THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN versus THE MEWAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD, BHILWARA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 17 March 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1129 | 1954 INSC 29
Key facts
- Decided
- 17 March 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 103/1952
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1129
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 29
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
U29
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
tJ.
THE MEWAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD.,
BHIL W ARA AND OTHERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MUKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN Bos'.E and
GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Industrial Disputes Act (Act
XIV of 1947), s. 7(3) (a), and
Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act (XLVlll of 1950)-A fudge of a High Court and a
District fudge-Whether includes a fudge of the High Court and a
District fudge in the former State of fodhpur.
Held, that under s. 7(3) (a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes
Act (XIV of 1947) as amended by s. 34 of the Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) ~ct (XLVIII of 1950) the phrase "a Judge of
a High Court and a District Judge" includes a Judge of the High
Court and a District Judge in the former State of Jodhpur.
(b) as amended by s. 34 of the
C1v1L Ai>PELLATE JuR1so1cTtoN :
Civil Appeal
No. 103 of 1952.
Appeal under article 133 ( 1) ( c) of the Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order, dated the 10th
August, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan at Jodhpur (Wanch6o and Bapna JJ.),
in D. B. Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 21
of 1951.
K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General of Rajasthan, for
the appellant.
No appearance for the respondents.
1954. March 17. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought under
a certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan
under article 133 ( c) of the Comtitution of India against
a judgment and order of that High Court in writ
petition under article 226 holding the appointment of
one Shri Sukhdeo Narain as invalid and directing that
all proceedings taken by him as the Industrial Court
under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act (No. XIV
of 1947) are null and void.
1954
Marth 17
1130
1954
Thi State of
Rajasthan
v.
Tht Mewar Tex·
tile Mills Ltd.,
Bhilwara
and Ot™rs.
Ghulam HaJan ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
We are informed that Shri Sukhdeo Narain has
ceased to work as an Industrial Tribunal and the".
present appeal, therefore, becomes infructuous, but we
are invited by the Advocate-General on behalf of the
State of Rajasthan who is the appellant before us to
decide the question as to the validity of the appointment, as it is likely to affect other awards made by
tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act. We
according! y proceed to give our decision.
The question involved in the case is whether the
appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain is invalid because
he does not fulfil the qualifications laid down for a
tribunal under section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes
Act.
Section 7(3) hereinafter referred to as the Industrial
Act says:"Where a tribunal consists of one member only,
that member, and where it consists of two or more
members, the chairman of the tribunal, shall be a
person who(a) is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or
(b) is or has been a District Judge ;
"
The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the
Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance,
1950 (Ordinance IV of 1950), by the Rajpramukh on
January 24, 1950. By this adaptation section 7 of the
Industrial Act came to be applied to Rajasthan. Shri
Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on October 9, 1950, by
a notificati<;m which ran as follows :"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) the
Government of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute an
Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain,
a retired Judge of the High Court of the erstwhile
Jodhpur State for the adjudication of an Industrial
dispute in the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in
Rajasthan."
The appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was
objected to by the respondent on the ground that the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1131
words "a Judge of a High Court" in section 7(3) mean
"a Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court
Ordinance, 1949" and as Shri Sukhdeo Narain had
been a Judge of the High Court of the former State of
Jodhpur, he could not be held to be Judge of the High
Court under section 7(3) of the Industrial Act. · This
objection was upheld by the High Court.
Though the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain in
the notification was based upon the fact that he was a
retired Judge of the High Court of · Jodhpur, in arguments· it was also contended before the High Court
that even if he was not qualified for appointment as a
former Judge of a High Court, he was certainly qualified for appointment as a former District Judge. The
High Court repelled this contention. It appears that
the United State of Rajasthan came into existence on
April 7, 1949, and the United State of Matsya was
integrated with it on May · 15, 1949. Section 5 of
Ordinance No. IV of 1950 lays down that :
"For the purpose of the application of any Central
law to Rajasthan, unless there be anything repugnant
in the subject or context,(ix) references therein to other civil, criminal and
revenue courts, to public offices, and to Judges,
Magistrates, officers or authorities shall be deemed to
be references to
such courts, offices and Judges,
Magistrates, officers or authorities of or in Rajasthan."
The High Court held that the word "Rajasthan" as
defined in Ordinance I of 1949 means the United State
of Rajasthan and "the Judges and other officers"
mentioned in section 5 (ix) must be held to be those in
the service of the United State of Rajasthan. Accordingly they held that Shri Sukhdeo Narain could not be
held to be a District Judge within the meaning of
section 7(3) (b) and his appointment as an Industrial
Tribunal under that section was, therefore, invalid.
We are of opinion that this_ appeal can be decided on a
short ground.
The Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act (XLVIII of 1950) came into force on May
20, 1950. By section 34 it was provided that the
1954
The State of
Rajasthan
v,.
T ht Mewar Textile Mills Ltd.,
Bhilwara
and Others.
GhUlam Hasan J.
1132
1954
The Stat1 ef
Rqjast!,.an
v.
Tht Mewar T1xtile Mills Lld.,
8hilwara
and Others.
Oh~/am Hasan ]'
SUl'REME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947, shall be amended
in the manner specified in the Schedule and the
Schedule substituted sub-section (2) to section (1) of
the Industrial Act as follows :"It extends to the whole of India except the State
of Jammu and Kashmir."
As we have already stated the appointment of Shri
Sukhdeo Narain was made on October 9, 1950, i.t:.,
after the Industrial Disputes Act had become applicable to Rajasthan. It is not necessary therefore to
invoke the provisions of Ordinance IV of 1950 in
deciding the question of the validity of the appointment. The argument based on section 34 of Act
XLVIII of 1950 was put forward before the High Court
at the time of the hearing of the application for leave
to appeal and it was contended that in view of
section 34 the provisions of Rajasthan Adaptation of
Central Laws Ordinance, 1950, namely section 5, subsections (vii) and (ix), stood amended or repealed but
the High Court observed that even if this argument
had been .raised before them in appeal, it would have
made no difference. It has been contended before us
by Mr. Hajela, the learned Advocate-General on behalf
of the State, that after the Industrial Disputes Act of
1947 was extended to Rajasthan by section 34 of the
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, XLVIII
of 1950, the provisions of the former stood amended
by section 34 and could not be read subject to section 5
of the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance IV of 1950. We think there is force in this
contention. ·, The effect of section 34, as we have
already indicated, was to extend the territorial application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the
whole of India· including Rajasthan the exception being
the State of Jammu and Kashmir only. This being
so the words "A Judge of a High Court and a District
Judge" used in section 7(3) (a) and (b) respectively of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must be held now
to include "A Judge of the High Court and a District
Judge in the former State of Jodhpur". There is now
no room for the application of section 5 of Ordinance IV
of 1950 according to which a Judge of the High Court
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1133
and a District Judge could only mean a Judge of the
High Court for
Rajasthan established under the
Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 and a District
Judge of or in Rajasthan within the meaning of
section 5(ix) of Ordinance No. IV of 1950. Accordingly
we hold that the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain
was perfectly valid.
1954
Tiu Stat• qf
Raja.sthan
v.
TM Mewar T ,,,_
Iii< Mthq J,td.,
, ·Bhilwara
and Ot/urs.
Ghulam Ha.son ]. '
We accordingly set aside the order of the High
Court but without costs, as the respondent is not
represented.
Agent for the appellant : R. H. Dhebar.
HEM RAJ
1954
().
THE STATE OF AJMER
(And Connected Appeal)
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.
J., VIVIAN BosE
and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, art. 136(1)-Principles gorcrning the
exercise of powers by the Supreme Court under art. 136(1)-Confessions-Whether can be corroborated by evidence already in possession
of police.
Unless it is shown that execeptional and special circumstan~
ces exist that substantial and grave injustice has been done and
the case in question presents features _of sufficient gravity to war~
rant a review of the decision appealed against, the Supreme Court
does not exercise its overriding powers under art. 136 ( 1) of the
Constitution and the circumstance that the
appeal
has been
admitted by special leave does not entitle the appellant to open
out the whole case and contest all the findings of fact and raise
every point which could be raised in the High Court. Even at the
final hearing only those points can be urged which are fit to be
urged at the preliminary stage when the leave to appeal is asked
for.
·The contention that confession cannot be corroborated by the
use of materials already in the possession of the police is devoid
of force. A confession made and recorded even during a trial can
be corroborated by the evidence already recorded. It may .be made
and recorded in the court of committing magistrate and materia,ls
already in the possession of the police may be used for purpose ef
corroboration.
Marth 17.
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