RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 22 May 1953 | [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1188 | 1953 INSC 50
Key facts
- Decided
- 22 May 1953
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN, B. JAGANNADHADAS
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 7/1951
- Citation
- [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1188
- Neutral citation
- 1953 INSC 50
Text of the judgment
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1953
that basis against respondent 3 who is pnly a nominat·
ed member.
N ain Sukh Da/J
and Another
The petitioners appear to have misconceived their
remedy and their application under article 32 must
v.
The State of fail.
The petition is dismissed with costs, one set.
U ttar Pradesh
Petition dismissed.
and Others.
Agent for the petitioners: K. L. 11fehta.
Patanjali Sastri
Agent for respondent No. 1 : 0. P. Lal.
0.J.
Agent for respondent No. 4: S. P. Varma.
1953
RAO SHIV BAHADUR SINGH AND ANOTHER
.ilfay 22
v.
THE STATE OF VINDHYAPRADESH.
PATANJALI SASTm C. J., Mt:KHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE,
GHULAM HASAN and JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.
Constitution of India, 1950, Art.1. 14, 20-Acts committed in
Rewa State in 1949 before Vindhya. Pradesh Ordinance No. XL VIII
of 1949-Charge mider said Ordinance and tr-ial under Vindh:yr>
Pradesh Criininr<l Law Amendme1't (Special Courts) Ordinance (V
of 1949) -Validity of trial and conviction-F\tncla.>nental rights to
equality of laws and against conviction nnrler ex post facto lawScope of Arts.14 and 20-Integration of States and Vi·ndhwi Pradesh Ordinances, effect of.
The appellants, who were during the relevant period, the
~Iiuister for Industries and Secretary to the Government respect-
ively of the State of Vindbya Pradesh, were tried by a Special
Judge under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law Amendment
(Special Courts) Ordinance (No. V of 1949) for charges under
ss. 120-B, 16l, 465 and 466 of the Indian Penal Code as adapted
by the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance No. XLV III of 1949, the facts
alleged against them being that they entered into a conspiracy in
February, 1949, at Rewa to obtain illegal gratification for revoking
a previous Government Order and in pursuance of that conspiracy
the second appellant domanded such gratification on 8th March,
1949, at Rewa and the first appellant received Rs. 25,000 towards
it on the 11th April, 1949, at New Delhi and forged certain documents purporting to be official orders. They were acquitted by
the Special Judge but on appeal the first appellant was convicted
by the Judicial Commissioner 011 all t.he charges and the second
•ppellanl; on the clrnrges under ss. 120-13 and 161 of the Indian
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SUPREiVIE COURT REPOHTS
1189
Penal Code. Tqe validity of the trial and convictions was cha!1963
longed on appeal to the Supreme Court inter alia on the ground
that they contrnvenecl arts. 14 and 20 of the Constitution and on
Rao Shiv
the ground that no appeal lay to the Judicial Commissioner from Bahadur Singh
the order of the Special Judge.
and Another
Held (i) that, as s. 5 (2) of the Vindbya Pradesh Ordinance, Th ;; t if
1949. provided that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code v· d~ ~·~8 h
shall apply to the proceedings of a Special Court and that the '" ya ra
Special Judge shall be deemed to be a court of session, the normal
right of appeal provided by s. 410 ors. 417, as the case may be, of
the Criminal Procedure Code must be taken to have been expressly
provided by reference, and the order of the Special Judge was
appealable to the Judicial Commissioner.
Attorney-General v. Herman James Sillem (11 H. L. C. 704)
distinguished.
(ii) That the trial of the appellants did not contravene art.14
of the Constitution inasmuch as in the Vindbya Pradesh Criminal
Procedure Code las amended) which was in force at the commencement of the trial (namely 2nd December, 1949) there was no
provision requiring all trials before Courts of Sessions to be either
by jury or with the aid of assessors, and the fact that the entire
Criminal Procedure Code including s. 268 thereof was extended to
Vindbya Pradesh on the 16th April, 1950. by the Part C States
(Laws) Act, 1950, could not affect the validity of the trial after
that date as s. 4 of the said Act provides that the repeal of the
earlier law by that Act shall not affect pending proceedings, and
pending proceedings being a class in themselves, a provision saving
such proceedings could not contravene art. 14.
Syed Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad ([1952] S.C.R. 710)
referred to.
(iii) The prohibition contained in art. 20 of the Constitution
against convictions and subjections to penalty under ex post facto
laws is not confined in its operation to post-Constitution laws but
applies also to ex post facto laws passed before the Constitution
in their application to pending proceedings. [The difference
between Indian and American law in this respect pointed out.]
(iv) Article 20, however, prohibits only conviction or
sentence under an ex post facto law, and not the trial thereof.
Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the
time of the offence or by a court different from that which had
co npetence al that time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional.
(v) The expression" law in force" in art. 20 means a law
which was in fact in existence and in operation at the time of the
co1nmission of the offanoe (or, in other words, the the11 e:-dsting
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law) and does not include a law which by subsequent legislation
bas to he deemed to have been in force •t that tii:ne.
1953
11
h ""d Shsfr
(vi) Though the charges against the appellants were specifin a a ur 1ngi
1
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· cally framed with reference lo the o ence under
rdmance
an d A noth"e''
·
No. XLVIIIof 1949, as the acts charged as offencesd1dnot become
:i· such only hy virtue al the said Ordinance and as they were offen. 'h" Pa' dof h ces even under the law which prevailed at the time when the acts
Tl
vm" ·'1"
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d, th ey cou Id no t b e regar ded as conv1c
· t'ions for
were committe
violation of a law which was not in force at the time of the commission of the acts charged.
(vii) By virtue of the Orders of the Regent of Rewa of 1921
and 1922, the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code
with the necessary adaptations were in force in the Rewa State and
either became extended to tho entire Vindhya Pradesh State from
the 9th August, 1948, by Ordinance No. IV of 1948, or continued
to be in force in the Rewa portion of that State by virtue of the
principle laid down in 11fa.yor of Lyons v. East India Co. (1 M.I.A.
175), and were the penal law in force in the relevant area when
the acts were committed.
(viii) The amendment of the definition of "public servant" in
s. 21 of the Penal Code, made by Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949
brought about no substantial change in the position of the first
appellant as a public servant.
(ix) The Ruler of the Rewa State had prior to 1947 the
authority to pass extra.territorial laws relating to offences committed by his own subjects and vesting in his own courts the
power to try them, that power was not in any way curtailed either
by the integration covenant or the Instrument of Accession, and
ss. 3 and 4 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 188 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, at least in so far as they affected the subjects
and courts of the State, were \vi thin the legislative competence of
the State.
(x) The conviction of the appell•nts in respect of all the
offences with which they were charged including the extra-territorial offence said to have been committed by the first a.ppellant at
New Delhi was not illegal under art. 220 on the ground that the
conviction was under an ex z)ost facto la'\\'.
CRUUNAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 7 of 1951. Appeal under article 134 (l)(c)
of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and
Order dated the 10th March, 1951, of the Court of the
.Judicial Commissioner, Vindhyft Pradesh, Rewa, in
Criminal Appeal No. 81. of 1950, arising out of the
Judgment and Order dated the 26th July, 1950, of the
Court of Special Judge. Rewa, in Criminal Case No, l
()f 1949,
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1191
G. S. Pathp,k (K. B. Asthana, with him), for the
appellant No. 1.
K. B. Asthana, for appellant No. 2.
196J
Rao Shiv
Bahadhur Singh
and Another
v.
M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N.
The State of
Joshi, with him), for the respondent.
Vindhya Pradesl~.
1953. May 22.
dellvered by
The Judgment of the Court was
JAGANNADHADASJ.-This is an appeal against the
judgment of the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya
Pradesh dated 10th March, 1951, by leave granted
under article 134( 1) (c) of the Constitution. The first
and the second appellants were at the material period
of time respectively the Minister for Industries and the
Secretary to the Government, Commerce and Industries Department of the then United State of Vindhya
Pradesh. The case for the prosecution against them
is as follows : In the State of Panna (one of the component units of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh)
there are certain diamond mines. By an agreement
dated the 1st of August, 1936, between the Panna
Durbar on the one part and the Panna Diamond Mining
Syndicate on the other part, the latter obtained a
lease for carrying out diamond-mining operations for a
period of 15 years. It appears that on or about the
31st October, 1947, the Panna Durbar directed the
stoppage of the mining work on the ground that the
Syndicate was not carrying on the operations properly.
Since then the Syndicate was making strenuous efforts
to obtain cancellation of the said order. It is alleged
that the two appellants in the course of these
attempts, with which, at the material time, they were
concerned in their official capacity, entered into a conspiracy about the beginning of February 1949 at
Rewa (within the United State ofVindhya Pradesh), to
obtain illegal gratification for the purpose of revoking
the previous order of stoppage of mining work. In
pursuance of the said conspiracy it is alleged that the
second appellant demanded on 8th March, 1949, at
Rewa illegal gratification from one Xt1gindils 1Iehta, a
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representative of the Panna Diamond ~fining Syndi.
cate, and that later on, on 11th April, 1949, the first
81
B :"; ~" h appellant, in fact, received a sum of Rs. 25,000 to:n~ ~:wt~::~ wards it at the Constitution House in New Delhi and
v.
forged certain documents purporting to be orders
The State of passed in official capacity and intended to confer some
Vindhya Pradesh. advantages or benefits on the Panna Diamond Mining
-Syndicate.
J agannadhadas
J.
On these allegations the two appellants were
charged for criminal conspiracy and for the taking of
illegal gratification by a public servant for doing an
official act and for the commission of forgery in connection therewith. The charges were under sections 120-B, 161, 4n5 and 466, Indian Penal Code, as
adapted by the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance No.
XLVIII of 1949, and the trial was held by a Special
Judge under t,he Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law
Amendment (Special Court) Ordinance No. V of 1949.
At the trial both the appellants were acquitted. The
State filed an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner
against the same whereupon both were convicted
under sections 120-B and 161, Indian Penal Code (as
adapted). In addition, the first, appellant was convicted under sections 465 and 466, Indian Penal Code
(as adapted). He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years and to a fine of .Rs. 2,000 under
section 120-B and to rigorous imprisonment for three
years under section 161, Indian Penal Code, the two
sentences to run concurrently. In respect of his conviction under sections 465 and 466 no separate sentence
was awarded. The second appellant was sentenced to
one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of
Rs. 1,000 under section 120-B, but under section 161
no separate sentence was awarded. The validity of
the convictions and sentences has been challenged on
the ground that there has been infringement of
articles 14 and 20 of the Constitution.
In addition, a further point has been raised before
us by leave that no appeal lay to the Judicial Commissioner from the acquittal by the special Judge. It
is convenient to deal with this point in the first
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instance. 'fhe question raised depends 011 a construction
1953
of the provisions of the Vindhya PradeKh Criminal Law Ra Sh.
Amendment (Special Court) Ordinance No. V of 1949 Bahad:r ;;~•uh
dated 2nd December, 1949. By section 2 thereof the and Another
Vindhya Pradesh Government was given the power by
v.
notification to constitute Special Courts of criminal .. 2'he Stat• of
jurisdiction within the State and by section 3 to hndhya Pradesh.
appoint a Special Judge to preside J)ver the Special
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Jagannadhadas
ourt.
B
y
sect10n
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t
e
overnment
was
ant
or1se
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C
to issue notifications from time to time allotting cases
for trial by the Special Judge in respect of charges for
offences specified in the Schedule to the Ordinance.
· Sections 5( 1), 7 and 8 provide certain departures from
the normal procedure or evidence, and section 9 provides for special punishment. Section 5, sub-section
(2) provides as follows :"Save as provided in sub-section (1) the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as adapted in
Vindhya Pradesh, shall, so far as they are not
inconsistent with this Ordinance, apply to the proceedings of a Special Court, and for the purposes of the
said provisions, the Court of the Special Judge shall
be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a Jury or without the aid of Assessors, and a
person conducting a prosecution before a Speci:.l
Judge shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor."
Section 6 provides as follows :"The High Court may, subject to the provisions
of section 7 regarding transfer of cases, exercise, so
far as they may be applicable, all the powers conferred by Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, as adapted in Vindhya Pradesh,
on a High Court as if the Court of the Special Judge
were a Court of Session trying cases without a
Jury within the local limits of the High Court's jurisdictions."
The argument oflearned counsel for the appellants
is that section 6 above quoted provides only for the
powers of the High Court on appeal preferred
to it, but that there is no provision at i:tll conferring on an aggrieved party a right of appeal from
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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the judgment and order of the Sp<icial Judge to
the High Court. It is contended that the absence
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R ao Shiv
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Bahadur Singh ?f a nght ~f appea may be a lacuna, bll:t th~t
and Another masmuch as rt has not been expressly provided, rt
v.
cannot be implied from the fact that a provision has
_The State of been made for the exercise of powers by the appellate
VindhyaPradesh court. It is conceded that this line of argument, if
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accepted, would .result in there being no appeal even
agan";. " as as against a conviction. But it is urged that it is the
inevitable consequence of the lacuna. It appears however on careful consideration that no such lacuna
exists and that sub-section (2) of section 5 of the
Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance reasonably construed is
an express provision conferring a right of appeal
to the aggrieved party, whether an accused or the
State, against the judgment of the Special Judge. The
section, in terms, says that the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure as adapted and in so far as they
are not inconsistent with the Ordinance shall apply to
the proceedings of a Special Court, and that for the
purposes of the said provisions (that is, the adapted
provisions which are not inconsistent and hence apply)
the court of a Special Judge is to be deemed a Court of
Session. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code relating to the right of appeal are sections 410
and 417, and there is nothing in the Vindhya Pradesh
Ordinance which is inconsistent with the application of
these two sections to the proceedings of a Special Court
treated as a Court of Session for the purpose. It
follows that the said proceedings are subject to appeal.
But it is urged that the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code that are attracted by sub-section (2) of
section 5 of the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance to the
proceedings of a Special Court are only those provisions
which relate to the procedure before the Special Court
itself in respect of the proceedings before it and not all
the provisions which are connected with or related to
those proceedings. There is, in our opinion, no warrant for putting such a limited construction on this
sub-section. The only limitation on the application of
the provisions of the Cl'iminal Procedure Code to the
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1195
proceedings of the Special Court is the one arising from
J9b3
the existence of any inconsistent provisions in the R S .
Ordina~ce and not with reference to the conduct of t?e Bah:U.:, ;;,,gh
proceedmgs before that very court. Once the Spemal and Anothe~
Court is to be deemed a Court of Session the normal
v.
right of appeal provided by section 410 or section 417 .The State of
as the case may be, mnst be taken to have been VindhyaPradesl"
expressly provided by reference and not as arising by J '
]'
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agannadhadas
mere imp wat1on.
J.
Learned counsel strongly relied on Attorney-Genera.l
v. Herman James Sillem(1) to show that a provision
such as the above was meant only to regulate the
proceedings in a case within the four walls or limits of
the court. The statutory provision which came up
for construction in that case was however very differently worded, and was meant to regulate "the process, practice, and mode of pleadings,'' i.e., the
procedurf' in the court and not "the proceeding" of the
court. While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply
a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute and imply a
right of appeal, it is incumbent on the court to avoid a
construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid
of any meaning or application. The construction
urged for the appellant renders section 6 futile and
leaves even a convicted person without appeal. We
have no hesitation in rejecting it.
Out of the constitutional points raised, that which
relates to the alleged violation of article 14 has no
substance. In reliance on Lakshmandas Ahuja's case(')
it was sought to be argued that though the trial in this
case under Ordinance No. V of 1949 related to offences
committed prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the continuance thereof under the special
procedure prescribed by the Ordinance was discriminatory and hence unconstitutional. It is to be noticed
that the trial commenced on 2nd December, 1949, the
acquittal by the Sessions Judge was on 26th July,
1950, and the conviction by the Judicial Commissioner
on appeal therefrom was on 10th March, 1~51. In the
(1) 10 H, L. Cas. 704; It E. R. 1200,
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(2) [1952] S.C.R. 710.
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light, however, of the later decision of the Supreme
Court in Syed Qasim Razvi v. The 8tcite of Hyderabad('),
it was recognised that this point was unsubstantial,
unless some material prejudice in the matter of prov.
cedure was shown. In this context the learned
J'he State 0!
Attorney-General brought to our notice that even
Vindhya Pradesh. before the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court)
Jagoi;;:;,,hadas Ordinance No. V of 1949, dated 2nd December, 1949,
· J.
came into force there was in operation the Code of
Criminal Procedure Adaptation (Amendment) Ordinance No. XXVIII ofl949 dated 3rd May, 1949, whereby section 268, Criminal Procedure Code, requiring all
trials before a Court of Session to be either by jury or
with the aid of assessors was deleted from the Vindhya
Pradesh Criminal Procedure Code as adapted. Therefore by the date when the trial in the present case
commenced before the Special ·Court there was no substantial or material prejudice caused to an accused
who was tried by the Special Court, and the continuance of such procedure after the Constitution came
into force would make no serious difference. What,
however, was relied upon was a subsequent change in
the situation as a result of section 3 of Central Act
No. XXX of 1950 [Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950],
whereby Acts and Ordinances specified in the Schedule
to the Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949 (LIX of
1949) were extended to Vindhya Pradesh, and one of
the Acts specified in that Schedule was the entire
Code of Criminal Procedure. This therefore had the
effect of reviving section 268, Criminal Procedure Code,
in its application to Vindhya Pradesh, repealing by
section 4 of the Act the pre-existing law in this behalf
in the State. It was accordingly argued that to the
l!xtent the trial continued under the old procedure
subsequent to 16th April, 1950, there were inevitable
discrimination and necessary prejudice. This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the repealing
section 4 of Act No. XXX of 1950 contained a saving
clause providing that "the repeal shall not affect (a)
the previous operation of any such law, or (b) any
penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect
T9S3
Rao Shiv
s .. hadur Singli
and Anoth,,·.
(1) [1952] S. C. R. 71<"
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1197
of any offence.committed against any such law, or (c)
1963
any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in res- R sh·
pect of any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment, Baha~:r ;~ngh
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy and Another
may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such
v.
penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as .The State 0!
if this Act had not been passed.'' It is to be noticed Vindhya Pradesh.
that the saving provision applies equally to proceedings Jagannadhadas
previously commenced and then pending, whether
J.
before the special court or the ordinary 0ourt, and that
therefore in respect of two persons equally situated in
this behalf, one under trial by the ordinary court and
the other by the special court, the position continues
what it was before, i.e., the continuance of trial does
not involve any substantially discriminatory and prejudicial procedure. Learned counsel however attempted to argue that the very saving clause was a discriminatory provision and hence unconstitutional and
invalid. But there is no reason, \rhy pending proceedings cannot be treated by the legislature as a class
by themselves having regard to the exigencies of
the situation which such pendency itself calls for.
There can arise no question as to such a saving provision infringing article 14 so long as no scope is left
for any further discrimination inter se as between
persons affected by such pending matters.
The next and the only serious question that arises in
this case is with reference to the objections raised in
reliance on article 20 of the Constitution. This question arises from the fact that the charges as against
the two appellants, in terms, refer to the offences
committed as having been under the various sections
of the Indian Penal Code as adapted in the United
States of Vindhya Pradesh by Ordinance No. XLVIII
of 1949. This Ordinance was passed on llth September, 1949, while the offences themselves are said to
have been committed in the months of Fehrnary,
March and April, 1949, i.e., months prior to the Ordinance. It is nrged thernfore that the convictions in this
case which were after t lw Corrnhtution r"~nie. into fon'u
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[1953]
are in respect of an ex post facto law creiiting offences
after the commission of the acts charged as such
1-tao Shiv
This contention
llahadur Singh offences and hence unconstitutional.
and Another raises two important questions, vfa., (1) the proper
v.
construction of article 20 of the Constitution, and
The State 01 (2) whether the various acts in respect of which the
Viudhya I'radeBh. appellants were convicted constituted offences in this
Jagannruthadas area only from the date when Ordinance No. XLVIII
J.
of 1949 was passed or were already so prior thereto.
Article 20(1) of the Constitution is as follows:
"No person shall be convicted of any offence
except for violation of a law in force at the time of
the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor
be subjected to a penalty greater than that which
might have been inflicted under the law in force at the
time of the commission of the offence."
This article in its broad import has been enacted
to prohibit convictions and sentences under ex post facto
laws. The principle underlying such prohibition has
been very elaborately discussed and pointed out in the
very learned judgment of Justice 'Villes in the well
known case of Phillips v. Eyre(') and also by the
Supreme Court of U. S. A. in Calder v. Bull (2 ). In
the English case it is explained that ex post facto laws
are laws which voided and punished what had been
lawful when done. There can be no doubt as to the
paramount importance of the principle that such ea:
post facto laws, which retrospectively create offences
and punish them are bad as being highly inequitable
and unjust. In the English system of jurisprudence
repugnance of such laws to universal notions of fairness and justice is treated as a ground not for invalidating the law itself but as compelling a beneficent
construction thereof where the language of the statute
by any means permits it. In the American system,
however, such ex post facto laws are themselves rendered invalid by virtue of article l, sections ll and 10
of its Constitution. It is contended by the learned
Attorney-Genera! that article 20 of the Constitution
(1) (1870) 6Q.B.D. 1, at 13 and 25.
(2) 3 Dallas 386; I Lav.', Edition 64S at 649 1
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1199
was meant t<> bring about nothing more than the
i:i.; 3
invalidity of such ex post facto laws in the post-Con.
. d b ut t h at t he vaI'd'
Raa Sim•
st ~'tu t'~on per10
1 1ty of t h e pre- Con- JJahadur
Sinylt
stitut10n laws in this behalf was not intended to be and Another
affected in any way. The case in Keshavan 1vladhavan
v.
11lenon v. The 8tate of Bombay (1 ) has been relied on to 2'he state of
show that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Vindhya Pradesh·
the Constitution have no retrospective operation, and J -dhad08
that the invalidity of laws brought about by article 13 agan~;.
(1) of the Constitution relates only to the future operation of the pre-Constitution laws which are in violation of the fundamental rights. On this footing it
was argued that even on the assumption of the convictions in this case being in respect of new offences
created by Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 after the
commission of the offences charged, the fundamental
right guaranteed under article 20 is not attracted
thereto so as to invalidate such convictions.
This contention, however, cannot be upheld. On a
careful consideration of the respective articles, one is
struck by the marked difference in language used in
the Indian and American Constitutions. Sections9(3)
and 10 of article 1 of the American Constitution
merely say that "No ex post facto law shall be
passed ... " and "No State shall pass ex post facto
law .... " But in article 20 of the Indian Constitution
the language used is in much wider terms, and what
is prohibited is the conviction of a person or his
subjection to a penalty under ex post fa.eta laws. The
prohibition under the article is not confined to the
passing or the validity of the law, but extends to the
conviction pr the sentence and is based on its
character as an ex post facto law. The fullest effect
must therefore be given to the actual words used in
the article. Nor does such a construction of article 20
result in giving retrospective operation to the fundamental right thereby recognised. All that it amounts
to is that the future operation of the fundamental
right declared in article 20 may also in certain cases
(1) [I95I] S.C. R. 2'8.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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result from acts and situations which.had their commencement in the pre-Constitution period. In The
Rao Shlv
CJ
Bahadur Singh Queen v. St. Mary Whitechapel (1) Lord Denman . .
and Another pointed out that a statute which in its direct operation
v.
is prospective cannot properly be ealled a retrospeetive
The State of statute because a part of the requisites for its action is
Vindhya Prade•h. drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. The
.Jagannadhadas general principle therefore that the fundamental rights
J.
have no retrospective operation is not in any way
affected by giving the fullest effect to the wording of
article 20. This article must accordingly be taken to
prohibit all convictions or subjections to penalty after
the Constitution in respect of ex post facto Jaws
whether the same was a post-Constitution law or I!- preConstitution law. That such is the intendment of the
wording used in article 20 ( l) is confirmed by the
similar wording used in articles 20 (2) and 20 (3).
Under article 20 (2), for instance, it cannot be reasonably urged that the prohibitioE of double jeopardy
applies only when both the occasions therefor arise after
the Constitution. Similarly, under article 20 (3) it
cannot be suggested that a person accused before the
Constitution can be compelled to be a witness against
himS<Jlf, if after the Constitution ~he case is pending.
In this context it is necessary to notice that what
is prohibited under article 20 is only conviction or
sentence under an ex post fatto law and not the trial
thereof. Such trial under a procedure different from
what obtained at the time of the commission of the
offence or by a court different from that which had
competence at the time cannot ipso facto be held
to be unconstitutional. A person accused of the
commission of an offence has no fundam~ntal right to
trial by a particular court or by a particular procedn 1·e,
except in so far as any constitutional objt:iction by
way of discrimination or the violation of any other
fundamental right may be involved.
In this connection our attent.ion has been drawn
to the fact that the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance
XLVIII of· 1949, though enacted on 11th September,
1953
(1) u6 E.H. 8n at 814.
•
\
•
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SUPREME COURT REPOR'rs
1201
1963
1949, i.e., aft~r the alleged offences were committed,
was in terms made retrospective by section 2 of the Rao Shiv
said Ordinance which says that the Act " shall be Bahadur Singh
deemed to have been in force in Vindhya Pradesh and Another
from the 9th day of August, 1948," a date long prior
v.
to the date of the commission of the offonces. It was .2'he State 0!
accordingly suggested that since such a law at the Vindhya Pradesh.
time when it was passed was a valid law and since this Jayannadluula•
law had the effect of bringing this Ordinance into
J.
force from 9th August, 1949, it cannot be said that
the convictions are not ·in respect of "a law in force"
at the time when the offences were committed. This,
however, would be to import a somewhat technical
meaning into the phrase "law in force" as used in
article 20. "Law in force" referred to therein must be
taken to relate not to a law "deemed" to be in force
and thus brought into force but the law factually in
operation at the time or what may be called the then
existing law. Otherwise, it is clear that the whole
purpose of article 20 would be completely defeated in
its application even to ex post facto laws passed after
the Constitution. Every such ex post facto law can be
made retrospective, as it must be, if it is to regulate
acts committed before the actual passing of the Act,
and it can well be urged that by such retrospective
operation it becomes the law in force at the time of
the commencement of the Act. It is obvious that
such a construction which nullifies article 20 cannot
possibly be adopted. It cannot therefore be doubted
that the phrase "law in force" as used in article 20
must be understood in its natural sense as being the
law in fact in existence and in operation a.t the time of
the commission of the offence as distinct from the law
"deemed" to have become operative by virtue of the
power of legislature to pass retrospective laws. It
follows that if the :>ppellants are able to substantiate
their contention that the acts charged as offences in
this case have become such only by virtue of Ordinance No. XL VIII of 1949 which has admittedly been
passed subsequent to the commission thereof, then
they would be entitled to the benefit of article 20 of
•
,
•
. i202
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
the Constitution and to have their oonvictions set
aside.
This ] leads to an examination of the relevant
R <to Shiv
• •
Bahadur Singh pre-ex1stmg aw.
and Anather
But before taking up that examination, it is conv.
venient to deal with a. contention which has been rev· ~~' s;ie;J h peatedly pressed on us, viz., that the validity of the
in ·ya ra " ·convictions in this case cannot be upheld on a conJagannadha<ias sideration of the pre-existing state of law, because
J.
(1) the charges are specifically with reference to the
offences under Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949, and (2)
the said Ordinance itself has repealed the pre-existing
law. This contention is, however, without any substance. An examination of the pre-existing state of
law in this behalf as on the date of the commission of
the offence is not for the purpose of converting the
convictions under Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 into
those under the previous Jaw. The convictions in this
case are clearly and legally referable only to Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949, which was the law applicable to the offence at the tir.ae of the commission
thereof on account of the retrospective operation
validly given to that law by section 2 of the Ordinance.
It is only for the purpose of considering the constitutional validity of those convictions that the factual
position as regards the previous law in this behalf becomes necessary to be examined. This is a
question which arises on the contention of the appellants themselves, and is not an objection to the frame
of the charge or the legality of the conviction othe1'wise than on the footing of constitutional invalidity.
Nor is there any question of prejudice involved, since
that question has been raised on behalf of the appellants in the trial court itself, and the burden of
making out the facts requisite fur the constitutional
invalidity of the convictions is on them.
The argument that on the very terms of 0l'Clinance No. XLVIII of 1949 there is no pre-existing law
with reference to which the constitutionality of the
convictions under article 20 is to be judged is based on
8ections 2 and 3 (I) of the said Ordinance, which run
as follows:
1953
.
•
\
•
S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COUitT REPOitTS
•
1203
1953
Section 2: !'The Indian Penal Code as in force
generally in the Provinces of India immediately before
the commencement
of. this Ordinance shall . applv,
and B a 1Bado
Sh fo
.
.
J
1a ur 3 zng 11
shall be 111 force 111 V111dhya Pradesh, subject to the and Anothc;
adaptation and modifications set out in the Schedule,
v.
and the said Code as so applied shall be deemed to The State of
have been in force in Vindhya Pradesh from the 9th Vindhya PradCBli.
day of August, 1948."
,J agannadhadaa
J.
Section 3 (1 ): "If immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance there is in force .in
Vindhya Pradesh or any part thereof any law corresponding to the Indian Penal Code, such law is hereby
repealed."
It is urged that as a result of these two provisions
the pre-existing law, if any, has been repealed as from
9th August, 1948, and that therefore the period between 9th August, 1948, and 11th September, 1949, on
•
which date Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 came into
force must be taken to be a period of no penal law in
this territory for judging the constitutionality of any
conviction subsequent to 11th September, 1949, for an
alleged offence committed during that period. This
argument is self-contradictory, and proceeds on
misconception. What is relevant for the application
of article 20 is not the result brought about by repeal
and the retrospective operation thereof, but the factual
state of law as it existed prior to the date when the
repeal came into operation. The repeal itself posits
the pre-existence of the law, and it is that law which
is relevant for our present purpose.
It therefore becomes necessary to examine in some
detail what was the criminal law factually in force
during the months of February, March and April, 1949,
when the acts charged as offences against the appellants were committed, and to see whether it was anything different from what wa.s enacted by Ordinance
No. XLVIII of 1949. Since the valid existence of such
law has been, in the course of the arguments, contended as depending on the administrative set-up at the
relevant period ancl the legiRlative authority·functioning
•
f,
•
1204
SUPRENIE COVRT REPOR'l'S
[1953]
in that set-up, it becomes necessary. to have a
Rao Shiv
correct appreciation of the events which resulted in
BahadurSinuh bringing about a United State of Vindhya Pradesh.
and Another
The State ofVindhya Pradesh consists of as many
"·
as 35 pre-existing native States known as Bundelkhand
8101 0
,,, Tdhle P 'a f and Baghhelkand States of which the State of Rewa
1
•in iya '" e.n
. I mme d'iate1y a f ter
was apparent1y t he 1argest umt.
JauannarlhadaB the passing of the Indian Independence Act of 1947
J,
which by virtue of section 7 thereof resulted in the
lapse of the suzerainty of the British Government in
India, these various States executed in favour of the
Government of India Instruments of Accession under
section 6 of the Government of India Act in accordance
with the form which is found at pages 165 and 169 of
the White Paper on Indian States issued by the
Government of India in March 1951. At about the
same time they executed also standstill agreements as
•
per form given at page 173 of the W'hite Paper.
Shortly thereafter and in pursuance of the policy of
the Government of India all these 35 States executed,
with the concurrence of the Government of India, an
inter se Covenant dated 18th March, 1948, for the
establishment of a UnitedState ofVindhyaPradesh comprising the territories of these 35 States with a common
executive, legislature and judiciary. That Covenant
provided for common administrative arrangements
and for the election of a Rajpramukh. Article 9 of
the Covenant vested in the Rajpramukh the entire
legislative authority of the United State of Vindhya
Pradesh until a Constitution to be framed by the
appropriate body for the said United State ofVindhya
Pradesh provided otherwise. The Maharajah of Rewa
became the first Rajpramukh of the United State of
Vindhya Pradesh, and we are informed that though
the Covenant provided the 1st day of May, 1948, as
the date within which the administration is 'to be
made over to the Rajpramukh by each of the States,
some did not, and that, as a fact, the integrated
administration by the Rajpramukh in respect of all
States came into operation only from the 9th of
August, 1948. j\1eanwhile, however, it appears to have
1953
•
\
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1205
been thought.expedient that a fresh Instrument of
1953
Accession shoul~ be executed b.y the Rajpramukh on Rao Shiv
behalf of the Umted State of Vmdhya Pradesh replac. Bahadur Singh
ing the individual Instruments of Accession which and Another
were executed in the months of August, September,
v.
October and Novemb~r, 1947. Consequently a fres? Vi:::::v:;;:;;sh.
Instrument of Access10n was executed by the RaJpramukh on behalf of the United State of Vindhya Jagannadhadas
Pradesh on the 20th of July, 1948, and was accepted
J.
by the Governor-General of India on the 13th of
September, 1949. It may be incidentally mentioned
that one of the important differences between the previous individual Instruments of Accession executed
by the various rulers and the later Instrument of
Accession executed by the Rajpramukh is that while
under the former, accession was only in respect of
three matters, viz., Defence, External Affairs and
Communications, under the later Instrument dated
the 20th of July, 1948, all matters enumerated in Lists
Nos. I and III of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, were accepted as the matters
in respect of which the legislature of India, then called
the Dominion Legislature, might make laws for the
United State of Vindhya Pradesh. It may also be
mentioned that on the 25th November, 1949, the Rajpramukh of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh
issued a proclamation whereby he declared that the
Constitution of India which was then shortly to be
adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall be
the Constitution for the Vindhya Pradesh as for the
other parts of India and specifically superseded and
abrogated all other constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith which were then in force in this State.
These arrangements brought about an integrated
United State of Vindhya Pradesh within the frame·
work vf the Dominion of India but only by way of
accession. Further steps, however, had the effect of
merging these United States as part of the territory of
India. It is unnecessary to notice those steps in
detail, as they fall beyond the period with which we
ii.re concerned for the present purpose.
156
•
I
•
1206
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
It is against this background of events constituting
the integration of these various ruler S'tates into the
B ~a; Sh;~ z "Cnited State of Vindhya Pradesh within the Union of
;,,',; ;;, ,;~;' India by accession thereto that the question as to what
0
v.
was the criminal law in force by February, March and
The State of April, 1949, has got to be judged.
From the above
Vindhya P'"desh. narration it will be noticed that at the relevant period
---;
it was the Government of the United State of Vindhya
J agannadaadas p
'
· t egra t'10n Cove·
J
ra desh consti't ut ed b y t h e inter
se m
.
nant dated the 18th March, 1948, that was functioning under the authority of the Rajpramukh of
Vindhya Pradesh and subject to the Instrument of
Accession with the Dominion of India executed by
him on the 20th July, 1948. As already stated, the
actual integrated administration under these arrangements came into operation for the entire United State
only on the 9th of August, 1948.
We may now start with the fact above noticed that
the various component States became the "Cnited
State of Vindhya Pradesh on the 18th March, 1948.
In the normal course and in the absence of any
attempts to introduce uniform legislation throughout
the State the pre-existing laws of the various component States would continue to be in force on the
well-accepted principle laid down by the Privy Council
in .Mayor of Lyons v. East India Company('). The
first step towards the introduction of some uniformity
in the laws for the entire State was taken by the Rajpramukh by issuing on the 31st July, 1948, an Ordinance styled the Vindhya Pradesh Application of Laws
Ordinance No. IV of 1948. Section 2 of that Ordinance provided as follows :"All Acts, Codes, Ordinances and other laws, and
rules and regulations made thereunder, which have, by
publication in the Rewa Raj Gazette, been enforced in
the Rewa State, and continue to be in force, are
extended so as to be applicable to the whole of
Vindhya Pradesh, Provided that nothing in this
clause shall apply to any local law, rules, regulation or
custom having the force of law, which relates to
matters connected with land revenue or tenancy."
1953
(1) 1 M.I.A. 175, at 270 1 271.
•
'
••
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
i207
This Ordin~nce extended to the whole of Vindhya
19.53
Pradesh, and was to come into force with effect from
the 9th ?f August, 1948, by virtue of section 1 there?f. Ba:a~u~,~~ngh
The Ordmance was amended later by another Ordm- and Another
ance No. XX of 1949 which deleted from section 2
v.
of the previous Ordinance the words "by publication The State of
in the Rewa Raj Gazette". The effect of these two VindhyaPradesh.
Ordinances, so far as we are concerned, was to extend J --:;h0 d
to the entire State of Vindhya Pradesh the criminal agan";_ as
law which was in force previously in the Rewa State.
That law is to be found by reference to Orders Nos. IV
of 1921 and VI of 1922 issued by the then Regent of
Rewa acting for the Maharajah on the 18th February,
1921, and 9th March, 1922, respectively. A perusal of
these two Orders and in particular of paragraph 10
of the 1921 Order as interpreted by the 1922 Order
makes it perfectly clear "that the Indian Penal Code
and the Code of Criminal Procedure were introduced
in the Rewa 8tate, in the letter and in the spirit with
due adaptation to local conditions.'' It is not disputed
that this continued to be the position so far as Rewa
State was concerned until the United State ofVindhya
Pradesh was formed. It follows that the Indian Penal
Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure with necessary adaptations were bro\jght into operation in the
entire Pnited State of Vindhya Pradesh shortly after
the introduction of the integrated administration under
the Rajpramukh.
It has been urged, however, that though this may
have been the intention, the intention did not become
operative for reasons to be presently stated. Section
2 of Ordinance No. IV of 1948 while extending the laws
of Rewa State to the rest of Vindhya Pradesh refers
to the publication of such laws in the Rewa Gazette as
<t requisite therefor, and it is pointed out that the Rewa
Gazette itself came into existence only in October 1930
( vide page 386 of the printed paper book), whereas the
Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code were
brought into operation in the Rewa State in 1921 and
1922. lt is also pointed out that the deletion of the
(
•
1208
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
requirement of previous publication in the Rewa
Gazette by Ordinance No. XX of 1949 caine into operRao Shiv
.
1 h th at 0 r d'mance was pu bl'ts jied m
, t he
Bahadu,· Singh at10n on y w en
and Another Vindhya Pradesh Gazette, i.e., on the 15th May, 1949,
v.
sometime after the commission of the offence in this
. The Slate vf case. To substantiate the view that only such of the
Vmdhya Prade8/i. Rewa laws which were previously published in the
Rewa Gazette were understood as having been origiJ
agmmadhadas
J
na11y ex t en d ed t o v·mdhya p ra desh by 0 r d'mance No.
·
lV of 1948, a decision of the Vindhya Pradesh High
Court dated the 29th October, 1949, in Criminal Appeal
No. 27 has been brought to our notice which assumes
that the Prisoners' Act in force in India was not in
force in Vindhya Pradesh as there was no previous
publication of it in the Rewa Gazette. On the other side
a notification of Vindhya Pradesh Government dated
the 19th March, 1949, and published in the Vindhya
Pradesh Gazette dated the 30th ;\Iarch, 1949, has been
brought to our notice which specifically mentions all the
laws by then in force in Vindhya Pradesh and shows
"Indian Penal Code-mutatis mutandis-with necessary adaptations" as item 86 thereof. This is relied on
to show that there must have been a previous publication thereof in the Rewa Gazette before integration,
There seems to be considerable force in this argument
that in respect of the vari~s Rewa State laws which
have been enumerated in the above-mentioned Gazette
as having been brought into force in Vindhya Pradesh
(some of these are Acts prior to 1930) there must have
been previous publication in the Rewa Gazette .sometime after 1930, and that neither Ordinance No. XX
of 1949 nor the decision of Vindhya Pradesh High
Court relating to Prisoners' Act (which is not one enumerated in the above Gazette) can be taken to negative it. We are prima f acie inclined to accept this
view and to think that tho Indian Penal Code as in
force in Rewa became extended to Vindhya Pradesh
by Ordinance No. IV of 1948. But even assuming that
section 2 of the Ordinance failed to achieve its purpose on
account of misconception as to the previous publication
of any particular Rewa law in the Rewa Gazette,
1953
•
'
•
s.c.:R.
SUP.REME COURT REPORTS
1209
it is clear that that Rewa law would continue to be in
1953
force in the Rew'a portion
of
the
United
State
ofVindhya
R S' .
.
ao 1iiv
Pradesh, as the Vmdhya Pradesh law therefor, on the Bahadar Singh
principle recognised in 1ffoyor of Lyons v. East India and Another.
Company (1 ), that on change of sovereignty over an
v.
inhabited territory the pre-existing laws continue to .1'he Staie of
be in force until duly altered. Since in the present Vindhya Prad,,h.
case we are concerned with offences committed in rela- Jagannadhadas
tion to the Rewa State portion of Vindhya PraJ.
desh, there can be no reasonable difficulty in holding that the criminal law of Itewa State, i.e., the
lndian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code
with adaptations mutatis mutandis, was the relevant
law for our present purpose by the date of integrated
administration, viz., the 9th August, 194.8.
Now the subsequent alterations therein by Ordinances of the Rajpramukh may be shortly noticed. So
far as the substantive penal law is concerned, there
was the Anti-corruption Ordinance ~o. XII of 1948
dated the 16th December, 1948, and the Indian Penal
Code (Application to Vindhya Pradesh) Ordinance No.
XLVIII of 1949 dated the 11th September, 1949. The
former being prior to the dates of commission of the
offences in the present case does not require any further notice. So far as the Criminal Procedure Code is
concerned, there were two Ordinances: (1) the Criminal
Procedure Code Adaptation Ordinance .N"o. XV of 1948
dated the 31st December, 1948, and (2) the Criminal
Procedure Code Adaptation (Amendment) Ordinance
~u. XXVII of 1949 dated the 3rd May, 1949. In view
of what has been found above, viz., that by virtue of
the Orders of the Regent of Rewa dated 1921 and 1922
the Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code
with the necessary adaptations rnutatis mutandis were
in force in Itewa 8tate and either became extended to
the entire Vindhya Pradesh State from the 9th August,
1948, by Ordinance :N"u. IV of 1948 or continued tu be
in force in the ltcwa portion ofVindhya Pratlesh State
hy virtue of the principle in "vlayor of Lyons' case (1 ) it is
prima fac·ie correct to say that the penal law in force
(r) 1 M. I. A. 175 •
•
•
1210
SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
(1953]
in the relevant area was substantially ,the same both
before and after the above-mentioned amendments
Rao Shiv
d b h R .
kh .
Bahadur Singh ma e y t e aJprarnu
and Another
It is urged however that in two important respects
v.
relevant for our present. purpose there is a difference.
1
Vi~~;,v~ ;:01,,h. It is poin~e.d out ~hat th~re is an amendment. as regards
·_
the defimt10n of "public servant" by Ordmance No.
Jagannadhadas XL VIII of 1949. It is also urged that sections 3 and
J.
4 of the Indian Penal Code and section 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which are extra-territorial in
operation could not have been brought into force into
Rewa or Vindhya Pradesh by adaptation or legislation
for lack of legislative competence in this behalf at the
relevant times. The points thus raised assume importance since the cha.rges against the fiIBt appellant, who
is a Minister, is in his capacity as a public servant and
since also one of the charges against him is in respect
of acts done in New Delhi-completely outside Vindhya
Pradesh. It is true that Ordinance No. XLVIII of
1949 amended the Indian Penal Code by substituting
for the previous first clause of section 21 thereof relating to the definition of a "public servant" the phrase
"Every Minister of State". But it does not follow that
"a Minister of State" was not a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code even before
this amendment. Clause 9 of section 21, Ind,an Penal
Code, shows that every officer in the service or pay of
the Crown for the performance of any public duty is a
"public servant". The decision of the Privy Council in
King-Ernperor v. Sibnath Banerji(') is decisive to show
that a Minister under the Government of India Act is
"an officer" subordinate to the Governor. On the same
reasoning there can be no doubt that the Minister of
Vindhya Pradesh would be an "officer" of the State of
Vindhya Pradesh. Therefore, prior to the p:1ssing of
Ordinance No. XL VIII of 1H49 and on the view that
the Indian Penal Code with necess0-ry ad:1ptations
inutatis rnutandis was in force at least in the Rewa portion of Vindhya Pmdesh (if not in the entirety of
VindhyaPradesh) the first :1ppellant was a public servant
1953
(r) (1945] F. C.R. 195 at 222.
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1211
1953
as defined in section 21, Indian Penal Code, as adapted.
about there- Ilao Shiv
The amendment of the said section bro112:ht
,_,
fore no substantial change in the position of the first Bahadur Singh
appellant. It has been faintly suggested that, even so, and Another
under the pre-existing law the definition of public serv.
vant could have reference only to an officer of the . The State of
Rewa State, and that the change brought about by VnidhyaPmdesh.
Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 made only the Minister JagannadhadM
of Vindhya Pradesh State a public servant. This argu.1.
ment is fallacious. It is implicit in the continuance of
Rewa law after integration that from the moment of
such continuance it became the Vindhya Pradesh law
for the Rewa portion of Vindhya Pradesh territory
with the requisite implied adaptation consonant to the
new set-up. There is therefore no substance in the
argument that the amendment of section 21, Indian
Penal Code, by Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 brought
about any change in the situation of the first appellant
as a public servant.
The furthAr qirnstion that remains to be considered
is whether under the Vindhya Pradesh law, acts committed outside the State are offences and are triable by
Vindhya Pradesh courts, and whether in any case
there was any such law in factual operation at the date
when the acts charged as offences in this case were
committed at New Delhi in April, 1949. Under the
normal Indian law the relevant legislative provisions
are sections 3 and 4, Indian Penal Code, and section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, and the question is whether by express or implied adaptation
rnutatis mutandis these sections can be held to have
been validly in force in Vindhya Pradesh at thA
relevant period. It is contended that the rulers of
native States had no authority for extra-territorial
legislation, and that consequently any adaptation in
this behalf cannot be implied and if expressly purporting
to be made, cannot be valid. There can be no doubt
that the provisions of the Penal Code and the Criminal
Procedure Code are in the nature of extra-territorial
legislation, and that every sovereign legislative authority has the power to pass such laws also. [See Macleod
•
•
•
1212
SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
v. Attorney-General for New South ,Wales(')]. In
the present case we are concerned only with that porRao Shiv
tion of the releYant extra-territorial law which renders
Bahadur Singh
and Another an act committed hy a subject of the State outside the
v.
limits of the State •tn offence triable by the courts of
2'he State of the State. In 1he course of the arguments it has
Vindhya Pradesh. been suggested that to that limited extent no question
· -of extra-territori::dity of the relevant legislation arises.
Jagan;adhodas But the concept of extra-territorial legislation appears
·
to comprehend such cases also, if the passages relied on
before us from Pitt-Gobbet's International Law, 5th
Edition, at page 216 as also at pages 225 and 226paragraphs l.01 and 102, are to be accepted as correct.
Assuming without deciding that this is so, the argument has been advanced that no ruler of the Indian
States, before the 15th August, 1947, and much less
the Rajpramukh of Vindhya Pradesh, had any such
full sovereign status as to entitle them to pass extraterritorial laws. It is well-known that these rulers
had no external sovereignty, as it was taken out of
them and exercised by the suzerain British power.
But for internal purposes or municipal purposes the
rulers were generally considered as having full sovereign status except to the extent that the suzerain
power assumed to itself any function of such internal
sovereignty either on specific occasions, or generally
but for specified and limited purposes. In their relation with the rulers of the native States, the suzerain
British power acted on the juristic theory propounded
by Sir Henry Maine that "sovereignty is divisible,
though independence is not"-See Ilbert's Government
of India, page 425-a theory accepted in the Butler
Committee Report on Indian States (1928-29) at page
25, paragraph 44. The pitssages at pages 398, 399 and
426 of Ilbert's Government; of India would show that
what may have been left of internal sovereignty <;o a
particular ruler may in exceptional mises be nothing
more than titular. The general position of these
Native States in India prior to 15th August, 194 7,
appears fairly clearly from certain instructive passages at pages 422 and 423 of Ilbert and is correlative
1953
(r) [1891] A.C. 455,
I
••
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1213
195-3
·to the actual a.xercise of British jurisdiction within
those States as appears from the following pas- J{ao Shiv
sages:Bahadur Singh
"In point of fact the jurisdiction of the Governor- and Another
v.
General in Council within the territories of Native
The State of
States is exercisedV indhya Pradesh.
(a) over European British subjects in all cases;
(b) over native Indian subjects in certain cases; Jagannadhadas
J.
(c) over all classes of persons, British or foreign,
within certain areas.
It is the policy of the Government of India not to
allow native courts to exercise jurisdiction in the case
of European British subjects but to require them
either to be tried by the British courts established in
the Native State, or to be sent for trial before a court
in British India.
The Government of India does not claim similar
exclusive jurisdiction over native Indian subjects of
His Majesty when within Native States, but doubtless
would assert jurisdiction over such persons in cases
where it thought the assertion necessary ............ "
"The Government of India does not, except within
specified areas, or under special circumstances, such
as during the minority of a native prince, take 9ver
or interfere with the jurisdiction of the courts of a
Native State in cases affecting only the subjects of
that State, but leaves such cases to be dealt with by
the native courts in accordance with native laws."
Lee Warner in his book on "Protected Princes of
India" states the position at pages 351 and 352. The
following extract from paragraph 143 at page 351 is
instructive :
"But where, as in the case of European British
subjects, material distinctions in religion, education,
11nd social habits separate them from the native community, and justify the extension to them of those
rights of ex-territoriality, which are still obtained for
them by C11pitulations a,nd agreements with foreign
157
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
IP63
[1953]
non-Christian nations, these distinctiol'.l$ are absent in
the case of nat!ve ~nd!an s~bjects ?f ~er Majesty. T~e
Bahadur 8 ingh systems of native Justice, if not s1mtlar to those m
and Anot11e; British territory, are more or less assimilated, and prov.
vided that the trial of native Indian subjects by the
The State of ordinary tribunals of the States, whose laws thev have
Vindh!fn Praae.,h. offended, is supervised by the British agent, the
Jnryn,,:,dhana 8 general rule is to leave to the Native States jurisd:ction
·
J.
over such British subjects who break their laws, even
where the offence committed is also cognisable under
the law of India. The British Government goes still
farther, since it extradites to the Native State a native
Indian subject, who, after the commission of an extraditable offence in the Native principality, seeks shelter
in British territory, provided that the political agent
is satisfied that the crime can be properly tried in the
courts of the Native State. The powers of the sovereigns of the States, in respect of the trial of native
Indian subjects, have been generally classified. Some
chiefs can try any person, whether their own or a
native Indian subject, for a capital offence without
express permission; others can only try a native Indian
subject for such an offence with permission.; and
others, again, cannot pass a final sentence of death
without the confirmation of Government to it."
These passages, while showing that the extent of the
exercise of internal sovereignty by each of these rulers
in actual practice, is a matter for evidence, when called
in quest.ion, indicate that full jurisdiction over the
rulers' own subjects was never denied but generally
conceded, except where a sentence of death was involved. There is therefore no reason at all to think that
the rulers had no authority to pass laws binding their
own subjects and regulating their own courts in respect of acts committed outside their State assuming
such laws to be extra-territorial. In this context an
old treaty of 1813 between Rewa State and the British
Government and a fairly recent judgment of the Rewa
High Court in 1945 have been brought to our notice
to show the contrary at least so far as Rewa State is
concerned. The treaty is to be found at page 255 of
Hao Shiv
•
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
12i5
Volume V of i\itchison's Treaties, ~ngagements and
19~3
Sanads. Article 6 thereof which is relied on only pro- R
.
. ,.ror th e suzeram
. Government to ,.1011ow Bahadur
aoShw
v1'des f ac il'1t1es
Singh
and pursue into Rewa State, offenders who having and Another
committed offences in British India escape away into
v.
the State. This does not negative the authority of .The State of
the Rewa State to enact legislation concerning its own Vindhya Prad..h.
subjects when they commit such o~ences outside the Jagannadhad«>
State. 1945 Rewa Law Reports 84 1s no doubt a case
;1,
in which the High Court assumed that the court had
no jurisdiction to try an offence committed outside
the State by a subject of the State. There is no discussion in the judgment of the question involved, and
this single instance is not enough to make out either
the absence of the State's legislative authority in this
behalf or the factual non-existence of the relevant
law.
It must therefore be held that the rulers of the
native State~ had prior to 1947, the authority to pass
extra-territorial laws relating to offences committed by
their own subjects and vesting in their own courts the
power to try them, except where the contrary is made
out by evidence in the case of any individual State,
and that so far at least as Rewa State is concerned,
the contrary cannot be held to have been proved.
The further point that has been raised is that whatever may be the position of the Rewa State before
1947 the attempt of the Rajpramukh of the State of
Vindhya Pradesh in so far as he purported to extend
the extra-territorial portion of any of the Rewa laws to
Vindhya Pradesh by Ordinances Nos. IV of 1948 and
XX of 1949 and his attempt to introduce into Vindhya Pradesh the extra-territorial portion of the
Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code
by Ordinances Nos. XLVIII of 1949 and XXVIII of
1949 respectively, must fail as he had no such authority for extra-territorial legislation with reierence
to the basic covenants from which his authority
was derived. These basic covenants are as ah·eady
above shown the inter se integration ·agreement
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
dated 18th March, 1948, executed by aJl the rulers of
Rao Shiv
the component States .of Vindhya Pradesh and the
/Jahadnr Singh Instrument of Access10n da,ted 20th July, 1948,
and Another executed by the Rajpramukh in favour of the
v.
Dominion of India. Under the inter se integration
. The State of agreement and by article IX, clause (3)
thereof,
ViitdhyaPradesh. the Rajpramukh was vested with the power to
Jagannadhadas make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace
.f.
and good government of the United State of Vindhya
Pradesh or of any part thereof. Under the Instrument
of Accession and by clause (3) thereof the Rajpramukh
accepted all matters enumerated in Lists I and III of
the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act,
1935, as matters in respect of which the Dominion
Legislature may make laws for the United State. It
has been strenuously argued before us that in view of
these provisions the authority of the Rajpramukh for
legislation was in substance reduced to the powers of
the Provincial Legislature within the framework of the
Constitution of India as it then was. Section 6, subsection (1), of the Indian Independence Act and section
99(2) as amended are relied on to show that the Provincial Legislature has no power to make extra-territorial laws. It is accordingly argued that the Rajpramukh had no power at least after the execution of the
Instl'ument of Accession to amend or adapt the Indian
Penal Code or the Criminal Procedure Code so as to
bring into opera tion sections 3 and 4, Indian Penal Code,
and section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, with the
necessary modifications in the State of Vindhya
Pradesh. Though this argument appears plausible, a
careful scrutiny of the scheme of the integration and
accession covenants as also of the relevant provisions
of the Government of India Act and the Indian Independence Act shows clearly that such an argument is
not tenable. The provisions under the Government of
India Act under which the Instrument of Accession
has been executed keep the position of the Provinces
distinct from the position of the acceding States.
Section 5(1) of the Government of India Act while
making the Provinces as well as the acceding States,
lJJJ
•
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s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1217
part of the Pominion of India enumerates the two
19.53
under separate categories by clauses (a) and (b). Sub- Rao Shiv
section (2) of section 6 specifically provided that,
Bahadur Singh
"An Instrument of Accession shall specify the and Another
matters which the Ruler accepts as matters with res- h v.
pect to which the Federal Legislature may make laws
s~te 1 h
for his State, and the limitations, if any, to which the
Y~._:_" " ·
power of the Federal Legislature to make laws for his Jagannadhadas
State, and the exercise of the executive authority of
J.
the Federation in his State, are respectively to be
subject."
Section 101 of the Government of India Act in, terms
says that,
"Nothing in the Act shall be construed as empowering the Federal Legislature to make laws for a
Federated State otherwise than in accordance with
the Instrument of Accession of that State and any
limitation contained therein."
If the argument put forward by the appellants'
counsel is correct, viz., that the mere reference to the
legislative items in respect of which the Dominion
Legislature could make laws applicable to the State of
Vindhya Pradesh as Lists I and III carried with it the
necessary implication that the Dominion Legislature
alone had the power to make laws for the State with
extra-territorial operation, and to that extent therefore curtailed the legislative authority of the Rajpramukh, it would be tantamount to the importation of
all the limitations under sections 99 to 104 into the
Instrument of Accession. This would be contrary to
section 101 of the Government of India Act. There is
no justification for such a view merely because of the
reference to the enumerated items as Lists I and III
which may have been a matter of convenience for
reference. On the other hand, the Instrument of
Accession in terms states by clause 9 as follows :
"Save as provided by or under this Instrument
nothing contained in this Instrument shall affect the
exercise of any power, authority and rights.enjoyed by
the Rajpramukh or the validity of any law for the
v;'!:a:
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
time being in force in the United State, or any part
thereof."
Rao Shiv
Bahadur Singh
The authority of the Rajpramukh which is referred
and Another to in this clause is not only the unfettered legislative
The ;1~ 1 , of authority "to make and promulgate Ordinances for
VindhyaPradesh. the peace and good government of the United States
_
or any part thereof" vested in him by Article IX of
Jagannadhadas the integration Covenant dated 18th March, 1948, but
J.
also that which is vested in him under article VI of the
said agreement. This article vests in him "all rights,
authority, and jurisdiction belonging to the ruler of
each Covenanting State and incidental to the government thereof." There can be no doubt therefore that
if, as has been pointed out above, the various Cov.
enanting States and in particular the State of Rewa,
had the power to pass extra-territorial laws at least to
the extent of making certain acts committed outside
the State by its subjects as offences and to vest in the
State courts authority to deal with such offences, that
power has not in any way been cmtailed either by the
integration Covenant or the Instrument of Accession.
It follows therefore that sections 3 and 4, Indian Penal
Code, and section 188, Criminal Procedure Code, at
least in so far as it affected the subjects and courts of
the State, were entirely within the legislative competence of the States concerned for all purposes of
adaptation or amendments.
1953
•
Now, so far as sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Penal
Code are concerned, the amendment brought about by
Ordinance No. XLVIII of 1949 is nothing more and
nothing less than a mere adaptation of these sections
for the new set-up and this, as shown above, was
exactly the law already in force without formal
amendment. Hence it would follow that the conviction of the appellants in respect of all the offences of
which they are charged including the extra-territorial
offence said to have been committed by the first appellant at New Delhi is not open to the objection under
article 20 on the ground that it. is a conviction under
an ex post facto law .
•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1953
As regards t,he amendments in th\l Criminal Procedure Code brought about .by Ordinances Nos. XV of Rao Shiv
1948 dated the 31st December, 1948, and XXVII of Bahad'" Singh
1949 dated the 3rd May, 1949, no detailed considera- and Another
tion is necessary in view of what has been held at the
v.
outset that the constitutional objection under arti- v::a~.::~~;{.h.
cle 20 does not apply to a change in procedure or
change of court. Items 62 and 63 of section 2 of JagannadhadM
Ordinance No. XV of 1948 would seem to indicate
J.
that the jurisdiction which the criminal courts of
Vindhya Pradesh previously had to try extra-territorial offences was probably lost thereby. If so, that
jurisdiction was restored under Ordinance XXVII of
1949 by the amendment thereby of the said items 62
and 63 thus bringing it into line with section 188,
Criminal Procedure Code, with the requisite adaptations. Hence the power of the Vindhya Pradesh
courts to hold trials for extra-territorial offences which
was probably interrupted from 31st December, 1948,
was restored on 3rd May, 1949, before the trial in this
case commenced with retrospective operation, i.e.,
as from the date of the prior Orclinance, i.e., 31st
December, 1948.
In the result, we hold that (1) The appeal to
the Judicial Commissioner from the acquittal by the
Special Judge was competent; (2) The trial of the
appellants under the Vindhya Pradesh Criminal Law
Amendment (Special Courts) Ordinance No. V of 1949
is not open to objection under article 14 of the Constitution; (3) The criminal law relating to the offences
charged against the appellants at the time of their
commission was substantially the same as that which
obtained at the time of the convictions and sentences
by the appellate court. This was so both in respect of
offences committed within the limits of the State of
Vindhya Pradesh and those committed outside it ;
(4) The law relating to the offence committed by the
first appellant outside the State of Vindhya Pradesh
(at New Delhi) was perfectly within the competence of
the appropriate legislative authority at t.he relevant
•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
time; and (5) Con~equent on 3 and 4 ab,ove, the objection to the convictions and sentences of the appellants
Rao Shiv
under article 20 is not sustainable.
Bahadur Singh
1953
and Another
"'h v.
·'
.1. e 3 tateoJ
The appeal is accordingly directed to be posted for
consideration
whether it is to be heard on the
.
Vindhya Pradesh. Il101'ItS.
J a.gannadhadas
J.
Order accordingly.
Agent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha .
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