DWARKADAS SHRINIVAS OF BOMBAY versus THE SHOLAPUR SPINNING & WEAVING CO. LTD., AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 18 December 1953 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 674 | 1953 INSC 92
Key facts
- Decided
- 18 December 1953
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 141/1952
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 674
- Neutral citation
- 1953 INSC 92
Text of the judgment
674
1953
T!11 Sta11 of
W1Jt B1ngal
Y,
Subodh Gopal
BoJt a11d Otlitrr.
JazannU!11u/as J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
of Eminent Domain. It is on a par with article 21.
It seems to me to serve a distinct purpose over and
above that relating to the law of Eminent Domain,
viz., that it relates also to deprivation of property
other than that which may fall within the scope of
article 31 (2). It enjoins that such deprivation shall
not be brought about save by authority of law.
In view of what I have said above, it follows that
the assumption with which I have started, vit:., that
this is a case falling under article 19 (1) (f) :md (5) is, in
my opinion, correct.
In the result I agree that the appeal should be
allowed with costs here and in the High Court.
•
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant : P. K. Bose.
Agent for respondent No. 1 : R. R. Biswas.
195~
Dec. 18.
DWARKADAS SHRINIVAS OF BOMBAY
v.
THE SHOLAPUR SPINNING & WEAVING CO.
LTD., AND OTHERS.
rPATANJALI sAsTRI c.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE
and GHIJLAM HASAN JJ.]
Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co1npany (Emergency Prouisions) Ordinance II of 1950, replaced by Act XXVl!l of !950H1 hether ultra vircs art. 31 of the Constitution-Arts. 19 and 31Scope of-Whether different.
The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., was incorpo
rated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, with an authorised
capilal of Rs. 48 lakhs divided into 1590 fully paid up ordinary
• shares of Rs. 1,000 each, 20 fully paid up ordinary shares of Rs. 500
each and 32,000 partly paid up cumulative prcferenc<": shares of
Rs. 100 each, the paid up capital of the Company being- Rs. 32 lakhs
comprised of Rs. 16 lakhs fully paid up ordinary shares and
Rs. 16 lakhs partly paid up preference shares, Rs. 50 being unpaid
on each of the 32,000 cumulative preference shares. The Company
did goo<l business and declared high dividends for son1c time ; but
in the year 1949 there \Vas accumulation of stocks and financia1
difficulties. On the 27th July, 1949, the Directors gave notice Gf
4
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
675
their decision to close the Mills to the workers, and pursuant to
this notice the Mills were closed. Thi• created a labour problem
DW1lr/i;tlt/11i
and to solve it the Governn1cnt on he 5th October, 1949, appointed
Sllrinivtu of
a Controller to supervise the affairs of the· Mills under the
Essential Supplies Emergency Powers Act, 1946. On the 9th
v.
Novcrnher, 1949, the Controller in order to resolve the deadlock
Tiu Sh1l_,11
decided to call in 1nore capital and asked the Directors of the
Spi!tttin1: mr4
Company to n1ake a call of Rs. 50 per share, on the preference Weaoiot Co. Ltil.f
shareholders, the amount remaining unpaid on each of the prefer~
4n.l Oth1r1.
ence shares. The Directors refused- to comply with this rcquisi~
tion, as in their judgment, this was not in the interests of the
Company. '[hereupon the Govcrnor~Gcncral on the 9th January,
1950, pro1nulgated the itnpugne<l Ordinance, under which the Mills
could be 1nanaged an<l run by the Directors appointed by the
Central Government. On the 9th January, 1950, the Central
Govern1nent acting under s. 15 of the Ordinance delegated all iu
powers to the c;overn1nent of Bombay. The Government of
Bombay then appointed certain Directors \Vho took over the
assets and inanagemcnt of the Mills. On the 7th February, 1950,
they passed a resolution 1nakinp,: a call of Rs. 50 on each of the
preferc-nce shares payable at the titnc stated in the resolution.
Pursuant t~ this resolution a notice was addressed on the 22nd
February, 1950, to the plaintiff in the suit \vho held preference
shares, to pay Rs. 1,62,000 the amount of the said call on or ~fore
the 3r<l April, 1910. Tht': plaintiff instead of meeting the demand,
filed the present suit on the 28th March, 1950, in a represt":ntativc
capacity on behalf of hi1nself and other preference shareholders
against the Coinpany and the Directors appointed by the Government of Ro111bay challenging the validity of the Ordinance and
qucstiof1ing the right of the Directors to make the call. It was
alleged in the suit that the Ordinance \Vas illegal and ultra vire.r
and invalid as it contravened the provisions of Section 299(2) of the
(;overntnent of India Act, 1935, and the provisions of Part III of
the Constitution an<l that the resolution of the Directors dated
7th February, 1950, inaking a call ,Vas illegal and ultra vires as
the law under \vhich they were appointed was itself invalid. The
suit \Vas <lismissed by the Trial Judge and his decision was affinned
on appeal by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court by the
Judgment dated 29th August, 1950. The plaintiff preferred the
present appeal to the Supre1nc Court. This appeal concerns the
validity of the same Ordinance and the J\ct replacing it \Vhich
were considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Chiranjit Lal
Chowdhuri (1950 S.C.R. 869). There an ordinary shareholder of
the defendant Company holding one fully paid up share challenged
the Yalidity of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance II of 1950 and Act XXVIII of 1950,
«eking relief under Article 32 of the Constitution on the ground
that the said Ordinance and the
Act abridged his fundamental
.rights conferred on him under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition by a majoriy of
s.,,.,,.,
676
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrir.ivtu of
BGmhay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.1
and Othtrs.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
3 to 2 holding that the presumption in regard to the Constitutionality of the Act had not been displaced by the petitioner and
that it had not been proved that the i1npugned statute was a hostile
or <liscrin1inatory piece of legislation as against him or that the
State had taken possession of his share. The minority held that
i1npugnc<l statute \Vas \•oid as it abridged the
petitioner's fundan1ental rights under Article 14 of the Constitution. This de..::ision
was delivered on 4th Dece1nber, 1950. The suit giving rise to the
present appeal \Vas decided by the Bo1nbay High Court durin~ the
pendency of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri's petition in the Supreme
Court :
Held, (per PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J., MAHAJAN, BosE, an<l
(;HL'LAr.r HASAN JJ.) (i) that the impugned Ordinance and th~ Act
replacing it authorise in effect a deprivation of the property of the
Con1pany ,vithin the n1eaning of Article 31 'vithout compensation
and are not covered by the exception in clause (S)(b) (ii) of that
Article. The Ordinance and the Act thus violate the fundamental
rights of the Company under Article 31(2) of the Constitution and
the appellant as a preference shareholder who is called upon to
pay the inoneys unpaid on his shares is entitled to impugn their
constitutionality.
(ii) that the previous decision of the Supren1e Court in
Charanjit Lal Chotudhuri v. The Union of India and Others{1) is
distinguishable and has no application to the present case.
Per MAHAJAN J.
(i) Constitutional prov1s1ons for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed. A close and literal cons·
truction deprives then1 of half their efficacy and leads to gradual
depreciation of the right, as if it consisted 1nore in sound than in
substance. It is the duty of C'_,ourts to be \Vatchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Boyd v. United States ( 1 ) referred to.
By promulgating the Ordinance, the Government has not
merely taken oYcr the superintendence of the affairs of the Con1·
parry but has in effect and substance taken over the undertaking
itself. In the situation the contention has no force that the effect
of th<": Ordinance is that the Central Government has taken over
the superintendence of the affairs of the Con1pany and that the
i1npugned legislation is n1erely regulative in character. In the
present case practically all incidents of ownership have been taken
over by the State and nothing has been left \Vith the Company but
the mere husk of title and in the premises the impugned statute
has oYerstcppcd the limits of legiti1nate Social Control Legislation
and has infringed the funda1nental right of the Company
guaranteed to it under Article 31(2) of the Constitution ~1nd is,
therefore, unconstitutional.
(I) (1950] S. C.R. 869.
(2) !iii L'. S. 616
•
S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
(ii) It is significant that Article 31 deals with private pro1953
perty of persons residing in the Union of India, while Article 19
Dwark,a,tliu
only' deals with citizens defined in Article 5 of the Constitution.
Shrinivas of
It is obvious that the scope of these two i\rticles cannot be the
Bombay
sa1ne as they cover different fields. The true approach to this
v.
question is that these two 1\rticles really deal with two different
The
Sholapur
subjects and one has no direct relation with the other, nan1ely,
Spinning and
Article 31 deals with the field of e1ninent domain and the \vhole Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Othtrs.
boundary of that field is demarcated by this Article.
From the language entployed in the different sub-clal-lses of
Articie 31 it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the words
"acquisition" and "taking possession" used in Article 31(2) have
the same 1neaning as the word "deprivation" in Article 31(1).
(iii) Article 31 is a self-contained provision delimiting the
field of eminent and clauses ( l) and (2) of Article 31 deal with the
s:unt: topic of compulsory acquisition of property.
Article 31 gives complete protection to private property as
against executive action, no 1natter by what process a person is
deprived of possession of it.
It is a narrow view that "acquisition" necessarily means acquisition of title in whole or part of the property and cannot be
accep~ed. The
word "acquisition" has quite a wide; concept,
n1ean1ng the procuring of property or the taking of it pern1anentiy
or ternporarily. It does not necessarily iI!lply acquisition of
legal title by the State in the property taken possession of.
Minister of State for the Army \'. Dalziel (68 C.L.R. 261)
referred to.
Per Das /.
(I) As the appellant as a preference shareholder is directly
affected by the impugned statute, \vhich circumstance distingui·
shes this case fron1 Chiranjit Lal'; case, it must be held that the
appellant is entitled to challenge the Ordinance which dismissed
the Directors elected by the shareholders, authorised the appoint~
ment of Direc:.tors by the State and n1a<le it possible for the Dire.:·
tors so appointed to make the call and thereby impose a liability
on all preference shareholders including the appellant.
(II) The provisions of the Ordinance and the Act are drastic
in the ·extreme. The Managing Agents and the elected Directors
have been dismissed and ne\v Directors have been appointed by the
Stat~. So far as the Company is concerned it has been complete·
ly denuded of the possession of its property. All that has been left
to the Company is its bare legal title. It is impossible to uphold
this la\v as an instance of the exercise of the State's police power
as an emergency measure. It has far overstepped the limits of
police power and is, in substance, nothing short of expropriation
by way of the exercise of the power of eminent domain and as
the law has not provided for any compensation it must be held to
offend the provisions of Article 31(2).
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
678
19~3
[1954]
Per Bos• J.
The words "taken possession of" or "acquired" in .~rticle
31(2) have to be read along with the word "deprived" in clause
.Bombay
(1). The possession and acquisition referred to in clause (2) mean
v.
the sort of "possession" and "acquisition" that amount to "deprivation" within the meaning of clause (1). No hard and fast rule
The Sholapur
Spinning and
can be laid down.
Each case must depend on its own
Weaiiing Co. Ltd., facts. But if there is substantial deprivation, then clause (2) is
and Others,
attracted.
DuJ4,k<JdoJ
ShtinilllU ef
Per GHULAM HASAN J.
The Act in substance robs the Company of every vestige of right,
except what has heen laconically called the husk of the title. The
impugned Act oversteps the constitutional limits of the power conferred upon the State and offends against the provisions of Article 31 and must therefore be held to be void.
The intention underlying Article 31 being the protection of property against invasion by the State, both parts (1) and (2) of Article 31 should be read together so as to harmonize that intention.
The two parts of the Article form an integral whole and cannot
be dissociated from earh other. Article 31 is wider than Article
19(1)(£) which confers upon a citizen only the right to acquire, hold
and dispose of property and is different in scope and content.
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India and Others
([1950] S.C.R. 869) distinguished, The State of West Bengal v.
Subodh Copa/ Bose and Others ([1954] S.C.R. 587), Boyd
v. United States (116 U.S. 616), Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
(260 U.S. 322), A. K. Copa/an v. The State of Madras ([1950]
S.C.R. 88), State of Bihar v. Maharajah Kameswar Singh and Others
([1952] S.C.R. 889), Minister of State for the Army v. Dalzid
(68 C.L.R. 261), Tan Bug Tain v. Collector of Bombay (I.L.R. 1946
Born. 517), and Jupiter General Insurance Co. v. Rajagopalan
(A.LR. 1952 Punjab 9), referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
CIVIL
APPEAL
No. 141 of 1952.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 29th
August 1950 of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Gajendragadkar J.) in
Appeal No. 48 of 1950 arising out of the Judgment
and Decree dated the 28th June, 1950, of the said High
Court (Bhagwati J.) in its Ordinary Original Civil
Jurisdiction in Suit No. 438 of 1950.
M. P. Amin (M. M. Desai and K. H. Bhabha, with
him) for the appellant.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
M. C. &talvad, Attorney-General for India and
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General fior India ( G. N.
Joshi, with them) for respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and 6
to 8.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.
Joshi and Portts A. Mehta, with him) for respondent
No. 9.
1953. December 18. The following Judgments
were delivered.
PATANJALI SAsrnr C.J.-I have fully discussed and
explained the meaning and effect of articles 19 and 31
in my Judgment just delivered in Civil Appeal No. 107
of 1952-The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others '· On that view I agree with my learned brothers that the impugned Ordinance authorises,
in effect, a deprivation of the property of the Company
within the meaning of article 31 without compensation
and is not covered by the exception in clause (5) (b)
(ii) of that article. The Ordinance thus violates the
fundamental right of the Company under article 31(2),
and the appellant as a preference shareholder who is
now called upon to pay the moneys unpaid on his
shares is entitled to impugn the constitutionality of
the Ordinance. I also agree with my learned brother
Mahajan that the previous of this Court in Chiranjit
Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India and Others(') is
distinguishable and has no application here for the
reasons mentioned by him.
MAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal from the judgment
and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay
passed on the 29th day of August, 1950, in Appeal No.
48 of 1950.
The appeal concerns the validity of the same piece
of legislation that was considered by this court in the
case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri ( 2). There, an ordinary
shareholder of the defendant company holding one
fully paid up share claimed relief under Art. 32 of
the Constitution of India on the ground that the
provisions of the Sholapur Spinning & Weaving
Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, XXVIII of
(1) [1951] S. C. R 587.
(2) [1950] S. C.R. 869.
1953
DWarkadas
S!irinirlas of
Bom6ay
v.
Th• Sholapur
Spinning and
Wea1Jing Co. Ltd.,
and Otller.r
Patanjaii
Sa.Itri C. J.
680
1953
Dwarkada1
Sh:rinivas of
Bo~ay
v.
The Sholapr'f
Spinning and
Wro;;ing Co. Ltd.,
and OlhtrJ.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1950 abridged his fundamental rights conferred under
Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. This Court
by a majority of 3 to 2 dismissed the petition holding
that the presumption in regard to the constitutionality
of the Act had not been displaced by the petitioner
and that it had not been proved that the impugned
statute was a hostile or a discriminatory piece of
legislation as against him, or that the State had taken
possession of his share. The minority held that the
impugned )fatute was void as it abridged the petitioner's fundamental rights under Art. 14 of the
Constitution. This decision was delivered on 4th
December, 1950.
The suit out of which this appeal arises was decided
by the High Court of Bombay during the pendency of
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri's petition in this court. Most
of the facts furnishing the cause of action for the suit
have been detailed in the judgment of this court in
that case, but it seems necessary to briefly re-state
them from a proper appreciation of the contentions that
have been raised in the appeal.
The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd.,
was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act
with an authorized capital of Rs. 48 lakhs divided
into 1,590 fully paid up ordinary shares of Rs. 1,000
each, 20 fully paid up ordinary shares of 500 each, and
32,000 partly paid up cumulative preference shares of
Rs. 100 each, the paid up capital of the company being Rs. 32 lakhs comprised of Rs. 16 lakhs fully paid
up ordinary shares and Rs. 16 lakhs partly paid up
preference shares, Rs. 50 being unpaid on each of the
32,000 cumulative preference shares. The company
did good business and declared high dividends for
some time ; but in the year 1949, there was accumulation of stocks and financial difficulties. In order to
overcome this situation the directors decidecl to close
the Mills and on the 27th July, 1949, they gave notice
.of this decision to the workers. Pursuant to this
notice the Mills were closed on the 27th August, 1949.
This created a labour problem and to solve it the
Government on the 5th October, 1949, appointed a
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
Controller to ,supervise the affairs of the Mills under
the Essential Supplies Emergency Powers Act, 1946.
On the 9th November, 1949, the Controller in order to
resolve the deadlock decided to call in more capital
and he asked the directors of the company 'to make a
call of Rs. 50 per share on the preference shareholders,
the amount remaining unpaid on each of the preference shares. The directors refused to comply with
this requisition, as in their judgment that was not in
the interest of the company. Thereupon the Governor-General on the 9th January, 1950, promulgated
the impugned Ordinance, under which the Mills could
be managed and run by directors appointed by the
Central Government. On the ·9th January, 1950, the
Central Government acting under section 15 of the
Ordinance delegated all its powers to the Government
of Bombay. The Government of Bombay then
appointed certain directors who took over the assets
and management of the Mills. On the 7th February,
1950, they passed a resolution making a call of Rs. 50
on each of the preference shares payable at the time
stated in the resolution. Pursuant to this resolution
a notice was addressed on the 22nd February, 1950,
to the plaintiff in the suit, who held preference shares,
to pay Rs. 1,62,000, the amount of the said call on or
before the 3rd April, 1950. The plaintiff instead of
meeting the demand, filed the present suit on the 28th
March, 1950, in a representative capacity on behalf of
himself and other preference shareholders against the
company and the directors appointed by the Government of Bombay challenging the validity of the Ordinance and questioning the right of the directors to make
the call. On the 19th April, 1950, a notice was given
to the Attorney-General of India of the said suit
and the Union of India was added as defendant No. 9
therein.
The principal allegations in the suit were that the
Ordinance was illegal, ultra vires and invalid as it
contravened the provisions of section 299 (2) of the
GOl·ernment of India Act, 1935, and all the provisions
contained in Part III of the Constitution, and that
the resolution of the directors dated 7th Febrnary,
7-93 $. C. Tndia/59.
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
~Veaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Mahqjan J,
682
1953
Dwcrkadas
Shri,~ivaJ of
BtJmbay
v.
The Sholapur
Spir.ning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Othm.
Ma.11ajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1950, making a call was illegal and ultra vires, as the
law under which they were appointed was itself invalid. The plaintiff claimed relief in the form of a
declaration regarding the invalidity of the Ordinance
and prayed for an injunction restraining the directors
from giving effect to the resolution. The defendants
denied the correctness of the contentions put forward
by the plaintiff.
Mr. Justice Bhagwati, who tried the sl!it,
the following issues therein :-
framed
1. Whether by the Ordinance the plaintiff and
holders of prefernce shares have been deprived of
their interest in the 1st defendant company by taking
possession of or requisitioning or acquiring the same
as alleged in para. 6 of the plaint ;
2. Whether s. 4 ( d) of the Ordinance is illegal,
ultra vires, and void in law as alleged ; and
3. Whether the
resolution dated the 7th February, 1950, made by defendants 2 to 6 is illegal, ultra
vires, void and inoperative in law for the reasons
mentioned in para. 6 of the plaint or any of them.
By his judgment dated the 28th June, 1950, the
learned Judges answered all the three issues in the
negative and dismissed the suit, and this decision
was affirmed on appeal. It was held that by force
of the Ordinance the State had neither acquired the
property of the plaintiff, nor of the company, nor had
it taken possession of it, but that the title to the
property and its possession were with the respective
owners, and the State was only supervising the affairs
of the company through its nominated directors. It
was further held that the Ordinance had not in anv
manner infringed the rights of the plaintiff unde~
Art. 14 of the Constitution and there had been to
him no denial of equality before the law or equal protection of laws, as the Ordinance was based on a
classification which rested upon a ground having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation and that it had a reasonable basis for that
classification. It was also held that the restrictions
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
imposed on the right of the appellant and the company to hold his or its property were imposed in the
interests of the general public.
The principal questions for consideration m this
appeal are :1. Whether the prov1S1ons of the Ordinance for
taking over the management and administration of
the company, contravene the provisions of article 31
. (2) of the Constitution ; and
2. Whether the Ordinance as a whole or any of
its provisions infringe articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
In order to decide these issues it is necessary to
examine with some strictness the substance of the
legislation for the purpose of determining what it is
that the legislature has really done; the court, when
.such questions arise, is not overpersuaded by the
mere appearance of the legislation. In relation to
constitutional prohibitions binding a legislature it is
dear that the legislature cannot disobey the prohibitions merely by employing indirect method of
achieving exactly the same result. Therefore, in all
such cases the court has to look behind the names,
forms and appearances to discover the _true character
and nature of the legislation.
The preamble of the Ordinance states :"On account of mismanagement and neglect a
· situation has arisen in the affairs of the Sholapur
Spinning & Weaving Company, Ltd., which has prejudicially affected the production of an essential
commodity and has caused serious unemployment
amongst a certain section of the community".
Section 3 is the most material section and is in these
terms:"The Central Government may at any time by
notified order appoint as many persons as it thinks fit
to be directors of the company for the purpose of
taking over its management and administration and
may appoint one of such directors to be the chairman."
.1953
Dwarkadas
S/Jrinivas.of
Bombay
v.
T 11' Sholap"'
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Lld.,
and Others.
Mahaja•],
684
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrit!fras of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Othtrs.
ManajanJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
The provisions of this section are supplemented by
what is subsequently provided for in section 12 which
provides that notwithstanding anything contained in
the Companies Act or in tl1e memorandum or articles
of association of the company, it shall not be lawful
for the shareholders of the company or any other
person to nominate or appoint any person to be a
director of the company, that no resolution passed at
any meeting of the shareholders of the company shall
be given effect to unless approved by the Central
Government, and that no proceeding for the winding
up of the company or for the appointment of a
receiver in respect thereof shall lie in any court
unless by or with the sanction of the Central Government, and subject to such exceptions, restrictions and
limitations as the Central Government may by notified
order specify, the Companies Act shall continue to
apply to the company in the same manner as it applied
thereto before the issue of the notified order under
section 3. Section 4 states the effect of the order of
the Central Government appointing directors. It
provides that all the directors of the company who
were holding office as such immediately before the
issue of the notified order shall be deemed to have
vacated their offices.
In other words, the directors
elected and appointed by the shareholders stand
automatically dismissed without more. Not only do
the directors stand automatically dismissed by legislative action, the managing agents also share their
fate and their contracts come to an end. Section 4
directs the persons appointed under section 3 to take
into custody and under their control all the property,
effects and actionable claims to which the company
is or appears to he entitled and to exercise all the
powers of the directors of the company, whether
those powers are derived from the Companies Act
or from the memorandum or articles of association
or from any other source. By section 5 these nominated directors are given powers to raise funds in
such manner and offer such security as they may
deem fit. They are !fiven the overriding power of
cancelling and varymg contrar~s and agreements
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
entered into between the company and any other
person at any time if they are satisfied that the contract or the agreement is detrimental to the interest<
of the company. Section 10 denies to the managing
agents compensation for the premature termination of
the contract of management entered into by the company and it also says that no person shall be entitled
ro compensation in respect of a cancelled or varied
contract under this Ordinance, entered into with the
company. The Ordinance thus confers powers on
the directors of overriding all contracts and deprives
persons who had entered into contracts with the company of their right under the ordinary law to recover
compensation. Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Ordinance
lay down the method and manner how the existing
directors were to give charge of the companv's affairs
and properties to the directors nominated by the
Central Government under section 3 and any default
in the matter of handing over charge is made punishable by imprisonment or other punitive action.
The result of these provisions is that all the properties and effects of the company pass into the hands
of persons nominated by the Central Government who
are not members of the company or its shareholders,
or in any way connected with it, and who are merely
the creatures of the Central Government or its
dummies. The combined effect of the provisions of
sections 3, 4 and 12 is that the Central Government
becomes vested with the possession, control and
management of the property and effects of the company, and the normal function of the company under
its articles and the Indian Companies Act comes to
an end. The shareholders' most valuable right to
appoint directors to manage the affairs of the company and be in possession of its property and effect
is taken away. Resolutions passed by them lose all
vigour and become subject to the veto of the Central
Government. Their power of voluntarily winding up
the company formed by them or of winding it up
through court also becomes subject to the veto of the
Central Government. The
Central Government by
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinfras of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
· Spinning and
lVeauing Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Mahajan].
686
1953
Dwr.rkada1
Shririivas of
Bttmhay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Olher1.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
executive action can override, if it likes, all the provisions of the Indian Companies Act. In substance
therefore by the provisions of this Ordinance the company and its shareholders as well as its directors and
managing agents have been completely deprived of
possession of the property and effects of the company, and its possession has been taken by the
Central Government, i.e., by the Union of India. The
undertaking purports to have been taken over for a
public purpose, namely, to keep up the production of
an essential commodity, and to avoid serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the people.
The majority of the court in Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri's
case( 1), was inclined to take the view that that was the
true effect of the provisions of the Ordinance.
Mukherjea J., with whose views Kania C. J., concurred, and to whose views to a certain extent Faz! Ali J.
subscribed on this part of the case said as follows :"Mr. Chari, on the other hand, has contended on
behalf of the petitioner that after the management is
taken over by the statutory directors, it cannot be said
that the company still retains possession or control
over its property and assets. Assuming that this State
management was imposed in the interests of the shareholders themselves and that the statutory directors
are acting as the agents of the company, the possession
of the statutory directors could not, it is argued, be
regarded in law as possession of the company so long
as they are bound to act in obedience to the dictates
of the Central Government and not of the company
itself in the administration of its a ffairs. Possession
of an agent, it is said, cannot juridically be the possession of the principal, if the agent is to act not according
to the commands or dictates of the principal, but
under the direction of an exterior authority.
There can be no doubt that there is force in this
contention."
Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri, as he then was held
that the effect of the Act was that all the properties
and effects of the company passed into the absolute
(1) (1950] S.C.R. 869.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
power and control of the Central Government and the
normal function of the company as a corporate body
came to an end. Mr. Justice Das on this part of' the
case said as follows :"It is, however, urged by the learned AttorneyGcneral that the mills and all other assets now in the
possession and custody of the new directors who are
only servants or agents of the said company are, in the
eye of the law, in the possession and custody of the
company and have not really been taken possession of
by the State. This argument, however, overlooks the
fact that in order that the possession of the servant or
agent may be juridically regarded as the possession of
the master or principal, the servant or agent must k
obedient to, and amenable to the directions of, the
master or principal. If the master or principal has no
hand in the appointment of the servant or agent or
has no control over him or has no power to dismiss or
<lischarge him, as in this case, the possession of such
servant or agent can hardly, in law, be regarded as the
possession of the company. ·In this view of the matter
there is great force in Li1e argument that the property
of the company has been taken possession of by the
State through directors who have l?een appointed by
the State in exercise of the powers conferred by the
Ordinance and the Act and who are under the direction
and control of the State and this has been done without payment of any compensation, , , .................. .
Here, therefore, it ,may well be argued that the property of the company having been taken possession of
by the State in exercise of powers conferred by a' law
which does not provide for payment of any compensation, the fundamental right of the company has, in the
eye of the law, been infringed."
The learned Attorney-General combated this view
arnl strenuously argued that the Ordinance could not
be construed in the manner suggested above and on its
true construction its effect was that the Government
took under its superintendence the affairs of the company without in any way disturbing its title in the property and that the shareholders have still to a certain
extent an effective voice in its affairs. Illustratively
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weariing Co. Ltcf.,
and Others.
Mahajan].
688
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spi1111ing and
Weaving Co, Ltd. 1
and Others.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
he said that the company was in the same state
as a Jisqualified owner is under the provisions of the
Court of Wards Act and that the provisions of the
Ordinance should be construed m that light. To
emphasize the same point of view reference was also
made to the provisions of the Lunacy Act, the provisions of sections 52-A and 52-B introduced in the
Insurance Act by Act 47 of 1950, the provisions of the
Railway Companies Emergency Powers Act (51 of
1951 ), and also to the provisions of Act 65 of 1951
(Development of Industries Act), and it was contended
that the impugned Ordinance was a piece of social
control legislation as were the provisions contained in
the statutes referred to above.
In my opm10n, these contentions are not well
founded. Reference to illustrative pieces of legislation
designed on the same pattern is neither very happy
nor apposite ; on the other hand, it is apt to mislead
because except in the case of the Court of Wards Act,
all the laws to which reference was made were enacted
after the enactment of the Ordinance in question. The
different Court of Wards Acts being existing laws have
been excepted from the fundamental right guaranteed
by article 31 (2). That being so, they can afford little
assistance in judging the validity of the impugned law.
In dealing with constitutional matters of this kind it
is always well to bear in mind what Bradley, J.,
speaking for the court said in Boyd v. United States( 1 ) ,
at page 635 :"Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to
the rule that constitutional provisions for the security
of person arnl property should be liberally construed.
A close and literal construction deprives them of half
their efficacy and leads to gradual depreciation of the
right, as· if it consisted more in sound than in substance.
It is the dutv of conrts to he watchful for the constitutional right~ of the citizen and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon."
(1) 1•6 U.S. 616.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
These illustrative pieces of legislation to which the
learned Attorney-General made reference may well
have to be judged in the light of these observatiom
when occasion arises. Reference may also be made to
the observations of Holmes C. J. in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon( 1), wherein that learned Judge said
as follows :·
"As long recognized, some values were enjoyed
under an implied limitation and must yield to police
power but obviously the implied limitation must have
its limits or the contract and due process clauses are
_gone. One fact for consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most, if. not in all
<eases, there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to sustain the act."
In my judgment, in the determination of all such
<eases no abstract standard or general rule can be laid
down and the question is really one of degree and
hence its determination depends on the facts of each
case. In these circumstances, what is to be determined here is whether the provisions of the Ordinance
have not overstepped the limits of socia.1 legislation
and whether they do not come within the ambit of
article 31 (2).
The Ordinance in question is not a law of a general
<=haracter and applicable to all companies that may
fall in a particular category or class. It deals only
with a single companv and it is difficult to say that
mismanagement is a vice peculiar to this company
alone and good management is a virtue possessed by
all other incorporated companies. That being so, can
it be reasonably held that by promulgating this
Ordinance the Government has merely taken over the
· superintendence of the affairs of the company ? Or,
has it in effect and substance taken over the undertaking itself ? Obviously, the field of superintendence
has to be demarcated from the field of eminent domain.
It is one thing to superintend the affairs of a concern
and it is quite another thing to take over its affairs
(1) 260 U.S. 322
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Mahajan].
690
1953
DuiarkaOas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
Thi Sholapur
Spi11ning and
Wtav:ing Co. Ltd..
and Others.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
and then proceed to carry on its trade through agents
appointed by the State itself. It seems to me that
under the guise of superintendence the State is carrying on the business or trade for which the company
was incorporated with the capital of the company but
through its own agents who take orders from it and are
appointed by it and in the appointment and dismissal
of whom the shareho)ders have absolutely no voice. The
purpose of taking over the company's undertaking is a
public purpose, namely, to keep the labour going and
contended and to maintain the supply of essential
commodity. The company is debarred from carrying
on its business in the manner and according to the
terms of its charter. Its old complexion stands
changed by the terms of the Ordinance. The Ordinance
overrides the directors, deprives the shareholders of
their legal rights and privileges and completely puts
an end to the contract of the managing agents. Without there being any vacancy in the number of
directors new directors step in and old directors and
managing agents stand dismissed. Exercise of any
power by them under the articles is subject to heavy
penalties. In this situation it is not possible to subscribe to the contention of the learned AttorneyGeneral that the effect of the Ordinance is that the
Central Government has taken over the superintendence of the affairs of the company and that the
impugned legislation is merely regulative in character.
In the present case, practically all incidents of ownership have been taken over by the State and all that
has been left with the company is mere paper ownership. This Ordinance, in my judgment, is an apposite
illustration of what Holmes C. J. had in mind when
he made the following observations in the case already
referred to :"Where the seemingly absolute protection m
respect of private property given by the Constitution
is found to be qualified by the police power, the
natural tendency of human nature is to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private
property disappears. We are in danger of forgetting
that a strong public desire to improve the public
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change and that the general rule is that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent
but if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking."
•
For the reasons given above I am of the opinion
that the impugned statute has overstepped the limits
of legitimate social control legislation and has infringed the fundamental right of the company guaranteed
to it. under article 31 (2) of the Constitution and is
therefore unconstitutional.
Next it was -contended that the Ordinance in
question in any event could not fall within the mischief of article 31 (2) because the State had not
acquired title in the property of the company under
its . provisions and that whatever possession had been
taken had. been taken for the purpose of managing the
company's property on the company's behalf and that
it had not been requisitioned for any State purpose. It
was said that unless the property of the company by the provisions of the Ordinance was vested in the
State or was commandeered by the State for State
purposes, article 31 (2) could not be invoked to judge
the constitutionality of the Ordinance, that article 31
(2) covered within its ambit only two forms of taking
of property by the State, namely, where the State
acquired title in the property or where the State
temporarily commandeered it, and that all other forms
of taking the property were outside the fundamental
right guaranteed by article 31 (2). It was suggested
that the scope of the protection given to private
property by our Constitution was not as large as it
was contained in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America. According to
the learned Attorney-General, the true content of the
fundamental right guaranteed by article 31 (1) was
that a person could not be ·deprived of his property
except by statutory authority, but once a law was
made depriving a person of his property then the
article afforded no further protection. Support for this
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
...
The Shoiapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. ltd.,
and Others.
Mahajan J.
692
1953
Dwarkadas
S!.rinfras of
Bombay
v.
Tilt Sholapur
Spinning and
Wea~'ing Co. Ltd.,
aad Others.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
contention was sought to be derived from the reasoning employed in Gopalan's case (1). There it was held
that the freedoms relating to the person of a citizen
guaranteed by article 19 assume the existence of a
free citizen and can no longer be enjoyed if a citizen is
deprived of his liberty by the law of preventive or
punitive detention. In like manner it was argned that
the freedom relating to property guaranteed by
article 19 also vanished as soon as a person was
deprived of his property under a law enacted by an
appropriate legislature. The learned Attorney-General
suggested that the two clauses of article 31 were in the
nature of two exceptions to the provisions of article 19
(1) (f). The first exception was that the guarantee of
freedom given by article 19 (1). (f) could be defeated
simply by enacting a statute and the second exception
was that it could also be defeated by the State acquiring title in the property in exercise of its power of
eminent domain within the limited fiel<l prescribed by
article 31 (2) hut that if a certain deprivation of
property did not fall within the prescribed field of
. article 31 (2) and fell within article 31 (1), then for
such deprivation no compensation was payable. As
regards clause (5) which excepted certain laws from
the ambit of article 31 (2), it was argued that this
clause had been inserted in the article by way of
abundant caution.
In my judgment, none of these contentions have any
validity. The construction sought to be placed by the
learned Attorney-General on the language of article 31
is neither borne out by the phraseology employed in
that article nor by the scheme of Part III of the
Constitution, It seems to me that our Constitution
subject to certain exceptions has gnaranteed the
fullest protection to pnvate property. It has not only
provided that no person can be deprived of property
by the executive without legislative sanction but it
has further provided that even the legislature cannot
deprive a person of his property unless there is a
public purpose and then only on payment of compensation. This article provides as follows :(!) ['9:,o] S.C.R. 88.
•
S.C.R.
693
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
"31. (1) No person shall be
property save by authority of law.
deprived
of
his
(2) No property, movable or immovable, including any interest, in, or in any company owning, any
commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken
possession of or acquired for public purposes under
any law authorising the taking of such possession or
such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired
and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or
specifies the principles on which, and the manner in ·
which, the compensation 1s to be determined and
given.
(3) No such law as 1s referred to in clause (2)
made by the Legislature of a State shall have effect
unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.
( 4) It any Bill pending at the commencement of
this Constitution in the legislature of a State has,
after it has been passed by such Legislature, been
reserved for the consideration of the President and
has received his assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall
not be called in question in any court on the ground
that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2).
(5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect(.a) the provisions of any existing law other than
a law to which the provisions of clause (6) apply, or
(b) the provisions of any law which the State
may hereafter make( i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax
or penalty, or
(ii) for the promotion of public health or the
prevention of danger to life or property, or
(iii) in pursuance of any agreement entered into
between the Government of the Dominion of India or
the Government of India and the. Government of any
other country, or otherwise, with respect to property
declared by law to be evacuee property.
1953
Dwarkar!aJ
Shrinfoas of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinr1ing and
Weacing Co. Ltd.-,
and Others.
Mahajan].
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
( 6) Any law of the State enacted not more than
eighteen
months before the commencement of this
Dwarkadas
S4rinivaJ of
Constitution may within three months from such
Bombay
commencement be submitted to the President for his
certification ; and thereupon, if the President by
IThe Sholapw
public notification so certifies, it shall not be called in
Spinning and
Weauing Co. Ltd.,
question in any court on the ground that it contraand Others.
venes the provisions of clause (2) of this article or has
contravened the provisions of sub-section (2) of
Mahajan].
section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935."
It bears the heading "Right to Property". It is
significant that the different articles in Part III . have
been put in several groups, each bearing a heading of
its own. These headings briefly indicate the nature
and character of the fundamental rights thus grouped.
The first group of articles 14 to 18, bears. the heading
"Right to Equality".
The
fundamental right of
equality in matters of law, religion, social status etc.
is mentioned in the different articles grouped under
this heading. Articles 19 to 22 have been grouped
under the heading "Right to Freedom". Not only are
the protections given against deprication of personal
freedom mentioned in this group but it also mentions
cases where personal freedom can be deprived by certain laws. Similarly, other articles in this part have
been grouped under the headings "Right against
exploitation", "Educational rights" and "Constitutional remedies". Under this scheme the fundamental
right regarding property apart from personal and
property freedoms has been dealt with in this part
separately as a self-contained provision and as a distinct subject from the various freedoms declared by
article 19. In considering article 31 it is significant
to note that it deals with private property of persons
residing in the Union of India, while article 19 only
deals with citizens defined in article 5 of the Constitution. It is thus obvious that the scope of these two
articles cannot be the same as they cover different
fields. It cannot be seriously argued that so far as
citizens are concerned, freedoms regarding enjoyment
of property have been granted in two articles of the
Constitution, while the protection to property qua all
1953
.,,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
other persons has been dealt with in article 31 alone.
If both articles covered the same ground, it was unnecessary to have two articles o.n the same subject. The
true approach to this question is that these two articles
really deal with two different subjects and one has no
direct relation with the other, namely, article 31 deals
with the field of eminent domain and the whole boundary of that field is demarcated by this article. In
other words, the State's power to take the property of
a person is comprehensively delimited by this article.
The article• has been split up in six clauses. Moreover,
by the amendment of the Constitution certain kinds
of laws have been exempted from the operation of the
article or from the whole of Part. III of the Constitution by the addition of articles 31A and 31B. Article
31(1) declares the first requisite for the exercise of
the power of eminent domain. It guarantees that a
·person cannot be deprived of property by an executive
fiat and that it is only by the exercise of its legislative
powers that the State can deprive a person of his
property. In other words, all that article 31(1) says is
that private property can only be taken pursuant to
law and not otherwise. · A reference to Cooley's Constitutional Limitations fully bears out what the true
content of article 31(1) is. This is what he has said at
page 1119 (8th edn.) :"Legislative authority requisite : The right to
appropriate private property to public uses lies dormant in the State, until legislative action is had,
pointing out the occasions, the modes, conditions and
agencies for its appropriations. Private property can
only be taken pursuant to law."
Article 31 (2) defines the powers of the legislature in
the field of eminent domain. It declares that private
property shall not be taken by the State under a law
unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken. It is also implicit in the language of the
article that such taking can only be for public purposes.
Clause (3) of the article places an additional limitation
on State laws enacted on this subject while clause (4)
limits the justiciability of the quantum of compensation
in certain cases. Clause (5) is the saving clause . It saves
1953
Dwar/r,arlas
Shrinicias of
Bombay
v.
TJ,, Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. I.Jd.,
and Others.
Mahajan].
696
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
from the operation of clause (2) laws made on certain
subjects.
The scope of the first clause being merely to
DwarkaJas
save private property from being taken purely by
Shrinfras oj
Bomf.iay
executive action and the only clause which limits
v.
legislative action in the field of eminent domain being
Ti1e Sholapur
clause (2), the saving clause therefore concerns itself
Sp£m1ing and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
with clause (2) only.
and Others.
As pointed out in Willis on Constitutional Law, at
Mahajan].
page 716, police power, power of taxation and eminent
domain arc all forms of social control and probably
include all the forms of social control knowu to the law:
but each differs from the others; though it is possible
to distinguish each from the others, yet each has
characteristics which resemble the characteristics of
others and there are times when it is very difficult to
draw a line between the one and the others. The
saving clause (5) in article 31 has been designed with
the express purpose of saving to a certain extent laws
made in exercise of the police power of the State
which may lead to deprivation property. It has also
saved laws relating to tax. It has thus delimited from
the field of eminent domain the field of exercise of
police power and the exercise of the power of taxation.
Not only has it saved from the mischief of clause (2)
of article 31 provisions of laws made for the purpose
of imposing or levying any tax or penalty and the
laws made for promotion of public health or the
prevention of danger to life· or property, but it has
also saved from the mischief of the clause the provisions of all existing laws which may be construed as
amounting to deprivation of property of a person as
well as evacuee property laws under which the State
takes possession of properties of persons who have left
India for Pakistan. In the result the saving clause
comprehensively includes within the ambit all the
powers of the State in exercise of which it could deprive
a person of property without payment of compensation. In other words, all forms of deprivation of
property by the State without payment of compensation have been included within the ambit of the
exception clause, while other forms of deprivation of
property which are outside the ambit of the exception
1953
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
1953
clause are inevitably within the mischief of clause (2) of
the article. From the language employed in the differDwarkadas
Shrinivas of
ent sub-clauses of article 31 it is difficult to escape the
Bombay
conclusion that the words "acquisition" and "taking
v.
The Sholapur
possession" used in article 31 (2) Juve the same meanSpinning· and
ing as the word "deprivation" in article 31(1). The Weai•ing Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
learned Attorney-General suggested that much weight
could not be attached in construing article 31 to the
~ohajan J.
provrnons of. clause (5) inasmuch as the saving clause
had been introduced by the article merely by way of
abundant caution. [ am unable to accede to this contention as it seems to me that the Constitution while
defining and delimiting fundamental rights would not
introduce in the :irt1cles de:iling with those rights some
matter merely by way of abundant caution. To my
mind, it was essential while delimiting and defining
fundamental rights to fully define the field of the right
and to say what was not included within that right.
As already said, the article read as a whole comprehensively defines the State"s power of eminent domain
as distinguished from all its other powers the exercise
of which may amount to the taking of private property. The argument that these exceptions were incorporated in article 31 by way of abundant caution
further stands negatived by the contents of sub-clause
(5) (b) (ii) of the article. Only laws made for the promotion of public health or for prevention of danger to
life or property have been excluded from the mischief
of clause (2) of the article, while other laws made in
exercise of power of social control which deprive a
person of property have not been saved frorl} the operation of clause (2). Illustratively, laws made by the
State dealing with morality and which may lead to
deprivation of property are outside the ambit of the
exception clause. A fortiori, any deprivation of property under a law made for promotion of morality
would fall within the mischief of clause (2) of article
31. It is thus clear that only that form of legislation
which promotes public health or prevention of danger
to life or property is saved from the provisions of
article 31 (2), while other laws made in exercise of the
power of social control, if they deprive a person of
8-95 S.G.J./59
698
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
Tk Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
_,..
J,faftajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
property, are not saved from the operation of clause
(2) of article 31.
In support of his contention that the content of
article 31(1) was larger than that of article 31(2) and
that except in cases where the form of taking private
property took the shape of acquisition of title or
requisition for State uses, in all other cases the State
could deprive a person of his property by simply
m:· :cing a law, the learned Attorney-General placed
reliance on the following observations of my brother
Das in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri's case(') :"Article 31 (1) formulates the fundamental right
in a negative form prohibiting the deprivation of property except by authority of law. It implies that a
person may be deprived of his property by authority
of law. Article 31(2) prohibits the acquisition or taking possession of property for a public purpose under
any law, unless such law provides for payment of
compensation. It is suggested that clauses (1) and (2)
of article 31 deal with the same topic, namely,
compulsory acqu1S1t1on or taking possession of property, clause (2) being only an elaboration of clause ( 1 )
There appear to me to be two objections to this
suggestion. If that were the correct view, then clause
(1) must be held to be wholly redundant and clause (2),
by itself, would have been sufficient. In the next
place, such a view would exclude deprivation of
property otherwise than by acquisition or t;iking of
possession. One can conceive of circumstances where
the State may have to deprive a person of his property without acquiring or taking possession of the
same. For example, in any emergency, in order to
prevent a fire spreading, the authorities may have to
demolish an intervening building. This deprivation of
property is different from acquisition or taking of
possession of property which goes by the name of
'eminent domain' in the American law. The construction suggested implies that our Constitution has dealt
with only the. law of 'eminent domain', but has not
provided for deprivation of property in exercise of
(l) [!950] S.C.R. 869.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
'police power'. I am not prepared to adopt such
construction, for I do not feel pressed to do so by the
language used in article 31. On the contrary, the
language of clause (1) of article 31 is wider than that
of clause (2), for deprivation of property may well be
brought about otherwise than by acquiring or taking
possession of it. I think clause (1) enunciates the
general principle that no person shall be deprived of
his property except by authority of law, which, put in
a positive form, implies that a person may be deprived
of his property, provided he is so deprived by authority of law. No question of _compensation arises
under clause (1). The effect of clause (2) is that only
certain kinds of deprivation of property, namely, those
brought about by acquisition or taking possession of
it, will not be permissible under any law, unless such
law provides for payment of compensation. If the
deprivation of property is brought about by means
other than acquisition or taking possession of it, no
compensation is required, provided that such deprivation is by authority of law."
Similar observations were made by my brother in
the Bihar Zamindari case('). Undoubtedly great weight
must be given to the opinion expressed on this question by my learned brother and had I not felt
convinced that his approach to this question was
illiberal and restricted, I would have hesitated to
differ from his views. After a full consideration of the
problem and after giving due weight to the reasoning
of my learned brother, I am unable, for reasons above
stated, to agree with him. The objections envisaged
by my brother in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri's case ( 2 }
against the suggestion that clauses (1) and (2) of
article 31 deal with the same topic of compulsory
acquisition or taking of property do not at all oppress
me and do not seem to me to be insurmountable or
cogent.
On the assumption that clauses (1) and (2) of
artide 31 deal with the same topic, it is not clear to
me why in that context article 31(1) somehow becomes
(') ['952]S.CR·889.
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
W eoving Co. LlJ.,
and Others.
Mahqjan J.
700
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
Th~ Sholapur
Spinning a11d
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
anti Others.
Afahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
mlu1Hlant. This is the only clause in the article which
giYes protection to priYate property from being taken
under executive orders without legislative sanction
behind them. The first requisite for the exercise of
the power of eminent domain is that it can only be
exercised pursuant to law. lt was necessary while
delimiting the field of eminent domain to state that iD
the article. If the State had been entitled by clause
(1) to take away private property merely by making a
law, then no question of paying compensation would
arise, whether the taking 'assumed one form or another.
Acquisition of property or its requisition, on that
construction of the article, are merely two modes of
depriving a person of property and must be held to be
included within the ambit of clause (1) of article 31,
and clause (2) has not been drafted in the nature of an
exception to the provisions of clause (1) of article 31.
On this construction of clause ( 1) of article 31 t,he
logical conclusion is that what has been ·done by this
clause is that it has declared a fundamental right in
the State as against an individual. Such a construction of the article in Part III, in my opinion, has to
be avoided, as the purpose of those articles is to
declace the fundamental rights
possessed by the
citizens or other persons residing within the Union,
rather than to declare the rights of the State as
against them.
Secondly, my learned brother was oppressed with
the idea that if a wide construction was not placed on
the phraseology employed in clause (1), deprivation of
property by the State in cases of emergency, for
instance, in order • to prevent a fire from spreading,
would also have to be paid for. It seems that in that
case pointed attention was not drawn during arguments to the comprehensive provisions of the saving
clause of the article which seems fully to cover cases
of that kind. The Constitution makers were fully alive
to cases of that character and considering th;t all
such cases, unless excepted, would fall within the mischief of clause (2), they purposely excepted them from
the ambit of the clause.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
The maionty of the court in Chiranjit Lal
Chowdhuri's case(') refrained from expressing any
opinion on the scope of article 31 (1). My brother
Mukherjea made a reference to this question but
declined to express any opinion on it. There is thus
no concensus of opinion on the ssope of the provisions
of clause (1) of article 31 in this court and no final
opinion has been pronounced upon it so far.
The result of the above discussion is that, in my
opinion,
article 31
is a self-contained provlS!on
delimiting the field of eminent domain and article 31
clauses (1) and (2) deal with the same topic of
compulsory acquisition of property.
The contention of the learned Attorney-General
that on the analogy of the decision of this court in
Gopalrm's case(') it should be held that when a person
is deprived of private property by authority of law
that deprivation puts an end to all the freedoms
regarding property guaranteed under article 19, does
not require any detailed examination in the lighr of
the comtruction placed by me on the language of
article 31(1). It-was conceded by the learnecl counsel
that that decis1011 would have had no application
once it was held that clauses (1) and (2) of article -31
dealt with the same topic of compulsory acquisition of
property.
The next contention of the learned counsel that the
word "acquisition" m article 31 (2) means the
acquisition of title by the State and that unless the
State becomes vested with the property there can be
no acquisition within the meaning of the clause and
that the expression "taking
possession"
connoted
the idea of requisition cannot be sustained and does
not, to my mind, affect the decision of the case. As
above pointed, both these expressions used in clause (2)
convey the same meaning that is conveyed in clause ( 1)
by the expression "deprivation". As I read article 31,
it gives complete protection to private property as
against executive action, no matter by what process a
·(1) [1950] s.c.R. 869.
(2i [1950] S.C.R 88.
I
1953
Dwarkadas
Shriniz'as of
Bombay
v.
Tile Sholopur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Mahajan J.
702
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
T.
Thi Slwlapur
~)inning and
W~aving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Mahojan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
person is deprived of possession of it. In other words,
the Constitution declares that no person shall be
deprived of possession of private property without
payment of compensation and that too under the
authority of law, provided there was a public purpose
behind that law. It is immaterial to the person who
is deprived of property as to what use the State makes
of his property or what title it acquires in it. The
protection is against loss of property to the owner and
there is no protection given to the State by the
article. It has no fundamental right as against the
individual citizen. Article 31 states the limitations on
the power of the State in the field of taking property
and those limitations are in the interests of the person
sought to be deprived of his property. The question
whether acquisition has a larger concept than is
conveyed by the expression "taking possession" is
really of academic interest in view of the comprehensive phraseology employed by clause (2) of article 31.
As the matter was argued at some length, I propose
to briellv indicate my opinion on that point.
For the proposition that the expression "acquisition"
has the concept of vesting of title in the State reliance
was placed on the opinion of Latham C. J. in Minister
of State for the Army v. Dalzi ,I ( 1 ) • By virtue of the provisions of section SI, placitum (xxxi) of the Constitution
of Australia, the Commonwealth Parliament is empowered to make laws with respect to "the acquisition of
property on just terms from any state or person for any
purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to
make laws." General regulations styled as the National
Security Regulations were made under the national
Security Act, 1939-1943, section S. Regulation 54
relates to the taking of possession of land by the
Commonwealth and other regulations provide for the
ascertainment and payment of compensation for loss
or damage suffered by reason of things done in pursuance of the regulation. The Supreme Court of New
South Wales held that taking possession of land
in pursuance of Reg. 54 amounted to acquisition
r1J 68 c.w.L.R. 261.
S.C.R.
,
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
703
of property within the meaning of section 51 (xxxi) of
the Constitution, On appeal Latham C. ). made the
following observations :"The Commonwealth cannot be held to have
acquired land unless it has become the owner of land
or of some interest in land. If the Commonwealth
becomes only a possessor but does not become an
owner of land, then, though the Commonwealth may
have rights in respect to land, which land may be
called prfperty, the Commonwealth has not in such
a case acquired property ....... .
Accordingly, in my opinion, the facts that the
right to possession is the most valuable attribute of
ownership, that possession is prima facie evidence of
ownership, and that possession may develop into
ownership, do not justify any identification of possession with ownership, hut, on the contrary, emphasize
the distinction between the two ideas. The fact that
the Commonwealth is in possession of land as a result
of action under the Regulations does not show that
the Commonwealth has become the owner of the land
or of any estate in the land".
The majority of the court held otherwise and expressed the opinion that the taking under Regulation 54 of the National Security (General) Regulations
by the Commonwealth for an indefinite period of the
exclusive possession of property constituted an acquisition of property within the meaning of section 51
(xxxi) of the Constitution. This is what Rich J.
said, representing the majority opinion :"It would, in my opinion, be wholly inconsistent
with the language of the placitum to hold that, whilst
preventing the legislature from authorizing the acquisition of a citizen's ' full title except upon just terms,
it leaves it open to the legislature to seize possession
and enjoy the full fruits of possession, indefinitely, on
any terms it chooses, or upon no terms at all. In the
case now before us, the Minister has seized and taken
away from Dalziel everything that made his weekly
tenancy worth having, and has left him with 'the
empty husk of tenancy. In such circumstances, he
may well say :-
•
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
Th~ Sholapur
Spinning and
fV1aving Co. Lid.,
and Others.
Mahajan].
704
Ul53
Dwarkada.t
Shrini1;as of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Wea11ing Co. Ltd.,
a11d Others.
Mahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
'You take my house, when you do take the prop
That doth sustain my house ; you take mv life.
\Vhen you do take the means whereby I live.'"
In the present case nothing has been left with the
company but the mere husk of title.
In my judgment, the true concept of the expression
"acquisition" in our Constitution as well as in the
Government of India Act is the one enunciated bv
Rich J. and the majority of the court in Dal.zic's
case('). Vv'ith great respect I am nnahk to accept the
narrow view that ''acquisition"
necessarily
tneans
acqms1t10n of title in whole or part of the propertv.
It has been rightlv said that a close and literal co11strnctio11 of constitutional provisions made for the
security of person and property deprives them of half
their efficacy and ends in a gradual depreciation of
the right as if the right consisted more in sound than
in .sub.stance. In other words, such provisions cannot
be construed merely by taking a dictionary in hand.
Tl1e \Vord
''acquisition"
has
quite
a wide:
concept.
meaning the procuring -af property or the taking of it
permanently or temporarily. It does not necessarily
imply the acquisition of legal title by the State in the
property taken possession of. The learned AttornevGeneral combated this view and contended that such
a wide concept of the meaning of the word "acquisition)) \Vas contrary to legislative
practice in India
which practice was in accord with the view enunciated
by Latham C.J. in the case above cited. It was said
that the decided cases in India supported that construction of the word. Reference was made to a
decision of Bhagwati J. in Tan Bug Taim v. Collector
of Bombay ( 2 ). That case concerned the requisition by
the State of the premises of a leading Bombay Chinese
restaurant. On a petition presented to court und·:r
section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, Bhagwati J. hdd
that having regard to the principles applicable to
Britjsh jurisprudence which had been enacted in section 299 ( 1) and (2) of the Government of India Ac:,
(1) 68 C.W.L.R. ,61.
(2) l.L.R. 1946 Born. 51-.
•
!
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
requmt1on of land could not be considered as being
included either in item 9 or item 21 of List II of the
7th Schedule of the Act, that the word "acquisition"
implied ownership in the property or rights in or over
such property, while "requisition" implied deprivation of the owner of the property for the time heing
of the use and possession thereof and meant control
of the property, and that there was no warrant for
holding that so far as legislative practice in India was
concerned,
l
"requisition"
was included in "acquisition".
The learned Judge preferred to follow the view of
Latl1am C.J. and refused
to follow the maionty
judgment in Dalziel's case('). Having considered the
matter in full, and with respect to the learned Judge,
I prefer to follow the view of .the majority of the
court, because it seems to me that it is more in con'onance with juridical principle that possession after
all is nine-tenths of ownership, and once possession is
taken away, practically everything is taken away, and
that in construing the Constitution it is the substance and the practical result of the act of the State
that should be considered rather than its purely legal
aspect. As already said, the correct approach in such
cases should be this : what in substance is the loss
or injury caused to the owner and not what manner
and method has been adopted by the State in taking
the property.
That the view expressed by Bhagwati J. did not
truly represent the intent of Parliament in drafting
entry 9 of List II of the 7th SchecJ.ule becomes clear
from what happened subsequent to this pronouncement. After this judgment was deliverec1, an Act
was passed by Parliament amending the Government
of India Act nullifying the effect of the juc1gment as
regards requisition of property. The Indian (Proclamation of Emergency) Act, 1945, (9 & 10 Geo.
6 Ch. 23) was promulgated on February 14, 1946,
the judgment of Bhagwati J. having been delivered
on August 9, 1945, section 102 of the Government of
Inc1ia Act was amended and by it the Central Legislature, when a proclamation of emergency was in force,
(I) 68 C.W.L.R. 261.'
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Wea11ing Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Mahajan J.
706
1953
Dwarkadas
~Miniva.s of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
.,ntf Othlrs.
..~ahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1954}
was empowered to make laws for a province or a part
thereof, in respect of any matters not enumerated in
any of the lists of the 7th Schedule. Reference was
also made to certain observations of my brother Das
in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri' s case(') in which the
opinion was expressed that the word "acquisition"
had implicit in it the idea of vesting of property in
the State. For the reasons already given, with great
respect, I am unable to subscribe to that view.
Reference was also made to a decision of the
Punjab High Court in Jupiter General Insurance, Co.
v. Rajagopalan('). This case concerned the provisions
of sections 52 and 52(a) of the Insurance Amendment
Act, 1950. It was contended there that those provisions abridged the fundamental rights guaranteed
by article 31 (2) of the Constitution. In view of the
decision of this Court in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri's
case('), the Punjab High Court construed the word
"acquisition" in the narrower sense and held that as
the beneficial interest in the property remained in the
insurer the provisions of the impugned section did
not amount to appropriation of the insurer's property and mere! y amounted to exerdse of police
power. It was further held that the pith and sub- .
stance of the impugned legislation was the regulation
of insurance companies and winding up such corporations, if that was most advantageous to the general
interest of policy holders. It is unnecessary for the
purpose of this case to say anything about the correctness of that decision.
In the light of these different decisions the Constitution employed more comprehensive phraseology
in article 31 than had been employed in the entries
of the 7th Schedule appended to the Government
of India Act, 1935, and which became the subject
matter of construction in the case decided by
Bhagwati J.
In the entries of the 7th Schedule
appended to the Constitution the word used is
"requisition" but the same phraseology has not been
employed purposely in clause (2) of article 31, in all
(l\ [1950] S.C.R. 869.
12\ A.l.R. 1952 Punjab 9.
S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
probability to avoid any controversy on . the scope of
the article by gmng a limited meaning to these two
words.
On the finding that the company's property was in
effect taken possession of under the provisions of the
Ordinance by the State and that the company was
deprived of it, there is no escape from the conclusion
that the impugned Ordinance and the statute · following it are void as both of them encroach on the fundamental right of the company under article 31 (2) of the
Constitution.
It was then argued that even so the plaintiff in the
suit was not entitled to the relief claimed by hiQl as it
was the company alone that could complain about the
abridgement of its fundamental rights by the Ordinance
in question. It was also contended that the plaintiff's
fundamental right to property had not been infringed
in any manner as his property in the share had not
been taken possession of by the State. Finally it was
said that on both these questions the majority decision
of this court in Cliiranjit Lal Chowdhuri's case(') was
conclusive. I am unable to sustain any one of these
contentions. Undoubtedly the majority decision in
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri's case ( 1 ) has binding force till
it is reconsidered or overruled by this court. But this
decision, in my opinion, has no apposite application
to the facts and circumstances of this case and
is clearly distinguishable. My reasons for saying so
are these:1. The decision in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri's
case(1) was given on a petition presented to this court
in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 32 of the
Constitution. Inter alia, Chowdhuri's grievance was
that his fundamental right under article 31 (2) of the
Constitution had been infringed by the impugned law,
inasmuch as the State had taken possession of the
company's property and that all the rights and
privileges annexed to his share had thereby been lost.
The majority of the court took the view that the peti-.
tioner was still in possession of his share and that he
had power to dispose of that . share, that he could
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
9•
1953
Dwarkat/as
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Lrd.J
and Others.
Mahajan].
•
708
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay~
v.
The S!wlap'lr
Spftming arid
Wtoiing Co. f)d .•
and Other:r.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
receive a dividend on that share, and that though he
ha,\ lost some of the privileges annexed to his share, it
could not be said that the State had taken possession
of his share or was exercising the privileges which he
enjoyec\ as a shareholder. The situation however of
the present plaintiff and of all the preference shareholders whom he represents is quite different. Chiranjit Lal was an ordinary shareholder of a fully paid up
share. The plaintiff and the other preference shareholders arc in a different situation from Chiranjit Lal.
All of them hold partly paid up preference shares on
which their liabilitv amounts to a sum of Rs. 16 bkhs,
the pTaintiff alo;,.e being under a liability of
Rs. 1,62,000. In case this liability is not met when it
is sought to be enforced, the shares are liable to forfeiture. The plaintiff and the other preference shareholders therefore arc in imminent danger of losing the
shares themselves or losing valuable property in the
nature of money which they will have to pay out in
order to meet the call. For all practical purposes the
plaintiff is in danger of losing valuable prope\tV which
the State is threatening to take possession of. Not
only will these shareholders lose their shares and be
deprived of them but they will also be forced to pay
large sums of money and all this will be in exercise of
the powers conferred on the directors appointed by
the State by the Ordinance in question. There can
thus be no comparison between the rights and liabilities of Chiranjit Lal with the rights and liabilities of the present plaintiff and the other preference
shareholders.
2. The rights and privileges of preference sharchol,lers even in winding up and in earning dividends
are somewhat different from the rights and privileges
of the ordinary fully paid up shareholders. The court
in Chiranjit Lal Chowd!rnri's case(') did not at all
advert to the case of preference shareholders and the
effect the Ordinance hacl on their rights. It is eviclent
that it was the refusal of the directors to obey the
mandate of the Controller appointed by the Centnl
Government to make a call on the preference
(l) [t_150) S.C.R,869.
'
•
S.C.R.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
shareholders that to a certain extent resulted in the
making of the Ordinance. On the 5th October, 1949, the
Government appointed a Controller to supervise the
affairs of this company. On the 9th November, 1949,
the Controller asked the directors of the company to
make a call on the preference shareholders. Soon
after the directors passed a resolution refusing to
compl:1 with the commarnl. On the 9th January,
1950, the Ordinance was promulgated, i.e., soon after
the refusal, and on the same day powers were delegated by the Central Government to the Bombay Government under the Ordinance. Next c1ay, on the 10th
January, 1950, the Bombay Government appointed
its nominees as directors of the company. On the 7th
February, 1950,, these directors passed a resolution to
call up 1he uncalled capital and actually on the 22nd
February, 1950, call was made and the plaintiff was called upon to pay a sum of Rs. 1,62,000. In these circumstances, it cannot be held to be an unreasonable inference that one of the purposes of the Ordinance was
to raise further finance for the business of the company
so that it may start working. In any case, that was
clearly the effect of the Or<linance on the property of
the preference shareholders. In these circumstances,
it cannot be said that on the rule of stare decisis the
plaintiff is out of court in view of that decision.
3. In the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri(') the
court was influenced considerably by the · fact that
a solitarv shareholder was trying to enforce the company's fundamental. right in the exercise of its jurisdiction under article 32 and that he could not do so unless
his own fundamental right under article 31 (2) had been
infringed. It was said that the complainant could not
succeed because somebody else was hurt and that it
was an elementary principle of law that in order to
1 justify the grant of extraordinary relief the complainant's need of it and the absence of an adequate
remedy
at law must clearly appear. Das J. also
pointed out that article 32 can only be invoked for the
purpose of enforcement of the fundamental right and
that that article c1oes not permit an application merely
(I) [1950] S.C.R. 869,
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bomb0;.v
y,
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Ji'eaving Co. Ltd.,
arid Other's . .
Mahajan J.
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
for the purpose of agitating the competence of the
appropriate legislature in passing any particular
enactment unless the enactment also infringes any of
the fundamental rights. The learned Judge concluded
v.
The Sholapur
by sayingSpinning and
"In exceptional cases where the company's pre>Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
perty is injured by outsiders, a shareholder may,
under the English law, after making all endeavours to
Mahajan J.
induce the persons in charge of the affairs of the company to take steps, file a suit on behalf of himself and
other shareholders for redressing the wrong done ,to the
company, but that principle does not apply here for
this is not a suit, nor has it been shown that any
attempt was made by the petitioner to induce the old
directors to take steps nor do these proceedings purport to have been taken by the petitioner on behalf of
himself and the other shareholders of the company."
Here it is quite clear that the present contention
has been raised in a suit and not in an application for
a writ under article 32. That itself distinguishes
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri's case( 1 ) from the present. It
is further clear that all the necessary steps visualised
by my learned brother have been taken by the preference shareholders. A requisition for calling a meeting of the shareholders of the company was made on
3rd August, 1950, a meeting was actually held on 23th
September, 1950, and on subsequent days and on 5th
November, 1950, resolutions were passed that the call
should not be made. The resolutions were, . however,
vetoed by the Government. All the preference shareholders are represented in this suit including some of
the directors, the company has been impleaded as a
defendant and the old directors of the company have
made an application that they should be allowed to support the appeal. On these facts the present case is clearly
distinguishable from that of ChiranFt Lal Chowdhuri( 2 ),
4. In any case, even if it is held that in view of the
binding character of this court's decision in Chiranjit
Lal Chowdhuri's case(') the point is concluded, that the
State has hot taken possession of the shareholders
property, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
B01.1bay
(I) [19.10] S.C.R. 869.
'
•
S.C.R.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
and the other preference shareholders are entitled
in this suit to attack the validity of the Ordinance on
the basis of the infringement of the fundamental right
of the company. The plaintiff. has every right to challenge the authority of the directors to make the call
and to question their locus standi before they call fix a
liability on him. The directors seek to derive authority from the Ordinance. If, however, the Ordinance
is void as against the company obviously they are not to
be regarded as the directors of the company and would
thus have no authority to make the call. It would indeed
be a strange thing to hold that the plaintiff in a suit
cannot question the authority and the credentials of the
person who is seeking to enforce a demand against him.
Unless the person making the demand makes out his
authoritv or his credentials to do so, he is not entitled
to enfo;ce the demand. In all cases where a pecuniary
or other similar liability is sought to be enforced by a
person, it is always open to the person challenging the
liability to raise the question of the locus standi and
authority of the person making the demand. If that
person claims in the status of an agent of some other
person, unless his appointment is validly made, he
would have no authority. In this case the shareholders
unr\er the articles of association were under a contractual liability to meet calls made by the directors
of the company appointed by them. They never
agreed to meet a call made by persons appointed by
an external authority and in these circumstances they
are entitled to question the authority of the person
making the call. The directors appointed by the
Government can only invoke in aid the authority given
to them by the Ordinance and if the Ordinance is void
as against the company, they cannot be held to be
directors of the company and would therefore have no
authority to make the call. In my judgment, therefore,
it is plain that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on
the basis of the infringement of the company's fundamental right under article 31 (2), because that is the
only authority under which the directors have been
brought into existence and are exercising powers by
virtue of the provisions of the Ordinance. If they are
,
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
BEm~ay
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Mahajan].
712
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
Th• Sholapur
Spinning and
it'eaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Mahqjan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Ll954 J
not the validly appointed agents of the company qua
the company, they cannot function as directors qua
the shareholders.
5. The learned Attorney-General drew our attention
to a number of cases for the proposition that unless
there was a direct infringement of the fundamental
right of the shareholders it was not open to them to
take ad vantage of the breach of a fundamental right
of the company. In these wide terms I am unable to
accede to this proposition. In my opinion, the correct
rule on this point has been stated in Willoughby, at
page 20, on the authority of the decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon( 1 ), and is in these terms:"We have no power per se to review and annul
acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when
· the justification for some direct injury suffered or
threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to
rest upon such an act. Then the power exercised is
that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable
to the controversv. It amounts to little more than
the negative poV,:er to disregard an unconstitutional
enactment, which otherwise, would stand in the way of
the enforcement of a legal right. The party who invokes
the power must be able to show, not only that the
statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury
as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that
he suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally. If a case for preventive relief be
prevented, the court enjoins, in effect, not the execution of the statute, hut the acts of the official, the
statute notwithstanding".
The rule stated above has apposite application LO
this case. The plaintiff and the other preference shareholders are in imminent danger of susta111111g direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of this Ordinance,
the clireet injury being the amount of the call that
they are called upon to pay and the consequent
forfeiture of their shares. Not only would they lose
(1:1 262 U.S. 447.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
their shares, if they do not meet the demand, but they
would also have to pay the amoum of the call. My
brother Das elaborately dealt with this question in
Chiranjit Lat's case( 1 ), and made reference to all the
cases that were cited by the Attorney-General on this
subject, viz., McCabe v. Atchison ( '); /effrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg( 3 ) ; Hendrick v. Maryland( •) ;
.Newark Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v. The City of
.Newark(') ; and in which the rule laid .down was that
in order to justify the granting of extraordinary relief
the complainant's need of it and the absence of an
adequate remedy at law mpst clearly appear and that
the complainant cannot succeed because some one else
was hurt. He also made reference to the cases of
Truax v. Raich (' ), and Buchanan v. Warley ( '). There
the court allowed the plea to be raised because in both
these cases the person . raising it was directly affected.
In the first of the two last mentioned cases an Arizona
Act of 1914 requiring employers employing more than
five workqs to employ not less than eighty per cent.
native born citizens was challenged by an alien who
had been employed as a cook in a restaurant. That
. statute made a violation of the Act by an employer
punishable. The fact that the employment was at will
or that the employer and not the employee was subject
to prosecution did not prevent the employee from
raising the question of constitutionality because the
statute, if enforced, would compel the employer to
discharge the employee and, therefore, the employee
was directly affected by the statute. In the second
case a city Ordinance prevented the occupation of a
plot by a coloured person in a block where a majority
of the residences were occupied by white persorn.
A white 111an sold his property in such a block to a
Negro under a contract which provided that the purchaser should not be required to accept a deed unless
he would have a right, under the laws of the city, to
occupy the same as a residence. The vendor sued for
(1) (1950] S.C.R. 869.
(2) 235 u. s. 151,
(3) 235 u. s. 571,
(4) 235 u. s. 610.
!r-95 S.C.l./59
(5) 242 U.S. 403.
(6) 239 U.S. 33.
(7) 245 U.S. 60.
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombll)I
v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
WeavingCo. lJd.,
and Others.
Mahajan J .
714
1953
&-
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
T Ml/ilwlapur
JSpi,nning and
'1-Veaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Mahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954 \
specific performance and contended that the Ordinance
was unconstitutional. Although the alleged denial of
constitutional rights involved only the rights of
coloured persons and the vendor was a white person,
yet it was held that the vendor was directly affected,
because the courts below, in view of the Ordinance,
declined to enforce his contract and thereby directly
affected his right to sell his property. Reference was
also made to tlle case of Darnell v. The State of
Indiana ( 1 ). That is tlle only case in which a shareholder was not heard to complain in his own name
when the Ordinance infri>l.gcd the fundamental right
of the company, his own rights had not been infringed.
In view of this decision my brother Das took the view
that Chiranjit Lal who was merely a shareholder and
did not suffer any direct injury by the result of the law
was not entitled to complain. That may very well
have been the correct view in the case of a fully paid
up shareholder who had no further liability or who
was not likely to suffer in any manner by the enforcement of the Ordinance but the situation of a partly
paid up preference shareholder as in this case is quite
different and distinguishable and in my judgment the
apposite rule to apply to tlle present case is the one
laid down in the cases of Truax v. Raich ( 2 ) and
Buchanan v. Warley(' ). The result is that the plaintiff
is entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the
Ordinance on the basis that it abridges the company's
fundamental right under article 31 (2). The plaintiff is
thus entitled to succeed in this suit which should have
been decreed in the terms in which it was laid.
I am further of the opinion that the question of the
locus standi of the plaintiff to raise the plea that the
Ordinance being void against the company the directors had no authority to make the call, is really of
academic interest in this case because here the company
has been impleaded as a defendant. Its old directors
have made an application to this court supporting the
case of the plaintiff on the ground that the Ordinance
(!) 226 U.S. 388.
(2) 23g U.S. 33.
(3) 245 U.S. 60.
.:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
715
is void as it infringes the company's fundamental right
under article 31 (Z). The learned Attorney-General
when asked about this application said that it not
having been made in the High Court and having only
'been made at the last stage of the case should not be
entertained. In my view, when the question in issue
is one .concerning constitutional rights, the matter cannot be viewed purely from a technical angle and if in
the interests of doing substantial justice it is necessary
to grant permission to the old directors to have their
say, technical considerations should not stand in the
way of doing so. If the Ordinance qua the company
is void, I do not see why the old directors should be
debarred from saying so and if it is void qua the
.company, it can certainly not be · sustained qua the
shareholders. Some of the directors who are preference
.shareholders are also represented in the suit as well. In
Chiraniit Lal's case(') the question of his locus standi
was left open by the Chief Justice. This is what the
learned Chief Justice said :"The first question is whether one individual
:Shareholder can, under the circumstances of the case
and particularly when one of the respondents is the
-company which opposes the petition, challenge the
validity of the Act on .the ground that it is a piece
·Of discriminatory legislation .......... I do not think
it is necessary to pronounce a definite opinion on the
:first point."
In that case Patanjali Sastri J., as he then was,
also did not pronounce any definite opinion on the
question so far as the shareholder's right to question
the invasion of the right to property of the company
under article 31 was concerned. This is what the
learned Judge said :-
"Whatever validity the argument may have in
relation to the petitioner's claim based on the alleged
invasion of his right of property under article 31, there
<an be little doubt that, so far as his claim based on
the contravention of article 14 is concerned, the petitioner is entitled to relief in his own right."
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
1953
DwarkadaJ
Shrinit:as of
'Bombay
v.
The SholopUT
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Olhen.
Mahajan J.
716
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinh'aS of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spi,11ning and
J.Veaving Co. lid.,
and Others.
Mahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
The learned Judge did not offer any opinion on the
other questions. Mukherjea J. decided the question
on grounds somewhat different from that taken by
Faz! Ali J. This what the learned Judge said :"A discussion of the fundamental rights of the
company as such would be outside the purview of
our enquiry. It is settled law that in order to redress
a wrong done to the company, the action should
prima facie be brought by the company itself. It
cannot be said that this .course is not possible in the
circumstances of the present case. As the law is
alleged to be unconstitutional, it is open to the old
directors of the company who have been ousted from
their position by reason of the enactment to maintain
that they are directors still in the eye of law, and on
that footing the majority of shareholders can also
assert the rights of the company as such. None of
them, however, have come forward to institute any
proceeding on behalf of the company. Neither in
form nor in substance does the present application
purport to be one made by the company itself.
Indeed, the company is one of the respondents, and
opposes the petition."
Even on the basis of this reasoning the situation of
the present plaintiff, as already explained, is quite
different and so is . that of the company. In these
circumstances it cannot be said that the decision
given in Chiranjit Lat's case(') is binding on this point,
as even the judgments of the Judges forming the
majority did not speak with the same voice.
For the reasons given above I would allow this
appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and
decree the plaintiff's suit with costs. It is not necessary to give any decision on issue 2 in view of the
decision reached above, viz., whether the law is void
because it infringes the fundamental rights under
articles 14 and 19.
DAs J.-I agree that this apeal should be allowed
but I prefer to rest my decision on the grounds and
reasonings set forth in detail in my judgment in
(t) [1950] S.C.R. 86:,.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
,
1953
Appeal No. 107 of 1952 [The State of West Bengal v.
Subodh Gopal Bose(')].
Dwarkadas
ShrinivoJ of
This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit filed in
Bombay
v.
the Bombay High Court on behalf of himself and
Thi Sholapur
other preference shareholders of the respondent comSpinning, and
Weaving Co- Ltd.,
pany praying for a declaration that the power given
and Others.
to the defendants respondents 2 to 8 who had been
Das].
appointed directors under the Sholapur Spinning and
Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance
II of 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance) to make a call and the resolution passed by the
defendants respondents 2 to 6 on the 7th February,
1950, for making a call of Rs. 50 per each preference
share are illegal, ultra vires, void and inoperative in
law. The plaintiff-appellant is the registered holder
-of 3,244 preference shares of the respondent company
of the face· value of Rs. 100 per share out of which
-only Rs. 50 had been paid up and consequently if the
call has been duly made, he will have to pay
Rs. 1,62,200 in respect of his holding. The plaintiff
·appellant resists the payment of the call on the
ground, inter alia, that the said Ordinance is illegal,
ultra vires and invalid under the provisions of the
Government of India Act, 1935, and/or the Constitution of India. No oral evidence was adduced on
·either side. The matters in issue were argued as
·questions of law governed by the Constitution. The
contention was that the Ordinance was inconsistent
with or in derogation of the fundamental rights •
guaranteed by the Constitution. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and that dismissal was
affirmed by the appeal court. The plaintiff has now
come up on appeal before us after having obtained a
certificate under article 132 ( 1) of the Constitution
from the High Court.
The material facts leading up to the institution of
the suit and the terms of the impugned Ordinance have
been set out in detail in the judgments delivered by
this court in the case of Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri v.
The Union. of India(') where this very Ordinance
and · the Act which replaced it were challenged
(T) [1954] S.C.R. 51l7.
(2! [1950) S.C.R. 86J.
718
1953
DwarkaJas
Shriniias ef
Bombay
v,
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co· Ltd.,
tind Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954J
as unconstitutional and also in the judgment just
delivered and it is not necessary for me to recapitulate
the same. The determination of the matters in issue
depends on the correct interpretation of article 19
(1) (f) read with article 19 (5), article 31 and article
14 of the Constitution.
My view about the correlation between article 19
(1) (f) read with article 19 (5) and article 31 and the
true meaning and the respective scope and effect of
clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 have been set forth
in detail in my judgment in Chiranjitlal' s case ( 1 }
and have been more fully explained in my judgment
in Appeal No. 107 of 1952 fThe State of West Bengal
v. Subodh Gopal Bose and others(')] and no reiteration
of them is called for. In the light of the conclusions
reached and the reasons in support thereof given by
me in those judgments I proceed to examine the contentions advanced by the appellant.
The appellant seeks to question the validity of the
Ordinance on the grouncl that it infringes the fundamental rights of (a) the company, (b) the shareholders,
( c) the managing agents, ( d) the directors elected by
the shareholders and ( e) persons having contracts
with the company. The first thing to consider is
whether he can raise the question of constitutionality
of the Ordinance founded on the breach of the fundamental rights of anybody other than himself.
The above matter was agitated in Chiranjitlal's
case (1 ) . There Chiranjitbl Chowdhuri, who was the
holder of one fully paid up ordinary share, applied to
this court under article 32 challenging the validity
of this very Ordinance which is now questioned before
us and the Act which eventually replaced it. One of
the grounds of attack was that the Ordinance had'
infringed the fundamental rights of the company
under article 19 (1) (f) and article 31 in that it dismissed the managing agents and the directors and
authorised the State to appoint new directors :md
authorised the directors so appointed under the Ordinance to take possession of the company's assets
without payment of any compensation. On the point
(•) [1950] S.C.R. B6J.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 587.
ti
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
now under consideration Mukhcrjea J. expressed
himself thus, at page 898 :
"An incorporated company, therefore, can come
up to this court for enforcement of its fundamental
rights and so may be individual shareholders to
enforce their own ; but it would not be open to an
individual shareholder to complain of an Act which
affects the fundamental rights of the company except
to the extent that it constitutes an infraction of his
own rights · as well. This follows logically from the
rule of law that a corporation has a distinct legal
personality of its own with rights and capacities,
duties and obligations separate from those of its
individual members. As the rights are different and
inhere indifferent legal entities, it is not competent
to one person to seek to enforce the rights of another
except where the law permits him to do so. A well
known illustration of such exception is furnished by
the procedure that is sanctioned in aa application for
a writ of habeas corpus."
And again at page 899 :"The rights
that . could be enforced under
article 32 must ordinarily be the rights of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such
rights and approaches the court for relief. This being
the position, proper subject of our investigation would
be what rights, if any, of the petitioner as a shareholder of the company have been violated by the
impugned legislation. A discussion of the fundamental
rights of the company as such would be outside the
purv.iew of our enquiry."
At pages 904-909 the learned Judge discussed the
question whether the impugned law had infringed any
funclamental right of the shareholders under article 31
(2) or article 19(1) (f) and answered it in the negative.
Kania C. J. agreed with the line of reasoning and the
conclusion reached by Mukherjea J. on this point.
Faz\ Ali J. at page 876 referred to a passage in the
judgment of Hughes J. in McCabe v. Atchison( 1) and
expressly held that no one except those whose rights
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
BombllJ
••
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co· Ltd,,
and Othlr:.
Das].
720
1953
Dwarkot!'"
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
Tht Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co· IJd·,
and Olhtrs.
Dos].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
were <lirectly affected by a law could raise the
question of the constitutionality of that law. His
Lordship said :
"The company and the shareholders are in law
separate entities, and if the allegation is made that
any property belonging to the company has been
taken possession of without compensation or the right
enjoyed by the company under article 19 (1) (f) has
been infringed, it would be for the company to come
forward to assert or vindicate its own rights and not
for any individual shareholder to do so."
As to the question whether the petitioner had
succeeded in showing that there had been an infringement of his own rights as a shareholder under
articles 31 and 19 (1) (f) his Lordship agreed with and
adopted the conclusions arrived at by Mukherjea J.
without committing himself to the acceptance of all
the reasonings of Mukherjea J. My Lord the present
Chief Justice rested his decision on article 14 and
came to the conclusion that the petitioner as a shareholder had been discriminated against. Having thus
decided the question arising under article 14, he did
not think it necessary to express any opinion on the
questions raised under articles 19 and 31. At pages
927-930 I dealt with the question whether the shareholder could impugn the constitutionality of the law
on the ground that the fundamental right of the
company had been infringed. After referring to several
decisions of the Supreme Court of America I came to
the following conclusion at page 930 :
"In my opinion, although a shareholder may, m
a sense, be interested to see that the company of
which he is a shareholder is not deprived of its
property he cannot, as held in Darnell v. Indiana(') be
heard to complain in his own name and on his own
behalf, of the infringement of the fundamental right
to property of the company, for, in law, his own right
to property has not been infringed as he is not the
owner of the company's properties."
In the premises, I think it is quite clear that the
majority of the members of the Bench which heard
(1) 226 U.S. 388.'
.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Chiranjitlal's case(')
721
held that the petitioner was not
to question
the constitutionality of the
entitled
Ordinance and the Act on the ground that the fundamental rights of the company under articles 19 (1) (f)
and 31 had been infringed. He had, therefore, to rely
on the plea of infringement of his own fundamental
rights. The majority of the court held that there had
been no infringement of his rights as a shareholder
under article 19(l)(f) or article 31 and that the petitioner consequently had to fall back on article 14 in
·Order to suppori;. his plea of the unconstitutionality of
the Ordinance and the Act. Even here the majority
of the Bench took the view that the petitioner had
not discharged the onus that was .on him of showing
that in fact there had been any discrimination against
him and other shareholders of the company.
Learned Attorney-General submits that in so far as
. the challenge to the validity of the law is, in the
present case, founded on the infringement of the
company's fundamental rights, it is concluded by
the decision in Chiranjitlal's case(1) for the reasons
adopted by the maionty in that case apply equally
to the case now before us and the same conclusion
must be drawn, namely, that the present appellant,
who is also a shareholder, cannot be permitted to
impugn the said Ordinance on the ground that it
infringes the fundamental rights of the company, or
the managing agents or the directors or other persons
having contracts with the company. It is, on the other
hand, contended on behalf of the appellant that the
present case is distinguishable from Chiranjitlal's
.ca~e( 1) in that the question here arises in a regular suit
and not on an application under article 32 for the
.enforcement of fundamental rights. I do not think
that this, by itself, is a substantial ground of distinction at all. I cannot see bow the mere form of the
proceeding can affect the question. The true principle
being that only a person who is directly affected by a
law can challenge the validity of that law and that a
person whose own right or interest has not been
Yiolated or threatened cannot impugn the law on the
ground that wmebody else's right bas been infringed,
(I) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
1953
i>wDkildas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
Th4 S/wlapur
Spinning and )
J1le.:uring Co. Ltd.
and Others.
Das].
722
1953
Dwarkad-.s
Shriniva1 of
BOmb'IJ
v.
The S!wlapur
Spinning and
We.,ving Co· Ltd.,
and Others
Dos].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
the same principle must prevail irrespective of the
form of the proceeding in which the question of
constitutionality is raised.
Learned counsel for the appellant, however, urges
that although on a parity of reasoning there has been
no infringement of the fundamental right of the preference shareholders under article 19(1) (f) or article 31
(2), the impugned law, if it stands, certainly subjects
the preference shareholders to the risk of being called
upon to pay the amount of capital remaining unpaid
on their respective shareholding. Indeed, the directors
appointed under the said Ordinance ~ave made a call
for the payment of Rs. 50 on each preference share
and the plaintiff appellant alone will have to pay
Rs. 1,62,200 on rus· shares. There was no such liability
on the petitioner in Chiranjitlal's case( 1 ) for the
was the holder of only one fully paid up ordinary
share. The impugned Ordinance, therefore, directly
affects the preference shareholders by imposing on
them this liability, or the risk of it, and gives them a
sufficient interest to challenge the validity of the
Ordinance. It is quite true, as submitted by the
learned Attorney-General, that the fact of the property of the company or the managing agents, or the
directors or the other persons having contracts with
the company having been taken possession of by the
State through the directors appointed by the State
under the Ordinance has no relation to or bearing on
the imposition on the preference shareholders of the
liability to pay the caJI, for the directors were not
obliged to make the call because they had taken
possession of the property of the company or the
other persons and that this imposition of liability or
risk cannot, therefore, be said to be the direct or even
indirect result of the State having through the directors appointed under the Ordinance taken possession
of the property of the company or the other persons.
It is then urged by him that, that being so, the preference shareholders cannot be allowed to complain
of the infringment of the rights of the company or of
the other persons which does not concern or affect
them. This argument, however, overlooks the purpose
(>) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
and scope of the suit filed by the appellant for himself
and all other preference shareholders. The appellant is
disputing his liability to pay the call made by the
directors appointed under the Ordinance. He is, therefore, entitled to show that the directors who have
made the call are not ,competent to do so. It is open
to him to allege and prove, if he can, that the gentlemen who have purported to make the call are not
competent to do so because they are not the directors
of the company. Take the case of a company which
is not governed by this Ordinance. If a call is made
on the shareholders of such a company, it is certainly
open to a shareholder to resist tl1e payment of the call
by proving, if he can, that the persons who have
purported to make the call are not the dire,ctors of the
company. This he may do by showing that those
persons have not the requisite qualifications or have
not been duly elected. Likewise, on a parity of reasoning, the appellant as a preference shareholder in the
respondent company is entitled to show, if he can,
that the persons who have made the call are really
not the directors of the company. Certainly he can
show that the Ordinance under which these persons
have been appointed wa·s
beyond
the
legislative
competency of the authority which made it or that
the Ordinonce had not been duly promulgated. If
he can, with a view to destroy the locus standi of
the persons who have made the call, raise the question
of the invalidity of the Ordinance on the grounds
I have just mentioned, I can see no valid reason why,
for the self same purpose, he should not be permitted
to challenge the validity of the Ordinance on the
ground of its unconstitutionality for the breach of the
fundamental rights of the company or of other persons.
He may not be interested in or concerned with the
facts which constitute the unconstitutionality, e.g., the
taking of possession of tlie property of the company or
of the other persons but he is certainly interested in
getting out of the law so as to destroy the very foundation of the status of the persons who have made the
call and thereby repel the attack on him and avoid
his own liability. In C!iiranjitlal's case(1) the
(I) [rJ50] S.C.R. 869.
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
. v.
The Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd-~
and Others.
Das].
724
1953
DwarlcadM
Shrini~as of
Bombay
v.
The ShoZ.pur
Spinning llJ1d
iWtaving Co· Ltd·,
and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
petitioner was held to have suffered no loss of his own
fundamental right as a shareholder and, therefore, by
raising the> question of unconstitutionality of the
Ordinance on the ground of the breach of the fundamental rights of the company, or of the other persons
he was really fighting the battle of the company and
the other persons and not of his own. Here the position is different. Here the law has made the imposition of a liability on him and other preference
shareholders possible and he is seeking to resist that
liability and as in the premises he is directly affected
by the statute he has sufficient interest to challenge
its validity. If as between the company or the other
persons and these persons who, purporting to act as
directors, have made the call the law is unconstitutional for breach of the fonner's fundamental rights
then it follows that these persons are not, in the eye
of the law, the directors of the company at
all and if they are not in law the directors
of the company, surely they cannot arrogate to
themselves the right to exercise any of the
powers of the directors of the company and to make
any cail. If the said Ordinance stands, the directors
appointed thereunder will have authority to make the
call which they have done and the appellant's liabilitv
to pay it will stand good. Therefore, the appellant as
a preference shareholder is directly affected by the
statute and this circumstance, in my opinion, distinguishes this case from Chiranjitlal' s case(1 ) and it must he
held that, in the circumstances of this case, the appellant, who is a preference shareholder and as such liable
to pay the call, is entitled to challenge the Ordinance
which dismissed the directors elected by the shareholders, authorised the appointment of directors by the
State and made it possible for the directors so appointed to make the call and thereby impose a liability on
all preference shareholders including the appellant.
On the hypothesis that, with a view to resist his own
liability to pay the call, it is open to the appellant to
impugn the Ordinance and the Act which has replaced
it and for that purpose to call in aid the infringement of
the fundamental right under article 31 (2) of the
l•) [r950) S.C.R. 869.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
company or of the other persons mentioned above, it
has yet to be shown that there has in fact been such
infringement. Two questions will have to ·be considered and decided, namely, (1) whether the impugned law
has authorised the taking of possession or acquisition
of any property and (2) whether what has been taken
possession of or acquired is "property" within the
meaning of article 31(2). Taking the second question
first, there cannot be any doubt that the mills,
machineries, stocks etc., of the respondent company
are "property" within the meaning of articles 19
and 31. A contract or agreement which a person
may have with the company and which may be
cancelled
by the directors in exercise of powers
under the Ordinance will undoubtedly be "property"
within the meaning of the two articles. There may
be some argument as to whether the office of managing agents or of the directors, though each of such
offices carries substantial remuneration, can be said to
be "property" which, by itself, can be acquired or
taken possession of or disposed of. I need not dilate
on this further, for the machinery etc., of the company
and the benefits of agreements of persons having contracts with the company are certainly "property"
within those articles and if those have been taken
possession of or acquired that will be quite sufficient
for the plaintiff appellant to sustain his challenge to
the constitutionality of the impugned law, whether or
no the office of the managing agents or of the directors is "property" or has been taken possession of or
acquired.
The next question is whether the impugned law has
authorised the taking of possession or acquisition of
the property of the shareholders, or of the company.
It may be mentioned at the outset that the impugned
law has not authorised any acquisition of any property
in the sense of divesting the shareholders or the company of any property and vesting that property in the
State or its nominee. In other words, there has been
no transfer of title, voluntarily or by operation of law.
It . is, therefore, necessary to enquire and as.certain
whether the Ordinance or the Act which replaced it
1953
Dwarktldas
Shrinivas of
BrJm6oy
••
Tile S!wlapur
Spinning and
J-VeavingCo. Ltd.,,
and OthtrJ.
Das].
726
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
has authorised the taking of possession of any properly
of the shareholders or of the company.
As regards the property of the shareholders the position is the same as in Chiranj;tlal's case('). The
Spinning and
shares still belong to them. They can hold them or
Weaving Co· Ltd·,
and Other~.
dispose of them. If any dividend is declared they will
get them. If there is any winding up and if after payDas].
ment of all liabilities there remains any surplus then
they will participate in that surplus. It is true· that
from a practical point of view it may be difficult for
the shareholders, if they desire to sell the shares, to
find a purchaser who will be willing to buy shares in a
company which is governed by an Ordinance of this
kind but, nevertheless, it cannot be said that the State
has taken possession of the shares in the sense in
which that expression used in article 31(2) has been
explained by me in Subodh Go pal Bose's case(').
It is said, as was done in Chiranjitlal's case(' ), that
certain
valuable rights of the shareholders, e.g.,
the right of voting, the right to elect directors and the
right to apply for the winding up of the company have
been taken away. In the first place, it is donbtful if
any of these right can be called "property" within the
meaning of article 31 (2) for, by itself and apart from
the shares, none of them can be acquired or dispmed
of. In the next place, the State has not taken possession of these rights as explained by Mukherjea J. in
Chiranjitlal's case ( 1 ) at pages 904-906 and by me at
pages 923-924. Therefore, there has been no infringement of the shareholders right to property under
article 31 (2). What has happened is that these rights
which are only incidents of the ownership of the shares
have been suspended or kept in abeyance and if this
may be regarded as amounting to imposing restnctmn<
on the exercise of the rights of ownership of the shares
it may possibly be justified as an exercise in any
emergency of the State's police power under clause (5)
of article 19 by imposing by law reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public so as co
secure the supply of an essential commodity and to
prevent unempolyment.
v.
The Sholapw
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 587.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
As regards the property of the company also there
has been no transfer of title to any such property, voluntary or involuntary, from the company to the State or its
nominee and, therefore, no question arises of any property of the company having been "acquired''. The
question remains whether any property of the company
has been "taken possession of" by the State within the ·
meaning of article 31 (2) as explained by me in Subodh
Gopal Bose's case(1). In Chiranjitla/'s case( 2) Mukherjea J. at pages 903-904 said :
"Assuming that this State management was imposed in the interests of tl1e shareholders tl1emselves and
tl1at the statutory directors are acting as the agents
of the company, the possession of the statutory directors could not, it is argued, be regarded in law as
possession of the company so long as tliey are bound
to act in obedience to the dictates of the Central Government ·and not of the company itself in the administration of its affairs. Possession of an agent, it is said,
cannot judicially be the possession of tlie principal, if
the agent is to act not according to the commands or
dictates of the principal, but under the direction of an
exterior authority.
There can be no doubt that tl1ere is force in this
contention, but as I have indicated at the outset, we
are not concerned in this case with the larger question
as to how far the inter-position of this statutory
management
and
control
amounts
to
taking
possession of the property and assets belonging to the
company.
It is fairly clear that his Lordship was inclined to the
view that the company's properties had. been taken
possession of although he <lid not categorically an explicitly say so. I dealt with the matter at pages 926-927.
After pointing out that the possession of directors who
were not obedient to or amenable to the company or its
shareholders and are not liable to be dismissed or
discharged by the company cannot, in the eye of the
law, be regarded as the possession of tlie company
I said :
i953
DwaT!cadas
Shrinivas ef
Bombay
v.
The Slwlapur
Spinning and
JVeaving Co· Ltd.,
and OtherJ.
Das].
728
1953
Dwarkada.s
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v,
Tm ShDlal'M
Spinning and
Weaving Co. IJd.,
and Othtrs.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
"In this view of the matter there is great force in
the argument that the property of the company has
been taken possession of by the State through directors who have been appointed by the State in exercise
of the powers conferred by the Ordinance and the Act
and who are under the direction and control of the
State and this has been done without payment of any
compensation."
Then after quoting a passage from the judgment of
Holmes J. in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon(')
I concluded :
"Here, therefore, it may well be argued that the
property of the company having been taken possession
of by the State in exercise of powers conferred by a law
which does not provide for payment of any compensation, the fundamental right of the company, has, in
the eye of the law, been infringed."
It is quite clear that although I used the words
"there is great force in the argument" and "it may
well be argued", the then inclination of my mind was
definitely that the property of the company had been
taken possession of as contemplated by article 31 (2).
My observations were much more definite than ·those
of Mukherjea J.
Learned Attorney-General contends that the taking
of possession of the property of the company that has
taken place in this case is clearly not an exercise of
the power of eminent domain within article 31 (2)
but constitutes an exercise of police power under
article 31 ( 1). Here, according to him, the State has
not taken possession of the company's property on its
own account to implement a public purpose such as is
contemplated by article 31 (2) but the State has taken
possession of the company's property to prevent the
company from using its own property to the detriment
of the interests of the public and to do for the company
what the company should itself have done. In order
to determine to which category this taking of possession falls, it is necessary to keep in mind the circumstances in which the Ordinance and the Act were passed
and to ascertain from their language their immediate
(1) 260 U.S. 399·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
purpose and ultimate aim and to consider their effect
on the rights of the company. It should be remembered that the Ordinance of 1950 was promulgated on
the 9th January, 1950. The preamble to the Ordinance
·
recited as follows :
"Whereas on account of mismanagement and
neglect a situation has arisen in the affairs of· the
Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited,
which has
prejudicialiy
affected
the production
of an essential commodity and has caused serious
the
unemployment amongst a ·certain section of
community."
Then came the Act on the 10th April, 1950. There
is no preamble to the Act. Although the short title of
the Act contains a reference to emergency provisions the full title of the Act is as follows :
An Act to make special provision for the proper
1
management and administration of the Shola pur
Spinning and Weaving Company Limited.
,,
There is . no suggestion either in this long title or in
the body of the Act except in section 12 that the Act
is intended only to be a temporary emergency measure.
The object of the Ordinance was stated to be to provide
employment to a large number of workmen and to
keep up the production of an essential commodity.
There is no doubt that section 12 of the Act provide,
that the property of the company and the management
and administration of its affairs would be restored to
the company or its directors elected by the shareholders but that is left entirely . to the unfettered
discretion of the Government. The prvisions of the
Ordinance and the Act are drastic in the extreme. The
managing agents and the elected directors have been
dismissed and new directors have been appointed by
the State. So far as the company is concerned it has
been completely denuded of the possession of its
property. All that is left to the company is its bare
legal title. The carrying on of a business demands
many personal qualities and considerable business
acumen and is much more complicated than collecting
ta-~J 5. G. Indiaf39
•
1953
Dwarkadas
Shn'nivas of
Bombay
VJ
The Sholapur'
Spinning and
. Weaving Ca. Lt<h,
avd Others.
i-
DasJ.
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
the rents of the estate of a disqualified proprietor. The
impugned
law has thrust upon the company a board of
DwarJ:adas
Shrinivas of
directors in whose business capacity the company and
Bombay
its shareholders may have no confidence and over
v.
T ha Sholapur
whom the company has certainly no vestige of control
Spinning and
O" authority and who are not answerable to them at
Weaving Co. LJ4.,
and Others.
all. Although in outward form the directors are the
officers of the company and are bound to act under
Da.s:J
the articles of association in so far as they are not
contrary to or inconsistent with the Ordinance and
the Act, nevertheless, in effect and in substance, they
are the creatures of the State and are answerable to
the State and it is the State that has through these
directors of its choice taken possession of the undertaking of the company and has been carrying on
an experiment in State management of business at the
risk and expense of the company and the shareholders.
Indeed we are told that under such State management
which is going on for pretty nearly four years the
business has been running at a loss. At any rate no
profit has been made or distributed as and by way of
dividend during this long period-a sad commentary
on the efficacy of State management. And nobody
knows how long this state of affairs will continue, for
the Act does not prescribe any definite time limit to
this hazardous experiment. It is, in the premises,
impossible to uphold this law as an instance of the
exercise of the State's police power as an emergency
measure. It has far overstepped the limits of police
power and is, in substance, nothing short of expropriation by way of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain and as the law has not provided for any
compensation it must be held to offend the provisions
of article 31 (2).
The last contention of the appell&nt is that the
Ordinance is unconstitutional and void in that it
infringes the fundamental rights of the shareholders under article 14. In Chiranjitlal's case(') my
Lord the present Chief Justice and I were of the
opinion that the Ordinance and the Act did not proceed
on any rational basis of classification and that this
company and its shareholders had been arbitrarily
1953
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
:S~C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
.singled out for di&criminatory treatment and · that as
equality before the law was denied to this company
and 1ts shareholders the Ordinance and the Act
-offended the equal protection clause of our C.onstitution.
The majority of the Bench, however, took the view
that, there being a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the law and that the onus of displacing
that presumption being on him who impugns the law,
the petitioner in that case had not discharged that
-0nus and that, therefore, he could not complain of
discrimination. In the present case there is nothing
more than what there was before the court in
(;hiranjitlal' s case( 1 ) • Indeed, the question of discrimination does not appear , to have been argued
before the trial court and the appeal court has
rejected it by saying that the plaintiff had not shown
that there were other companies which were guilty of
the same conduct but had not been similarly dealt
with. Learned Attorney-General has submitted that
this court is not bound by its previous decision and
has pressed us to go behind the majority decision.
Accepting that this court is not bound by its own
decisions and may reverse a previous decision especially
on constitutional questions the court will surely be
slow to do so unless such previous decision appears to
be obvious! y erroneous. But in view of the conclusion
I have already arrived at on the other point I do not
feel called upon to pursue this point of discrimination
any further. In my judgment, therefore, this appeal
should be allowed and the plaintiff's suit should be
decreed. The Union of India must pay the plaintiff
his costs throughout.
BosE J.-I agree with my brother Mahajan that the
impugned Ordinance and Act offend article 31 (2) of
the Constitution and so are void. But I prefer to rest
my decision on simpler foundations. With the utmost
respect I deprecate, as I have done in previous case5,
the use of doubtful words like "police power,"
"social control", "eminent domain" and the like.
I say doubtful, not because they .are devoid of meaning
but because they have different shades of meaning in
different countries and because they represent powers
(t) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
1953
DwarWas
SkrinivtU of
Bombqy
v.
Th< Sho/ajJU1
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
DasJ.
732
1953
Dwarkadas
·Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
Spirmin$ and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Bose J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954J
which spring from widely differing sources. In my
opinion, it is wrong to assume that these powers
are inherent in the State in India and then to see
how far the Constitution regulates and fits in with
them. We have to interpret the plain provisions of
the Constitution and it is for jurists and students of
law, not for Judges, to see whether our Constitution
also provides for these powers and it is for them to
determine whether the shape which they take in India
resemble any of the varying forms which they . assume
in other countries.
Article 19 ( 1) ( £) confers a certain fundamental
freedom on all citizens of India, namely, the freedom
to acquire, hold and dispose of property. Article -31(1)
is a sort of corollary, namely that after the property
has been acquired it cannot be taken away save by
authority of law. Article 31 is wider than article 19
because it applies to everyone and is not restricted to
citizens. But what article 19 (1) (f) means is that
whereas a law can be passed to prevent persons who
are not citizens of India from acquiring and holding
property in this country no such restrictions· can be
placed on citizens. But in the absence of such a law
non-citizens can also acquire property in India and if
they do then they cannot be deprived of it any more
than citizens, save by authority of law.
I have put the matter broadly and ignored for the
moment the restrictions imposed by article 19 (5).
The rights conferred by article 19 ( 1) ( f) are not
unfettered
and
the State can impose restrictions
provided they are (1) reasonable and (2) are in the
interests of either the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. But we
are not concerned with article 19 in this case because
no one has prevented either the company or the
plaintiff from acquiring and holding property. They
actually did acquire property and they held it and
nobody stopped them. The complaint is that they are
now being deprived, in a manner not allowed by the
Constitution, of the property which they were lawfully permitted to acquire and hold. That concerns
article 31.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
Now article 31(1) says that no one shall be deprived
of property save by authority of law. That to my
mind is straightforward and simple. It means that no
one's property can be taken away arbitrarily or by
executive action. There must be legal sanction for
every act of deprivation.
Now an Act of the legislature is legal sanction,
therefore if the rest of the article was not there a man
could be deprived of his property by legislative enactment though not by executive action. But that brings
in article 31 (2). Restrictions are there placed even on
the legislature. Unless the Act provides for compensation and either fixes the amount or specifies the
principles on which, and the manner. in which, it is to
be determined it cannot be validly enacted. The only
exceptions are those set out in clause (5). Therefore,
to my mind, the simple question in this case is, do the
impugned Ordinance and Act fall foul of article 31 (2)
read with clause (5) ? All we have to do is to examine
these provisions.
We start with the word "property". Are the
in this company "property"
plaintiff's "interests"
within the meaning of this clause ? Property includes
"any interest" in "any commercial or industrial
undertaking." It also includes any interest in "any
company owning" any interest in any commercial or
industrial undertaking. That is how I read this clum~ily drafted clause. The company here certainly has
an interest in a commercial and industrial undertaking and the plaintiff has an undoubted interest in
the company. He also has a direct interest in the
undertaking that the company runs because, as a·
preference shareholder, he is a member of the company
and would, on liquidation, be entitled to share in the
distribution of its assets.
Next, have these interests been "taken possession
of" or "acquired" ? Here again I have no doubt. In
my judgment, the provisions in the Constitution
touching fundamental rights must be construed broadly and liberally in favour of those on whom the rights
have been conferred. But in any case, in this instance,
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
· Bombay.
v.
Th• Siwlapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Bose].
)
734
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
BombaJ
v.
The Slwlap"'
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ud.,
and Others.
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
these words have to be read along with the word
"deprived" in clause (1). In my opinion, the possession and acquisition referred to in clause (2) mean the
sort of "possession" and "acquisition" that amounts
to "deprivation" within the meaning of clause (1) •.
No hard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case
must depend on its own facts. But if there is substantial deprivation, then clause (2) is, in my judgment,
attracted. By substantial deprivation I mean the sort
of deprivation that substancially robs a man of those
attributes of enjoyment which normally accompany
rights to, or an interest in, property. The form is unessential. It is the substance that we must seek.
Has that happened here ? Of course, it has. The
plaintiff and the company have been left with the
mere husk of title and not only has every form of
enjoyment which normally accompanies an interst in
this kind of property been taken away from them but
to add insult to injury the plaintiff has also been
called upon to pay substantial sums of money ; and for
what ?-not in compliance with any engagement into
which he has entered, not in fulfilment of any duty
or obligation which he has incurred, not in furtherance
of his interests of which he is the best judge, but
blankly and unashamedly because the furtherance of
his interests affects "the production of an essential
commodity" and has caused "serious unemployment
amongst a certain section of the community." If that
is not "deprivation" it is difficult to know what is.
One of the privileges of a democracy of free men is the
right to mismanage one's own affairs within the
confines of the law ; and if A can mismanage his
concerns in a particular way, so can B, C and D. The
production of essential commodities and the employment of labour are matters for the State and statutory
bodies to handle. They have the right, when the law
so permits it, to take over this responsibility when the
public interests so demand but if by doing so they
deprive private individuals and
non-statutory bodies
of their interests in property in the sense explained
above they must pay compensation. They cannot
evade their own duties by fathering their obligations
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
735
on others who are not responsible for carrying on the
affairs of the State. My brother Mahajan has dealt
with this at length and there is no need for me to add
to what he has said.
The only other point I need consider is the appli- .
cability of clause (5) of article 31. The exceptions to
clauses (1) and (2) lie there. I am clear that none of
the exceptions set out there apply. The impugned
Ordinapce and Act have not been made for the promotion of. public health nor to prevent danger to life
and property.
In my opinion, Chiraniit Lal's case(') is distinguishable. I do not think it is a bar here. My brother
Mahajan has explained this at length and as I agree
with him I need say no more. I would therefore
also, in agreement with my learned brother, allow
the appeal and decree the plaintiff's claim with
costs.
GHuLAM HASAN J.-I have had the advantage of
perusing the judgment of my learned brother Mr.
Justice Mahajan and I agree with his conclusion that
the appeal should be allowed and the plaintiff's suit
decreed with costs. I would like to add a few words.
This appeal raises the . question of the constitutional
validity of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving
Company (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance II of
1950, subsequently replaced by Act XXVIII of 1950,
which reproduced substantially the same provisions.
This question arose originally upon a petition under
article 32 of the Constitution filed by one Chiranjit
Lal Chowdhuri an ordinary shareholder of the company, challenging the Act as being in violation of his
fundamental rights under articles 14, 19 and 31 of the
Constitution. By a majority of 3 : 2 it was held that
the petitioner had failed to displace the presumption
of the constitutionality of the Act or that there had
been any abridgement of his fundamental rights. The
minority declared the impugned Act as void as· it
violated the
fundamental rights of the petitioner
under article 14 of the Constitution.
(') [1s50] S. C.R. 863.
1953
Dwarkadar
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v. The Slwlapu-r
Spinning and
Weavin~ Co. Ut!.,
and Others.
Bose J•
736
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinfras of
Bombay
••
The Sholapur
Spinning and
, Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and OtherJ.
Ghul•m Hasan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
My learned brother has distinguished, and if I may
say so with respect successfully, the decision in
Chiranjit Lal's case(') and has explained the ratio
decidendi of the majority view in that case and I
entirely agree with him. That decision does not, in my
opinion, conclude the matter so far as the present
case is concerned and no question of invoking the
principle of stare decisis arises.
The question which we are now invited to consider
was raised by the appellant, a preference sbareho Ider
holding 3,244 preference shares of the face value of
Rs. 100 out of which he had paid up Rs. 50 per share.
He was called upon by the statutory directors nominated by the Government under the impugned Act to
pay Rs. 1,62,000 as the balance of the amount of the
call. Thereupon he filed the suit in a representative
capacity on behalf of himself and other preference
shareholders challenging the validity of the Act. The
suit was dismissed by the trial Judge whose decision
was affirmed on appeal by the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court.
My learned brother has analysed in detail the relevant provisions of tbe in1puzncJ P. . ct a:vl I have no
hesitation in agreeing with him that the Act in substance robs the company of every vestige of right
except what has been laconically called the husk of
title. I agree, therefore, that tbe impugned Act oversteps the constitutional limits of the power conferred
upon the State and offends against the provisions of
article 31 and must, therefore, be held void.
Article 31 finds ~ place in Part !II Gf the Comt::,,_
tion which deals with fundamrntal •ights.
It "
headed "Right to Property". Upon a simple and
straightforward construction of its language and the
context in which it stands and unhampered by the
provisions of the American Constitution the article
confers upon every person, whether a citizen or not,
a fundamental right of protection of property against
encroachment by the executive without the authority
of law and against the legislature unless the law
passed by it satisfies the two essential conditions
(I) [I950] s.c.R. 869.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
737
laid down in (2) that there must be public purpose for
taking away private . property and that the law must
provide for compensation and either fix the amount
of such compensation or specify the principles on
which and the manner in which the compensation
shall be determined and given. Article 31 (1) embodies a categorical declaration proclaiming the right
of property and equally categorically prohibits the
State from depriving the owner of that property by
an executive act or without being backed by the
authority of law. The intention underlying the
article -being the protection of property against invasion by the State, both parts (1) and (2) of article 31
should be read together so as to harmonize with that
intention. Article 31, in my opinion, is wider than
article 19(1) (f) whLch confers upon a citizen only the
right to acquire, hold and aispose of property and
is different in scope and content. Article 31 is selfcontained and ( 1) refers to deprivation of property
in general. Acquisition or taking possession in (2) are
different modes of deprivation and are comprehensive
enough to include all forms of taking away rights of
property: Having regard to the setting in which
article 31 is placed, the word 'property' used in the
article must be construed in the widest sense as connoting a bundle of rights exercisable by the owner
in respect thereof and embracing within its purview
both corporeal and incorporeal rights. The word
'property' is not defined in the Constitution and there
is no good reason to restrict its meaning. Whether
the facts in a given case amount to deprivation of
property within the meaning of article 31 will depend
upon the circumstances of each case and it is not
possible, in the nature of things, to lay down any
inflexible test which may be universally applicable.
When it can be shown that the statute substantially
interfores with the right of enjoyment of property,
it wrn, in my opinion, be hit by article 31 (2) and
declared void, unless compensation is provided.
I am not prepared to subscribe to the proposition
that article 31 (1) stands by itself and should be read
separately from (2) and I cannot attribute an intention
!953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
The _Sholapur
Spinning and
Weaving Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
Ghulam Hasan J.
738
1953
Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of
Bombay
v.
The Sholapur
spinning and
Weaziing Co. Ltd.,
and Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)'
to our Parliament to deprive a person of his property
merely by passing an Act. The two parts of the
article form an integral whole and cannot be disassociated from each other.
The result is that I agree with the order proposed
by my learned brother.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant : /. N. Shroff.
Agent for respondents
Rajinder Narain.
Nos.
1 to 4 and 6 to 8 ~
Agent for respondent No. 9 : G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
K. S. RASHID AND SON
1954
Jan. 22.
ti.
THE INCOME-TAX INVESTIGATION
COMMISSION, ETC.
(With connected appeals)
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, art. 226-/urisdiction of Punjab High
Court to issue writs to Income-tax Investigation Commission located
in Delhi-Remedy under art. 226-Discretionary-Taxation on
Income (Investigation Commission) (Act XXX of 1947), ss. 5 and
8(5).
The Punjab High Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ under
art. 226 of the Constitution to the Income-tax Investigation
Commission located in Delhi and investigating the case of the
petitioner under 5 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, ·1947, although the petitioners were assessees within
the U. P. State an<l their original assessments were made by the
Income-tax authorities of that State.
Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts
new and very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs which
they never possessed before. There are only two limitations placed
upon the exercise of such powers by a High Court ; one is that the
power is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation
to which it exercises jurisdiction", that is to say, the writs issued
by the court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its
jurisdiction. The other is that the person or authority to whom
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