THE COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS, MADRAS versus SRI LAKSHMINDRA THIRTHA SWAMIAR OF SRI SHIRUR MUTT.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 March 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1005 | 1954 INSC 26
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 March 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 38/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1005
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 26
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT i,EPORTS
1005
existed in the other parts of Rajasthan. This difference
between the two parts did not justify that such progressive and ameliorative measures for the welfare of
the people existing in a particular area should be done
away with and the State be brought down to the level
of the unprogressive States. The judgment shows that
the Bench far from going back on its previous view
adhered to it and expressly distinguished the case
under appeal before us on its special facts.
As a result of the foregoing discussion we hold
that the view taken by the High Court is correct. We
accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.
Agent for the appellant :
1954
TheStateof
RaJasthan
v.
Rao Manohcr
Sinthji.
Ghulam Hasan]•.
•
Appeal dismissed.
R. H. Dhebar.
1954
THE COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS
ENDOWMENTS, MADRAS
March 16.
ti.
SRI LAKSHMINDRA THIRTHA SWAMIAR
OF SRI SHIRUR MUTT.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HASAN,
BHAGW~TI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, arts. 19(1)(f), 25, 26, 27-Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act
XIX of 1951), ss. 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69, 76--Whether
ultra vires the Constitution-Work "property" in art 19(1) (f)
meaning of-Tax and fee, meaning of-Distinction bet1vcen.
Held, that ss. 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69 of the Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras
Act XIX of 1951) are ultra vires arts. 19(\)(f), 25 and 26 of the
Constitution cf India.
Section 76( I) of the Act is void as the provision relating to tlie
payment of annual contribution contained in it is a tax and not a
fee and so it was beyond the legislative competence of the Madras
Sta~c Legislature to enact such a provision.
That on the facts of the present case the imposition
under
s. 76( I) of the Act, although it is a tax, does not come within the
hitter part of art. 27 because the t>bject of the contribution under
the section is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu reli·
gion or any denomination under it but the proper administration
ot rc.li<i;iam. tnms and institutions wherever they exist.
1006
1954
Thi C•mmis
4
siomr, Hindu
&ligiow Endow
mmts, Madras
4
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
7 hirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
The word "property" as used in art. 19( 1) ( f) of the Constitution should be given a liberal and wide connotation and should be
extended to all well-recognized types of interest \vhich have the
insignia or characteristics of proprietary right.
The ingredients of both office and property, of duties anJ personal interest are biended together in the rights of a Mahant and
the Mahant has the right to enjoy this property or beneficial
interest so long as he is entitled to hold his office. Therefore he is
entitled to claim the protection of art. 19(1)(£).
A tax is a con1pulsory exaction of money by public authority
for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payn1ent for~
services renderc:d .
It is not possible to formulate a definition of fc:c: that can
apply to all cases as there are various kinds of fees. But a fc:e 1nay
generally be defined as a charge for a special service rendered to
individuals by so111e governn1ental agency. 1"'hc: an1ount of fee
levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the
Govern1nent in rendering the service, though in inany cases such
expenses are arbitrarily assessed.
"The distinction between a tax and a fee lies prirnarily in
the: fact that a tax is levied as part of a comn1on burden, while: a
fee is a payn1ent for a special benefit or privilege."
Scope of arls. 25 an<l 26 <lisi..:ussed.
Meaning of the tern1 "Mathadhipati" and "religion"
explained.
Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami ( 48 I.A. 302), Monahar v. Rhupendm {60 Cal. 452), Ganesh v. Lal Behary (63 I.A. 448), /!habatarini
v. Ashalata (70 I.A. 57), Angurbala v. Debabrata ((1951] S.C.R. 1125),
Davis v. Benson (133 U.S. 333), The State of West Bengal v. Subodh
Gopal Rose (Civil Appeal No. 107 of 1952 decided by the Supreme
Court on the 17th December, 1953), Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth ( 67 C.L.R. 116, 127), Minersville School Dutrict, Board
of Education etc. v. Gobitis (310 U.S. 586), West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette (319 U.S. 624), Murdock v. Pennsylvania (319 U.S. 105), /ones v. Opelika (316 U.S. 584). Matthews v.
Chicory Marketing Board ( 60 C.L.R. 263, 276), Lower Mainland
Dairy v. Crystal Dairy Ltd. ([1933] A.C. 168) referred to.
(Findlay Shirras on Science of Puhlic Finance, Vol. LP. 203).
C1VIL APPELLATE
38 of 1953.
JUR1so1cTION : Civil Appeal No·
Appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th
December, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature,
Madras, m Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 2591 of
1951.
S.C.R.
SJJPREME COURT REPORTS
V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras R. Gana'
pathy Iyer, with him) for the appellant.
B. Somayya and C. R. Pattabhi Raman (T. Krishna
Rao and M. S. K. Sastri, with them) for the respondent.
T. N. Subramania Iyer, Advocate-General of Travancore-Cochin (T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and Sardar Bahadur, with him) for the Intervener (State of TravancoreCochin).
1954. March 16. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against a
judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High
Court, (lated the 13th of December, 1951, by which
the learned Judges allowed a petition, presented by
the respondent under article 226 of the Constitution,
and directed a writ of prohibition to issue in his favour
prohibiting the appellant from proceeding with the
settlement of a scheme in connection with a Math,
known as the Shirur Math, of which the petitioner
happens to be the head or superior. It may be stated
at the outset that the petition was filed at a time when
the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (Act II
of 1927), was in force and the writ was prayed for
Board
against the Hindu Religious Endowments
constituted under that Act, which was the preaecessor
in authority . of the present appellant and had initiated
proceedings for settlement of a scheme against the
petitioner under section 61 of the said Act.
The petition was directed to be heard along with two
other petitions of a similar nature relating to the
temple at Chidambaram in the district of South Arcot
and questions were raised in all of them regarding the
validity of Madras Act II of 1927, hereinafter referred
to as the Earlier Act. While the petitions were still
pending, the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowments Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the New
Act), was passed by the Madras Legislature and came
into force on the 27th of Augnst, 1951. Jn view of the
Earlier Act being replaced by the new one, leave was
given to all the petitioners to amend their petitions
and challenge the validity of the New Act as well.
•
1954
The Commissioner; Hindu
Religious Endowments; Mad,ras
v.
Sr£ Llfkshmindra
T.hirtha Swarniar
•f Sri Shirur
Mutt
MukMr:JeaJ.
1008
1954
T ht Commissioner, Hindu
.Rtligious Endowrmnts, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Mukhnjea J.
/SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
[1954]
Under section 103 of the New Act, notifications, orders
and acts under the Earlier Act are to be treated as
notifications, orders and acts issued, made or done by
the appropriate authority
under the corresponding
provisions of the New Act, and in accordance with this
provision, the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, who takes the place of the President,
Hindu Religious Endowments Board under the Earlier
Act, was added as a party to the proceedings.
So far as the ~present appeal is concerned, the
material facts may be shortly narrated as follows: The
Math, known as Shirur Math, of which the petitioner
is the superior or Mathadhipati, is one of the eight
Maths situated at Udipi in the district of Souh Kanara
and they are reputed to have been founded by Shri
Madhwacharya, the well-known exponent of dualistic
theism in the Hindu Religion. Besides these eight
Maths, each one of which is presided over by a Sanyasi
or Swami, there exists another ancient religious institution at Udipi known as Shri Krishna Devara Math,
also established by Madhwacharya which is supposed
to contain an image of God Krishna originally made
by Arjun and miraculously obtained from a vessel
wrecked at the coast of Tulava. There is no Mathadhipati in the Shri Krishna Math and its affairs arc
managed by the superiors of the other eight Maths by
turns and the custom is that tbe Swami of each of
these eight Maths presides over the Shri Krishna Math
in turn for a period of two years in every sixteen years.
The appointed time of change in the headship of the
Shri Krishna Math is the occasion of a great festival,
known as Pariyayam, when a vast concourse af
devotees gather at Udipi from all parts of Southern
India, and ·an ancient usage imposes a duty upon the
Mathadhipati to feed every Brahmin that comes to the
place at that time.
The petitioner was installed as Mathadhipati in the
year 1919, when he was still a minor, and he assumed
management after coming of age some time in 1926.
At that time the' Math was heavily in debt. Between
1926 and 1930 the Swami succeeded in clearing off a
large portion of the debt. In 1931, however, came the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
lOOJ
turn of his taking over management of the Shri Krishna
Math and he had had to incur debts to meet the heavy
expenditure attendant on the Pariyayam .ceremonies.
The financial position improved to some extent during
the years that followed, but troubles again arose in
, 1946, which was the year of the second Pariyayam of
the Swami. Owing to scarcity and the high prices of
commodities at that time, the Swami had to borrow
money to meet the expenditure and the debts mounted
up to nearly a lakh of rupees. The Hindu Religious
Endowments Board, functioning under the Earlier Act
of 1927, intervened at this stage and in exercise of its
powers under section 61-A of the Act called upon the
Swami to appoint a competent manager to manage the
affairs of the institution. The petitioners' case is that
the action
of the Board was instigated by one
Lakshminarayana Rao, a lawyer of Udipi, who wanted
to have control over the affairs of the Math. It appears
that in pursuance of the direction of the Board, one
Sripath Achar was appointed an agent and a Power of
Attorney _was executed in his favour on the 24th of
December, 1948. The agent, it is alleged by the petitioner, wanted to have his own way in all the affairs of
the Math and paid no regard whatsoever to the wishes
of the Maham. He did not even submit accounts to
the Maham and deliberately flouted his authority. . In
this state of affairs the Swami, on the 26th of September, 1950, served a notice upon the agent terminating
his agency and calling upon him to hand over to the
Mathadhipati all account papers and vouchers relating
·to the institution together with the cash in hand. Far,
from complying with this demand, the agent, who was
supported by the aforesaid Lakshminarayana Rao,
questioned the authority of the Swami to cancel his
agency and threatened that he would refer the matter
for action to the Board. On the 4th of October, 1950,
the petitioner filed a suit against the agent in the SubCourt of South Kanara for recovery of the account
books and other articles belonging to the Math, -for
rendering an account of the management and also for
an injunction restraining the said agent from interfering with the affairs of the Math under colour of the
195{
T"6 Commis·
siotteT, Hindu
Religious Endoww
mmts, Madras
·V.
Sri Lalcshmindra
T hirtha Swamiar
of Sri .Shirur
MMtt.
1010
195~
Tht Commissioner, Hindu
&li.gfous Endowments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmitidra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Mukhrr.ie• J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
authority conferred by the Power of Attorney which
the plaintiff had cancelled. The said Sripath Achar
anticipating this suit filed an application to the Board
on the 3rd of October, 1950, complaining against the
cancellation of the Power of Attorµey and his management of the Math. The Board on the 4th October,
1950, issued a notice to the Swami proposing to inquire
into the matter on the 24th of October following
at 2 p. m. at Madras and requesting the Swami either
to appear in person or by a pleader. To this the Swami
sent a reply on 21st October, 1950, stating that the
subject-matter of the very enquiry was before the
court in the original suit filed by him and as the matter
was sub j~dice, the enquiry should be put off. A copy
of the plaint filed in that suit was also sent along with
the reply. .The Board, it appears, dropped that
enquiry, but without waiting for the result of the suit,
initiated proceedings suo moto under sect(on 62 of the
Earlier Act and issued a notice upon the Swami on the
6th of November, 1950, stating that it had reason to
believe that the endowments of the said Math were
being mismanaged and that a scheme should be framed
for the administration of its affairs. The notice was
served by af!ixture on the Swami and the 8th of
December, 1950, was fixed as the date of enquiry. On
that date at the request of the counsel for the Swami,
it was adjourned to the 21st of December, following.
On the 8th of December, 1950, an application was filed
on behalf of the Swami praying to the Board to issue a
direction to the agent to hand over the account papers
and other documents, without which it was not possible
for him to file his objections. As the lawyer appearing
for the Swami was unwell, the matter was again
adjourned till the 10th of January, 1951. The Swami
was not ready with his objections even on that date as
his lawyer had not recovered from his illness and a
telegram was sent to the Board· on the previous day
requesting the latter to grant a further adjournment.
The Board did not accede to this request and as no
explanation was filed by the Swami, the enquiry was
closed and orders reserved upon it. On the 13th of_
January, 1951, the Swami, it appears, sent a written
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
IOU
explanation to the Board, which the latter admittedly
received on the 15th. On the 24th of January, .1951,
the Swami received a notice from the Board stating
inter alia that the Board was satisfied that in the
interests of proper administration of the Math and its
endowments, the settlement of a scheme was necessary·
A draft scheme was sent along with the notice and if
the petitioner had any objections to the same, he was
required to send in his objections on or before the llth
of February, 1951, as the final order regarding
the scheme would be made on the 15th of February,
1951. On the 12th of February, 1951, the petitioner filed the petltlon, out of which this appeal
anses, · in the High Court of Madras praying for
a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Board from taking
further steps in the matter of settling a scheme for the
administration of the Math. It was alleged inter a/ia
that the Board was actuated by bias against the petitioner and the action taken by it with regard to the
settling of a scheme was not a bona fide act at all. The
main contention, however, was that having regard to
the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution in matters of religion and religious institutions
beionging to particular religious denominations, the
law regulating the framing of a scheme interfering with
the management of the Math and its affairs by the
Mathadhipati conflicted with the provisions of articles 19(1) (f) and 26 of the Constitution and was hence
void under article 13. It was alleged further that the
provisions of the Act were discriminatory in their
character and offended against article 15 of the
Constitution. As has been stated already, after
the
New Act came into force, the petitioner was allowed to
amend his petition and the attack was now directed
against the constitutional validity of the New Act
which replaced the earlier legislation.
The learned Judges, who heard tl1e petition, went
into the matter with elaborate fullness, both on the
constitutional questions involved in it as well as on its
merits. On the merits, it was held that in the circumstances of the case the action of the Board was a
perverse exercise of its jurisdiction and that it should
6--97 S. C.Ind'a/59
1954
The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
T hirtha Swamiar
of Sri Sftirur
Mutt.
Mukherjea J,
1012
1954
The Commis-sioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
T hirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Muk/,,rjea ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
not be allowed to proceed in regard to the settlement
of the scheme. On the constitutional issues raised in
the case, the learned Judges pronounced quite a number of sections of the New Act to be ultra vires the
Constitution by reason of their being in conflict with
the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed
under articles 19(1) (f), 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution. In the result, the rule nisi issued on the
pet1t10n was made absolute and the Commissioner,
Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, was prohibited
from proceeding further with the framing of a scheme
in regard to the petitioner's Math. The Commissioner
has now come up on appeal before us on the strength
of a certificate granted by the High Court under
article 132(1) of the Constitution.
The learned Advocate-General for Madras, who
appeared in support of the appeal, confined his arguments exclusively to the constitutional points involved
in this case. Although he had put in an application
to urge grounds other than the constitutional grounds,
that application was not pressed and he did not
challenge the findings of fact upon which the High
Court based its decision on the merits of the petition.
The position, therefore, is that the order of the High
Court issuing the writ of prohibition against the appellant must stand irrespective of the decision which we
might arrive at on the Constitution Points raised
before us.
It is not disputed that a State Legislature is competent to enact laws on the subject of religious and
charitable endowment, which is covered by entry 28
of List III in Schedule VII of the Constitution. No
question of legislative incompetency on the part of the
Madras Legislature to enact the legislation in question
has been raised before us with the exception of the
prov1s1on relating to payment of annual contribution
contained in section 76 of the impugned Act. The
argument that has been advanced is, that the contribution is in reality a tax and not a fee and consequently
the State Legislature had no authority to enact a provision of this character. We will deal with this point
:separately later on. All the other points canvassed
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1013
before us relate to the constitutional validity or otherwise of the 'several provisions of the Act which have
been held to be invalid by the High Court of Madras
on grounds of their being in conflict with the fundamental rights guaranteed under articles 19(1) (f), 25,
26 and 27 of the Constitution. In order to appreciate
the contentions that have been advanced on these
heads by the learned counsel on both sides, it may be
convenient to refer briefly to the scheme and the
salient provisions of the Act.
The object of the legislation, as indicated in the
preamble, is to amend and consolidate the law relating
to the administration and governance of Hindu
religious and charitable institutions and endowments
in the Stat.e of Madras. As compared with the Earlier
Act, . its scope is wider and it can be made applicable
to purely charitable endowments by proper notification
under section 3 of the Act. The Earlier Act provided
for supervision of Hindu religious endowments through
a statutory body known as the Madras Hindu Religious
Endowments Board. The New Act has abolished this
Board and the administration of religious and charitable institutions has been vested practically in a
department of the Government, at the head of which
is the Commissioner. The powers of the Commissioner
and of the other authorities under him have been
enumerated in Chapter II of the Act. Under the
Commissioner are the Deputy Commissioners, Assistant
Commissioners and Area Committees. The Commissioner, with the approval of the Government, has to
divide the State into certain areas and each area 1s
placed in charge of a Deputy Commissioner, to
whom the powers of the Commissioner · can be
delegated. The State has also to be divided into a
number of divisions and an Assistant Commissioner is
to be placed in charge of each division. Below the
Assistant Commissioner, there will be an Area Committee in charge
of an the temples situated within a
division or part of a division. Under section 18, the
Commissioner is empowered to examine the records of
any Deputy Commissioner, .Assistant Commissioner, or
Area Committee, or of any trustee not being the trustee
1954
The Commis·
sioner, Hindu
&liiiou.s Endow·
'!l''nts, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirthit Swamiar
ofSri Shirur
Mutt.
Mukherjea J.
1014
1954
The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
of a Math, in respect of any proceeding under the
Act, to satisfy himself as to the regularity, correctness,
or propriety of any decision or order. Chapter III
contains the general provisions relating to all religious
institutions. Under section 20, the administration of
religions endowments is placed under the general
snperintendence and control of the Commissioner and
he is empowered to pass any orders which may be
deemed necessary to ensure that such endowments are
properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for the purposes for which they were founded
or exist. Section 21 gives the Commissioner, the
Deputy and Assistant Commissioners and such other
officers as may be authorised in this behalf, the power
to enter the premis.es of any religious institution or
any place of worship for the purpose of exercising any
power conferred, or discharging any duty imposed, by
or under the Act. The only restriction is that the
officer exercis.ing the power must be a Hindu. Section
23 makes it obligatory on the trustee of a religious
institution to obey all lawful orders issued under the
provisions of this Act by the Government, the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Area Committee or the Assistant Commissioner. Section 24 lays
down that in the administration of the affairs of the
institution, a trustee should use as much care as a man
of ordinary prudence would use in the management of
his own affairs. Section 25 deals with the preparation
of registers of all religious institutions and section 26
provides for the annual verification of such registers.
Section 27 imposes a duty on the trustee to furnish to
the Commissioner such accounts, returns, reports and
other information as the Commissioner may require.
Under section 28, power is given to the Commissioner
or any other officer authorised by him to inspect all
movable and immovable properties appertaining to a
religious institution. Section 29 forbids alienation of
all immovable properties belonging to the trust, except
leases for a term not exceeding five years, without the
sanction of the Commissioner. Section 30 lavs down
that although a trustee may incur expenditure for
making arrangements for securing the health and
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1015
comfort of pilgrims, worshippers and other people, when
there is a surplus left after making adequate provision
for purposes specified in section 79(2), he shall be guided in such matters by all general or special instructions
which he may receive from the Commissioner or the
Area Committee. Section 31 deals with surplus funds
which the trustee may apply wholly or in part with
the permission, in writing, of the Deputy Commissioner for any of the purposes specified in section
59(1 ). Chapter IV deals specifically with Maths. Section 52 enumerates the grounds on which a suit would
lie to remove a trustee. Section 54 relates to what is
called "dittam" or scale of expenditure. The trustee
has got to submit to the Commissioner proposals for
fixing the "dittam" and the amounts to be allotted to
the various objects connected with the institution.
The proposals are to be published and after rece1vmg
suggestions, if any, from persons interested in the
institution, they would be scrutinised by the Commis-.
sioner. If the Commissioner thinks that a modification
is necessary, he shall submit the case to the Government and the orders of the Government would be final.
Section 55 empowers the trustee to spend at his discretion aird for purposes connected with the Math the
"Pathakanikas" or gifts made to him personally, but
he is required to keep regular accounts of the receipts
and expenditure of such personal gifts. Under section
56, the Commissioner is empowered to call upon the
trustee to appoint a manager for the administration
of the secular affairs of the institution and in default
of such appointment, the Commissioner may make the
appointment himself. Under section 58, a Deputy
Commissioner is competent to frame a scheme for any
religious institution if he has reason to believe tha·t
in the interests of the proper administration of the
trust any such scheme is necessary. Sub-section (3)
of this section provides that a scheme settled for a
Math may contain inter alia a provision for appointment of a paid executive officer professing the Hindu
religion, whose salary shall be paid out of the funds
of the institution. Section 59 makes provision for
application of the "cy pres" doctrine when the specific
1954
The Commis-sioner, Hindn
Religious Endowments, lvladras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
T hirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Mukherjea J.
'
1016
1954
The Commis·
sioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
MukherjeaJ.
ST.JPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
objects of the trust fail. Chapter VI of the Act, which
comprises sections 63 to 69, deals with the notification
of religious institutions. A religious institution may
be notified in accordance with the provisions laid
down in this chapter. Such notification remains in
force for five years and the effect of it is to take over
the administration and vest it in an executive officer
appointed by the Commissioner. Chapter VII deals
with budgets, accounts and audit and Chapter VIII
relates to finance. Section 76 of Chapter VIII makes
it compulsory for all religious institutions to pay
annually to the Government a contribution not exceeding 5 per cent. of their income on account of the
services rendered to them by the Government and
their officers functioning under this Act. Chapter IX
is not material for our purpose, and Chapter X deals
with provisions of a miscellaneous nature. Section 89
in Chapter X prescribes the penalty for refusal by a
trustee to comply with the provisions of the Act. Section 92 lays down that nothing contained in the Act
shall be de,med to confer any power or impose any
duty in contravention of the right conferred on any
religious denomination under clauses (a), (b) ,;,ind ( c)
of article 26 of the Constitution. Section 99 vests a
revisional jurisdiction in the Government to call for
and examine the records of the Commissioner and
other subordinate authorities to satisfy themselves as
to the regularity and propriety of any proceeding taken
or any order or decision made by them. These, in
hrief, are the provisions of the Act material for our
present purpose.
The learned Judges of the High Court have taken
the view that the respondent as Mathadhipati has
certain well defined rights in the institution and its
endowments which could be regarded as rights to
property within the meaning of article 19(1) (f) of the
Constitution. The provisions of the Act to the extent
that they take away or unduly restrict the power to
exercise these right are not reasonable restrictions
within the meaning of article 19(5) and must consequently be held invalid. The High Court has held in
the second place that the respondent, as the head and
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1917
representative of a religious institution, has a ri6ht
guaranteed to him under article 25 of the Constitution
to practise and propagate freely the religion of which
he and his followers profess to be adherents. This
right, in the opinion of the High Court, has been
affected by some of the provisions of the, Act. The
High Court has held further that the .Math in question
is really an institution belonging to Sivalli Brahmins,
who are a section of the followers of Madhwacharya
and hence constitutes a religious denomination within the meaning of article 26 of the Constitution. This
religious denomination has a fundamental right under
article 26 to manage its own affairs in matters of
religion through the Mathadhipati who is their spiritual head and superior, and those provisions of the
Act, which substantially take away the rights of the
Mathadhipati in this respect, amount to violation of
the fundamental right guaranteed under article 26.
Lastly, the High Court has held that the provision for
compulsory contribution made in section 76 of the Act
comes within the mischief of article 27 of the Constitution. This last point raises a wide issue and we
propose to discuss it separate! y later on. So far as the
other three points arc concerned, we will have to
examine first of all the general contentions that have
been raised by the learned Attorney-General, who
· appeared for the Union of India as an intervener in
this and other connected cases, and the questions
raised are, whether these articles of the Constitution
are at all 'lvailable to the respondent in the present
case and whether they give him any protection
regarding the rights and privileges, of the infraction of
which he complains.
As regards article 19(l)(f) of the C.onstitution, the
question that requires consideration is, whether the
respondent as Mathadhipati has a right to property in
the legal sense, in the religious institution and its
endowments which would enable him to claim the
protection of this article? A question is also formulated as to whether this article deals with concrete rights
of property at all ? So far as article 25 of the Constitution is concerned, the point raised is, whether this
1954
The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras
v.
Sri Laksh;nindra
Thirtha Swaffliar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Mukhnjea ].
1018
1954
The Commis·
sioner, Hindu
Religious EndowM
ments, .\>!i:1ras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirlha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Mukherjea ].
[1954]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
article which, it is said, is intended to protect religious
freedom only so far as individuals are concerned, can
be invokecl in favour of an institution or organisatic"1 '
WitI1
rcgar'~
to article
26,
the contention
is
that a
Math does not come within the description of a religious denomination as provided for in the article and
even if it does, what cannot be interfrrd with is its
rigl1t to manage its own affairs in matters of religion
only and nothing else. It is said, that the word
"religion", as used in this article, should be taken in
its strict etymological sense as distinguished from any
kind of secular activity which may be connected in
some way with religion but doe& not form an essential
part of it. Reference is made in this ccnnection to
clause (2) (a) of article 25 ar.d clause ( d) of article 26.
We will take up these points for consideration one
after another.
As regards the property rights of a Mathadhipati. it
may not be possible to say in view of the pronouncemen~s of the Judicial Committee,
which have been
accepted as good law
in this country ever since 1921,
that a Mathadhipati ho:ds the Math property as a life
tenant or that his positio'1 is similar to that of a Hi11du
wdow in respect to her husband's estate or of an English
Bishop holding a benefice. He is certainly not a trustee
in the strict sense. He may he, as the Privy Council('),
says, a manager or custodian of the institution who
has to discharge the duties of a trustee and is answerable as such; but he is not a mere manager and it
would not be ;·ight to describe Mahantship as a mere
office. A superior of a Math has not only duties to
discharge in connection with the endowment but he
has a personal interest of a beneficial character which
is sanctioned by custom. and is much larger than that
of a Shebait in the debutter property· It was held by
a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court('), that
Shebaitship itself is property, and this decision was
approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh v.
Lal Behary('), and again in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata ('),
(t) Vide Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami, 48 I. A. ::;02
.'.2', ''i.--1(' .\fonahai v. Bhupendra 6n Cal. 452.
is" 63 r. A. 448.
14' 7or.A.57.
S.CR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1019
The effect of the first two decisions, as the Privy Council
pointed out in the last case, was to emphasise the proprietary element in the Shebaiti right' and to show that
though in some respects an anomaly, it was anomaly
to be accepted having been admitted into Hindu
law from an early date. This view was adopted in its
entirety by this court in Angurbala v. Debabrata (' )
and what was said in that case in respect to Shebaiti
right · could, with equal propriety, be applied to the
office of a Mahant. Thus in the conception of Mahantship, as in Shebaitship, both the elements of office and
property, of duties and personal interest are blended
together and neither . can be detached from the other.
The personal or beneficial interest of the Mahant in the
endowments attached to an institution is manifested
in his large powers of disposal and administration and
his right to create derivative tenures in respect to
endowed properties; and these and other rights of a
similar character in vest the office of the Mahant with
the character of proprietary right which, though
anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal right.
It is true .that the Mahantship is not heritable like
ordinary property, but that is because of its peculiar
nature and the fact that the office is generally held by
an ascetic, whose connection with his natural family
being completely cut off, the ordinary rules of succession
do not apply.
There is no reason why the word "property", as
used in article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution, should not
be given a liberal and wide connotation and should not
be extended to those well recognised types of interest
·which have the insignia or characteristics of proprietary
right. As said above, the ingredients of both office and
property, of duties and personal interest are blended
together in the rights of a Mahant and the Mahant has
the right to cnjov this propertv or beneficial interest so
long as he is entitled to hold his. office. To take away
this beneficial interest and leave him merely to the
discharge of his duties would be to destroy his character
as a Mahant altogether. It is true that the beneficial ·
interest which he enjoys is appurtenant to his duties ·
(1) [1951) S.C.R. 1125·
The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endow~
ments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
T hirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
MukherjeaJ.
1020
Tm Commis-
sioner, Hindu
Religious Endow•
ments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
and as he is in charge of a public institution, reasonable
restrictions can always be placed upon his rights in
the interest of the public. But the restrictions would
cease to be reasonable if they are calculated to make
him unfit to discharge the duties which he is called
upon to discharge. A Mahant's duty is not simply to
manage the temporalities of a Math. He is the head
and superior of spiritual ·fraternity and the purpose of
Math is to encourage and foster • spiritual training by
maintenance of a competent line of teachers who could
impart religious instructions to the disciples and
followers of the Math and try to strengthen the
doctrines of the particular school or order, of which
they profess to be adherents. This purpose cannot be
served if the restrictions are such as would bring the
Matha<lhipati down to the level of a servan~ under a
State department. It is from this standpoint that the
reasonableness of the restrictions should be judged.
A point was suggested by the learned AttorneyGeneral that as article 19(1) (f) deals only with the
natural rights inherent in a citizen to acquire, hold and
dispose of property in the abstract without reference to
rights to any particular property, it can be of no real
assistance to the respondent in the present case and
article 31 of the Constitution, which deals with deprivation of property, has no application here. In the
case of The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Copa! Bose( 1 )
(Civil Appeal .No. 107 of 1952, decided by this court on
the 17th December, 1953), an opinion was expressed by
Patanjali Sastri
C. J. that article 19(1) (f) of the
Constitution is concerned only with the abstract right
and capacity to acquire, hold and dispose of property
and that it has no relation to concrete property rights.
This, it may be noted, was an expression of opinion by
the learned Chief Justice alone and it was not the
decision of the court; for out of the other four learned
Judges who together with the Chief Justice constituted
the Bench, two did not definitely agree with this view,
while the remaining two did not express any opinion
one way or the other. This point was not raised before
us by the Advocate-General for Madras, who appeared
in support of the appeal, nor by any of the other
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 587.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1021
counsel appearing in this case. The learned AttorneyGeneral himself stated candidly that he was not prepared to support the view taken by the late Chief
Justice as mentioned above and he only raised the
point to get an authoritative pronouncement upon it
by the court. In our opinion, it would not be proper
to express any final opinion upon the point in the
present case when we had not the advantage of any
arguments addressed to us upon it. We would prefer
to proceed, as this court has proceeded all along, in
dealing with similar cases in the past, on the footing
that article 19(1)(f) applies equally to concrete as well
as abstract rights of property.
We now come to article 25 which, as its language
indicates, secures to every person, subject to public
order, health and morality, a freedom not only to
entertain such religious belief, as inay be approved of
by his judgment and conscience, but also to exhibit
his belief in such outward acts as he think> proper and
to propagate or disseminate his ideas for the edification
of others. A question is raised as to whether the word
"persons" here means individuals only or includes
corporate bodies as well. The question, in our opinion,
is not at all relevant for our present purpose. A
Mathadhipati is certainly not a corporate body; he is
the head of a spiritual fraternity and by virtue of his
office has to perform the duties of a religious teacher.
It is his duty to practise and propagate the religious
tenets, of whi.ch he is an adherent and if any provision
of law prevents him from propagating his doctrines,
that would certainly affect the religious freedom which
is guaranteed to every person under article 25. Institution as such cannot practise ·or propagate religion;
it can be done only by individual persons and whether
these persons propagate their personal views or the
tenets for which the institntion stands is really immaterial for purposes of article 25. It is the propagation
of belief that is protected, no matter whether the
propagation takes place in a chnrch or monastery, or in
a temple or parlour meeting.
As regards article 26, the first question -Is, what is
the precis~ meaning or connotation of the expression
!954
Tiu Commissioner, HikdU.
&ligious Endow.
mmts, .Madras
v.
Sr£ Lakshmindra
T hirtha Swa.ffliar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Muk,,,rjea ].
1022
1954
The Commisp
sioner, Hindu
Religious Endow•
ments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
MukheT,J°taJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
"religious denomination" and whether a Math could
come within this expression. The word "denomination" has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to
mean "a collection of individuals classed together under
the same name: a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a
distinctive name." It is well known that the practice
of setting up Maths as centres of theological teaching
was started by Shri Sankaracharya and was followed
by various teachers since then. After Sankara, came
a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who
founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu
rdigion that we find in India at t:1e prrs"nt ,·_cc_;
Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly
be called
a religious denomination, as it is designated
by a distinctive name,-in many cases it is the
name of the founder,-and has a common faith
and common spiritual organisation. The followers
of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri
Vaishnabas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination; and so do the followers of Madliwacharya and
other religious teachers. It is a fact well established
by tradition that the eight Udipi Maths were founded
by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and the
beneficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of
that teacher. The High Court has found that the
Math in question is in charge of the Sivalli Brahmins
who constitute a section of the followers of Madhwacharya. As article 26 contemplates not merely a
religious denomination but also a section thereof, the
Math or the spiritual frat~rnity represented by it
can legitimately come within the purview of this article.
The other thing that remains to be considered in
regard to article 26 is, what is the scope of clause
(b)
of the article which speaks of management "of its own
affairs in matters of religion I" The language undoubted! y suggests that there could be other affairs of
a religious denomination or a section thereof which
are not matters of religion and to which the guarantee
given by this clause would not apply. The question
is, where is the line to be drawn between what are
matters of religion and what are not?
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1023
1954
It will be seen that besides the right to manage its
own affairs in matters of religion, which is given by
·rhe Commis~
.sinner, Hindu
clause (b ), the next two clauses of article 26 guarantee
Religious Endour ·
to a religious denomination the right to acquire and
mtnts, Madras
v.
own property and
to administer such property in
Sri Lakshmindra·
accordance
with
law. The administration of its Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
property by a religious denomination has thus been
Mutt.
placed on a different footing from the riglit to manage
Muklzerjea ].
its own affairs in matters of religion· The latter is a
fundament:il right which no legisla_ture can take away,
whereas the former can be regulated by laws which
the legislature can validly impose. It is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to administration
of properties belonging to a religious group or inst!tution are not matters of religion to which clause (b)
of the article ·applies. What then are matters of religion? The word "religion" has not been defined in
the Constitution and it is a term which is hardly
msceptible of any rigid definition. In an American
case('), it has been said "that the term 'religion' has
reference to one's views of his relation to his Creator
and to the obligations they impose of reverence for
His Being ¥id character and of ooedience to His wi!I.
It is often confounded with cultus of fOrm or worship
of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the
latter." We do not think that the above definition
can be regarded as either precise or adequate. Articles
25 and 26 of our Constitution are based for the most
part upon article 44(2) of the Constitution of Eire and
we have great doubt whether a definition of "religion"
as Jiiven above could have been in the minds of our
Con~titution-makers when they framed the Constitution. Religion is certain! y a matter of faith with
individuals or communities and it is not necessarily
theistic. There are wdl known religions in India like
Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in God or
in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly
has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which
are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be
correct to say that religion is notlllng el6e but a:
(1) Vide Da11is v. Benso,,, 133 U.S. at 34Q.
1024
The Commis ..
sioner, Hindu
Religious EndoW""
nients, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Mukhrr}ta J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a
code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it
might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies
and modes of worship which are regarded as integral
parts of religion,
and these forms and observances
might extend even to matters of food and dress.
The guarantee under our Constitution not only
protects the freedom of religious opinion but it protects
also acts done in pursuance of a religion and this is
made clear by the use of the expression "practice of
religion" in article 25. Latham C. J. of the High
Court of Australia while dealing with the provision of
section 116 of the Australian Constitution which inter
alia forbids the Commonwealth to prohibit the "free
exercise of any religion" made the IO!lowing weighty
observations ( 1 ) :
"It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the
subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil
Government should not interfere with religious opinions,
it nevertheless may deal as it pleases with any acts
which are done in pursuance of religious belief without
infringing the principle of freedom of religion. It
appears to me to be difficult to rnaintai1' this distinction as relevant to the interpretation of section 116.
The section refers in express terms to the exercise of
religion, and therefore it is intended to protect from
the operation of any Commonwealth laws acts which
are done in the exercise of religion. Thus the section
goes far beyond protecting liberty of opinion. It
protects also acts done in pursuance of religious belief
as part of religion."
.
These observations apply fully to the protection of
religion as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.
Restrictions by the State upon free exercise of religion
are permitted both under articles 25 and 26 on grounds
of public order, morality and health. Clause (2) (a) of
article 25 reserves the right of the State to regulate or
restrict an economic, financial, political and other
secular activities which may be associated with religions practice and there is a further right given to the
State by. sub-clause (b) under which the State can
(1) Vide Adelaide Company v. The Commonwtalth 67 C.1;-.R. 116, 127.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1025
legislate for social welfare and reform even though by
so doing it might interfere with religious practices.
The learned Attorney-General lays stress upon clause
(2) (a) of the article and his contention is that all secular activities, which may be associated with religion
but do not really constitute an essential part of it,
are amenable to State regulation.
'
The contention formulated m such broad terms
cannot, we think, be supported. In the first place,
what constitutes the essential part of a religion is
primarily to be ascertained with reference to the
doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any
~eligious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of
food should be given to the idol at particular hours of
the da'y, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or
that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or
oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they
involve expenditure of money or employment of priests
and servants or the use of marketable commodities
would not make them secular activities partaking of a
commercial · or economic character; all of them are
leligious practise.s and sho.uld be regarded as matters of
religion within the meaning of article 26(b ). What
article 25(2) (a) contemplate.s is not regulation by the
State of religious practices as such, the freedom of
which is guaranteed by the Constitution except when
they run· coun'ter to public order, health and morality,
but regulation of activities which are economic, commercial or political in their character though they are
associated with religious practices. We may refer in
this connection to a few American and Australian
cases, all of which arose out of the· activities of persons
connected with the religious association known as
"Jehova's - Witnesses." This association · of persons
loosely organised throughout Australia, U.S.A. and
other countries regard ·the literal interpretation of the
Bible as fundamental to proper religious beliefs. This
belief in the supreme authority of the Bible colours
many of their political ideas. They refuse to take
oath of allegiance to the king or other constituted
1954
Till CommisSioner, ·Hindu
Religious EndoWments, Madras
v.
Sri Laksltmindra
Thirlha SWamiiJr
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Muk/,,rjea J.
1026
1954
The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endow-
ments, Madras
v.
Sri l.akshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
... Mutt.
M1•kherj,a J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
human authority and even to show m\Pect to the
national flag, and they decry all wars between nations
and all kinds of war activities. In 1941 a company of
"Jehova's Witnesses" incorporated in Australia commenced proclaiming and teaching matttrs which were
prejudicial to war activities ancl the defence of the
Commonwealth and steps were taken against them
under the National Security Regulations of the State.
The legality of the action of the Government was questioned by means of a writ petitiQn before the High
Court and the High Court held that the action of the
Government was. justified and that section 116, which
guaranteed freedom of religion under the Australian
Constitution, was not in any way infringed by the
National Security Regulations('). These were undoubtedly political activities though arising out of
religious belief entertained by a particular community.
In such cases, as Chief Justice Latham pointed out,
the provision for protection of religion was not an
absolute protection to be interpreted and applied
independently of other provisions of the Constitution.
These privileges must be reconciled with the right of
the State to employ the sovereign power to ensure
peace, security and orderly living without which
constitutional guarantee of civil liberty would be a
mockery.
The courts of America were at one time greatly
agitated over the question of legality of a State
regulation which required the pupils in public schools
on pain of
compulsion to participate in a daily
ceremony of saluting the national flag, while reciting
in unison, a pledge of allegiance to it in a certain set
formula. The question arose in Minersville School
District, Board of Education, etc. v. GobitiI( 2 ). In that
case two small children, Lilian and William Gobitis,
were expelled from the public school of Minersville,
Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as
part of the daily exercise. The Gobitis family were
affiliated with "Jehova's Witnesses" and had been
(1)
Vide
Adelaide
127.
(•) 310 U.S. 586.
Company
v.
The Commonwealt.>:,
67 C.L.R.
11
•
S.C.R.
1027
SUPREME,< COURT
REPORTS
: ,.' • ,: ~ ~ .
j
' ''
'
•
f
'
•
brought up conscientipusly to beli~ve that such .a
gesture of respect for the flag was . forbidden by the
scripture. The point· for decision by the Supreme Court
Was whether· the requirement of participation in such a
ceremony 'exacted froin a child, who refused· upon
sincefr ·~eligtous ground, li1fringed the liberty of religion
guaranteed by the First arid the Fourteenth ' Amendments? The court held' by a majority that it did not
and . that it' was within the province of the 'legislature
and ffie school authorities to adopt appropriate means
to· evoke and foster a sentiment of national unity
amongst the children in public schools." The Supreme
Court, however, changeCl · their views on· this identical
point in the later case of West .Virginia State Board of
Education v: Barnett'e( 1 ). 'There it was held overruling
the earlier decision referred ·to · above' that the ' actioh
of a State iri making it compulsory for children in
public ·schools to salute the 'flag and pledge allegiance
constituted a violation of the First and the Fourteenth
Ame1idinents. This difference 'in judicial' opinion brings
out forcibly 'the difficult ·task 'wliich ·a court has fo perform in cases of this type where the freedom or re'ligious
convictions genuinely entert:iined by . men come ihto
conflict with · the · proper political attitude which is
expected from. citizens in matters'· of unity and solidarity of the State organization·.
·· • ·
·'
'
.
-
'·
~
'
As regards •commercial· activities, which are. prompted
by religious beliefs, we can, cite.. the ,case of Murdock v.
Pennsylvania ( ) . Here . al~o the ·petitioners . were
"Jehova's ·Witnesses" and they went about from door .to·
door in the city of Jeannette distributing . literature aµd
S0liciting people to purchase certain religious books
and pamphlets, · all published by :.the Watch Tower
Bible and· Tract Society. A )11unicipal ordinance
required religious · colporteurs to pay a licence tax as a·
condition to the pursuit · of their activities. The. petitioners were convicted and fined. for violation of the·
ordinance.. It was held · that the ordinance in question
was invalid .under the Federal COnstitution as.. constituting a:denial of freedom·. of speech, press am;! religion;
(1) 319· U.S. 624.
(2) 319 U.S. 105.
7-97 S. C. India/59
.. '·
195'4
The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras
.v.
Sri Lakshmindra
T hirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
MutJ.
Mukherjea J'.
1028
1954
The Commissioner, Hindu
Rtligious Endowments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
; of Sri Shirur
li!utt.
Mukheljea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
and it was held further that upon the facts of the case
it could not be said that "Jehova's Witnesses" were
engaged in a commercial rather than in a religious
venture. Here again, it may be pointed out that a
contrary view was taken only a few years before in the
case of /ones v. Opelika( 1 ), and it was hel<l that a city
ordinance, which required that licence be procured and
taxes paid for the business of selling books and pamphlets on the streets from house to house, was applicable to a member of a religious organisation who was
engaged in selling the printed propaganda pamphlets
without having complied with the provisions of the
ordinance.
It is to be noted that both in the American as well
as in the Australian Constitutions the right to freedom
of religion has been declared in unrestricted terms without any limitation whatsoever. Limitations, therefore,
have been introduced by -courts of law in these countries on grounds of morality, order and social protection.
An adjustment of the competing demands of the
interests of Government and constitutional liberties is
always a delicate and a difficult task and that is why
we find difference of judicial opinion to such an extent
in cases decided by the American courts where questions of ·religious freedom were involved. Our
Constitution-makers,
however,
have embodied the
limitations which have been evolved by judicial
pronouncements in America or Australia in the Constitution itself and the language of articles 25 and 26 is
sufficiently clear to enable us to determine without the
aid of foreign authorities as to what matters e-0me
within the purview of religion and what do not. As
we have already indicated, freedom of religion in our
Constitution is not confined to religious beliefs only; it
extends to religious practices as well subject to the
restrictions which the Constitution itself has laid down.
Under article 26(b), therefore, a religious denomination
or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the
matter of deciding as to what rites and ·ceremonies are
essential according to the tenets of the religion they
hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to
(I)
316 U.8. 584.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RFPORTS
1029
1954
interefere with their decision in such matters. Of course,
the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with
The Commis·
sioner, Hindu
these religious observances would be a matter of Religious
Endowadministration of property belonging to the religious
ments, Madras
v.
denomination and can be controlled by secular Sri Lakshmindra
authorities in accordance with any law laid down by a Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
competent legislature; for it could not be the injunction
Mutt.
of any religion to destroy the institution and its endowMuklurjea ].
ments by incurring wasteful expenditure on rites and
ceremonies. It should be noticed, however, that under
article 26 ( d), it is the fundamental right of a religious
denomination or its representative to administer its
properties in accordance with law ; and the law, therefore, must
leave the right of administration to the
religious denomination itself subject to such restrictions
and regulations as it might choose to impose. A law
which takes away the right of administration from the
hands of a religious denomination altogether and vests
it in any other authority would amount to a violation
of the right guaranteed under clause ( d) of article 26.
Having thus disposed of the general contentions that
were raised in this appeal, we will proceed · now to
examine the specific grounds that have been urged by
the parties before us in regard to the decision of the
High Court so far as it declared several sections of the
new Act to be ultra vires the Constitution by reason of
their conflicting with the fundamental rights of the
respondent. The. concluding portion of the judgment
of the High Court where the learned Judges summed
up their decision on this point stands as follows:
"To sum up,. we hold that the following sections
are ultra vires the State Legislature in so far as they
relate to this Math: and what we say will also equally
apply to other Maths of a similar nature. The sections
of the new Act are: sections 18, 20, 21, 25(4), section 26
(to the extent. section 25(4) is made applicable),
section 28 (though it sounds innacuous, it is liable to
abuse as we have already pointed out earlier in the
judgment), section 29, clause (2) of section 30, section 31, section 39(2), section 42;. section 53 .(beca.use
courts have ample powers to meet these contingencies),
section 54, clause (2) of section 55, section 56, clause (3)
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS'
1030
'·.
1954
The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindta
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur . ·
Mutt.
Mukheijea J.
of section 58, sections 63 to 69 in Chapter VI, clauses (2),
(3) and •( 4) of· section 70,. section 76, ·section 89 and'
section 99 (to the extent it 'gives the · Cfovernment' ·
virtually .complete control over the Matadhipati and
Maths)."
It may be pointed out at the outset that the learned·
Judges were not right in including sections 18,' 39(2)
and 42 in this list, as these ·sections are not applicable
to Maths under the At:t itself. This position · has not
been disputed by Mr. Somayya, who appears for the
respondent.
Section 20 of the Act ·describes the powers of the
Commissioner in respect · to religious endowments and
they include power · · to· pass an,y ·orders that may be ·
deemed necessary to ensure. that' such' endowments are
properly administered and that their income is duly
appropriated for the purposes for which "they were
founded .. · Having regard to the fact that the Mathadhi~
pati occupies · the position.. of" a trustee with regard to
the Math, which is a public institution, •some ·amnunt
of' control or supervision · over the due ·administration
of the . endowments. and due appropriation of their
fuhds is' 'certainly . necessary in the interest of the public
arid ·we do not think that" the pr~vision of this section
by itself oifends . any fundamental right of the Mahant.
We do not" agree with the High Court that the result of
this provision would be to reduce ·the Mahant . to the
position· of a servarit..' No doubt the Q:>mmissioner is
invested ' with powers io pass orders, but orders can be
p~ssed .. ' 'orily for the purposes specified . ln. the section
and not for interference with the rights of the Mahant
as are sanctioned by usage . or for lowering his position
as the spiritual head of.· the institution; The saving
pro~!siol\ co;itained in section 91 of . the .Act makes the
pos1t:Jon qmte· clear. ·An apprehension that the powers
conferred · by this section· may be abused in individual
cases .. rdoes not make the provision itself bad or invalid
inJaW;•,11
.L
. ..We agree, however, with the High Court in the view
taken· :brit about ..section 21. This · section empowers
the Commissioner antl> his. subordinate officers and also
persons'~ authorised· ·by them t-0 ente,r ·the premises· af
i.·:·;·_.. 1-''!···J1,:
1,;_)
·;,:>Jlt~!·_,
.
~:.·ti:·;· ljl ~--· .. _ .... ~ -·,
!~,; '"t~!/").i<'. _((· ~'!.)._.:,.·,..~
):1
"'.•'
i:.l
,.
·_,.i,
~
-i.•1.•J-, .r;
;1
.
'1'",";".;7
'
S.C.R.
.
.
'' '
, ..
'
1031
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l:;S
..
,
. I ., ,
1954
any religious · institution or . place . of worship ·for the
.purpose of exercjsing any power conferred or any duty
Tlze Commis, sioner, Hindu
imposed by or under the Act. . It .is well known that
Religio'us Endow ..
there could be no such thing as an ·unregulated and
~ents, MadrtlJ
v.
unrestricted right of en.tty in a public temple or other
Sri L"akshmindra
.religious institution, for persons. who are not connected Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
with .the spiritual . functions thereof.. It is: a , traditional
·Mutt.
custom universally observed ,not to allow. ·access to any
Muklierjea J.
"Outsider to the partip,ilarly, .sacred parts of a temple. as
for example, the place where the deity is ' located.
There are .. also fixed hours of worship and rest for the
idol when, no disturbance. by . any member of the public
.is alloweq. . Section 21,. ! it is. : to .• be noted, does,· not
confine the right of. entry.. to the outer portion :of. the
premises; it does not even exclude .the inner sanctliary
"the Holy of Holies".-· as it.is .said, the sanctity· of .which
is. zealously .preserved .. r .It clots not say that• . the· entry
may be made . after due· . notice 'to the head, of the
.institution. and a.t,such , hqurs which would.notihterfere
. with the. due .observance of.the rites and. ceremonies in
.the institiition . . W,e think that: as ,·,the. sectibn:stands,
:it interferes with the . . fund~mental . rights ·of· the
Mathadhipati and the denomination of which he is head
. guaranteed under arti.cks 25. and 26 .the, Constitution.
Dur attention qas .. been drawn , in. this ,ronnection. to
section 91 of the Act which, it is,. said, provides a sufli.cient safeguard.. against_. any abuse of.power under section 21. We cannot agree with this contention,. Clause
(a) of section 91 excepts .. from the saving ... clause all
express provisions 0f the :.4ct ..within which the: , provi. sion of section . 21 would -have t0 .be included., Clause
(b) again. does not say anything about cu~om or ,usage
obtaining ..in an institution and it . does not indicate· by
whom aqd ,in what. manner the question of -interference
with the religious . and .. spiritual functions. of the Math
would . be decided . in .c~e- of any. dispute arising, regarding ,it. In our.. opinion, section 21 has .been.. (ightly-.held
to. be .invalid. · .
.
Section 23 imposes a d\ltY, upon the trustees, to· obey
.all.lawful ,orders issued by.tlie .. Commissioner.,;or any
.subordinate authority under the provisions of' the Act.
No exception can be taken to the section if those
of
1032
19~4
The Commissfoner, Hindu
Religious Endow-
ments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mut~.
Mukh<rjea J.
S~PREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
provisions of the Act, · which offend against the fundamental rights ofthe respondent, are left out of account
as being invalid. No body can .make a grievance if he
is directed to obey orders in · pursuance of valid
legal authority. The same reason would, in our
opinion, apply to section · 24. . It may be mentioned
here that sections 23 and 24 have not been specifically
mentioned in the concluding portion of the judgment
of the High Court set out above, though .they have
been attacked by . the learned Judges in. course. of their
discussion.
As regards section 25, the High Court l;~s taken
exception only to chu~e ( 4) of the sect\on. If the
preparation of registers for religious institutions 'is not
wrong and does · not affect the fundamental rights. pf the
Mahant, one fails to see how the direction for addition
to or alteration of entries insuch reglste~s, whichdause
(4) ' cont~mplates and which,,will be npcessa;y as '~ re111lt
of enqumes made under dause (3), can, m any. sense,
be hdd to be invalid as infringing the fundam,ental
rights of the Mahant. The enquiry .that ·is. contemplated by clauses (3) and ( 4) is an equiry into the
actual state' pf . affairs, ' :ind ~h~ whole obj,eci of' the
section· is ~o 'keep an accurate . re.cord. of the particulars
specified in it. We are u\lable, ,therefore, to agree
with the view expressed by the learned Judges. ,F?r
the same reasons, sec.tion . 2(5, ' ,which' provides
annual vetification 'of the registers, ' caiu:iot be held
for
to be bad.
'
· ·
· ·
,Acc,br<ling ' to the High' Comt "section 28 .i.s itself
iniiocuous. The mere . possibility of . its being . abused
is" no' ground for h9lding it to ):l~, i11,val\d'. .~s . all
endowed . properties are ordinarily . inalienable, .we
fail tci see why the' .restrictions." placeq . by secti;in 29
~pon aliei;iation of. endqw~d.' propfrties sJ:i?1;1id',;be cons1der~d. ,: b,a?. )n .· ou: op1m?n, t,he .Pro~isi,op _of ~!~use
(2) of sect10n 29, which enables the Comm1ss1oner . to
impose .conditions when he gran.ti sanctiOI) '. 'to alie1:1.~tiofi,, · of , .• enr!'o-yed jroperty,, )s p~rf~ctly ,re~~onable
an,d to .that no except10n cap. be ta~ep. ,
. .. .
...',' fli~ rr?Yision.-;: of... se~t\?.~}0(2) ~~P,ear~ .~ ~f1h iii)e
somewhat obscure. Clause (1) of the· section enables
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1033
a trustee to incur expenditure out of the funds in his
1954
charge after making· adequate provision for the
Tht Commiipurposes referred to in section 70(2), for making
sioner, Hindu
Endowarrangements for the health, safetv and convenience &ligious
ments, Madras
of disciples, pilgrims, etc. Clause · (2), however, says
v.
Lakshmindra
that in incurring expenditure under clause (1), the Sri
Thirtha Swamiar
trustee shall be guided by such general or special
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
instruction ' as the Commissioner or the Area Committee
might 'give in that connection. If the trustee is to be
Mukherjea]~
guided but not fettered by such directions, possibly
no objection can be taken to this clause; but if he is
bound to carry out such instructions, · we do think that
it constitutes an encroachment on his · right. Under ·
the law, . as it stapds, the Maham has large . powers of
disposal over the surplus income and the only restriction is that he cannot spend· anything out of it for his
personal use unconnected· ·with the dignity of his
office. ·But as the purposes •specified in sub-clauses (a)
and (b) of section 30(1) are beneficial to the 'institution
there seems to be no reason · why the authority vested
in the Mahant to spend the surplus incoine for such
purposes should be taken away from him and. he should
be compelled tci act · in such matters under the instructions of the _(}overnment officers. We think that this
1s an unrea·sonable "restnct10n on the Mahant's
right of property which is blended with his office.
The same reason applies in our ·opinion' tci section
31 of the Act, the meaning of which also is far from
clear. If after · making . ildequate provision for the
purposes referred to . in .se'ction 70(2) and for the
arrangements mcntiond in section 30(2) there is still
a surplus kft with the trustee; · section 31 enables him
to spend it for the pwposes. specified in section 59(1)
with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner.
One of the purposes mentioned in section 59(1) is the
propagation of the religi_ous ten~nts of the institution,
and. it is not understood .. why sanction of the. Deputy
Commissioner .should be· necessary . for . spendiiig the
surplus incorne. for .· the propagatio11 · of the,fdigious
tenets of the.' order ;yhich is on_e r,>f the primary ; duties
of a Mahant to discharge. .The next thing . that strikes
one is, ~hether s~nciion . i~ nece'ssary' if ' die" trustee
.
·• , •. \
1034
. '
,·'I i · ' ' ' :
r ,f . ·,
;i
1954
·71ze Commissioner, Hindu
.Religious Endow·
ments, Madras
v.
.Sri ·Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Muklu:rjea J.
;
·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. ..[1954]
,..
• '
:wants to spend .the money for p.urposes other than. those
specified in section 59(1)? If the answer. is in the negative, the whole objett of the. section becomes meaningless. ' . If, on the other hand, , the implication ' of the
section is' that the surplus ' can · be spent only for the
purposes specified ih section 59(1) and· that too with the
·permission of the Deputy· Commissioner, it undoubtedly places ·a'burdensome restriction upon ··the· .property
-rfghts of the Mahant which are sanctioned by usage
and ' which· would · have the. effeet · of impairing his
dignity- and efficiency · as .. the head of the institution.
We think 'that sections 30(2} ·and 31 have bee!1'rightly
held to be invalid by ·the High• Court.
Sections 39 and 42, - as· said· already, are not applicable to' Maths:• and hence ·can ·be left.· out of consideration. Section 53 has been condemned by the High
Court · merely on .·the· ground that the ·court has ample
jurisdiction · to provide .f6t· the contingencies that this
section is· intended to meet. But that · surely · cannot
prevent :·a competent · legisla"ture from · legislating on
·the· topic,' provided ·it can· do so with6ut violating any
of the fundamental 'rights · guaranteed· by the· Constitu'"tion. - We are unable to agree with the High Court on
- this point. · ··There seems to be nothing' wrong or unreasonable in section · 54 of the' Act -which provides.for
fixing. the. standand scale of. expenditure.•. The propo-·sals .for • this purpose, wquld have to b_e submitted by
.. the trustee; .. , they are. then to. he published and sugges.tions invited from , persons .. having· interest in the
:amendment. The Commissioner. is·. to scrutinise the
·original proposals . and the. suggestions received. and . if
in his opinion a. modification, .of the scale .is necessary,
he has to submit -a report . to the Government, whose
. decision will be final. This we consider to be quite a
reasonable and salutary .provisioµ. _
Section. 55 .. deals with a . Mahant's power. over
Pathakanikas ·or personal ·gifts. Ordinarily a .•Mehant
has absolute. power of disposal over such .. gifts, . though
if he dies·. without making any disposition, it. is reckoned as the property of the.Math _and goes , to the succeed. ing Mahan(. The first clause ..of section, 55 Jays · down
that such Pathakanikas shall be spent only for the
r; _
.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
,> ',
'S.C.R.
~
\
1
:
~ 1:
•
·,··
I '
1035
'1,:'
purposes .«)(the Math, · This is an unwarranted restricuon on . the property right of -the, Mahant. . It may
be that according , to . customs prevailing• in ·a particular
institution, such. .personal .. gifts .. are , regarded.. as
gifts to the institution. ·itself· and • the Mahant
rece-1ves
.them only ·; as , the -representative., of
the institution;. but . the general , rule.-is .othel'.V(ise.
As section SS ( 1) _does . , not say · <that this rule will
apply only when there is a custom of that .nature
in a particular institution, we must . say , that
the provision in this' unrestricted forih' ls" :in' ·un"re'asonable · eneioachmef,lt upon. the ftindartiental tight 'of \:he
Mahant. The· same' ob'jection cart be'" r~ised. agaifist
clause (2). ' of. .the 'section; for •·if the Pathakanikas
constitute the property ofa Mahant,' · there 'is rio ·Justification for compelling' him . to ·keep" "accounts 'of the
rec'eipts and .expenditure of such ' peisoh~l gifts.'' As
said already, . if the Maha:nt dies without . di"sposing _of
these personal gifts, 'they irl~y form. part .' of the assets
'of the Math, 'but thatis ''no.reason fof'restriciing" "the
powers · of the' Mahan{·,. 'ov'er these gifts s·o "l!)ng' as he' is
alive.
· '· ... ',, ;,·
;.. ···-···
Section 56 ha~ been rightly invalidat.ed. by the; High
Court. It makes . provision . of, an .-.extremely .. drastic
character., Power-.has been. giyen· iO the . -Commissioner
to .require " the "trustee .. to-appoint,-, ,a.manager . for
administration .of · the secular ;iffairs -of- ·the insti~tion
a!ld in case of default, ..the ·Commissioner can malq:- the
appointment .. ,himself. _.:The manager-, thus 'appoipted
though- -nominally a ~er'rant of the -trustee, .-has ,,pra~ti
caUy to do , everyth-ing accordi11g. to• the , ,directions of
the ·Commissioner and, his .. subordinates. .It , is ;,:to . be
noted that. this power- <;an' be exercised· .at. the . mere
option . of the .Commissioner .. without· any justifying
necessity. whatsoever .. and· no pre--requisites , li];;e niisrnanagement of . property... or mal;idministration of .. trust
funds . are . : necessary to· enable -the trustee to ex<;rcise
such .drastic· .power., .It is . true. that th¢. section contemplates the appointment of a ma11agei: . for-, administration, of the. sec'ubr affairs_. of. this• ;-inst;itution. But
no.-.,,rigid.. demarcation · could be . made . as-we .J:iave
already .. said between ·,the ,spiritu;il duties. of _the Mahap.t
1
1
·'"·
1954
The CvmmisSioner, Hindu
Reli'giOu.s En'dowmerits, Madras
' . v. '
STi Liz.kshmiiidra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sr{ Shirur
Mutt.
Mukherjea J.
!036
1954
TheCommisrsioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madra$
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha. Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Muk!urjw ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
and his personal interest in the tru;t property. The
effect of the section really is that the Commissioner is
at liberty at any moment he chooses to deprive the
Mahant of his right to administer the trust property
even if here h no negligence or maladministration on
his part. Such restriction would be opposed to the
provision of article, 26( d) of the Constitution. It would
cripple his authority as Mahant . altogether and reduce
his position to. that of an ordinary priest or paid
servant.
We Jinfl nothing wrong in section 58 of the Act
which relates to the framing of the scheme by the
Deputy -Commissioner. 1t is true that it is a Government officer and not , the court who is given the power
to settle the scheme, but we think that ample safeguards have been provided in the Act to rectify any
error or unjust decision 'made by the Deputy Commissioner. , Section . 61 provides for an appeal . to the
Commissioner against ·the· order ·of the Deputy Commissioner and there is a right of suit given to a party
who is aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner
with a further right of appeal to· the High Court.
'fhe objection u;ged against the provision of Clause
(3) (b). of section 58 does not appear to us to be of
much ·substance. The· executive officer mentioned in
that clause ' could be nothing else' but a manager of the
properties of the Math, . and he cam1ot possibly be empowered to exercise the functions of the M~thadhipati
himself. In any eve'nt, the trustee would have h-is remedy
against such ocder ,ofJhc Deputy Commissioner by way
of appeal to: the Commissioner and also by _way of suit
as laid down in sections 61 and. 62. Section 59 simply
provides a scheri;ie .' for the· appiii:ation of the cy pres
doctrine in case the obiect of the trust fails either from
the inception '9r' by reason of subsequent events. Here
again the cirily .COIIlplaint . that is raised . is, . that such
order" could, .be , wa.de by the D.eputy , Colilinissioner.
We think that thl.s: objection has f)ot much substance.
In. the first pla~e, the v~riotis. objects on which the
~ruse .fup~s,c~,ii14p~ spi11t . a.re ,laid d?vv,i-\' i~,theje~ti8n
itself and the 1unschct1on of the Deputy Comm1ss10ner
is only to make a choice out of the several heads.
S.C.R.
1037
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Further an appeal has been provided from an order of
the Deputy Commissioner under this section to the Commissioner. We, therefore, cannot agree with the High
Court that sections 58 and 59 of the Act are invalid.
Chapter VI of. th~ Act, which contaiµs. sections 63
to 69, relates to notification of religious institutions.
The provisions . are . ·extremely drastic in .their- character
and the worst' feature 'of it is that JJO ac;cess is allowed
to the court to set aside · an order of notification. The
Advocate-General for Madras frankly 'stated that he
could not support the legality .of these.' provisiqns. We
hold, therefore; in· agreement with High· Co\irt that
these sections should be held to be void.'
s~dion 70 relates ' to the budget tq ;eligi6u~ institutions. Objectioµ has bee.n taken only . to .claµse (3)
whiCh empowers the Commissioner and the Area Committee to mak:e any additions· io or alterations in the
budget· as ·they· deem fit. A budget is' indispensable in
all public institutions and we do not think that it is
per se · unreasonable' . to provide· for · the.··· budget of . a
religious institution '' being prepared under fhe' supervision · of the Co'minissioner or the Are~ .Committee.. It
is to be noted that if the order is. mack . by an An;a
Committee under clause (3), clailse '(4) provides an
appeal against it · to· the E>eputy Commissioner. '·
Section · '89 provides for penalties foi' refosal by the
trustee to comply with the p'rov!sions · of the . Act.• If
the objectionable' J?brtions ·.· of the Act" are eliminated,
the portion 'that Terriains 'will' be perlectly valid ~nd, for
violation' of these valid 'provisions; penalties can legitimately be, pro~lded. Section, 99 vesti an qveralt revisioriaJ. power iri 'the Government. 'TJiis, In our opinion,
is 'beneficial to' the frus'tee~' for hi:', will' have ah' opportunity' to' approach' ihe' Gclvtrnm~'rit' in'' case. ' df any
i:re~iibri!y, er;or or ·c,~~ssion ina?e ,by th~ Commissioner or any ·other subordm:ite officer.
'
· .
. ·,
'
. '
') '' ., '
'"'
'
"' :'' ,, . .. .
,'
.' 1:;
.
. . ;. "
T~+~ 9n1y o\her . pfiint tha~ ,req~~es . c 0 11sider~tion is
d).e ,c;onstitutio11al,,')'.~.\ic\ity 1• .o~. section .,76, ·.qf ,t~~, Act
which,JUJlS % follow"":
."
,,., , , ., , ....
"76. (1) In respect of the services· ren<lerefil -by.the
Government and their officers, every religious institution shall, from the income derived by it, pay to the
1954
TM Commissioner,. Hindu ·
Religious Endour
ments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
T hirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Mukherjea ].
'
1038
' ~· ' _.., !
''; /. .
. ! ,' :
i!'
[1954]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
''Goverument '.:~~n~ually s11ch. contribution· not exceeding
.five. per ceutum of its income as , may be prescribed.
(2), Every religious institution, the annual income
.of .,vhich for.thefasli. year. -immediately· preceding as
.calculated for .· the. purposes . of ·the levy of contribution
under· s11b-section (I), is . not; less than one thousand
rupees, "shall,, pay to the Government annually, for
· meetii;ig . the.cost of auditing · its accounts, such further
sum ,.not exceeding . one, and, a half. per· centum of its
income. as the Commission\:t.~m.ay,.determine.
(3) The annual · payments •.:referred . to in sub-sections (1) and (2).shal!.be' made; •rtotwithstanding any,thiug t9._ .. th;e contrary: .contained fa. any •scheme,.-sett!ed
or dee111<;d ,to be. settled· unc;lei: this Act•for .the religious
.~~stitutiq~ conc;erned., ,,. ,:~. . i~ ,··~ " ·->
~. 1·,
: · · ·.( 4), 'the .. Government .shall. pay the salaries, allowances, . pensions' and •. ·other. ''beneficial .' remuneration of
.the .Commissioner; •Deputy .. ·, Commissioners, ·:Assistant
Commissioners <and· other· •·officers ··imd" servants {other
.than , executive• officers . oL :·.·religious. .. institutions)
employed· for the. ·purposes of this ·Act· and the other
-expenses. ' incurred. : for · .such •purposes, · including th~
.expenses of Area Committees. and the cost of auditing
the acwurits, •of· religious'. .institutions,"
Thus the section. authorises the .levy -of · an . annual
.. contribution i>n all religious i institutioris,r the ·maximum
· of. which is fixed at 5 per cent. of the inl:ome: derived by
,them. · The Government is· to frame rules for the purposes of fixing rates within·, the:' permissibre maximums
.-and •.the section... expressly;. ··.states ·that•. the levy is. in
·respect .of · the :services rendered by the Government
.and . its officers. The validity -of .the provision · has been
.attacked on a.:two-fold .. ground:· tl1e . first is, that the
. contribution 1s really a .tax . and as such it was beyond
the legislative competence .of the State Legislature to
. , eqaq ..such . pr9yisi9n. The otl;te~ is, that the. cqntribu,. tion being a: ta/!''. pr impmitioq, .th,e .PFOceed~ ~f .which
are specifically. appropriated for .the maintenance of a
particular religion or religiol!s denomination, it . comes
'within · thi(mischid bf article · 27. of the Constitution
0
1954
TheCommis-
. sioner, Hindu
·'Religious Endowments, Madras
v.
·Sri Lakshminrlra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
lY!ukherjea J.
:·afid··is.hence·,·vord; .. , ·· .·.r~. ·
.. <·
:.ri
-
i(
.n
·.-·:·:·.· ·.
.-,_i.
· ':_ 1
·: t
"»1:
·i:,;.
;-·· r•,
·I·)·
·•·
....,.
SUPREME COURT RF:C . _,,s
S.C.R.
I'
1039
1,-
1954
So far as the first ground is concerned, it is not
disputed that the legislation in the present· ·case· is
The Commissioner, Hindu
covered·· by entries·. 10 and 28 of List III iir ·Schedule
Religious Endow~
VII of the Constitution. · If the cbntributioh· payable
ments, Madras
under section 76 of the Act · is ·a "'fee'', it may· · come
"·
Sri Lakshmindra
under entry 47 .of the Concurrent List which· deals with T hirtha Swamiar.
.of-Sri Shirur
"fees" in respect of any of the matters included in that
Mutt.
list. .On· the other hand, if. it . is a tax, as this ·particular·
Mukherjea ].
tax has not been · provided · for in any specific entry in
any of the ·three · lists, it· could come only · under
entry 97 of List I or article . 248 ( 1) of the· Constitution.
and in either view the Union Legislature alone" would
be competent to legislate .upon it. On behalf 'of the
appellant,- the contention raised · is that · the contribution
levied is a fee ·. and not · tax and the learned ·AttorneyGeneral, who·' appeared for. the Union ·of India as
intervener in ·this · as well as· in the other connected
appeals,. made · •a' strenuous ·attempt to support · this
position. .The point is certainly not free from doubt
and requires careful consid~ration. ·
The learned Attorney-General ·has argued in the first'
place that our Constitution · makes a clear distinction
between taxes· and· Jees. •It is true, as he -has -pointed
out, that there .are: a number of entries in List I of the
Seventh Schedule which ·relate to taxes and· duties of
various sorts; whereas the 'last. entry; namely entry 96,
speaks of "fees"· in respect .. of .any-.of the matters dealt
with: in the list. Exactly the. same is with ·regard· 'to
entries 46 to. 62 .in Lisr II all of which relate ·to taxes
and here again ' the last entry .deals only with "fees"
leviable . in respect. of .the different matters specified in
the list. · It appears· that articles 110 and 119 .of· the
Constitution which deal · with "Money Bills" . lay down
expressly that a bill will not · be deemed to be a "Money
Bill" ·by reason .. only that it provides for the imposition
of ,fines ...... or for the demand ·or payment of ·fees for
licences or fees .for .. services, rendered, whereas· a bill
dealing with ·imposition : or regulation of a ·tax·. will
always .be. a rMoney . ' Bill.. · Article 277 ·also mentions
taxes, cesses and fees separately:• clt is not dear,· however,. whether the word "tax" as used in article 265 has
not been used in the wider sense as including. all· orher
,,
;,.,
~"
.,. . . , \
·~·.··
. ,..
,,,,,'
1040
1954
TheCommisM
siomr, Hindu
Religious Endow~
ments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
MukherJea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
impositions like cesses and fees; and that at least
seems to be the implication of clause (28) of article 366
which defines taxation as including the imposition of
a.ny . tax or impost, whether general, local or special. It
seems to us that though levying of fees is only a particular form of the exercise of the taxing power of the
State, our Constitution has placed fees under a separate
category for purposes of legislation and at the end of
each one of the three legislative lists, it has given a
power to the particular legislature to legislate on the
imposition of fees in respect to every one of the items
dealt with in the list itself. Some idea as to what fees
are may be gathered from clause (2) of articles llO and
119 referred to above which speak of fees for licences
and for services rendered. The question for our
consideration really is, what are the indicia or special
characteristics that distinguish a fee from a tax proper?
On this point we have been referred to several authori·
ties by the learned counsel appearing for the different
parties including opinions expressed by writers of
recognised treatises on public finance.
A neat definition of ,what "tax" means has been
given by Latham C. J. of the High Court of Australia
in Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board('). "A tax",
according to the learned Chief Justice, "is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for
public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment
for services rendered". This definition brings out, in
our opinion, the essential characteristics of a tax as
distinguished from other forms of imposition which, in
a general sense, are included within iL It is said that
the essence of taxation is compulsion, that is to say, it
is imposed under statutory power without the taxpayer's consent and the payment is enforced by law (' ).
The second characteristic of tax is that it is an imposition made for pµblic purpose without reference to any
special benefit to be conferred on .the payer of the tax.
This is expressed by saying that the levy of taxed is fot
the purposes of general revenue, which when collected
forms part of the public revenues of the State. As the
(1) 6o C.L.R. 263, 276.
(2) Vide Lowd Mai;iand Dairy v. Crystal Dairy.Ltd., [1933] A ..d . .
·a.
'
•
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1041
object of a tax is not to confer any special benefit
upon any particular individual, there is, as it is said,
no element of quid pro quo between the taxpayer and
the public authority ( 1 ) • Another feature of the taxation
is that as it is a part of the common burden, the
quantum of imposition upon the taxpayer depends
generally upon his capacity to pay.
Coming now to fees, a 'fee' is generally defined to be
a charge for a special service rendered to individuals
by some governmental agency. The amount of fee
levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred
by the Government in rendering the service, though in
many
cases the costs are arbitrarily assessed.
Ordinarily, the fees are uniform and no account is
taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to
pay('). These are undoubtedly some of the general
characteristics, but as there may be various kinds of
fees, it · is not possible to formulate a definition that
would be applicable to all cases.
As regards the distini::tion between a tax and a fee,
it is argued in the first place on behalf of the respondent that a fee is something voluntary which a person
has got to pay if he wants certain services from the
Government; but there is no obligation on his part to
seek such services and if he does not want the services,
he can avoid the obligation. The example given is oi
a licence fee. If a man wants a licence that is entirely
his own choice ·and then only he has to pay the fees,
but not otherwise.
We think that a careful examination will reveal that the element of compulsion or
coerciveness is present in all kinds of imposition, though
in different degrees and that it is not total! y absent in
fees. This, therefore, cannot be made the sole or even
a material criterion for distinguishing a tax from fees.
It is difficult, we think, to conceive of a tax except, it
be something like a poll tax, the incidence of which
falls on all persons within a State. The house tax has
to be paid only by those who own houses, the land tax
by those who possess lands, municipal .taxes or rates
will fall on those who have properties within a
(r) See ·Findlay Shirras on '•Sc:iehce of Public Finance", Vol. I, p. :203.
(2) Vide Lutz on "Pµblic Finance" p. !2I5.
1954
TheCommis-sioner, Hindu
R,Jigious :Endow·
ments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
T hirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt
Muk"-erfea ].
•
..
1042
1954
The Commissioner, Hindu
Religioti~ Endow-
ments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of-Sri Shirur
·Mutt.
Mukherjea J.
'
COURT .REPORTS
,.SUPREME
. ,;·-·:·
.
[1954]
~' .
. .
municipality. Persons, who do not have houses, lands or
properties within municipalities, would not have to pay
these taxes, but nevertheless · these impositions come
within' ·the 'Category· of ti:!.'< es· 1 and" nobody cart say that
it is a choice of'these" people to own" lands · or-houses or
specified kinds' of properties, ·so that there is no compulsion orr · them to' pay taxes :it· all. Compulsion lies
in the fact that payment is ·enforceable by law against
a 'man in spite of his unwillingness 'or want of consent;
and this element. is 'present' in 'ta:ie5 . as well' as in fees.
Of course in· some cases whether" a man would come
Within', , .the 'category· · of a .-serviCe receiver. may be a
matter of . his choice, ' but that . by'' itself would . not
constitute a' major test which can ' be taken: as the
criterion of this species .of imposition. The distinction
betWeeri a tax and a fee ,lies'' primarily ill the fact ' that
a tax .is levied as a part of 'a common burden, while a
fee is a payment· for 'a special benefit or privilege. Fees
confer a special capacity, although the. special advantage, as for example in the case of 'registration fees for
documents "'or 'marrfage lieel)ces, . is secondary. to the
primary nibtive of regulation in the ·public iriterest(' ).
Pµblic interest · seems to be at ' the basis of all impositions, but in a fee it is some !;pecial benefit which the
individual receives.· · · As Seligman says, it' is the special
ben'efir acctuirig · to the individual which is the 'reason
for payment 'in the case of fees; 'in the case of a tax,
the particular advantage if" it exists at all
is an
incidental· result of State· action().
,
'· If, as 'we 'hold, a fee is regarded as a sort of ret:Urn or
consideration for services rendered, it· is absolutely
necessary 'that 'the ' levy of fees should, on the ·face of
the legislative provision, be co-related to the expenses
incurred by Governrrtent 1in rendering the services. As.
indicated. in artide 110 ·<of the Constit:Utibn, ordinarily
there ·are two classes'· •of cases where Government
imposes 'fees' · uport ·persorts~ In the first class of cases,.
Government simply grants a' permission cir privilege to
a· person ·to' do 'scimethlng,' ·which otherwise that person
would '"not' be competent to· do and extracts 'fees either
'V.iae1FlnC:Ua)r Sliirras on ''StienCe'of Public ·Finance" Vol. I, p. 202.
{2) Vide·Sefigro:ah'S'Es'says 'oil Taxafit>rt;·p. 408.
~ :: ' · "
..
'l
-· .,,_ ,, .
(1)
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•
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1043
1954
heavy or moderate from that person in return for the
privilege that is conferred. A most common illustration
c of this type of cases is furnished by the licence fees fpr
motor vehicles. Here the costs incurred by the Governi=nt in maintaining an office or bureau for the granting
of licences may be very small and the amount of imposition that is levied is based really not upon the costs incurred by the Government but upon the benefit that the
individual receives. In such cases, according to all
the writers on public finance, tlie tax element is
predominant(1), and if the money paid by licence
holders goes for t'1e upkeep of roads and other matters ..
of general public lJ' .. 'Y, the licence fee cannot but b~
regarded 'as a tax.
In the other class ·of cases, the Government does
some po~~tive work for the benefit of persons and the
money is taken as the return for the work done or
services· rendered. If the money thus paid is set apart
and appropriated specifically for the performance of
such work and is not merged in the public revenues for
the benefit of the general public, it could be counted as
fees and not a tax. There is really no generic difference
between the tax and fees and as said by Seligman, the
taxing power of a State may manifest itself in three
different forms known respectively as special assessments, fees and taxes ( 2 ).
Our Constitution has, for legislative purposes, made
a uistinction between a tax and a fee and while there
are various entri ~s in the legislative lists with regard
to various forrr. of taxes, there is an entry at the end
of each one c' the three lists as regards fees ·which
could be levied in respect of any of the matters that is
included in it. The implication seems to be that fees
ha>1e special reference to governmental action under·
taken -in respect to any of these matters.
Section 76 of the Madras Act speaks definitely of the
contribution being levied in respect to the services
rendered by, the Government; so far it has the appearance of . fees. It is true that religious institutions do
not want :hese services to be rendered to them and it
The Commis.
sioner, l/indu 1
Religious EndOlllments, Madras '
v•
Sri Lakshmindra
'Thirtha Swamiar
of SrilShirur
Mutt.
-i
Mukhn)eaJ,
•
(1) Vide Sc'igrpan's Essays on~Taxation, p. 409.
(2)"lbid., p 406.
•
I
Q-~7 S,Q, Indi~[53
•
1044
1954
The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
Mukher}ta J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
may be that they do not consider the State interference
to be a benefit at all. We agree, however, with the
learned Attorney-General that in the present day concept of a State, it cannot be said that services could be
rendered by the State only at the request of those who
require these services. If in the larger interest of the
public, a State considers it desirable that some special
service should be done for certain people, the people
must accept these services, whether willing or not (').
It may be noticed, however, that the contribution that
has been levied under section 76 of the Act has been
made to depend upon the capacity of the payer and
not upon the quantum of benefit that is supposed to
be conferred on any particular religious institution.
Further the institutions, which come under the lower
income group and have income less than Rs. 1,000
annually, are excluded from the liability to pay the
additional charges under clause (2) of the section.
These are undoubtedly some of the characteristics of a
'tax' and the imposition bears a close analogy to
income-tax. But the material fact which negatives
the theory of fees in the present case is that the money
raised by levy of the contribution is, not ear-marked or
specified for defraying the expenses that the Government has to incur in performing the services. All the
collections go to the consolidated fund of the State
and all th(· expenses have to be met not out of these
collections but out of the general revenues by a proper
method of .appropriation as is done in case of other
Government expenses. That in itself might not be
conclusive, but in this case there is total absence of
any co-relation between the expenses incurred bv the
Government and the amount raised hy contribution
under the provision of section 76 and in these circumstances the theory of a return or counter-payment or
quid pro quo cannot have any possible application to
this case. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court
was right in holding that the contribution levied under
section 76 is a tax and not a fee and consequently it
was beyond the power of the State Legislature to enact
this provision.
(t) Vide Findlay Shirras on "Science of public Financ.-;" Vol. f. p. 202.
S.C.R.
'
1045
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
In view of our decision on this point, the' other
ground
hardly requires consideration. We
will
indicate, however, very briefly our opinion on the
second point raised. The first contention, which has
been raised by Mr. Nambiar in reference to article 27
of the Constitution is that the word "taxes", as used
therein, is not confined . to taxes proper' but is inclusive
of_ all other impositions like ceses, fees,· etc. We do
not think it necessary to decide this point in the present
case, for in our opinion on the facts of the present case,
the Imposition, although it is a tax, does not come
within the purview of the latter part of the article
at all. What is forbidden by the article is the specific
appropriation of the proceeds of any tax in payment
of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any
particular religion or religious denomination. The
reason underlying this provision is obvious. Ours
being a secular State and there being freedom of
religion .guaranteed by the Constitution, both to individuals and to groups, it is against the policy of the
Constitution to pay out of public funds any money for
the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion
or religious denomination. But . the object of the
contribution under section 76 of the Madras Act is not
the fostering or preservation of the Hindu religion or
any denomination within it. The purpose is to see
that religious trusts and institutions, wherever they
exist, are properly administered. It is a secular
administration of the religious institutions that the
legislature seeks to control and the object, as enunciated
in the Act, is to ensure that the endowments attached
to the religious institutions are properly administered
and their income is duly appropriated for the purposes
for which they were founded or exist. There is- no
question of favouring any particular religion or religious
denomination in such cases. Jn our opinion, article 27
of the Constitution is not attracted to the facts of the
present case. ,The result, therefore, is that in our
opinion sections 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69 are
the only sections which should be declared invalid as
conflicting with the fundamental rights of the respondent as Mathadhipati of the Math in question and
•
•
)954
The Commis-
sioiier~ Hiridu
ReligiOUs Endow-
ments, M ddias
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thiiilia Swa'niiar
of Sri ShirUr
Mutt.
J{ukherjea J.
1046
1954
The Commis·
siontr, Hindu
Reli'gious Endow·
rnents, Madras
v.
Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur
Mutt.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
section 76 ( 1) is void as beyond the legislative competence of the Madras. State Legislature. The rest of
the Act is to be regarded as. valid. The decision of the
High Court will be modified to this extent, but as the
judgment of the High Court is affirmed on its merits
the appeal will stand dismissed with costs to the
respondent.
Appeal dismissed.
MAHANT SRI JAGANNATH RAMANUJ DAS
AND ANOTHER
!954
March 16.
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, and GHULAM HAsAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, arts. 19(1)(1), 25, 26, 27-0rissa Hindtt
Religious Endowments Act, 1939, as amended by Amending Act II of
1952, ss. 38 and 39 and proviso to s. 46-Whether ultra vires
the Constitution-Section 49 of the Act-Whether ultra vires
art. 27.
Held, that ss. 38 and 39 and the proviso to s. 46 of the Orissa
Hindu Religious. Endowments Act, 1939 as amended by the
Amending Act II of 1952 arc ultra vim arts. 19(1)(£), 25 and 26 of
the Constitution.
The annual contribution provided in s. 49 of the Act is in the
nature of a fee and not a tax and therefore it was \Vithin the
competence of the Provincial Legislature to enact such a provision.
Further an imposition like this is not hit by art. 27 of the Consti·
tution because the object of the contribution under s. 49 is not the
fostering or preservation of the Hindu religion or of any denomi,
nation within it but the proper administration of religious trusl;
and institutions wherever they exist.
Civil ,Appeal No. 38 of 1953 referred to.
OruGINAL JuRISDICTION : Petition No. 405 of 1953,
Under article 32 of the Constitution of India for
tl~e enforcement of Fundamental Rights
and
APPELLATE JuR1so1cT10N : Case No. 1 of 1950.
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