K. C. GAJAPATI NARAYAN DEO AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF ORISSA.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 May 1953 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1 | 1953 INSC 52
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 May 1953
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, GHULAM HASAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 71/1953
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 1
- Neutral citation
- 1953 INSC 52
Text of the judgment
•
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
K. C. GAJAPATI NARAYAN DEO AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA.
[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs,
GHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]
f.
j
..
I
{
Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952, ss. 23, 26, 27, 37-0rissa
Agric1tlt1tral Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1950-Validity"Golourable legislation"-Tests of va.lidity-E.ffect of itlterior
inotives-Provisions for vesting buildings and private lands in
Govermnent-Provisimi for paying compe11sation in 30 yearsValidity- Provisions introduced in Bill after coming into force of
new.Constitution-Whether protected by art. 31(4)-Gonstitntion of
India, 1950, arts. 31(2), 31(4); Sch. VII, List II entry 46, List III
entry 42.
The Bill relating to the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952,
was published in the Gazette on the 3rd J an[\ary, 1950. It contained a provision that any sum payable for agricultural incometax for the previous year should be deducted from the gross
asset of an estate for the purpose of arriving at its net income on
the basis on which compensation was payable to the· estate
owners. On the 8th January, 1950, a Bill to amend the Orissa
Agricultural Income-tax Act of 1947 so as to enhance the highest
rate of tax from 3 annas in the rupee to 4 annas and reduce the
highest slab from Rs. 30,000 to Rs. 20,000 was published in the
Gazette. This Bill was dropped by the next Chief Minister who
introduced a revised Bill on the 22nd July, 1950, enhancing the
highest rate to 12 annas 6 pies in the rupee and reducing the
highest slab to Rs. 15,000 and this was passed into law in August;
1950. It was contended that the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax
(Amendment) Act of 1950 was a fraud on the Constitution and as
such invalid as it was a colourable legislation to effect a drastic
reduction in the compensation payable under the Estates Abolition
Act:
Held, (i) that the question whether ·a law was a colourable
legislation and as such void did not depend on the motive or bona
fides of the legislature in passing the law but upon the competency
of the legislature to pass that particular law, and what the courts
have to determine in such cases is whether though the legislature
has purported to act within the limits of its powers, it has in substance and reality transgressed those powers, the transgression
peing veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere
pretence or disguise. The whole doctrine of colourable legislation
is based upon the maxim that you cannot do indirectly what you
cannot do directly.
1953
May Z9.
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StJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
19,JJ
(ii) The impngned Act \VB.Sin substance ancl form a la¥.• in
respect to tbe "taxing of agricultural income", as described in
K. 0. Gajapati entry 46 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
flarayan Deo and, as the State Legislature was con1petent to legislate on this
and Others
subject, the Act was not void, and the fact that the object of the
v.
legislature \Vas to accomplish another purpose, viz., to reduce the
The State 01 compensation payable under the Estates Abolition Act, cannot
Orissa.
render this law a colourablo legislation and void as such. as the
ulterior object itself was not beyond the competence of the
legislature.
(iii) Assuming that in India there is no absolute rule of
law that whatever is affixed to or built on the soil becomes a part
of it and is subject to the same rights of property as the soil
itself, there is nothing in la'i\' which prevents the State Legislature from providing as part of an estate abolition scheme tbat
buildings lying within the ambit of an estate and used primarily
for the tnanagement or administration of the estate should vest in
the Government as appurtenances to the estate itself. Such
acquisition would come within article 31(2) of the Constitution
and if the conditions laid down in clause (4) of that article are
complied with, it would be protected by that clause even if the
compensation provided for is not just and proper.
(iv) The provisions in the Orissa Estates Abolition Act,
1950, relating to private lands in the possession of temporary
tenants are not unconstitutional. Merely because compensation
was based on the produce rent payable by the tenants it cannot
be said that the landholder was given compensation only for the
landholder's rights and not for the kudivarain (tenant's) rights
also.
(v) Tho expression "passed by such legislature" in article
31(4) of the Constitution means passed with or without amendments and the fact that the provisions relating to vesting of
private lands did not form a part of the Est.tee Abolition Bill as
originally introduced but were added to the Bill after the new
Constitution had come into force would not deprive those proyisions of the protection of article 31(4) of the Constitution.
(vi) The provision contained in section 37 of the Orissa
Estates Abolition A.ct, 1950, for payment of cornpensation by 30
annual instalments is not a piece of colourable legislation. It
comes clearly within entry 42 of List III of Schedule VII of
the Constitution.
[The question whether the provisions of the Madras Estates
Land (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1947, which empowered the
Collector to settle and reduce rents were void' because they involY·
ed an improper delegation of legislative powers to the executive
and contravened article 14 of the Constitution was raised, hut
with the consent of the counsel, th0ir Lordships decided to leR.ve
the question open as it did not relate \o the validity of the Ori~·~
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1953
Estates Abolition Act, which was the subject-matter in dispute in
the present case].
K. 0. Gajapati
State of Bihcir v. 2'rlahcwajah Kameshwnr Sinyh ctncl Others Narayan Deo
([1952] S.C.R. 889) distinguished. Snrya Pal Sinuh v. The State
and Others
of Uttar Praclesh ((1952] S.O.R. 1056) followed.
v.
Attorney-General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers ancl The State of
Orissa.
Others ([1924] A.O. 328), Attorney-General for Alberta v. AttorneyGeneral for Ccinncla ([1939] A.O. 117), Union Colliery Co. of Br.
Colnmbia Ltd. v. Bryden ([1899] A.O. 580), C1mninahnrn v. Tomeyhomma C1903] A.O. 151), Be Inwrancl Act of Canada ([1932] A.O.
4 l), Moran v. Depnty Commissioner for Taxation, New So1ith Wales
([1940] A.O. 838) referred to.
CIVIL APPELLA'rE JURISDICTION:
Nos. 71 to 76 of 1953.
Civil
Appeals
Appeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated 30th January, 1953, of the Orissa High Court in Original Jurisdiction Oases Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, 25 and 26 of 1952.
The facts of the case appear in the judgment.
B. Somayya ( K. B. Krishnamurthi, with him) for
the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 71 of 1953 ..
B; Somayya (D. Narasaraju and N. V. Ramdas,
with him) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 72
of 1953.
D. Narasaraju and A. Krishnaswami (N. V. Ramdas, with them) for the appellant in Civil Appeal
. No. 73 of 1953.
D. Narasaraju (N. V. Rtimdas, with him) for the
appellant in Civil Appea) No. 76of1953.
D. V. Narasinga Rao for the appellant in Civil
Appeal No. 75 of 1953.
R. Patnaik for the appellant in Civil Appeal
No. 74 of 1953.
M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
Pitumbar Misra, Advowte-General of Orissa (P. A.
Mehta, with them) for the respondent.
1953. May 29. The Judgment of the Court wac;
delivered by MUKHERJEA J.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
[1954]
)-
1963
MUI>:HERJEA J.-These six appeals arise out of as
many
applications, presented to the High Court of
~· G. Gajapati
Orissa,
under article 226 of the Constitution, by the
Narayan Deo
proprietors of certain permanently settled estates withand Others
v.
in the State of Orissa, challenging the constitutional
The State of
validity of the legislation known as the Orissa Estates
Orissa.
Abolition Act of 1952 (hereinafter called "the Act")
M ukherjea J, and praying for mandatory writs against the State
Government restraining them from enforcing the provisions of the Act so far as the estates owned by the
petitioners are concerned.
The impugned Act was introduced in the Orissa
State Legislature on the 17th of January, 1950, and
was passed by it on the 28th September, 1951. It was
reserved by the State Governor for consideration of
the President and the President gave his assent on
23rd January, 1952. The Act thus receives the protection of articles 31(4) ··and 31A of the Constitution
though it was not and could not be included in the list
of statutes enumerated in the ninth schedule to the
Constitution, as referred to in article 31B.
The Act, so far as its main features are concerned,
follows the pattern of similar statutes passed by the
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh Legislative
Assemblies. The primary purpose of the Act is to
abolish all zemindary and other proprietary estates and
interests in the State of Orissa and after eliminating
all the intermediaries, to bring the ryots or the actual
occupants of the lands in direct contact with the State
Government. It may be convenient here to refer
briefly to some of the provisions of the Act which are
·material for our present purpose. The object of the
legislation is fully set out in the preamble to the Act
which discloses the public purpose underlying it.. Section 2(g) defines an "estate" as meaning any land held
by an intermediary and included under one entry in
any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands
and revenue-free lands prepared and maintained under
the law for the time being in force by the Collector of
a district.
The expression "intermediary" with
reference to any estate is then defined and it
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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means a proprietor, sub-proprietor, landlord, landholder .... thikadar, tenure-holder, under-tenure-holder
and includes the holder of inam estate, jagir
and maufi tenures and all other interests of similar
Secnature between the ryot and the State.
tion 3 of the Act empowers the State Government
to declare, by notification, that the estate described in
the notification has vested in the State free from all
incumbrances. Under section 4 it is open to the State
Government, at any time before issuing such notification, to invite proposals from "intermediaries" for
surrender of their estates and if such proposals are
accepted, the surrendered estate shall vest in the
Government as soon as the agreement embodying the
terms of surrender is executed. The consequences of
vesting either by issue of notification or as a result of
surrender are described in detail in section 5 of the
Act. It would be sufficient for our present purpose to
state that the primary consequence is that all lands
comprised in the estate including communal lands,
non-ryoti la:nds, waste lands, trees, orchards, pasture
lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and
streams, tanks, water channels, fisheries, ferries, hats
and bazars, and buildings or structures together with
the land on whi.ch they stand shall, subject to the
other provisions of the Act, vest absolutely in the
State Government free from all incumbrances and the
intermediary shall cease to have any interest in them.
Under section 6, the intermediary is allowed to keep
for himself his homestead and buildings and structures
used for residential or trading purposes such as golas,
factories, mills, etc.; but buildings used for office or
estate purposes would vest in the Government. Section 7 provides that an intermediary will be entitled to
retain all lands used for agricultural or horticultural
purposes which are in his khas possession at the date
of vesting. Private lands of the intermediary, which
were held by temporary tenants under him, would
however vest in the Government and the temporary
tenants would be deemed to be tenants under tl1e
Government, except where the intermediary himself
holds less than 33 acres of land in any capacity. As
1953
r. C. Gajapati
NaraJa• Deo
•nd Others
v,
Th< Stat< ef
Orissa.
M.k/ie1ojeo ].
6
1953
K. C. Gajapati
NarayanDeo
and Others
. v.
The State of
Orissa.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
regards the compensation to be paid for the compulsory acquisition of the estates, the principle adopted
is that the amount of compensation would be
calculated at a certain number of years' purchase of
the net annual income of the estate during the previous
agricultural year, that is to say, the year immediately
preceding that in which the date of vesting falls.
First of all, the gross asset is to be ascertained and by
gross asset is meant the aggregate of the rents including all cesses payable in respect of the estate. From
the gross asset certain deductions are made in order to
arrive at the net income. These deductions include
land revenue or rent including cesses payable to the
State Government, the agricultural income-tax payable in the previous year, any sum payable as chowkidary or municipal tax in respect of the buildings taken
over as office or estate buildings and also costs of
management fixed in accordance with a sliding percentage scale with reference to the gross income. Any
other sum payable as income-tax in respect of any
other kind of income derived from the estate would
also be included in the deductions. The amount of
compensation thus determined is payable in 30 annual
equated instalments commencing from the date of
vesting and an option is given to the State Government
to m'ake full payment at any time. These in brief are
the main features of the Act.
There was a fairly large number of grounds put forward on behalf of the appellants before the High
Court in assailing the validity of the Act. It is to be
remembered that the question of the constitutional
validity of three other similar legislative measures
passed, respectively, by the Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and
Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assemblies had already
come for consideration before this court and this court
had pronounced all of them to be valid with the exception of two very minor provisions in the Bihar Act. In
spite of all the previous pronouncements there appears
to have been no lack of legal ingenuity to support the
present attack upon the Orissa legislation, and as a
matter of fact, much of the arguments put forward on
behalf of the appellants purported to have been based
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7
on the majority judgment of this court in the Bihar
appeals, where two small provisions of the Bihar Act
were held to be unconstitutional.
The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants
before the High Court have been classified by the
learned Chief fustice in his judgment under three separate heads. In the first place, there were contentions
raised, attacking the validity of the Act as a whole. In
the second place, the validity of the Act was challenged
as far as it related to certain specified items of property included in an estate, e.g., private lands, buildings,
waste lands, etc. Thirdly, the challenge was as to the
validity of certain provisions in the Act relating to
determination of compensation payable to the intermediary, with reference either to the calculation of the
gross assets or the deductions to be made therefrom
for the purpose of arriving at the net income.
The learned Chief Justice in a most elaborate judgment discussed all the points raised by the appellants
and negatived them all except that the objections with
regard to some of the. matters were kept open.
Mr. fustice Narasimham, the other learned fudge in
the Bench, while agreeing with the Chief Justice as to
other points, expressed, in a separate judgment of his
own, his suspicion about the bona fides of the Orissa
Agricultural Income-tax (Second Amendment) Act,
1950, and he was inclined to hold that though ostensibly
it was a taxation measure, it was in substance nothing
else but a colourable device to cut down drastically the
income of the intermediaries so as to facilitate further
reduction of their net income as provided in clause (b)
of section 27 ( 1) of the Act. He, however, did not dissent from the final decision arrived at by the Chief
justice, the ground assigned being that whenever
lhere is any doubt regarding the constitutionality of an
enactment, the doubt should always go in favour of
lhe legislature. The result was that with the exceplion of the few matters that were kept open, all the
petitions were dismissed. The proprietors have now
·come before us on appeal on the strength of certificates
·granted by the High Court under articles 132 and 133
1953
K. C. Gajapali
Narayan Deo
and Othm
v.
The State ef
01issa.
Mukhetiea J.
8
1953
K. C. Gajapati
NarayanDeo
and 0th.rs
•• of
Tm State
Orissa.
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
of the Constitution as well as under section 110 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
No contention has been pressed before us on behalf
of the appellants attacking the constitutional validity
of the Act as a whole. The arguments that have been
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants can
be conveniently divided under three heads : In the
first place, there has been an attack on the validity of
the provisions of two other statutes, namely, the Orissa
Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1950, and
the Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act, 1947, in
so far as they affect the calculation of the net income
of an estate for the purpose of determining the compensation payable under the Act. In the second
place, the provisions of the Act have been challenged
as unconstitutional to the extent that they are applicable to private lands and buildings of the proprietors,
both of which vest as parts of the estate, undersection 5 of the Act. Lastly, the manner of payment
of compensation money, as laid down in section 37 of
the Act, has been challenged as invalid and unconstitutional.
Under the first head the appellants' main contention·
relates to the validity of the Orissa Agricultural
Income-tax (Amendment) Act of 1950. This Act, it is
said, is not a bona fide taxation statute at all, but is a
colourable piece of legislation, the real object of which
is to reduce, by artificial means, the net income of the
intermediaries, so that the compensation payable to·
them under the Act might be kept down to as low a
figure as possible. To appreciate this contention of
the appellants, it would be necessary to narrate a few·
relevant facts. Under section 27 ( 1) (b) of the Act,
any sum payable in respect of an estate as agricultural
income-tax, for the previous agricultural year, consti-tutes an item of deduction which has to be deducted'
from the gross asset of an estate for the purpose of
arriving at its net income, on the basis of which the·
amount of compensation is to be determined. The·
Estates Abolition Bill was published in the local
gazette on 3rd January, 1950. As has been saidi
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1953
already, it was introduced in the Orissa Legislative
Assembly on the 17th of January following and it was K. 0. Gajapati
passed on the 28th September, 1951. There was an JV arayan Dea
Agricultural Income-tax Act in force in the State of and Others
v.
Orissa from the year 1947 which provided a progressive
scale of taxation on agricultural income, the highest The State of
Orissa.
rate of tax being 3 annas in the rupee on a slab of over
Rs. 30,000 received as agricultural income. On 8th Mukherjea J.
January, 1950, that is to say, five days after the publication of the Abolition Bill, an amended agricultural
income-tax bill was published in the official gazette.
At that time Mr. H. K. Mahtab was the Chief Minister
of Orissa and this bill was sponsored by him. The
changes proposed by this Amendment Act were not
very material. . The highest rate was enhanced from
3 annas to 4 annas in the rupee and the highest slab
was reduced from Rs. 30,000 to Rs. 20,000. For some
reason or other, however, this bill was dropped and a
revised bill was published in the local gazette on 22nd
July, 1950, and it passed into law on 10th of August
following. This new Act admittedly made changes of
a very drastic character regarding agricultural incometax. The rate of taxation was greatly enhanced for
slabs of agricultural income above Rs. 15,000 and for
the highest slab the rate prescribed was as much as
12 annas 6 pies in the rupee. It was stated in the
statement of objects and reasons that the enhanced
agricultural income was necessary for financing various
development schemes in the State. This, it is said,
was wholly untrue for it could not be disputed that
almost all the persons who came within the higher
income group and were primarily affected by the
enhanced rates were intermediaries under the Estates
Abolition Bill which was at that time before the Select
Committee and was expected to become law very soon,
and as the legislature had already definitely decided to
extinguish this class of intermediaries, it was absurd
to say that an increased taxation upon them was
necessary for the development schemes. The object of
this amended legislation, according to the appellants,
was totally different from what it ostensibly purported
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
to be and the object was nothing else but to use it as a
means of effecting a drastic reduction in the income
1(. C. GaJapa.ti
of
the intermediaries, so that the compensation payable
Narayan Deo
to
them may be reduced almost to nothing. This
and Others
change in the provisions of the Agriculturallncome-tax
v.
~'lie Stale of
Bill, it is further pointed out, synchronized with a
Orissa,
change in the Ministry of the Orissa State. The
original amended bill was introduced by the then Chief
Minister, Mr. H. K. Mahtab, who was in favour of
allowing suitable compensation to expropriated zemindars; but his successor, who introduced the revised
bill, was said to be a champion of the abolition of
zemindary rights with little or no compensation to the
proprietors. In these circumstances, the argument of
the learned counsel is that the agricultural income-tax
legislation being really not a taxation statute but a
mere device for serving another collateral purpose
constitutes a fraud on the Constitution and as such is
invalid, either in its entirety, or at any rate to the
extent that it affects the estate abolition scheme. We
have been referred to a number of decisions on this
point where the doctrine of colourable legislation came
up for discussion before courts of law; and stress is laid
primarily upon the pronouncement of the majority of
this court in the case of The State of Bihar v. Maharaj a
Karneshwar Singh and Others (1 ) which held two
provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, namely,
sections 4(b) and 23 (f) to be unconstitutional on the
ground, among others, that these provisions ·constituted a fraud on the Constitution. The fact that the
provisions in the amended Agricultural Income-tax
Act were embodied in a separate statute and not
expressly made a part of the Abolition Act itself should
not, it is argued, make any difference in principle. As
the question is of some importance and is likely to be
debated in similar cases in future, it would be necessary
to examine the precise scope and meaning of what is
known ordinarily as the doctrine of "colourable legislation".
It may be made clear at the outset that the doctrine
of colourable legislation does not involve any question
1953
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(1) (1952] s.c.R. ss9.
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
lll53
of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature. The whole doctrine resolves itself into the [(. C. Gajapati
question of competency of a particular legislature to Narayan Deo
enact a particular law. If the legislature is com- and Ot.hers
v.
petent to pass a particular law, the motives which
impelled it to act are really irrelevant. On the The State of
Orissa.
other hand, if the legislature lacks competency, the
question of motive does not arise at all. Whether a· Mukherjea J.
statute is constitutional or not is thus always a
question of power('). A distinction, however, exists
between a legislature which is legally omnipotent like
the British Parliament and the laws promulgated by
which could not be challenged on the ground of incompetency, and a legislature which enjoys only a limited
or a qualified jurisdiction. If the Constitution of a
State distributes the legislative powers amongst
different bodies, which have to act within their respective spheres marked out by specific legislative entries,
or if there are limitations on the legislative authority
in the shape of fundamental rights, questions do arise
as to whether the legislature in a particular case has or
~ has not, in respect to the subject-matter of the statute
or in the method of enacting it, transgressed the limits
of its constitutional powers. Such transgression may
he patent, manifest or direct, but it may also be disguised, covert and indirect and it is to this latter class
of cases that the expression "colourable legislation"
has been applied in certain judicial pronouncements.
The idea conveyed by the expression is that although
apparently a legislature in passing a statute purported
• to act within the limits of its powers, yet in substance
and in reality it transgressed these powers, the
transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper
examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise. As was
said by Duff J. in .Attorney-General for Ontario
v. Reciprocal Insurers and Others( 2 ),
"Where the law making authority is of a limited
or qualified character it may be necessary to examine
with some strictness the substance of the legislation
(r) Vide Oooley'5 Oon5titutiona! Limitation5 Vol, 1 1 p. 379·
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(2) [1924] A.C. 328 at 337.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
for the purpose of determining what is that the legislature is really doing."
K- {}, Gajap«,ti
In other words, it is the substance of the Act that is
Narayan Deo
and Others
material and not merely the form or outward appearv.
ance, and if the subject-matter in substance is someThe State of
thing which is beyond the powers of that legislature
Orissa.
to legislate upon, the form in which the law is clothed
The legislature
MukherJea J. 'would not save it from condemnation.
cannot violate the constitutional prohibitions by
. employing an indirect method. In cases like these,
the enquiry must always be as to the true nature and
character of the challenged legislation and it is the
result of such investigation and not the form alone
that will determine as to whether or not it relates to a
subject which is within the power of the legislative
authority('). For the purpose of this investigation the
court could certainly examine the effect of the legislation and take into consideration its object, purpose or
design('). But these are only relevant for the purpose
of ascertaining the true character and substance of the
enactment and the class of subjects of legislation to
which it really belongs and not for finding out the
motives which induced the legislature to exercise its
powers. It is said by Lefroy in his well known work
on Canadian Constitution that even if the legislature
avow on the face of an Act that it intends thereby to
legislate in reference to a subject over which it has no
jurisdiction, yet if the enacting clauses of the Act
bring the legislation within its powers, the Act cannot
be considered ultra vires( 3 ).
In support of his contention that the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act of 1950 isa colourable piece of legisfation and hence ultra vires the
Constitution, the learned counsel for the appellants, as
said above, placed considerable reliance upon the
majority decision of this court in the case of The State
of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh('), where two clauses
(I) Vide AUorney-Genera.l for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurer«1 and Othr.rs,
(1924] A.G. 328 at 337.
(2) Vide Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada.,
[1939) A.C. 117 at 130.
(3) See Lefroy on Canadian Constitution, page 75.
(4) [1952] S.C.R. 889.
.
.
S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
13
1953
of the Bihar Land Reform Act were held to be unconstitutional as being colourable exercise oflegislative K. 0. Gajapati
power under entry 42 of List III of Schedule VII of Narayan Deo
the Constitution. The learned counsel has also refer- and Others
red us, in this connection, to a number of cases, mostly
v.
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, where The State of
Oris.sa.
the doctrine of colourablelegislation came up for consideration in relation to certain enactments of the
Canadian and Australian legislatures. The principles Mukherjea J.
laid down in these decisions do appear to us to be
fairly well settled, but we do not think that the appellants in these appeals could derive much assistanc.e
from them.
In the cases from Canada, the question invariably
has been whether the Dominion Parliament has, under
colour of general legislation, attempted to deal with
what are merely provincial matters, or conversely
whether the Provincial legislatures under the pretence
of legislating on any of the matters enumerated in
section 92 of the British North America Act really
legislated on a matter assigned to the Dominion Parliament. In the case of Union Colliery Company of
British Columbia Ltd. v. Bryden( ), the question raised
was whether section 4 of the British Columbian Coal
Mines Regulation Act, 1890, which prohibited Chinamen of full age from employment in under-ground coal
working, was, in that respect, ultra vires of the Provincial legislature. The question was answered in the
affirmative. It was held that if it was regarded merely
as a coal working regulation, it could certainly come
within section 92, sub-section (10) or (13), of the British North America Act; but its exclusive application
to Chinamen, who were aliens or naturalised subjects,
would be a statutory prohibition which was within the
exclusive authority of the Dominion Parliament, conferred by section 91, sub-section (25), of the Act. As
the Judicial Committee themselves explained in a later
case( 2 ), the regulations in the British Columbian Act
"were not really aimed at the regulation of coal mines
at all, but were in truth a device to deprive the Chinese,
(1) [1899) A.C. 580.
(2) Vide Cunningham v. Tomeyhomma [1903] A.C. 151 at 157·
•
14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
[1954]
1963
naturalised or not, of the ordinary rights of the inhabitants
of British Columbia and in effect to prohibit their
K. G. Gajapati
continued
residence in that province since it prohibited
Narayan Deo
their earning their living in that province."
and Others
v.
On the other hand, in Re Insurance Act of Canada('),
The State of the Privy Council had to deal with the constitutionalOris13a,
ity of sections 11 and 12 of the Insurance Act of
Mukherjea J. Canada passed by the Dominion Parliament under
which it was declared to be unlawful for any Canadian
company or an alien, whether a natural person or a
foreign company, to carry on insurance business except
under a licence from the Minister, granted pursuant to
the provisions of the Act. The question was whether
a foreign or British insurer licensed under the Quebec
Insurance Act was entitled to carry on business within
that Province without taking out a licence under the
Dominion Act? It was held that sections 11 and 12
of the Canadian Insurance Act, which, required the
foreign insurers to be licensed, were ultra vires, since
in the guise of legislation as to aliens and immigration
-matters admittedly within the Domin,ion authoritythe Dominion legi"slature was seeking to intermeddle
with the conduct of insurance business which was a
subject exclusively within the provincial authority.
The whole law on this point was thus summed up by
Lord Maugham in Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada(') :
"It is not competent either for the Dominion or a
Province under the guise, or the pretence, or in the
form of an exercise of its own powers to carry out an
object which is beyond its powers and a trespass on the
exclusive power of the other."
The same principle has been applied where the question was not of one legislature encroaching upon the
exclusive field of another but of itself violating any
constitutional guarantee or prohibition. As an illustration of this type of cases we may refer to the
Australian case of Moran v. The Deputy Commissioner
of Taxation for New South Wales('). What happened
(1) [1932) A.C. 41.
(2) [1939] A.C. 117 at 130.
•
(3) [1940] A.C. 838.
..r
•
S.C.R.
.}
-<
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
15
1953
in that case was that in pursuance of a joint Commonwealth and States scheme to ensure to wheat growers K. C. Gajapati
in all the Australian States "a payable price for their Narayan Deo
produce" a number of Acts were passed by the and Others
v.
Commonwealth Parliament imposing taxes on flour
sold in Australia for home consumption, so as to The State of
Orissa
provide a fund available for payment of moneys to
wheat growers. Besides a number of taxing statutes, Mukherjea J.
which imposed tax on flour, the Wheat Industry Assistance Act No. 53of1938 provided for a fund into which
the taxes were to be paid and of which certain payments were to be made to the wheat growers in accordance with State legislation. In the case of Tasmania
where the quantity of wheat grown was relatively small
but the taxes were imposed as in the other States, it
was agreed as a part of the scheme and was provided
by section 14 of the Wheat Industry Assistance Act
that a special grant should be made fo Tasmania, not
subject to any federal statutory conditions but intended to be applied by the Government of Tasmania, in
paying back to Tasmanian millers, nearly the whole of
the flour tax paid by them and provision to give effect
t~ that purpose was made by the Flour Tax Relief Act
No. 40of1938 of the State of Tasmania. !J.'he contention raised was that these Acts were a part of a scheme
of taxation operating and intended to operate by way of
discriminating between States or parts of States and
as such were contrary to the provisions of section 5l(ii)
of the Commonwealth Australian Constitution Act .
The matter came up for consideration before a full
court of the High Court of Australia and the majority
of the Judges came to the conclusion that such legislation was protected by Section 96 of the Constitution,
which empowered the Parliament of the Commonwealth
to grant financial assistance to any State on such terms
and conditions as the Parliament thought fit. Evatt J.
in a separate judgment dissented from the view and
held that under the guise of executing the powers
under section 96 of the Constitution, the legislature had
really violated the constitutional prohibition laid down
in section 5l{ii) of the Constitution. There was an
appeal taken to the Privy Council. The Privy Council
•
•
16
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
affirmed the judgment of the majority but pointed out
K. 0. Gajapati that " cases may be imagined in which a purported
Narayan Deo exercise of the power to grant financial assistance
under section 96 would be merely colourable. Under
and Others
v.
the guise and pretence of assisting a State with money,
'1.'he State of
the real substance and purpose of the Act might simply
Orissa.
be to effect discrimination in regard to taxation. Such
Mukherjea J. an Act might well be ?tltra vires the Commonwealth
Parliament."
We will now come to the decision of the majority of
this court regarding two clauses in the Bihar Land
Reforms Act which seems to be the sheet anchor of
the appellants' case('). In that case the provisions of
sections 23(f) and 4(b) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act
were held to be invalid by the majority of this court
not on the ground that, in legislating on these topics,
the State legislature had encroached upon the exclusive
field of the Central legislature, but that the subjectmatter of legislation did not at all come within the
ambit of item No. 42 of List III, Schedule VII of the
Constitution under which it purported to have been
enacted. As these sections did not come within entry
42, the consequence was that half of the arrears of rent
as well as 12t% of the gross assets of an estate were
taken away, otherwise than by authority of law and
therefore there was a violation of fundamental rights
guaranteed by article 31(1) of the Constitution. This
was a form of colourable legislation which made these
provisions ultra vires the Constitution.
It may be stated here that section 23 of the Bihar
Land Reforms Act lays down the method of computing
the net income of an estate or a tenure which is the
subject-matter of acquisition under tho Act. In arriving at the not income certain deductions are to be
made from the gross asset and the deductions include,
among others, revenue, cess and agricultural income
tax payable in respect of the properties and also the
costs of management. Section 23 (f) provided another
item of deduction under which a sum representing 4 to
12J,% of the gross asset of an estate was to be
....
5
(I) 'Tide The State of Bihar v, Sir Kaineshwar Singh, [1952] S.C.R. 889.
,~
S.C.R.
-(
)
-4..._
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
deducted as" costs of works for benefit to the raiyat".
The other provision contained in section 4 (b) provides
that all arrears of rent which had already accrued due
to the landlord prior to the date of vesting shall vest
in the State and the latter would pay only 50% of
these arrears to the landlord. Both these provisions
purported to have been enacted under entry 42 of List
III Schedule VII of the Constitution and that entry
speaks of "principles on which compensation for property acquired is to be determined and the form and
manner in which that compensation is to be given."
It was held in the Bi)1ar case( 1 ) by the majority of this
court that the item of deduction provided for in section
23(f) was a fictitious item wholly unrelated to facts.
There was no definable pre-existing liability on the
part of the landlord to execute works of any kind for
the benefit of the raiyat. What was attempted to be
done, therefore, was to bring within the scope of the
legislation something which not being existent at all
could not have conceivable relation to any principle of
compensation. This was, therefore, held to be a
colourable piece of legiRlation which though purporting
to have been made under entry 42 could not factually
0ome within its scope.
The same principle was held applicable in regard to
acquisition of arrears of rent which had become due to
the landlord prior to the date of vesting. The net
result of this provision was that the State Government
was given the power to appropriate to itself half of the
arrears of rent due to the landlord without giving him
any compensation whatsoever. Taking the whole and
returning the half meant nothing more or less than taking the half without any return and this, it was held,
could not be regarded as a principle of compensation
in any sense of the word. It was held definitely by
one of the learned Judges, who constituted the majority,
that item 42 of List III was nothing but the description of a legislative head and in deciding the competency of the legislation under this entry, the court is
not concerned with the justice or propriety of the
(r) [1952] S.C.R. RSq.
-l
17
3
1963
K. 0. Gajapati
Narayan Deo
and Others
v.
The State of
Orissa.
Mukherjea J.
•
18
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
principles upon which the assessment of compensation
is directed to be made ; but it must be a principle of
K. G. Gajapati
compensation, no matter whether it was just or unjust
l:\ arayan Deo
and
there could be no principle of compensation based
and Others
upon something which was unrelated to facts. It may
v.
The Slate of be mentioned here that two of the three learned Judges
Orissa.
who formed the majority did base their decision regarding the invalidity of the provision, relating to arrears
M ukherjea J.
of rent, mainly on the ground that there was no public
purpose behind such acquisition. It was held by these
Judges that the scope of article 31(4) is limited to the
express provisions of article 31 (2) and although the
court could not examine the adequacy of the provision
for compensation contained in any law which came
within the purview of article 31(4), yet that clause did
not in any way debar the court from considering
whether the acquisition was for any public purpose.
This view was not taken by the majority of the court
and Mr. Narasaraju, who argued the appeals before us,
did not very properly pursue that line of reasoning.
This being the position, the question now arises
whether the majority decision of this court with regard
to the two provisions of the Bihar Act is really of any
assistance to the appellants in the cases before us. In
our opinion, the question has got to be answered in the
negative.
In the first place, the line of reasoning underlying
the majority decision in the Bihar case(') cannot possibly
have any application to the facts of the present case.
The Orissa Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act
of 1950 is certainly a legislation on "taxing of agricultural income " as described in entry 46 of List II of
the Seventh Schedule. The State legislature had undoubted competency to legislate on agricultural incometax and the substance of the amended legislation of
1950 is that it purports to increase the existing rates of
agricultural income-tax, the highest rate being fixed at
12 annas 6 pies in the rupee. . This may be unjust or
inequitable, but that does not affect the competency of
the legislature. It cannot be said, as was said in the
Bihar case('), that the legislation purported to be based
1953
7
(1) (1952] S.C.R. 889.
•
S.C.R.
i
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19
1953
on something which was unrelated to facts and did not
exist at all. Both in form and in substance the Act
K. 0. Gajapati
was an agricultural income-tax legislation and agricul- Narayan Deo
tural income-tax is certainly a relevant item of deduc- and Others
tion in the computation of the net income of an
v.
estate and is not unrelated to it as item No. 23(f) of The State of
Oris~a.
the Bihar Act was held to be. If under the existing
law the agricultural income-tax was payable at a Mukherjea J.
certain rate and without any amendment or change
in the law, it was provided in the Estates Abolition
Act that agricultural income-tax should be deducted
from the gross asset at a higher rate than what was
payable under law, it might have been possible to
argue that there being no pre-existing liability of this
character it was really a non-existing thing and could
not be an ingredient in the assessment of compensation.
But here the Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment)
Act was passed in August, 1950. It came into force
immediately thereafter and agricultural income-tax
was realised on the basis of the amended Act in the
following year. It was, therefore, an existing liability in 1952, when the Estates Abolition Act came into
force. It may be that many of the people· belonging
to the higher income group did disappear as a result
of the Estates Abolition Act, but even then there were
people still existing upon whom the Act could operate.
The contention of Mr. Narasaraju really is that
though apparently it purported to be a taxation
statute coming under entry 46 of List II, really and
in substance it was not so. It was introduced under
the guise of a taxation statute with a view to accomplish an ulterior purpose, namely, to inflate the deductions for the purpose of valuing an estate so that the
compensation payable in respect of it might be as
small as possible. Assuming that it is so, still it
cannot be regarded as a colourable legislation ·in
accordance with the principles indicated above, unless
the ulterior purpose which it is intended to serve is
something which lies beyond the powers of the
legislature to legislate upon. The whole doctrine of
colourable legislation is based upon the maxim that
you cannot do indirectly what you cannot do
•
20
SUPREME COUliT REPOHTt:l
[1954]
directly.
If a legislature is competent to do a thing
directly, then the mere fact that it attempted
]{. C. Gajapaf-i
to do it in an indirect or disguised manner,
Narayan Deo
cannot
make the Act invalid.
Under entry
and Others
42 of List III which is a mere head of legislative
v.
power the legislature can adopt any princip1e of
The Stale of
Orissa.
compensation in respect to properties compulsorily
acquired. Whether the deductions are large or small,
MukherJea J.
inflated or deflated they do not affect the constitutionality of a legislation under this entry. The only
restrictions on this power, as has been explained by
this court in the earlier cases, are those mentioned in
article 31(2) of the Constitution and if in the circumstances of a particular case the provision of article 31( 4)
is attracted to a legislation, no objection as to the
amount or adequacy of the compensation can at all be
raised. The fact that the deductions are unjust,
exorbitant or improper does not make the legislation
invalid, unless it is shown to be based on something
which is unrelated to facts. As we have already
stated, the question of motive does not rea,lly arise in
such cases and one of the learned Judges of the High
Court in our opinion pursued a wrong line of enquiry
in trying to find out what actually the motives were
which impelled the legislature to act in this manner.
It may appear on scrutiny that the real purpose of a
legislation is different from what appears on the face
of it, but it would be a colourable legislation only if
it is shown that the real object is not attainable to it
by reason of any constitutional limitation or that it
lies within the exclusive field of another legislature.
The result is that in our opinion the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act of 1950 could not
be held to be a piece of colourable legislation, and as
such invalid. The first point raised on behalf of the
appellants must therefore fail.
The other point raised by the learned counsel for the
appellants under the first head of his arguments relates
to the validity of certain provisions of the Madras
Estates Land (Orissa Amendment) Act of 1947. This
argument is applicable only to those estates which are
1953
·- ,..
).-•
;-
S.C.R.
-\
•
SUPB,EME COUH,1' B,EPORTS
21
1953
situated in what is known a~ ex-Madras area, that is
to say, which formerly belonged to the State of K 0 -;;--:, t'
Madras but became a part of Orissa from 1st April, .Na;ay:;,ab~:
1936. The law regulating the relation of landlord and and Others
tenant in these areas is contained in the Madras
v,
Estates Land Act of 1908 and this Act was amended './.'he State 01
Orissa.
with reference to the areas situated in the State of
Orissa by the amending Act XIX of 1947. The provi- Mukherjea J.
sions in the amended Act, to which objections have
been taken by the learned counsel for the appellants,
relate to settlement and reduction of rents payable by
raiyats. Under section 168 of the Madras Estates
Land. Act, settlement of rents in any village or area
for which a record of rights has been published can be
made either on the applic;:i,tion of the landholder or
the raiyats. On such application being made, the
Provincial Government may at any time direct the
Collector to settle fair and equitable rents in respect
of the lands situated therein. Sub-section (2) of section 1Q8 expressly provides that in settling rents under
this section, the Collector shall presume, until the
contrary is proved, that the existing rate of rent is
fair and equitable and he would further have regard
to the provisions of this Act for determining the rates
of rent payable by raiyats. Section 177 provides that
when any rent is settled under this chapter, it can
neither be enhanced nor reduced for a period of 20
years, except on grounds specified in sections 30 and
38 of the Act respectively. The amending Act of
1947 introduced certain changes in this law. A new
section, namely, section 168-A was introduced and a
further provision was added to section 177 as subsection (2) of that section, the original section being
renumbered as sub-section (1). Section 168-A of the
amended Act runs as follows:-" ( 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act the Provincial Government may, on being satisfied
that the exercise of the powers hereinafter mentioned
is necessary in the interests of public order or of the
local welfare or that the rates of rent payable in
money or in kind whether commuted, settled or
I
•
•
22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1963
otherwise fixed are unfair or inequitable invest
the Collector with the following powers:K. 0. Gajapati
Narayan IJeo
(a) Power to settle fair and equitable rents in
and Othere
cash;
v.
(b) Power, when settling rents to reduce rents if
The State of
in the opinion of tQ,e Collector the continuance of the
Ori3sa.
existing rents would on any ground, whether specified
M ukherjea J. in this Act or not, be unfair and inequitable.
(2) The power given under this section may be
made exercisable within specified areas either generally
or with reference to specified cases or class of cases."
Sub-section (2) which has been added to section 177
stands thus:" 2(a) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1)
where rent is settled under the provisions of section
168-A, the Provincial Government may either retrospectively or prospectively prescribe the date on
which such settlement shall take effect. In giving
retrospective effect the Provincial Government may,
at their discretion, direct that the rent so settled
shall take effect from a date prior to the commencement of the Madras Estates Land ( Orissa Amendment)
Act, 1947."
The appellants' contention is that by these amended
provisions the Provincial Government was authorised
to invest the Collector with power to settle and reduce
rents, in any way he liked, unfettered by any of the
rules and principles laid down in the Act and the
Provincial Government was also at liberty to direct
that the reduction of rents should take effect retrospectively, even with reference to a period for which
rents had already been paid by the tenant. Under
section 26 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, the
gross asset of an estate is to be calculated on the basis
of rents payable by raiyats for the previous agricultural year. According to the appellants, the State
Government made use of the provisions of the amended Madras Estates Land (Orissa Amendment) Act to
reduce arbitrarily the rents payable by raiyats and
further to make the reduction take effect retrospectively, so that the diminished rents could be reckoned
.)
/
}
•
S.C.R.
.,,
·..,
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23
1953
as rents for the previous year in accordance with the
,
Provision of section 26 of, the Estates
aJapa1i
. h Abolition Act K . a,-a~
and thus deflate t he basis upon wh1c the gross asset Narayan Dea
of an estate was to be computed.
and Others
It is conceded by the learned counsel for the
v.
appellants that the amendments in the Madras Estates T~r~::;~
Land Act are no part of the Estates Abolition Act of
Orissa and there is no question of any colourable Mukherjea J.
exercise of legislative powers in regard to the enactment of these provisions. The legislation, however,
has been challenged, as unconstitutional, on two
grounds. First of all, it is urged that by the amended
sections mentioned above, there has been an improper
delegation of legislative powers by the legislature to the
Provincial Government, the latter being virtually empowered to repeal existing laws which govern the relations between landlord and tenant in those areas. The
other ground put forward is that these provisions offend
against the equal protection clause embodied in
article 14 of the Constitution. It is pointed out that
the Provincial Government is given unfettered discretion to choose the particular areas where the settlement of rent is to be made. The Government has also
absolute power to direct that the reduced rents should
take effect either prospectively or retrospectively in
particular cases as they deem proper. It is argued
that there bAing no principle of classification indicated
in these legislative provisions and the discretion vested
in the Government being an uncontrolled and unfettered discretion guided by no legislative policy, the provisions are void as repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution.
In reply to these arguments it has been contended
by the learned Attorney-General that, apart from the
fact as to whether the contentions are well-founded or
not, they are not relevant for purposes of the present
case. The arguments put forward by the appellants
are not grounds of attack on the validity of the
Estates Abolition Act, which is the subject-matter of
dispute in the present case, and it is not suggested that
the provisions of the Estft,tes Abolition Act relating to
of
•
24
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
the computation of gross asset on the basis of rents
payable by raiyats is in any way illegal. The grievance
K, O. Gajapati
of the appellants in substance is that the machinery of
Narayan Deo
the
amended Act is being utilised by the Government
and, Others
for
the purpose of deflating the gross asset of an
v.
·Thfi State of
estate. We agree with the learned Attorney-General
Oris8a.
that if the appellants are right in the.ir contention,
they can raise these objection" if and when the gross
MHkh.erjea J.
assets are sought to be computed on the basis of the
rents settled under the above provisions. If the provisions are void, the rents settled in pursuance thereof
could not legitimately form the basis of the valuation
of the estat<J under the Estates Abolition Act and it
might be open to the appellants then to say that for
purposes of section 26 of the Estates Abolition Act,
the rents payable for the previous year would be the
rents settled under the Madras Estates Land Act, as
it stood unamended before 1947. The learned counsel
for the appellants eventually agreed with the views of
the Attorney-General on this point and with the consent of both sides we decided to leave these questions
open. They should not be deemed to have been decided in these cases.
The appellants' second head of arguments relates to
two items of property, namely, buildings and private
lands of the intermediary, which, along with other interests, vest in the State under section 5 of the Act.
There are different provisions in the Act in regard to
different classes of buildings. Firstly, dwelling houses
used by an intermediary for purposes of residence or
for commercial or trading purposes remain with him
on the footing of his being a tenant under the State in
respect to the sites thereof and paying such fair and
equitable rent as might be determined in accordance
with the provisions of the Act. In the second place,
buildings used primarily as office or kutchery for management of the estates or for collection of rents or as
rest houses for estate servants or as golas for storjng
of rents in kind vest in the State and the owner is
allowed compensation in respect thereof. In addition
to these, there are certain Bpecial provisions in the Act
1953
r-
•
)
•
S.C.R.
_,
.,
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
1953
relating to buildings constructed after 1st January,
1946, and used for residential or trading pur- K. a. Gajapati
poses, in respect to which the question of bonafides Narayan Deo
as to its construction and use might be raised and in- and Others
v.
vestigated by the Collector. There are separate provisions also in respect to buildings constructed before The State oj
Orissa.
1st January, 1946, which were not in possession of the
intermediary at the date of coming into force of the Mukherjea J,
Act. The questions arising in regard to this class of
cases have been left open by the High Court and we
are not concerned with them in the present appeals.
No objection has been taken by the appellants in
respect to the provisions of the Act relating to buildings used for residential or trade purposes. Their
objections relate only to the building. used for estate
or office purposes which vest in the State Goyernment
under the provisions of the Act.
In regard to these provisions, it is urged primarily
that the buildings raised on lands do not necessarily
become parts of the land under: Indian law and the
legislature, therefore, was wrong in treating them as
parts of the estate for purposes of acquisition. This
contention, we are afraid, raises an unneeessary issue
with which we are not at all concerned in the present
cases. Assuming that in India there is no absolute
rule of law that whatever is affixed to or built on the
soil becomes a part of it and is subject to the same
rights of property as the soil itself, there is nothing in
law which prevents the State legislature from providing as a part of the estates abolition scheme that
buildings, lying within the ambit of an estate and
used primarily for management or administration of
the estate, would vest in the Government as appurtenances to the estate itself. This is merely ancillary
to the acquisition of an estate and forms an integral
part of the abolition scheme. Such acquisition would
come within article 31(2) of the Constitution and if the
conditions laid down in clause (4) of that article are
complied with, it would certainly attract the protection
afforded by that clause. Compensation has been provided for these buildings in section 26(2) (iii) of th~
4
..
i
•
26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
Act and the annual rent of these buildings determined
in the prescribed manner constitutes one of the eleK. O. GaJapati
Narayan Dea ments for computation of the gross asset of an estate.
The contention of the appellants eventually narrows
and Others
v.
down to this that the effect of treating the annual
The State of
valuation of the buildings as part.of the gross asset of
Orissa.
the estate in its entirety, leads to unjust results, for if
MulcherjeaJ. these buildings were treated as separate properties, the
intermediaries could. have got compensation on a
much higher scale in accordance with the slab system
adopted in the Act. To this objection, two answers
can be given. In the first place, if these buildings are
really appurtenant to the estate, they can certainly
be valued as parts of the estate itself. In the s·econd
place, even if the compensation provided for the
acquisition of the buildings is not just and proper, the
provision of article 31 (4) of the Constitution would be
a complete answer to such acquisition.
As regards the private lands of the proprietor, the
appellants have taken strong exception to the provisions of the Act so far as they relate to private lands
in possession of temporary tenants. In law these
lands are in possession of the proprietor and the tern porary tenants cannot acquire occupancy rights therein,
yet they vest, under the Act, in the State Government
on the acquisition of an estate, the only exception
being made in cases of small land-holders who do not
hold more than 33 acres of land in any capacity.
Section 8(1) of the Act gives the temporary tenants
the right to hold the lands in their occupation under
the State Government on the same terms as they held
them under the proprietor. Under the Orissa Tenants
Protection Act, which is a temporary Act, the landholder is not entitled to get contractual or competitive
rents from these temporary tenants in possession of
his private lands and the rent is fixed at two-fifths of
the gross produce. It is on the basis of this produce
rent which is included in the computation of the gross
asset of an estate under section 26 of the Act, that the
land-holder gets compensation in respect to the private
lands in occupation of temporary tenants. The appellants' main contention is tha,t a,lthough in these la,nds
,.
(
•
~-
..
s.c.:R.
~.
.)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
both the melvaram and kudivaram rights, that is to
w.53
say, both th~ pdr?prihetor'sdash wdell atshthe rai:y~t's inf- K. a. Gajapati
terests are umte mt. e 1an - o1 er, e prov1s10ns o Narayan Deo
the Act indicated above have given no compensation and Others
whatsoever for the kudivaram or the tenant's right
v.
and in substance this interest has been confisoated The State 01
without any return. This, in our opinion, is a wrong
Orissa.
way of looking at the provisions for compensation Mukherjea J.
made in the Act. The Orissa Act, like similar Acts
passed by the legislatures of other States, provides for
payment of compensation on the basis of the net
income of the whole estate. One result of the adoption of this principle, undoubtedly is, that no compensation is allowed in respect of potential values of properties; and those parts of an estate which do not fetch
any income have practically been ignorned. There is no
doubt that the Act does not give anything like a fair or
market price of the properties acquired and the appellants may be right in their contention that the compensation allowed is inadequate and improper; but that
does not affect the constitutionality of the provisions.
In the first place, no question of inadequacy of compensation can be raised in view of the provision of article
• 31(4) of the Constitution and it cannot also be suggested
that the rule for payment of compensation on rental
basis is outside the ambit of entry 42 of List III. This
point is concluded by the earlier decision of thiH
court in Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of
U.P.(') and is not open to further discussion. Mr.
Narasaraju is not right in saying that the compensation for the private lands in possession of temporary
tenants has been given only for the landlord's interest
in these properties and nothing has been given in lieu
of the tenant's interest. The entire interest of the
proprietor in these lands has been acquired and the
compensation payable for the whole interest has been
assessed on the basis of the net income of the property
as represented by the share of the produce payable by
the temporary tenants to the landlord. It is true that
the Orissa Tenants Protection Act is a temporary
statute, but whether or not it is renewed in future, the
(1) (1952] S.C.R. 1056 •
•
2S
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[i954j
rent fixed by it has been taken only as the measure of
the income derivable from these properties at the
K. 0. Gajapati d t
f
. 't'
Narayan Deo
a e 0 acqu1s1 IOU.
and Others
Mr. Narasaraju further argues that his clients are
v.
not precluded from raising any objection on the ground
The State of of inadequacy of compensation in regard to these
Orissa.
·
land s b y reason of article 31(4)of the Constitupnvate
tion, as the provision of that article is not attracted
M ukherjea J.
to the facts of the present case. What is said is, that
the original Estates Abolition Bill, which was pending
before the Orissa Legislature at the time when the
Constitution came into force, did not contain any provision that the private lands of the proprietor in occupation of temporary tenants would also vest in the
State. This provision was subsequently introduced by
way of amendment during the progress of the Bill and
after the Constitution came into force. It is argued,
therefore, that this provision is not protected by article
31(4). The contention seems to us to be manifestly
untenable. Article 31(4) is worded as follows:"If any Bill pending at the commencement of this
Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it
has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved for.
the consideration of the President and has received his
assent, then, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called
in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2)."
Thus it is necessary first of all that the Bill, which
ultimately becomes law, should be pending before the
State Legislature at the time of the coming into force
of the Constitution. That Bill must be passed by the
Legislature and then receive the assent of the President. It is the law to which the assent of the President
is given that is protected from any attack on the
ground of non-compliance with the provisions of
clause (2) of article 31. The fallacy in the reasoning
of the learned counsel lies in the assumption that the
Bill has got to be passed in its original shape without
any change whatsoever, before the provision of
clause (4) of article 31 could be attracted. There is no
1953
--
..>
•
s.6.R.
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...
)
r
).
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
29
19li3
warrant for such assumption in the language of the
clause. The expression "passed by such Legislature" K. G. Gajapati
must mean "passed with or without amendments" in Narayan Deo
accordance with the normal procedure contemplated and Others
v.
by article 107 of the Constitution. There can be no
doubt that all the requirements of article 31(4) have The State of
Orissa.
been complied with in the present case and consequently there is no room for any objection to the Mukherjea J.
legislation on the ground that the compensation
provided by it is inadequate.
The last contention of the appellants is directed
against the provision of the Act laying down the
manner of payment of the compensation money. The
relevant section is section 37 and it provides for the
payment of compensation together with interest in 30
annual equated instalments leaving it open to the State
to make the payment in full at any time prior to the
expiration of the period. The validity of this provision
has been challenged on the ground that it is a piece of
colourable legislation which comes within the principle
enunciated by the majority of this court in the Bihar
case referred to above. It is difficult to appreciate
this argument of the learned counsel. Section 37 of
the Act contains the legislative provision regarding the
form and the manner in which the compensation for
acquired properties is to be given and as such it comes
within the clear language of entry 42 of List III,
Schedule VII of the Constitution. It is not a legislation on something which is non-existent or unrelated
to facts. It cannot also be seriously contended that
what section 37 provides for, is not the giving of compensation but of negativing the right to compensation
as the learned counsel seems to suggest. There is no
substance in this contention and we have no hesitation
in overruling it. The result is that all the points raise.d
by the learned counsel for the appellants fail and the
appeals are dismissed. Having regard to some important constitutional questions involved in these cases
which needed clearing up, we direct that each party
should bear his own costs in these appeals.
Appeals dismissed.
'-...,..
•
3o
1953
K. 0. Gajapati
Narayan Deo
and Others
v.
The State of
Orissa.
1953
May 22.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
,_
Agent for the appellant in Civil Appeal Nos. 71,
72, 73, 75 & 76: M. S. K. Sastri.
Agent for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 74:
R. 0. Prasad.
Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
)-
KEDAR NATH BAJORIA
v.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL.
HARI RAM VAID
v.
THE STATE OF V\'EST BENGAL.
[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,
GHULAM HASAN and JAGANNADHA DAs JJ.]
West Bengal Criminal Law AmendJment (Sp:Cial Cozwts) Act,
1949, s. 4(1)-Constit1'tion of In.dia, 1950, arts. 14, 20-LP.w
constitiiting Special Oonrts to try special kinds of offences and
empowering execu,tive to direct particular cases to be tried by Special
Courts-Validity-Equal protection of law-Tests of validityBeasonable classification-Imposition of additional finesLegality.
Vlbether n.n en&ctment providing for special procedure for
the trial of certain offences is or is not discriminatory and viola·
tive of art. 14 of the Constitution must be determined in each case
as_ it arises, for no general rule applicable to all cases can safely be
laid down.
The West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts)
Act, 1949, which was entitled an Act to provide for the more
speedy trial and more effective punishment of certain offences, and
the preamble of which declared that it was expedient to provide
for the more speedy trial and the more effective punishment of
certain offences which were set out in the Schedule to the Act,
empowered the Provincial Government (by ss. 2 and 3) to constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for specified areas and
to appoint Special Judges to preside over such courts. Section 4
'
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