CHATTURBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI versus MORESHWAR PARASHRAM AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 February 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 817 | 1954 INSC 15
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 February 1954
- Bench
- BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, VIVIAN BOSE, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 155/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 817
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 15
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
817
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
allow the licensing authority to make any reduction he
likes. On the whole we are of the opinion that clauses (7)
and (8) of the Control Order do not impose unreasonable
restrictions upon the freedom of trade enjoyed by the
petitioners and consequently the declaration of the
16th of Juiy, 1953, cannot be held to be invalid. The
result is that, in our opinion, clause 4(3) of the Control
Order as well as tbe cancellation of the petitioners'
licence should be held to be invalid and a writ in the
nature of mandamus would issue against the respondents opposite parties preventing them from enforcing
the cancellation order. The rest of the prayers of the
petitioners arc
disallowed.
\Ve make no order as
to costs.
•
1954
.i\.ftssrs. Dwarka
Prasad Laxmi
Narain
v.
The State of
Uttw Pradesh and
Two Others.
Mukhtrjea J.
Petition partly allot11ed.
Agent for the petitioners : Ga11pat Rai.
Agent for the respondents : C. P. Lal.
CHA TTURBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI
v.
MORESHWAR PARASHRAM AND OTHERS.
[MuKHERJEA,
V1v1""
BosE and
BHAGWATI
JJ. /
Represellfation of t!1c People Act (XLlll of 1951), s. 7(d)-A
firm entering into co11trac1s with Central Govern1ne11t for supply of
goods-A candidate seeking election for Parlianient, a partner of the
said firm on the crucial dates-Disqualificatio11-Co11stitution of
India, art. 299(1)-Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872) s. 230(3)Contract ivith Gover111nent not in proper forn1-TVhether void-
Ratification-Contract for supply of
goods-Subsists
till fully dis-
charged by both sides-And payn1ent. 1nade-Person of Scheduled
Caste Mahar convertt'd
to 1\fahanubhava
Pa11th-FVhether convert..,·
caste statu.i altered.
A contract for the supply of goods does not tenninate \Vhcn
the goods arc supplied, it continues into being till pay1ncnt is
made and the contract is fully discharged by performance on both
•
sides.
O'Carroll v. Hastingt ([1905] 2 LR. 590) and Satyendrakumal'
})as v. Chairn1an of the Municipal Com1nissioners of Dacca (I.L.R .
58 Cal. 180) relieJ upon.
The firm Moolji Sicka and Company of which the candidate
was a partner had _ entered into contracts \Vith the Central
1954
February 15.
818
1954
Chatturbhuj
Vithaldas
Jasani
v.
Moreshwar
Parashram
and Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
(;overnn1ent for the supply of goods. The contracts subsisted on
the crucial dates, Nove1nber 15, 1951, and February 14, 1952.
Novernber 15, 1951, \Vas the last date for putting in nominations.
an<l February 14, 1952, \Vas the date on which results were
declared :
Held, that the candidate had both a share and an interest in
the contracts for the supply of goods to th~ appropriate Governn1ent on the crucial dates and was thus disqualified for being
chosen as a member of Parliament by virtue of the disqualification
set out ins. 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act (XLIII
of 1951).
•
•
Held further, that the contention that the contracts in question \Vere void because the l}nion Government could not be .sued
by reason of art. 299(1) of the Constitution as the contracts were
not expressed to be nlade by the President was without force be-
cause this was the type of case to which s. 230(3) of the Indian
Contract Act would apply.
\\.'hen a Government officer acts in excess of authority Government is bound if it ratified the excess.
T/1e Collector of J.\1asulipatam v. Cavaly Venkata Narrainapah
(8 M.l.A. 519) relied upon.
A member of the Mahar caste \vhich is one of the Scheduled
Castes continues to be a member of the Mahar caste despite his
conversion to the tenet.s of the ~IahanubhaYa Panth as such conversion
imports
little
beyond
an
intellectual acceptance of
certain ideological tenets and does not alter the convert's caste
status.
Abraham v. A />raham (9 M.I.A. 199) relied upon.
C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
155 of 1953.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 15th July, 1953, of the Election Tribunal, Nagpur, in Election Petition No. 3 of 1952.
B. Sen and T· P. Naik for the appellant.
Veda Vyas (S. K. Kapur with him) for respondent
No. 1.
1954. February 15. The Judgment of th<' Court
was defo ere.cl by
BosE J.-This is an appeal against a decision of
the Nagpur Election Tribunal.
The contest before
the tribunal was about two seats rn the Bhandara
The elections were held
Parliamentary Constimency.
on five days in December, 1951, and January, 1952.
•
S.C.R.
•
819
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Thirteen candidates filed nomination papers among
them the petitioner. Of these, six contested the seat
reserved for the Scheduled Castes. One of these was
Gangaram Thaware who has since died.
The Scheduled Caste in question is the Mahar caste.
Objection was taken to Thaware's nomination for
the reserved seat on the ground that he was not a
Mahar. It is admitted that he was born a Mahar,
but later in life he joined the Mahanubhava Pantli.
This, according to the appellant, is a sect which does
not believe in caste, and alternativdv that it forms
a separate caste in itself. The contention was that
when Gangaram Thaware joined the Panth he ceased
to be a member of the Mahar caste. The objection
succeeded and his nomination was rejected.
The nomination of another Scheduled Caste camli.datc was also rejected and five others were withdrawn
before
the election, among them was the present
petitioner. That left six candidates of whom three
were eligible for the reserved seat.
The two who were elected were Tularam Sakhare,
for the Scheduled Caste seat, and Chaturbhuj Jasani,
for the general seat. Jasani's election was challenged
-0n the ground that he was subject to the disqualifications set out in section 7(d) of the Representation of
the People Act (Act XLIII of 1951) as he \Yas interested in a contract for the supply of goods to the
Central Government.
The Election Tribunal held that the rejection of
Gangaram Thaware's nomination was improper as he
continued to be a member of the Mahar caste despite
his conversion
to the tenets of the Mahanubhava
Panth. It also held that Chaturbhuj Jasani had a
<:ontract with the Central Government, so he was
disqualified. Accordingly it set aside the whole
election.
We will deal with Chaturbhuj Jasani's election
first. Section 7 ( d) is in these terms:
"A person shall be dissqualified for being chosen
as, and for being, .a member etc.
*
*
*
*
1954
Chatturhhuj
Vithaldas
Jasani
v.
Moreshwar
Parashram
and Others.
Bose].
820
1954
Chattwbhuj
Vithaldas
Jasani
v.
Moreshwar
Parashram
and Ot/urs.
BoseJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954\
( d) if. .. .. . hy himself ...... he has any share or
interest in a contract for the supply of goods to ..... .
the appropriate Government."
Chaturbhuj Jasani was, and still is, a partner in the
firm of Moolji Sicka & Company, and it is said that
at all material times the firm had a contract for the
supply of bidis to the Government for the troops.
Moolji Sicka & Company is a firm of bidi manufacturers.
The Central
Government was interested
in stocking and purchasing bidis for sale to its troops
throngh its canteens. Accordingly, it placed two of
the brands of bidis manufactured by this firm on its
approved list and entered into an arrangement with
the firm under which the firm was to sell, and the
Government was to buy from the firm, from time to
time, these two brands of bidis. It was argued that
this amounted to a contract for the supply of goods
within the meaning of the section. It was said that
the contract was embodied in four letters.
We do not intend to analyse the~e letters in detail
here. It is enough to say that in our opinion no
binding engagement can be spelt out of them except
to this extent: Moolji Sicka & Company undertook
to sell to the canteen contractors only through the
Canteen Stores and not direct and undertook to pay
a commission on all sales. This, in our opinion, constituted a continuing arrangement under which the
Canteen Stores, i.e., the Government, would be
entitled to the commission on all orders placed and
accepted in accordance with the arrangement; and in
fact the Canteen Stores did obtain a sum of Rs. 7,500
in satisfaction of a claim of this kind. This money
was paid long before the dates which are crucial here
but the settlcmcnr illustrates that there was an
arrangement of that nature and that it was a contmumg one. In our opinion, it continued in being
even after that and the mere fact that there was no
occasion for any claim subsequent to the settlement
does not indicate that it was no longer alive. But
except for this, the letters merely set out the terms
on which the parties were ready to do business with
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
821
1954
each other if and when orders were placed and executed. As soon as an order was placed and accepted a
C/iatturbh11i
VithaldaS
contract arose.
It is true this contract would be
Jasani
governed bv the terms set out in the letters but until
v.
Mareshwar
an order ~as placed and accepted there was no conLParashram
tract. Also, each separate order and acceptance
artd Others.
constituted a different and distinct contract: see Rose ~'.-.. :Bose].
and Fran!( Co. v. J. R. Crompton & Bros. Ltd.( 1 ).
The crucial dates with which we are concerned are
15th November, 1951, the last date for putting in the
nominations, and 14th February, 1952, the date on
which the results were declared. The section runs"A person shall be disqualified for being chosen
as ...... n
The words which follow, "and for being'', need not
he considered as it is enough for our purposes to use
only the former.
Now the words of the section are "shall be disqualified for being chosen." The choice is made by a
series of steps starting with the nomination and
ending with the announcement of the election. lt
follows that if a disqualification attaches to a candidate at any one of these stages he cannot be chosen.
· The disqmlificatwn alleged in this case is that
Chaturbhuj Jasani had an interest in a contract, ur a
series 0£ contracts, for the supply of goods to the
Central Government. He hail this interest because
the contracts were made with Moolji Sicka & Company, a firm of which Jasani is one of the partners.
The fact of partnership is admitted but the other
facts are denied. \Ve have therefore to see whether
any contract for the supply of goods to Government
by Moolji Sicka & Company existed at any time on
or between the relevant dates.
Exhibit C is a tabular statement which sets out the
dealings between the parties during certain months.
It is accepted as correct by both sides. The following extracts from this statement show that Moolji
Sicka & Company had an interest in a series of
contracts for the sale of bidis to the Canteen Stores
at and between the relevant dates .
. (1) [1925] A.C. 445.
822
1954
Chatturbhuj
Vilhaldas
Jasani
v.
Moreshwar
Parashram
and Others.
Bose].
Date of ord<:>r
by
Canteen Stores
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Date of invoice
and
Despatch
Price of
goods
supplied
[1954]
Date of
payme-nt
- - -..
8-10-1951
8-10-1951
17-8-1951
12-9-1951
I 1-10-1951
21-10-1951
9-8-1951
8-10-1951
14-n-1951
17-10-1951
12-11-1951
13-12-1951
14-1-1952
21-12-1951
12-II-1951
9-1-1952
23-1-1952
18-10-1951
19-10-1951
26-10-1951
26-10-1951
26-10-1951
30-11-1951
29-8-1951
18-10-195 I
22-11-1951
8-J I-I 95 l
20-l 1-1951
l0-1-1952
22-1-1952
l0-1-1952
22-n-1951
16-1-1952
28-1-1952
Rs. 1,684-13-9 19-12-1951
d.:;
3,373-9-3
I 2,662- 8-0
do
I l,426-14-6
do
do
8,411-14-0
do
IO, 125-2-9
25,812-12-0 24-12-1951
do
4,793-4-9
l ,887-9-9
5-1-1952
16,554-2-0 22-1-1952
do
4,205-15-0
13,97,079-7-9 12-2-1952
do
1,691-11-9
16,983-8-0 18-2-1952
8,411-14-0 13-3-1952
do
5,888-4-9
8,411-14-0 20-3-1 <)52
This statew.ent reveals that various contracts aggregating Rs. 15,39,345-6-0 less some small sums for
railway freight, were
outstanding
at one time or
another between the two crucial dates and that payments in discharge of these liabilities were made at
various dates between 15th November, 1951, and 20th
March, 1952.
It also shows that orders were placed and accepted
for goods priced at Rs. 84,659-14-3 before 15th
November, 1951, and that payment was not made till
after that date. Therefore, on 15th November, 1951,
goods worth Rs. 84,659-14-3 had still to be paid for.
Then between 15th November, 1951, and 14th
February,
1952, further orders for goods v:ilued at
Rs. 39,695-8-9 were placed and accepted and they
were not paid for till after 14th February, 1952.
It was argued that there is nothing to show that the
goods were not supplied before 15th November, 1951,
and before 14th February, 1952. It was said on behalf
of the appellant that these are the only dates which
are crucial, so if Moolji Sicka & Company had fully
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
823
executed their part of the contracts before the two
crucial dates the disqualification would not apply.
That raises these questions: (1) Does a person who
has fully executed his part of a contract continue to
have an interest in it till the goods are paid for?; and
(2) were these contracts fully executed so far as Moolji
Sicka & Company's part was concerned?
The parties
are not agreed about this, so it will now be necessary
to examine their letters in detail to determine the
terms of the various contracts.
The correspondence discloses that the Canteen
Stores and Moolij Sicka & Company dealt with each
.,. -Other from time to time under various arrangements
which ,!hey called "systems".
The earliest letter we have about the transactions
between these parties is one dated 30th March, 1951.
It shows that the "system" which they called the
"Direct Supply System" was in use at that time The
.details of the "system" are set out in an order dated
17th April, 1951. Under it Moolji Sicka & Company
had to send supplies of bidis direct to the Canteen
Stores contractors as and when ordered. The value of
the goods so supplied was to be recovered from the
.contractors direct and the Canteen ·Stores were to he
informed of the sales and were to be paid a certain
.comm1ss1on.
This led to some friction and in their letter of 30th
March. 1951,. the
Canteen Stores complain that
information about some of the sales to the contractors
had been suppressed with the result that the Canteen
Stores lost their c.ommission. Moolji Sicka & Company replied to this on 24th April, 1951, and suggested
a slight change in the system, namely that all orders
for the goods should in future be placed through the
Canteen Stores and that there should be no dealings
with the contractors direct except to supply them
with the goods ordered by the Canteen stores; then,
they said, there would be no complaint about their
having been kept in the dark. This appears to have
been agreed to because such of the subsequent orders
as arc on record were placed by the Canteen Stores.
1954
Chatturhhuj
Vithaldas
Jasani.
v.
Moreshwar
Parashram
and Others.
Bose J.
824
1954
Chatturhhuj
Vithaldas
:Ja.1an1
v.
More.Jltwcu
Parashram
and Other.J".
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
The or<ler date<l 17th April, 1951, to which we have
referred above is a sample.
This was considered unsatisfactory and it was felt
that a change was called for. Moolji Sicka & Company's letter of 24th Ap1il, 1951, shows that their
complaint was that the Canteen Stores did not keep a
sufficient stock of bidis on hand. They said"W e feel that
you can stock more of our bidis.
And that will mean an added profit to you; since the
rebate you get on supplies made under the Direct
Supply System 1s Rs. 4 only, whereas on supplies
made to you we have now offered a much higher
rebate .............. We have therefore to request you to
kindly stock more of our bidis."
In view of this, two representatives of Moolji Sicka
& Company, met the
Chairman of the Board of
Administration, who was in charge of the Canteen
Stores Department, on 10th July, 1951. They reached
certain tentative conclusions which were reduced to
writing by the Canteen Stores on 11th July, 1951.
Their letter of that date shows that the Canteen Stores
proposed to abolish the Direct Supply System in the
near future but so far as Moolji Sicka & Company
were concerned they said that the system could be
abolished at once ("forthwith" is the word used)
provided Moolji Sicka & Company would agree to
supply bidis for the Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi
Depots of the Canteen Stores under a new system
which they called the "Consignment System''. Under
this the Canteen Stores were to pay as they sold. But
the new system was intended only for the Bombay
Calcutta and Delhi Depots of the Canteen Stores. The
letter goes on to say that for the Pathankot and Srinagar Depots the supplies would have to be made on
the
"Outright Purchase Basis". These
proposals
were embodied under the heading "Future Business
Relations". Then there was a provision for what was
called the "Transition Period". That said that
"Until stoch could be placed in our depots, it
was agreed that you would supply your bidis direct
against. our orders and on such supplies you would
allow us rebate as at present."
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
825
These proposals were sent to Moolji Sicka & Compau y for confirmation.
It will be seen that the letter makes four
proposals :
(1) That so far as Moolji Sicka & Company were
concerned, "the Direct Supply System" should be
terminated at once though, so far as other manufacturers were concerned, it should continue in force
for some time longer;
(2) That in its place the Calcutta, Bombay and
Delhi Depots were to be supplied under a new system
called the "Consignment System";
(3) That the Pathankot and Srinagar Depots were
to be supplied under another new system called the
"Outright Purchase System";
( 4) That during the "transition period" the "Direct
Supply System" was to continue in operation "as at
present" even with Moolji Sicka and Company.
Moolji Sicka & Company replied on 16th July,
1951, saying that they were prepared to accept these
terms prqvided the Canteen Stores confirmed certain
modifications which Moolji Sicka & Company proposed. They were as follows:
(1) Regarding the "Transition Period" they said"We arc pleased to note that vou will soon be
abolishing the Direct Supply System. But it should be
applied to all suppliers at the same time. Till then we
should b('. allowed to supply any orders received from
the Canteen Contractors. You should inform us of the
date on which Direct Supply System will be discontinued."
(2) Regarding the new proposals under the heading
"Future
Business Relations"
Moolji Sicka
&
Company said"Goods sent to your depots on consignment basis
must be either returned to us or paid for fully within
three months of the date of supply. We understand
that the system of supplying goods on consignment basis will be discontint~d in about six months'
time."
1951
Chatturbhuj
Vithaldas
Jasa'!li
v.
Moreshwar
Parashram
and LOtJiers.
Bose J.
826
Chatturblud
Vithaldas
Jasani
v.
Mareshwar
Parashram
and Others.
Bose .7·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
(3) They said" And for this purpose we have agreed to offer you
Rs. 7,500 in full and final settlement of all your claims
to date and upon the understanding of your acceptance
of the terms for future business."
They concluded"Upon rece1vmg your confirmation we shall
instruct our Bombay office to send you the cheque for
the amount stated above."
The Rs. 7,500 was what the Canteen Stores claimed
from Moolji Sicka & Company as compensation for
breach of the agreement under which Moolji Sicka &
Company had agreed not to sell to the Canteen
Contractors without paying the Canteen Stores a
comm1ss10n. Neither side was able to produce exact
figures but this was the estimate made by the Canteen
Stores of the loss suffered by them by reason of that
breach.
It will be seen that the proposal about the "Consignment Svstem" which the Canteen Stores made was
that they would pay Moolji Sicka & Company only
when they sold the stocks with which Moolji Sicka &
Company were to supply them for stocking their depots
at Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi. Moo! ji Sicka & Company were not satisfied with this and said that the
Canteen Stores must either return or pay for all
stocks supplied, within three months from the date of
supply.
The Canteen Stores replied on 19th July, 1951, as
follows:
( l) They accepted Moolji Sicka & Company's
suggestion that when the Direct Supply System was
abolished the abolition would apply to all suppliers
of bidis.
(2) As regards the "Consignment Account System"
they did not turn down the proposals but observed
that they were thinking of doing away witl1 that too in
favour
of the "Outright Purchase System" and
warned Moolji Sicka & Company that in view of that
it might not be necessary to place any of Moolji Sicka
& Company's stocks in their depots.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
(3) They wanted a six months' guarantee period in
place of three months.
The letter concludes"Although under the system of provisioning
adopted by us, and as explained to you during our
discussions, it may not be that we shall at any time
have any stocks surplus to our requirements or stocks
which have not been disposed of within the guarantee
period, but should there be any solitary occasions will
you please confirm that you will replace such stock with
fresh stock without any cost to us? We await yoar
agreement by return."
They also said, "We now await your cheque for
Rs. 7,500."
Moolji Sicka & Company replied on 26th July, 1951,
and commenced by saying"W e agree to all you have said in page one of
your letter under reply."
Regarding. the guarantee they said they could not
agree to six months but would agree to three provided
the guarantee was limited to goods found to be
defective because of faults in manufacture. They
concluded"We have also to pay you Rs. 7,500 as per our
letter, dated 16th July, 1951," and asked how the
like the payment to be
Canteen Stores would
made.
The Canteen Stores replied on 31st July, 1951, and
explained what they meant by the "guarantee period".
Bidis deteriorate by keeping, so the · idea was to have
a system under which they could be returned within
six months to prevent their deterioration. They
explain that this is in the interests of the manufacturer
because ( 1) it will not bring their brands into disrepute,
for that would be the inevitable result if stale bidis
which had deteriorated were sold in the canteens and
(2) if the period is made too short, then
"the goods will not stay in our depots and in the
stalls of our canteens and contractors long enough to
sell and hence our depots will always be anxious to
•
1954
C!iatturbhuj
Vithaldas
Jasani
v.
Moreshwa"
Parashram
ond Others.
Bose].
828
i95+
Chatturbhuj
Vithaldas
JrLfani
v.
Moteshwar
Parashram
and Others.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
return these stocks. The result will be obvious. Your
sales will be lower."
They continue"We therefore consider that the period of six
months should be the least before the expiry of which
goods may be taken back by you and replaced . ........ .
The period of three months within which you expect
us to return your stocks, should we find them not moving.
will be too short."
Tky conclude by saying that they hope Moolji
Sicka & Company will agree to the six months.
Now it will be seen that all this correspondence
related to the proposals about the
"Consignment
System" which were first mooted on 11th July, 1951.
Moolji Sicka & Company complained on 24th April
1951, that the Canteen Stores were not keeping large
enough stocks of their bidis and they asked the Canteen
Stores to stop the Direct Supply System and purchase
stocks direct. The Canteen Stores were naturally
reluctant to keep large stocks on hand because bidis
deteriorate and become unsaleable in course of time.
Therefore they proposed the "pay as we sell" system,
that is, they would keep stocks of bidis and pay for
whatever they sold. But the problem of unsold stocks
deteriorating still remained. \Vho was to be responsible? The obvious answer was that the manufacturers should take back the unsold stocks before
they were too far gone and in their place send fresh
consignments for sale on the "pay as we sell" basis.
We say "obvious" because the manufacturers could
use the stale tobacco by re-curing and blending it, or
could use it for other purposes provided it was not toQ ·
far gone. The proposal therefore was that the Canteen
Stores were to keep stocks of Moolji Sicka & Company's bidis in their depots and canteens, pay for what
they sold and return all unsold stocks within six
months. Moolji Sicka & Company were then to replace
them with fresh stocks which would he paid for when
sold. This was agree< I to in the· main but the point at
which they were at issue was the six months. Moolji
Sicka & Company proposed three months w hilc the
•
"
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
829
Canteen Stores wanted six months. We think the
argument used in the letter of 31st July, 1951, that
"the result will be obvious. Your sales will be lower'"
.can only have reference to an arrangement of this
kind, otherwise no question of the sales being lower
could arise. In the case of an outright sale, the sale
would be complete when the order was executed, and
·except for bidis found to be defective due to manufacture.
Moolji Sicka & Company would have no further con<:ern with them. The sentences "the goods may be
taken back by you and replaced" and "should w~
find them not moving" can only refer to these p: uposals about the "Consignment System". In any
<ease, it certainly includes this system.
Moolji Sicka & Company's reply is dated 9th August,
1951. They say"We are in receipt of your letter No. 7B/29/-17/
1299, dated 31st July, 1951, and are pleased to extend
the guarantee period from three. to six months. \Ve
are sure this will now enable you to keep adequate
·stocks of our bidis. Awaiting your esteemed orders."
This is an acceptance of the interpretation of the
"guarantee period" as given by the Canteen Stores in
their letter of 31st July, 1951. The words "now"
and "adequate" relate to the dispme which started
on 24th April, 1951, when Moolji Sicka & Company
<:mnplained that the Canteen Stores were not keeping
adequate stocks of their bidis in their depots. The
subsequent correspondence was aimed at finding out
ways and means to meet this objection and at the
same time satisfy both sides. It all ended by Moolii
Sicka & Company accepting the terms set out in the
ktter of 31st July,
1951. We are accordingly of
opinion that Moolji Sicka & Company accepted the
"Consigmnent System" on 9th August, 1951. That
imported a "pay as we sell" arrangement with an
obligation to take back stocks unsold within six
months and replace them with fresh stock which
would he paid for when sold. In the "transition
period" the Direct Supply System was also to continue.
That meant that there would be two systems in force
for a time in certain depots: the "Consignment
1954
Chatturbhuj
Vithaldas
Jamni
v.
Moreshwar
Parashram
and Others.
Bose].
830
1954
Chatturbhuj
Vithaldas
Jasani
v.
Moreshwar
Parashram
and Others.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
System" regarding stocks ordered for the stocking upof the Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi depots of the
Canteen Stores and the "Direct Supply System" till
such time as the depots were stocked. The third
system of "Outright Purchase" was limited for the
time being to the Pathankot and Srinagar depots.
Both the "Direct Supply" and the "Consignment"
systems were abolished together on 1st November,
1951 (see
the Canteen Stores' letter dated 24th
November, 1951). But the obligation to take back
unsold stocks within the six months' period continued
to attach to all contracts for consignment to the Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi depots made between 9th
August, 1951, and 31st October, 1951. The tabular
statement shows that the following contracts for consignment to one or other of these three depots were
made during that period. The date of the invoice is
the date of the execution of the order and thus of the
acceptance of the proposal contained in the order.
Date of Invoice
& DLspatch.
Depot.
1- l 0-195 l
13-10-1951
18-10-1951
19-10-1951
18-10-1951
Bombay.
do
Delhi
Calcutta
Bombay
Price of goods
supplid.
Date of
payment
Rs. 5,056-2-0
13,536-4-6
I ,684-13-9
3,373-9-3
4,793-4-9
15-11-1951
do
19-12-1951
do
24-12-1951
The value of these orders comes to Rs. 28,444-2-3.
The obligations under these sc veral contracts continl!ed from !st April, 1952 to 18th April, 1952.
It was argued that assuming that to be the case,
then there were no longer any contracts for the
"supply of goods" in existence but only an obligation arising
under the guarantee clause. We are unable to accept such a narrow construction. This term
of the contract, whatever the parties may have
chosen to call it, was a term in a contract for the supply
of goods. When a contract consists of a number of
terms and conditions, each condition does not form
a separate contract but is an item in the one ·c"P.tract
of which it is a part. The consideration for ~~ch
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
condition in a case like this is the consideration for
the contract taken as a whole. It is not split up into
several consider:,tions apportioned between each term
separately. But quite apart from that, the obligation, even under this term, was to supply fresh stocks
for these three depots in exchange for the stocks
which were returned and so even when regarded
from that narrow angle it would be a contract for
the supply of goods. It is true they are replacements
but a contract to replace goods is still one for the
supply of the goods which are sent as replacements.
But even if all that be disregarded and it be assumed that Moolii Sicka & Company had fully performed
their part of the contract by placing the goods on
rails before 15th November, 1951, we are of opinion
that the contracts were not at an end until the
vendors were paid and the contracts were fully discharged. The words of the sections are "if .... he has
any share or int.-rest in a contract for the supply of
goods to ...... the appropriate Government." There
can be no doubt that these various transactions were
contracts and there can equally be no doubt that
they were contracts for the supply of the goods.
Whether they were contracts for the supply of
goods to the Government is a matter which we shall
deal with presently. But we have no doubt that they
were contracts for the supply of goods. The question
then is, does a contract for the supply of goods
terminate when the goods are supplied or does it continue in being till p~yment is made and the ~ontract
is fully discharged by performance on both sides? We
are of opinion that it continues in being till it is fully
discharged by performance on both sides.
It was contended, on the strength of certain observations
in
some English cases, that the moment a
contract is fully executed on one side and all that
remains is to receive payment from the other, then
the contract terminates and a new relationship of
debtor and creditor takes its place. With the utmost respect . we are unable to agree. There is
always a possibility of the liability being disputed
before actual payment is made and the vendor may
2-96 S. C. India/59
19M
C!.allurb'iuj
Vlt a/dos
J..sani
,..
Mf)rtS'.1.Q(ll
Paras!JfanJ
ind' Ot.i.trS·
Bo" J'
'
832
1954
Chatturb '1lfi
Vit .aldas
Jw.ani
v.
Mares'.war
Ptiias ,ram
and Ot,,ns.
f!ose J~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 195~ J
have to bring an action to establish his claim to payment. The existence of the debt depends on the contract and cannot be established without showing that
payment was a term of the contract. It is true the
contractor might abandon the contract and sue on
quantum mem1t but if the other side contested and
relied on the terms of the contract, the decision
would have to rest on that basis. In any case, as we
are not bound by the dicta and authority of those cases,
even assuming they go that far, we prefer to hold that
a contract continues in being till it is fully discharged
by both sides: see the observations of Gibson J. in
O'Carroll v. Hastings(').
To use the language of
O'Brien L.C.J. in that case at page 599, these contracts have not been "merged, abandoned, rescinded,
extinguished or satisfied; and if any demur was made
as to payment before payment was actually made, he
could have sued upon the contract specially; or if
he sued for work done at the request of the defendants the contract would have been a part of his
necessary proofs." We agree with the learned Lord
Chief Justice in thinking that "it is far-fetched to
contend that a man is not concerned in the contract or
security by which he can enforce payment." The
same view was taken by Costello J. in an Indian
case in Satyendral(umar Das v. Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners of Dacca(').
Counsel for the appellant relied strongly on certain
English cases. They were all examined and distinguished in the above decisions. They either turned
on special facts or on the words of a statute which
are not the same as ours. The leading case appears to
be Royse v. Birley('). But the decision turned on the
language of the English statute which the learned
Judges construed to mean that the contract must be
executory on the contractor's part before the English
Act can apply. Tranton v. Astor(') follows the earlier
ruling. The statute with which Darling J. was dealing
(t) (1905) 2 I. R. 590 at 608.
(2) I.L.R. 58, Cal. from P· 193 on,\•ar<ls.
(3) L. R. 4 C. P. 296.
(4) 33 T.L.R. 383.
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
833
in Co>.: v. Truscott( 1 ) is nearer the language of our Act.
He hesitatingly proceeded on the debtor and .creditor
basis. We need not
go further than this because, as
we have said, if these decisions cannot be distinguished,
then we must with respect differ. We hold therefore
that these contracts which Moolji Sicka & Company
had entered into with the Government subsisted on
15th November, 1951, and on 14th February, 1952,
and that as Chatturbhuj Jasani, the appellant, was a
partner in the firm he also had both a share and an
interest in them on the crucial dates.
That brings us to article 299(1) of me Constitution. It states:"All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed
to be made by the President. ..... and all such contracts ...
made in the exercise of that power shall be executed
on behalf of the President ... by such persons and in
'uch manner as he may direct or authorise."
The contention was that as these contracts were
not expressed to be made by the President they are
void.
Cases were cited to us under the Government
of India Acts of 1919 and 1935.
Certain sections in
these Acts were said to be similar to article 299. We
do not think that they are, but in any case the rulings
under section 30(2) of the Government of India Act,
1915, as amended bv the Government of India Act of
1919 disclose a diff~rence of opinion. Thus, Krishnaji
Nilkant v. Secretary of State(') ruled that comracrs with
the Secretary of State must be by a deed executed 011
behalf of the Secretary of State for India and in his
name. They cannot be made by correspondence or
orally. Secretary ot State v. Bhagwandas(') and Devi
Prasad Sri Krishna Prasad Ltd. v. Secretary of State(')
held they could be made by correspondence. Secretary
of State v. O.T. Sarin & Company(') took an intermediate view and held that though contracts in the
prescribed form could not be enforced by either side,
(1) 21 T.L.R. 319.
(>) A.LR. 1937 Born. 449, 451.
(3) A.LR. 1938 Born. 168.
I08
(4) A.LR. i941 A\\. 377.
(5) I.L.R. 11Lah. 375.
195+
C/,alturbhtd
Vithaldas
Jasani
.,,
Mores11war
Paras/,ram
and Other:..
Bose].
834
1954
Chatturb,'1uj
Vit'ialdas
]asani
-,,
J.\{oreshwar
Par ashram
nr.d Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954 ~
a claim for compensation under section 70 of the Indian
Contract Act would lie. Province of Bengal v. S. L.
Puri(') took a strict view and held that even letter~
headed "Government of India" did not comply with
the rule in section 175 (3) of the Government of India
Act, 1935.
The Federal Court was called upon to construe section 40 (1) of the Ninth Schedule of the Government
of India Act, 1935. It held that the directions m n
were only directory and not mandatory, and the same
view was taken of article 166 (1) of the
present
Constitution by this court in Dattatreya Moreshtuar
Pangarkar v. State of Bombay(').
None of these provisions is quite the same as article
299. For example, in article 166, as also in section
40(1) of the Government of India Act of 1935, there is
a clause which says that "orders" and "instruments"
and
"other proceedings" "made" and "expressed" in
the
name of the Governor or Governor-General in
Cou'ilcil and "authenticated" in the manner prescribed
shall not be called in question on the ground that it is
not an "order" or "instrument" etc. "made" or
"executed" by the Governor or Governor-General in
Council. It was held that the provisions had to be read
as a whole and when that was done it became evident
that the intention of the legislature and the Constitution was to dispense with proof of the due "making"
and "execution" when the form prescribed was followed
but not to invalidate orders and instruments otherwise
valid. Article 299( 1) does not contain a similar clause,
so we are unable to apply the same reasoning here.
In our opinion, this is a type of contract to which
section 230(3) of the Indian Contract Act would apply.
This view obviates the inconvenience and injustice to
innocent persons which the Federal Court felt in
f. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. The KingEmperor(3) and at the same time protects Government. We feel that some reasonable meaning must
(1) ;;1 C.W.N. 753·
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 612 at 63,, 633.
(3) [1947] F.C.R. 141 at 156, 157
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
835
be attached to article 299 ( 1). We do not think the
provisions were inserted for the sake of mere form.
We feel they are there to safeguard Government
against unauthorised contracts. If in fact a contract
is unauthorised or in excess of authority it is right that
Government should be safeguarded. On the other
hand, an officer entering into a contract on behalf of
Government can always safeguard himself by having
recourse to the proper form. In between is a large
class of contracts, probably by far the greatest in
numbers, which, though authorised, are for one reason
or other not in proper form. It is only right that an
innocent contracting party should not suffer because
of this and if there is no other defect or objection we
have no doubt Government will always accept the responsibility.
If not, its interests are safeguarded
as we think the Constitution intended that they should
be.
In the present case, there can be no doubt that the
Chairman of the Board of Administration acted on behalf of the Union Government and his authority to
contract in that capacity was not questioned. There
can equally be no doubt that both sides acted in the
belief and on the assumption, which was also the fact,
that the goods were intended for Government purposes,
namely, amenities for the troops. The only flaw is
that the contracts were not in proper form and so,
because of this purely technical defect, the principal
could not have been sued. But that is just the kind
of case that section 230(3) of the Indian Contract Act
is designed to meet. It would, in our opinion, be
disastrous to hold that the hundreds of Government
officers who have daily to enter into a variety of contracts, often of a petty nature, and sometimes in an
emerg~ncy, cannot contract orally or through correspondence and that every petty contract must be effected by a ponderous legal document couched in a parti<:ular form. It may be that Government will not be
bound by the contract in that case, but that is a very
different thing from saying that the contracts as such
are void and of no effect. It only means that the
principal cannot be sued; hut we take it there would
1954
Chat.urb.izy'
Vi.haldas
Jasani
v.
A1ores/,wa1
Parashram
and Ot.'iers.
Bou J.
836
195·t
C ,atturhhu}
Vitlial;fas
Jasani
v.
J foreshwar
Para1-hram
and Ot '1ers,
Bose]
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1954]
be nothing to prevent ratification, especially if that
was for the benefit of Government. There is authority for the view that when a Government officer acts
in excess of au,hority Government is bound if it ratifies the excess: see The Collector of Masulipatam v.
Cavaly
Venkata Narrainapah(' ). We accordingly
hold that the contracts in question here are not voici
simply because the Union Government could not have
been sued on them by reason of article 299 ( 1).
Now section 7 ( d) of the Representation of the
People Act does not require that the contracts at
which
it strikes should be enforceable against the
Government; all it requires is that the contracts should
be foe the supply of goods to the Government. The
contracts in question are just that and so are hit by
the section.
The purpose of the Act is to maintain the purity of
the legislatures and to avoid a conflict between duty
and interest. It is obvious that the temptation to
place interect before duty is just as great when there
is likely to be some difficulty in recovering the money
from Government (for example, if Government were to
choose not to ratify the contracts) as when there is
none.
In our opinion, the Election Tribunal was right in
disqualifying Cbatturbhuj Jasani.
We now turn to Gangaram Thaware. He stood as
a Scheduled Caste candidate and his nomination was
rejected on the ground that he did not belong to the
Scheduled Caste in question, namely the Mahars.
The only question here is whether he ceased to be a
Mahar when he joined the Mahanubhava Panth. This
gave rise to much controversy and we have been presented with many conflicting opinions. Thus, the
Imperial Gazetteer of India, Volume XXI, page 301,
states that the founder of the sect repudiated the
caste system as also a multiplicity of Gods and insisted
on the monotheistic principle. At the same time it
says that he taught his disciples to eat with none but
(1) 8 M.I.A. 529 at 554·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
837
the initiated and to break off all former ties of caste
and religion. Russell in Volume IV of his Tribes and
Castes of the Central Provinces says that the Manbhaos
(Mahanubhau) is a religious sect or order which has
"now" (1911) become a caste. The Central Provinces
Ethnographic Survey, Volume IX, says the same thing
at page 107 and at page 110 and adds that members of
the sect often act as priests or gurus to the Mahars.
As against this, the Election Tribunal has quoted a
number of opinions which tend the other way. Thus,
V. B. Kolte says at page 247 of his Shri Chandradhar
Charitra that no serious attempt has been made by
them to abolish caste, and Ketkar says at page 76,
Volume XVIII of the 1926 edition of his Maha.
rashtriya Dhnyankosh that there are two divisions
among the Mahanubhavas, one of Sanyasis who
renounce the world and the other a secular one. The
latter observe the caste system and follow the ritmls
of their own caste and cirry on social contacts with
their caste people and marry among them. Similar
views are expressed by Bal Krishna Mahanubhav
Shastri. But we are not really concerned with their
theology. What we have to determine are the social
and political consequences of such conversions and that,
we feel, must be decided in a common
sense
practical way rather than on theoretical and theocratic
grounds.
Conversion brings many · complexities in its train,
for it imports a complex composite composed of many
ingredients.
Religious beliefs, spiritual experience
and emotion and intellectual conviction mingle with
more material considerations such as severance of
family and social ties and the casting off or retention
of old customs and observances. The exact proportions of the mixture vary from person to person. At
one extreme there is bigoted fanaticism bitterly hostile
towards the old order and at the other an easy going
laxness and
tolerance which makes the convenion
only nominal. There is no clear cut dividing line
and it is not a matter which can be viewed from only
one angle.
1954
Cf.attUrb'iu)
Vitkaldas
Jaasni
v~
.
MOreshwa'r
Pafashrr.im
and Otaers.
Bose J.
838
1954
Chauurb ;.j
Vit aldas
]1JJani
v
Moru1War
Paras .ram
and Ot.'ps.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
Looked at from tbe secular point of view, there are
three factors which have to be considered: (1) the
reactions of the old body, (2) the intentions of the
individual himself and (3) the rules of the new order.
If the old order is tolerant of the new faith and sees
no reason to outcaste or ex-communicate the convert
and the individual himself desires and intends to
retain his old social and political ties, the conversion
is only nominal for all practical purposes and when we
have to consider the legal and political rights of the
old bodv the views of the new faith hardlv matter.
The new body is free to ostracise and outcaste the
convert from its fold if he does not adhere to its tenets,
but it can hardly claim tbe right to interfere in matters
which concern the political rights of the old body when
neither the old body nor the convert is seeking either
legal or political favours from the new as opposed to
purely spiritual advantage. On the otber hand, if the
convert has shown by his conduct and dealings that
his break from the old order is so complete and final
that he no longer regards himself as " member of the
old body and there is no reconversion and readmittance to the old fold, it would be wrong to hold
that he can nevertheless claim temporal privileges
and political advantages which are special to the old
order.
In our opinion, broadly speaking, the principles laid
down by the privv Council in the case of a Hindu
convert to Christianity apply here: not, of course, the
details of the decision but the broad underlying
principle. In Abraham v. Abraham (1 ), their Lordships
say:"He" (the convert) "may renounce the old law
by which he was bound, as he has renounced his old
religion, or, if he thinks fit, he may abide by the old
law, notwithstanding he
has renounced the old
religion."
The only modification here is that it is not only his
choice which must be taken into account but also the
views of the body whose religious tenets he has
(1) g M.I.A. 199 at 242, 243 and 214
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
839
renounced because here the right we are considering
is the right of the old body, the right conferred on it
as a special privilege to send a member of its own
fold
to Parliament. But with that modification
the observations which follow apply in their broad
·outline·
"The profession of Christianity releases the con. vert from the trammels of the Hindu law, but it <loes
not of necessity involve any change of the rights or
relations of the convert in matters with which
Christianity has no concern, such as his rights and
interests in, and his powers over, property. The
convert, though not bound as to such matters, either
by the Hindu hiw or hy any other positive law, may
bv his course of conduct after his conversion have
shown by what law he intended to be governed as to
these matters.
He may have done so either by attaching himself to a class which as to these matters has
an<l acted upon some particular law, or by
adopted
having himself observed some family usage or custom;
and nothing can surely be more just than that the
rights and interests in his property, and his powers
·over it, should be governed by the law which he has
·adopted, or the rules which he has observed."
Now what are the facts here? 'Whatever the views
·of the founder of this sect may have been about caste,
it is evident that there has been no rigid adherence
to them among his followers in later years. They have
·either changed their views or have not been able to
keep a tight enough control over converts who join
them and yet choose to retain their old caste customs
and ties. We need not determine whether the Mahanu-bhava tenets encourage a repudiation of caste only as
a desirable ideal or make it a fundamental of the faith
-because it is evident that present-day Mahanubhavas
admit to their fold persons who elect to retain their
·old caste customs. That makes it easy for the old
·caste
to regard
the converts as one of themselves
:despite the conversion which for all practical purposes
is only ideological and involves no change of
o:status.
1954
Chatturhhuj
Vithaldas
Jasani
v.
Moreshwar
Paras/,ram
and Others.
Bose J.
840
1954
c. . atturb!inj
Vithaldas
]asani
'.
.Woreshwar
Parashram
llnd Ot.'1ers.
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
Now no witness has spoken of any outcasting, neither
outcasting in general nor in this special case. No single
instance has been produced in which any person who
has joined this sect from the Mahar community has
ever been outcasted from the Mahars for that reason;
and as the sect is said to be over 1000 years old, there
has been time enough for such instances to accumulate.
Further. no instance has been produced of a Mahanubhava marrying outside his or her old caste whereas
there are instances of Mahanubhavas who
have
married non-Mahanubhavas belonging to their own
caste. Nene (P. W. 1), Sadasheo (P. W. 3), Sitaram
(P. W. ·t) and Haridas (P. W. 5) say that a Mahar
convert does not lose his caste on conversion. He is
admitted to all caste functions and can marry in the
community. Of these, Sadasheo (P. W. 3) and Haridas
(P. W. 5) are Mahars.
There is no evidence to rebut this. The witnesses
on the· other side take refuge in theory and, when
confronted with actual facts, evade the issue by saying
that Mahanubhavas who do these things are not real
Mahanubhavas. Harendra (R. W. 1) is a Mahanubhava
Guru and so ought to know, but he affects an otherworldly indifference to mundane affairs and says that
as he does not lead a worldly life he does not know
whether converts retain their caste distinctions and
whether there are inter-dinings and inter-marriages in
.the Mahanubhava fold itself among those who belonged to different castes before conversion.
Shankar (R. W. 2) says that a convert loses his
caste on conversion but gives no instance of ostracism
from the old fold. In any case, his evidence is
confined to the sanyasi order among the Mahanubhavas because he says that every person who becomes a convert to this sect must renounce the world
and cannot marry. W'hen pinned down in cross-examination he had to admit that he did know two or three
Mahanubhavas who were leading a worldly life but he
meets that by saying that they are not real Mahanubhavas. Chudaman (R. W. 3) evades the issue in the
same way. He is a Mahanubhava Pujari and so isc
S·C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
841
another person who ought to have special knowledge.
Despite that he says he cannot give a single instance
of a person belonging to one caste, initiated into the
Mahanubluva sect, marrying a person of another caste
initiated into the same Panth. When further pressed
he said the question <lid not arise as a man lost his
caste 011 con version.
On this evidence, and after considering the historical
material placed before us, we conclude that conversion to this sect imports little beyond an intellectual
acceptance of certain ideological tenets and does not
alter the convert's caste status, at any rate, so far as
the householder section of the Panth is concerned.
So much for the caste consciousness on both sides.
Now considering Gangaram Thaware the individml
we find that he was twice married and on both occasions to Mahar girls who were not Mahanubhavas at
the time of their respective marriages. His first wife
was never converted. His second wife was converted
after her marriage. The witnesses say he was still
regarded as a Mahar after his conversion and aiways
looked upon himself as a Mahar and identified himself
with the caste. No one on the other side denies this.
As we have shown, they took shelter behind generalities and evaded the issue by saying that in that case
he cannot be a real Mahanubhava. If he was not, then
he must have continued a Mahar even on their view
The evidence also discloses. that Gangaram Thaware
led Mahar agitations and processions as a member and
leader of the Mahar caste.
In 1936 he contested the
election for the Provincial Assembly as a Mahar ondidate. No one appears to have questioned his competency. And lastly, he declared himself to he a Mahar
in the verifica.tion to his nomination form in the
present election as also in an affidavit filed before the
Returning Officer who rejected his nomination. The
Returning Officer described that as a "cleverly worded
document." We have read it and find nothing tricky
or crooked in it. Therefore, applying the test in
Abraham v. Abraham ( 1 ), we hold that despite his
(1) 9 M.I.A. 199.
1954
Chatturhiwj
Vithulda1
Jasa'li
v.
Mcreshwar
Paras 1,ram
and Others ..
Bost].
842
1954
Chatturb·',uj
Vithaldat
,7asani
v.
.i\toreshwar
Paras 11ram
and Others.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1954J
conversion he continued to be a Mahar and so his
nomination form was wrongly rejected. That affects
the whole election.
The other points argued before the Election Tribunal
were not pressed before us. We therefore uphold the
decision of the Tribunal and dismiss the appeal with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: I. N. Shroff.
Agent for the respondent: Gan pat Rai.
1953
BISWAMBHAR SINGH
Det:emhcr 18.
ti.
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER
JANARDHAN SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER
SIBANARA YAN SINGH MAHAPATRA
ti.
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER.
rPATANJALI sAsTRI
MAHAJAN,
c.J., MEHR CHAND
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE
and GHuLAM HASAN. JJ.J
Orissa Estates Abolition Act, (Orissa Act I of ]952), ss. 2(g)
2(h) and 3-0tuners of certain zamindaries-Whether intern1ediaries holding an estate iuithin the nieaning of ss. 2(g';
and 2(/i ).
The State Government is en1po\vered under s. 3( 1) to issue a
notification declaring that
the estate specified
therein has
passed to the State, but the notification must be in respect of the
property which is defined as an estate in s. 2(g) and that estate
must be held by an intermediary as defined in s. 2(h).
In order to be an intennediary accordirig to the definition in
s. 2(h) the person n1us.t be, among other things, "a
Zamindar,
Jlaquedar, Kherposhdar or Jagirdar within the nieaning of Wajibul-arz or any Sanad, deed or other instrument."
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