KARNAL SINGH AND ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 January 1954 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 904 | 1954 INSC 7
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 January 1954
- Bench
- NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 64/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 904
- Neutral citation
- 1954 INSC 7
Text of the judgment
904
1954
Ja11uary 29.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954J
KARNAL SINGH AND ANOTHER
f),
THE STATE OF PUNJAB.
[BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS and
VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J
Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 34 and 149-Scop<"
of-Charge under s. 302 read with s. 149-Conviction under s. 302'
1·ead tvith s. 34-Whether valid.
It was contended that the conviction of the appellants under
s. 302, Indian Penal Code, read with s. 34 was illegal when they
had been charged only under s. 302 read with s. 149 because the
scope of s. 149 was different from that of s. 34, that while what
s. 149 required was proof of a common object, it would be necessary under s. 34 to establish a common intention and that there. fore when the charge against the accused was under s. 149, it could'
not be conv~rted in appeal into one under s. 34.
Held, that it is true that there is substantial
difference
between the two sections but they also to some extent overlap
an<l it is a question to be determined on the facts of each case
\vhether the charge under s. 149 overlaps the ground covered by
s. 34.
If the common object which is the subject.matter of the
charge under s. 149 docs not necessarily involve a common inten·
tion, then the substitution of s. 34 for s. 149 might result in
prejudice to the accused and ought not therefore to be permitted.
But if the facts to be proved and the evidence to be adduced with:
reference to the charge under s. 149 would be the same if the·
charge were under s. 34, then the failure to charge the accused·
under s. 34 could not result in any prejudice and in such cases the
. substitution of s. 34 for s. 149 must be held to be a formal matter ..
There is no such broad proposition of law that there can be no·
recourse to s. 34 when the charge is only under s. 149.
Whether such recourse can he had or not must depend on thefacts of each case.
The facts of the present case \Varranted such a recourse.
Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab (A.LR. 1953 S.C. 364),.
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. EmPeror (I.LR. 52 Cal. 197 P.C.),.
Lachman Singh v. The State ([1952] S.C.R. 839) referred to.
CruMINAL APPELLATE JuR1so1cr10N :
peal No. 64 of 1953.
Criminal Ap-
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 9th June, 1953, of the High Court of
Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla (Falshaw
and Kapur JJ.) in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1953
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
905
arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 15th
December, 1952, of the Court of the Additional
Sessions Judge, Ferozepore, in Sessions Case No. 50 of
1952 and Trial No. 57 of 1952.
fai Copa! Sethi (R. L. Kohli, with him) for the
appellants.
.Porus A. Mehta for the respondent.
1954. January 29. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This is an appeal by
special lea\·e by Karnaii Singh and Malkiat Singh
against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab
confirming their conviction by the Additional Sessions
Ji!dge of F erozepore under section 302, Indian Penal
Code, and the sentence of death passed on them.
The facts as found by the courts below are as
follows: There had been long standing enmity between
the appellants
and their party on the one hand and
the deceased Gurbaksh Singh and his party on the
other, resulting in a number ot crimes, ~nd proceedings in court. On the 27th January, 1952, at about
sunset time, Gurbaksh Singh was sitting inside his
house on the sabath and his sister Mst. Bholan
was .in the kitchen. Then the a]cpellants and .their
men came to the place armed with rin~s, got on the
roof of the house of Gurbaksh Singh and challenged
him to come out. Gurbaksh Singh and Mst.
Bholan went to the kotha and bolted the door from inside. Then the appellants and their men made holes in
the roof with spades, ignited inflammable materials,
such as dry twigs, and threw them inside the kotha
through the holes and set fire to the building. Both
Gurbaksh Singh and Mst. Bholan were caught inside
and burnt to death. A brother of Gurbaksh Singh
called Dev, who had been at that time away, was,
according to the prosecution, seized when he subsequently turned up, thrown into the flames and was
also burnt to death. Meantime one Gurnam Singh,
P. W. 13, a cousin of Gurbaksh Singh and his neighbour, managed to slip out of the village and reported
the occurrence at the police station at Nihal Singhwala,
1954
Karnail Singk
a1td Another
v.
The State of
Punjab.
·Vmkatarama
Ayyar ] •
906
1954
,Karnail Singh
and Another
v.
The State of
Punjflb.
iVenkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954J
a place eight miles away (vide Exhibit PQ). It was then
10-30 P.M. On receipt of this information, the police
sub-inspector, P.W. 25, went to the village with a posse
of constables and with Gurnam Singh. He found the
house mostly burnt and recovered therefrom the
charred remains of three dead bodies and they were
identified as those of Gurbaksh, Dev and Mst. Bholan.
The appellant Kamai! Singh was actually seen at that
place and arrested on the spot. Malkiat Singh who
had been mentioned in Exhibit PQ as one of the
pamc1pants was found in his house with gunshot
wounds and was also arrested. Eventually eight
persons, including the appellants, were charged under
section 148, Indian Penal Code, for forming an unlawful assembly with the object of burning the house oi
Gurbaksh Singh and murdering him, Der and Mst.
Bholan, and under section 302 read with section 149
for their murder. The Additional Sessions Judge,
F erozepore, held that the case had not been established beyond doubt as against two of the accused and he
accordingly acquitted them. He convicted the six
others including the appellants under section 148 and
section 302 read with section 149. and sentenced them
to death. On appeal, the learned Judges of the
Punjab High Court held that "although there can be
no doubt whatever that the occurrence took place
more or less on the lines described by the prosecution
witnesses, and the primary object of the culprits must
have been to murde" Gurbaksh Singh, deceased, in
consequence of the bitter enmity. between him and the
main body of the accused" and that "although it may
very well be true that all the six appellants took part
in this occurrence". the evidence against the four
accused other than the appellants was insufficient to
to sustain their conviction, as it consisted of the testimony of persons who were at a distance of 40 to 50
feet from the scene of occurrence and who claimed to
identify the particular
accused
only by their voice.
They were accordingly acquitted. Then dealing with
the case against the two appellants they observed that
as against t]:iem, there was evidence of the two eyewitnesses, Gurnam Singh (P. W. 13) and Maghar Singh
'
S.C.R ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(P. W. 14), that Maghar Singh was not a reliable witness, that ·nothing could be urged against the evidence
of Gurnam Singh, that even so it would be unsafe to
base a conviction on his evidence alone, but that the
presence of Karnail Singh at the spot and the existence of. wounds on the person of Malkiat Singh afforded sufficient corroboration of the evidence of Gurnam
Singh. They accordingly confirmed the conviction
and sentence as against the appellants. As four of the
accused were acquitted in appeal, the learned Judges
set aside the conviction of the appell:mts under section
149 and substituted section 34, Indian Penal Code,
therefor.
Two contentions: have been urged on behalf of the
appellants, that the evidence which had been accepted
by the learned Judges as reliable was insufficient to
establish the guilt of the appellants and that their
conviction under section 34 was bad as no charge had
been framed against them under that _section .. On the
first point, the argument of the learned counsel for the
appellants was that having held that the only eye
witness whose evidence was worthy of credence was
P.W. 13, and that even his evidence could not be acted
upon unless it was corroborated, the learned Judges
were in error in holding that there was. such corroboration
against the appellants. The circumstance
on by the. court below as corroborating the
'relied
evidence of '[' .W. 13 was that the appellants were
proved to have been present at the scene of occurrence.
and there was no satisfactory explanation from .them
therefor. As regards Karnail Singh, the police subinspector, P.W. 25, actually found him emerging out
of the burning house with a spear in his hand. He
had injuries on his person and his pyjama was bloodstained. He was arrested on the spot and the spear
and the pyjama were seized and marked as Exhibits
P-12 and P-20. As for Malkiat Singh, his name was
mentioned in the first information report, Exhibit. PO,
and P.W. 25 went to his house and found him with
gunshot wounds and arrested him. In the statement
given by Karnail Singh under section 342, Criminal
Procedure Code, he stated that when he saw the house
1954
Kamai[ Singh
and Aflf.Jthrr
v.
The Statt _of
Punjab.
Venkatarama
AyyarJ.
908
1954
Jlarnail Singh
and Anothtr
v.
The State of
Punjab.
V rnkatarama
AyyarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
of Gurnam Singh on fire, he went there and was
assaulted by culprits, that Malkiat Singh came there to
help him, that when they were grappling with the
culprits he was attacked and Malkiat Singh received a
gunshot and thereafter they went away to their houses.
The statement of Malkiat Singh also was on. similar
lines. There was no evidence that any other person
or persons were responsible for the acts and the learned
Judges therefore rejected as untrue the explanation of
the appellants that "they received these injuries while
intervening against some unknown assailants on
behalf of their bitterest enemy."
It is contended for the appellants that the mere
. presence of Kamai! Singh at the place of occurrence
would in itself mean nothing and that it would
amount to corroboration only if some further act
incriminatory in character was proved. With reference
to Malkiat Singh, it was argued that the existence of
gunshot wounds would be inconclusive as there was
no evidence as to how· they were caused. It was contended that the theory of the learned Judges that
Gurbaksh Singh might himself have shot at him
through the hole while he was on the roof was wholly
unsupported by evidence and opposed to the medical
evidence in the case as to the nature of the wounds
and to the fact that no gun was recovered from the'
house, and that there was accordingly nothing to
connect Malkiat Singh with the incident at the house
of Gurbaksh Singh. With reference to the statements
of the accused admitting their presence at the place
but explaining that some culprits had set fire to the
house and
that they went there thereafter, it was
argued that if the statements were to be taken into
considr.ration they must be taken as a whole and that
it was not proper to accept the incriminating portion
and reject the exculpatory portion thereof and the
observations of this court in Hanumant v. Stat~ of
Madhya Pradesh('), at page 1111 were relied on in
support
of this position. The result according
to the appellants is that there was not sufficient
(1) [1 95 21s.c.R.1091.
,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
909
corroboration of the evidence of P. W. 13 to support
their conviction.
It is necessary in view of this contention to examine
the evidence in order to see what corroboration there
is against each of the appellants. So far as Kamai!
Singh is concerned, his presence, at the scene of occurrence under the circumstances disclosed in the evidence is sufficient to corroborate the evidence of
P.W. 13. It should be remembered that Gurnam
Singh is not an approver. He is a witness against whom
the learned Judges had nothing to say and if they
required corroboration of his evidence it was because
he was a relation of the deceased and it was considered not safe to base a conviction on his sole testimony.
The corroboration that is required in such cases is not
what would be necessary to support the evidence of
an approver but what would be sufficient to "lend
assurance to the evidence before them, and satisfy
them that the particular persons were really concerned
in the murder of the deceased." (Vide Lachhman Singh
v. State(•)).
Kamai! Singh was arrested on the spot
with a spear and a bloodstained pyjama, and these are
pieces of evidence which would support the inference
that he was concerned in the crime.
The case of Malkiat Singh presents greater difficulty.
He was arrested in his house with gunshot wounds on
~
his person and unless it could be established that they
were received at the scene of occurrence that would
not be sufficient to connect him with the crime. We
agree that the mention of his name in Exhibit PQ
cannot be held to be sufficient corroboration because
that is only the statement of P. W. 13 at an earlier
stage and it is not independent evidence. With
reference to the statement of the accused under
section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, it is true
that if it . is sought to be used as an admission it
must be read as a whole; but where it consists
of distinct and separate matters, there is no reason
why an admission contained in one matter should
not be relied on without reference to the statements relating to other matters. In this case the
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 839 at p. 845.
1954
K arnail Singh
a11d Another
v.
The Stalt of
Pu,Yab.
Venkatarama
AyJ<lr J.
910
1954
K arnail Singh
and :4.nothe.r
v.
Tht State of
Purrjab.
Vtnkatar(lma
A;yar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
admiss.ion of the appellant that he was present at or
near the scene of occurrence is distinct and separate
from his explanation as tc how he received the
1111uries. The learned fodges having disbelieved, in our
opinion rightly, the statement of the appellant that
the house was burnt by sorr.e unknown enemies of
Gurbaksh Singh and that it was they who murdered
him, we do not see any objection to the statement of
the appellant that he was present at the scene of the
occurrence from being used as an admission. Another
piece of corroboration which the learned Judges relied
on was that in their view the gunshot wounds must
have been received .by Malkiat Singh at the house of
Gurbaksh Singh. They gave their finding on this point
in the alternative. They observed that the injuries
might have been caused by Gurbaksh Singh firing from
inside the house. But of this there is no evidence and
the medical evidence is in fact opposed to it and as
already stated, no gun was recovered from the house
of the deceased. In the alternative, they observed that
the injuries might have been caused by a shot from
one ot his own men. This view is supported by the
evidence of P. W. 14 who deposed that while the
incidents were in progress Malkiat Singh stated that
he had been shot by one of his own men and then left
the place. It is argued ·for the appellant that as the
learned Judges had declined to act on the evidence of
P. W. 14, the alternative suggestion must be ruled out
as unsupported by evidence. What all the learned
Judges remarked about P.W. 14 was that it was
"impossible to place any
very great reliance on
Maghar . Singh's evidence". But then they also expressly referred to his evidence on this point (Vide page 61
of the record) and accepted it as one of the possible
alternatives (Vide page 65). And on their finding that
the injuries must have been received at the place of
occurrence and the theory that Gurbaksh Singh fired
the shot being negatived, there is no difficulty in hold~
ing that they were prepared to ac_cept the evidence of
P. W. 14 on this point. Thus there are ample materials
for holding that the gunshot wounds were received
by Malkiat Singh in the house of Gurbaksh Singh and
S.C.R
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
911
that is sufficient corroboration of the evidence of
P. W. 13. In this view we must overrule the first
contention.
Then the next question is w'.:ether the conviction of
the appellant under section 302 read with section 34,
when they had been charged o.Jy under section 302
read with section 149, was illegal. The contention of the
appellants is that the scope of section 149 is differe:it
from that 01 section 34, that while what section 149
requires is proof of a common object, it would be
necessary ilnder section 34 to establish a common
intention and that therefore when the charge against
the accused is under section 149 it cannot be
converted in appeal into one under section 34. The
following observations of this court in Dalip Singh v.
State of Punjab(') were relied on in support of this
position:"Nor is it possible in chi's case to have recourse
to section 34 because the appellants have not been
charged with that even in the alternative and the
common intention required by section 34 and the
common object required by section 149 a1 c far [ram
being the same thing."
It is true that there is substantial difference between
the two sections but as observed by Lord Sumner in
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor('), they also to
some extent overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of each case whether the charge
under section 149 overlaps the ground covered by
section 34. If the common object which is the subjectmatter of the charge under section 149 does not
necessarily involve a common intention, then the substitution of section 34 for section 149 might result in
prejudice to the accused and ought not therefore to be
permitted. But if the facts to be proved and the evidence • to be adduced with reference to the charge
under section 149 would be the same if the charge
were under section 34, then the failure to charge the
accused
under section 34 could not result in any
(x) A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 364 at p. 3f,6.
(•) I.L.R.52 Cal. 197 (P.C.).
7-96 S.C. India/59 .
•
1954
Karnaii 5inlllt
a.a Aul;.lf
••
Till ~t.u (if
P..jo/J.
912
1954
Kamail Sing!i
ona AtuJt:ier
v.
Tht StaU of
Pu.ifab.
V1nkatarama
Ayyar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
prejudice and in such cases the substitution of section
34 for section 149 must be held to be a formal matter.
We do not read the observations in Dalip Singh v.
State of Punjab(') as an authority for the broad propmition that in law there could be no recourse to
section 34 when the charge is only under section 149.
Whether such recourse can be had or not must depend
on the facts of each case. This is in accord with the
view taken by this court in Lachhman Singh v. The
State(') where the substitution of section 34 for section 149 was upheld on the ground that the facts were
have been charged
such "that the accused could
alternatively either under section 302 read with
section 149, or under section 302 read with section 34."
•
Examining the record from this point of view the
findings are that both the appellants who had long
standing enmity with Gurbaksh Singh, got on the roof
of his house and set fire to it, with the deceased and
Mst. Bholan couped up within. If it was their object
under section 149 to burn the house and cause the
death of Gurbaksh Singh, that was also their intention
under section 34. On the facts of this case there can
be no difference between the object and the intentio11
with which the offences were committed. Our attention was also drawn to the wording of the charge
whicl, while mentioning section 149 also sets out that
in prosecution of the common object the accused
intentmnally set fire to the house and murdered
GurbaKsh Singh and Mst.
Bholan. We are satisfied
that the substitution of section 34 in the place of
section 149 in the charge by the court below has
resulted in no prejudice to the appellant and it is there
fore not open to objection.
The appeal fails and is dismissed. ,
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellants: Nau nit Lal.
Agent for the respondent: R. H. Dhebar.
(1) A.J.R. 1953 S.C. 364.
(2) [1952] S.G.R. 839.
•
'
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org