BISWAMBHAR SINGH versus THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 18 December 1953 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 842 | 1953 INSC 93
Key facts
- Decided
- 18 December 1953
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 167/1953
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 842
- Neutral citation
- 1953 INSC 93
Text of the judgment
842
1954
Chatturb·',uj
Vithaldat
,7asani
v.
.i\toreshwar
Paras 11ram
and Others.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1954J
conversion he continued to be a Mahar and so his
nomination form was wrongly rejected. That affects
the whole election.
The other points argued before the Election Tribunal
were not pressed before us. We therefore uphold the
decision of the Tribunal and dismiss the appeal with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: I. N. Shroff.
Agent for the respondent: Gan pat Rai.
1953
BISWAMBHAR SINGH
Det:emhcr 18.
ti.
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER
JANARDHAN SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER
SIBANARA YAN SINGH MAHAPATRA
ti.
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER.
rPATANJALI sAsTRI
MAHAJAN,
c.J., MEHR CHAND
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE
and GHuLAM HASAN. JJ.J
Orissa Estates Abolition Act, (Orissa Act I of ]952), ss. 2(g)
2(h) and 3-0tuners of certain zamindaries-Whether intern1ediaries holding an estate iuithin the nieaning of ss. 2(g';
and 2(/i ).
The State Government is en1po\vered under s. 3( 1) to issue a
notification declaring that
the estate specified
therein has
passed to the State, but the notification must be in respect of the
property which is defined as an estate in s. 2(g) and that estate
must be held by an intermediary as defined in s. 2(h).
In order to be an intennediary accordirig to the definition in
s. 2(h) the person n1us.t be, among other things, "a
Zamindar,
Jlaquedar, Kherposhdar or Jagirdar within the nieaning of Wajibul-arz or any Sanad, deed or other instrument."
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
843
Held, that the proprietors of Hamgir and Serapgarh properties
were not intermediaries as defined in s 2.(h) and their respective
properties were not "estates" within the meaning of s. 2(g) and
therefore Government had no jurisdiction or authority
to issue
any notification under s. 3 with respect to their properties.
Held (Per PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., DAs and GHULAM HAsAo; JI.,
MAHAJAN and BosE JJ., dissenting), as respects the Nagra Zan::indari
that the Zan1indar appellant)- was an intern1ediary as defined in
s. 2(h) of the Act and his estate \Vas an estate \Vithin tbe meaning
of s. 2(g) because the predecessor-in-title of the present Zamindar
had acknowledged the overlordship of Raja of Gangpur and therefore the State Government had jurisdiction to issue a notification
under s. 3 of the Act declaring that the estate had passed to and
become vested in the State.
Per 1'1AHAJAN ar:.d BosE JJ.-'fhe words "deed" and "other
instruments" in s. 2(h) are not to be read ejusdem generis \Vith
"Sanad" and thus are not confined to a docun1ent of title like ~
San.ad in which one party creates or confers a zamindari estate
on another. 1"he words must be read disjunctively and be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning.
With reference to inerged territories an intermediary neither
"includes" a zamin<lar nor "1ncans" a zan1indar, but
means a
zaminJar "within the meaning of" (I) the Wajib-ul-arz (2) any
Sanad (3) any deed or (4) of any others instrument.
The kind of zamindar referred to in s. 2(h) is one who may be
called "a true intern1ediary" within the 1neaning of the four documents set out there, that is to say, persons who hold an interest
in the land between the raiyat and the overlord of the estate.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION :
Civil Appeals
Nos. 167 and 169 of 1953·
Appeals under articles 132(1) and 133(1) (c) of
the Constitutic:o. of India from the Judgment and Order,.
dated the 7th April 1953, of the High Court of
Judicature of Orissa at Cuttack in Original Jurisdiction·
Cases Nos. 65, 67 an<l 68 of 1952.
N. C. Chatteriee (B. Sen K. C. Mukheriea and
H. S. Mohanty, with him) for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India
and Pitambar Misra, Advocate-General of Orissa,
(V. N. Sethi, with them) for the respondents.
1953. December 18. The Judgment of Patanjali
Sastri C. J·, Das and Ghulam Hassan JJ. was delivered
by Das J. The Judgment of Mahajan J. and Bose J.
was delivered by Bose J.
DAs J.-These three appeals which have been heard
together raise the same or similar questions. Appr;:iL
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
TLe State 'of
Orissa
and 0!11.rs.
844
1953
Biswamb:iar
Singh
v.
'T/;e Slate vj·
Orissa
url'f Otherj',
/Jri1 ] .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
No. I67 of 1953, relates to Hemgir of which the
appellant, Shri Biswambhar Singh, is the proprietor. It
comprises an area of about 360 square miles out of
which 145 square miles are covered by forests. Appeal
No. 168 of 1953 is by the appellant, Shri Janardhan
Singh, who is the proprietor qf Sarapgarh comprising
an area of about 45 square miles. Appeal No. 169 of
1953 relates to Nagra the proprietor whereof is the
appellant. Shri Sibanarayan Singh Mahapatra. It comprises an area of 545 square miles including 109 square
miles of forests.
All these proprietors are the descendants of Blmiyan
Chiefs and they claim that their ancestors were
independent ruling chiefs of their respective principalities. There is no dispute that in course of time they
became subordimte vassals of the Raja of Gangpur.
It appears from Connolly's Report, Mukherjee's Report
and Ramdhyani's Report that neither the Raja of
Gangpur nor any of these proprietors was anxious to
have theic respective rights defined specifically and so
the settiement officers made no attempt to do so with
the result that their status vis-a-vis the Raja of
Gangpur remains undertermined. There is no evidence
on record that the ancestors of the proprietors of
Hemgir and Sarapgarah ever received or accepted any
Sanad or grant from the Raja of Gangpur. There is,
however, evidence that the ancestors of the proprietor
of Nagra had executed an Ekrarnama in favour of the
Raja of Gangpur as to which more will be said hereafter. There is no dispute that the ancestors of each
of these proprietors paitl every year to the Raja of
Gangpur what has been called "Takoli" and the
present appellants are continuing this annual paymern.
This payment has sometimes been called a tribute and
sometimes even rent as in the order, dated the 9th
August, 1878, of A. C. Mangles, the Commissioner of
Chota Nagpur. These cmsiderable properties are and
have been heritable and the rule of primogeniture
rrcvails.
By a certain process beginning with Agreement of
Integration made in December, 1947, and ending with
the States' Merger (Governor's Province) Order made
on the 27th July, 1949, by the then Governor-General
.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
845
.of India in exercise of the powers conferred on him by
section 290-A
of
the Government of India Act as
amended by the Indian Independence Act, 1947, all the
feudatory States of Orissa merged into and became
part of the State of Orissa. In consequence of such
merger the area comprised in Hemgir, Sarapgarh and
Nagra as parts of the merged territories became parts
of the State of Orissa.
On the 17th January, 1950, a bill which eventually
became the Orissa Estates Abolition Act was introduced
in the Orissa Legislature. The Constitution of India
came into operation on the 26th January, 1950. The
bill having been passed by the Orissa Legislature on
the 28th September, 1951, the Governor of Orissa
reserved the same for the consideration of the President.
On the 23rd January, 1952, the bill received the assent
-of the President and became law as Orissa Act I of
1952. An Act called the Orissa Estates Abolition
(Amendment) Act 1952, was passed on the 5th July,
1952, and was assented to by the President on the 27th
August, 1952.
The long title of the Act is as follows:
"An Act to provide for the abolition of all the
rights, title and interest in land of intermediaries by
whatever name known, including the mortgagees and
lessees of such interests, between the raiyat and the
State of Orissa, for vesting in the said State of the
said rights, title and interest and to make provision
for other matters connected therewith."
There are two preambles to the Aet which recite:"\Vhereas in pursuance of the Directive Principles
·of State policy laid down by the Constitution of India
it is incumbent on the State to secure economic justice
for all and to that end to secure the ownership and
,control of all material resources of the community so
diat they may best subserve the common good, and to
prevent the concentration of wealth and means of
production to the common detriment;
And whereas in order to enable the State to
<lischarge the above obligation, it is expedient to
provide for the abolition of all the rights, title and
1953
Biswamb:iar
Singh
.
v.
The State of
Orfasa
and Others.
Das].
846
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
.
The State of
Ori.tsa
and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
interest m lan<l of interme<liaries by whatever name
known, including the mortgagees and lessees of such
interest, between the raiyat and the State of Orisrn,
for vesting in the said State of the said rights, title and
interest and to make provision for other matters
connected therewith;"
The material parts of the definitions of "Estate"
and
"Intcrn1cdiarics"
set forth
in
section_ 2
are
as
follows:
( g ) " estate " . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................... .
. . . . . . . . . . in relation to merged territories means any
collection of Mahals or villages held by the same intermediary which has been or is liable to be assessed
as one unit to land revenue whether such land revenue
be payable or has been released or compounded for or
redeemed in whole or in part." .
(h) "Intermediary" .................... with reference to the merged territories means a maufidar
including the ruler of an Indian State mergeu with the
State of Orissa, a Zamindar, Ilaquedar, Khorposhdar
or Jagirdar within the meaning of the Wajib-ul-arz, or
any sana<l, deed or other instrument, and a gaontia or
a thikadar of a village in respect of which by or under
the provisions contained in the Wajib-ul-arz applicable to such village the manufidar, gaontia or the
thikadar, as the case may be, has a hereditary right to·
recover rent or revenue from persons holding land in
such village."
Section 3 (1) runs thus:
"3- (1) The State Government may, from time to
time by notification, declare that the estate specified
in the notification has passed to and become vested in
the State free from all encumbrances.
As was to be expected the constitutionality of t11e
Act was challenged in a number of petitions under
article 226 of the Constitution, but the Orissa High
Court pronounced in favour of the validity of the Act.
That decision has since been upheld by this court in
Civil Appeal No. 71 of 1953 (Maliaraja Sri Krishna
Chandra Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa(')
During the pendency of the writ petitions before the
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 1.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
847
High Court, the State Government on the 27th
November,
1952, issued a number of notifications
under section 3 covering a large number of estates
including those of the three appellants before us and
called upon them to deliver up possession. These
appellants thereupon filed three separate writ petitions
praying in each case for a writ in the nature of a writ
of mandamus directing the State of Orissa and the
Collector of Sundargarh not to interfere with their
possess10n of their respective estate or to intermeddle
with it or to give effect to the provmons of
the Act. These applications were opposed by the
State of Orissa.
The several grounds taken in support of the petitions were, very broadly speaking, (a) that they were
not intermediaries, (b) that their properties were not
estates, ( c) that the forest areas within their properties were not estates, ( d) that the Act did not come
under article 31A of the Constitution and was not
entitled to its protection, (e) that the Act was discriminatory and offended against the . provisions of article 14. The then Chief Justice of Orissa, again very
broadly speaking, decided each of these issues against
the appellants and was of opinion that the petitions
should be dismissed. N arasimham J. agreed with the
Chief Justice that the appellants were intermediaries
and that immovable properties of the petitioners were
estates, that the forest areas were included in their
estates but he took a different view on two important
questions. In his_ view the Act was not covered by
article 31A and was not entitled to its protection and
section 3 of the Act contravened article 14 of the Constitution and as it was the key section to the whole Act
tl1e entire Act was invalid in its application to the
immovable properties of the appellants although it
was valid in its application to other estates which come
with article 31-A(Z)(a). The learned Judge was
accordingly of the opinion that the appellants were
entitled to the reliefs prayed for by them. In view of
this difference of opinion the applications were directed to be posted before a third Judge for hearing on
fresh argument. Mahapatra J. before whom the
3-96 S. C. !ndia/59
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State of
Orissa
and Others.
Das].
848
1953
Biswambhar
Si'ngh
v.
Th• State of
Orissa
and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
applications were re-argued agreed substantially with
the learned Chief Justice that the Act was protected by
article 31A and that in any case it did not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. In the
result the applications were dismissed. Hence the
present appeals.
Section 3 (1) authorises the State Government to
issue a notification declaring that the estate specified
therein has passed to the State. The State Government has no power to issue a notification in respect of
any property unless such property is an "estate" as
defined in section 2(g). A perusal of the relevant part
of that definition which has been quoted above will at
once show that in order to be an "estate" the collection of mahals or villages must, amongst other things,
be held by the same "intermediary". An "Intermediary", according to the definition in section 2(h),
must be, amongst other things, "a Zamindar, Ilaqueder, Khorposhdar, or Jagirdar within the meaning of
the Wajib-ul-arz or any Sanad, deed or other instrument." The point to note is that in order to be an
"intermediary" within the definition, it is not enough.
if the person is a Zamindar, Ilaquedar, Khorposhdar or
Jagirdar simpliciter but he must fall within one or
other of the categories "within the meaning of the
Wajib-ul-arz or any Sanad, deed or other instrument."
Accordingly, the first head of argument advanced before us by learned counsel for the appellants is that
the State Government had no authority to issue the
notification because they are not intermediaries and,
therefore, their properties are not estates. This argument obviously proceeds on the footing that the Act is
intra vires the Constitution and if it succeeds then no
question of constitutionality will arise.
We have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by our learned brother Bose and we
agree, substantially for reasons stated therein, that
the appellants Shri Biswambhar Singh and Shri Janardhan Singh are not intermediaries as defined in section
2(h) and their respective properties, namely, Hemgir
and Sarapgarh are not "estates" within the meaning of
section 2(g) and that that being so the State
S.C.R.·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
849
Government had no jurisdiction or authority to issue
any notification under section 3 with respect to their
properties. In this view of the matter no constitutional questions need be considered in Appeals Nos.
167 and 168 of 1953, which will, therefore, have to be
allowed.
Appeal No. 169 of 1953 filed by the appellant Shri
Sibanarayan Singh Mahapatra of Nagra appears to us
to stand on a different footing· In paragraph 13
0£ the counter-affidavit filed by the State in opposition
to this appellant's petition specific reference was
made to the Rubakari in the court of J. F. K. Hewitt,
Commissioner · of Chota Nagpur, dated the 10th March,
1879. At the hearing of the petition that ·Rubakari
was filed in court without any objection. It is document No. 6(g). Evidently the commissioner sent for
both the Raja of Gangpur and Balki Mahapatra of
Nagra and after referring to the then outstanding disputes between the then Raja of Gangpur and Balki
Mahapatra, the predecessor-in-title of the appellant
Shri Sibanarayan Singh Mahapatra this Rubakari
records that "it was agreed upon that from future
Balki Mahapatra would be paying to the Raja of
Gangpur Rs. 700 as yearly rent from the year 1935
and thereafter instead of Rs. 425 which he used to pay.
This amount of Rs. 700 is the fixed rent." The words
rent and fixed rent are significant. It further appears
tl;iat Rubakari decided that "Balki Mahapatra and his
heirs and .successors should ever 'hold' possession
over this Nagra State Zamindari on the aforesaid fixed
annual rent and nothing more would be demanded
from him except marriage Pancha and Dashra Panch
which according to local custom and usage he can pay
.......... The claim of the Raja about Rs. 200 as
Raja Bijoy should be discontinued and the Raja
should stop granting patta to the Gauntias of Nagra."
The Rubakari then concluded thus:
"This Ekrarnama being signed by them by their
own pen was filed before me and they agreed to abide
by the terms mentioned in the Ekrarnama. So it has
been ordered that copy of it may be sent to the Raja
1953
Biswambhizr
Singh
v.
The State of.
Orissa
and Others.
Das].
850
1953
Biswamhhar
Singh
v.
The State of
Orissa
artd Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
of Gangpur and Balki Mahapatra of Nagra for information and guidance."
It is thus quite clear from the above Rubakari that
as far back as 1879 an Ekrarnama had been executed
both by the then Raja of Gangpur and Balki Mahapatra of Nagra recording the terms on which the latter
the Nagra Zamindari,
would "hold" possession of
namely, that he must pay a fixed annual rent besides
certain customary dues.
Years later, to wit on the 29th March, 1943, the
Dewan of Gangpur State wrote a letter to the Zamindar of Nagra Estate calling upon him to show cause
why the takoli should not be enhanced. This letter is
document No. 6 (r-2). The Zamindar of Nagra to
whom this letter was addressed was no other than the
appellant Shri Sibanarayan Singh Mahapatra·
On the
19th July, 1943, a long reply was sent by the latter.
In the heading of this reply after the name of the appellant is added the description "Zamindar of Nagra".
In paragraph 3 (XV) reference is made to the fact that
takoli had been fixed in perpetuity and had been
finally settled in the year 1879. The whole of Rubakari of J. F. K. Hewitt is set out in extenso in paragraph 14 of this reply. Paragraph 15 states:
"That from the Rubakari proceeding of Mr.
Hewitt it will appear that the then Ra;~ Raghunath
Sekhar Deo of Gangpur and Babu Balki Mahapatra,
Zam'indar, Nagra, duly signed a deed of compromise
in which it has been, clearly and in unequivocal terms,
embodied that Gangpur Raja and his successors will
be bound by that term and Nagra should only pay
Rs. 700 as Takoli every year and nothing more and
this Takoli should remain fixed for ever."
Reference is then made in paragraph 17 to the proceedings of the 29th June, 1891, before W.H. Grimley,
the then Commissioner, which is marked as document
No. 6 (L). This also refers to the settlement made
by J.F.K. Hewitt in 1879. There is, therefore, no
getting away from the fact that an Ekrarnama had
Balki
been executed by the Raja of Gangpur and
Mahapatra, the predecessor-in-title of this appellant,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
851
under which Balki Mahapatra "held" the estate of
Nagra upon terms of payment of an annual rent.
Indeed, the appellant Shri Sibanarayan Singh Mahapatra firmly takes his stand on the Ekrarnama and
its terms.
A question has been
raised that the original
Ekrarnama of 1879 has not been filed and as no evidence was led to explain the reason for its nonproduction, secondary
evidence of its contents is
inadmissible. We see no force in this belated contention. The
Rubakari and the other documents
referred to above were filed without any objection as
to their admissibility on the ground that they are
merely secondary evidence of the contents of the
Ekrarnama. Indeed, in the matter of production
and proof of documents the parties undoubtedly proceeded a little informally. The following extract from
the judgment of the learned Chief Justice will make
the position clear:
"As regards some of them, neither the originals,
nor the authenticated copies have been filed before
us, but typed paper books containing unauthenticated
copies have been filed by both sides and have been
treated as evidence, with the mutual consent of the
parties. Those typed paper books have accordingly
been placed on the record. Some annual administration reports of the Gangpur State as well as certain
working plans for the reserved forests of Hemgir,
Nagra and other zamindaris as also the Forest Act of
Gangpur State have been filed and received without
any objection from either side. Quite a number of
further documents have been produced on behalf of
the State as per the list of documents filed along with
two affidavits dated the 9th and 10th February, 1953,
and certain annexures have been filed on behalf of the
petitioners along
with an affidavit dated the 11th
I:ebruary, 1953. All these have been, without objection, treated as part of the record excepting one
document to be presently noticed. The only document whose reception has been objected to is what is
referred to as the Mukherjee's Settlement Report,
1953
Birwamhhar_
Singh
v.
The Stale ef
Orissa
and Others.
Das].
852
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State of
OrisJa
and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
p954]
item No. 18 in the list of documents filed on behalf of
the State."
Further and strictly speaking the appellant Shri
Sibanarayan Singh Mahapatra having in his own letter
dated the 19th July, 1943, referred to above admitted
the existence and contents of the Ekrarnama, secondary evidence is, strictly speaking, admissible under
section 65 (b) of the Indian Evidence Act. It may
also be mentioned here that in the grounds of appeal
set forth in the petition for leave to this court no
grievance was made t11at secondary evidence of the
contents of the Ekrarnama had been wrongly let in.
In the circumstances, this appellant cannot now be
heard to complain of admission of inadmissible evidence as to the terms of the Ekrarnama. Apart from
this, the recital of the Ekrarnama and its terms in an
ancient public document like the Rubakari whose
authenticity has not been, nor indeed could be,
doubted furnishes strong evidence of the existence
and genuineness of the settlement arrived at by the
parties.
·
Procee<ling, then, on the footing that Bal ki Mahapatra and his descendants including the present
proprietor held the Nagra Zamindari estate under the
Ekrarnama on the terms of payment of a fixe<l annual
rent there can arise no question as to tl1e real status
of the proprietor of Nagra vis-a-vis the Raja of
Gangrur since 1879, whatever the position may have
been prior thereto. It is, therefore, quite clear that
the proprietors of N agra are zamindars within the
meaning of the Ekrarnama, call it a "deed" or "other
instrument" as one likes. In this view of the matter
the appellant Shri Sibanarayan Singh Mahapatra is
an intermediary as define<l in section 2 (h) of the Act
and his estate is an "estate" within the meaning of
section 2 (g) and consequently there is no escape from
the conclusion that the State Government had ample
jurisdiction or authority to issue a notification under
section 3 of the Act.
A subsidiary point was raised that "' any rate the
forest lands which are not parts of any Mahal of
village and are not assessed as one ll11it to land
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
revenue cannot possibly fall within the definition of
estate. This contention was repelled by the High
Court and there was no disagreement between the
two learned Judges on this question. We find ourselves in agreement with the High Court in this
behalf. There is no dispute that geographically the
forest tract is included within the Nagra Zamindari
estate. Our attention was drawn to certain maps or
plan~ which clearly indicate that the forest lands are
scattered in blocks within the boundaries of the
estate. There is no dispute that the annual rent fixed
under the Ekrarnama was so payable in respect of
the whole estate. In those days there was hardly any
income from the forests as at present and, therefore, in
those ancient days the existence of the forest like that
of uncultivable waste land would not affect the assessment of the rent to any appreciable degree. There is
no evidence on record that in. fixing the annual rent
the forests were left out of consideration in the sense
that they were treated as a separate item of property.
There is no proof on the record in support of such an
unusual arrangement. If the forests are included
within the boundaries of the estate and if the Zamindar
of Nagra "holds" the estate under the Raja of
Gangpur, he must be holding the forests also under
the Raja of Gangpur. The suggestion that the proprietor of Nagra accepted a grant from the Raja of
Gangpur only in respect of the collection of Mahals or
villages but retained his independent chieftainship
with respect to the forest lands interspersed between
the villages but situate within the geographical limits
of the entire estate is hardly convincing. For the
above reasons and those set out in the judgment of
the learned Chief Justice we are of the opinion that
the forest lands are included within the estate held by
the Zamindar of Nagra under the Raja of Gangpur.
In the view that the Zamindar of Nagra is an intermediary and his territories are an estate it must
follow that the appellant Shri Subanarayan Singh
Mahapatra cannot get any relief if the Act is valid.
Learned ,counsel appearing in support of his appeal
(No. 169 of 1953) then falls back on the question of
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State of
Orissa
and Others.
Das].
854
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
Th£ State of
Orissa
and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
the constitutionality
of the Act. Here he has a preliminary hurdle to get over, for if the Act is covered
and protected by article 31-A then the Act cannot be
deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent
with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provision of Part III of the Constitution. It has, therefore, been the endeavour of learned
counsel for the appellant before us, as it was before
the High Court, that Nagra was not an "estate" as
defined in article 31-A(2) (a). The learned Chief Justice
took the view that N agra was an estate as defined and
consequently the Act was within the protection of
article 31-A but Narasimham J. took the opposite
view. The third Judge Mahapatra J. agreed with the
learned Chief Justice. In the view we take on the
question of the alleged violation of the provisions of
article 14 it is not necessary for us, for the purpose of
disposing of this appeal, to enter into a long discussion
on the applicability of article 31-A to the impugned
Act.
On the assumption, then, that article 31-A is out of
the way the Act in question becomes liable to attack
both under article 31 (2) and article 14. Learned
counsel appearing before us did not call in aid
article 31 (2) hut confined himself to article 14. Tn
the High Court article 14 was invoked in two ways
namely (1) that the provision for assessing and fixing
the amount of compensation is discriminatory and
(2) that section 3 which gives an unfettered discretion
to the State Government to issue or not to issue notification with respect to an estate is discriminatory in
that it enables the State Government to issue notificatim with respect to those zamindars who opposed
the ruling party in the election and to refrain
from doing so with respect to others who were loyal
to that party. The objection as to discrimination
founded on the manner of assessment of the compensation has not been pressed before us and learned
counsel confined his arguments to the second ground.
Here again the learned Chief Justice held that there
was no violation of article 14 while Narasimham J.
took the opposite view. Mr. Justice Mahapatra,
iS.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
855
however, agreed with the Chief Justice. We find
ourselves in agreement with the majority view.
The long title of the Act and the two preambles
which have been quoted above clearly indicate that
the object and purpose of the Act is to abolish all the
rights, title and interest in land of intermediaries by
whatever name known. This is a clear enunciation of
the policy which is sought to be implemented by the
operative provisions of the Act. Whatever discretion
has been vested in the State Government under
section 3 or section 4 must be exercised in tbe light of
this policy and, therefore, it cannot be said to be an
absolute or unfettered discretion, for sooner or later all
estates must perforce be abolished. From the vety
nature of
things a certain amount of discretionary
latitude had to be given to the State Government. It
would have been a colossal task if the State Government had to take over all the estates at one and the
same time. It would have broken down the entire
administrative machinery. It could not be possible to
collect sufficient staff to take over and discharge the
responsibilities. It would be difficult to arrange for the
requisite finance all at once. It was, therefore, imperative to confer some discretion' on the State Government. It has not been suggested or shown that in
practice any discrimination has been made. If any
notification or order is made, not in furtherance of the
policy of the Act but in bad faith and as and by way
of discrimination such notification or order, which by
virtue of article 13(3) comes within the definition of
"Law", will itself be void under article 13 (2).
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has not
shown, by advancing any cogent and convincing argument, how and why the reasonings adopted by the
majority of the learned Judges below are faulty or
Untenable. In the premises, it is not necessary for us
to pursue this matter further beyond saying that we
find ourselves in agreement with the conclusions of the
majority of the learned Judges of the High Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant referred to another
point, namely that the amending Act altering the
<lefinition of the date of vesting was invalid as there
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State oj
Orlssa
and Othtrs.
856
1953
Biswambh11.1
Singh
v.
The State of
Orissa
and Others.
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
was no public purpose for taking away the vested
right that the original definition of that expression in
the Act had given to the persons whose estates had
been notified. Learned counsel, however, did not
seriously press this objection and nothing further need
be said about it.
The result, therefore, is that appeals Nos. 167 and
168 of 1953 are allowed with costs and appeal No. 169
of 1953 is dismissed with costs.
BosE J.-These three appeals arise out of petitions made to the High Court of Orissa under article 226
of the Constitution by the Zarnindars of Hemgir,
Sarapgarh and Nagra.
· On the 28th of September, 1951, the Orissa State
Legislature passed the Orissa Estates Abolition Act of
1951* (Orissa Act I of 1952*). The Act was reserved
for the assent of the President and became law on the
23rd of January, 1952, when the President gave his
assent.
The Act enables the State Government to take over
the "estates" of all "intermediaries" situate in the
State of Orissa. In pursuance of the powers so conferred the State Government issued notifications from
time to time under section 3 of the Act and among
the notifications so issued are the three which affect
the present petitioners.
This action of the State Government was challenged
on a number of grounds, among them the following:
(1) that the Act was invalid as it infringed the hmdamental provisions of the Constitution, (2) that even if
it is valid the notifications are ultra vires because (a)
the zarnindaris in question are not "estates" within
the meaning of section 2(g) of the Act and because
(b) the petitioners are not "intermediaries" within
the meaning of section 2(h).
We will first deal with the question of "estates"
and "intermediaries". The question assumes importance because of section 3( 1) which enacts that
"The State Government may, from time to time
by notification, declare that the estate specified in the
*Sic.
S.C.R:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
857
notification · bas passed to and become vested in the
State free from all encumbrances."'
Tl1e definition of an "estate" is given in section 2(g)
and is as follows:
"'estate' ...... in relation to merged territories
means any collection of Mabals or villages held bv the
same intermediary which has been or is liable to be
assessed as one nnit to land revenue."
"Intermediary" fa defined in section 2(h):
" 'Intermediary' ...... with reference to the merged
territories means a maufidar including the Ruler of an
Indian State merged with the State of Orissa,
Zamindar, Ilaquedar, Khorposhdar or Jagirdar within
the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz, or any sanad, deed
or other in$trun1ent."
It is admitted that the territories with which we are
concerned are merged territories, so the portions of
the definition that we have reproduced above are all
we need consider. Before any property can be taken
over under the Act it must be an "estate" within the
meaning of the above definition and so must belong to
an "intermediary" as defined in clause (h).
We will start with the definition of "intermediary."
It is admitted by both sides that the petitioners are
zamindars but the petitioners contend that they are
not "intermediaries" because the definition does not
include all zamindars but only those who are zamindars, etc., within the meaning of(a) any "wajib-ul,arz"
(b) any "sanad, deed or other instrument."
We have grouped the last three together because
that is how the appellant's learned counsel says they
should be read. According to him, the "deed" and
"other instrument" must be read ejusdem generis
with "sanad" and so must be confined to a document
of title like a sanad in which one partv creates or
confers a zamindari estate on another.
We do not agree. In our opinion, the words must be
read disjunctively and be interpreted according to
their ordinary meaning. For example, a document by
1953
Biswombf;a,
Singh
v.
The Sta#of
Orii~•
and Others.
Bose J.
858
1953
Biswamhhar
Singh
v.
The. State of
Orissa
and Others.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
an intermediary acknowledging the overlordship of
another would, 111 our op11110n, fall within the
definition.
Now had these zamindars been in what was once
British India there would be no difficulty because the
first part of the definition in section 2(h) is straightforward and clear. The petitioners in these case would
have fallen under one or other of the categories
mentioned there. But when we come to the merged
territories the definition changes and an "intermediary" there no longer means this or that (except in
the case of a maufidar) but this or that "U1ithin the
meaning of" certain docuriients. Thus an "intermediary"
neither
"includes"
a zamindar 11or "means''
a zamindar, but means a zamindar within the meaning '
of (1) the wajib-ul-arz (2) any sanad (3) any deed or
(4) any other instrument. We take it that this was
deliberate and that there was purpose behind the
change.
What then do the words "within the meaning of"
signify' They cannot mean mere mention of A as a
zamindar. They cannot mean that if A is mentioned
in one of those doc_uments and is called or referred to
as a zamindar that makes him an intermediary, for if
that had been the intention, the definition would have
said so. In our opinion, the words have been inserted
to include only those documents which deal, or
purport to deal, with true intermediaries, that is to
say, with persons who hold an interest in the land
between the raiyat or actual cultivator and the overlord of the demesne. Two illustrations will show what
we mean.
A may be a zamindar in one State and yet may hold
lands, which have no connection with his zamindari, as
an ordinary tenant in another State. Now A may well
execute a kabuliat or enter into a lease with his
immediate landlord in that other State and refer to
himself as a zamindar, but that would not make him a
zamindar within the meaning of that deed because the
deed does not purport to deal with zamindars but with
a landlord and his tenant. Though called a zamindar
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
859
there, the word would only be descriptive, and he
would really be a tenant within the meaning of
that deed.
Consider a second illustration. A ruling Chief might
acquire a zamindari of the intermediary type in a
neighbouring State by purchase or otherwise. In documents relating to the zamindari he may well be described as the Raja or Chief of so and so but he would
not be a ruling Chief within the meaning of that document though so called. He would only be a zamindar.
That is the only way in which we are able to interpret
this clause in section 2. We cannot ignore the change
in the two parts of the definition and we are bound to
assign some intelligible purpose to the words "within
the meaning of."
The distinction is of importance because zamindars
are of various kinds; some are true intermediaries in
that they are the collectors of the revenue of the State
from the raiyats and other under-tenants of lands.
They have an interest in the land but not the true fee
simple of English law. They are not the lords of the
manor as in England and bear little or no resemblance
to an English landlord though they have some of his
attributes.
(See Baden-Powell's Land
Systems of
British India, Vol. I, pages 130, 519 and 523); others
are either Ruling Chiefs or court favourites with a
mere courtesy title or just peasant cultivators.
The following description by Baden-Powell Jt
page 508 of Volume I is illuminating. He is dealing
with the decline of the Moghul Empire in the year 1713
and says that the decline was marked by a relaxation
of control, not only over the outlying provinces, but
over the whole administrative machinery, and by the
substitution of plans of farming the revenues of convenient tracts. Then comes this passage"Then it was that besides the Rajas, Chiefs and
ancient grantees, who had a real hold over the country,
and were already spoken of as the zamindars, other
classes of persons were employed as farmers, and the
same name and the same designation came to be applied
·to them also. As a matter of fact, we find ex-officials
1953
Biswambh.ar
Si•gh
v.
Tht Statt of
Orissa
and Others ..
BUse ].
860
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State of
Orissa
and Others.
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
possessed of wealth and energy-amils, karoris, etc.also bankers and court favourities, receiving the name
of zamindar. And such persons would, besides taking
the name, also ape the dignities and importance of the
older landholders."
At page 401 he tells us that some of the zamindars
were old Rajas who had a very close connection with
the land (see also page 579) and at page 7 he says that
in some parts of India the term means a petty peasant
cultivator. The net result is that he calls the word
"zamindar" a "protean term" at page 261 because of
the variety of shapes which it takes, not only in
different places but at different stages of history in the
same place. At one moment we are dealing with a
rajah or petty chieftain exercising sovereign or quasisovereign powers, at another with revenue farmers, at
another with landlords of small estates in the English
sense of the term, at another with a petty peasant
cultivator and at times with mere courtesy titles which
have no legal foundations or backing.
We do not
think the Act can be applied to peasants who own their
own land and cultivate it, that is to say, to the raiyats,
nor do we think it can be applied to a landlord in the
English sense of the term, the man who is the true lord
of the soil, because the title of the Act, the preamble
and the definitions, all point the other way. The title
and the preamble use the same language and describe
the Act and its purpose as one
"to provide for the abolition of all the rights,
title and interest in land of intermediaries by whatever
name known."
We are therefore bound to construe the ambiguous
words which we have examined above in a sense which
will carry out the purpose of the Act and not in a way
which will travel beyond it. We accordingly hold
that the kind of zamindar referred to in section 2 (h) is
one who is what we may call a "true intermediary"
within the meaning of the four documents set
out
there, that is to say, persons who hold an interest in
the land between the raiyat and the overlord of the
estate.
s:e:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
861
It 1s unfortunate that we should have to call them
"true intermediaries" when the whole purpose of the
discussion is to examine what an "intermediary"
means but that is a convenient term and we do not
think it will mislead when read in conjunction with
what we have said.
Now the mere fact that the zamindari lands in the
present cases are situate within the boundaries of the
Gangpur State is not conclusive to show that the petitioners who own them are "intermediaries" because,
as the Privy Council has pointed out in two cases, the
mere fact that disputed lands are within the geographical boundaries of a larger estate is not conclusive
proof that they are part of that estate [see Secretary of
State for India v. Raja Jyoti Prashad Singh(') and
Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Tuquee( 2 ) ] ; nor is the fact
that the Raja of Gangpur exercises a general superintendence over these zamindars in certain matters
necessariiy condusive, for, as Lord Phillimore says in
Secretary
of State
for India v. Raja Jyoti Prashad
Singh( 1 ) at page 552, care must be taken not to confound hierarchical superintendence with what may be
called feudal overlordship.
The contention of the petitioners that they are not
"intermediaries" but are the direct landlords of the
soil will best be understood if we refer again to the
Privy Council decision just cited. The zamindar there
claimed to be the overlord of the Ghatwali Digwars in
the same way as Gangpur is said to be the overlord of
the zamindaris in the present cases. Lord Phillimore
said at page 553"It is agreed that these digwars have existed
from time immemorial and may be coeval with the
Raja and may have been created or recognised by a
sovereign power superior to both."
The Tudicial Committee held that though the
Ghatwali lands they were dealing with fell within the
geographical limits of the Raja's zamindari, they did
not form part of it.
(1) l.L.R. 53 Cal. 533 at 547·
(2) (1870) 13 I.A. 438 at 457.
i!i53
BiswamhharSingh
.
v.
The State ef
Orissa
and OthPrs.
Bose J.
862
1953
Biswamhhar
Singh
v.
The Stole of
Orissa
and Others.
Bo" J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
Similar questions arose for consideration in Bir
Deo v. Secretary of State for India('), where
the Privy Council examined claims made by eight of
the Central Provinces zamindars. They also claimed
semi-sovereign status. The history of the Central
Provinces zamindaris was elaborately set out in the ·
lower courts and copious extracts from their judgments
are given in the report. The lower courts held that the
zamindars in that area were of two kinds-feudatory
and non-feudatory (page 637). The Privy Council
remarking on this at page 657 said"The status of the Zamindar of Khariar and the
plaintiffs in the other suits is simply the status of an
ordinary British subject· That m~tter was determined
by the grant in 1864 after an exhaustive enquiry into
the position of the petty chiefs of the Central
Provinces. A few were recognised as feudatories having
some of the attributes, of sovereignty. The rest were
classed as non-feudatories and declared to be ordinary
British subjects."
Now if the State of Gangpur be substituted for the
British Government the claim made by the present
petitioners vis-a-vis the State of Gangpur becomes the
same as the claims which the plaintiffs in the suit made
agains,t the Secretary of State for India. The status
of the plaintiffs in that case vis-a-vis the British
Government was settled because the question had been
definitely raised and examined in the year 1863 and
determined in the year 1864 and in 1874 sanads were
granted to and accepted by the ancestors of the parties
to that litigation (page 637). In the present cases the
question of the present petitioners' status vis-a-vis the
State of Gangpur was repeatedly raised and as often
deliberately not decided; and it is an admitted fact
that there are no sanads.
Bikram
There is another point. The petitioners are Bhuyans
and they have repeatedly claimed that their ancestors were the original settlers who were on the
soil long before the Chiefs of Gangpur came on the
scene.
Now Baden-Powell sets out the history of
(1) l.L.R. 39 Cal. 615.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
863
the Bhuyans in the Bengal and Chota Nagpur area of
what was once British India in Volume I of his book.
At page 577 he explains that the Bhuyans were the
original founders of the village and at page 581 he
says that"Anciently the theory was t11at no bhuinhar (of
an original founders' family) could ever lose his lands;
so that after years of absence he might return and
claim it from the present holder."
But he says at page 580 that"When British rule began, some of tl1e survmng
Rajas, chiefa and grantees, were recognised as "Zamin·
dars" with a permanent settlement ........ When the
old Rajas (or their successors) became Zamindar landlords .......... they did their best to reduce to a minimum
the rights of the 'bhuinhars' in their free allotments;
and this led to so much discontent as to cause rebellion
in 1831-32 and again 1858 ...... ,.In 1869 it was determined to put an end to the uncertainty and discontent
which arose from the encroachments of the landlords
who had ignored the old tenures and infringed the
bhuinhari rights."
Accordingly, a 1Special Commissioner was appointed
in that
year to examine, define and record all the
various classes of rights and, in accordance with that,
determine the status of the Bhuyans in British India
vis-a-vis the "zamindars" who were the surviving
Rajas and petty chiefs. This was done and settlements were made and accepted. But that was British
India. In the present case, _every attempt to settle
the same question between the Bhuyan petitioners and
the Ruler of Gangpur ended in failure. No decision
has been reached to this day.
Reference is made to the Bhuyans in the Gangpur
State in Dalton's Ethnology of Bengal (1873), pages
139 and 140· According to that author the Bhuvans
in Gangpur possess proprietary rights under. the
Chiefs. But he weakens this by saying in the next
sentence that- .
4-96 s; a. India/59
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State of
Orissa
ond othtrs.
Bose J.
864
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State of
Orissa
and others.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
"They are the barons from whom those Chiefs
originally derived their authority, and are either the
support or the sap of that authority according to the
side they take in the politics of the State."
This is evidence to indicate that the Bhuvans in
Gangpur were there before the Rulers of Gangpur.'
In . the year 1891 a dispute arose between the
Raja of Gangpur and the Zamindars of Hemgir and
Nagra. The Bengal-Nagpur Railway cut through a
part of their lands and both claimed compensation
from the railway for timber which was cut from the
forests. The
Commissioner Mr. W. H. Grimley refused to pay the Raja any compensation for timber
taken from the zamindari forests and only paid him
for what was taken from his Khalsa lands. In the
course of his decision he refers to Hewitt's Settlement
of 1879 and quotes the following from the reports:
"The contention that the Zamindar of Nagra is
merely a tehsildar or rent-collector subordinate to the
Raja is therefore invalid, and it is established beyond
doubt that the zamindar has a permanent interest in
the Nagra Estate and is practically on the same
footing as a zamindar under permanent settlement in
Bengal."
He then concludes"The above extracts and remarks show that the
zamindars of Nagra and Hemgir and other zamindars
of Gangpur were regarded by a former Commissione1
not only as possessing permanent rights in their zamindaris but as having full and exclusive rights over the
jungles in their estates. They seem to be the original
settlers of the soil, and their position appears to be
analogous to that of the Mankis in Lohardugga and
Manbhum, who, as aboriginal chiefs, or heads of the
clans holding groups of twelve or more villages, exercise jungle rights and are independent or the
supenor Raja or zamindar, a creature of subsequent
growth."
We need not make further extracts from the large
volume of historical material w\lich was placed before
us because we are not deciding the point here and it
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
865
would be wrong to say more than is necessary for the
present case as the Raja of Gangpur is not before.
us. It is enough to say that there is much historical material to indicate that the Bhuyan tenures
had their origin in pre-historic times and were not the
creations of a conquering line of Rajput Rajas. As
Mr. Forbes put it in Political Suit No. 26 of 190().
1901:
"The British Government had the unquestionable rights of the conqueror and is in a position to
to dictate its terms in its Sanads to the Chiefs. Bttt
the Chiefs are very far from being in a similar position
of authority in regard to the landholders."
Similar observations occur in Hunter's Imperial
Gazetteer Volume 4,
page 478, and Sir Richard
Temple's Treaties, Zamindaries, Chieftainships in the
Central Provinces, page 18. But we wish to emphasise
that this is only one side of the picture and that there
may be much to indicate the contrary and in the
absence of the Ruler of Gangpur it would not be right
to say that this is the full picture especially as two
successive Settlement Officers have refused to decide
the question despite raising of the dispute on the
occasions which we have indicated. Connolly in his
Settlement Report of 1907-1911 says"There are four Lamindaris in the State .... all held
by Bhuias. No attempt has be.en made in this settlement to determine their relations to the Chief."
Mukherji in his Settlement Report of 1929-36 also
says that·
"The relations of the zamindars with the Chief
have not been expressed in any administration paper
which is accepted by the zamindar in each settlement."
In the year 1941 Ramdhyani was appointed an
Officer on Special Duty to report on the Land Tenures
and the Revenue System of the Orissa and Chhattisgarh States. In paragraph 75 of the first volume
of his Report he says that the zamindars on the one
hand refuse to accept sanads to determine their
rights and the Rulers on the other hand do not
favour precise laws which will tie their hands. And
in Volume III he says that-
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State of
Orissa
and others.
Bose].
866
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
Tht State ef
Orissa
and others.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
"No sanads have been issued by the State to the
zamindars and thus there is no clear definition of
their rights."
That there can be another side to the picture is
evident from the historical material collected in
Kunwarlalsingh v. Provincial Government, Central Provinces and Berar(') and in Raikrishna Prasad/al Singh
Deo v. Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd.(') In many cases,
even though the zamindars started as independent
sovereigns vis-a-vis the ruling power, their rights were
so whittled away in course of time that whatever they
may once have been their present status has become
one of subordination. Whether that happened in
these cases has. never been determined and it would
not be right for us to assume anything one way or the
other in the absence of the Raja of Gangpur. Our
object in delving into this mass of historical material
is to show that the mere use of the word "zamindar"
proves nothing and that a passing reference to the
term in the various documents which we will now
examine cannot fix the petitioners' status as "intermediaries' when the Settlement Reports to which the
documents appertain state in categorical terms that
neither side would agree to a definition of their rights
vis-a-vis each other and that consequently no attempt
was made to define them.
The first document on which reliance ;, placed by
the State is the Wajib-ul-arz. Much iesearch and
learning were expended on finding out what a Wajibul-arz means and what it consists of. We do not intend
to go into any of that. We will assume for the
purposes of this case (without deciding the point) that
the only document relied on by the State of Orissa as
a Wajib-ul-arz, though it is called the Record of
Rights, is a Wajib-ul-arz within the meaning of the
Act. B11t what is that document? It records the
rights of the raiyats and the gaontias vis-a-vis the
"Chief of Ilaquedar"; The word "zamindar" is not
used and neither the word "Chief" nor the word
I.L.R. 1944 Nag. 180 at 215 to 221.
(2) I.L.R 62 Cal. 346 at 354 & 355.
(1)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
867
"Ilaquedar" has been struck out. All it says is that
the "malguzari" will be paid to the "Chief or Ilaque
dar" and that all lawful orders of the "Chief or
Ilaquedar" will immediately be carried out without
any objection. We have the further fact that the
petitioners have been issuing pattas to the gaontias
in their areas apparently in conformity with this
Re.cord of Rights because their pattas expressly refer
to it; also that the petitioners .have signed the pattas
as, zamindars. , A typical patta is in this form:
:. "Gountia Patta: This Gountia Patta is granted to
you. , .......... according to the rules and conditions
mentioned in the Record of Rights included hereunder.
·You should deposit the malguzari and the cess in the
Treasury according to the kists mentioned below ..... .
(Sd.)
,
(Signature)
Zamindar."
Now when this is read along with Connolly's Settlement Report of which it forms a part, it is evident that
the document does not pretend to deal with the rights
and status of the petitioners vis-a-vis the Chief of
Gangpur, because Connolly expressly says that those
rights were neither agreed upon nor determined. It
is true the petitioners style themselves as zamindars
in the pattas, but the whole question is what kind of
zamindar is meant. That is deliberately left indeterminate by the continued use of the words "Chief" . or
"Ilaquedar". The petitioners' case is that they are
the overlords within the meaning of these documents
and that the gaontias are their intermediaries and, as
we have seen, there is ground for that contention.
We are therefore unable to hold that the petitioners
are "zamindars" within the meaning of this "Wajibul-arz" (even if the document is assumed to be a
Wajib-ul-arz), taking "zamindar" to mean, as it must
under the definition, what we have ~ailed a "true
intermediary".
It was also said that certain Settlement Khewats and
Khatians formed part of the Wajib-ul-arz in this part
of the country. We were not shown anything to support
!953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State ef
Orissa
and Others.
Bos< J.
868
1953
BiJwambhar
Singh
v.
The State ef
Orissa
and Others.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
that beyond the bare assertion that that was so but
even if that is correct we cannot read more into these
documents than what the Settlement Commissioner
expressly stated. The Khatian~, for ·example, merely
say that the name of the person who receives the
revenue is "Zamindar so and so of Khewat No. 2".
It is to be observed that the column refers to the
name of the person and not to his designation. But
quite apart from that, we find it impossible to
separate
the statements in these documents from the
categorical
reservation made by the Settlement Officer
in his report. If it was understood on all hands, and
was solemnly recorded in the Settlement Report, thr1t
the dispute about the relations between the Ruler of
Gangpur and the petitioners was neither agreed to
nor decided in these Settlements we can hardly conclude that despite that solemn assurance a number of
subsidiary documents
settled
the matter and that
therefore the petitioners must be taken to be "true
intermediaries" within the meaning of the Wajib-ularz. The same is true of the Khewats. It is true one
of the columns shows that these petitioners hold
under the Chief of Gangpur and it is possible that the
Officer preparing the Khewats thought that that was
the true pos1tlon. But the final assessment is in the
Settlement Report and that, in our opinion, must be
regarded as the governing factor.
Whatever else a
Wajib-ul-arz may be, it is only a part of the Record
of Rights and entries in the Record of Rights have
only a presumptive value. They can be shown to be
wrong. And what better proof can there be of that
than the categorical statement of the Settlement
Commissioner who was in charge of those very returns.
Even as late as 1935 we have the Secretary to the
Agent to the Governor-General saying"The record of rights of the settlement of Gangpur
State of the year 1911 seems to the Governor-General
in the main to support the contentions of the zamindar
as enjoying his zamindari on the same rights as the
State enjoys in Khalsa."
We are therefore unable to regard the petitioners as
zamindars within the meaning of the Wajib-ul-arz.
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
869
\Ve turn next to the portion of the definition in section 2 (h) which refers to a "deed or other instrument". Now even if the Parchas and Khatians and
Khewats are either "deeds" or "instruments" they
are of no assistance in these cases for the reasons we
have just given.
It is necessary in this connection to say that though
the documents filed clearly establish that the petitioners have been paying a certain sum of money
each year to the Chief of the Gangpur State, that in
itself does not show that they are municipally, as
opposed to politically, subordinate to him. These
moneys have been variously described at different
times. Sometimes they are called malguzari, at others
takolz~ at others revenue and sometimes rent. But
pone of that is conclusive because what we have to
determine is whether the petitioners are "true intermediaries" within the meaning of certain documents,
and there the overriding factor is the repeated assertions of the Settlement Officer that at no time has
their status inter se been agreed upon or decided.
Among the documents relied on as "deeds or other
instruments" are the pattas to which we have just
referred· The petitioners are said to have signed
them as "zamindars'', or some one else is said to
have signed for them. The signatures were not
admitted in all the cases but even if they were validly
signed by or on behalf of the petitioners that would
not make the pet1t10ners "zamindars" within the
meaning of the pattas. The word "zamindar" under their
respective signatures is merely descriptive and does
not in itself indicate what kind of zamindar is meant
and since everybody agreed that that question should
be left open the pattas cannot be taken to mean that
the petitioners are the kind of zamindars about which
there is a dispute and that they have the status which
they have stoutly contested at every stage.
The rest of the documents, except one which concerns Nagra. alone, are merely historical material.
They are neither Wajib-ul-arz nor deeds nor other
instruments. We have already referred to a numbe:
on which the petitioners rely. There are others
1953
Biswamhhar
. Singh
v.
The Stall of
Orissa
and Other~.
Bose].
870
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
Tht State of
Orissa
and Others.
Bose J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
which are more favourable to Gangpur as, for example, a Political Book of 1831-1833 and an order of
the Commissioner of the Chota Nagpur dated 9th
August, 1878. The Imperial Gazetteer, Volume IV,
was also relied on by the State but we do not think
that helps it much. The passage in point says that"Included within
the
State are two Feudatory
Chiefships subordinate to the Raja, Nagra in the
East and Hemgir in the West."
But this appears to point more to political than to
municipal subordination and, that is just what the
petitioners say they are. They claim to be feudatory
chiefs vis-a-vis. Gangpur and say that the money they
pay to the Raja i~ tribute and not revenue. However,
these historical document are not relevant except to
show that the word "zamindar" has different meanings, one of which lifts them out of the category of
"intermediaries" within the meaning of that part of
the definition which applies to the merged territories.
We are not called upon to decide the actual relationship between the Chief of Gangpur and the petitioners
but only to see whether the petitioners are "zamindars" within the meaning of certain specified documents. Even if they are "intermediaries" within the
broader sense of the term, they are not so within the
meaning of the specified documents and that is the
definition to which we are tied. We do not intend,
therefore, to examine them further.
That leaves a document which concerns Nagra. l n
or about the year I 879 the Zamindar of N agra is
said to have executed an Ekrarnama in favour of
the Raja of Gangpur. The Ekrarnama has not been
produced and there is nothing on record to show that
it has been lost and that despite a search it cannot be
found, nevertheles.s we are asked to hold that such a
document was executed
and to deduce its contents
from a description of it given by Mr. Hewitt, the
Officiating Commissioner in a Rubakari dated 10th
March, 1879. In the absence of the document itself
we do not think it would be right to infer that the
Zamindar of Nagra had suddenly surrendered the
S.C.R.
.SUPREME COURT REPORTS
871
claims to municipal independence which he had been
contesting for years and which he has continued to
contest to the present day. The immediate cause of
the dispute was about Gangpur' s right to grant leases
to Gaontias in the zamindari, about a royalty of
'Rs. 200, about the Raja's right to interfere with the
policing of . the zamindari tract and about certain
taxes. The zamindar agreed to pay the Raja a fixed
yearly sum of Rs. 700 as "rent" while the Raja
agreed that the Nagra Zamindar should police his
own estate and agreed that he, the Raja, would not
grant any more pattas to the Gaontias in that area;
also that the Raja would not collect taxes from the
Kumbars etc., but would instead settle separately
with the zamindar after first submitting his report
about this to the Commissioner.
The only point here against the Zamindar is that
the word "rent" is used instead of "tribute'', but
this loses all its force in view of the fact that the
Diwan of the Gangpur State writing to the Zamindar
of Nagra himself called it Takoli in a letter dated 29th
March, 1943. The rights of the Zamindar regarding
Gaontias and the policing of his own tracts were
conceded. Now the right to police a tract of land is
one of the first attributes of sovereignty. The power
can be delegated but that is at the will of the sovereign
and not the other way round; the subject cam10t
resist the sovereign's right to police his own State.
The settlement about the taxes is neither here nor
there because that was done as a matter 0£ compromise without either side admitting the basic rights of
the other or surrendering his own. Read as a whole,
the settlement supports the Zamindar's claims rather
than negatives them. And as to the word "rent" the
English of the document shows that it was not written
or drawn up by an Englishman though it was signed
by one, so no one can know just what was meant.
The Ekrarnama would, we take it, have been in the
vernacular and unless we know just what term was
used there it would be wrong to assume on the basis
of this Rubakari that the Zamindar had suddenly
abandoned the position for which he had been fighting
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State Of
Orissa
and O'hers.
Bose J.
872
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State of
Ori.ssa
and Others.
Bou].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
all this time. If the original word was "takoli", as it
would seem to have been because of the Gangpur
State Diwan's letter of 29th March, 1943, it is as consistent with tribute as with revenue, especially when
we read it along with the concessions made by Gangpur about the police powers and the Gaontias. Takoli
is a term which has no fixed meaning and is what the
Zamindars of Hemgir and Sarapgar also pay the Raja
of Gangpur. The only difference in their cases is that
their Takoli can be enhanced from time to time whereas that of Nagra cannot; that we think places Nagra
in a much stronger position than the other two and so,
far from showing municipal subordination to Gangpur, indicates the contrary particularly when read in
conjunction with the police powers which Nagra
retained in defiance of Gangpur's claim· We are accordingly not able to conclude on the basis of this imperfect secondary evidence that the meaning of the
Ekrarnama was to define the Zamindar's
status as
that of a "true intermediary."
The result is that there is no deed or other instrument within whose meaning the petitioners can be said
to be the kind of zamindars which are "true intermediaries", and we so hold. It follows that the
petitionfrs are
not "intermediaries" within
the
meaning of section 2(h). If they are not "intermediaries", then their lands are not an "estate" within the
meaning of section (2) (g) and so cannot be taken over
by the State of Orissa under section 3.
In view of this it is not necessary to examine any
other points. The learned Judges of the High Court
differed on the remaining points and so those points
were referred to a third Judge. But on the definition
of "intermediary" there was no difference of opinion.
Both the Chief Justice and Narasimham J. agreed
that the petitioners were "intermediaries." We disagree for the reasons we have given above.
The result is that in our opinion, all three appeals
should be allowed and that the decision of the High
Court should be set aside and a mandamus issued to
the State of Orissa directing that State not to give
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
873
effect to the provisions of the Orissa Estates Abolition
Act of 1951 and not to take possession of the several
estates of the three petitioners under that Act.
The costs of the petitions here and in the High
Court should, in our opinion, be paid by the State of
Orissa.
1953
Biswambhar
Singh
v.
The State of
Orissa
and Others.
Bose J.
Appeals Nos. 167 and 168 allowed
Appeal No. 169 dismissed.
Agent for the appellants: B· P. Maheshwari.
Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
COOVERJEE B. BHARUCHA
1954
v.
January 13
THE EXCISE COMMISSIONER AND
THE CHIEF COMMISSIOKER, AJMER,
AND OTHERS.
[MEHR
CHAND MAHAJAN. C.J., MuKHERJEA,
VIVIAN BosE, GHuLAM HAsAN
and JAGANNADHADAS JJ.]
Constitution of India, art. 19 (1) (g)-Excise Regulation I of
1915-Whether ultra vires art. 19 (J) (g)-Reasonable restrictions
under art. 19 (6)-Charge of fee-Whether in the nature of tax.
Held, (i) that with reference to Excise Regulation I of 1915
for the purpose of determining reasonable restrictions within the
meaning of art. 19 ( 6) of the Constitution, on the right given
un<lrr cl. 19 ( 1) (g) regard must be had to the nature of the
business and the conditions prevailing in a particular trade and
no hard and fast rules concerning all trades can be laid
down.
The State has the power to prohibit trades which are illegal or
in1moral or injurious to the health and welfare of the public. There
"is no inherent right in a citizen to sell intoxicating liquors by
retail and therefore the provisions of the Excise Regulation I of
1915 purporting to regulate trade in liquor in all its different
spheres are not invalid;
(ii) charge of licence fee by public auction is more in the nature
of a tax than a licence fee though it is described as a licence
One of the purposes of the Regulation is to raise revenue.
fee.
Revenue is collected by the grant of contracts to carry on trade
in liquors and these contracts are sold by auction.
The grantee
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