and in
either case it is Parliament alone that has the competency to legislate upon the subject. If, on the other
hand, the imposition could be regarded as "fees'', it
can be brought under entry 47 of the Concurrent List,
the Act itself being a legislation under entries 10 and
28 of that List. The whole controversy thus centers
round a point as to whether the contribution leviable
under section 50 is a fee or tax and what in fact are
the indicia and characteristics of a fee which distinguish it from a tax. This identical question came up
for consideration before this court in Civil Appeal
No. 38 of 1953 referred to above, in connection with
the provision of section 76 of the Madras Religious and
Charitable Endowments Act, and the view which we
have taken in that case regarding the proper criterion
for determining whether an imposition is a fee or tax
is in substantial agreement with the view taken by the
Bombay High Court in the present case. As the matter
has been discussed at some length in the Madras case,
it will not be necessary to repeat the same discussions
over again. It will be enough if we indicate the salient
principles that were enunciated by this court in its
judgment in the Madras case mentioned above.
We may start by saying that although there is no
generic difference between a tax and a fee and in fact
they are only different forms in which the taxing
power of a State manifests itself, our Constitution has,
in fact, made a distinction between a tax and a fee for
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
TheStateof
Bombay and
Others.
M•kherjea ].
1074
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombay and
Others.
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
legislative purposes. While there are various entries
in the three legislative lists with regard to various forms
of taxation, there is an entry at the end of each one of
these lists as regards 'fees' which could be levied in
respect of every one of the matters that are included
therein. This distinction is further evidenced by the
provisions of the Constitution relating to Money Bills
which are embodied in articles 110 and 199. Both
these articles provide that a bill should not be deemed
to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides for
the imposition of fines or for the demand or payment
of fees licences or fees for services rendered, whereas
a bill relating to imposition, abolition or regulation of
a tax would a!ways be reckoned as a Money Bill. There
is no doubt that a fee resembles a tax in many respects
and the question which presents difficulty is, what is
the proper test by which the one could be distinguished
from the other? A tax is undoubtedly in the nature
of a compulsory exaction of money by a public
authority for public purposes, the payment of which is
enforced by law. But the other and equally important
characteristic of a tax is, that the imposition is made
for public purpose to meet the general expenses of the
State without reference to any special advantage to be
conferred upon the payers of the tax. It follows,
therefore, that although a tax may be levied upon
particular classes of persons or particular kinds of
property, it is imposed not to confer any special benefit
upon individual persons and the collections are all
merged in the general revenue of the State to be
applied for general public purposes. Tax is a common
burden and the only return which the taxpayer gets
is participation in the common benefits of the State.
Fees, on the other hand, are payments primarily in the
public interest, but for some special service rendered
or some special work done for the benefit of those from
whom the payments are demanded. Thus in fees there
is always an element of quid pro quo which is absent
in a tax. It may not be possible to prove in every
case that the fees that are collected by the Government approximate to the expenses that are incurred by
it in rendering any particular kind of services or in
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1075
performing any particular work for the benefit of
certain individuals. But in order that the collections
made by the Government can rank as fees, there must
be co-relation between the levy imposed and the
expenses incurred by the State for the purpose of
rendering such services. This can be proved by
showing that on the face of the legislative provmon
itself, the collections are not merged in the general
revenue but are set apart and appropriated for rendering these services. Thus two elements are essential in
order that a payment may be regarded as a fee. In the
first place, it must be levied . in c_onsideration of certain
services which the individuals accepted either willingly
or unwillingly and in the second place, the amount
collected must be ear-marked to meet the expenses of
rendering these services and must not go to the general
revenue of the State to be spent for general public
purposes. As has been pointed out in the Madras case
mentioned above, too much stress should not be laid
on the presence or absence of what has been called the
'coercive' element. It is not correct to say that as
distinguished from taxation which is compulsory payment, the payment of fees is always voluntary, it
being a matter of choice with individuals either to
accept the service or not for which fees are to be paid.
We may cite for example the case of a licence fee for a
motor car. It is argued that this would be a fee and
not a tax, as it is optional with a person either to own
a motor car or not and in case he does not choose to
have a motor car, he need nvt pay any fees at all. But
the same argument can be applied ·in the case of a
house tax or land tax. Such taxes are levied onlv on
those people who own lands or houses and it could be
said with equal propriety that a man need not own any
house or land and in that event he could avoid the
payment of these taxes. In the second place, even if
the payment of a motor licence fee is a voluntary payment, it can still be regarded as a tax if the fees that
are realised on motor licences have no relation to the
expenses that the Government incurs in keeping an
office or bureau for the granting of licences and the
collections are not appropriated for that purpose but
\
1954
Ratilal
Panachand
Gandhi
v.
The State of
Bombay and
Others.
MukherJea J.
1076
1954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
go to the general revenue. Judging by this test, it
appears to us that the High Court was perfectly right
in holding that the contributions imposed under
section 58 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act are really
v.
Tht State of
fees and not taxes. In the first place, the contributions,
Bombay and
which
are collected under section 58, are to be credited
Ot/tds.
·P"~
to
the
Public Trusts Administration Fund as constiMukhnjea ].~tuted under section 57. This is a special fund which
is to be applied exclusively for payment of charges for
expenses incidental to the regulation of public trusts
and for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act.
It vests in the Charity Commissioner and the custody
and investments of the money belonging to the fund
and the disbursement and payment therefrom are to
be effected not in the manner in which general revenues
. are disbursed, but in the way prescribed by the rules
made under the Act. The collections, therefore, are
not merged in the general revenue, but they are earmarked and set apart for this particular purpose. It
is true that under section 6A of the Act, the officers
and servants appointed under the Act are to draw their
pay and allowances from the Consolidated Fund of the
State but we agree with what has been said by
Mr. Justice Shah of the Bombay High Court that this
provision is made only for the purpose of facilitating
the administration and not with a view to mix up the
fund with the general revenue collected for Government purposes. This would be clear from the provision
of section 6B which provi<les that out of the Public
Trusts Administration Fund all the costs, which the
State Government may determine on account of pay,
pension, leave and other allowances of all the officers
appointed under this Act, shall be paid. It is the
Public Trusts Administration Fund, therefore, which
meets all the expenses of the administration of trust
property within the scheme of the Act, and it is to
meet the expenses of this administration that thes~
collections are levied. As has been said by the learned
Judges of the High Court, according to the concept of
a modern State, it is not necessary that services
should be rendered only at the request of particular
people, it is enough that payments are demanded for
Rati/al
Panachand
Gandhi
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1077
rendering services which the State considers beneficial
in the public interests and which the people have to
accept whether they are willing or not. Our conclusion,
therefore, is that section 58 is not ultra vires of the
State Legislature by reason of the fact that it is not a
tax but a fee which comes within the purview of
entry 47 of List III in Schedule VII of the Constitution.
The result, therefore, is that in our opinion the
appeals are allowed only in part and a mandamus will
issue in each of these cases restraining the State
Government and the
Charity Commissioner from
enforcing against the appellants the following provisions
of the Act to wit :( i) Section 44 of the Act to the extent that it
relates to the appointment of the Charity Commiss10ner as a trustee of religious public trust by the
court,
(ii) the provisions of clauses (3) to
(6) of
section 47, and
(iii) clause (c) of section 55 and the part of
clause ( 1) of section 56 corresponding thereto.
The other prayers of the appellants stand dismissed.
Each party will bear his own costs m both the
appeals.
1954
Ratilol
Panackarul
Gandhi
V,
Tiet Stat. ef
Bombay atlld
Others.
Mukherjeo].
M. P. SHARMA AND OTHERS
1954
tJ.
March 15.
SATISH CHANDRA, DIS1'RICT MAGISTRATE,
DELHI, AND OTHERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MDKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, V1vIAN BosE, GHDLAM HASAN,
BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J
Constitution of India, arts. 19(1)(!) and 20(3)-Search warrant issued under s. 96(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V
of 1898)-Whether ultra vires art. 19(1~(!)-Search and seizure of
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org