THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN versus RAO MANOHAR SINGHJL
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 March 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 996 | 1954 INSC 25
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 March 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN, B. JAGANNADHADAS
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 143/1952
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 996
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 25
Text of the judgment
996
1954
Srimati OramlitJ
Sundari Dasi
v.
Sri Sri Iswar
Gopal .7itu.
Mukhtlj1a ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
Schedule properties,
however, Oramba Sundari was
the purchaser at the execution sale and whether or
not the money for such purchase was paid by her
husband becomes immaterial. This was not the property purchased by the decreeholders and there is no
proof of the decreeholders being in possession of the
same either by themselves or through Oramba Sundari.
In these circumstances, clause (c) of section 36(2) cannot be attracted in favour of judgment-debtors so far
as this property is concerned and the possession of it
must remain with the appellant. We, therefore, allow
the appeal
in part and set aside the order for restoration of possession made by the courts below in respect
to the Ga Schedule property. The rest of the decision
of the High Court will stand. We make no order as
to costs of these appeals.
App(a/ partly allo1ud.
1954
March 15.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
v.
RAO MANOHAR SINGHJL
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHJ'.RJEA, S. R. DAs,
VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, art. 14-Section 8-A of Rajasthan
Ordinance XXV/l of 1948 as amended-Whether ultra vim the
Const£tutiQn.
Held, that s. 8-A inserted in Rajasthan Ordinance XXVII of
1948 by s. 4 of Rajasthan Ordinance X of 1949 and as amended by
s. 3 of Rajasthan Ordinance XV of 1949 is void under art. 14 of
the Constitution.
Frank f. Bowman v. Edward A. Lewis (101 U.S. 22; 25 Law.
Ed. 989), Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, Mohindargarh ([1951]
S.C.R. 127), The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh ([1953] S.C.R.
254) and Thakur Madan Singh v. Collector of Sikar (Rajasthan
Law Weekly, 1954, p. 1), referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 143 of 1952.
of
JuRismcnoN :
Civil
Appeal
Appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution
India from the Judgment and Order, dated the
S.C.R.
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
997 '
11th December, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature,
Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D. B. Civil Miscellaneous
Case No. 1 of 1951.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and
K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General of Rajasthan, (Porus
A. Mehta, with them) for the appellant.
N. C. Chatterjee and U. M. Trivedi (Jiwan Sinha
Chandra and Ganpat .Rai, with them) for the
respondent.
1954. March
delivered by
15.
The Judgment
of the Court was
GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal filed on a
certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan under
article 132(1) of the Constitution arises from the
judgment and order of the said High Court (Wanchoo
C.J. and Bapna J.) in a petition under article 226 of
the Constitution, whereby the High Court held that
section 8-A inserted, in Rajasthan Ordinance No.
XXVII of 1948 by section 4 of Rajasthan Ordinance
No. X of 1949, and the amendment to section 8-A by
section 3 of Rajasthan Ordinance XV of 1949 are void
under article 14 of the Constitution and issued a writ
restrammg the State of Rajasthan from collecting
rents from the tenants of lands comprising the Jagir
of Bedla held by the respondent.
The respondent Rao Manohar Singhji is the owner
of the Jagir of Bedla situate in the former State of
Mewar, now included in the State of Rajasthan. The
former State of Mewar was integrated in April, 1948,
to -form what was known as the former United State
of Rajasthan. In April and May, 1949, the latter
State was amalgamated with the former States of
Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur and the former
Union of Matsya to form the present United State of
Rajasthan. Three Ordinances, No. XXVII of 1948 and
Nos.
X and XV of 1949, were issued by the former
State of Rajasthan in connection with State Jagirs.
The management of the Jagirs including the Jagir of
Bedla was assumed by the former State of Rajasthan
in virtue of the powers under these Ordinances. After
the final formation of the State of Rajasthan in May,
!954
Till Stat• qf
Rajasthan
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
998
195~
Tm Stale •f
...
RajtJSlhan
Rao ManohM
SU.ghji.
Ghulam Hasan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
l949, the Ordinances remained in force in a part of
the present area of Rajasthan with the result that
while jagirs in a part of the area were managed by the
State in that area, the Jagirs in the rest of the State
were left untouched and remained with the Jagirdars.
On 4th January, 1951, the respondent filed a petition
under article 226 of the Constitution contending that
the said Ordinances were ultra vires the Constitution
and that they became void under article 13 (1) of the
Constitution of India, read with articles 14 and 31. The
respondent challenged the Ordinances firstly because
they constitute an infringement of articles 14, 19 and
31 of the Constitution and secondly because the Jagirrlars only of the former State of Rajasthan which was
formed in 1948 are prejudicially affected, while Jagirdars of the States which integrated later on are not at
all affected (Para 9, K and L). It was alleged that
there was a denial of equality before the law and the
equal protection of the laws by reason of these Ordinances and further that the State had taken possession
of the property of the respondent without providing
for compensation. The reply of the State was that
the fagir was a State grant held at the pleasure of the
Ruler and that it reverted to the Ruler on the death
of the holder of the Jagir and was regranted to his
successor after the Ruler had recognized the succession.
The rights of the Jagirdars were non-heritable and nontransferable and the Jagirs could not be partitioned
amongst the heirs of the Jagirdar. It was pleaded
therefore that even if the State took possession of the
Jagir, the Jagirdar was not entitled to compensation
under article 31 (2). It was also alleged that the
impugned Ordinances had merelv the effect of transferring the management of the Jagirs to the Government and did not deprive the Jagirdars of their property and they were consequently not hit by article
31 (2). It was denied that there was any discrimination under article 14 of the Constitution. The High
Court held on the first question that the provisions of
Ordinances Nos. X ancl XV of 1949 are not void
under article 31 (2) or 19 (1) (f). On the second point
they recorded the conclusion that section 8-A which was
introduced in Ordinance No. XXVII of 1948, by section
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
999
4 of Ordinance No. X of 1949, and the amendment
to section 8-A by section 3 of'Rajasthan Ordinance. No.
XV of 1949, are void under article 13(1) of the. Constitution, read with article 14. The High Court according! y allowed the petition and prohibited the State
from collecting rents from the tenants of the land
comprising the Jagir of Bedla held by the respondent.
This judgment was given on 11th December, 1951,
but we understand that since then the State has passed Acts abolishing Jagirs throughout the State. The
question however is of some importatice to the respondent inasmuch as it affects his 'right of collecting the
rents even though for a short period.
In appeal it is contended by the learned AttorneyGeneral on behalf of the State of Rajasthan that the
decision of the High Court that the impugned section
8-A as amended was hit by article 14 of the Constitution is erroneous. Before deciding the validity of this
contention it will be nec·cssary to refer briefly to the
relative provisions of the Ordinances. Ordinance No.
I of 1948 (the United State of Rajasthan Administration Ordinance, 1948) was made and promulgated on
April 28, 1948, by the Rajprarqukh of Rajasthan
to provide for the administration of the United State
of Rajasthan after the latter came into existence. On
July 26, 1948, Ordinance No. XXVII of 1948, [the
United State of Rajasthan Jagirdars (Abolition of
Powers) Ordinance, 1948] was made and promulgated
by the Rajpramukh providing for the abolition of
judicial powers of Jagirdars and executive powers in
connection with the judiciary and vesting them in the
Government. Section 8 of this Ordinance authorised
the Government to make orders with a view to carrying out and giving effect to the provisions and purpose~ of the Ordinance and the various powers enumerated in that section. Then came section 8-A which
was introduced by Ordinance X of 1949 [the United
State of Rajasthan Jagirdars (Abolition of Powers)
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1949]. It reads thus:"Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, it is hereby ' enacted that the revenue
y.rhich was heretofore collected by Jagirdars shall
1954
Th. Sute of
Rajasth111}
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
Ghwla(Hasan J.
'
1000
1954
The Sta" ef
Rajasthan
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
Ghulam Hasan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f 19541
henceforward be collected by and paid to · the Government; the Goverrurient will'after deducting the collection
and other expenses pay it to the Jagirdar concerned."
It was amended by section 3 of Ordinance No. XV
of 1949 [the United State of Rajasthan Jagirdars
(2nd Amendment) Ordinance,
(Abolition of Powers)
1949] by adding to section 8-A after the word
'Revenue' the following :
"Including taxes, cesses and other revenue from
forests."
It is not denied · that when the State of Rajasthan
was formed in April and May, 1949, the Jagirdars of
only a part of the present State of Rajasthan could
not collect their rents while Jagirdars in other areas
which were covered by Jaipur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and
Jodhpur and Matsya Union were under no snch disability. It appears that in the former State of Rajasthan provisions regarding the management by Government of Jagirs and the right to collect rents already
existed, whereas there was· no such provision in the
former States of Jaipur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur
and Matsya Union, but when the integration took
place in April and May, 1949, the discrimination exhibited itself not by virtue of anything inherent in the
impugned Ordinances but by reason of the fact that
Jagirdars of one part of the present State of Rajasthan
were already subjected to a disability in the matter of
management of their Jagirs while the other parts wer"
wholly unaffected. This discrimination,
however
m1desirable, was not open to any exception until the
Constitution came into force on January 26, 1950,
when article 13 of the Constitution declared that "all
laws in force in the territory of India immediately
before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far
as
they are inconsistent with provisions of this
Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be
void." It becomes therefore necessary to see whether
the impugned provision which is discriminatory on the
face of it is hit by article 14 which declares that "the
State shall not deny to an); person equality before the
law or the equal protection of the laws within the
territory of India." Such an obvious discrimination
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1001
can be supported on! y on the ground that it was based
upon a reasonable classification. It is now well settled
by the decision of this court that a proper classification
must always bear a reasonable and just relation to the
things in respect of which it is proposed. Judged by
this criterion it seems to us that the discrimination is
based on no classification at all and is manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary. The classification might have
been justified if the State had shown that it was based
upon a substantial distinction, namely that the Jagirdars of the area subjected to the disability were in
some way different to those of the other area of Rajas..
tl1an who were not similarly situated. It was perfectly possible for the State to have raised a specific
ground in order to get out of the mischief of article 14,
that the discrimination was based upon what the learned Attorney-General called geographical consideration,
that the Jagirs of the partiCular area were governed
by different laws of tenure and thus constituted a class
by itself and that that was a good ground for differentiation. No such ground was ever put forward before
the High Court, much less was any, attempt made to
substantiate such a ground. In the absence of any
allegation supported by evidence we are unable to find
in favour of the State that the Jagirdars of the particular area to which category the respondent belongs
were differently situated to other Jagirdars.
The preambles of the Ordinances do not purport to
show tl1at the conditions in the former State of Rajasthan were such as to justify the imposition of the
disability on the Jagirdars of that State while the
conditions prevailing in the other States forbade such
a course. The High Court held that the Ordinance
abolishing the Police and the Judicial powers and the
administrative powers of the Jagirdars in respect to
revenue in forests was open to no objection but there
was no reason for taking away from the Jagirdars by
section 8-A the power to collect rents to which they
were entitled.
We agree with the High Court in holding that there
was no real and
substantial distinction why the
Jagirdars of a particular area should , continue to be
•
195+
Thi State of
Raj'asthan
v.
Ra1J Manohar'
Singhji.
lihulam Hasan J..
1002
195f
The State of
Rojasthan
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
Ghulam Hasan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
treated with inequality as compared with the Jagirdars
in another area of Rajasthan. We hold therefore that
no rational basis for any classification or differentiation
has been made out. Section 8-A of the impugned
Ordinance as amended is a clear contravention of the
respondent's right under article 14 of the Constitutior.
and must be declared void.
The case of Frank J. Bowman v. Edward A Let11is( 1 )
relied upon by the learned Attorney-General on behalf
of the State is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. By the Constitution and
laws of Missouri the citizens residing in one hundred
and nine counties of the State of Missouri had the
right and privilege of an unrestricted appeal to the
Supreme Court of the State, while at the same time the
right of appeal was denied to the citizens of the State
residing in four of the counties in the easterly portion
of the State, as also to those residing in the Citv of
St. Louis. It was contended that this feature
of the judicial system of Missouri was in conflict with
the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of tbe United
States. Bradley J. held that the equality clause in
the 14th Amendment contemplates the protection of it
persons against unjust discriminations by a State; it
has no reference to territorial or municipal arrangements made for different portions of a State. He went
on to say :-"If a Mexican State should be acquired by
treaty and added to an adjoining State or part of a
State, in the United States, and the two should be
erected into a new State, it cannot be doubted that
such new State might allow the Mexican laws and
judicature to continue unchanged in the one portion,
and the common law and its corresponding judicature
in the other portion. Such an arrangement would not
be prohibited by any fair construction of the 14th
Amendment. It would not be based on any respect of
persons or classes, but on municipal considerations
alone, and a regard to the welfare of all classes
within the particular territory or jurisdiction."
This passage . which was strongly relied upon by the
learned Attorney-General does not advance his case
(1) 101 U.S. 22; 25 La,v. Ed. 989 .
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1003
for in the present case there is no question of continu- 1
ing unchanged the old laws and judicature in one
portion and a different law in the other. As we have
already said there is nothing to show that there was
any peculiarity or any special feature in the Jagirs of
the former State of Rajasthan to justify differentiation
from the Jagirs comprised in the States which subsequently integrated into the present United State of
Rajasthan. After the new State was formed, there
was no occasion to take away the powers of Jagirdars
of a disfavoured area and to leave them intact in the
rest of the area.
The case in Ramjilal v. Income-tax . Officer
Mohindargarh(') is distinguishable on the ground that,
that case proceeded upon the principle that "pending
proceedings should he concluded according to the law
applicable at the time when the rights or liabilities
accrued and the proceeding commenced was a reason1able law founded upon a reasonable classification of
the assessees which is permissible under the equal
protection clause." Such is however not the case
here.
Reliance was also placed on the case of The State of
Punjab v. Ajaib Singh and Another(')- In that case
the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act
·of 1949 was not held to be unconstitutional under
14 upon the ground that it extended only to
article
the several States mentioned in section 1(2), for in the
·opinion of the court clas~ification could well be made
-0n a geographical basis. There the Muslim abducted
persons found in those States were held to form one
class having similar interests to protect and their
1nclusion in the definition of abducted persons could
not be called discriminatory.
. The learned Attorney-General referred to two cases
decided by the same Bench of the Rajasthan High
·Court, Thakur Madan Singh v. Collector of Sikar(')
and an unreported judgment delivered on November 10,
1953, In re, Raja Hari Singh v. Rajasthan and argued
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 127.
(2) [1953] S.C.R. 254.
(3) Rajasthan Law \Veekly, 1954, p. I.
1954
Thi StaU of
Rajasthan
v.
RM Manohar
Singhji.
Ghulam Hasan].
1004
1954
The State of
Rajasthan
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
Ghulam Hasan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
that the Bench had not stuck to its view expressed in
the judgment under appeal. A careful perusal of the
judgments in these cases will show that this is far from
being the case. The former case was distinguished
from the case under appeal on the ground that there
was a reasonable basis for classification in that case,
while no such basis existed in the case before us. It
appears that before Jaipur State merged into the
present United State of Rajasthan there were District
Boards existing in that State. They were continued on
the formation of the new State but there were no District
Boards in the other States. The argument that the
Jaipur District Boards Act was invalid under article 14
of the Constitution was repelled it being held that the
existence of District Boards in Jaipur was for the welfare of all classes within Jaipur, that Jaipur had reached a higher stage of development than many of the
other States and it would have been a retrograde step•
to deprive the people living in the former Jaipur State
of the benefits of Local Self Government conferred · by
the District Boards Act. Reliance was placed on the
observations of Bradley J. in Frank J. Bot,/Jman v.
Edward A. Lewis(') in connection with the illustration
of the Mexican State and the learned Chief Justice
referred with approval to the decision under appeal
before us. In the secono case the attack was on the
alleged. discriminatory prov1S1on contained in the
Mewar Tenancy Act and the Land Revenue Act.
Under these Acts the rent rates had been approved
by the Board of Revenue and the Government and
they were alleged to be detrimental to the interests of
the Jagirdars. The Jagirdars had challenged those
Acts by a petition under article 226. It appears that
no such laws existed in the other parts of Rajasthan.
The decision of the High Court proceeded on the
ground that it was not shown that there were no similar tenancy and Land Revenue laws in other parts of
Rajasthan and the impugned Acts being ameliorative
legislation designed to raise the economic status of the
agriculturists in' Mcwar could not be ,-,aid to constitute
any discrimination merely because no such legislatiol1l
(1) 101 U.S. 22; ~5 La'\'. Ed. 989.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT i,EPORTS
1005
existed in the other parts of Rajasthan. This difference
between the two parts did not justify that such progressive and ameliorative measures for the welfare of
the people existing in a particular area should be done
away with and the State be brought down to the level
of the unprogressive States. The judgment shows that
the Bench far from going back on its previous view
adhered to it and expressly distinguished the case
under appeal before us on its special facts.
As a result of the foregoing discussion we hold
that the view taken by the High Court is correct. We
accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.
Agent for the appellant :
1954
TheStateof
RaJasthan
v.
Rao Manohcr
Sinthji.
Ghulam Hasan]•.
•
Appeal dismissed.
R. H. Dhebar.
1954
THE COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS
ENDOWMENTS, MADRAS
March 16.
ti.
SRI LAKSHMINDRA THIRTHA SWAMIAR
OF SRI SHIRUR MUTT.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HASAN,
BHAGW~TI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, arts. 19(1)(f), 25, 26, 27-Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act
XIX of 1951), ss. 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69, 76--Whether
ultra vires the Constitution-Work "property" in art 19(1) (f)
meaning of-Tax and fee, meaning of-Distinction bet1vcen.
Held, that ss. 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69 of the Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras
Act XIX of 1951) are ultra vires arts. 19(\)(f), 25 and 26 of the
Constitution cf India.
Section 76( I) of the Act is void as the provision relating to tlie
payment of annual contribution contained in it is a tax and not a
fee and so it was beyond the legislative competence of the Madras
Sta~c Legislature to enact such a provision.
That on the facts of the present case the imposition
under
s. 76( I) of the Act, although it is a tax, does not come within the
hitter part of art. 27 because the t>bject of the contribution under
the section is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu reli·
gion or any denomination under it but the proper administration
ot rc.li<i;iam. tnms and institutions wherever they exist.
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