M. P. SHARMA AND OTHERS versus SATISH CHANDRA, DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, DELHI, AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 March 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1077 | 1954 INSC 24
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 March 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 8
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 372/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1077
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 24
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1077
rendering services which the State considers beneficial
in the public interests and which the people have to
accept whether they are willing or not. Our conclusion,
therefore, is that section 58 is not ultra vires of the
State Legislature by reason of the fact that it is not a
tax but a fee which comes within the purview of
entry 47 of List III in Schedule VII of the Constitution.
The result, therefore, is that in our opinion the
appeals are allowed only in part and a mandamus will
issue in each of these cases restraining the State
Government and the
Charity Commissioner from
enforcing against the appellants the following provisions
of the Act to wit :( i) Section 44 of the Act to the extent that it
relates to the appointment of the Charity Commiss10ner as a trustee of religious public trust by the
court,
(ii) the provisions of clauses (3) to
(6) of
section 47, and
(iii) clause (c) of section 55 and the part of
clause ( 1) of section 56 corresponding thereto.
The other prayers of the appellants stand dismissed.
Each party will bear his own costs m both the
appeals.
1954
Ratilol
Panackarul
Gandhi
V,
Tiet Stat. ef
Bombay atlld
Others.
Mukherjeo].
M. P. SHARMA AND OTHERS
1954
tJ.
March 15.
SATISH CHANDRA, DIS1'RICT MAGISTRATE,
DELHI, AND OTHERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN c. J., MDKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, V1vIAN BosE, GHDLAM HASAN,
BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J
Constitution of India, arts. 19(1)(!) and 20(3)-Search warrant issued under s. 96(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V
of 1898)-Whether ultra vires art. 19(1~(!)-Search and seizure of
1078
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra,
District
Magistrate,
Delhi,
and Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
documents under :s. 94 and 96 of the Code of Criminal ProcedureT:Vhether compelltd production thereof-Within the meaning of art.
20(3).
Held, that the provision for the search warrant under the first
alternative of s. 96( 1) of the Code of Crin1inal Procedure does not
offend art. 19(1)(£) of the Constitution.
A search and seizure is only a temporary interference with
the right to hold the property searched and tht: articles seized.
Statutory recognition in this behalf is a necessary and reasonable
unconstiturestriction and cannot per se be considered to be
tional.
A compelled production of incriminating documents by a person against whom a First Information Report has been made is
testimonial compulsion within the meaning of art. 20(3) of the
Constitution. But a search and seizure of a document under the
provisions of ss. 94 and 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is
not a compelled production thereof within the meaning of art. 20
( 3) and hence does not offend the said Article.
A power of search and seizure is, in any system of jurisprudence, an overriding power of the State for the protection of social
security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When
the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of the fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, there is no justification for in:o.porting into it, a totally
different fundamental right by some process of strained construction.
Scope and connotation of art. 20(3) explained.
fohn Lilburn"s Case (3 State Trials 1315), Boyd v. United
States (116 U.S. 616), Weeks v. United States, (232 U.S. 383), Feliz
Gould v. United States (255 U.S. 298), Entick v. Carrington (19
State Trials 1030), Hale v. Henkel (201 U.S. 43), and Satya Kinkar
Roy v. Nikhil Chandra fyotis!iopadhaya (A.LR. 1951 Cal. 104)
referred to.
ORIGINAL JuR1so1cT10N PETITIONS Nos. 372 and 375
of 1953.
Original petition under article 32 of the Constitution
of India for the enforcement of fundamental right.
Veda Vyas and Daulat Ram Kalia (S. K. Kapur and
Ganpat Rai, with them) for the petitioners.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General for India (Porus
A. Mehta and A. M. Chatterjee, with him) for the
respondents.
1954. March 15. The Judgment
delivered by JAGANNAD!cLD.\S J.
of the
Court was
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1079
JAGANNADHADAS J.-These two applications are for
relief under article 32 of the Constitution arising out
of similar and connected set of facts and are dealt
with together. They arise under the following circumstances. The Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies,
Delhi State, lodged information with the InspectorGeneral, Delhi Special Police Establishment, to the
following effect. Messrs. Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd.
was registered in his office on the 9th July, 1946, with
an authorised capital of Rs. 10 crores and went into
liquidation on the 13th June, 1952. An investigation
into the affairs of the company was ordered by the
Government and the report of the inspector appointed
under section 138 of the Indian Companies Act indicated that an organised attempt was made from the
inception of the company to misappropriate and embezzle the funds of the company and declare it to be
substantial loss, and to conceal from the shareholders
the true state of affairs by submitting false accounts
and balance-sheets. Various dishonest and fraudulent
transactions were also disclosed which show that false
accounts with fictitious entries and false records were
being maintained and that dishonest transfers of
moneys had been made. It was accordingly alleged
that offences under sections 406, 408, 409, 418, 420,
465, 467, 468, 471 and 477(a) of the Indian Penal Code
had been committed. It was also stated that Seth
R. K. Dalmia who was the Director and Chairman of
Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. has been controlling certain
other concerns, viz., ( 1) Dalmia Cement & Paper
Marketing Co., Ltd., (2) Dalmia Jain Aviation Ltd.
now known as Asia Udyog Ltd., and (3) Allen Berry &
Co., Ltd. through his nominees and that all these
concerns were utilised in order to commit the frauds.
It was further stated therein by the Registrar of Joint
Stock Companies that to determine the extent of the
fraud, it was necessary to get hold of books not only
of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. but also of the allied concerns controlled by the Dalmia group, some of which
are outside the Delhi State. Lists of the offices and
places in which and of the persons in whose custody
the records may be available were furnished. Speedy
4-36 S. C. !ndia.(59
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra,
District Magistrate, Delhi, and
Othtrs
Jagannadha·
das].
1080
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Others.
v.
Satish Chandra,
District Magistrate, Delhi, arid
Others.
jagannadha-
das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
investigation was asked for. This information was
recorded by the Special Police on the 19th November,
1953, as the First Information Report. On the basis
thereof an application was made to the District
Magistrate, Delhi, under section % of the Criminal
Procedure Code, for the issue of warrants for the
search of documents and in the places, as per schedules
furnished. Permission to investigate in respect of
some of the non-cognisable offences mentioned in the
First Information Report was also asked for. On the
same day, the District Magistrate ordered investigation
of the offences and issued warrants for simultaneous
searches at as many as 34 places. The searches were
made on the 25th November, 1953, and subsequent
days and a voluminous mass of records was seized
from various places. The petitioners pray that the
search warrants may be quashed as being absolutely
illegal, and ask for return of the documents seized. In
Petition No. 372 of 1953 there are four petitioners of
whom the second is the Delhi Glass Works Ltd., and
the first the Deputy-General Manager thereof, the
third its Secretary and the fourth a shareholder therein. In Petition No. 375 of 1953 there are five petitioners
of whom the first is Messrs. Allen Berry & Co., Ltd.,
second Asia Udyog Ltd., the third Shri R. K. Dalmia,
the fourth the Secretary and General Attorney of the
third and the fifth a shareholder of petitioners Nos. 1
and 2, and an officer of petitioner No. 2. It will be
seen that the petitioners in both the petitions belong
to the four concerns, namely, ( 1) Delhi Glass Works
Ltd., (2) Messrs. Allen Berry & Co., Ltd., (3) Asia
Udyog Ltd., and (4) Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. The
last three are stated to be Dalmia concerns but it does
not appear from the records placed before us what
exact connection Delhi Glass Works Ltd. has with
them. However, it is admittedly one of the places
for which a search warrant was asked for and against
which the First Information Report appears to have
been lodged. In the petitions various questions were
raised. But such of them which raise only irregularities and illegalities of the searches and do not involve
any consitutional violation are matters which may
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1081
be more appropriately canvassed before the High Court
on applications under article 226 of the Constitution
and we have declined to go into them. The petitionen
have, therefore, confined themselves before us to two
grounds on which they challenge the constitutional
validity of the searches. The contentions raised a:-e
that the fundamental rights of the petitioners under
article 20(3) and article 19(l)(f) have been violated by
the searches in question.
So far as the contention based on article 19(1) (f) is
concerned we are unable to see that the petitioners
have any arguable case. Article 19(1) (f) declares the
right of all citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of
property subject to the operation of any existing or
future law in so far as it imposes reasonable restr'.ctions, on the exercise of any of the rights conferred
thereby, in the interests of general public. It is urged
that the searches and seizures as effected in this case
were unreasonable and constitute a serious restnct1on
on the right of the various petitioners, inasmuch as
their buildings were invaded, their document< taken
away and their business and reputation affected by
these largescale and allegedly arbitrary searches and
that a law (section 96(1), Cr.P.C.) which authorises
such searches violates the constitutional guarantee and
i> involved in this case in respect of the wauant.•
on the right to hold and enjoy property. No doubt a
seizure and carrying away is a restriction of the possession and enjoyment of the property seized. This,
however, is only temporary and for the limited purpose of investigation. A search and seizure is, therefore, only a temporary interference with the right to
hold the premises searched and the articles seized.
behalf 1s necessary
Statntory r~gulation m this
and reasunable restriction
cannot
per
se be
considered to
be
unconstitutional. The damage,
if any, caused by such temporary interference if
found to be in excess of legal authority is a matter
for redress in other proceedings. We are unable to
sec how any question of violation of article 19(1) (f)
is invalid. But, a search by itself is not a restriction
m question which purport to be under the Erst
1954
M. P. Sharma
and oth rs
v.
- Salish Chandra
District Magistratt, Delhi, and
Others.
Jagannadhadaa ].
1082
1954
M.P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra,
District Magistrate, Delhi, and
Others.
Jagannadha·
das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
alternative of section 96(1) of the Criminal Procedure
Code.
The only substantial question, therefore, that has
been raised is the one relating to article 20(3) which
runs as follows :
"No person accused of any offence shall be COffif
pelled to be a witness against himself."
The argument urged before us is that a search to
obtain documents, for investigation into an offence is
a compulsory procuring of incriminatory evidence
from the accused himself and is, therefore, hit by article 20(3) as unconstitutional and illegal. It 1s not
disputed that, prima facie, the article in question has
nothing to indicate that it comprehends within its
scope, the prohibition of searches and seizures of documents from the custody of an accused. But it is urged
that this is necessarily implied therein by certain
canons of liberal construction which are applicable to
guarantees.
In
the interpretation of constitutional
suppqrt of this line of argument great reliance has
been placed upon American deci~ions in which similar
questions were canvassed. The argument on behalf
of the petitioners is presented in the following wav.
The fundamental guarantee in article 20(3) comprehends within its scope not merely oral testimony
given by an accused in a criminal case pending against
him, but also evidence of whatever character compelled
out of a person who is or is likely to become incriminated thereby as an accused. It, therefore, extends
not only to compelled production of documents by
an accused from his possession, but also to such compelled production of oral or documentary evidence
from any other person who may become incriminated
thereby as an accused in future proceedings. If this
view of the content of article 20(3) is accepted, the
next step in the argument presented is that a forcible
search and seizure of documents is, for purposes of
constitutional protection of this guarantee, on the
said
same footing as a compelled production of the
documents by the person from whom they are seized.
This chain of reasoning, if accepted in its entirety, would
render searches and seizures of documents and any
SC.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1083
statutory provisions in that behalf illegal and void, as
being in violation of the fundamental right under
article 20(3). The question thus raised is of farreaching importance and
reqmres careful consideration.
Article 20(3) embodies the principle · of protection
against compulsion of self-incrimination which is one
of the fundamental canons of the British system of
criminal 'jurisprudence and which has been adopted
by the American system and incorporated as an article
of its Constitution. It has also, to a substantial
extent, been recognised in the Anglo-Indian administration of criminal justice in this country by incorporation into various statutory provisions. In order, therefore, to arrive at a correct appraisal of the scope and
content of the doctrine and to judge to what
extent that was intended to be recognised by our
Constitution-makers in article 20(3), it is necessary to
have a cursory view of the origin and scope of this
doctrine and the implications thereof as understood in
English law and in American law and as recognised in
the Indian law.
In English law, this principle of protection against
self-incrimination had a historical origin. It resulted
from a feeling of revulsion against the inquisitorial
methods adopted and the barbarous sentences imposed, by the Court of Star Chamber, in the exercise of
its criminal jurisdiction. This· came to a head in the
case of John Lilburn(') which brough~ about the abolition of the Star Chamber and the firm: recognition of
the principle that the accused should not be put on
oath and that no evidence should be taken from him.
This principle, in course of time, developed into its
logical extensions, by way of privilege of witnesses
against self-incrimination, when called for giving oral
testimony or for production of documents. A change
was introduced by the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898
by making an accused a competent witness· on his own
behalf, if he applied for it. But so far as the oral
testimony of witnesses and
the
production
of
documents
are concerned, the
protection
against
(1) 3 State Trials 1315.
M. P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra,
District Magi.strait, Delhi, and
Otl1'Ts.
Jagannai/ha. das].
1084
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra,
District Magis·
trate, Delhi, and
Otliers.
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fl954]
self-incrimination continued as before. (See Phipson
on Evidence, 9th Edition, pages 215 and 474).
These principles, as the·y were before the statutory
change in 1898, were carried into the American legal
system and became part of its common law. (See
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, pages 301 to 303).
This was later on incorporated into ·their Constitution
by virtue of the Fifth Amendment thereof. The
language of the Fifth Amendment was considered by
the American Courts as being wide enough to cover all
the aspects of the principle of protection against selfincrimination as administered under the English common law including oral testimony of witnesses and
production of documents. (See Willis on Constitutional
Law, pages 518 and 519). In course of time further
extensions of that privilege were recognised by the
courts relating to searches and seizures. It came to
be held that unreasonable searches
and seizures of
documents fell equally within the mischief of the
Fourth and the Fifth Amendments fBoyd v. United
States(') ] , and that documents or other evidence so
obtained were inadmissible in evidence [Weeks v.
United States(')].
In the Indian law the extent to which this protection is recognised appears from the various relevant
statutory provisions . from time to time. Section III
of Act XV of 1852 recognised that an accused in a
criminal proceedings was not a competent or compellable witness to give evidence for or against himself.
This provision was repealed by the Evidence Act I of
1872. But meanwhile the Criminal Procedure Code of
1861 in sections 204 and 203 thereof respectively provided that no oath shall be administered to the accused
and that it shall be in the discretion of the Magistrate
to examine him. The Criminal Procedure Code of 1872
by section 250 thereof made a general questioning of
the accused, after the witnesses for the prosecution
had been examined, compulsory and section 345 thereof provided that no oath or affirmation shall be
(•) II6 U.S. 616.
(2) 232 U.S. 383.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REFCJ:'/,TS
1085
administered to the accused person. These features
have been continued in the later Codes of Criminal
Procedure and have been incorporated into section 342
of the present Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. The
only later statutory change, so far, in this behalf,
appears to be that brought about by section 7 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. By virtue of
that section an accused is a competent witness on his
own application in respect of offences under that Act.
So far as witnesses are concerned, section · III of Act
XV of 1852 also declared the protection of witnesses
against compulsion to answer incriminating questions.
Shortly thereafter in 1855, this protection was modified
by section 32 of Act II of 1855 which made him compellable to answer even incriminating questions but
provided immunity from arrest or prosecution . on the
basis of such evidence or any other kind of use thereof
in criminal proceedings except prosecution for giving
false evidence. This position has been continued under
section 132 of the Evidence Act I of 1872 which. is still
in force. So far as documents are concerned, it does
not appear that the Indian statutory law specifically
recognised protection. against production of incriminating documents until Evidence Act I of 1872 was
enacted which has a provision in this bel;@lf in section
130 thereof. It is not quite clear whether this section
which excludes parties to a suit applies to an accused.
Thus so far as the Indian law is concerned it may be
taken that the protection against self-incrimination
continues more or less as in the English common
law,. so far as the accused and production of documents
are concerned, but that it has been modified as regards
oral testimony of witnesses, by introducing compulsion
and providing immunity from prosecution on the basis
of such compelled evidence.
Since the time when the principle of protection
against self-incrimination became established in English
law and in other systems of law which have followed
it, there has been considerable debate as to the utility
thereof and serious doubts were held in some quarters
that this principle has a tendency to d>feat justice. In
support of the principle it is .claimea that the protection
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Others
V,
Satish Chandra,
District Magistrate, Delhi, and
Others.
Jagannadha·
dtisJ.
1086
1954
M. P. Shanna
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra,
District Magistrate, Delhi, and
Others.
Jagannadhadas ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
of
accused
against
self-incrimination
promotes
active investigation from external sources to find out
the truth and proof of alleged or suspected crime
instead of extortion of confessions on unverified suspicion. (See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, page 309).
It is also claimed that that privilege in its application
to witnesses as regards oral testimony and production
of documents affords to them in general a free atmosphere in which they can be persuaded to come forward
to furnish evidence in courts and be of substantial help
in elucidating truth in a case, with reference to material
within their knowledge and in their possession. (See
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII, page 307). On the
other hand, the opinion has been strongly held in some
quarters that this rule has an undesirable effect on
social interests and that in the· detection of crime, the
State is confronted with overwhelming difficulties as a
result of this privilege. It is said this has become a
hiding place of crime and has outlived its usefulness
and that· the rights of accused persons are amply protected without this privilege and that no innocent person is in need of it. (See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. VIII.
pages 314 and 315). Certain passages at pages 441
and 442 of Vol. 1 of Stephen's History of the Criminal
Law of England are also instructive in this context
and show a similar divergence of opinion.
In view of the above background, there is no
inherent reason to construe the ambit. of this fundamental right as comprising a very wide range. Nor
would it be legitimate to confine it to the barely literal
meaning of the words used, since it is a recognised
doctrine that when appropriate a constitutional provision has to be liberally construed, so as to advance
the intendment thereof and to prevent its circumvention. Analysing the terms in which this right has been
declared in our Constitution, it may be said to consist
of the following components. ( 1) It is a right pertaining to a person "accused of an offence"; (2) It is a
protection against "compulsion to be a ' witness";
and (3) It is a protection against such compulsion
resulting in his givinir evidence "against himself".
The cases with which we are concerned have been
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1087
presented to us on the footing that the persons against
whom the search warrants were issued, were all of
them persons against whom the First Information
Report was lodged and who were included in the category of accused therein and that therefore they are
persons "accused of an offence" within the meaning
of article 20 (3) and also that the documents for whose
search the warrants were issued, being required for investigation into the alleged offences, such searches
were for incriminating material. It may be noticed
that some of the accused enumerated in the First
Information Report are incorporated companies. But
no question has been raised before us that the protection does not apply to corporations or to documents
belonging to them-a question about which there has
been considerable debate in the American Courts. On
the above footing, therefore, the only substantial argument before us on this part of the case was that compelled production of incriminating documents from
the possession of an accused is compelling an accused
to
be a witness against himself. This argument
accordingly raises mainly the issue relating to the scope
and connotation of the second of the three components
above stated.
Broadly stated the guarantee m article 20(3) is
against "testimonial compulsion".
It 1s
suggested
that this is confined to the oral evidence of a person
standing his trial for an offence when called to the
witness-stand. We can see no reason to confine the
content of the constitutional guarantee to this barely
literal import. So to limit it would be to rob the
guarantee of its substantial purpose and to miss the
substance for the sound as stated in certain American
decisions. The phrase used in article 20(3) is "to be
a witness." A person can "be a witness" not merely
by giving oral evidence but also by producing documents or making intelligible gestures as in the case of
a dumb witness (see section 119 of the Evidence Act)
or the like. "To be a witness" is nothing more
than "to furnish evidence", and such evidence can be
furnished through the lips or by production of a thing
or of a document or in other modes. So far as
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra.
District Magistrate, Delhi, and
0th.rs.
]agannadkadas ].
1088
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Salish Chandra,
Dhtrict Magistrat~, Delhi, and
Others.
Jagannadha-
das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
production of documents is concerned, no doubt section
139 of the Evidence Act says that a person producing
a document on summons is not a witness. But that
section is meant to regulate the right of cross-examination. It is not a guide to the· ·connotation of the
word "witness'', which must be understood in its.
natural sense, i.e., as referring to a.person who furnishes evidence.
Indeed, every positive volitional act
which furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial
compulsion connotes coercion
which procures the
positive volitional evidentiary acts of the person, as.
opposed to the negative attitude of silence or submission on his part. Nor is there any reason to think
that the protection in respect of the evidence se>
procured is confined to what transpires at the trial
in the court room. The phrase used in article 20(3)
is "to be a witness" and not to "appear as a witness":It follows that the protection afforded to an accused
in so far as it is related to the phrase "to be a witness"·
is not mere1y in respect of testimonial compulsion in
the court room but may well . extend to compelled
testimony previously obtained from him. It is available therefore to a person against whom a formal
accusation relating to the commission of an offence
has been levelled which in the normal course may
result in prosecution. \Vhether it is available to other
persons in other situations does not call for decision
in this case.
Considered in this light, the guarantee under article
20(3) would be available in the present cases to these
petitioners against whom a First Information Report
has been recorded as accused therein. It would extend
to any compulsory process for production of evidentiary
documents which are reasonably likely - to support a
prosecution against them. The question then that
arises next is whether search warrants for the seizure
of such documents from the custody of these persons
are unconstitutional and hence illegal on the ground that
in effect they are tantamount to compelled production
of evidence. It is urged that both search .and seizure
of a document uand a compelled production thereof on
notice or summons serve the same · purpose of being
S.C.R.
SuPREME COURT REPORTS
1089
available as evidence in a prosecution against the . person concerned, and that any other view would defeat
or weaken the protection afforded by the guarantee of
the fundamental right. This line of argument is not
altogether without force and has the apparent support
of the Supreme Court of the United States of America
in Boyd v. United States(').
The question there which came up for consideration
was in fact the converse, namely, whether a compulsory
production of documents on the facts of that case amounted to search and seizure. There are dicta in that decision
to the effect that a compulsory production of a man's
private papers is a search and seizure since it . affects
the sole object thereof and that by this process the
court extorts from the party his private books and
papers to make him liable for penalty. ·It is necessary,
therefore, to examine this decision rather closely in
order to determine how far it can be a safe guide for
our purpose. The question therein arose under the
following circumsta)lces. In an Act to amend the
Customs Revenue Laws, there was a provision which
enabled the Government Attorney to make a written
motion to the court for the issue of a notice to the
opposite-party for production of papers in his possession. The motion could be made if in the Attorney's
opinion those books contain materials which will prove
an alleged fact in support of a charge of defrauding
the
revenues,
jnvolving penalty and forfeiture
of merchandise to which the fraud relates. It
is also provided by the said section that if the
court in its discretion allows the motion in which
is set out the fact sought to be proved and calls upon
the defendant to produce the documents, and the
defendant fails or refuses to produce them without any
proper and satisfactory explanation, the allegation of
fact sought to be proved by such production may be
deemed to have been
confessed.
The question
that thereupon arose was whether an order for
production made by the court under that section
did not violate
the constitutional rights declared
by the · Fourth· and Fifth Amendments of the
(1) 116 U.S. 616.
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra,
District Magis·
trate, Delhi, and
Others.
Jagannadhadas J.
1954
.MP. Sharma
and Others
v.
.Sa:ish Chandra
District Magis.
Jrate, Delhi, and
Others
7agannadhadas J.
1090
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
American
follows:
Constitution.
are
These
amendments
as
Amendment IV.
"The right of the people to be secure m their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not . be violated; and
no warrants shall issue, ' but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
Amendment V.
"No person ...... shall
be
compelled in
any
criminal case, to be a witness against himself ; ........ "
On the facts of the above case, there was no difficulty
in holding that the production of documents m
response to the motion granted by the court was a
compelled production of incriminating evidence and
that it violated the Fifth Amendment. The minority
judgment brought this out clearly m. the following
passage:
.
''The order of the court under the statute is in
effect a subpoena duces tecum; and though the penalty
for the witness' failure to appear in court with the
criminating papers is not fine and imprisonment, it is
one which may be made more severe, namely, to have
the charges against him of a criminal nature taken for
confessed and made the foundation of the judgment of
the court. That this is within the protection which
the Constitution intended against compelling a person
to be a witness against . himself is, I think, quite
clear."
The majority Judges, however, went one step
further and said as follows :
"The compulsory production of a man's private
papers is search and seizure."
and again thus
"We have been unable to perceive that the seizure
of a man's private books and papers to . be used in
evidence against him is soubstantialy different from
compelling him to be a witness against himself."
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1091
Thus in the view that the order for production was
tantamount to search and seizure and that in the case
it was for a purpose prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, they held that the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches was also violated. The
minority Judges, however, did not accept this view
and pointed out that there was an essential difference
between the seizure of a document on search and the
production of a document. But even otherwise, it
would appear on a careful consideration of the decision
that the majority were at pains to make out that, in
the circumstances of the case the order for production
would amount to "an unreasonable search and seizure"
and is hence unconstitutional as violating the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. The case, therefore, does not
lend support for any general doctrine that a search and
seizure in all circumstances is tantamount to a compelled production in violation of the Fifth Amendn:1ent.
That decision itself expressly recognizes the legality of
various kinds of searches and indeed the Fourth
Amendment itself shows it. Thus what that decision
really established was that the obtaining of incriminating evidence by illegal search and seizure is tantamount to the violation of the Fifth Amendment. It
was in this light that subsequent cases have also
understood this decision. [See Felix Gouled v. United
States(')].
Boyd's case(") has relied on the famous judgment of
Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington( 3 ), and learned
counsel for the petitioners has also relied on it
Strenuously before us. Wigmore in his Law of
Evidence, Vol. VIII, page 368, has shown how some of
the assumptions relating to it in Boyd's case("), were
inaccurate and misleading. While no doubt Lord
Camden refers to the principle of protection against
self-accusation with great force, in his consideration of
the validity of general search-warrants, that case does
not treat a seizure on a search warrant as ipso facto
tantamount to self-incrimination. All that was said
(1) 255 U.S. 298; 65 Law. Edn. 647 at 651 and 653.
(2) 116 U.S. 616.
(3) 19 State Trials 1030.
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Otbrs.
v.
Salish Chandra,
District Magis-
trate, Delhi, and'
Others.
Jagannadha·
das J.
1092
1554
M. P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra,
District Magistrate, Delhi, and
Ot,,,,.s.
Jagannadhadas J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
was that the legal philosophy underlying both is the
same, as appears from the following passage :
"It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man
to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as
well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust;
and it should seem, that search for evidence is
disallowed upon the same principle. There too the
innocent would be confounded with the guilty."
It may be noted that Lord Camden's judgment
shows, by an elaborate dissertation, that the search
warrant therein under consideration was unauthorised
and illegal. Thus even the above dictum has reference
only to an illegal search.
It is, therefore, impossible to derive from Boyd's
case (1), support for the proposition that searches and
seizures, in general, are violative of the privilege of
protection against self-incrimination. Nor is it possible
to import that doctrine with its differentiation between
legal and illegal searches into our Constitution because
we have nothing in our Constitution corresponding to
the Fourth Amendment enabling the courts to import
the test of unreasonableness or any analogous criterion
for discrimination between legal and illegal searches.
In the arguments before us strong reliance has also
been placed on the provision of sections 94 and 96 of
the Criminal Procedure Code in support of the broad
proposition that a seizure of documents on search is in
the contemplation of law a compelled production of
documents. The sections run as follows :
"94(1). Whenever any court, or in any place
beyond the limits of the towns of Calcutta and
Bombay, any officer in charge of a police-station
considers that the production of any document or other
thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any
investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under
this Code by or before such court or officer, such court
may issue a summons, or such officer a written order,
to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend
(l) Jl6 u. s. 616
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1093
and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place
stated in the summons or order.
,,
"96(1). Where any Court has reason to believe
that a person to whom a summons or order under
section 94 or a requisition under section 95, subsection ( 1), has been or might be addressed will not or
would not produce the document or thing as required
by such summons or requisition,
or where such document or thing is not known to
the court to be in the possession of any person,
or where the court considers that the purposes of
any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code
will be served bv a general search or inspection,
It may issue a search-warrant ; and the person to
whom such warrant is directed, may search or inspect
in accordance therewith and the provisions hereinafter
mntained.
,,
It is pointed out that the procedure contemplated is
that normally there should be a summons or notice for
production under section 94 and it is only if there is no
compliance therewith or if the Magistrate is satisfied
about the likelihood of non-compliance that a search
warrant is to be issued. It is, therefore, urged that
these provisions themselves show that in law search
and seizure is a substitute for compelled production on
5ummons. There has been some debate before us
whether section 94 applies to an accused person and
whether there is any element of compulsion in it. For
the purpose of this case it is unnecessary to decide
these points. We may assume without deciding that
the section is applicable to the accused as held by a
Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in a recent case
in Satya Kinkar Roy v. Nikhil
Chandra Jyotishopadhaya(' ). We may also assume that there is an
element of complusion implicit in the process contemplated by section 94 because, in any case, noncompliance results in the unpleasant consequence of
invasion of one's premises and rummaging of · one's
(1) A.I.R. 1951 Cal. IOI.
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra,
District Magis~
trate, Delhi, and
Others.
Jagannmfha~
d"' ].
1094
1954
M. P. Sharma
and Othtrs
V,
Satish Chandra,
District Magis-
trate, Delhi, and
Others.
Jagannadha·
dasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
private papers by the minions of law under a ·search
warrant. Notwithstanding these assumptions we are
unable to read sections 94 and 96(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code as importing any statutory recognition
of a theory that search and seizure of documents is
compelled production thereof. It is to be noticed that
section 96( l) has three alternatives and that the
requirement of previous notice or summons and the
non-compliance with it or the likelihood of such noncompliance is prescribed only for the first alternative
and not for the second . or the third. A "general
search" and a "search for a document or a thing not
known to be in possession. of any particular person"
are not conditioned by any such requirement. Indeed
in cases covered by the second alternative such a
requirement cannot even be contemplated as possible.
It would, therefore, follow, on the theory propounded,
that some at least of the searches within the scope of
the second and third alternatives in section 96 ( 1)
would fall outside the constitutional protection of
article 20(3)-an anomalous distinction for which no
justification can be found on principle.
A consideration of the history of Indian statutory
legislation relating to searches does not support the
theory propounded. The provisions for searches are
to be found in the successive Codes of Criminal Procedure. In the earliest Code, Act XXV of 1861, there
appears no provision for issuing summons or notices
for production of documents, but there was only a
provision for the issue of a search warrant by a
Magistrate under section 114 thereof, which is in the
following terms :
"When a Magistrate
shall
consider that the
production of any thing is essential to the conduct of
an enquiry . into an offence known or suspected to have
been committed, he may grant his warrant to search
for such thing ; and it shall be lawful for the officer
charged with the execution of such warrant to search
for such thing in any house or place within the jurisdiction of such Magistrate. In such case the Magistrate
may specify in his warrant the house or place, or part
thereof, to which only the search shall extend."
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1095
There was also section 142 of the said Code which
vested in an officer in charge of police station with the
power to make a search suo moto in certain circumstances. In the next Criminal Procedure Code, Act I
of 1872, the relevant provisions were in sections 365,
368 and 379. Section 379 was more or less a repetition
of section 142 of the previous Code (Act XXV of 1861)
vesting power in a police officer to make a suo moto
search. Section 3.65 appears to
be the earliest
statutory provision for the issue of a summons, either
by a police officer or by a court for the production of
a document required for ilwestigation. This was
followed by section 368 relating to the issue of searchwarrants which was in the following terms :
"When a Magistrate considers that the production
of anything is essential to the conduct of an inquiry
into an offence known or suspected to have been committed or to the discovery of the offender,
or when he considers that such inquiry or discovery
will be furthered by the search or inspection of any
house or place,
he may grant his search-warrant; and the officer
charged with the execution of such warrant may search
or inspect any house or place within the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate of the District.
The Magistrate issuing such warrant may, if he
sees fit, specify in his warrant the house or place, or
part thereof, to which only the search or inspection
shall extend; and the officer charged with the execution
of such warrant shall then search or inspect only the
house, place or part so specified."
It will be noticed that even when the procedure of
summons for production of documents was introduced,
as above in section 365, the provision for the issue of
a search-warrant in section 368 had absolutely nothing
to do with the question of non-compliance by the
concerned person with the summons for production. It
is only in the next Criminal Procedure Code, Act X of
1882, that the provisions, sections 94 and 96, appear
which correspond to the present sections 94 and 96 of
Act V of 1898, linking up to some extent the issue of
5-98 SC India.(59
1954
M.P. Shtmn•
and OtherJ
y,
SatiJh Chandra,\.
District Magis-
trate, Delhi, and
Others.
]agannatfhadas J.
1954
M. P.Sharm•
and Others
v.
r atiJh
Chandra,
District Magis-
Jrate, Delhi, and
Others.
Jagannadhadas ].
1096
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
search-warrants with non-compliance or likelihood of
non-compliance with a summons to produce. It may
be mentioned in passing that the provision for the
issue of general search warrants appears for the first
time in the Procedure Code of 1882 and even there the
issue of such general warrants is not based on noncompliance with a previous summons for production.
It is, therefore, clear that there is no basis in the
Indian law for the assumption that a search or seizure
of a thing or document is in itself to be treated as
compelled production of the
same. Indeed a little
consideration will show that the two are essentially
different matters for the purpose relevant to the present
discussion. A notice to produce is addressed to the
party concerned and his production in compliance
therewith constitutes a testimonial act by him within
the meaning of article 20(3) as above explained. But
search warrant is addressed to an officer of the Government, generally a police officer. Neither the search nor
the seizure are acts of the occupier of the searched
premises. They are acts of another to which he is
obliged to submit and are, therefore, not his testimonial acts in any sense. Even in the American
<lecisions there is a strong current of judicial opinion in
support of this distinction. In Hale v. Henkel('),
Justice McKenna in his dissenting judgment makes the
following observations :
"Search implies a quest by an officer of the law ;
a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the
owner ............ The quest of an officer acts upon the
things themselves,-may be secret, intrusive, accompanied by force. The service of a subpoena is but the
delivery of a paper to a party,-is open and
aboveboard. There is no element of trespass or force
in it."
A power of search and seizure is in any system of
jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the
protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution
makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation
to constitutional limitations by recognition of a
(1) 201 U.S. 43; 50 Law. Edn. 652.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1097
fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to
import it, into a totally different fundamental right,
by some process of strained construction. Nor is it
legitimate to assume that the constitutional protection
under article 20(3) would be defeated by the statutory provisions for searches.
It is to be remembered
that searches of the kind we are concerned with are
under the authority of a Magistrate (excepting in the
limited class of cases falling under section 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code). Therefore, issue of a search warrant is normally the judicial function of the Magistrate.
When such jndicial function is interposed between the
individual and the officer's authority for search, no
circumvention thereby of the fundamental right is to
be assumed. We are not unaware that in the present
set up of the Magistracy in this country, it is not infrequently that the exercise of this judicial function is
liable to serious error, as is alleged in the present case.
But the existence of scope for such occasional error is
no ground to assume circumvention of the constitutional guarantee.
We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the
searches with which we are concerned in the present
cases cannot be challenged as illegal on . the ground
of violation of any fundamental rights and that these
applications are liable to be dismissed.
As stated at the outset, we have dealt only with the
constitutional issues involved in this case leaving the
other allegations as to the high-handedness and illegality of the searches open to be raised and canvassed
before the High Court on appropriate applications.
But we cannot he! p observing that on those allegations and on the material that has come within our
notice,
there appears to
be scope
for serious
grievance on the side of the petitioners, which requires
scrutiny.
We accordingly
without costs.
dismiss
these
applications
but
1954
M.P. Sharma
and Others
v.
Satish Chandra,
District Magis-
trate, Delhi, and
Others.
Jagarmadha~
das].
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