THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL versus SUBODH GOPALBOSE AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 17 December 1953 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 587 | 1953 INSC 89
Key facts
- Decided
- 17 December 1953
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, GHULAM HASAN, B. JAGANNADHADAS
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 107/1952
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 587
- Neutral citation
- 1953 INSC 89
Text of the judgment
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
587
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
Dec.17.
f}.
SUBODH GOPAL BOSE AND OTHERS.
[PATANJALI
SAsTRI
C.J.,
MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN,
S. R. DAs, GHULAM HASAN and
JAGANNADHADAS
•
•
JJ.j
Constitution of India, arts. 19 (J) (f) & 31-Scope ofCorrelation between art. 19 (1) (!) and art. 31-Clauses (J) and (2)
of art. 31, whether
mutually exclusivc-"Deprivation"-"Acquisition"-f'Taking possession of"-Meanings of-Bengal !And
Revenue Sales (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1950 (West Bengal
Act VII of 1950), s. 7-Whether ultra vires ·art. 19 (1) (/)
and art. 31.
The first respondent B purchased a Touzi in 24-Parganas Collectorate at a revenue sale held on 9th January, 1942. As such
purchaser he acquired under s. 37 of the Bengal Revenue
, Sales Act, 18j9, the right "t:v avoid and annul all under~tenures
and forthwith to eject all under-tenants" with certain exceptions
which are not material here. In exercise of that right he gave
notices of ejectment and brought a suit in 1946 to evict certain
under-tenants including the second respondent herein and to
recover possession of the lands. The suit was decreed against the
second respondent who preferred an appeal to the District Judge,
24-Parganas, contending that his under-tenure came within one of
the exceptions referred to in s. 37. When the appeal was
pending, the Bill which was later passed as the West Bengal
Revenue Sales (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1950, .was introduced
in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly on 23rd March, 1950.
It would appear, according to the "statement of objects and
reasons" annexed to the Bill, that great hardship was being caused
to a large section of the people by the application of s. 37 of the
Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1859, in the urban areas and
.
particularly in Calcutta and its suburbs where "the present
phenomenal increase in land values has supplied the necessary
incentive to speculative purchasers in exploiting this provision
(section 37)
of the law for unwarranted large scale eviction" and
it was, therefore, considered necessary to enlarge the scope of protection already given by the section to certain categories of
"
1953
tenants with due safeguards for the security of Government
revenue. The Bill was eventually passed as the amending Act
and it came into force on 15th March, 1950. It substituted
by s. 4 the new s. 37 in place of the original s. 37 and it
provided by s. 7 that all pending suits, appeals •nd other
proceedings which had not already resulted in delivery of possession, shall abate. Thereupon B contending that s. 7 was void
588
!S53
The State of
West Bengal
v.
SuOodft Goj)al
Bose awl Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
as abridging his fundamental rights under art. 19(1)(£) and art. 31
inoved the High Court under art. 228 to withdraw the pending
appeal and to detern1ine the constitutional issue raised by him.
The appeal was accordingly withdrawn and the case was heard by
~freYor Harries C.J. and Banerjee J. who, by separate but con·
curring Judg111ents, declared ·S. 7 unconstitutional
and void.
~fhey hel<l that B's right to annul under-tenures an<l evict
undertenants being a vested right acquired by him under- his purchase
before s. 37 was an1en<led, the retrospective depri\'ation of
that right by s. 7 of the ainending Act without
any abaten1ent of the price paid by him at the revenue sale was an
infringement of his fundamental right under art. 19 (l)(f) to hold
property with all the rights acquired under his purchase, and as
such depriYation \Vas not a reasonable restriction on the exercise
of his vested right, s. 7 was not saved by cl. ( 5) of that
article and \Vas void. The State of \\Test Bengal preferred the
present appeal to the Supren1e Court :
•
,
Held, per PATANJALI SAsm1 C.J.-Artick 19 (!) (£) has no
application to this case. 1"he vvord "hold" in the article means
O\VIl. rfhe said sub-clause (£) gives the citizen of India the abstract
right to acquire, O\Vn and dispose of property. This article does not
deal with the concrete rights of the citizens of India in respect
of the property so acquired and o\vned by him. These concrete
rights are dealt with in art. 31 of the Constitution.
Under the scherne of the Constitution all those broad and
basic freedo1ns inherent in the status of a citizen as a free 1nan
are e1nbodied and protected fro1n invasion by the State under
cl. (I) of art. 19, the powers of State regulation of those freedon1s in public interest being defined in relation lo each of those
freedoms by els. (2) to (6) of that article, while rights of private
property are separately dealt with and their protection provided
for in art. 31, the cases where social control and regulation
could extend to the deprivation of such rights being indicated
in para. (ii) of sub-clause (b) of cl. (5) of art. 31 and exempted
fron1 liability to pay compensation under cl. (2).
Held, per PATANJALI SASTRI C.J. (Mnrn CHAND MAHAJAN
and G!!ULAM HASAN JJ. concurring).-(i) Article 31 protects the
right to property by defining the litnitations on the power of the
State to take away private property without the consent of the
ovvner. Clauses (1) and (2) of art. 31 are not mutually exclusive
in scope and content, but should be read together and understood
as dealing with the same subject, namely the protection of the
right to property by means of limitations on the State's power
referred to above, the deprivation contemplated in clause (1) being
no other than the acquisition or taking possession of the property
referred to in cl. (2).
The words "taking of ........ possession or ........ acquisition" in
art. 31(2) and the words "acquisition or requisitioning" in entry
..
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
No. 33 of List I and entry No. 36 of List II as also the words
"acquired or requisitioned" in entry No. 42 of List III are <liffercnt expressions connoting the salne idea and instances of different kinds of deprivation of property within the meaning of art.
31 (1) of the Constitution.
No cut and dried test can be formulated as to whether in a
given case the owner is "deprived" of his property within the
meaning of art. 31 ; each case n1ust be decided
its
own
facts.
ment would
as it arises on
Broadly speaking it may be said that an abridge-
be so substantial
as to amount to a deprivation \vith-
in the meaning of art. 31, if, in effect, it \Vithheld the property
fron1 the possession and enjoyn1ent of the owner, or seriously
impaired its use and enjoy1nent by hi1n· or materially reduced its
value. The expression "taking ........ possession" in art. 31(2)
of the Constitution can only mean such possession as the property
taken possession of, is susceptible -to and need not be. actual phy·
sical possession.
(ii) It is difficult to hold that the abridgement sought to be
effected retrospectively of the rights of a purchaser at a revenue
sale is so substantial as to amount to a deprivation of his property
within .the meaning of art. 31(1) and (2). No question accordingly arises as to the applicability of cl. 5(b)(ii) of art. 31 to the
case.
Per DAs ).-(!)The abridgement of the rights of the purchaser
at a revenue sale brought about by the new s. 37 amounts to no·
thing 1nore than the imposition of a reasonable restriction on the
exercise of the right conferred by art. 19( 1) ( f) in the interests
of the general publi~ and is perfectly _legitimate and pennissible
under cl. '(5) of that article. It is well-settled that the statement of objects and reasons is not adn1issible as an aid to the con~
struction of a statute but it can be referred to only for the limited
purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which
actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the same and the
cXtent and urgency of the evil which he sought to remedy. Tlhose
cire matters which must enter into the judicial verdict as to the
reasonableness of the restrictions which art. 19(5) permits to be
imposed on the exercise of the right guaranteed by art. 19(l)(f).
•
(II) The correlation between art. 19(1)(f) ;rnd art. 31 is
that if a person loses his property by reason of its having been
compulsorily acquired under art. 31 he loses his right to hold
that property and cannot con1plain that his funda1nental right
under art. 19(1)(£) has been infringed. The rights enumerated
in art. 19{ 1) subsist while the citizen has the legal capacity to
exercise then1.
A. K. Gopalan's case [1950] S.C.R. 88 and Chiranjit Lat's case
{1950] S.C.R: 869 referred to.
1953
The Stale of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bilse and Others.
590
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Suhodh Gopal
&Je and Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
For the purpose
footing that art. 19
[1954]
of this appeal the matter proceeds on the
relates to abstract right as well as to right
to concrete property.
(III) The true scope and effect of els. (1) and (2) of art. 31 is
that cl. ( 1) deals with deprivation of property in exercise of
police po\ver and enuaciates the restrictions which our Constitu·
tion n1akers thought necessary or sufficient to be placed on the
exercise of that power, namely, that such power can be exercised
only by authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat and that
cl. (2) <leals with the exercise of the power of eminent domain
and places limitations on the exercise of that po\ver. These
litnitations constitute our fundan1ental rights against the State's
po\ver of eminent domain.
(1\1 ) Both these clauses cannot be regarded as concerned only
with the State's power of e1ninent domain, because then(a) cl. (1) would be wholly redundant, for the >1ecessity
of a la\V is quite clearly itnplicit in cl. (2) itself;
(b) deprivation of property otherwise than by taking of
possession or acquisition o'f it \vill be outside the pale of constitu·
tional protection :
( c) there will be no protection against the exercise of
police po\ver in respect of property either by the executive or by
the legislature.
Chit'anjit Lal's case [1950] S.C.R. 869 and The Bihar Zami11dari
case [ 1952] S.C.R. 889 referred to.
(V) The State's police power is not confined( a) within the ambit of art. 19 for to say otherwise
\vill mean :
(i) that there is no protection for any person, citizen or
non·c1ttzen, against exercise of police power by the executive
over property ;
(ii) that although in els. (2) to (6) there is protection
against the legislature in respect of urestriction" there is no
protection against "deprivation" ; or
(b) within cl. (5) (b) of art. 31 because to say otherwise
\vill mean :(i) that the police power which is inherent in sovereignty and
<loes not require express reservation has been unnecessarily <lefin.
e<l and reserved ;
(ii) that the Constitution does not prescribe any test for the
validity of the laws which fall within the clause and, therefore,
the law falling within the clause may be as arch;iic, offensive and
unreasonable as the legislature may choose to make it ;
(iii) that the clause gives no protection against the executive;
(iv) that the exercise of the police power by the legislature
is confined within the very narrow and inelastic limits of the
clause and that no beneficial or social legislation involving taking
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
th;
i953
of property can be undertaken by the State if
law falls outside
the clause except on terms of payment of compensation ;
ThtState of
f·Vest Btligal
( v) that acquisition of property for which compensation is
v.
v
usually provided, e.g., acquisition of land for a public park, hospital
Subodh Gopal
or clearing a slum area will henceforth be permissible without Bost
a11d Others.
the law providing any compensation.
(VI) The argument that if art. 31(1) is read as a fundamental right against deprivation of property by the executive and
art. 31(2) as laying down the limi\s of State's power of eminent
domain then there will be no real protection whatever, for the
State will deprive a person of his property without cornpensation
by simply making a law is not tenable because(i) there will certainly be protection against the execute just
as the 29th clause ~the Magna Charta . was a protection against
the British Crown ;
(ii) there is protection under art. 31(2) against the legislature in the matter of taking of possession or acquisition for com~
pensation has to be given and under cl. (5) of art. 19 against
unreasonable re!>traint :
(iii) the absence of protection against the legislature in other
cases is not greater than the absence of protection against the
legislature in respi:ct of taxation and if the legislature can be
trusted in the latter case it may equally be truste<l in the former
case.
(Vil) Every taking of a thing into the custody of the State
or its non1inee <locs not necessarily mean the taking of possession
of that thing within the meaning of art. 31(2) so as to call for
compensation. The police po\ver is exercised in the interest of
the con1munity and the power of eminent do1nain is exercised to
in1plen1ent a public purpose and in both cases there is a taking of
possession of private property. There is, however, a marked
difference between the exercise of these two sovereign powers. It
.is easy to perceive, though some\vhat difficult to express, the
distinction bet\veen the two kinds of taking of possession which
undoubtedly exists. In view of the wide sweep of the State's
police power it is neither desirable nor possible to lay down a
fixed general test for determining whether the taking of possession
authorised by any particular law falls within one category or the
other. Without, therefore, attempting any such general enunciation of any inflexible rule it is possible to say broadly that the aim,
purpose and the effect of the two kinds of taking of possession arc
different and that in each case the provisions of the particular
law in question will have to be carefully scrutinised in order to
detern1ine in \Vhich category falls the taking of possession authorised by such law. A consideration of the ultimate aim, the
immediate purpose and the mode and manner of the taking of
possession and the duration for which such possession is taken,
the effect of it on the rights of the person dispossessed and other
such like elements must all detcnnine the judicial verdict.
•
•
•
592
\.953
TJ1eStalt o!
West Bengal
. v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Ot.1,er.r.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
(VIII) Treating the right t<> annul under-tenures and to eject
under-tenants and decree. for .cjectment as "property" as used in
art. 31(2) the State has not acquired those rights for there has
been no transfer by agreement or by operation of law of those
rights fro1n the respondent B to the State or anybody else. The
purchase being at a llcvenue sale to which West Bengal Act ,VII
of 1950 applies, the purchaser of the property has been deprived of
this right by authority of law and the case falls
within cl. (I)
of art. 31 and no \\'ithin cl. (2) of art. 31.
If the
i1npugne<l section 1s regarded as imposing restrictions on the
purchaser, such restrictions in the circun1stances of the case are
quite reasonable an<l permissible under article 19(5) and, in the
premises, the plea of unconstitutionality cannot prevail and must
be rejected.
•
Per )AGAN:<ADHADAs J.-(i) On the assumption that the question raised in this case is one that arises under_ art. 19(1)(£) and
(5) of the Constitution, the impugned section of the West Bengal
Act \ 7II 0£ 1950 is intra vires because the restrictions are reason·
able within the meaning of art. 19(5) of the Constitution;
(ii) that art. 19(1)(f) while probably meant to relate to the
natural rights of the citizens comprehends within the scope also
concrete property rights. The restrictions on the exercise of rights
envisaged in art; 19(5) appear to relate-normally, if not invari·
ably-to concrete property rights ;
(iii) that cl. (1) of art. 31 cannot be construed as being
a declaration or implied recognition of
the American
doctrine of "police po\Ver".
~ither
It comprehends · \vithin its scope the requiren1ent of the
authority of law, as distinguished from executive fiat for the
exercise of the poWer of eminent domain, but its scope may well
be wider. "Acquisition" and "taking p6ssession" in art. 31(2)
.cannot be taken as necessarily involving transfer of title or posses·
sion. The words or phrases comprehend all cases where the title
-0r possession is taken out of the owner and appropriated without
his consent by transfer or extinction or by some other process~
which in substance amounts to it, the possession in this context
-n1e:ining such possession as the nature of the property adrnits and
which the law recognizes as possession.
(iv) In the context of art. 31(2) as in the cognate context
-0f article 19(l)(f)-the connotation of the word "property" is
limited by the accompanying words "acquisition" and "taking
possession". In the present case the right to annul under~tenurcs
Cannot in itself be treated as property for it is not capable of independent acquisition or possession. The deprivation of it can only
an1ount to a restriction on the exercise of the rights as regards
the main property itself and hence must fall under art. 19(1)(£)
taken with 19(5).
.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
593
Butchers Union etc. Co. v. Crescent City etc. Co., (111 U.S. 746),
Punjab Province v. Dau/at Singh and Others ([1946] F.C.R. I),
Chiranjit Lal Chaudhuri v. The Union of India and Others ([1950]
s:C.R. 869), A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 88),
P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India ([1952] S.C.R. 391),
Ministry of State for the Army v. Dalziel (68 C.L.R. 261), Pennsy/.
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon (260 U.S. 322), Dwarkadas Shrinivas v.
Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. ([1954] S.C.R. 674),
State of Madras v. V. G. Row ([1952] S.C.R. 597), Ram Singh
v. The State of Madras (1_1951] S.C.R. 451), ·State- of Bihar v.
Maharajadhiraja Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga ([1952] S.C.R.
889), Noble State Bank v. Haskell (219 U.S. 104), Eubank v.
Richmond (226 U.S. 137), Joseph Hurtado v. People of California
•
(1883) (IO U.S. 516), referred to;
CIVIL.
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION : Civil
Appeal
No. 107 of 1952.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 22nd
March, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at
Calcutta (Harries C.J. and Banerjee J.) in Reference
No. 4 of 1950 in Civil Rule No. 1643 of 1950.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (B. Sen,
with him) for the appellant.
Atul Chandra Gupta (Jay Copa/ Chose, with him) for
respondent No. 1.
1953. December 17. The following Judgments
were delivered.
PATANJALI SASTRI C. J.-This appeal raises issues
.of great public and private importance regarding the
extent of protection which the Constitution of India
accords to ownerships of private property.
•
The first respondent herein (hereinafter referred to
as the respondent) purchased the entire Touzi No. 341
·of the 24-Parganas Collectorate at a revenue sale held
on· January 9, 1942. · As such purchaser, the respondent
acquired under section 37 of the Bengal Revenue
Sales Act, · 1859 (Central Act No. 11 of 1859) the right
"to avoid and· annul all under-tenures and forthwith
to eject all under-tenants" with certain exceptions
which are not material here. In exercise of that right
~he respondent gave notices of ejectment and brought
-a suit in 1946 ·to evict certain under-tenants, including
·the se.cond respondent herein, ·and to recover·. possession
!953
The State of
WestBetigaJ.
"·
Subodh Gopal
ose ·and Others.
594
1953
ThtSlate of
Wt.ti Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
BoJ t and Othtrs.
Pata11jali Sastri
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
of the lands. The suit was decreed against the
second respondent who preferred an appeal to the
District Judge, 24-Parganas, contending that his undertenure came within one of the exceptions referred t<>
in section 37.
When the appeal was pending, the Bill, which was
later passed as the West Bengal Revenue Sales (West
Bengal Amendment) Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred t<>
as "the amending Act") was intmduced in the West
Bengal Legislative Assembly on March 23, 1950. It
would appear, according to the "statement of objects
and reasons" annexed to the Bill, that great hardship
was being caused to a large section of the people by
the application of section 37 of the Bengal Land
Revenue Sales Act,· 1859, in the urban areas and
particularly in Calcutta and. its suburbs where "the
present phenomenal increase in land values has
supplied the necessary incentive to speculative purchasers in exploiting this provision (section 37) of the law
for unwarranted large-scale eviction" and it was,
therefore, considered necessary to enlarge the scope of
protection already given by the section to certain
categories of tenants with due safeguards for the
security of Government revenue. The Bill was eventually passed as the amending Act and it came int<>
force on March 15, 1950. It substituted by section 4
the new . section 37 in the place of the original section 37, and it provided by section 7 that all pending
suits, appeals and other proceedings which had not
already resulted m
delivery of possession sha!I
abate.
Thereupon, the respondent, contending that section 7
was void as abriging his fundamental rights under
article 19(1) (f) and article 31, moved the High Court
under article 228 to withdraw the pending appeal and
determine the constitutional issue raised by him. The
appeal was accordingly withdrawn and the case was
heard by Trevor Harries C. J. and Banerjee J. who,
by separate but concurring
judgments, declared
section 7 unconstitutional and void and returned the
case to the District Court for disposal in conformity
•
•
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
595
with their decision. The learned Judges held that the
respondent's right to annul under-tenures and evict
under-tenants being a vested right acquired by him
under his purchase before section 37 was amended,
the retrospective deprivation of that right by section 7
of the amending Act without any abatement of the
price paid by the respondent at the revenue sale was
an infringement of his fundamental right under article
19(1) (f) to hold property with all the rights acquired
under his purchase, and as su~h deprivation was not a
reasonable restriction on the respondent's exercise of
his vested right, section 7 was not saved by clause (S)
of that article and was void.
•
On behalf of the appellant State the learned
Attorney-General contended before us that if, as the
respondent claims, his right to annul under-tenures
and evict under-tenants in occupation other than
those protected under the original enactment, was
"property" within the meaning of clause (1) of article
19, then, it was also "property" within the meaning of
clause (1) of article 31, as the expression must have the
same connotation in both the provisions, and the
respondent, having been "deprived" of it under the
authority of law, namely, section 7 of the amending
Act, such deprivation was lawful and could not be
challenged. In support of this contention learned
counsel strongly relied on the observations of my
learned brother Das in Chiranjit Lal Choudhury's case( 1 )
and also on the, analogy of the reasoning of the
majority in Gopalan's case('). Alternatively, it was
urged that if the correct view was that the nullification
of the respondent's right was only the imposition of a
"restriction" on the enjoyment of the property
purchased by him, as has been held by the learned
Judges below, then, it was a reasonable restriction
imposed in the interests of the general public under
clause (5) of article 19, having regard to the facts and
circumstances which led to the enactment of the
measure as disclosed in the Statement of Objects and
(l) (1950] S. C.R. 869.
(2) (1950] S. C.R. 88.
1953
The State of
WeJtBengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others~.
Pata,Yali Sastri;,
C.J.
5%
T953
..
ThtState qf
West Bengal
Subodh Gopal
.Boso! and Others.
.Pal'llljali Smtri
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
Reasons annexed to the Bill which, for this purpose, 1s
admissible.
It will be convenient to deal first with the latter
contention of the Attorney-General. Sub-clause (f) of
clause ( 1) of article 19 has, in my opinion, no application
to ·the case. That article enumerates certain freedoms
under the caption "right to freedom" and deals with
those great and basic rights which are recognised and
guaranteed as the natural rights inherent in the
status of a citizen of a free country. The freedoms
declared in sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) are clearly of
that description and in such context sub-clause (f)
should, I think, also be understood as declaring the
freedom ·appertaining to the citizen of free India in the
matter of acquisition, · possession and disposal of private
property. In other words, it declares the citizen's
right to own property and has no reference to the right
to the property owned by him, which is dealt with in
article 31. Referring to the "privileges and immunities" mentioned in article 4 and Amendment 14 of the
American Federal Constitution, Bradley J. said m
Butcher's Union etc. Co. v. Crescent City etc. Co.(') :
"The phrase has a broader meaning. It includes
those fundamental privileges and immunities which
belong essentially to the citizens of every free government, among which Washington J. enumerates the
right of protection ; the right to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety ; the right to pass through and
reside in any State ·for the purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits or otherwise ; to claim the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus ; to institute and
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State
and to take, hold and dispose of property either real or
persona/; · (Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. (C.C.) 371).
These rights are different from the concrete rights
which a man may have to a specific chattel or a piece
of land or to the performance by another of a particular contract, or to damages of a particular wrong,
all which may be invaded by individuals ; they are the
capacity, power or privilege of having and enjoying
(I) JI 1 U.S. 746.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
597
those concrete rights and of maintaining them in the
courts, which capacity, power or privilege_ can only be
invaded by the State. These primordial and fundamental rights •are the privileges and immunities of
citiztns which are referred to in the 4th article of the
Constitution and m the 14th Amendment to it."
(Italics mine).
•
.,.,.
We are not here concerned with the meaning and
content of the phrase "privileges and immunities" in
the context of those provisions which, according to
some of the Judges, have a reference only to those
privileges and immunities which owe their existence to
the Federal Constitution or its laws. What is of
importance for the present purpose is that the two
learned Judges thought that the "right to take, hold
and dispose of property" was one of those "primordial
and fundamental rights" of the same class as the
right to pursue happiness and safety and other such
basic freedoms appertaining to free citizens and was
different from the concrete rights which a person may
have to a specific res or thing owned, being the capacity, power cir privilege of having and enjoying those
concrete rights. Sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of article 19
seems analogous to clause (1) of article 17 of the
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights "Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others" and article 31 to clause (2) of
article 17 "N:o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property." I have no doubt that the framers of our
Constitution drew the same distinction and classed the
natural right or capacity of a citizen "to acquire, hold
and dispose of property" with other natural rights
and freedoms inherent in the status of a free citizen
and embodied them in article 19(1), while they provided for the protection of concrete rights of property
owned by a person in article 31. The meaning of the
phrase "to acquire, hold and dispose of property" as
well as the nature of the subject matter to which it
has reference in the sense indicated above, is also clear
from the terms of sections 111 and 298 of the Governc
ment of India Act, 1935, where the same phrase is used
1953
The Stale of
Weit Bengal
v.
Suhodh Copa!
Bose and Others~
Patanjali Sasfrf
C.J.
598
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
..-Bose and Others.
-Patanjali SaJlri
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
in prohibiting imposition of "disability" on grounds
of religion,. place of birth, descent, colour or any of
them on a British subject domiciled in the United
Kingdom and on an Indian subject of His Majesty
determined, in the case of citizens and non-citizens
not deal
with
expropriation of specific property
belonging to such persons which is dealt with in
section 299.
•
There are difficulties in the way of accepting the
view of the learned Judges below that article 19 ( 1) ( f)
and 19 (5) deal with the concrete rights of property
and the restraint to which they are liable to be
subjected. In the first place, it will be noticed that
sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of article 19 deals only with
the rights of citizens, whereas article 31 deals with the
rights of persons in general. If article 31, which is
headed by the caption "right to property'', was
designed to protect property rights of citizens as well
as non-citizens, why was it considered necessary to
provide for the protection of those rights in snb-clause
(f) of clause (1) of article 19 also? I do not think that
our Constitution-makers could have intended to pre>·
vide a double-barrelled constitutional protection to
private property. Moreover, right to "acquire" and
"dispose of" property could only refer to the capacity
of a citizen. The word "hold", which is inserted
between those two words must, in my opinion, be
understood to mean "own", and not as
having
reference to something different, viz., rights to specific
things owned by a citizen ? I see no force in the objection that unless sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of article 19
read with clause (5) is construed as relating to concrete
property rights also, the legislature would have the
power to impose even unreasonable restrictions on the
enjoyment of private property by citizens. It is difficult to believe that the framers of our Constitution
could have intended to differentiate between citizens
and non-citizens in regard to imposition of restrictions
-0n enjoyment of private property. Such restrictions
are imposed in exercise of the power inherent in the
State to regulate private rights of property when they
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
599
_,_,
,•
are sought to be exercised to the injury of others
naving similar rights, and the measure of restriction
imposed in exercise of such regulative power must be
determined, in the case of ,citizens and non-citizens
alike, by the necessity of protecting the community.
On the other hand, differential treatment of citizens
and non-citizens would be perfectly intelligible if subdause ( f) of clause ( 1) of article 19 and clause (5) are
understood as dealing only with the freedom or capacity to acquire, hold and dispose of property in general,
for, it would be justifiable to exclude aliens from such
freedom, as has been done' in several countries for the
benefit of their own nationals, particularly in respect
of land. Moreover, both by the preamble and the
directive principles of State policy in Part IV, our
Constitution has set the goal of a social welfare State
and this must involve the exercise of a large measure
of social control and regulation of the enjoyment of
private property. If concrete rights of property are
brought within the purview of article 19(1) (f), the
judicial review under clause (5) as to the reasonable,ness of such control and regulation might have an unduly hampering effect on legislation in that behalf,
and the makers of our Constitution may well have
intended to leave the Legislatures free to exercise such
control and regulation in relation to the enjoyment of
"rights of property, providing only that if such regulation reaches the point of deprivation of property the
owner should be indemnified under clause (2) of
article 31 subject to the exceptions specified in para.
(ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (5) of article 31.
Nor am I much impressed with the suggestion that
the reference to "exercise" in clause (5) of article 19
of the rights conferred by sub-clause (f) of clause (1)
indicates that the latter rights must be rights of
property. Clause (5) could as well contemplate restrictions on the excercise of a citizen's freedom to acquire,
hold and dispose of property, as for instance, banning
acquisition of land in a givien locality, say a tribal
area, or putting a ceiling on the quantum of land that
a citizen can hold, or restricting alienation of land to
specified classes of persons only (cf. Punjab Province v.
1953
The State of
WestBt'ffgal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Qthers.
Patanjali Sastri
c.•J.
600
1953
The State of
lfe.st Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bost and Others.
PatanJali Sastri
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954J
Dau/at Singh and Other (') and the reasonableness of
such restrictions being brought under judicial review.
For all these reasons, I am of opinion that under the
scheme of the Constitution, all those broad and basic
freedoms inherent in the status of a citizen as a free
man are embodied and protected from invasion by the
State under clause ( 1) of article 19, the powers of State
regulation of those freedoms in public interest being
defined in relation to each of those freedoms by
clauses (2) to (6) of that article, while rights of private
property are separately dealt with and their protection
provided for in article 31, the cases where social
control and regulation could extend to the deprivation
of such rights being indicated in para. (ii) of subclause (b) of clause (5) of article 31 and exempted
from liability to pay compensation under clause (2).
On this view, no question of correlating article 19 ( 1)
(f) with article 31 could arise and the analogy of
Gopalan' s .case has no application. On this view, the
question whether section 7 of the amending Act is a
reasonable restriction on the exercise of the respondent's right to the property purchased by him could not
also arise, as clause (5) of article 19 could then have
reference only to disabilities of the kind already
mentioned.
Turning next to the contention based on article 31
(1), it was put thus in the language of Das J. in
Chiranjit Lal Choudhury's case( ) which the learned
Attorney-General fully adopted :
"Article 31(1) formulates the fundamental right in
negative form prohibiting the deprivation of property
except by authority of law. It implies that a person
may be deprived of hi~ property by authority of law.
Article 31 (2) prohibits the acquisition or taking possession of property for a public purpose under any law,
unless such law provides for payment of compensation.
It is suggested that clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 deal
with the same topic, namely, compulsory acquisition or taking possession of property, clause (2)
being only an elaboration of clause (1). There appear
(1) [1946] F.C.R. 1 (P.C.).
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 924.
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
601
to me to be two objections to this suggestion.
If that were the correct view, then clause (1)
must be held to be wholly redundant and clause (2),
by itself, would have been sufficient. In the next place
such a view would exclude deprivation of property
otherwise than by acquisition or taking of possession.
One can conceive of circumstances where the State
may have to deprive a person of his property without
acquiring or taking possession of the same. For
example, in any emergency, in order to prevent a fire
spreading, the authorities may have to demolish an
intervening building. This deprivation of property is
supported in the United States of America as an exer-.
cise of "police power". This deprivation of property
is different from acquisition or taking of possession of
property which goes by the name of "eminent domain"
in the American law. The construction suggested
implies that our Constitution has dealt with only the
law of "eminent domain'', but has not provided for
deprivation of property in exercise of "police powers".
I am not prepared to adopt such construction, for I
do not feel pressed to do so by the language used in
article 31. On the contrary, the language of clause (1)
of article 31 is wider than that of clause (2), for deprivation of property may well be brought about otherwise than by acquiring or taking possession of it. I
think clause ( 1) enunciat~s the general principle that
no person shall be deprived of his property except by
authority of law, which, put in a positive form, implies
that a person may be deprived of his property, provided he is so deprived by authority of law. No question
of compensation arises under clause (1). The effect
of clause (2) is that only certain kinds of deprivation
of property, namely those brought about by acquisition
or taking possession of it, will not be permissible under
any law, unless such law provides for payment of compensation. If the deprivation of property is brought
about by means other than acquisition or taking
possession of it, no compensation is required, provided
that such deprivation is by authority of law."
I have made this lengthy extract in order to avoid
possible . unfairness
in summarising
it.
These
~-95 S.C.I./59
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bast and Othn's.
-'
Patanjali' Sadri
C.J.
602
1953
TheStateof
WestBengid
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others.
P1Jtanjali Sastri
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
observations were made while rejecting an argument of
the petitioner in that case, which, howevtr, the learned
Judge decided in his favour on another point, and are
thus purely obiter. With all respect to my learned
brother I am unable to share the view expressed by
him. He reads clauses ( 1) and (2) as mutually exclusive in scope and content,-clause (2) imposing limitations only on two particular kinds of deprivation of
private property, namely, those brought about by
acquisition or taking possession thereof, and clause ( 1)
authorising all other kinds of deprivation with no
limitation except that they should be authorised by
law. There are several objections to the acceptance
of this view. But the most serious of them all is that
jt largely nullifies the protection afforded by the
Constitution to rights of private property and, jndeed,
stultifies the very conception of the "right to property" as a fundamental right. For, on this view,
the State, acting through its legislative organ, could,
for instance, arbitrarily prohibit a person from using
ills property, or authorise its destruction, or render it
useless for him, without any compensation and without a public purpose to be served thereby, as these
two conditions are stipulated only for acquisition and
taking possession under clause (2). Now, the whole
object of Part III of the Constitution is to provide
protection for the freedoms and rights mentioned
therein against arbitrary invasion by the State, wruch
as defined by article 12 includes the Legislatures of the
country. It would be a startling irony if the fundamental rights of property were, in effect, to be turned
by construction into an arbitrary power of the State
to deprive a person of his property without compensation in all ways other than acquisition or taking
possession of such property. If the Legislatures were
to have such arbitrary power, why should compensation and public purpose be insisted upon in connection
with what are termed two particular forms of depribe the
rational
principle
vation ? What could
underlying this differentiation? To say that clause (1)
defines the "police power" in relation to rights of
property is no satisfactory answer, as the same power
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
603
<:oul<l 'as well have been extended to these two parti·cular kinds of deprivation. Such extensioo would at
least have avoided the following anomaly : compensation is paid to i~emnify the owner for the loss of his
property. It could make no difference to him whether
such deprivation was authorised under clause (1) or
dause (2). In either case his property would be gone
and he would suffer loss. It would matter little to him
what happened to the property after he was deprived
·of it-whether it was used for a public purpose or was
:simply destroyed without any public purpose being
In fact, he could more readily reconcile
served.
himself to the loss forced upon him if he found
his property being used for the public benefit ;
for, in that case, he would be participating in
that benefit as a member of the public. But
that consolation would be denied to him by deprivation under clause (1), which makes his loss all
the more grievous.
But, according to Das J.'s.
reading of that clause, the Constitution-makers have
provided for no indemnification of the expropriated
-0wner. Why ? Because, it is said, deprivation under
dause (1) is an exercise of "police power." This, to
my mind, is fallacious. You first construe the clause
as conferring upon the State acting through its Legislature unfettered power to deprive owners of their
property in all other cases except the two mentioned
in clause (2), and then seek to justify such sweeping
a.nd arbitrary power by calling it "police power."
According to Das J. clause (1) was designed to confer
"police power" on the State to deprive persons of
their property by means other than acquisition or
taking possession of such property. He would read
the clause in a positive form as implying that a person
may be deprived of his property by authority of law.
In other words, the framers of our Constitution, who
beg~n P~rt III by . form.ulatii;g the fundamental rights
of mdmduals agamst mvas10n by the Legislatures in
the country, ended by formulating the right of the
Lc;gislatures to ~eprive individuals of their property
without compensat10n I
1953
The State of
West Bengal
V;
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others.
Patanjali Sastri
C.J ..
604
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Suboah Gopal
Bose and Others,
Patanjali Sastri
G.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
LI954}
Speaking of police power, as applied to personal
liberty, Prqj:. Willis says( 1 ) :
There are two main requirements for a proper
exercise of the police power-(1) thel't must be a social
interest to be protected which is more important than
the social interest in personal liberty, and (2) there
must be, as a means for the accomplishment of this
end, something which bears a substantial relation
thereto.
This statement is equally true of police power as
applied to private property. This is re.cognised and
given effect to in clauses (2) to ( 6) of article 19 which
delimit the regulative power of the Legislatures as
applied to the freedoms enumerated in clause (1) of
that article including the freedom referred to in subclause (f). But clause (1) of article 31 imposes no such
limitations. Why should such absolute power be conferred on the Legislature in relation to private property,
whereas the exercise of restrictive power under
clauses (2) to (6) of article 19 is carefully limited to
specified purposes and to the imposition of only
reasonable restrictions in each of those cases ? Could it
have been intended that, while restriction imposed on
the freedoms mentioned in clause ( 1) of article 19
should be reasonable and in public interest, deprivation
of property, except in the two cases provided for in
clause (2) of article 31, need not be reasonable nor for
the public benefit ? To say that the requirement of
"authorisation by law" was
considered
sufficient
limitation in all other cases of deprivation takes no
note of the fact that in the case of restrictions under
clauses (2) to (6) of article 19 also, their authorisation
could only be by law and yet other limitations have
been imposed. In fact,
authorisation by law can
obviously be no limitation on . the Legislature, and
"police power", as developed in the American case
law, is essentially a legislative power.
Now, what is this "police power" and how does
the Constitution of India provide for its exercise by
the State ? Referring to the doctrine of police power
(I) Constitutional Law, p. 728.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
605
in America, I said in Gopalan's case(') : "When that
power (legislative power) was threatened with prostration by the excesses of due process, the equally vague
and expansive doctrine of "police power", i.e., the
power of Government to regulate private rights in
public interest, was evolved to counteract such excesses."
And Das J. (' ), said that the content of due process of
law had to be narrowed down by the "enunciation and
application of the new doctrine of police power as an
antidote or palliative to the former". This court
held in the aforesaid case that the framers of our
·Constitution definitely rejected the doctrine of due
process of law. Is it to be supposed that they
accepted the "antidote" doctrine of police power and
embodied it in clause (1) of article 31 as a specific
power conferred on the Legislatures to deprive persons
Qf their property ? The suggestion seems unwarrant~d
and, indeed, contrary to the scheme of our Constitution. That scheme, in marked contrast with the
Constitution of America, is to distribute legislative
powers among the Union and the State Legislatures
according to the Lists of the Seventh Schedule and
among such powers was included the power of
"acquisition or requisitioning of property" for Union
and State purposes in entry No. 33 of List I and
No. 36 of List II respectively. Thus, what is called the
power of eminent domain, which is assumed to be
inherent in the sovereignty of the State according to
Continental and American jurists and is accordingly
not expressly provided for in the American Constitution, is made the subject of an express grant in our
Constitution. Having granted the power in express
terms, the Constitution defines in article 31 the limitations on the exercise thereof as
constituting the
fundamental right to property of the owner, all fundamental rights of the people being restraints on the
State [see observations at page 198 in Go palan's
case(')]. But the power of social control and regulation
10f private rights and freedoms for the common g_ood
(I) [1950] S.C.R. 88, 200.
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 88, 313.
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose aiid Others.
Patanjali Sastri
C.J.
606
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
s,bodhl Gopal
Bose and Others.
Patanjali Sastri
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
being an essential attribute of a social and political
organisation otherwise called a State, and pervading,
as it does, the entire legislative field, was not specially
provided for under any of the entries in the legislative
Lists and was left to be exercised, wherever desired,
as part of the appropriate legislative power. Even
where such regulative powers are defined and
delimited, as for instance in clauses (2) to ( 6) of
article 19 in relation to the rights and freedoms specified in clause (1), the powers themselves are left to
be exercised under laws made with respect to those
matters. For example, the power of social control and
regulation as applied to freedom of speech and expression is exercisable under a law made with respect to
entry No. 1 of List II (Public Order) or entry No. 39'
of List III (Newspapers, books and printing presses)
and in relation to a freedom not falling under clause (1}
of article 19, like the freedom to drink or to eat what
one likes, such freedom can be restrained or even
prohibited under a law made with reference to entry
No. 8 of List II (Intoxicating liquors, etc.) or entry
No. 19 of List III (Drugs and poisons). Thus the
American doctrine of police power as a distinct and'
specific legislative power is not recognised in our
Constitution and it is therefore contrary to the scheme
of the Constitution to say that clause (1) of article 31
must be read in positive terms and understood as
conferring police power on the Legislature in relatioll'
to rights of property. I entirely agree with the observations of Mukherjea J. in Chiranjit Lal's case('), that
"In interpreting the provisions of our Constitution we
should go by the plain words used by the Constitutionmakers and the importing of expressions like 'police
power', which is a term of variable and indefinite
connotation in American law, can only make the task
of interpretation more difficult."
The correct approach, in my opinion, to the interpretation of . article 31 is to bear in mind the context
and setting in which it has been placed. As alreadv
stated, Part III of the Constitution is designed ti>
afford protection to the freedoms and rights mentioned
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 907
•
S.C.R.
SUPR"ME COURT REPORTS
607
therein against inroads by the State which includes
the Legislatures as well as the executive Governments
in the country. Though, as pointed out in Gopalan's
case( 1 ) citing Eshukbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering
the Government of! Nigeria( 2 ), protection against executive action is not really needed under systems of
Government based on British jurisprudence according
to which no member of the executive' can interfere with
the. liberty or property of a subject except in pmsuance of powers given by law, our Constitution- ·
makers, who were framing a written Constitution,
conferred such protection explicitly by including the
executive Governments of the Union and the States in
the definition of "the State" in article 12. A fundamental right is thus fought to be protefaed not only
against the legislative organ of the State but also
against its· executive organ. The purpose of article 31,
it is hardly necessary to emphasise, is not to declare
the right of the State to deprive a person of his property out, as the heading of the article shows, tl>
protect the "right to property" of every person. But
how does the article protect the right to property ? It
protects it by defining the limitations on the power of
the State to take away private property without the
consent of the owner. It is an important limitation
on that power that legislative action is a pre-requisite
for its exercise. As pointed out by Cooley, "The right
to appropriate private property to public uses lies
dormant in the State, until legislative action is had,
pointing out the occasions, the modes, · conditions, and
agencies for its appropriation. Private property can
only be taken pursuant to law"("). In England the
struggle between prerogative •and Parliament having
endeq in favour of the latter, the prerogative right of
taking private property became merged in the
absolutism of Parliament, and the right to compensation as a fundamental right of the subject does not
exist independently of Parliamentary enactment. The
result is that Parliament alone could authorise interference with the
enjoyment of private
property.
(1) [;950] S.C.R. 88.
(2) [1931] AC. 662·
(31 Constitutional Limitations, Vol. II, P· 1119.
•
!953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others ...
Patanjali Sastri:
C.J.
608
•
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
,_
Bose and Others,
Patan ali Sastri
C.J.
SUPREME 'COURT REPORTS
[1954]
Blackstone also says that it is the Legislature alone that
can interpose and compel the individual to part with his
property( 1 ). It is this limitation which the framers of
our Constitution have embodied in clause (1) of
article 31 which is thus designed to protect the rights
to property against deprivation by the State acting
through its executive organ, the Government. Clause (2)
imposes two further limitations on the Legislature
itself. It is prohibited from making a law authorising
·expropriation except for public purposes and on pavment of compensation for the injury sustained by the
owner, These important limitations on the power of
the State, acting through the executive and legislative
organs, to take away private property are designed to
protect the o~ner against arbitrary deprivation of his
property. Clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 are thus not
mutually exclusive in scope and content, but should,
in my view, be read together and understood as dealing
with the same subject, namely, the protection of the
right to property by means of the limitations on the
State power referred to above, the deprivation contemplated in clause (1) being no other than the acquisition
or taking possession of property referred to in clause (2).
Much argument was expended to show that clause (2)
dealt only with two specified modes of depriYing a
person of his property, namely, acquisition and requisitioning and could not, therefore, be considered to be
a mere elahoration of clause (1), which referred to
deprivation generally. It was submitted that clause (2)
should be read with entry No. 33 of List I, No. 36 of
List II and No. 42 of List III, each of which refers to
acquisition or requisitioqing of property and to no
other mode of deprivation. It was also pointed out
that sub-section (2) of section 299 of the Government of
India Act, 1935, as well as entry No. 9 of List II of
the Seventh Schedule thereof referred only to compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, and it
was not until the Bombay High Court held in Tan Bug
T aim and Others v. The Collector of Bombay and
Others (' ) , that rule 75 (a) of the Defence of India Rules
(I) Commentaries, Vol. I, p, 110.
(2)'1.L.R. 1946 Born. 517.
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
609
-under which a property situated in Bombay was requisitioned was ultra vires on the ground that entry No. 9 of
List II did not confer on the Legislature the power of
requisitioning, that such power was conferred on the
Central Legislature by the India (Proclamations of
:Emergency) Act, 1946 (9 and JO Geo. V, Ch. 23).
Attention was drawn to the Regulations and Acts
relating to compulsory acquisition of land in this
country including the Land Acquisition Act, · 1894, all
-of which provided for the vesting of the property
.acquired in the Government or in one of its officers,
-and it was suggested that the framers of our Consti-mtion, who must have been aware of the difficulties
· ansmg out of the lacuna in the Government of India
Act, 1935, in regard to the power of requisitioning,
. added the words "taken possession- of" in clause (2)
. and the word "requisitioning" in the entries referted
-to above. It was, therefore, urged that the words
·"acquired" or "taken possession of" should not be
taken to have reference to all forms of deprivation of
priva•:e property by the State.
l see no sufficient reason to construe the words
·"acquired or taken possession" used in clause (2) of
'article 31 in a narrow technical sense. The Constitution
mar~ s a definite break with the old order and intro-duces new concepts in regard to many matters,
particularly those relating to fundamental rights, and it
·cannot be assumed that the ordinary word "acquisition"
was. used in the Constitution in the same narrow sense
in which it may have been used in pre-Constitution
legislation relating to acquisition of land. These enactments, it should be noted, related to land, whereas
article 31 (2) refers to moveable property as well, as to
which no formal transfer or vesting of title is neces·~ary. Nor is there any warrant for the assumption
·that "taking possession of property" was intended to
mean the same thing as "requisitioning property"
referred to in the entries of the Seventh Schedule. If
that was the intention,- why was the word "requisi·tioning" not used in clause (2) as well ? It is fallacious
·to suggest that unless "taking possession" is synony:inous with "requisitioning'~ the power to make a law
!953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others.
Patanjali Sastri
c.J.
610
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Suhodh Gopal
Bos(I and Others.
Patanjali Sastri
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541'
authorising the taking of possession of property would
be lacking because no entry in any of the Lists of the
Seventh Schedule confers that power. A specific entry
in the legislative Lists is no more necessary for
conferring such power than for conferring power to
make a law authorising deprivation of property which
clause (1) of article 31 postulates. [See observations in
P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of lndia( 1 )] • The
word "acquisition" is not a term of art, and it
ordinarily means coming into possession of, obtaining,.
gaining or getting as one's own. It is in this generat
sense that the word has been used in articles 9, 11 and
19(1) (f) and not as implying any transfer or vesting
of title. In Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel(')
a Full Bench of the High Court of Australia had to
construe the scope of the legislative power with respect
to "acquisition" of property conferred on the
Commonwealth Parliament by section 51 (xxxi) of the
Austrailan Constitution (63 and 64 Vic., Ch. 12h
and the court decided by a majority that the power
included the power to take possession of property for
a temporary purpose for an indefinite period. To say
that acquisition implies the transfer and vesting of
title in the Government is to overlook the real nature
of the power of the State as a sovereign acting through,
its legislative and executive organs to appropriate the·
property of a subject without his consent. When the·
State .chooses to exercise such power, it creates title in·.
itself rather than acquire it from the owner, the nature·
and extent of the title thus created depending on the·
purpose and duration of the use to which the property:
appropriated is intended to be put as disclosed in thelaw authorising its acquisition. No formula of vesting
is necessary. As already stated, in the case of moveable property no formal transfer or vesting of title·
apart from seizing it could have been contemplated •.
And, what is more, clause (5) (b) (ii) of article 31,
which excepts any law made in future "for the prevention of danger to life or property" from the operation,
of clause (2) shows that the latter clause, but for such.
exception, would entail liability 'to pay compensation
for deprivation by destruction, which must therefore:
(!) (!952] S.C.R. 391, 394.
(2) 68 C.L.R. 261.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
611
be taken to fall within the scope of clause (2), for a law
made for the prevention of danger to life or property
may often have to provide for destruction of the
property appropriate. I am of opinion that the word
"acquisition" and its grammatical variations should,
in the context of article 31 and the entries in the Lists
referred to above, be understood in their ordinary
sense, and the additional words "taking possession of"
or "requisitioning" are used in article 31(2) and in
the entries respectively, not in contradistinction
with, but in amplification of the term "acquisition'',
so as to make it clear that the words taken together
cover even those kinds of deprivation which do not
involve the continued existence of the property after
it is acquired. They would, for instance, include destruction which implies the reducing into possession of
the thing sought to be destroyed as a necessary step
to that end. The expression "taking possession" can
only mean taking such possession as the property is
susceptible of and not actual physical possession, as
"the interest in, or in any company owing, any
commercial or industrial undertaking", which is .expressly included in clause (2) of article 31, is not
susceptible of any actual physical occupancy or
seizure. It is, however, unnecessary here to express
any concluded opinion on the precise scope and meaning of the expression "shall be taken possession of or
acquired" in clause (2) except to say that it does not
admit of being construed in the same wide sense as the
word "taken" used in the Fifth Amendment of the
American Constitution, but implies such an appropriation of the property or abridgement of the incidents
of its ownerships as would amount to a deprivation of
the owner. Any other interference with enjoyment of
private property short of such appropriation or
abridgement would· not be compensable under article
31(2).
.
It will now be seen that the two objections raised by
· Das J. to the view expressed above, namely, that
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others ,
P1Jta~ali
Sastri:.
C.J.
•
612
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
clauses (1) and (2) must be read together and understood
as dealing with the same topic, are really baseless.
The State of
Wll'stBengal
The first objection is that clause ( 1) would then
v.
be redundant. It would not be so, because it embodies
Sub.?dh Gopal
Bose and Others.
one of the three important limitations on the exercise
of the State power of deprivation of private property,
PatanJali Sastri
C.J.
namely, the necessity for the legislative action as a
condition precedent to the exercise of the power and
constitutes a protection against the executive organ of
the State. The second objection that the State's. power
in an emergency to deprive a person of his property
without payment of compensation, as for example, to
demolish an intervening building to prevent a confbgration from spreading, would be excluded is equally
baseless. Cases of that kind, as we have seen, would
fall within the exception in clause (5) (b) (ii), and no
compensation would be payable for the loss caused by
the destruction of property authorised under that
clause. The learned Attorney-General suggested that
sub-clause (b) was inserted ex abundante cautela as even
without it no one could have supposed that a law of the
kind mentioned in that sub-clause would fall under
dause (2). There could have been no doubt, for
instance, that the power of taxation referred to in
paragraph (i) of that sub-clause was a distinct power.
It is difficult to appreciate this argument. If the
exceptions in sub-clause (b) were so obvious that they
need not have been explicitly provided for, then
equally must be second objection of Das J. fall to the
ground. To say that sub-clause (b) is introduced by
way of abundant caution is not to do away with the
exceptions but to emphasise their existence aliunde.
Whether it was considered necessary to provide
expressly that destruction of private property under
.emergency conditions
entails no liability to pay
<:ompensation or whether the State's power to do so
was so well established that sub-clause (b) (ii) was
really unnecessary and must be taken to have been
inserted ex abundante cautela, in either view, the second
objection must equally fail. The fact is that all the
_ <:ases referred to in sub-clause (b) are different forms
1953
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
613
of deprivation of property and, as difficulties of
'construction might arise in a written Constitution if
they are not expressly and specifically excepted from
the requirement under clause (2) as to payment of
compensation, the framers have thought it necessary
to insert clause (5) (b).
\Vhere was the necessity, it was asked, to provide
in clause (1) of article 31 for protection against the
executive government in the matter of compulsory
acquisition of property by the State, as no such protection is provided for in the case of the regulative
powers exercisable under article 19(2) to (6) ? The
answer is : the same need apparently which dictated
the enactmen_t of article 265 providing for similar
protection in the matter of taxation. In any case, this
would be no more of an objection, if it be an objection,
to the view I have indicated above than to the other
view which also recognises the necessity for legislative
action before a person could be deprived of his
property.
'"
Attention was called to article 38 as showing that
one of the goals set by the Constitution was the
promotion of social welfare, and it was urged that the
attainment of that object as well as the growing
complexities of modern conditions of life must call for
an expanding power of social control and regulation,
particularly in the sphere of the enjoyment of private
property and that the exercise of such power withont
entailing liability to pay compensation ought not to be
confined within the qarrow limits specified in article
31 (5) (b ). This is a misconception. In the first place,
social welfare is not inconsistent with the ownership of
private property and does not demand arbitrary expropriation of such property by the State without
compensation. On the other hand, as pointed out by
Blackstone "The public good is in nothing more
essentially interested than in the protecion of every
individual's private rights as modelled by the municipal law"('). This is not an antiquated view. So
modern a document as the Declaration of Human
(l) Commentaries· Vol. I, p. 109.
1953
TheStatt of
West Bengal
v.
Suoodh Gopal
Bose and Others.
Patanjali Sastr
C.J.
614
1953
The Slate of
JVest Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
13ose and Others.
.Patan}ali Sastri
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
Rights in the United Nations has specifically provided
for the protection of private property by including the·
clause "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property" in article 17, and the framers of our Constitution have evidently proceeded
on that view.
Secondly, the argument also overlooks that clause (5)
(b) was not intended to define and does not define
exhaustively the power of social control and regulation
in relation to rights of private property. It only
limits the purposes for which the power could be exercised without liability to pay compensation, though its
exercise results in deprivation of property in the sense
already explained. But where its exercise does not
involve deprivation of property, no question of paying
compensation would arise, and the Legislatures in the
country would, as already indicated, be free to enact
laws providing for the exercise of such power within
the fields marked out for them in the Legislative Lists.
There is, therefore, no room for the apprehension that
article 31 (5) (b) would unduly cramp social control
and regulation of private property for the public good
or would lead to any alarming consequences to the
safety of the community.
But why all this ado, it was asked, about protection
against deprivation of property by legislative action ?
There is no such protection provided in the Constitution against deprivation of property by the
Legislature exercising the power of taxation. Why
then complain if there is no protection against the
Legislature authorising deprivation of property without compensation under article 31(1) ? Our Constitution-makers, it was said, trusted the Legislature, as
the people of Great Britain trust their Parliament which
protects the Englishman's right to
property.
In
ultimate analysis, is not well-informed and organised
public opinion the true and effective protection against
arbitrary action of the Legislature ? The argument
has no force. So far as the power of taxation is concerned, the Constitution
recognises no fundamental
right to immunity from taxation and that is why
presumably no constitutional protection is provided
.against the exercise of that power. But fundamental
..
.
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
!953
:rights under the Constitution stand on a different
footing. Indeed, the argument is a bold challenge to
The Stat• of
WtJtBengal
the policy of including a declaration of such rights in
. v.
1
Part III of the Constitution. In Gopalan's case( ),
Subodh Gopal
Bost and Others.
I said :
Patanjali Sastri
"Madison (who played a prominent part in framing
c.J.
the First Amendment of the American Constitution)
.Pointing out the distinction, due to historical reasons,
between the American and the British ways of securing
·'the great and essential rights of the people', observed
''Here they are secured not by laws paramount to
prerogative but by Constitutions paramount to Jaws.' "
'This has been translated into positive law in Part III
.of the. Indian Constitution.
There have always been two schools of opinion
·regarding the efficacy of a declaration of fundamental
·rights in a Constitution. Britain never believed in a
formal declaration of such rights. Referring to the
.detnand of the Indian Delegation that the Parliamentary Bill which was later passed as the Government
.of India Act, 1935, should embody certain fundamental
rights, the Joint Parliamentary Committee
·observed(' ) :
. 'The question of so-called fundamental rights,
·which was much discussed at the three Round Table
· Confeterices, was brought to our notice by the British
India Delegation, many members of which were
, anxious that the riew Constitution should contain a
.declaration of rights of different kinds, for reassuring
· minorities for asserting the equality of all persons
'before the law, and for other like purposes; and we
.have examined more than one list of such rights which
have been compiled. The Statutory Commission
·observe with reference to this
subject :-'We are
oilware. that such provisions have been inserted in manv
·Constitiltions, notably in those of the European Stat~s
formed after the war. Experience, however, has hot
·shown them to be of any great practical value.
Abstract declarations are useless unless there exist the
'Will and means to make them effective.' With these
(1) (1950] S.C.R; BB, !9B. '
, (2) Para. 366.
616
1953
Tk1State of
I-Vest Bengal
v.
Sulodh Gopal
Bost and Others.
Patanjali Sastri
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
observations we entirely agree ; and a cynic might
indeed find plausible arguments, in the history during_
the last ten years of more than one country, for
asserting that the most effective method of ensuring
the destruction of a fundamental right is to include
a declaration of its existence in a constitutional
instrument.'.'
But the American view is different. Answering a
similar objection to the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in.
the American Constitution, Jefferson said :
"But though it is not absolutely efficacious under
all circumstances, it is of great potency always, and
rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will often keep
up the building which would have fallen with that
brace the less. There is
a remarkable difference
between the characters of the inconveniences which
attend a declaration of rights, and those which attend
the want of it. The inconveniences of the declaration
are, that it may cram Government in its useful·
exertions. But the evil of this is short-lived, moderate,.
and reparable. The inconveniences of the want of a.
declaration are permanent, affiictive, and irreparable..
They are in constant progressive from bad to worse.
The executive in our Governments is not the sole, it
is scarcely the principal, object of my jealousy. The
tyranny of the Legislatures is the most formidable
dread at present, and will be for many years." (Quoted
in Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edn.,
Vol. I, p. 535).
It is obvious that the framers of our Constitution •
shared the American view and included Part III in
the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, a wrong
approach to construe the articles of Part III by pointing to the British way, which is more a traditional
than a constitutional way, of protecting the rights and
liberties of the individual by making Parliament
supreme.
On this view of the meaning and effect of article 31,.
the question is whether section 7 read with section 4 of
the amending Act infringes the fundamental right of
the respondent under that article. These provisions.
"
5.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
617
by their retrospective operation undoubtedly abridge
the respo11dent's rights of property by nullifying one of
the incidents of the estate purchased by him at the
'revenue sale, namely, the right to annul certain kinds
of under-tenures and evict certain classes of undert~nants in occupation of portions of the estate. Does
such abridgement amount to deprivation of property
withjn the meaning of article 31 as interpreted above,
and, if so, does it fall within the exception in clause (5)
(h) (ii) of that article ?
Now, the word "property" in the context of
. article 31 which is designed to protect private property
in alt its forms, must he understood both in a corporeal
'ensc as having reference to all those specific things
that are susceptible of private appropriation and enjoyment as well as in its juridical or legal sense of a
bundle of rights which the owner can exercise under
the municipal law with respect to the user and enjoyment of those things to the exclusio11 of all others.
This wide connotation of the term makes it sometimes
difficult to determine whether an impugned law is a
deprivation of property within
the meaning of
article 31 (2), for, any restriction imposed on the use
and enjoyment of property can be regarded as a deprivation of one or more of the rights theretofore exercised
by the owner. The American courts have experienced
similar difficulty in deciding. whether a given statutory
abridgement of the rights of the owner is an exercise of
the police power" for which no compensation can be
claimed, or a "taking" of property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment clause "Nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compen£ation." "The general rule at least" said Holmes J.
in delivering the majority opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon('), "is that while property may be
regubted to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far, it will be recognised as a taking." The vague and
expansive doctrine of "police power" and the use of
the term "taken" in the Fifth Amendment construed
in a very wide sense so as to cover any injury or
damage to property, coupled with the equally vague
(I) 260 U.S. 393,
3--95 S.C.T./59
T ht Sl11t1 tt/ .
West Bengal.
v.
Suborl/1 GopaJ
Bost and Othtr1.
Patanjali Siutrl
C.J.
618
1953
TheStattof
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bcse ond Others.
l'atanjali Sastti
C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
and expansive concept of "due proi::ess'', allow a
greater freedom of action to the American courts m
accommodating and adjusting, on what may seem to
them a just basis, the conflicting demands of police
power and the constitutional prohibition of the Fifth
Amendment. Under the Constitution of India, however, such questions must be determined with reference
to the expression "taken possession of or acquired"
as interpreted above, namely, that it must be read
along with the word "deprived" in clause (1) and
understood as having reference to such substantial
abridgement of the rights of ownership as would
amount to deprivation of the owner of his property.
No cut and dried test can be formulated as to whether
in a given case the owner is "deprived" of his property
within the meaning of article 31 ; each case must be
decided as it arises on its own facts. Broadly speaking it may be said that an abridgement would be so
substantial as to amount to a deprivation within the
meaning of article 31 if, in effect, it withheld the
property from the possession and enjoyment of the
owner, or seriously impaired its use and enjoyment by
him, or materially reduced its value.
The learned Judges of the High Court did not consi<ler the case from this point of view. As has been
stated, they applied article 19 (1) (f) and (5) and held
that section 7 of the amending Act, by its retrospective operation, imposed on the respondent's enjoyment
of the property purchased by him at the revenue sale
restrictions which were not reasonable. That view,
for reasons already indicated, cannot be accepted and
the matter has to be looked at from the point of view
of article 31 as interpreted above. A comparison of
the scope and effect of the old section 37 which is
substituted in its place by section 4 of the amending
Act and which section 7 shows to be clearly retrospective, discloses that, although the right of a purchaser
to annual under-tenures and evict under-tenants is
curtailed by the new section 37 by enlarging the scope
of the exceptions in the old section, it entitles the
purchaser, as a countervailing advantage, to enhance
the rent payable by the tenure holder~ and tenants
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
1953
newly brought within the exception. The purchaser
is left free in other respects to continue in enjoyment
The State of
West Bengal
of the property as before. In other words, what the
v.
amending Act seeks to do is to enlarge the scope of
Suhodh Gopal
the protection provided by the exception in the old Bose and Others.
section, as it was found to be inadequate, while con- Patanjali Sastri
C.J.
ferring certain compensating benefits on the purchaser. This amendment is in the line with the traditional tenancy legislation in this country affording
relief to tenants whenever the tenancy laws were
found, due to changing conditions, to operate harshly
on the tenantry. I find it difficult to hold that the
abridgement sought to be effected retrospectively of
the rights of a purchaser at a revenue sale is so substantial as to amount to a deprivation of his property
within the meaning of article 31 (1) and (2). No
question accordingly arises to the applicability of
clause (5) (b) (ii) to the case.
In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The first respondent will pay the costs of this appeal incurred by the
appellant here and in the lower Court.
M>:HR CHAND MAHAJAN J.-For reasons given in
my judgment in Dwar kadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur
Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., (C.A. 141of1952)(') I
agree with my Lord the Chief Justice in his construction of article 31 'of the Constitution. I also concur in
the conclusions reached by him, and in his decision of
the appeal.
DAs J.-I agree that this appeal must be allowed
but I have arrived at this conclusion by a different
process of reasoning. As the arguments advanced
before us have raised very · important constitutional
issues it is only right that I should give the reasons for
my decision in some detail.
The facts and circumstances leading up to the
present appeal are as follows :
'
At a revenue sale held on the 9th January, 1942,
the respondent Subodh Gopal Bose purchased the
entire Touzi No. 341 recorded in the collectorate of the
(I) Reported infra.
620
1953
The State <!f
JVest Bengal
v.
Subudlt Uujwl
BoJe and Ol/icrs.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
perma11ently settled district of 24-Parganahs in West
Bengal. At the date of that sale the auction-purchasers at a revenue sale had, under section 37 of the
Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1859, as it then stood,
certain rights as therein mentioned. That section ran
thus:
"37. The purchaser of an entire estate in the
permanently-settled
districts of Bengal, Bihar and
Orissa, solt! under this Act for the recovery of arrears
due on account of the same shall acquire the estate
free from all encumbrances which may have been
imposed upon it after the time of settlement; and
shall be entitled to avoid and annul all under-tenures
and forthwith to eject all under-tenants, with the
following exceptions :First-lstimrari or Mukarrari tenures which have
been held at a fixed rent from the time of the permanent settlement.
Secondly-Tenures ex1st111g at the time of settlement which have not been held at a fixed rent ;
Provided always that the rents of such tenure
sl;all be liable . to enhancement under any law for the
time being in force for the enhancement of the rent of
such tenures.
Thirdly-Talukdari and other similar tenures
created since the time of settlement 'and held 1mmediatel y of the proprietors of estates and farms for terms
of years so held, when such tenures and farms have
been duly registered under the provisions of this Act.
whereon
dwelling
Fourthly-Leases ·of lands
houses, mannfactories or other permanent buildings
have been erected, or whereon gardens, plantations,
tanks, wells, canals, places of worship or burning or
burying grounds have been made, or wherein mines
have been sunk.
And such a purchase~ as is aforesaid shall be entitled to proceed in the manner prescribed by any law
for the time being in force for the enhancement of the
rent of any land coming within the fourth class of
exceptions above made, if he can prove the same to
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
have been held at what was orginally an unfair rent,
.-and if the same shall not have been helcl at a fixed
rent, equal to the rent of good arabl• land, for a term
exceeding twelve years ; but not otherwise ;
.
Pro\'idcd always that nothing in this section contained shall be construed to entitle any such purchaser as aforesaid to eject any raiyat having a right of
occupancy at a fixed rent or at a rent assessable according to fixed rules under the laws in force, or .to
enhance the rent of any such raiyilt otherwise than in
the manner prescribed by such laws, or otherwise than
the former proprietor,
irrespectively of all engagements made since the· time of settlement, may have
been entitled to do."
In .exercise of his rights under the section set out
abo\'e the respondent Subodh Gopal Bose annulled all
under-tenures and tenancies appertaining to the said
ToU'Li a\\l\ on the 18th March, 1946, instituted a suit,
being Title Suit No. 35 of 1946, in the Fourth Court of
the Subordinate Judge at Ali pore 24-Parganabs for
the ejcctment of respondents Nos. 2 to 6, claiming
that he was entitled to recover possession of the lands
in suit by virtue of the rights conferred on him by
section 37. The respondent No. 2, who was the defendant No. 1, alone contested tlic suit. His defence was,
i11ter. alia, that he was a raiyat and as such protected
by d1c proviso to section 37. He also claimed protection under the fourth exception to that section. The
learned Subordinate Judge who tried the suit delivered his judgment on the 14th February, 1949. By that
judgment he overruled the contentions . of the contesting defendant and passed a decree for ejectment
against him. He dismissed the suit against the otl1er
defendants (who are now responclents Nos. 3 to 6),
holding that they were not necessary parties to the
suit.
On the 25th March, 1949, the respondent No. 2
preferred an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 252 of
1949, before the
District
Judge
at Alipore, 24Parganahs. That appeal was transferred to the court
Qf the Additional District Judge for hearing. While
195,
Tht Statt of
H'e1t Btngal
v.
Subodh Gnpal
]Jose and Others.
Das].
622
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
that appeal was pending the West Bengal Legislature
passed West Bengal Act VII of 1950, called the
Bengal Land Revenue Sales (West Bengal Amendment) Act of 1950, which received the assent of the
Goyernor of Bengal on the 15th March, 1950, and
was published in the Official Gazette on the day.
By section 4 of the amending Act, section 37 of the
Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859, was replaced by a
new section the material part of which runs thus :
"37. (1) The purchaser of an entire estate m
the permanently settled districts of West Bengal
sold under this Act for the recovery of arrears due
on account of the same, shall acquire the estate free
from all encumbrances which may have been imposed
after the time of settlement and shall be entitled to
avoid and annul all tenures,
holdings and leases
with the following exceptions :
(a) tenures and holdings which have been held
from the time of the permanent settlement either
free of rent or at a fixed rent or fixed rate of rent,
and
(b) (i) tenures and holdings not included in exception (a) above made, and
(ii) other leases of land whether or not for purposes connected with agriculture or horticulture,
existing at the date of issue of the
for sale of the estate under this Act :
notification
Provided that notwithstanding anything contained
in any law for the time being in force or in any lease or
contract no person shall be entitled to hold under such
a purchaser as is aforesaid any tenure, holding or lease
coming within exception (b) above made, free of
rent or at. a low rent or at a rent or rate of rent
fixed in perpetuity or for any specified period unless
the right so to hold has been expressly recognised
under any law for the time being in force by any
competent civil or revenue court ; and the purchaser
shall be entitled to proceed in the manner prescribed
by any law for the time being in force for the
"
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
determination of a fair and equitable rent of such
tenure, holding or lease."
Section 7 of the amending Act provides as follows :"7. (1) (a) Every suit or proceeding for the
ejectment of any person from any land in pursuance
of section 37 or section 52 of the said Act, and
(b) every appeal or application for review
or
revision arising out of such suit or proceeding, pending at the date of the c01nmencement of this Act
shall. if the suit, proceeding, appeal or application
could not have been validly instituted, preferred or
made had this Act been in operation at the date of
the institution, the preferring or the making thereof,
abate.
(2) Every decree passed or order made, before
the date of commencement of this Act, for the ejectment of any person from any land in pursuance of
section 37 or section 52 of the said Act shall, if the
decree or order could not have been validly passed
or made had this Act been in operation. at the date
of the passing or making thereof, be void ;
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect
any decree or order in execution whereof the possession of the land in respect of which the decree or
order was passed or made, has already been delivered
before the date of commencement of this Act.
(3) Whenever any suit, proceeding, appeal or
application abates under sub-section (1) or any
decree or order becomes void under sub-section (2),
all fees paid under the Court-fees Act, 1870, ·shall be
refunded to the parties by whom the same were
respectively paid."
It is quite clear that under this section 7 the suit
of the respondent Subodh Gopal Bose must abate
and the decree passed in his favour must become
void if that section be valid law and intra t!ires the
Constitution of India.
On the 21st July, 1950, the respondent Subodh
Gopal Bose applied before the Additional District
Judge before whom the appeal was pending to make
1953
The Slate.of
WestBengat
v.
Subodh Gopa[
Bose and Others.
Das].
624
1.953
Tri State of
w~.JI flen:al
v.
Sub.,dh Gopal
BoJt and OtherJ.
Da•J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
a reference under article 228 of the Constitution of
India for a decision of the question whether the provisions of section 7 were void being ultra t1ires the
Constitution. The learned Additional District Judge
by his order dated the 16th September, 1950, dismissed that application. On the 24th November, 1950,
the respondent Subodh Gopal Bose applied to the ·
High Court under article 228 and eventually on the
18th December, 1950, the High Court directed the
appeal to he transferred to the High Court only for
the decision of the constitutional point. The proceedings were numbered as Reference Case No. 4 of
1950. Notice having been given by the Court to the
of
Bengal, the State of West
Advocate-General
On the 22nd
Bengal appeared on the Reference.
March, 1951, the High Court held that section 7 imposed an unreasonable restriction on the respondent
Suhod h Gopal Bose's right to hold property and
violated his furnlamental right guaranteed by article
19 (1) (f) read with article 19 (5) and was, therefore.
void under article 13 (1). With this finding the High
Court sent hack the records to the lower appellate
court for disposal of the appeal in the light of that
finding. On t.hc 30th November, 1951, the High
Court gave leaYc to the State of West Bengal to
appeal to us. Hence the present appeal.
Section 7 of the amending Act, the validity
whereof is challenged before us, in terms, affects prenisting rights. Accordnig to that section every suit
or proceedings for ejectment under old section 37 and
nuy appeal or application for review or rev1S1on
arising out of such suit or proceeding pending at the
commencement of the amending Act is to abate if the
suit, proceeding, appeal or application could not have
been validly instituted, referred or made, had the
.amending Act been in operation at the date of such
suit, proceeding, appeal or application. Further,
every decree passed or. order made before the commencement of the amending Act for the ejectrhent .'Of
any person from land in pursuance of old section 37
is likewise to become void if such decree or order
<:oukl not have been validly passed or made if the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
amending Act had been in operation at the date of
. the decree or or9er. The proviso, however, saves
·decrees or orders in execution whereof possession had
been delivered before the commencement of the
amending Act. It is, therefore, clear that section 7
g1vmg, in effect,
affects
pre-existing rights by
retrospective operation to section 4 which has substituted, inter alia, the new section 37 for the old
section 37 of the Act of 1859. A cursory comparison
· of the language of the olcl section 37 with that of the
new section 37 will at once make it clear that the
;ubstantial right given by the old section to the
purchaser to avoid and annul under-tenures and to
is no longer available to him
eject under-tenants
under the new section 37. Although the opening part
of the new section 37 purports to give to the purchaser
the right to avoid and annul the tenures etc., that
·right, 'by reason of the wide sweep of exception (b),
has,' for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. The
.new section 37 does not deprive ·the purchaser of
. the physical property, namely, the estate purchased
·at the · revenue. sale and he continues to be the
owner of that · property" and can exercise and enforce
. all the rightcs. which his ownership gives him, .except
.that he cannot, · by reason of the ·new section 37,
avoid or annul the under-tenures etc; or eject the
undcr:tenants. In other words, out of · the bundle
of. rights constituting the ownership acquired by him
.under the old section 37, an- item of important right
·has hecq· taken away, · thereby abridging or rcstrict·ing his ownership. The· respondent, Subodh Gopal
Bose, contends that his . funcbmental
right, •under
article 19( 1) (f) of the ;,Constitution, namely his right
.to hold, .·that is to say, his right to enjoy and exercise
the full rights of ownership in relation to · the property
·acquired by him under the old section · 37 has been
viobtecl · and, therefore, section 7 which operates
.retrospectively and.; gives retrospective operation to
. the new section 37 is ultra vires 'the Constitution · and
:is ·void under article 13 ( l).
: , .The leanied Atforney-General has
not seriously
«:ontended that the impugned . · section
has not
J953
The State of
TVtst Bn1gal
,..
Subodh Copa!
Bose awl Others.
·Das].
626
1953
Tht State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
B1Jst and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954J
prejudicially affected the right given to the purchaser
by the old section 37 but he maintains that the abridgement of the rights of the purchaser at a revenue saJe.
brought about by the new section 37 amounts t<>
nothing more than the imposition of a reasonable
restriction on the exercise of the right conferred by
article 19 ( 1) (f) in the interests of the general public and is perfectly legitimate and permissible under
clause (5) of that article. The High Court repealled.
the above noted contention
and held that the
restriction was unreasonable.
The High Court
based its conclusions on three things, namely, (i}
the retrospective operation of the impugned sec-tion, (ii) the absence of any provision for the
abatement of the purchase price and (iii) the failure·
of the State to show any reason why the impugned·
section was introduced into the amending Act•.
The learned Attorney-General , submits that the first
two elements taken into consideration by the High>
Court are wholly irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether the restriction imposed was reason~
able in the interest of the general public. Ordinarily
a statute is construed prospectively unless it is maderetrospective by express words or necessary intendment ; but, the learned Attorney-General submits, the·
fact that a statute is expressly or by necessary implication made retrospective, does not, by itself, furnish·
any cogent reason for saying that the statute is prima·
facie unfair and, therefore, unreasonable. While I see·
some force in this argument I am, nevertheless, not
convinced that the fact of the statute being given,
retrospective operation may not be properly taken
into consideration in determining the reasonableness"
of the restriction imposed in the interest of the general
public. Nor am I satisfied that the loss occasioned to.
the purchaser by reducing, without any abatement of
the purchase price, an estate in possession into one in
reversion may not also be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of the restrictions permissible under article 19 (5). As said by my Lord the
Chief Justice in The State of Madras v. V. G. Row(') ::
(I) [1952] S.C.R. 597 at p.607.
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
627
"It is important in this context to bear in mind
that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed,
should be applied to each individual statute impugned,
and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases.
The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed,
the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the
extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied
thereby, the disproportion of
the imposition, the
prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into
the judicial verdict."
As regards the third element, the High Court has
pointed out that no suggestion had been made before
it that the number of pending suits or proceeding for
ejectment of tenants was abnormally large or that
there was any other cogent reason for introducing the
impugned section in the amending Act. Indeed, in the
later case of lswari Prasad v. N. R. Sen(') a special
bench of the same High Court, consisting of three
learned Judges including the two who had decided the
case under appeal before us, has distinguished the very
judgment from the one then under appeal, and in
doing so, laid great emphasis on the absence of any such
suggestion i11 this case. The High Court held that
those circumstances were present in the later case and
accordingly held that the law impugned in the later
case was not unconstitutional.
It is, indeed, very unfortunate that several important matters which would have assisted the High Court
in arriving at a right conclusion as to the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the impugned
section were not brought to the notice of the Higb
Court. Thus, for example, the statement of objects
and reasons appended to the Bill which eventually
became the amending Act does not appear to have
been placed before the High Court. The statement of
the objects and reasons appended to the Bill' quite
clearly refers to the great hardship caused by the
application of the old section 37 to a large number of
people in the urban area and particularly in Calcutta
(I) 55 C.W.N. 719 at P· 727.
-
1953
The State ofWeslBengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others ...
Das].
628
i953
ThtState of
Wt'!I Bengal
v.
Subcdh Gopal
BoJt and Oliirrs.
Dos].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
and its suburbs where the then prevailing phenomenal
increase in land values had supplied the necessary
incentive to speculative purchasers in exploiting that
section for unwarranted large-scale eviction and maintains, according to the sponsor of the Bill, that such
large-scale c1·ictions necessitated the enlargement of
the scope of protection of that section, with due safeguards for the securing of Government revenue. It is
well settled by this court that the statement of objects
and reasons is not admissible as an aid to the construction of a statute (sec Aswini Kumar Gliose v. Arabinda
lioseC)) and l am not, therefore, referring to it for the
purpose of construing any part of the Act or of ascertaining the meaning of any word used in the Act but I
am referring to it only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which
actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the sam~
and the extent and urgency of the evil which he soug11t
to remedy. Those arc all matters which, as alread v
stated, must enter into the judicial verdict as to the
reasonableness of the ·restrictions which article 19 (5)
permits to be imposed on the exercise of" the right
guaranteed by article 19 (!) (f). Further, there is
another significant fact which does not appear to hav~
been pressed on the attention of the High Court. The
Bill had been introduced in the Legislature on the
23rd March, 1949, and was referred to a select cornmittce. On the 25th April, 1949, when the Bengal
Legislature was not in session \Vest Bengal Ordinance
No. 1 of 1949 was passed. The two preambles to that
Ordinance recited as follows :
"\Vhereas it is expedient, pending the enactmen:
of further legislation, to· provide for the temporarv
stay of certain suits, proceedings and appeals in pursu:mce of the Act :
And whereas the West Bengal Legislature is not in
session and the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take
in1mediate action ;"
The fact that an Ordinance had to he passed pending the passing of this Bill and the preambles to the
(I) [1953] S.C.R. I·
,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
Orclinance do u111loubtedly indicate that, m the
!ill
opinion of the authorities, the then prevailing condiTl~e State o
tions disclosed a serious evil which urgently necessi- • TYtjtBen~11l
v.
tated the taking of immediate action. Further, it
Subodlz Gopal
appears from the judgment delivered by the High
Rose and Others.
Court on the application subsequently made by the
f);Js ].
State for leave to appeal to this court that a number
of cases were pending before the courts in which the
same question was involved. This · is also a circumstance which was not brought to the notice of the High
Court before the judgment under appeal was pmnounce<l. Finally, in the judgment under appeal I find
no reference to the proviso to the new section 3i
• which enlarges, as it were, by way of compensation for
the loss of the right of ejectment, the purchaser's right
to claim enhancement of rent much beyond the very
limited right of enhancement of rent which, under the
old section, was confined only to the fourth excepted
under-tenures. Then. there is the fact, found by the
High Court, that land values had gone up so high that
auction-purchasers could now he found who, even without the right to eject the under-tenants, would willingly pay a sum much in excess of the arrears of Government revenue which· remains constant
since the
permanent settlement. The cumulative effect of the
foregoing facts which were not placed before the High
Court much outweighs the consideration
of
the
pecuniary loss of the respondent, Subodh Gopal Bose, as
the auction-purchaser and in the circumstances the
infliction of the loss of the right to eject under-tenants
can only be regarded as a reasonable
restriction
permitted by article 19(5) - to be imposed on the exercise of the right guaranteed under article 19(1) (f). In
my judgment the reasons for which the High Court
declared section i of the amending Act to be ultra vires
the Constitution are no longer tenable in view of the
circumstances now before us which were not brought
to the notice of the High Court and the decision of
'the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained,
An alternative argument, however, has been raised
by learned advocate for the respondent, Subodh
Gopal Bose, that the impugned section violates the
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
fundamental right secured to him by article 31 (2) of the
Constitution and is, therefore, void under article 13(1).
•
The
contention, shortly put, is that the right, conferred
v.
by the old section 37, to avoid and annul the underSuhodh Gopal
Bost and Others.
tenures and to eject the under-tenants is, by itself,
"property"
and that as the new section 37 has taken
Das].
away that property without having made any provision for compensation therefor the impugned section is
unconstitutional in that it violates the provisions of
article 31(2).
The State of
West Bengal
The Bill which eventually became the Bengal Land
Revenue Sales ('Vest Bengal Amendment) Act, 1950,
was introduced in the West Bengal Legislature on the
23rd March, 1949, and after having been passed by the
Legislature it received the assent of the Governor on
the 15th March, 1950. The Bill was, therefore, pending
in the West Bengal Legislature when the Constitution
of India came into force and was passed into law after
the date of the Constitution. It does not appear, however, that the Bill was reserved for the consideration
of the President or received his assent. Therefore, the
impugned law cannot claim the protection of article 31
(4) and, what is more, if it is such a law as is referred to
in clause (2) of article 31, then, by virtue of clause (3),
it cannot have any effect at all. The question, therefore, is as to whether the impugned section is or is not
such a law ·as is referred to in article 31(2). The
question requires, for a proper answer, a close scrutiny
of the provisions of article 31 and other relevant
articles of the Constitution bearing on it.
At the outset it is well to bear in mind the decision
of this court in A. K. Gopalan's case('), explaining the
correlation between the provisions of sub-clauses (a) to
(e) and (g) of clause (1) of article 19 and articles 20, 21
and 22 of the Constitution. Kania C. J., at page 101,
my Lord the present Chief Justice at pages 191-192,
Mahajan J., at page 229, Mukherjea J., at pages 255256 and I at pages 302-306 txpressed the view that·
the validity of the Preventive Detention Act could not
be judged by the provisions of article 19. The majority
rJ) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631
d the Bench took the view that the rights conferred
hy article 19(1) (a) to (e) and (g) could be enjoyed only
so long as the citizen was free and had the liberty of
his person but that the moment he was lawfully
<leprived of his personal liberty under article 21 he
ceased to have the rights guaranteed by article 19(1)
(a) to (e) and (g). The result of this part of the decision in A. K. Gopalan' s case (1 ) was summarised in
the later case of Ram Singh v. The State of Delhi('), by
my Lord the present Chief Justice in the judgment
that he delivered on behalf of himself, Kania C. J.,
and myself. Said his Lordship at pages 455-456 :
"Although personal liberty has a content sufficiently comprehensive to include the freedoms enumerated in article 19 (1), and its deprivation would result
in the extinction of those freedoms, the Constitution
has treated these civil liberties as distinct fundamental
rights and made separate provisions in article 19 and
articles 21 and 22 as to the limitations and conditions
subject to which alone they could be taken away or
abridged. The interpretation of these
articles and
their correlation were elaborately dealt with by the
full court in Gopalan's case('). The question arose
whether section 3 of the Act was a law imposing
restrictions on "the right to move freely throughout
the territory of India" guaranteed under article 19 ( 1)
( d) and, as such, was liable to be tested with reference
to its reasonableness under clause (5) of that article, It
was decided by a majority of 5 to 1 that a law which
authorises deprivation of personal liberty did not fall
within the purview of article 19 and its validity was
not be judged by the criteria indicated in that article
but depended on its compliance with the requirements
of articles 21 and 22, and as section 3 satisfied those
requirements, it was constitutional."
Mahajan J., who by a separate judgment dissented
from the majority on another point, not material for
our present purpose, said at page 467 :
"On the other points argued in the case I agree
with judgment of Sastri J."
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
(2) (1951] S.C.R. 451.
1953
T1" State of
West Bengal
v.
Suhodh Gopal
·Bose and Ot!iers,.
Das].
632
1953
Th• Slate of
IVo: Bengal
v.
Sub11c.'h Gopal
Bose "'nd Others·
DaJ]•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
It must, therefore, be regar<led as settled that the
freedom referred to in article 19 ( 1) sub-clauses (a) to
( e) and (g) are guarantee<l to a citizen of India while
he is a free man. These freedoms, eve11 when they are
so available, are, however, not :ibsotute and unbridled
licence but are subject to social control in that reasonable restrictions may be imposed on them by law as
indicate<l in clauses (2) to (6) of article 19. But as soon
as the citizen is lawfully deprived of his personal
liberty as a result of <letention, punitive or preventive,
he loses his capacity to exercise the several rights
enumerated in sub-clauses (a) to (e) an<l (g) of article 19
( 1) and cannot complain of the infraction of any of
those rights. The validity of the law which deprived
a citizen of his personal liberty which inevitably
destroys his rights un<ler the sub-clauses mentioned
above cannot be judge<l by the test of reasonableness
laid down in clauses (2) to ( 6) of article 19 but falls to
be determined according to the provisions of articles 20,
21 and 22 of the Constitution. This, I apprehend, is
the result of the two decisions of this court referred to
above.
Such being the correct correlation between article 19·
(1) sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) on the one hand and.
article 21 on the other, the question necessarily arises
as to the correlation between article 19 (1) (f) and
article 31. Article 19 (1) (f) guarantees to a citizen,
as one of his freedoms, the right to acquire, hold and
dispose of property but reasonable restrictions may be
imposed on the exercise of that right to the extent
indicated in clause (5). Article 31, as its heading shows,
guarantees to all persons, citizens and non-citizens the
"right to property" as a fundamental right to the
extent therein mentioned. What, I ask myself, is the
.correlation between article 19 ( 1) ( £) read with article 19
(5) and article 31 ? If, as held by my Lord in
A. K. Gopqlan's case(') at page 191, sub-clauses
(a) to (e) and (g) of article 19 (1) read with the relevant
clauses (2) to (6) "presuppose that the citizen to
whom the possession of these fundamental rights is
secured retains the substratum of personal freedom on
which alone the enjoyment of these rights necessarily
(!) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
rests'', it must follow logically that article 19 (1) (£)
read with article 19 (5) must likewise presuppose that
the person to whom that fundamental right is guaranteed retains his property over or with respect to
which alone that right may be exercised. I found
myself unable to escape from this logical conclusion
and so I said in A. K. Gopalan's case at pages 304-305 :
"But suppose a person loses · his property by
reason of its having been compulsorily acquired under
article 31 he loses his right to hold that property and
cannot complain that his fundamental right under subclause (f) of clause (1) of article 19 has been infringed.
It follows that the rights enumerated in article 19 ( 1)
subsist while the citizen has the legal capacity to
exercise them. If his capacity to exercise them is gone,
by reason of lawful conviction with respect to the
rights in sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g), or by reason of a
lawful compulsory acquisition with respect to the right
in sub-clause ( f), he ceases to have those rights while
his incapacity lasts."
I reiterated the same opinion in my judgment in
Chiranjitlal's case(' ). Nothing that I have heard on
the present occasion has shaken the opinion I expressed
in those cases as to the correlation of article 19 ( 1) (£)
read with article 19 (5) and article 31 of our
Constitution.
A suggestion was thrown out by my Lord in course
of arguments, that article 19 (1) (£) was concerned only
with the abstract right and capacity to acquire, hold
and dispose of property and had no· reference or relation to any rights in any particular property but that
article 31 only was concerned with the right to a
concrete property and there was no correlation between
the two articles. The matter, however, was not argued
by either side and I am not prepared to express any
final opinion on it. For the purpose of this appeal I am
content to proceed on the footing that article 19
relates to abstract right as well as to right to concrete
property.
(I) [1950] S.C.R. 869:at p. 919.
4-95 S.C.I./59
1955
The Stat.of
West Bengal
v.
Subotfh Gopat
Bose and Othm.
Das J.
634
1953
Tiu Statt of
West Bengal
v.
Subedh Gopal
Bose and Others.
Das].
SUP~EME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
I now turn to article 31 which appears under the
heading "right to Property". The clauses of that
article which are material for the purposes of determining the question in debate run as follows :
"(l) No person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law.
(2) No property, movable or immovable, including
any interest in, or · in any company owing, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken
possession of or acquired for public purposes under
any law authorising the taking of such possession or
such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired
and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or
specifies the principles on which, and the manner in
which, the compensation is to be determined and
given.
*
*
*
*
*
*
(S) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect( a) the provisions of any existing law other than
a law to which the provisions of clause ( 6) apply, or
(b) the provisions of any law which the State
may hereafter make( i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax
or penalty, or
(ii) for the promotion. of public health or the prevention of danger to life or property, or
(iii) in pursuance of any agreement entered into
between the Government of the Dominion of India
or the Government of India and the Government of
any other country, or otherwise, with respect to property declared by law to be evacuee property.''
It is suggested that the two clauses are not
mutually exclusive but must be read together and
that they are only concerned with what has beea
described as the State's power of eminent domain which,
according to Professor Willis, means the legal capacity
of sovereignty, or one of its governmental organs, to
take private property for a public use upon the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
payment of just compensation. Reference is made to
certain passages culled from the works of eminent
ancient writers like the Dutch publicist and statesman
Hugo Grotius who flourished in the 17th century
and William Blackstone the celebrated English jurist
who wrote his Commentaries round about 1769 and
.from Judge Cooley's well known book on Constitutional Limitations to show that from early times
jurists have insisted on three things as pre-requisites
for the exercise of this power of eminent domain,
·namely, (I) the authority of law, (2) the requirement
of public use, and (3) the payment of just compensation. These three pre-requisites which constitute
limitations on the power of eminent domain are said ·
to have been epitomised in 1791 in the last two
clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States of America. The contention is
that article 31 reproduces those three limitations on
the power of eminent domain, namely, that clause (I)
announces the necessity for legislative sanction as a
pre-requisite for the exercise of the power, thus protecting all persons against expropriation by the State
acting through its executive organ, the Government,
and that clause (2) reproduces the necessity of a public purpose and payment of compensation. It is
concluded ·that
these important limitations on ·the
State's power of eminent domain are designed to prate.ct a person against arbitrary deprivation of his
property and they constitute his fundamental right
in relation to his property.
The proposition thus formulated is certainly attractive and, indeed, has found favour with my learned
colleagues but appears to me to be open to certain
objections. I say in all humility that I consider the
method of approach and the line of reasoning in
support of that proposition entire! y fallacious and
wrong. The steps in the argument seem to be (i) that
the power of eminent · domain and the limitations
thereon as explained by eminent jurists are incorporated in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, (ii) that clauses (1) and (2) of
article 31 are concerned with the iame topic of
1953
The State ef'
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Goptil
Bose and Others.
Das J .
•
636
1953
The Slau of
W<St Bmgal
Vi
Subodh Gopal
Bo11 ar.d Others~
Das].
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
eminent domain and (iii) that, therefore, clauses (1)
and (2) of article 31 must be read as having reproduced the same limitations on the power of eminent
domain. This line of reasoning amounts, in effect, to
likening one thing with another thing and then saying
that as that other thing means such and such this
thing must, therefore, bear the same meaning-a
method which has been deprecated by Lord Halsbury
in Styles' case (1 ) . Further, if this line of reasoning
were correct or permissible then we might as well
have said, as indeed we were asked to say, that
article 21 reproduced the American
constitutional
limitations against deprivation of life and personal
liberties and that, therefore, the expression "procedure established by law" to be found in article 21
meant exactly what the expression "due process of
law" occurring in the Fifth Amendment did. This
we resolutely and definitely declined to do in
A. K. Gopalan's case (supra). At page 108 of the
report of that case Kania C.J. expressed the view
that that line of reasoning was not proper and was
misleading. My Lord the present Chief Justice at
page 197 repelled that contention. After quoting
the words of Madison about the great and essential
rights of the people" my Lord concluded at page
199:
"This has been translated into positive law in
Part III of the Indian Constitution, and I agree that
in construing these provisions the high purpose and
spirit of the Preamble as well as the constitutional
significance of a Declaration of Fundamental Rights
should be borne in mind. This, however, is not to
say that the language of the provisions should be
stretched to square with this or that constitutional
theory in disregard of the cardinal rule of interpretation of any enactment, constitutional or other, that
its spirit, no less than its intendment should be collected primarily from the natural meaning of the
words used".
After noticing the argument of learned counsel for
the petitioner Mukherjea J. at page 266 et seq found
(1) [1889] L.R. 14 A.C. 381.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
637
it impossible to introduce the American doctrine of
due process of law into our article 21. If the language
of our article 21 could not be stretched to square with
the American due process clause so as to give effect
to the suggested enlargement of the scope of our
fundamental right to life and personal liberties but
had to be interpreted by giving the words their·
ordinary natural meaning I cannot see why the
language of article 31 should not be construed in the
usual way so as to give effect to the plain intention of
our Constitution-makers. I say with
the utmost
humility that the proper method of approach is to
adopt the golden rule of construction referred to in
the judgment of my Lord quoted above and not to
start off with any kind of assumption that our Constitution must be regarded as having reproduced this
or that doctrine.
Apart from the erroneous line of reasoning referred
to above, the conclusion arrived at by following that
reasoning appears to me to be open to serious objections on merits also. If it were correct to say that the
two clauses, (1) and (2), of article 31 deal with the
same topic of the State's power of eminent domain
which is inhereIJt in its sovereignty then, as I pointed
out in my judgment in Chiranjitlal's case(') at page
925, clause (1) must be held to be wholly redundant
and clause (2) by itself would have sufficed, for the
necessity of a law is quite clearly implicit in clause (2)
itself which alone would have served as a protection
against State action through its executive organ, the
government. Another and more serious objection
against reading both the clauses as dealing only with
the same topic of eminent domain is, as ·pointea out
by me in Chiranjitlil's case (supra), that such construction will place the deprivation of property otherwise than by the taking of possession or acquisition of
it outside the pale of all constitutional protection. As
I said there and as I shall also do hereafter in detail,
one can conceive of circumstances where the State, in
exercise of the State's police power, may have to
deprive a person of his property without taking possession of it or acquiring it within the meaning of
•(I) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
1953
Tiu Stat• ~f
W<ll Btnt•I
v.
SulJodh Gopal
BOSI and Olh111.
Dru]•
638
1953
Tf..e Stat< of
Wtsl Bengal
v.
SufJ.tfh Gopal
Bos1 and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
article 31 (2). This police power of the State is alSC>
one of the powers inherent in the sovereignty of the
State. The suggestion that the first two clauses of
article 31 should be read as dealing only with eminent
domain will, if accepted, lead us to hold that our Constitution has not dealt with the State's police power
' to deprive a person of his property and has not pro.vided for us any protection against the State by
imposing any limitation on the exercise of that
power. The suggested construction will render the
enunciation of our fundamental "Right to property"
patently incomplete. It has been urged that the
State's police power is · recognised and regulated by
article 19 clauses (2) to ( 6) and article 31 (5) (b). I
shall deal with that argument in detail hereafter
and show that it is quite untenable. Apart from
that argument, the result of reading article 31,
clauses (1) and (2) together will be to hold that our
Constitution has not provided for us any protection
against the exercise of the State's
police power
either by the Legislature or by the executive. Such a
conclusion I am not prepared to accept. Accordingly
I thus explained what I conceived to be the true scope
and effect of clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 in Chiranjitlal's case (supra) at page 925, namely, that clause ( 1)
deals with deprivation of property in exercise of police
power and enunciates the restriction which our Constitution-makers thought necessary or sufficient to be
placed on the exercise of that power, namely, that
such power can be exercised only by authority of law
and not by a mere executive fiat and that clause (2)
deals with the exercise of the power of eminent
domain and places limitations on the exercise of that
power. It is these limitations which constitute our
fundamental right against the State's power of eminent
domain. The language used in article 31 (2) clearly
indicates beyond doubt that the power of eminent
domain as adopted in our Constitution is concerned
with only that kind of deprivation of property which
is brought about by the taking of possession or acquisition contemplated by that clause. I again adverted to
this matter in The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja
\
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
639
Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga(' ). It is said that such
a construction of article 31(1) instead of enunciating
any fundamental right of the people at all will, on the
contrary, declare the fm\damental right of the Legislature to deprive a person of his property by merely
enacting a law. This appears to me to be a very
superficial criticism which completely overlooks that
article 31(1), as far as it goes, does lay down a funda"
mental right by imposing a limitation at least on the
executive power. It is this limitation placed Gn the
executive power that constitutes our fundamental
right to property under article 31(1). I see no compelling or cogent reason for changing the views I expressed on this point in my judgments in those two
cases.
It is necessary, at this stage, to examine the several
other objections that have been taken to the correctness of the interpretation suggested by me. It is said
that the State's police power in relation to the citizens'
right to freedom is fully recognised in article 19.
Clause ( 1) of that article secures to the citizens of
India seven specified rights but clauses (2) to (6)
permit the State to make laws imposing reasonable
limitations on the exercise of these seven rights as
therein mentioned. The argument is that clauses (2)
to ( 6) recognise the police power of the State in that
they permit it to make laws imposing restrictions on
the seven rights of the citizens and that they at the
same time regulate that power by placing limitations
upon it by requiring that the restrictions which may
be imposed must be reasonable. It is then pointed out
that the State's police power is further saved by
article 31 (5) (b) and it is concluded that the police
power having been recognised and provided for in
article 19 and article 31 (5) (b) there is no necessity to
read article 31(1) as concerned with the State's police
power at all. I see no force or validity in the aforesaid
objection.
I first deal witli the objection in so far as it is founded on the recognition of the State's police power in
(i) [1952] S.C.R. 889 at pp. 988-989.
1953
Thi State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others.
Das].
640
1953
Tlr4 Stat• of
Wist Bmgd
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bos1 and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
article 19. I say that there is no force in this objection
for the following reasons :
(a) article 19(1) enumerates. seven rights to freedom
and guarantees them to the citizens of India. Clauses
(2) to (6) of that article recognise and regulate the
exercise of police power over those rights by the State
through its legislative organ, for tli.e State is, by those
clauses, permitted to impose reasonable restrictions by
law only. Therefore, it follows that article 19 does
not give any protection to the citizens against the
executive government in respect of even those seven
rights. The citizens, however, have protection against
the executive as well as the Legislature under article 21
but that protection covers life and personal liberties
only. Where, tl1en, is the citizen's protection against
the exercise of police power by the executive over hi~
property? It is nowhere except in article 31(1) as
construed by me.
(b) Article 19 guarantees the seven rights of the
citizens only and recognises and regulates the exercise
of police power over those rights by the legislative
organ of the State. A non-citizen is entirely outside
that article and consequently he has none of those
seven rights and has no protection against the State
under that article. He has, therefore, to fall back upon
article 21 and contended that all his personal liberties
including the six rights enunciated in article 19(1) (a)
to ( e) and (g) are protected against the exercise of
police power by the State through its executive or
legislative limb. But article 21, as already observed,
only protects him from deprivation of life and personal
liberties. Where, then, is the non-citizen's protection
against deprivation of his property by the exercise of
police power by the executive government. It is nowhere unless article 31(1) is read in the way I have
suggested.
( c) Finally, clauses (2) to ( 6) of article 19 authorise
the State to make laws imposing reasonable "restrictions" on the citizen's rights under clause (1). It is
true that in A. K. Gopalan's case (supra) Faz! Ali J.
m his dissenting judgment took the view that
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
641
"restrictions" might cover the case of total deprivation, but none of the other members of that Bench
3c.cepted that position. Kania C. J. said at page 106 :
"Therefore, article 19 (5) cannot apply to a substantive law depriving a citizen of personal liberty. I am
unable to accept the contention that the word 'deprivation' includes within its scope "restriction" when
:interpreting article 21".
My Lord the present Chief Justice expressed his
views at p. 191 in the words following :
"The use of the word 'restrictions' m the
various sub-clauses seems to imply, in the context,
that the rights guaranteed by the article are still
capable of being exercised, and to exclude the idea of
incarceration though the words 'restriction' and
"deprivation' ·are sometimes used as interchangeable
terms, as restriction may reach a point where it may
well amount to deprivation. Read as a whole and
viewed in its setting among the group of prov1s10ns
(articles 19-22) relating to 'Right to Freedom',
article 19 seems to my mind to presuppose that the
-citizen to whom the possession of these fundamental
rights is secured retails the substratum of personal
freedom on which alone the enjoyment of these rights
·necessarily rests".
The contrary view expressed by a Bench of the
Allahabad High Court was rejected by my Lord at the
'end of page 193 with the following remark :
" ........ their major ·premise that deprivation of
·personal liberty was a 'restriction' within the meaning of article 19 is, in my judgment, erroneous".
Mahajan J. expressed the same view in the following passage at page 227 in his judgment in that case :
"Preventive detention in substance is a negation
·of the freedom of locomotion guaranteed under
article 19(1) (d) but it .cannot be said that it merely
Testricts it".
Mukherjea J. said at page 256 :
........ and the purpose of article 19 is to indicate
the limits within which the State could, by legislation,
1953
T1" State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
.Bose and Others.
Das].
642
1953
Tiu State of
West Bengal
v.
Suhoah Gopal
Bose and Others·
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
impose 1+'Strictions on the exercise of these rights by
the individuals. The reasonableness or otherwise of
such legislation qn indeed be determined by the court
to the extent laid down in the several clauses of
article 19, though no such review is permissible with
regard to laws relating to deprivation of life and
personal liberty".
His Lordship concluded thus at page 264 :
"The result is that, in my opinion, the first contention raised by Mr. Nambiar cannot succeed and it
must be held that we are not entitled to examine the
;easonableness or otherwise of the Preventive Detention Act and see whether it is within the permissible
bounds specified in clause (5) of article 19".
After discussing the matter at some length at pages
302-305 I concluded on page 306 :
"In my judgment article 19 has no bearing on the
question of the validity or otherwise of preventive
detention and, that being so, clause (5) which prescribes a test of reasonableness to be defined and
applied by the court has no application at all".
A suggestion was made that although in A. K.
Gopalan's case (supra) the word "restriction" occurring in .clauses (2) to ( 6) could not, in its application to
sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) be taken as extending to
"deprivation '', there is no compelling reason to hold
that the word "restriction" occurring in clause (5) may
not in its application to sub-clause (f), cover "deprivation". There is no substance in this contention.
Clause (5) covers sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) and surely
one and the same word "restriction" used in one and
the same clause (5) cannot have one meaning in its
,application to sub-clauses (d) and (e) and a different
meaning and connotation in its application to subclause (f). Further, the reasons why, in A. K. Gopalan's
case (supra), that word was given a narrower meaning
in its application to sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) apply
mutatis mutandis in its application to sub-clause (f)
read in correlation to article 31. It is, therefore, clear.
from the decision of this court in A. K. Gopalan'scase (supra) that article 19 does not give any protection
S.C.R.
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
643
agafr1st. deprivation of property as distinct from mere
restnct10n imposed on the right to property. For
protection against deprivation of l.ife and personal
liberties including the several rights to freedom
enunciated in sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) of article 19
by the exercise of police power by the legislative or
the executive organ of the State the citizen as well as
the non-citizen will have to look to article 21. For
protection against the deprivation of property by
legislative or executive State action both the citizen
and the non-citizen will have to rely on article 31. If,
as I shall show presently, clause (5) (b) were inserted
in article 31 ex abundanti cautela and not as a suhstantive provision defining the ambit or scope of the
police power or formulating any limitation on that
power, then the protection against deprivation of property will have to be derived from only clauses ( 1)
and (2). If, in such circumstances, both tho~e clauses
are read in the way suggested by learned counsel for
the respondent, Subodh Gopal Bose, namely, as dealing
only with the topic of the State's power of eminent
domain then there will remain no escape from the
conclusion that in the Republic of India neither a
citizen nor a non-citizen has any constitutional protection against the exercise of police power either by the
legislative or executive organ of the State. On the
other hand, if the construction suggested by me be
adopted, everybody, citizen or non-citizen, will have,
under article 31 (2), full protection against the exercise
of the power of eminent domain by both the executive
as well as Legislature and in addition to tl1at will also
have protection against the exercise of police power
over property by the executive. The preservation of
this protection alone, even if some may regard it as
very meagre, is, to my mind, a sufficiently cogent
reason for adopting the construction suggested by me
in preference to tl1e other construction which, if
·,adopted, will not save even this meagre protection.
The next objection to the conclusion arrived at by
me is that police power of depriving a person of his
property is amply provided for in article 31 (5) (b) and
it is not necessary to read it into article 31 (1).
'
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Suhodh Gopal
Bose and Others ..
Das].
.
644
1953
Thi State of
West Bengal
Vo
•
Subodh Gcpal
Bose and Other
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
A perusal of clause (5) of article 31 which I have
already quoted will at once show that that clause
excepts certain laws from the operation of clause (2)
only. It will also appear that the exception covers,
under sub-clause (b), only certain kinds of future laws .
Item (i) under sub-clause (b) comprises future laws
imposing or levying any tax or penalty. Item (ii) under
that sub-clause saves future laws for the promotion of
public health or the prevention of danger to life or
property. It is said that this clause (5) (b) (ii) saves
laws to be made in exercise of the State's police power.
The argument is that the State's police power of
right to
imposing "restriction" on the citizens'
acquire, hold and dispose of property is recognised and
controlled by clause (5) of article 19 and that when it
becomes necessary for the police power to extend
beyond "restrictions" and to inflict "deprivation"
of property it can do so by the kind of law which is,
by clause (5) (b) (ii) of article 31, saved from the
operation of clause (2). It is pointed out that in the
matter of imposition of "restrictions" on the exercise
of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property
the only limitation on the police power is that the
"restrictions" to be imposed by law must be reasonable as indicated in article 19 (5) but that in the
matter of "deprivation" of property by authority of
law under article 31 the limitation on the police power
is more stringent, .namely, that such law may be made
only for the promotion of public health or the prevention of danger to life or property as mentioned in
clause (5) (b) (ii) and for no other purpose. The argument thus formulated is attractive for its simplicity
and has the appearance of plausibility but cannot
stand the test of close scrutiny. I say so for the
following reasons :( i) Every student of Constitutional law is well
aware that constitutional lawyers classify the State's.
sovereign power into three categories, namely, the
power of taxation, the power of eminent domain and
the police power. These are distinct categories of
sovereign powers with different connotations subserving different needs of the society and the State. If both
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
645
clauses (1) and (2) of article 31 deal with and i~pose
restrictions only on the State's power of emment
domain, then there was no real necessity for exempting
by article 31 (5) (b) the taxation power or the police
power from the operation of the power of eminent
domain, for, ex hypothesi, the two first mentioned
powers, being distinct from the power of eminent
domain, did not and could not fall within the last
mentioned power and, therefore, needed no exemption.
Even a casual student of Constitutional law knows
that money is one of the kinds of property which, it is
said, cannot be taken in exercise of the State's power
of eminent domain and that being so there could be no
necessity for exempting laws imposing taxes from the
operation of article 31 (2) which embodies only the
doctrine of eminent domain. Further, the police
power, like the power of taxation and the power of
eminent domain, is an attribute of sovereignty itself.
It is, as Professor Willis calls it, "the offspring of
political necessity". This coercive legal capacity is
inherent in every sovereign and require• no specific
reservation. Indeed, in the Constitution of the United
States there is no specific reservation of the police
power of the State. There was, therefore, no necessity
for expressly saving the police power of our State by a
constitutional provision. Why, then, was clause (5)
(b) (ii) inserted in article 31 at all ? The answer will
become obvious if it is remembered that it is extremely
difficult to define precisely the ambit and scope of the
State's police power over or in relation to private
property and some of the instances and forms of the
exercise of such polke power over or in relation to
property may superficially resemble the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. The conclusion, therefore,
becomes irresistible ·that although clause (5) (b) (ii)
was not strictly speaking necessary for saving the
police power, nevertheless, our Constitution-makers,
out of abundant caution and with a view to avoid any
possible argument, thought fit to insert sub-clause (5)
(b) (ii) in article 31. It is impossible to hold that the
entire police power of the State to deprive a person of
his property is contained in that sub-clause.
1953
The Stall of
Wist Bengal"
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others ..
Das],
646
1953
-3
The Slate of
Jt'"est Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bos1 and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
(ii) According to the argument article 31 (5) (b)
saves the power of the State to make certain laws in
exercise of its power of taxation or its police power.
It will be noticed that it does not give us any protection against the Legislature by laying down any test
for the validity of those laws. The acceptance of the
suggested construction will mean that laws thus saved
may be as archaic, offensive and unreasonable as the
legislature may choose to make them so long as they
relate to the subjects referred to in that sub-clause.
If our sense of the sanctity of private property is not
shocked at the prospect of leaving our property at the
unfettered mercy of the Legislature in respect of laws
of the kind specified in clause (5) (b) (ii), I do not see
why the construction suggested by me should be
rejected only on the ground that it will give a carte
blanche to the Legislature to make any law it pleases
for the deprivation of property in exercise of police
power.
(iii) Article 31 (5) (b) gives us no protection
against the executive with respect to the exercise of
these powers. Take article 31 (5) (b) (i) first. That it
was not intended to be a protection against the
executive in the exercise of the power of taxation
cannot for· a moment be doubted, for if it were so
intended, there was no necessity, then, for inserting
into the Constitution article 265 providing that no
taxes shall be levied or collected except by authority
of law, which clearly means that the executive cannot,
on its own authority, levy or collect any tax. It is,
therefore, quite plain that article 31 (5) (b) (i) was not
designed to give any protection against the executive
in the matter of the exercise of the power of taxation
and that our Constitution-makers, precisely for that
reason, considered that it was necessary that such
protection should be given expressly and, therefore,
inserted article 265. Likewise, article 31 (5) (b) (ii)
saves certain laws and does not in terms give us any
protection against the exercise of police power by the
executive. Where, then, is our protection against
deprivation of property by the exercise of police power
by the executive Government? It is nowhere to be
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
647
1953
found in our Constitution except in article 31 ( 1). This,
to my mind, clearly .indicates that article 31(1) was
The Stat1 of
West Bengal
designed to formulate a fundamental right against
v.
deprivation of property by the exercise of .Police power
Subodh Gopal
by the executive arm of the State. The protection Bose and Others.
against the exercise of the power of eminent domain
Das].
by the executive government is to be found in the
requirement of a law which alone may authorise the
taking of possession or the acquisition of the property
which, as will be explained later, is implicit in article
31 (2) itself and it is, therefore, not necessary to have
recourse to article 31(1) to secure that protection.
(iv) To say that the entire police power of the
State to deprive a person of his property is to be found
onlyinarticle 31(5)(b)(ii) willbe to confine theexercise of that power by the Legislature within a very
narrow and inelastic limit, namely, only for the
promotion of public health or the prevention of danger
to life or property. On the assumption that article 31
(5) (b) (ii) is concerned with saving the police power it
may cover the laws authorising the destruction of
rotten or adulterated foodstuff or the pulling down of
a dangerous dilapidated building or the demolition of
a building to prevent fire from spreading. But it is
quite easy to contemplate laws which do not fall within article 31 (5) (b) (ii) but are, nevertheless, made unmistakably in exercise of the State's police power.
Consider the case of a law authorising the seizure and
destruction of, say, obscene pictures or blasphemous
literature. Such law is clearly necessary for the promotion or protection of public morality. Nobody can
for a moment think of contending that such law will be
void if it does not provide for compensation and yet
that will be the result if we are to accept the suggested construction, for such a law made for protecting ·
public morality is obviously not covered by article 31
(5) (b) (ii) and will, according to such construction, be
hit by article 31(2). A construction which leads to
the astounding result of compelling the State to buy
up obscene pictures and blasphemous literature if it
desires to preserve public morality cannot merit serious
consideration and must. be discarded at once. Take
648
953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bost and Others.
Das J•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
the case of a law providing for the compulsory con·
tribution by all banks based upon the average daily
deposits for the purpose of creating a guarantee fund
to secure the full repayment of deposits to all depositors in case any such bank becomes insolvent and is
ordered to be wound up. This law quite clearly
deprives the banks of property in the shape of their
respective contributions and it is not covered by clause
(5) (b) (i) as it cannot be said to impose a tax or a
penalty and does not fall within (5) (b) (ii) either, for
it is not a law for the promotion of public health or
for the prevention of danger to life or property. This
law being thus outside clause (5) (b) cannot, according to the suggested construction be supported as an
instance of exercise of police power for, ex hypothesi,
the entire police power with regard to deprivation of
property is contained in clause (5) (b) and consequently
the law I have mentioned will not be protected from
the operation of article 31 (2) and must be void for not
providing any compensation. Yet in the United
States where so much is made of the sanctity of private property and from where we are prone to draw
inspiration in these matters such a law has been upheld as .constitutional, as an instance of a valid exercise of the State's police power "which extends to all
the great public needs." [See N able State Bank v.
Haskell(')]. Again, suppose there is a labour dispute
between, say, a tramway company and its workers and
the running of the tram cars is stopped. A law which
in such circumstances authorises the State to take
possession of the tram depot and run the tram cars by
the military or other personnel during such emergency
for the convenience of the travelling public is not within clause (5)(b)(ii) and on this construction will be void
if it does not provide for compensation to the tramway
company. On the suggested construction pushed to
its logical conclusion it will not be possible in future
to impose any social control on the profiteers or blackmarketeers, for a law controlling and fixing prices of
essential supplies will always deprive them of property
of the value to be measured by the difference between
(I) 219 U.S. 104.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
649
the blackmarket price and the controlled price. The
suggested ,construction may even make it difficult to
support any future law containing provisions similar
to those · in the procedure codes or other laws not strictly falling within the clause (5)(b)(ii) but authorising
the seizure of books, documents or other property or
the appointment of a receiver or sequestrator to take
possession of property, for in all such cases there will
be a "deprivation" of property. It is unnecessary to
multiply instances. The several instances I have just
given above appear to me to furnish ample justification for rejecting a construction which may make it
impossible for the State to undertake beneficial legislation to promote social interest and may invalidate
laws of the kind I have mentioned.
(v) Article 31(5)(b)(ii) saves from the operation of
clause (2) laws to be made in future for the promotion
of public health or the prevention of danger to life or
property. Obviously it was contemplated that the
laws thus saved would involve the taking of possession
or acquisition of private property, for othe1wise there
would be no necessity for the exemption at all. Take
the case of a law authorising the opening out of a congested part of a town and the acquisition of land for
the laying out of a public park for affording fresh air
and other health amenities to the public. Consider
the case of a law authorising the clearing up of slums
and the closing down of putrid and unhealthy surface
drains and acquisition of land for broadening the lanes
so as to lay underground sewers thereunder. One
may also refer to a law authorising the acquisition of
land for the erection of a hospital for patients suffering from infectious diseases, e.g., plague, small-pox and
cholera. All these laws will ,eome under the heading
of promotion of public health or the prevention of
danger to life. According to the suggested construction the acquisition of property authorised by each of
these laws will be exempt from payment of compensation to the owner, for these laws are, by clause (5) (b)
(ii) exempted from article 31(2). And yet acquisition
of land for such public purposes is precisely the kind of
acquisition which is always made on payment of
5-95 S.C.T./59
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Su/Jodh Gopal
Bose and Others.
Das].
650
1953
The State of
Wtst Bengal
v.
Suhodh Gopal
Bos~ and Others.
-]
Das]·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
compensation under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. A
construction which takes a law made really and essentially in exercise of the power of eminent domain out
of article 31 (2) cannot readily be accepted as cogent
or correct.
(vi) The complexities of modern States constantly give rise to· conflicts between opposing social interest and it is easy to visualise cir.cumstances when
much wider social control legislation than is envisaged
or recognised in the laws referred to in article 31 (5) (b)
will be imperatively necessary. Indeed, as Professor
Willoughby states in his Constitutional Law of the
United States, Vol. III, p. 1774, "the police power
knows no definite limit. It extends to every possible
phase of what the Courts deem to be the public welfare". In the language used by Holmes J. in Noble
State Bank v. Haskell (supra), "it may be said in a
general way that the police power extends to all the
great public needs". In Eubank v. Richmond~ 1 ) the
Court said of the police power :
"It extends not only
to
regulation which
promote the public health, morals, and safety, but to
those which promote the public convenience or the
general prosperity ...... It is the most essential of
ms1stent, and
always
powers, at
times
most
one of the least !imitable of the powers of government."
And all the more will such wide police powers be
required in a State which, like our own, aims at being
a welfare State governed by the directive principles of
State policy such as are to be found in Chapter IV of
our Constitution. To so confine the State's police
power as suggested by learned advocate for the re•pondent will be to bring about social stagnation and
thereby to retard the progress of our State. There is
nothing in the language of our Constitution which compels us to adopt such a construction. In my judgment a construction which is calculated to produce the
undesirable result I have mentioned must, I feel sure,
he rejected.
(1) 226 U.S. 137.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
651
The last objection to reading article 31 ( 1) as the
enunciation of the fundamental right against deprivation of property by the exercise of police power and
reading article 31(2) as laying down limitations on the
State's power of eminent domain is that so read article
31 will, in reality, afford no effective protection at all,
for the State will always exercise its police power under
article 31 (1) and deprive a person of his property
without any compensation by the simple device of
making a law and will never exer.cise its power of
eminent domain under article 31(2). Where, then, it is
asked, is our protection against the State with respect
to our property ? The objection thus formulated overlooks the difference between the nature and purpose
of the two powers which I shall presently discuss and
explain and is not otherwise well founded for the
following reasons :
(1) It is incorrect to say that article 31 (1) as
construed by me gives no protection at all. It certainly gives protection against deprivation of property by
executive fiat just as did that part of the famous 29th
Clause of the Magna Charta which proclaimed that no
free person should be dispossessed of any free tenement of his except by the law of the land. As pointed
out by Mathews J. in Joseph Hurtado v. People of
California('), by the 29th Clause of the Magna Charta ·
the English Barons were not providing for security
against ·their own body or in favour of the commons
by limiting the power of Parliament but were protecting themselves against oppression and usurpation of
the King's prerogatives. In other words, that clause
of the Magna Charta was not designed as a protection
against Parliament at all and indeed did not purport
to formulate any limitation on the State's power of
eminent domain but was only intended to be a protection against the exercise of police power by the
highest executive, the King. There is unmistakably
a familiar ring in the langauge of our article 31 (1)
echoing the sound of the language of the 29th Clause
of that great charter which the English Barons had
wrested from their King. The purpose and function
(I) (1883) IO U.S. 516 at p. 531.
!953
Thi Stall of
West Bengal
v.
Subodla Gopal
Bose and Others.
Das].
652
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Suhodh Gopal
Bose and Othtrs.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
of our article 31(1), as I apprehend it, are the same as
those of the Magna Charta. Our Constitution has.
given us ample protection against the executive in
relation to all the three sovereign powers of the State.
Thus the executive cannot, on its own authority, and
without the sanction of a law deprive any person of
his life or personal liberty by reason of article 21 or of
his property because of article 31(1) or take possession
of or acquire private property under article 31 (2) or
impose any tax under article 265. Our Constitution
makers evidently considered the protection against
deprivation of property in exercise of police power or
of the power of eminent domain by the executive to
be of greater importance than the protection against
deprivation of property brought about by the exercise
of the power of taxation by the executive, for they
found a place for the first mentioned protection in
article 31(1) and (2) set out in Part III dealing with
fundamental rights while they placed the last mentioned protection in article 265 to be found in Part XII
dealing with finance etc. So with regard to all the
three sovereign powers we have complete protection
against the executive organ of the State.
(2) It is said we have no protection against legislative tyranny in respect of our property. This complaint obviously is not well founded, for our Constitution has given us some measure of protection against
the legislature in respect of our property. ThHs if the
State exercises its power of eminent domain by taking
possession of or acquiring private property of any
person it must do so upon the three conditions
prescribed by article 31 (2). There is no shorter cut in
such a case. Apart from this the citizens of India
have further
protection against the legislature in
respect of their right to acquire, hold and dispose of
property. This right is guaranteed to them by •
article 19(1) (f). The Constitution, however, recognises
by clause (5) that the State has police power to
restrict the right in the interest of the general public
or for_ the protection of the interests of any Scheduled
tribe but prescribes a limitation on this police power
by requiring that the restrictions to be imposed by
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
653
law must· be reasonable. This requirement constitutes
the citizens' fundamental right against the exercise of
:police power by the legislature in respect of his right
under article 19 (1) (f) whilst they are in possession
.and enjoyment of this right.
(3) It is then urged that our Constitution, accordnig
to my' construction of it, does not give us any protection against the legislature in the matter of deprivation of property in exercise of the State's police power.
This is no ground for rejecting my construction, for,
on the construction suggested to the contrary, the
position is exactly the same, for article 31 (5) (b) only
~aves certain laws from article 31(2), that is to say,
recognises the police power but does not formulate
any test for determining the validity of those laws
which may be as unreasonable as the legislature may
make them. Apart from this, what, I ask, is our
protection against the legislature in the matter of
deprivation of property by the exercise of the power
of taxation ? None whatever. By exercising its power
of taxation by law the State may deprive us, citizen
·or non-citizen .of almost sixteen annas in the rupee of
-0ur income. What, I next ask, is the protection which
our Constitution gives to any person against the
legislature . in the matter of deprivation even of life or
·personal liberty ? None, except the requirement of
article 21, namely, a procedure to be established by
the · legisl~ture ·· itself and a skeleton procedure pres<:ribed. in article 22. In A. K. Gopalan'i case (supra),
notwithstanding the reference made to the epigrammatic observation of Bronson J. in Taylor v. Porte(')
to the effect that it sounded very much like the Constitution speaking to the legislature that the latter
could not infringe our right unless it chose to do so, the
majority of this Court declined to question the wisdom
and policy of the Constitution or to stretch the
language of article 21 so as to square it with its own
notions of what the ambit of the right. should be but
:felt bound to give effect to the plain words of the
COn~titution. (See Kania C. J, at page 11, Mukher'.
jea J. at page 277 arid my judgment at page 321). If,
(I) 4 Hill 140.
1953
The State of
Wl'st Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
BoJt and Others•
Das].
654
1953
T~e Slate of
West Bengal
v.
Suilodh Gopal
Bos., anti Othtrs.
Das]·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[195'1}
therefore, in the matter of deprivation of property by
the exercise of the State's power of taxation our
Constitution has only given us protection by article 265
against the executive but none whatever against the
legislature and if, in the matter of deprivation of our
life and personal liberty our Constitution has given us
no better protection against the legislature than the
requirement of a procedure to be established by the
legislature itself and the skeleton procedure prescribed
by article 22, and seeking that our Constitution has,
by article 31(2), given us protection against the legislature at least with respect to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, what is there . to complain
of if, in the matter of deprivation of property by the
exercise of the State's police power, our Constitution
has, by article 31 (1), given us protection only against
the executive but none against the legislature ? What
is abnormal if our Constitution has trusted the legislature, as the people of Great Britain have trusted their
Parliament ? Right to life and personal liberty and the
right to private property still exist in Great Britain in
spite of the supremacy of Parliament. Why should we
assume or apprehend that our Parliament or State
legislatures should act like mad men and deprive us
of our property without any rhyme or reason ? After
all our executive gevernment is responsible to the
legislature and the legislature is answerable to the
people. Even if the legislature indulges in occasional
vagaries, we have to put up with it for the time being.
That is the price we must pay for democracy. But the
apprehension of such vagaries can be no justification
for stretching the language of the Constitution to
bring it into line with our notion of what an ideal
Constitution should be. To do so is not to interpret
the Constitution but to make a new Constitution by
unmaking the one which the people of India have
given to themselves. That, I apprehend, is not the
function of the court. If the Constitution, properly
construed according to the cardinal rules of interpretation, appears to some to disclose any defect or lacuna
the appeal must be to the authority competent to
amend the Constitution and not to the court.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
655
( 4) Further, there may be quite cogent and compelling reason why our Constitution ,does not provide for
any protection against the. legislature in the matter of
deprivation of property otherwise than by taking of
possession or acquisition of it. It is futile to cling to
our notions of absolute sanctity of individual liberty
or private property and to wishfully think that our
Constitution-makers have enshrined in our COnstitution the notions of individual liberty and private property that prevailed in the 16th century when
Hugo Grotius flourished or in the 18th century when
Blackstone wrote his Commentaries and when the
Federal
Constitution of the United States of
America was framed. We must ·reconcile ourselves to
the plain truth that emphasis has now unmistakably
shifted from the ii1dividual to the communitv. We
cannot overlook that the avowed purpose of our Constitution is to set up a welfare State by subordinating
the social interest in individual liberty or property to
the larger social interest in the rights of the community. As already observed, the police power of the
State is "the most essential of powers, at times most
insistent, and always one of the least !imitable powers
of the government". Social interests are ever expanding and are' too numerous to enumerate or even
to anticipate and, therefore,. it is not possible to circumscribe the limits of social control to be exercised
by the State or adopt a construction which will confine
it within the narrow limits of article 31 (5) (b) (ii). It
must be left to the State to decide when and how
and to what extent it should exercise this social control. Our Constitution has not thought fit to leave
the responsibility of depriving a person of his property,
whether it be in exercise of the power of eminent
domain or of the police power, to the will or caprice
of the executive but has left it to that of the legislature. In the matter of deprivation of property
,9therwise than. by the taking of possession or by the
acquisition of it within the meaning of article 31 (2)
our Constitution has trusted our legislature and has
not though~ 'fit to impose any limitation on the legislature's exercise . of the State's police power over
1935
The Stal1 of
JV'est_ BetJgal
V•
Subodh Gopal
BoJe and Otherr.
Dai]·
656
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
private property. Our protection against legislative
tyranny, if any, lies, in ultimate analysis, in a free and
intelligent public opinion which must eventually
assert itself.
Bost and Others.
Das]·
Having dealt with the correlation between clauses
(1) and (2) of article 31 as I apprehend it and having
considered and rejected the objections to the conclusions I have arrived at, I proceed now to examine
and analyse the provisions of clause (2). As I explained in my judgment in the Darbhan ga case (supra)
at pp. 989-990, article 31 (2) has imposed three conditions on the exercise of the State's power of eminent
domain over private property and those limitations
constitute the protection granted to the owner of the
property as his fundamental right. It insists that
this sovereign power may be exercised only if it is
authorised by a law. It is, therefore, clear that the
executive limb of the State cannot exercise this
power on its own authority and without the sanction of law. The taking of possession or acquisition
must be for a public purpose which implies that this
power cannot be exercised except for implementing a
public purpose. It cannot be exercised for a private
purpose. What is a pnblic purpose has been elaborately dealt with in that case and need not be discussed• over again here. Finally, . the law authorising
the taking of possession or acquisition of the property
must provide
for compensation.
Compensation,
therefore, is payable only . when the State takes possession of or acquires private property. What, then,
is the meaning of the words "taken possession of or
acquired" and their grammatical variations as used
in article 31 (2) ?
It is pointed out that the last clause of the Fifth
Amendment which deals with eminent domain uses
the word "taken" and it is suggested that as our
article 31 (2) deals with the same topic of eminent
domain it will be reasonab1e to hold that our article
31 (2) reproduces the American constitutional limitations and that, therefore, the expression "taken
possession of or acquired" used in our article 31 (2)
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
must be read as having the same meaning which has
been attributed by the Judges ·of the Supreme
Court of the United States to the word "taken"
occurring in their Fifth Amendment. I am quite
<inable . to accept this construction and the line of
reasoning on which it is founded. In the first place,
I . deprecate the line of reasoning which starts by
likening one thing with another and then ends by
imputing the qualities of the other thing to the first
mentioned thing. The cardinal rule of interpretation
·is to ascertain the meaning and effect of an enactment,
constitutional or otherwise, from the words used
lherein. If the words used have acquired a technical
·or special meaning, that meaning must be given to
·them. To say that the expression "taken possession"
"Of or acquired" must be read as "taken" and given
the same wide meaning as the American courts have
_given to the word "taken" is to ignore the entire
historical background of the law relating to compulsory acquisition of private property by the State.
Under the English law, on which more or less our
modem laws are founded, the term "acquisition" has
a special meaning. It connotes the idea of transfer
·of title, voluntary or involuntary. When the acquisition by the State ·is effected by agreement after
negotiation there is a regular conveyance transferring
the' title from the vendor to the State. Even when
the acquisition by the State is effected by the coercive
process of exercising its sovereign power the idea of
_purchase is nevertheless present, for there is a vesting of the property in the State by operation of law.
Acquisition' of private property by the State under the
English faw, therefore, connotes the concept of a pur'-chase, voluntary or involuntary, and involves a
transfer of the entire title from the owner to the
State or a third party for whom the State acquires
the property. In India, the compulsory acquisition
'Of private ·property was first introduced by Bengal
Regulation I of 1824. Since then we have had no less
than seven Acts dealing with the compulsory acquisition
of private property by the State, namely, Act I of
1850, Act XLII of 1850, Act XX of 1852, Act I of
1953
TM Stale of
West' Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bost' and Others.
Das].
658
1953
The State of
WtslB!cngal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose atuf Others,
DtJJ ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1854, Act XXII of 1863, Act X of 1870 and lastly the·
present Land Acquisition Act, Act I of 1894. Each.
of these Acts provides for the vesting of the acquired.
property in the State. This means that the owner
is divested and his title passes, by operation of law,.
to the State. The word "acquisition'', therefore, has
become, as it were, a word of art having a long
accepted legislative meaning implying the transfer
of title. It will be quite wrong, according to the
correct principles of interpretation, not to give the·
word "acquisition" and its grammatical variations
this technical and special meaning I, therefore,.
respectfully agree with what Mukherjea J. said in
Chiranjit Lat's case (supra) at page 902, namely:
"It cannot be disputed that acquisition means.
and implies the acquiring of the entire title
of the expropriated owner, whatever the
nature
or extent of that title might be. The entire bundle
of rights which were vested in the original holder·
would pass on acquisition to the acquirer leaving nothing in the former. In taking possession,.
on the other hand, the title to the property admittedly
remains in the original holder, though he is excluded'
from possession or enjoyment of the property ...
Article 31 (2) of the Constitution itself makes a.
clear distinction between
acqms1t10n of property
and taking possession of it for a public purpose,.
though it places both of them on the same footing
in the sense that a legislation authorising either ·
of these acts must make provision for payment
of compensation to the displaced or expropriated·
holder of the property. In the context in which the·
word "acquisition" appears in article 31 (2), it can
only mean and refer to acquisition of the entire '
interest of the previous holder by transfer of title
and . .............. "
It follows from what has been stated above that·
the word "acquired" used in article 31 (2) must be
given the special meaning which that word has.
acquired and
cannot be read as synonymous with
"taken" as used in the Fifth Amendment to the Con-.
stitution of the United States.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
It is then suggested that any rate the expression
~'taken : possession of" should be read in the sense in
which the word "taken" is understood in the American
law. But even in America the. word "taken" has
not . always been interpreted in the same way. The
old ~iew was that in order to be a "taken" there
must be either an actual taking of physical property
or '1 physical occupancy of some physical property.
This view was, however, regarded as too narrow· and
mechanical. It was said that the ownership of ii
thirrg, tangible or intangible, was made up of the
rights, powers, privileges and immunities concerning
that thing. and that the property was not the thing
itself but consisted of these rights, powers, privileges
and immunities. .It was, therefore, concluded that there
must be ·a "taking" whenever there was any m1ury to
property otherwise than by the police power or tax~
tion which, if done by a private individual, would be
actionable as a tort; _in other words that it must be
held that there would be a "taking" whenever any
of the rights, powers, privileges or immunities making up the ownership was taken from the owner.
Indeed, this wide interpretation of the word "taken"
was facilitated by the fact that, in order · to avoid
the old, narrow view of the meaning of that word,
many of the States so amended their Constitutions as
to require compensation for property "damaged, injured or destroyed" for a public use. (See Professor Willis'
Constitutional Law, pp. 820-821). Our Constitutionmakers were well aware of the very wide meaning
eventually. given to the word "taken" by the American
courts. They did not, ·however, use the word "taken"
in article _31 (2) which they would surely have done if
they intended to reproduce the wide American concept
of "taking".
Our
Constitution-makers, · on the
contrary, . deliberately chose to adopt the narrower
view· point and accordingly used the words "taken
possession of" · in order to make it quite clear that
they required compensation to be paid only when th_ere
was an actual taking of the property out of the possession of the owner or possessor into · the . possession . of
i}ie State or its · nominee. Of· course the manner of
1953
Tht Stale of
West Bengal
V'
Subodh GopaI
Bose and Others~
Das].
660
1953
The State of
WeJt Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
.Bose and Ot!t.tts.
Da5"].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
taking possession must depend on the nature of the
property itself. I repeat with humility that it is not
permissible to ignore the historical background and
the actual words used in our Constitution.
It is finally said that both clauses (1) and (2) of
article 31 deal with the topic of eminent domain and,
therefore, the expression "taken possession of or
acquired" occurring in clause (2) has the same meaning
which the word "deprived" used in clause (1) has.
In other words, both the clauses are concerned with
deprivation of property and there is no reason to think
that the expression "taken possession of or acquired"
was used in clause (2) to indicate any particular kind
or shade of deprivation. The obvious retort that at
once comes to one's mind is that if it were intended by
o,µr Constitution-makers to convey the same general
idea 0£ deprivation of property by whatever means or
mode it was brought about why did they use the word
"deprived" in clause (1) and why did they use in
clause (2) a different expression which, as commonly
used and understood, connotes a much narrower
meaning ? It would have been quite easy to frame
clause (2) by using the word "deprived" instead of
the expression "taken possession of or acquired".
As our Constitution-makers used different expression>
in the two clauses it must be held that they had done'
so for a very definite purpose and that purpose could
be nothing else _ but to provide for compensation for
only a particular kind of deprivation specifically mentioned and not for any and every kind of deprivation. In
this connection reference may be made to Entry 33 in
List I, Entry 36 in List II and Entry 42 in List III of
the Seventh Schedule. The words used in those entries
are "acquisition or requisitioning" or their grammatical variations. The legislative power being confined
only to "acquisition or requisitioning" it will not be
unreasonable to 1101d that "taking of possession"
referred to in article 31 (2) is in the nature of "requisitioning". In section 299 (2) of the Government of
India Act the words "taking of possession" did not
occur ·'nor did they occur in any of the legislative lists
in the Seventh Schedule to that Act, but they have
• S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
been introduced in article 31 (2) and m the three
entries mentioned above the word "requisitioning"
has been added after the word "acquisition". If
"taken possession of or acquired"
occurring in
article 31 · (2) be given .a meaning wider than what is
meant . by ''acquired or requisitioned" or their variations used in the entries then it will amount to saying
that article 31 (2) even contemplates a law with . the
respect to matters which are beyond the legislative
powers conferred on Parliament and the State Legislatures, for they can only make a law with respect to
"acquisition
or requisitioning". To counter this
reasoning it is pointed out that Parliament under the
Union List has the residuary power of legislation and,
therefore, there is no difficulty in giving a wider meaning to the expression "taken possession of or
acquired". It will then amount to giving one and the
same expression different meanings. Thus in its
application to a law made by the State Legislature
"taken possession of or acquired" must perforce mean
"requisitioned" or "acquired" whereas in its application to a law made by Parliament it will have a much
wider meaning. This is opposed to the cardinal rules
of interpretation. Therefore, "taken possession of or
acquired" should be read as indicative of the concept
of "requisition or acquisition".
A further question, however, arises at this stage and
it may be now considered. Does every taking of a
thing into the custody of the State or its nominee
necessarily mean the taking of possession of that thing
within the meaning of article 31 (2) so as to call for
compensation ? The exercise of police power in relation to property may conceivably result in the extinction or destruction of the property or in the State
taking the property in its control. Take the case of
the law authorising the municipal bailiff to seize rotten
vegetables or adulterated foodstuffs and destroy them
or to enter upon the property of a private owner to
pull down the dilapidated structure. Consider the law
authorising the men of the fire brigade to go upon the
property of a private owner and demolish it to prevent
the fire from spreading to the houses beyond or on the
1953
The Stale of
We1t Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others ..
Das],
662
.953
T/ieStatf! of
iVeJt B:ngal
v.
Subod!i Gopal
Bose and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
other side of that house. Take the case of the law
authorising the seizure and destruction of property for
the protection of public morality. Although in none
of the above cases there is any acquisition of property
involving a transfer of title, there is in each of the
above cases a "taking of possession" and destruction
of property by the State by authority of law and yet.
nobody will -say that any of the above laws authorise
the "taking of possession" of the property within
the meaning of article 31 (2) so that if such law does
not prm·ide for compensation the law will be unconstitutional and void. Take the case of the Court of
Wards Act. It is a law which authorises the State to
take possession of the estate of a disqualified proprietor
and to manage it for him. The State only manages
the estate on behalf and for the benefit of the disqualified proprietor. The disqualified proprietor does not
appoint the State or any State official to manage his
estate and he cannot dismiss or discharge the manager
appointed by the State. The possession of the manager
can hardly, in such a situation, be described as the
possession of the disqualified proprietor. The disqualified proprietor is, therefore, in a sense, deprived of the
possession of his estate and the State takes the estates
in its possession. The same thing may be said of the
Lunacy Act. There is no transfer of title to the State
and, therefore, there is no acquisition of property by
the State. This law, however, takes the property out
of the possession of the owner who is adjudged a
lunatic. But nobody will say that the Court of Wards
Act or the Lunacy Act calls for compensation.
The learned Attorney-General has also drawn our
attention to statutes, namely, Act XLVII of 1950 (The
Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1950) passed on the 20th
May, 1950, and which has added several sections to the
Insurance Act, 1938, Act LI of 1951 (Railway Companies (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1951), passed on
the 14th September, 1951, and Act LXV of 1951
(Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951)
enacted on the 30th October, 1951, in support of his
contention. He points out that each of those laws is
strictly speaking outside article 31 (5) (b) and that the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
663
result of our holding that the taking of possession
authorised by those Acts falls within article 31 (2) so
as to call for compensation will be to prevent imposition of social control so urgently necessary for the
protection of the larger interests of the society. His
argument is that the taking of possession authorised by
none of these three Acts falls within article 31 (2) and
only illustrates the exercise of the State's police power.
As all the three Acts were passed after the Constitution
came into force and as they may be challenged in
future an argument founded on them will really be
begging the question in debate before us. I, therefore,
prefer just to note the Attorney-General's contention
and pass on and not to base my decision on consideration of any of those Acts.
Confining myself then to t~e illustrations given by
me I think it is fairly clear from the foregoing discussion that none of the laws referred to above by me
authorise any "acquisition" · of property in the sense
explained • above and although each of them does
authorise a sort of taking of possession of the property
yet nobody can contend that the taking of possession
so authorised by them falls within article 31 (2). In
other words, the taking of possession authorise& by
those laws does not amount to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain but is the result of the
exercise of police power. It follows, therefore, that
every taking of possession does not fall within
article 31 (2). What, then, is the test for determining
whether a taking of possession authorised by a particular law is a taking of possession in exercise of the
power of eminent domain or is a taking of possession
in exercise of the State's police power. I have already
referred to the nature of the State's police power and
quoted from some American decisions showing that
the State's police power extends not only to regulations
which promote public health, morals and safety but to
those which promote the public convenience or the
general prosperity. In its application to private property it, in some measure, resembles the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Thus the police power is
exercised in the interest of the community and the power
1953
The Stale of
West Bengal
v,
Subodh GopaJ
Bose and Othu1.
Das].
664
1953
The State of
West Bengal
v.
Subodh Got-al
Brue and Others.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954J
of eminent domain is exercised to implement a public
purpose and in both cases there is a taking of possession of private property. There is, however, a marked distinction between the exercise of these two sovereign powers. According to Professor Willis at page
717 eminent domain takes property for use by the
public or for the benefit of the public, while the police
power prevents people from so using their own property as to injure others. The fundamental principle
which is held to justify the exercise of police power is
that no one shall use his property or exercise a11y of
his legal rights as injuriously to interfere with or
affect the property or other legal rights of others.
(See Willoughby, Vol. III, p. 1775). The primary
purpose of police power is protection or preventionthat persons may be restrained from so exercising
their private rights of° property, contract or conduct
as to infringe the equal rights of others or to prejudice
the interests of the community. (Willoughby, Vol. III,
p. 1783). When the State finds that a certain
public purpose needs fulfilment and then in order to
implement that public purpose the State takes possession of private property on its own account after
acquiring it or even without acquiring it and having
taken possession of the property the State itself uses
or utilises the property or makes it over to a third
party to do so for implementing that public purpose
which the State has taken upon itself to serve and for
which the property was taken possession of or acquired
the State is said to have exercised its power of eminent
domain. This power can only be exercised under a
and that law must provide for compensation. The point
to note is that in such a case the public purpose is one
which the State has set out to fulfil as its own obligation and the State takes possession on its own account
to discharge its own obligation. In police power the
State destroys or extinguishes or takes possession of
property in order to prevent the owner from indulging
in anti-social activities or otherwise inflicting injury
upon the legitimate interests of other members of the
·community either by using his property in a manner
he should not do or by omitting to use it in a manner
S.C.R.
•
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
665
1953
he should do. In such a case. the State steps in and
The Stal• of
destroys or extinguishes only to prevent an injury to
West Benga!
social interest or takes possession and assumes the
v.
Subodh Gopal
superintendence of the property not on its own acBoJe atid Others.
count for implementing its own public purpose but for
protecting the interests of the community. It is easy
to perceive, though somewhat difficult to express, the
distinction between the two kinds of taking of possession which undoubtedly exists. In view of the wide
sweep of the State's police power it is neither desirable
nor possible to lay down a fixed general test for determining whether the taking of possession authorised by
any particular law falls into one ,category or the other.
\Vithout,
therefore,
attempting any such general
enunciation of any inflexible rule it is possible to say
broad! y that the aim, purpose and the effect of the
two kinds of taking of possession are different and that
in each case the provisions of the particular law in
question will have to be carefully scrutinised in order
to determine in which category falls the taking of
possession authorised by such law. A consideration of
the ultimate aim, the immediate purpose and the
mode and manner of the taking of possession and the
duration for which such possession is taken, the effect
of it on the rights of the person dispossessed and other
such like elements must all determine the judicial
verdict. The task is difficult and onerous but the
court will have to hold the scale even between the
social control and individual rights and determine
whether, in the light of the constitutional limitation,
th~ operation of the law is confined to the legitimate
sphere of the State's police power or whether it has
overstepped its limits and entered into the field of
eminent domain. It is only in this way that the Court
serves and upholds the Constitution by reconciling the
conflicting social interests.
In the light of the foregoing discussions and the
conclusions reached by me I now proceed to examine
the contention that the impugned section 7 of the
amending Act (VII of 1950) is unconstitutional in that
it infringes Subodh Gopal Bose'~ fundamental right to i
property guaranteed by article 31. The argument is 1
6-95 S. C. Indiaf59.
666
19~3
T\6 .St.u of
Wut&npl
v.
Suio<ih Gopal
Bo11 and Ot/1111.
DosJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
that having purchased the entire Touzinc at a revenue
sale the respondent Subodh Gopal Bose had under the
old section 37 of the Act of 1859, acquired the valuable right to annul the under-tenures and to eject the
under-tenants and that he had actually obtained a
decree for ejectment but that he had been deprived of
those vested rights by the operation of section 7 of the
amending Act which, in effect, gave retrospective
operation to the new section 37. Assuming that the
right to annul under-tenures and to eject under-tenants
and the decree for ejectment come within the term
"property", as used in article 31(2) as to which I have
considerable doubts the question at once arises whether they have been taken possession of or acquired
under the impugned Act. The Touzi still remains the
property of the respondent Subodh Gopal Bose. He
can realise rents and exercise all acts of ownership
except that he cannot exercise the right to annul the
under-tenures or eject any under-tenants or execute
the decree he has obtained. But have these last mentioned rights been taken possession of or acquired by
the
State within the meaning of article 31 (2) ?
There is no doubt that the State has not "acquired"
these rights in the sense I have explained, for there has
been no transfer, by agreement or by operation of law,
of those rights from the respondent Subodh Gopal
Bose to the State or anybody else. The impugned law
has not vested those rights in the State or anybody
else and does not authorise the State or anybody else
to exercise these rights. Referring to the position of
the shareholders under the Sholapur Spinning and
Weaving Company (Emergency Provision) Act, 1950,
Mukherjea J. said in his judgment in Chiranjitlal's
case (supra) at pp. 905-906 :"The State has not usurped the shareholders'
right to vote or vested it in any other authority. The
State appoints directors of its own choice but that it
does, not in exercise of the shareholders' right to vote
but in exercise of the powers vested in it by the
impugned Act. Thus there has been no dispossession
of the shareholders from their right of voting at all.
The same reasoning applies to the other rights of the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
667
shareholders spoken of above, namely, their right of
passing resolutions and of presenting winding up petitions. These rights have been restricted undoubtedly
~m<l may not be capable of being exercised to the
fullest extent as long as the management by the State
continues. Whether the restrictions are such as would
bring the case within the mischief of article 19(1) (f) of
the Constitution I will examine presently; but I have
no hesitation in holding that they do not amount to
dispossession of the shareholders from these rights in
the sense that the rights have been usurped by other
people who are exercising _them in place of the displaced shareholders."
The above reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to the
case now before us. The truth is that these rights
have not been taken possession of or acquired at all in
exercise of the power of eminent domain but have been
extinguished or destroyed in exercise of the State's
police power to prevent public mischief and anti-social
activities referred to in the objects and reasons appended to the bill which eventually became ·the impugned
law. In the premises, the respondent Subodh Gopal
Bose has been deprived of his "property'', if these
rights -can be properly so described, by authority of
law and the case falls within article 31 ( 1) and not
within article 31 (2) at all.
If the impugned section is regarded as imposing a
restriction on the right of Subodh Gopal Bose to hold
property then, for reasons I have mentioned, I hold
such restrictions, in the circumstances of this case, to
be quite reasonable and permissible under article 19
(5). If the impugned- section operates as an extinguishment of his right to property, treating the right to
annul under-tenures and to eject under-tenants and to
execute the decree for ejectment as property, then, in
my judgment, these rights of the respondent Subodh
Gopal Bose have not been taken possession of or
acquired by the State within the meaning of article
31 (2) but he has been deprived of his property by
authority of law under article 31 (1) which calls for no
compensation. In the premises, the plea of unconstitutionality cannot prevail and must be rejected. I
1933
The Stat1 ·of
W1Jt Bengal
v.
Subodh Gopal
BoJ1 and Other1.
668
1953
TM State of
West Bengal
v.
Sub1'dh Gopal
Bose and Others.
Ghulam Hasan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
would, therefore, allow the appeal with costs both here
and in the High Court.
GHULAM HASAN J.-I concur with my Lord the
Chief Justice that the view of the High Court, Calcutta,
that section 7 of the West Bengal Revenue Sales
(West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1950, is void as
abridging the fundamental rights of the first respondent under article 19(1)(f) and (5) of the Constitution
cannot be sustained and I agree with the order proposed by him.
JAGANNADHADAS J.-I have had the ad•antage of
reading the judgments of my Lord the Chief Justice
and of my learned brother Justice S. R. Das.
On the assumption that the question raised in this
case is one that arises under article 19(1) (f) and (5) of
the Constitution-that being the footing on which
the learned Judges of the High Court dealt with the
case-I agree with that portion of the judgment of my
learned brother Justice S. R. Das which holds that the
impugned section 7 of the Bengal Land-Revenue Sales
(West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1950 (West Bengal
Act VII of 1950) is intra vires and for the reasons
stated by him.
A larger question has, however, been raised as to
whether this is a case which falls within the scope of
article 19(1) (f) and (5) or article 31 of the Constitution. Since, on either view, we are all agreed as to the
final result of this appeal, I have felt rather reluctant
to go into this larger question. But out of profound
respect for my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned
brother Justice S. R. Das who have dealt with the
matter fully and out of a sense of duty to the Court, I
venture to express my views briefly.
My Lord the Chief Justice is inclined to the view
that the fundamental right declared in article 19(1) (f)
has no reference to concrete property rights but refers
only to the natural rights and freedoms inherent in the
status of a citizen. Even so, with respect, I fail to
see how the restrictions on the exercise of those rights
referred to in article 19(5) can be otherwise than with
reference to
concrete property rights.
To me, it
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
appears, that article 19(1) (f), while probably meant to
relate to the natural rights of the citizen, comprehends
within its scope also concrete property rights. That, I
believe, is how it has. been generally understood without question in various cases these near! y four years
in this Court arnl in the High· Courts. At any rate, the
restrictions on the exercise of rights envisaged in
article 19(5) appear to relate-normally, if not invariably-to concrete property
rights. To construe
article 19(1) (f) and (5) as not having reference to
concrete property rights and restrictions on them
would enable the legislature to impose unreasonable
restrictions on the enjoyment of concrete property
(except where such restrictions can be brought within
the scope of article 31 (2) by some process of construction). As at present advised, I am unable to give my
assent to such a view.
Now as regards article 31, I agree that clause (1)
cannot be construed as being either a declaration or
implied rccogrnt10n of the American doctrine of
.. police power". The negative language used therein
cannot, I think with respect, be turned into the grant,
express or implied, of a positive power. Ineed as my
Lord the Chief Justice has pointed out in his judgment, no such grant of police power is necessary
having regard to the scheme of the Constitution. That
scheme, as I understand it, is this. The respective
legislatures in the country have · plenary powers
assigned to them with reference to the ,various subjects
covered by the entries enumerated in the Lists of the
Seventh Schedule hy virtue of articles 245 to 255.
These powers are subject to the limitation under
article 13 that the power is not to be so exercised as
to infringe the fundamental rights declared in Part III
of the Constitution. And, therefore, the legislatures
can exercise every power-including the police power,
if it is necessary to import that concept-within these
limits, in so far as it is not provided for in article 19(2)
to (6) and article 31(5) (b) (ii) or other specific provi. sions in the Constitution, if any. The only problem
thus presented to the Courts is not as to what is the
extent of the police . power, but. as to what is the scope
1953
The Stale <?.f
W1JI Bengal
"'
Suhot!h ·Gopal
Bost and Othtrs.
JatatinadhadaJ J.
670
1953
Thi St.ti of
West Bengal
y.
Su6otf1i Gopal
Bose and Olh1rJ.
]•gaf111odhiulas ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1954}
and limit of the fundamental right which is alleged to
have been infringed by legislative action. I agree with
my learned brother Justice S. R. Das that the Constitution envisages a large measure of social control as
a means to achieve the goal set out in the preamble
and in the directive principles enumerated in Part IV.
I am also of the view that the Courts may not ignore
the directive principles, as having no bearing on the
of
constitutional
problems,
since
interpretation
article 31 categorically states that "it shall be the
duty of the State (including the legislature by virtue
of the definition of 'State' in Part III made applicable
by article 36) to apply these principles in making
laws". While, therefore, I agree in thinking that a
substantial measure of social control legislation may
become necessary in the fullness of time, that to my
mind, is no reason for construing article 31(1~ as
implying some undefined police power, though such a
consideration may have relevance in the determination
of the ambit of a fundamental right.
On the other hand, I am unable to agree with the
view that article 31(1) has reference only to the power
of Eminent Domain. I do not dispute that it comprehends within its scope the requirement of the authority
of law, as distinguished from executive fiat for the
exercise of the power of Eminent Domain. But it
appears to me that its scope may well be wider. This
really depends Qn what is the exact meaning to be
. assigned to the word "property" as herein used and
on whether "deprivation" contemplated by article 31
( l) 'is in substance the same as "taking possession" or
"acquisition" contemplated in article 31(2). My Lord
the Chief Justice is inclined to the view that "taking
possession" or "acquisition" is to be construed as
having reference to and meaning "deprivati~n" or
vice versa. Undoubtedly "taking possession" and
"acquisition"
amount
to
"deprivation"
but the
.converse may not follow in the particular context in
which these words and phrases arc used. With great
respect, I can see no warrant for the construction
adopted except the assumption that article 31 ( l) and
article 31 (2) refer to the same and identical topic of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
671
eminent domain and that they provide for the different requirements thereof, i.e., the
requirement of
authority of law under article 31(1) and the requirements of public purpose and compensation under
article 31(2). But it appears to me that if in article 31
(2)
"acquisition"
and "taking possession" were
meant to be synonymous with "deprivation" already
used in article 31 ( 1) there was no reason to drop the
use of the word "deprivation" in article 31 (2) and to
use other words and phrases therein. For instance,
article 31 (2) may well have run as follows. "There
shall be no deprivation of property, movable or immovable,. ........... for public purposes under any law
authorising the same unless the law provides ........ "
or some other such clause may have been suitably
drafted. It appears to me that while the framers of
the Constitution laid down the requirement of the
authority of law for "deprivation of property" with
a larger connotation, they limited the requirement of
payment of compensation to what may reasonably be
comprehended within the concepts of "acquisition"
and "taking possession". With respect, to read these
words and phrases in article 31 (2) as meaning the
same thing as "deprivation" used in article 31 (1)
and to make the test of "substantial abridgement" or
"deprivation" as the sine qu~ 11011 for payment of
compensation under article 31 (2) is to open the door
for introduction of most, if not all the elements of
wide uncertainty which have gathered round the word
"taken" used in the corresponding context in . the
American Constitution, notwithstanding caution to the
contrary which . my Lord the Chief Justice has
indicated in his judgment. I am inclined to think that
it is in order to obviate this that the framers of the
Constitution deliberatelv avoided the use of the word
. "deprived" or "deprivation" in article 31 (2).
I am conscious of the principle that a Constitution
has to be liberally construed so as to advance the
content of the right guaranteed by it. But where, as
in this case, there is, what appears, a deliberate choice
of the language used, and where it is not unlikely that
having regard to the goal that the Constitution ,has
Th.•811111 •I
W11t Bl,,tcl
•·'
S•6oJh [GoJol
Ba11 n4 Ot,1;rrs.
-l
J•tan•od/i.J•1 J.
672
1953
The State of
...
WeJl Bengal
Subodh Gopal
Bose:a11d Others.
JagannadhadaJ J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
set to itself in Part IV, certain degree of caution and
restraint may well have been intended as to the limits
of the right, the intendment of the language used has,
in my opinion, to prevail.
On the other hand, I am unable to agree with my
learned brother Justice S. R. Das that "acquisition"
and "taking possession" in article 31 (2) have to be
taken as necess'arily involving transfer 'of title or possession. The words or phrases appear to me to comprehend
all cases where the title or possession is taken out
of the owner ancl appropriated without his consent by
transfer or extinction or by some other process, which
in substance amounts to it, the possession in this
context meaning such possession as the nature of the
property admits and which the law recognises as
possession. This seems to follow from the enumeration
of the classes of property in article 31 (2) to which it is
applicable and also by reason of the broader consideration that from the point of view of the owner or
possessor whose title or possession is appropriated,
every such act of appropriation stands on the same
footing. That the idea of transference of title or
possession is not necessarily to be implied by ~rticle 31
(2) appears to me to be also indicated by article 31 (5)
(b) (ii), which more often than not, would cover cases
of destruction of property. Incidentally, I may mention that I am inclined to the view, in agreement with
my Lord the Chief Justice, that article 31 (5) (b) (ii) is
an exception to article 31 (2) and is intended to absolve
the need for payment of compensation for "acquisition" or "taking possession" of property for the
purposes specified therein. It, therefore, seems to
imply payment of compensation, if such "acquisition"
or "taking possession" of property is for other
purposes.
The question then remains as to what is "property"
contemplated by article 31 (2), apart from the specified
categories included therein by enumeration in the
phrase "any interest in, or in any company owning,
any commercial or industrial undertaking." It is no
doubt true that in a wide sense, property connotes not
S.C._R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
-0nly a concrete thing-corporeal or incorporeal-but
all the bundle of rights which constitute the ownership
thereof and probably also each individual right out of
that bundle in relation to such ownership. But in the
context of article 31 (2)-as in the cogriate context of
article 19 (1) (£)-the connotation of the word is
limited by the accompanying words "acquisition"'
and "taken possession". Hence out of the general
and wide category falling within the connotation of
the word "property'', only that which can be the
subject matter of "acquisition" or "taking possession",
is the "property" which is within the scope of
article 31(2). This . to my mind excludes, for instance,
a bare individual right, out of the bundle of rights
which go to make up property as being itself property
for purposes of article 31 (2), unless such individual
right is in itself recognised by law as property or as an
interest in property-an easement, a profits-a-prendre
and the like-and as capable · of distinctive acquisition
-0r possession. Thus for instance in the case with which
we are concerned in the present appeal, the right to
annul under-tenures cannot in itself be treated as
property, for it is not capable of independent acquisition or possession. The deprivation of it can only
amount to a restriction on the exercise of the rights as
regards the main property itself and hence must fall
under article 19 (1) (f) taken with 19 (5), according to
my understanding thereof.
In my view, however, the word "property" as used
in article 31 (!) may have been intended to be understood in a wider sense and deprivation of any individual
right out of a bundle of rights constit.!Jting concrete
property may be deprivation of "property" which
would require the authority of law. I am aware of the
possible criticism that in two parts of the same article
.the same word must be intended to have been used in
the same sense. While this is a normal rule of construction, it can yield to the requirement of the context
arising from the juxtaposition of other words or
phrases. To my mind article 31 (1), though part of an
article is in essence an independent provision to some
.extent overlapping with the requirements of the law
1953
TheStaJe of
Wert Bengal
v.·
Subodh Gopol
Bose and Ot!tm.
Jagannadhadas J.
•
674
1953
T!11 Sta11 of
W1Jt B1ngal
Y,
Subodh Gopal
BoJt a11d Otlitrr.
JazannU!11u/as J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
of Eminent Domain. It is on a par with article 21.
It seems to me to serve a distinct purpose over and
above that relating to the law of Eminent Domain,
viz., that it relates also to deprivation of property
other than that which may fall within the scope of
article 31 (2). It enjoins that such deprivation shall
not be brought about save by authority of law.
In view of what I have said above, it follows that
the assumption with which I have started, vit:., that
this is a case falling under article 19 (1) (f) :md (5) is, in
my opinion, correct.
In the result I agree that the appeal should be
allowed with costs here and in the High Court.
•
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant : P. K. Bose.
Agent for respondent No. 1 : R. R. Biswas.
195~
Dec. 18.
DWARKADAS SHRINIVAS OF BOMBAY
v.
THE SHOLAPUR SPINNING & WEAVING CO.
LTD., AND OTHERS.
rPATANJALI sAsTRI c.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE
and GHIJLAM HASAN JJ.]
Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co1npany (Emergency Prouisions) Ordinance II of 1950, replaced by Act XXVl!l of !950H1 hether ultra vircs art. 31 of the Constitution-Arts. 19 and 31Scope of-Whether different.
The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., was incorpo
rated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, with an authorised
capilal of Rs. 48 lakhs divided into 1590 fully paid up ordinary
• shares of Rs. 1,000 each, 20 fully paid up ordinary shares of Rs. 500
each and 32,000 partly paid up cumulative prcferenc<": shares of
Rs. 100 each, the paid up capital of the Company being- Rs. 32 lakhs
comprised of Rs. 16 lakhs fully paid up ordinary shares and
Rs. 16 lakhs partly paid up preference shares, Rs. 50 being unpaid
on each of the 32,000 cumulative preference shares. The Company
did goo<l business and declared high dividends for son1c time ; but
in the year 1949 there \Vas accumulation of stocks and financia1
difficulties. On the 27th July, 1949, the Directors gave notice Gf
4
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