HIMMATLAL HARILAL MEHTA versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 March 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1122 | 1954 INSC 28
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 March 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 20/1952
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1122
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 28
Text of the judgment
1122
1954
.March 16
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
HIMMATLAL HARILAL MEHTA
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
AND OTHERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DA>, VIVIAN BosE and
GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Coostitution of India, arts. 19(1) (g), 226, 286 (1) (a)-Central
Provinces and Berar Sales Ta:r Act (Act XX! of 1947), as amended
by Act XVI of 1949-Explanation II to section 2(g)-Whether
ultra vires th~
Constitutian-Threat to use coercive rnachinery of
Act for realising tax-Whether infringement of fundarnental rights
under art. 19(J)(g) of the Constitution.
Held, (i) that explanation II to s. 2(g) of the Central Pro·
vinces <ind Berar Sales Tax Act (Act XX! of 1947) as amended by
Central Provinces and Berar Act (Act XVI of 1949) is ultra vires
the State Legislature.
(ii) A threat by the State to realize tax from the assessee
without the authority of law by using the coercive machinery of
the impugned Act is a sufficient infringement of his fundamental
right under art. 19(1) (g) and gives him a right to seek relief under
..art. 226 of the Constitution. The impugned Act, requiring the
.assessee to deposit the whole of the tax before he can get the relief
provided by it, cannot be said to provide an adequate alternative
remedy.
The State of Bomba;· v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. ([1953]
S.C.R. 1069); Raleigh Investment Co. v. The Governor-General in
Council (L.R. 74 I.A. 50); Mohd. Yasin v. The Town Area Committee{[1952] S.C.R. 572) referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
20 of 1952.
Appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated the 25th
High
Court of Judicature
April, 1952, of the
.at Nagpur in Miscellaneous Petition No. 1623 of
1951.
N. P. Engineer (R. S. Dabir and I. N. Shroff, with
him) for the appellant.
T. L. Shevde, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh,
(T. P. Naik, with him) for respondent No. 1.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1123
V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (V. V.
Raghavan, with him) for the intervener.
1954. March 16. The Judgment of the Court was
deli1·ered by
MAHAJAN C. J.-This is an appeal by leave from
a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur
dated the 25th of April, 1952, dismissing a petition
under article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by
the appellant questioning the vires of certain provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax
Act, 1947.
The appellant represents a concern C. Parakh and
Company (India) Limited, a company registered under
the Indian Companies Act, 1913, having its head office
at Bombay, and several branches in the State of
Madhya Pradesh. The main business of the appellant company is that of cotton. The head-office of
the appellant at Bombay sells cotton bales to several
mills and individuals under the control and the system
regulated by the Textile Commissioner at Bombay,
and upon a contract of sale being completed the goods
after being ginned and pressed are sent from Khamgoan
and other places in the State of Madhya Pradesh and
are actually deliver-ed in Bombay and such other places
outside the State of Madhya Pradesh as directed by
the head office. The cotton bales are sent by rail
under an insurance in favour of the appellant, and
are delivered to the buyer by tender of railway receipt
against the payment of price in Bombay.
Under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax
Act, 1947 (Act XXI of 1947), cotton was declared
liable to sales tax on the 11th of April, 1949, and since
that date the appellant commenced paying the tax in
respect of the purchases made by it, and continued
to pay it till the 31st of December, 1950. For the
quarter ending on the 31st of March, 1951, the appellant declined to pay the tax in respect of 'the purchases
made during that quarter, realizing that it could not
be made legally liable for the payment of this tax in
the State of Madhya Pradesh, the transactions done
or effected in Madhya Pradesh not being "sales"
within that State. Apprehending that the company
1954
Himmatlal
H arilal Mehta
v.
The State of
M adh)'a Pradeshand Others
Mahajan C. J.
1124
1954
Himmatlal
•Harilal Mehta
v.
Tht State of
Madhva Pradesh
and Others.
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
may be subjected to the payment of the tax without
authority of law, an application was preferred in the
High Court of Judicature at Nagpur praying for an
appropriate writ or writs which may secure to the
company protection from the impugned Act ancf its
enforcement by the State. · It was alleged that Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Central Provinces and
Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as further amended by Act
XVI of 1949 was ultra vires and illegal.
This petition, along with a reference in another case
(Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 258 of 1951 : A.LR. 1952
Nag. 378), was heard by a Division Bench of the
Nagpur High Court and it was held that Explanation
II to section 2(g) of the Act was not enforceable
because under the Constitution sales tax could only be
collected in the State where the goods were delivered
for consumption. It was further held that Explanation II as amended by the C. P. & Berar Act XVI of
1949 was not validly enacted because it made drastic
changes in the rules of the Sale of Goods Act without
obtaining the assent of the Governor-General as required by section 107 of the Government of India Act,
1935. It was observed that the mere production of
the goods in a State is not enough t(!; make the tax
payable unless the goods are appropriated to a particular contract, and that to impose the tax at that stage
would be tantamount to charging an excise duty and
not a tax on the sale of goods. In spite of these findings the High Court declined to issue a writ and dismissed the petition made to it under article 226 of
the Constitution on the ground that a mandamus
issues only to compel an authority to do or abstain
from doing some act, that it is seldom ant1C1patory
and certainly never issues where the action of the
authority is dependant on some action of the petitioner
and that in the present case the petitioner had not
even made his return and no demand for the tax could
be made from him.
·
In this appeal it was argued by Shri Noshirwan
Engineer, learned counsel for the appellant, that an
illegal and unjust imposition operates as an illegal
restraint on trade and violates fundamental right;
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1125
that the High Court having held that the Constitution
by article 286 thereof made delivery of the goods for
consumption the decisive factor for determining which
State should have the right of taxing such sales, and
having thus found the provision of the Explanation to
the definition of "sale" unconstitutional, should have
issued a writ of mandamus restraining the respondent
State from enforcing that part of the Act.
To appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel
it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the
Act which the High Court has declared ultra vires the
State Legislature. Act XXI of 1947 defines the expression "sale" in section 2(g) of the Act in these
terms:" 'Sale' with all its grammatical variations and
cognate expressions means any transfer of property in
goods for cash or deferred payments or other valuable
consideration, including a transfer of property in goods
made in the course of the execution of a contract, but
does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or
pledge".
"Explanation (I)-"A transfer of goods on hirepurchase or other instalment system of payment shall,
notwithstanding that the seller retains a title to any
goods as security for payment of the price, be deemed
to be a sale."
Explanation ( II)-"Notwithstanding anything to
the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the
sale of any goods which are actually in the Central
Provinces and Berar at the time when the contract of
sale as defined in that Act in respect thereof is made,
shall, wherever the said contract of sale is made, be
deemed for the purpose of this Act to have taken
place in the Central Provinces and Berar."
This provision was amended by the Central Provinces
and Berar Act XVI of 1949 which came into force on
the 11th of April, 1949, by which Explanation II of
section 2(g) was amended as follows :Explanation (II)_:_"Notwithstanding anything to
the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930,
the sale or purchase of any goods shall be deemed for
the purposes of this Act, to have taken place in this
1954
Himmatlal
H arilal Mehta
v.
Tht State of
Afadh'J!a Pradesh
and Others.
Mahajan C. J.
1126
1954
Himmatlal
Harilal Mehta
v.
The State of
Madhya P1 adesh
and Others.
Mahajan C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
Province-wherever the contract of sale or purchase
might have been made.
(a) If the goods were actually in this Province at
the time when the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made, or
(b) In case, the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods by description, then, if the goods
are actually produced or found in this Province at any
time after the contract of sale or purchase in respect
thereof was made."
Certain amendments were made in the Act by Act
IV of 1951 which came into force on the 1st of April,
1951, but these are not relevant to the present
mqmry.
As pointed out above, the High Court held that the
new Explanation II was ultra vires the State Legislature and that the mere production of goods was not
enough to make the tax payable unless the goods were
appropriated to a particular contract. The correctness of this view can no longer be questioned by reason
of the majority decision of this court in The State of
Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(1), wherein
it was held that article 286 ( 1) (a) of the Constitution
read with the Explanation thereto and construed in
the light of article 301 and article 304 prohibits the
taxation of sales or purchases involving inter-State
elements, by all States except the State in which the
goods are delivered for the purpose of consumption
therein and that the view that the Explanation does
not deprive the State, in which the property in the
goods passed, of its taxing power and that consequently
both the State in which the property in the goods
passes and the State in which the goods are delivered
for consumption have the power to tax, is not
correct.
The learned Advocate-General of the State did not
in this situation, and very properly, challenge the
correctness of the decision of the High Court on this
point, and conceded that the Explanation was clearly
ultra vires the State Legislature. He however contended that ·on the principle enunciated by the Privy
(1) [1953]'8.C.R. rn6g.
J
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1127
Council in Raleigh Investment Co. v. The Got1ernorGeneral-in-Council('), jurisdiction to question assessment otherwise than by use of the machinery expressly
Act, was inconsistent with the
provided by the
statutory obligation to pay, arising by virtue of the
assessment and that the liability to pay the sales tax
under the Act is a special liability created by the Act
itself which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy which ought to be resorted to, and
therefore the remedy by a writ ought not to be allowed
to be used for evading the provisions of the Act,
especially a fiscal Act. It was also said that the conditions requisite for the issue of a writ of mandamus
were not present in the case and that it was not
within the scope and purpose of article 226 of the
Constitution to decide an academic question.
•.
In our opinion, the contentions raised by the learned
Advocate-General are not well founded. It is plain
that the State evinced an intention that it could
certainly proceed to apply the penal provisions of the
Act against the appellant if it failed to make the
return or to meet the demand and in order to escape
from such serious consequences threatened without
authority of law, and infringing fundamental rights,
relief by way of a writ of mandamus was clearly the
appropriate relief. In Mohd. Yasin v. The Town Area
Committee("), it was held by this court that a licence
fee on a business not only takes away the property of
the licensee but also operates as a restriction on his
fundamental right to carry on his business and there~
fore if the imposition of a licence fee is without
authority of law it can be challenged by way of an
application under article 32, a fortiori also under
article 226. These observations have apposite application to the circumstances of the present case.
Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Act having been
declared ultra vires, any imposition of sales tax on the
appellant in Madhya Pradesh is without the authority
of law, and that being so a threat by the State by
using the coercive machinery of the impugned Act to
(1) 741.A.50.
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 572.
\-~l\ S.G, ludi~(~S
19'4
Himmatlal
Harilal M1Alo
Y.
Th• Stat1 •f
Madhya Prade1l
and Others.
Mahajan C. :J.
1128
19M
Himmatlal
Hmilal Mehl•
.v.
Thi Statt of
Mad~va Pradeih
and Others.
Mahajan C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
realize it from the appellant is a sufficient infringe•
ment of his fundamental right under article 19(1) (g)
and it was clearly entitled to relief under article 226 of
the Constitution. The contention that because a
remedy under the impugned Act was available to the
appellant it was disentitled to relief under article 226
stands negatived by the decision of this court in The
State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.('},
above referred to. There it was held that the principle
that a court will not issue a prerogative writ when an
adequate alternative remedy was available could not
apply where a party came to the court with an allegation that his fundamental tight had been infringed
and sought relief under article 226. Moreover, the
remedy provided by the Act is of an onerous and
burdensome character. Before the appellant can avail
of it he has to deposit the whole amount of the tax.
Such a provision can hardly be described as an
adequate alternative remedy.
For the reasons given above, we are of the opm1on
that the High Court, having held that the Explanation II to section 2(g) of the Act Was ultra vires, was
in error in dismissing the application on the ground
that it was not entitled to relief under the provisions
of article 226 of the Constitution. In the result therefore we 11llow this appeal with costs and direct an
appropriate writ to issue restraining the first respond·
ent from imposing or authorising imposition of a tax
on the appellant in exercise of its authority under
Explanation II held void.
Appeal allowed;
(1) (1953] S.C.R. 1069.
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