V.M SYED MOHAMMAD AND COMPANY versus THE STTE OF ANDHRA.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 11 March 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1117 | 1954 INSC 19
Key facts
- Decided
- 11 March 1954
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 187/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1117
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 19
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
•
1117
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
have therefore eliminated from our consideration the ·
whole of the evidence given by Shanti Lal Ahuja, the
Additional District Magistrate, and come to our conclusion in regard to the gilt of the appellant No. 1
relying solely on the testimony of the two independ- .
ent witnesses Gadkari and Perulakar.
1954
Rao Shiv Bahadt11
Si'flgh and
Another
v.
The Stale of
Vindhya Pradesh.
Bhagwati].
The result therefore is that the appeal of the
appellant No. 1 will be dismissed except with regard
to his conviction and sentence under section 120-B
of the Indian Penal Code and the convictions and sentences passed upon him by the Judicial Commissioner
under section 465 and section 466 as also section
161 of the Indian Penal Code will be confirmed. The
appeal of the appellant No. 2 will be allowed and
he be acquitted Md discharged of the offences with
which he was charged and immediately set at liberty.
The bail bond of the
appellant No. 2 will be
cancelled.
V. M. SYED MOHAMMAD AND COMPANY
1954
v.
March111 ..
THE STATE OF ANDHRA.
(With Connected Appeal)
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAS, V1v1AN BosE and
GHULAM HASAN JJ.J
Constitution
of
India, art.
14-Government
of India
Act,
1935, "'"Y 48 in List I/ of the Seventh Schedule-Madras .General
Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939)-Whether ultra vires the Constitution
or Government of India Act, 1935-Rule 16(5) framed under the
Act-Whether ultra vires s. 5 (vi) of the Act.
Held, that the Madras General Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939) is
not ultra vires the
Government of India Act, 1935 as
in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
entry
48
Government of India
Act, 1935 was wide enough to cover a law imposing
purchaser of goods as well as on the seller.
a tax on the
Held, also that inasmuch as there was nothing to suggest
that the purchasers of other commodities were similarly situated
as the purchasers of hides and skins in the present case, the Act
1118
1954
V. M .•'iy,d
Mohammad
and Company
v.
T ht St alt of.
Andhra
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
was not void under art. 14 of the Constitution on the ground that
the impugned Act singles out for taxing purchasers of certain
specified commodities only but
leaves
out purchasers of other
commodities.
Article 14 does not forbid classification for legislative purposes provided such classification is based on some differentia
having a reasonable relation to the object and purpose of the law
in question.
Rule 16(5) framed under the Act contravenes the provisions
of s. 5(vi) of the Act but this sub-rule is severable and does not
affect the validity of the rules which may otherwise lie within
the ambit of the Act.
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India ([1950] S.C.R.
869) relied upon.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 187 and 188 of 1953.
Appeals under article 132 of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order, dated the 29th
August, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at
Madras in Writ Petitions Nos. 21 and 41 of 1952.
K. V. Venkatasubramania Iyer (A. N. Rangaswami
and M. S. K. Aiyangar, with him) for the appellant .
.M. Sesliachalapathi for the respondent.
V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras
(V. V. Raghavan, with him) for the intervener (State
of Madras).
T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and Sardar Bahadur for
the intervener (State of Travancore-Cochin).
Nittoor
Sreenivasa Rao,
Advocate-General of
Mysore (Porus A. Mehta, with him) for the intervener
(State of Mysore).
Lal Narayan Sinha (B. K. P. Sinha, with him) for
the intervener (State of Bihar).
1954. March 11. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
DAs J.-These two appeals arise out of Writ
Petitions Nos. 21 and 41 of 1952 filed in the High
Court of Judicature at Madras under article 226 questioning the validity of the Madras General Sales Tax
Act (IX of 1939) and of the Turnover and Assessment
Rules framed under that Act.
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1119
The petitioners are tanners carrying on business in
Eluru, West Godawari District, which is now part of
the newly created State of Andhra. They make large
purchases of untanned hides and skins and after tanning them in their tanneries they export the tanned
hides and skins or sell the same to local purchasers. In
the High Court the appellants impugned the Act and
the rules on the following grounds :(a) The Provincial Legislature had no power under
the Government of India Act of 1935 to enact a law
imposing a tax on purchasers ;
(b) The liability to pay tax on sales is thrown on
the purchaser not by the statute but by the rules.
This is an unconstitutional delegation by the legislature
·of its functions to the executive and the imposition of
:the tax is accordingly illegal ;
( c) The Act has become void under article 14 of
the Constitution, as it singles out for taxation
purchasers in some trades and is, therefore, discrimina·tory; and
( d) The rules framed under the Act are inconsist•ent with the provisions enacted in the body of the Act
:and are void.
The High Court repelled each of the aforesaid grounds
·except that under item (d). It held that rule 16(5) was
ultra vires in that it offended against section 5 (vi) of
·the Act and dismissed their applications. Hence the
;present appeals by the appellants under the certificate
granted by the High Court that it was a fit case for
:appeal to this court.
Learned advocate appearing in support of these
:appeals has not pressed the objection under item (b)
·but has insisted on the remaining grounds of objec·tion. In our opinion the decisions of the High Court
·on those grounds are substantially well-founded and
correct. On the question of legislative competency
·the learned advocate drew our attention to entry 54
in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
•of India and argued that this entry clearly indicated
that entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
•Government of India Act, 1935, under which the
1954
V. M.Syed
Mohammad
and Company
v.
The State of
Andhra
Das J.
1120
1954
V. M.Syed
Afohammad
and Company
v.
Tiu Stale of
'4 ·1dhra
Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
impugned Act was passed, was much narrower in its
scope and could not be read as authorising the making
of a law with respect to taxes on the purchase of goods.
This argument appears to us to be fallacious, for the
intention of the Constituent Assembly as expressed in
entry 54 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution cannot be a
guide for ascertammg
the intention of a totally different body, namely, the British Parliament, in enacting entry 48 in List
II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India
Act, 1935. Further, we agree with the High Court
that entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Government of India Act, on a proper construction,
was wide enough to cover a law imposing tax on the
purchaser of goods as well and that the Constituent
Assembly in entry 54 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution accepted this liberal construction of the corresponding entry 48 and expressed in
clearer language what was implicit in that corresponding entry.
The next poi,n_t urged by the learned advocate was
founded on the article 14 of the Constitution. The appellants' grievance is that the impugned Act singles out
for taxing purchasers of certain specified commodities
only but leaves out purchasers of all other commodities.
The principle under! ying
the
equal protection clause of the
Constitution has been dealt
with and explained in Chiranjitlal Chowdhury v.
The Union of India ( 1 ) and several subsequent
cases and
need not be reiterated.
It is well
settled that the guarantee
of
equal
protection
of laws does not require that the same law should
be made applicable to all persons. Article 14, it has
been said, does not forbid classification for legislative
purposes, provided that such classification is based on
some differentia having a reasonable relation to the
object and purpose of the law in question. As pointed
out by the majority of the Bench which decided
Chiranjitlal Chowdhury's case, there ts a strong
presumption in favour of the validity
of legislative.
classification and it is for those who challenge it as.
(1) (1 9soJ s.c.R: s6 9.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1121
unconstitutional to allege and prove beyond all doubt
that the legislation arbitrarily discriminates between
different persons similarly circumstanced. There is
no material on the record before us to suggest that the
purchasers of other commodities are similarly situated
as the purchasers of hides and skins. The majority decision in Chiranjitlal Chowdhury's case( 1 ) clearly applies
to the case before us and there is no getting away
from the position that the appellants before us have
not discharged the burden of proof that, according to the
majority
decision, was upon them
to do.
Lastly, the learned advocate urges that rule 16(5)
clearly contravenes the provisions of section 5(vi) of
the Act. This sub-rule has been held to be ·ultra vires
by the High Court and, indeed, the learned AdvocateGeneral of Madras did not in the High Court, as before
us, dispute that rule 16(5) was repugnant to section
5(vi). That sub-rule, however, affects only unlicensed
dealers and the appellants who are admittedly licensed
dealers are not affected by that sub-rule. Further, it .
has not been suggested before us that the appellants were
ever called upon to pay any tax on purchase of hides
or skins in respect of which tax had been previously
paid by some prior purchaser.
That sub-rule is
clearly severable and cannot affect the validity of the
rules which may otherwise be within the ambit of the
Act. Our attention has not been drawn to any other
infirmity in t11e rules.
In the premises
appeals which must,
costs.
there is no substance in these
therefore, be dismissed with
Appeals dismissed.
Agent for the respondent and for the interveners.
States of Madras, Mysore and Bihar: R. H. Dhebar.
(x) (1950] S.C.R. 86g.
1954
V. M. Syed·
Mohammad
and Compan)' ·
v.
The Statt of
Andhra
Das].
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