SRI SRI SRI KISHORE CHANDRA SINGH DEO versus BABU GANESH PRASAD BHAGAT AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 March 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 919 | 1954 INSC 17
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 March 1954
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 4
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1/1949
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 919
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 17
Text of the judgment
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
919
1954
Also,
"to give the names of all persons, if any, who
have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of
any corrupt or illegal practice and the nature of that
practice."
Kaj Krus/ma
Bose
v.
Binod Kanungo
and Others,
la.r J.
Their duty does not end by declaring an election to
be void or not because section 99 provides that in addition to that
"at the time of making an order under section 98
the tribunal shall also make an order etc ...... "
A number of allegations were made in the petition
about corruption and illegal practices, undue influence
and bribery. It was the duty of the tribunal not
only to enquire into those allegations, as it did, but
also to complete the enquiry by recording findings
about those allegations and either condemn or clear the
candidate of the charges made.
We make no order about costs.
BosE J.-I agree on all but one point. I have
:some doubt about the reason given by my learned
brother which is based on the d<:hnition of "candidate"
·in the Act. I prefer not to express any opinion on
:that one point.
Case remanded.
Agent for the appellant: Ratnaparkhi Anant Govind.
Agent for respondent No. 1. .-1.. D. Mathur.
SRI SRI SRI KISHORE CHANDRA SINGH DEO
Marth 9.
v.
'BABU GANESH PRASAD BHAGAT AND OTHERS.
[MuKHERJEA,
VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HASAN
VENKAIARAMA AYYAR TJ.)
1954
and
Indian Registration Act (XVI of 1908), ss. 32, 33-"Resides",
.1neaning -of-Pou•er-of-attorney containing mistaken endorsement,
.effect of-Applicability of ss. 32 and 33 to such a case-Legal
.effect of decision under s. 33(1), proviso (i).
920
1954
Sri Sri Sri
Kishore Chandra
Singh Dto
v.
Babu Ganesh
Prasad Bhagat
and Othrrs.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
The word "resides" in s. 33( 1) (a) of the
Indian Registration Act, 1908, is not defined in the statute. It contemplates not
only permanent residence but also temporary residence. Residence only connotes that a person eats, drinks and sleeps at that
place and it is not ~:ecessary that he should own it.
For purposes of s. 32( c) of the Act, a power-of-attorney
needs, in vie\v of the provisions of s. 33 of the Act, no registration
but is only required to be execcted before and authenticated by
the Registrar.
Hence an endorse1nent mistakenly 1nad::: on such
power-of-attorney that it was presented for registration must be
ignored and does not affect the validity of subsequent authentication by the Registrar \vhich \Vas an independent act complete in
itself and valid under s. 33.
A decision of the Registrar under s. 33( 1) proviso (i) of the
Indian llegistration Act that an applicant is suffering from bodily
infirmity and is unable to attend the Registration Office or court
without risk or serious inconvenience relates to a matter of mere
procedure and even if erroneous does not affect his jurisdiction..
The finding is on a matter which is within his exclusive jurisdiction, and cannot be questioned in a court of la\v.
fambu Prasad v. Maham mad Aftar Ali Khan ( 42 I.A. 22),
Sharat Chandar Basu v. Bijay Chand Mahtab (64 I.A. 77), Ma Pwa
May v. Chettiar Firm (56 I.A. 379) and Mujibunnissa v. Abdul'
Rahim (28 I.A. 15) referred to.
CML APPELLATE JuRrsmcTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 1 and 2 of 1949.
Appeals from the Judgment and Decree dated the
22nd December, 1942, of the High Court of Judicature
at Patna in First Appeals Nos. 10 and 11 of 1939
ansmg out of the Judgment and Decree dated the
23rd November, 1936, of the Court of the Subordinate
Judge of Berhampore in Original Suit No. 11 of 1935..
D. V. Narasinga Rao and M. S. K. Sastri for the·
appellant.
S. L. Chhibber and R. C. Prasad for respondents
Nos. 1-4, 6-9, 11 and 12.
1954. March 9. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These appeals anse out
of a suit instituted by the respondents to enforce a
mortgage deed, Exhibit A, dated 5th April, 1923, executed by the defendant in favour of one Radha.
Prasad Bhagat. The subject-matter of the mortgage
is an estate called the Bodogodo Zemin situated in
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
921
what was the District of Ganjam in the Province of
Madras and now comprised in the State of Orissa, and
governed by the provisions of the Madras Impartible
Estates Act II of 1904. The mortgage is for
Rs. 1,25,000 and the deed recites that a sum of
Rs. 12,500 was advanced to the mortgagor on a promissory note executed on 30th March, 1923, that the
balance of Rs. 1,12,500 was paid to him in cash, and
that the entire amount was borrowed for meeting the
expenses of the marriage of his second daughter with
the eldest son of the Rajah of Talcher. The marriage,
in fact, took place on 27th April, 1923. Though the
deed recites that Rs. 1,12,500 was paid iri cash, the
case of the plaintiffs is that it was, in fact, paid on
14th April, 1923, on the authority of the defendant
to his manager, one Mr. Henry Tapp, after the
mortgage bond was registered, which was on 10th
April, 1923. In 1926 and 1927 the defendant made
several payments towards the mortgage, in all aggregating to Rs. 42,000. The mortgagee died on 18th
November, 1933, and thereafter his legal representatives filed the suit, out of which these appeals arise,
for recovery of the balance due under the mortgage by
sale of the hypothecated property.
The defendant resisted the suit on several grounds.
He pleaded that the mortgage was supported by consideration only to the extent of Rs. 25,000, and that
it had become discharged by the payments made in
1926 and 1927. He also contended that the mortgage
· bond was not duly attested or validly registered, and
that it was therefore void and unenforceable.
The Subordinate Judge of Berhampur who heard
the suit held that no consideration passed for the promissory note for Rs. 12,500 dated 30th March, 1923,.
Exhibit J, and that it was really a salami; but that
the balance of Rs. 1,12,500 was paid to Mr. Tapp
unJer the authority of the defendant. He also held
t11at the mortgage bond was duly attested and validly
registered, and a decree was passed in accordance with
these findings.
Roth the parties took up the matter in appeal to
the High Court of Patna. The plaintiffs filed A. S.
1954
Sri S•i Sti
Kish.ore Chandro.c
Singh .Veo
v.
Babu.Ganesh
Prasad Bhagat·
and Others.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
922
1954-
Sri Sri S1i
Jlis:'.cr~ Ci:andru
Singh Dee>
v.
Babu Cants.·:
Pru~ad Bhagt1.t
and Ot/,crs.
.i:tnkaiarau;a
Ay)"ar ].
[1954]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
No. 10 of 1937 claiming that Exhibit J was supported
by consideration, and the defendant filed A. S. No.
11 of 1937 pleading that the alleged payment of
Rs. 1,12,500 to Mr. Tapp was unauthorised, and that
the mortgage bond was void, as it was neither duly attested nor properly registered. The High Court concurred with the Subordinate Judge in finding that that
Rs. 1,12,500 was paid to Mr. Tapp under the authority of the defendant, and that the bond was duly
attested and registered. But as regards the promissory note, Exhibit J, it held differing from the
Subordinate Judge that it was also supported by
consideration. Against this decision, the defendant
appeals, and repeats all the contentions urged by him
in the courts below.
•
•
•
:t(c
[The court held on a consideration of the evidence that
the mortgage bond was supported by consideration and
that it was duly attested.]
The last contention of the appellant was that the
deed was not validly registered in accordance with
the provisions of sections 32 and 33 of the Registration Act, and that it was therefore void. Section 32
enacts that,
"Except in the cases mentioned ;11 sections 31, 88
and 89 every document to be registered under this
Act ............ shall be presented ..... .
(a) by some person executing or claiming under
the saITle, ........ or
(b) by the representative or assign of such
person,
or
( c) by the agent or such person, representative or
assign, duly authorised by power-of-attorney executed
and authenticated in manner hereinatter mentioned."
Section 33, so far as is material for the present purpose, runs as follows:
•
33(1) "For the purposes of section 32, the following powers-of-attorney shall alone be recognized,
namelv:(;) if the principal at the time of executing the
power-of-attorney resides in any part of (the Provinces) in which this Act is for the time being in force, a
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
923
!954
executed before and authenticated
by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within whose disSri S1i Sri
!1' isho re Liiandrs
trict or sub-district the principal resides; ....
Singh Deo
,
Provided that the following persons shall not be
Babu Ganesh
required to attend at any registration office or court
Pra~ad BJ;agat
an.i Ot/;ef',f.
for the purpose of executing any such power-of-attorney as is mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of this
T/'enkataramo:
~);'rnr.J.
section, name! v:(i) persons who by reason of bodily infirmity arc
unable without risk or serious inconvenience so to
attend;
(ii) persons who are in jail under civil or criminal
proces.s; and
(iii) persons exempt cy law from personal appearance in court.
(2) In the case of every such person the Registrar
or Sub-Registrar or Magistrate, as the case may be, if
satisfied that the power-of-attorney has been volunta·
rily executed by the person purporting to be the
principal, rr:.oy attest the sJme without requiring his
personal attengance at the office or court aforesaid.
(3) To obtain evidence as to the voluntary nature
of the execution, the Registrar or Sub-Registrar or
Magistrate may either himself go to the house of the
person purporting to be the principal, or to the jail in
which he is confined, and examine him, or issue a
commission for his examination."
The substance of these provisions is that a document
must be presented for registration either by a party to
it or his legal representative or assign or by his agent
11olding a power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in accordance with section 33 of the Act.
In Jambu Prasad v. Muhammad Aftar Ali Khan(')
it was observed by the Judicial Committee approving:
of the decision in Ishri Prasad v. Baijnat!z(2) that,
" .... the terms of sections 32 and 33 of Act III of
1877 are imperative, and that n presentation of a document for registration by agent ...... ., who has not
been duly authorized in accordance with those
pov·~er-of-attorney
.•
(r) 4' I.A. 22.
·
(2) I.L.R. 2B All. 707.
924
1954
Sri Sri Sri
KishiJre Clandra
Sing.'i Deo
v.
Babu 'Ganesh
Prasad Bhagat
and Others.
Venkatarama
AY.yar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
sections, does not give to
indispensable foundation
the document."
[1954]
the Registering Officer the
of his authority to register
Vi'here, therefore, a document is presented for registration by a person other than a part to it or his legal
representative or assign or by a person who is not an
agent authorized in the manner prescribed in section 33,
such presentation is wholly inoperative, an the registration of such a document is void. In the present case,
Exhibit A was presented for registration by Mr. Tapp
as the agent of the defendant under a power-of-attorney executed by him, Exhibit B, and the question is
whether that power satisfies the requirements of
section 33.
Exhibit B was executed by the defendant
before the Registrar at the residence of the Chief of
Hindol at Cuttack and was authenticated by him. It
was argued for the appellant that the authentication
was invalid on three grounds: (1) that the defendant
was not residing at Cuttack at the time of the execution of Exhibit B, and consequently the Registrar at
Cuttack had no jurisdiction to authenticate the deed
under section 33 (1) (a); (2) that Exhibit B was presented for registration by one Sundaram who described
himself as the personal assistant of the defendant,
but was, in fact, a person not authorised to present
the document as required by section 32, and therefore
the authentication of the power based on such presentation
was void; and (3) that the authentication of
the power under the proviso to section 33 (1) at the
residence of the defendant was bad, as he was, in fact
not suffering from any bodily infirmity at that time,
and that in consequence the registration of Exhibit A
pursuant thereto was void.
With reference to the first contention that the
defendant was not residing at Cuttack at the date of
Exhibit B, and that consequently the Registrar of
that place had
no jurisdiction to register it under
section 33 (1) (a), the finding of the courts below is
that the defendant had been resi :ling at Cuttack for a
week prior to the date of Exhibit B, and that that was
sufficient for the purposes of section 33 ( 1) (a). In
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
925
1954
Sharat Chandra Basu v. Bijay Chand Mahtab ( 1 ) the
Privy Council, observed:
Sri Sri Sri
"The expression 'resides', as used in section 33, Kis!iore Chandra
SingkDeo
is
not defined in the statute; but there is no reason
v.
Babu Ganesh
for assuming that it contemplates only permanent
Prasad Bhagat
residence and excludes temporary residence."
and Others.
It must therefore be taken as settled that even
Venkatarama
A;yar].
temporary residence at a place j5 sufficient to clothe
the Registrar of that place with jurisdiction under
section 33 ( 1) (a). It was argued for the appellant that
his permanent place of residence was at Bodogodo,
that he owned no house at Cuttack, that the house
~here Exhibit B was registered belonged
to his
brother-in-law, the Chief of Hindol, and that he
stayed there
on! y for the purpose of registering the
power, and that on these facts, it cou 1.d not be held
that there was residence even of a temporary character
at Cuttack. The fact that the house did not belong to
the appellant is not material for this purpose; because
residence only connotes that a person eats, drinks and
sleeps at that place, and not that he owns it. Whether
the stay of the appellant at Cuttack was of a casual
nature,
or whether it amounted to residence must
<lepend on all the circumstances proved, and is essenti.a.lly a question of fact. The appellant described himself in Exhibit
B as temporarily residing at Cuttack,
and there is no reason why his words should not be
accepted as indicating the true position. Then there is
the endorsement of the Registrar on Exhibit B, and
that runs as follows:
"Having visited
and examined at his residence
the principal Sri Sri Sri Kishore Chandra Singh Deo,
son of Durga Mahtab Singh Deo, of at present Hindol
House .... by profession Zamindar, who is personally
.known to me, I am satisfied that this power-of-attorney has been voluntarily executed by him and I ac<:ordingly authenticate it under section 33 of Act XVI
of 1908."
In Sharat Chandra Basu v. Bijay Chand Mahtab(')
the endorsement on the power-of-attorney was as
follows:
926
1954
Sri Sri Sri
Kishore Chandra
Sing:i Deo
v.
BabuGamsh
Prasad Bhagat
and Others.
Venkatarama
Ay)'Of
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954 i
"Executed in my presence at
the Hazaribagh
on krgust 8, 1916, by Sharat
Registration Office
Chandra Basu, son of Nalinaksha Basu of Burdwan,
at present of Hazaribagh in Hazaribagh, who is personally known to me and I accordingly authenticate it
under s.:ction 33. <\ct XVI of 1908 .... "
In accepting this endc:sement as evidence of residence. the Privy Council ob<erved:
"It ts true that he (the principal) ordinarily
resided at Burdwan, but the endorsement of the SubRegistrar on the document expressly states that he
was living, at that time, at Hazaribagh. The endorsement also shows th«t he was personally known to the
Sub-Registrar, and it is not likely that a mistake
would be made about his piaee of residence."
The cp<lorsement in the present ease is even more
positive, in that it rders expressly to the residence of
the executant.
It is also not correct to say that the
defendant came to Cuttack only for the purpose of
executing the power, Exhibit B. He came there to complete the negotiations for raising a loan from Radha
Prasad, and the execution of the power was only one
and not a major incident in the business for which he
came to Cuttack. As already mentioned, he also·
borrowed a sum of Rs. 12,500 under Exhibit J on 30th
March, 1923, while at Cuttaek. It is also in evidence that
the defendant's son was studying at Cuttack at that
time, and was residing in the house of the Chief of
Hindol. Under the circumstances there were ample
materials to support the finding of the conrts below
that the appellant was residing at Cuttack at the time
of Exhibit B, and that must be affirmed.
It was next contended that as Exhibit B was present-·
ed for registration by one Sundaram, who was neither
a party to it nor an agent holding a power-of-attorney
duly registered or authenticated, and as such presentation was void under section 32, the registration of
Exhibit A under the authority contained in Exhibit n
must also be held to be void. The answer to this contention is that section 32. would apply only if a powerof-attorney is presented for registration, and not· when
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
927
it is produced merely for authentication, in which case,
the only requirements that have to be complied with
are those set out in section 33. The endorsements in
Exhibit B sj:iow that the Registrar examined the principal at his residence and satisfied himself that he had
executed it voluntarily. Then there was the authentication which was made expressly under section 33, and
then the defendant signed in the presence of the
Registrar. The defendant also admits in his evidence
that the Registrar questioned him about the . execution
of the power, and then authenticated it, and that he
thereafter signed before him. If the matter had stood
there, there would have been no question but that
Exhibit B was validly authenticated under section 33.
But then, there is an earlier endorsement on Exhibit B
that it was "presented for registration at 11 A.M. on
the 5th day of April, 1923, at the Sadar Sub-Registrar's
Office, Cuttack, by P. Sundaram." The contention of
the appellant based on this endorsement is that as
Exhibit B was presented for registration, section 32
applied, and as Sundaram · was not authorised to
presenr ir, it was rnoperative. But the endorsement in
question is clearly based on a misapprehension of the
true position. Exhibit B was obviously produced
before the Registrar along with the application for
attendance at the residence for authentication and not
for the purpose of registration. Rule 148 of the Bihar
and Orissa Registration Manual provides both for registration and for authentication of a power-of-attorney,
and prescribes separate endorsements for them. It
also requires that \hey should be separately charged.
Rule 157 pr0\·1des that any person can present a document for authentication. Exhibit B was, in fact, not
registered but only authenticated. It contains only
an endorsement of authentication, and the charges
collected were only for authentication. The enc,lorsement therefore that Exhibit B was presented for registration is clearly a mistake, and must be ignored.
Mor~over, even if there had been a presentation of
Exhibit B for registration and that was UP.authorised,
that does not detract from the validity of the subsequent authentication befor~ the Registrar, which was an
8-96 S.C. India/59.
1954
Sri Sri Sri
Kishore Chandra
Singh Deo
v.
Babu Ganesh
Prasad Bhagat
and Others.
Venkatarama
Ayyar ].
928
1954
Sri Sri Sri
Kishore Chandra
Singh Dea
v.
Babu Ganesh
Prasad Bhagat
and Others.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
independent act complete in itself and valid under
section 33. In Bharat lndu v. Hamid Ali Khan('), a
power-of-attorney executed by a mortgagor was
presented for registration by his servan~ but actually
the Registrar registered it at the residence of the principal under section 33. In a suit to enforce the mortgage, the contention was raised that the registration
of the mortgage deed was bad as the power-of-attorney in pursuance of which it was registered was presented for registration by a person not authorised. In
overruling this contention, the Privy Council observed
that even though the presentation of the power for
registration by the servant of the principal was bad,
when it was subsequently registered at the residence
of the executant in accordance with section 33 it
should be deemed to have been presented by him to
the Registrar, and that in that view the registration
would be valid. On the same reasoning, Exhibit B
should be deemed to have been presented for authentication by the defendant when the Registrar attended
at his residence, and the requirements
of section 33
were fully satisfied. This objection must, therefore,
be rejected.
It was finallv contended that the defendant was, in
fact, not sufferi~g from any bodily infirmity at the
time of Exhibit B, that the authentication of the
power by the Registrar at the residence under the proviso to section 33(1) was therefore bad, and that the
registration of Exhibit A pursuant thereto was void;
and reference was made to the evidence in the case
that the defendant was not ill at the time. But there
is the fact that the Registrar did, in fact, attend at the
residence and authenticate the document, and that
could have been only on the application of the defendant.
In his evidence the defendant stated:
"Perhaps an application was filed by me for
private attendance of the Sub-Registrar at Cuttack.
I do not remember what reasons were given for SubRegistrar's private attendance."
., , .
(t! 47 I.A. 177.
S.C.R.
929
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
No application has been produced in court, and it
must be presumed that when the Registrar authenticated Exhibit B under section 33 of the Act, he did so
on an application setting out the proper ground, and
that he satisfied himself that that ground did exist.
Whether he was right in his conclusion that the defendant was suffering from bodily infirmity is not a
matter which can be gone into in a court of law. It
is a matter exclusively within his jurisdiction, and
any error which he might have committed would not
affect his jurisdiction to register the document.
In Ma Pwa May v. Chettiar Firm(')
observed:
Lord Atkin
"In seeking to apply this section (section 87), it
is important to distinguish between defects in the procedure of the Registrar and lack of jurisdiction. Where
to register, as where
the Registrar has no jurisdiction
a person not entitled to do so presents for registration,
or where there is lack of territorial jurisdiction," or
where the presentation is out of time, the section is
inoperative: see Mujibunnissa v. Abdul Rahim( 2 ). On
the other hand, if the registrar having jurisdiction has
made a mistake in the exercise of it, the section (section 33) takes effect."
A decision of the Registrar that an applicant was
suffering from bodily infirmity . for the purposes of section 33 ( 1), proviso, clause ( i), relates to a mere matter
of procedure not affecting his jurisdiction, and even
if erroneous, would not affect the validity of the registration. Moreover, there is the fact already mentioned
that when the Registrar came to the residence for
authenticating Exhibit B, the defendant signed it once
again before him, and that would, in any case, be
·sufficient.
There is no substance in this contention
and it must be overruled.
In the result, the appeals fail and are dismis;ed. As
for costs, it must be mentioned that the defendanit died
while the appeals were pending, and that it is his legal
(1) (1929) 56 !. A. 379·
(2) (1901) 28 !. A. 15·
•
1954
Sri Sri Sri
Kishore Chandra
S£ngh Deo
v.
Babu Ganesh
Prasad Bhagat
and Others.
Venkatarama
Ay;ar J.
930
1954
Sri Sri Sri
Kishore Chandra
Singh Deo
v.
Babu Ganesh
Prasad Bhagat
and Others.
Venkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
representatives who are prosecuting them. The property mortgaged is an estate governed by the Madras
Impartible Estates Act II of 1904. The plaintiffs alleged in their plaint that the mortgage was binding on
the estate under section 4 of the Act. Issue 6 was
framed with reference to this allegation, and the finding of the trial court was that it was not binding on
the estate. But on appeal, the High Court held that
the questior, could not be gone into in a suit laid
against the mortgagor. It accordingly discharged the
finding, an<'1 left the question open to be determined
In view of
in other Jud appropriate proceedings.
this, we direct that the parties do bear their own costs
in this court.
Appeals dismissed
YUSUF ABDUL AZIZ
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND
HUSSEINBHOY LALJEE.
1954
March 10.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN. JT.]
Constitution of India, arts. 14 and 15-Section 497 of the
Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)-Whether ultra vires the
Constitution.
Held, that s. 497 of the Indian Penal Code does not offend
arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuR1sn1cnoN : Case No. 349
of 195 l.
Appeal under article 132 ( 1) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th
June, 1951, of the High Court of . Judicature at
Bombay (Chagla c. J. and Gajendragadkar J.) m
Criminal Application No. 345 of 1951.
A. A· Peerbhoy, Jindra Lal and I. N. Shroff for the
appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus
A. Mehta, with them) for respondent No. 1.
•
I
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