STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND OTHERS versus SHANMUGHA VILAS CASHEW NUT FACTORY AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 8 May 1953 | [1954] 1 S.C.R. 53 | 1953 INSC 44
Key facts
- Decided
- 8 May 1953
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 26/1952
- Citation
- [1954] 1 S.C.R. 53
- Neutral citation
- 1953 INSC 44
Text of the judgment
53
s.C.R.
1953
this extent and with the deepest regret I express my
respectful dissent.
Ktdar Nath
In my view, the convictions cannot be upheld and
Bajoria
v.
there should be a retrial in the normal way.
'l'he State of West
Appeals dismissed.
Bengal.
Agent for the appellant in C.A. No. 84: Sukwmar
Ghose.
Agent for the appellant in C.A. :No. 85: R.R.
Biswas.
Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
j
...
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND OTHERS
1963
v.
May8.
SHANMUGHA VILAS CASHEW NUT FACTORY
AND OTHERS.
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA, s. R. DAS,
VIVIAN BosE AND GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Constitiition of India, 1950, cirt. 286 (1) (a), (1) (b) and (2)Tax on scile or p11rchase of goods-Sales "oittside the State "-Sales
"·in the cmirse of" import or export-Sales "in the coiirse of interState trade orco1mnerce "-Nat-nre and incidents of-State's power
to fox-Scope of constitutional limitations.
.,..
Held, by (PATANJALI SASTRI 0.J., lVIUKHERJEA, VIVIAN
BOSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.)-(i) Sales and purchases which
themselves .occasion the export or import of the goods, as the
case may be, out of, or into, the territory of India come within
art. 286 (1) (b) and are exempt from State taxation. (ii) Purchases
in the State by the exporter for the purpose of export as well as
sales in the State by the importer after the goods have crossed the
customs barrier are not within the exemption. (iii) Sales in the
State by the exporter or importer by transfer of shipping documents while the goods are beyond the customs barrier are within '"
the exemption, assuming that the State power of taxation extends
to such transactions.
The word "course" etymologically denotes movement from
one point to another and the expression "in the course of" in art.
286 (1) (b) not only implies a period of time during which the
movement is in prngress but postulates also a connected 'relation.
Consequently, a sale in the course of export out of the country
•
54
1963
State of
Travancore·
' Oochin
and Others
v.
Shanmuuha
Vilas
Cashew
Nut Factory,
and Others.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1954)
should be understood in the context of art. 286 (1) (b) as meaning
a sale taking place not only d~tring the activities directed to the
end of exportation of the goods out of the country, but also as 1Ja1·t
of or connected with such activities. But a purchase of goods for
the purpose of export is only an act preparatory to their export
and not an act done in the course of the export of the goods.
The respondents purchased ra'v cashew nuts within the State
of Travancore-Cochin, from the neighbouring States and also imported such nuts from Africa, for the purpose of refining them and
exporting them to America. Imports from Africa were made in
the following ways: (a) puxchases were made through intermediaries doing business as comm.ission agents at Bombay who
acted as agents for the respondents charging commission ; (b) the
commission agents at BombaY indented the goods on their O\Vn account and they sold the goods as principals to the respondents. In
either case the goods were shipped direct from Africa to a port in
the Travancore·Cochin State. It was found as a fact that the process of the factory was such that the goods were not the same
goods commercially after refinement:
Held 1 (i) as regards purchases made in the local inarkets of the
State they were not exempted under art. 286 (1) (b); (ii) as regards
purchases made in the neighbouring States, if the purchases \Vere
effected and delivery was taken by the respondents' servants outside the Travancore-Oochin State, they \vould be exempt under
art. 286, cl. (i) (a), and if the purchases were effected by employ·
ing firms doing commission business outside the State and deliveries were made through normal commercial channels the tran·
sactions \vould be of an inter-State character and would fall under
cl. (2) but they would be taxable under the Sales Tax Continuance
Order (No. 7 of 1950) issued hy the President under cl. (2) as such
tax \Vas being levied before the Oonstitut~on. (iii) A.s regards imports froin Africa, where the Bombay merchants merely acted as
a.gents 1 the t1:ansactions would be purchases which occasioned the
import and would he exempt under art. 286 (1) (b), but where the
Bombay merchants did not act as agents for the respondents, purchases from them \vould be on the same footing as local purchases
and would not be exempt.
Pe1· S.R. DAS J.-The Explan"tion to art. 286 (1) (a) is not an
exception or a proviso but only explains cl. (1) (a). It does not
confer taxing power on any State but only takes a\vay the po\ver
of taxation of a State in respect of sales and purchases in \V hi ch
delivery does not take Place within the State by enacting that
such sales shall be deemed to have taken place outside that State
within cl. (1) (a). Consequently, il a sale or purchase takes place
outside a State, either under the general law or by virtue of the
fiction created by the Explanation, then th.at State cannot, under
(1) (a), tax such sale or purchase. If a sale or purchase
takes ptace within a State, either under the general law or by rea.
son of the Explanation 1 then, if such a sale or purchase takes place
l
-,
-·
f'
j....
•
.,,..
S.O.R.
)
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
55
"in the course of" inter-State trade and commerce, no State, n-0t
1953
even the State where the sale or purchase takes place as aforesaid
can tax it bv reason -of (2), unless and until Parliament bv
State of
law provides otherwise. A sale or purchase " in the course of;, Travancoreimport or export within the meaning of (1) (b) includes (i) a
Cochin
sale or pmchase which itself occasions the import or export as and Others
already held by this court, (ii) a sale or purchase which takes
v.
pla-0e while the goods are on the high seas on their import or ex- Shanmugha Vila•
port journey. and (iii) the last purch11se by the exporter with a
Cashew
view to export and the first sale by the importer to a dealer after Nut Factory,
the arrival of the imported goods. If a sale or purchase takes and Others.
pl11ce within a St11te, either under the general 111w or by reason of
the Explanation, then, if it takes place in the course of import
or export as explained above, no State, not even the State within
which such sale or purchase takes place can tax it by reason of
(1) (b).
As regards local purchases, as those purchases took place within the State they were not entitled to the protection of art. 286
(1) (a), since on the findings of the High Court, the goods purchased were so altered that they cannot be deemed to be the same
as the goods which were exported, and the purchases cannot be said
to have been made "in the course" of export so as to be entitled to
immunity from taxation under art. 286 (1) (b). As regards pm·chases from the neighbouring States, if the goods were taken delivery of by the agents of the respondents outside the State, such
purchases must, under tlie Explanation, be regarded as having
taken place outside the State and accordingly would be exempt
from taxation under art. 286 (1) (a). If however, the goods· were
directly delivered to the respondents in the . Travancore-Cochin
State the Explanation to art. 286 (1) (a) will apply in view of the
finding of the High Court which implies that the goods are also
consumed in the State, and the neighbouring States will not be
entitled to tax these sales or purchases, but the purchases are " in
the course of " inter-State trade and as such will be protected by
(2); but as the majority of the Court have taken a different
view and as such view must prevail, such purchases will become,
as a result of the Explanation to (1) (a), an intra-State
purchase and will lose the protection of (2). Even if such
purchases fall within (2), they would be liable· to be taxed
under the President's Order of 1950. They are not protected by
(1) (b) as the goods exported are different goods.
A8 regards pnrchases from Africa (i) where the Bombay
merchants act as agents of the respondents and pay the price and
take delivery of the shipping documents in Bombay the purchases
fall within (1) (a) and also (1) (b) and are not liable to tax
as they take place outside the State within (1) (a) and also
"in the course of import" within (1) (b); (ii) where the
African sellers ship the goods on their own initiation or on that of
their a~ents and while the !ioods are on the hi(lh seas they a~·~
156
1963
State of
TravancoreOochin
and Others
v.
Shanmugha
Vilas
Cashew,
JJlut Factory.
and Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1954)
purchased by the respondents' Bombay agents, tbe sale or
purchase would he exempt under (1) (a) and under (1) (b);
(iii) where the respondents place separate orders with the same
commission agent at Bombay and the latter places a consolidated
order with the Africrtn seller on his own responsibility and the
Bombay agent after paying for the entire lot, prepares a separate
invoice for ertch of their constituents and the latter receive the
delivery orders from a Travancore bank against payment a.nd
take delivery from a Travancore warehouse the sale takes place
in the Travancore-Cochin State and the goods cannot claim
exemption under (l) (a), (1) (b) or (2) of art. 286.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 26, 27 and 30 to 36 of 1952.
.
These were appeals under article 132 (1) of the
Constitution from the Judgment and Order dated
10th January, 1952, ofthe Travancore, Cochin High
Court in Original Petitions Nos. 5, 19, 34, 35, 71, 83,
88, 89 and 90 of 1951, quashing the assessments
.severally made on the respondents in each appeal
under the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act,
1124 M. E. The respondents who were assessed under
the Travancore Ceueral Sales Tax Act which came
into force in March, 1949, claimed exemption from
sales tax in respect of the purchases made by them
after the Constitution of 1950 came into force till the
end of the accounting year 1950 on the ground that·
under article 286 (1) (b) the State had no power .to .
levy tax on such purchases. The sales tax authorities
having rejected the claim the respondents applied to
the High Court under article 226 and the High Court
quashed the assessments so far as they related to the
said period. The State preferred the present appeals.
These appeals were heard in part with certain other
appeals in September and October, 1952, but as it was
found that the material facts had not been clearly
ascertained by the High Court the cases were remitted
to the High Court for further enquiry and findings.
The connected appeals were disposed of on the 16th
of October, 1952, and the judgment is reported as the
State of Travancore-Gochin v. The Bombay Go. Ltd.
([1952] S.C.R. 1112). The hearing of these appeals was
continued after the High Court had returned the record
with its findings.
''
.
I
. --::
.
....
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
57
1953
T. N. Subrahmanya Iyer, Advocate-General of
Travancore-Oochin State (T. R. Balakrishna Iyer, with
State of
him) for the appellants.
TravancoreOochin
M. K. Nambiyar (N. Palpu, with him) for the
and Others
respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 26, 27 and 30 to 36.
v.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and Shanmugha Vilas
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus
Cashew
A. Mehta, with them) for the Union of India.
.Nut Factory,
and Others.
V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General of Madras (V. V.
Raghavan, with him) for the State of Madras.
V. Rajaram Iyer, Advocate-General of Hyderabad
(B. N. Sastri, with him) for the State of Hyderabad.
S. M. Bikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (M. L.
Sethi, with him) for the State of Punjab.
A. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of
Mysore (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the State
of Mysore.
K. B. Asthana for the State of Uttar Pradesh.
(States of Bombay and Orissa were not represented.)
1953. May 8. The judgment of the Chief Justice
and Mukherjea, Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ.
was delivered by the Chief Justice. S. R. Das J.
delivered a separate judgment.
....
PATAN.JALI SASTRI C. J.-These are appeals from an
order of theHigh Court ofTravancore-Cochin quashing
the assessments severally made on the respondents in
each appeal under the Travancore-Cochin General
Sales Tax Act, 1124 M. E. (Act No. XVIII of 1124
M. E.) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
The Act provided by section 3 for the levy of a t11x
on the total turnover of every dealer for each year.
" Turnover " is the aggregate amount for which goods
are either bought or sold by a "dealer" [section 2(j)],
who is a person carrying on the business of buying and
selling goods [section 2 (d)]. "Sale", with all its
grammatical variations and cognate expressions, is
defined as meaning, among other things, every transfer
~
•
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1954]
of the property in goods by one person to another in
the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred
State of
h
Travancorepayment or ot er valuable consideration [section 2(h) ].
aochin
The sale or purchase is to be deemed to have taken
and Others
place in the State, wherever the contract might have
v.
.
been made, if the goods were actually in the State
Shanmugha Vilas when the contract was made or, if the goods are
Nu~a;,:::,Y actually produced in 'the State, at any time after
and Others.' the contract in respect thereof was made.
By sec~
tion 3 (4) the turnover is to be determined in accordPaianjali
ance with such rules as may be prescribed, and
Sastri a. J,
rule 4 of the rules framed under the Act prescribes that, in the case of certain goods including
" cashew and its kernel", the gross turnover of a
dealer is the amount for which the goods were bought
by him, and in all other cases the amount for which
the goods were sold by him.
The fespondents are dealers in cashew-nuts in the
State, and their business consists in importing raw
~ cashew-nuts from abroad and the neighbouring districts
in the State of Madras in addition to purchases made
in the local market, and, after converting them by
means of certain processes into edible kernels, exporting
the kernels to other countries, mainly America. The
oil pressed from the shells removed from the cashewnut~ was also exported. The Constitution having come
into force on January 26, 1950, the respondent in each
appeal claimed exemption under article 286 ( 1) (b) in
respect of the purchases made from that date till May
29, 1950, the end of the account year. The sales tax
authorities having rejected the claim, the respondents
applied to the High Court under article 226, and that
court upheld the claim and quashed the assessments in
so far as they related to the said period. The State
has preferred the appeals.
The. appeals were heard in part along with certain
other appeals from the same order, and as it was
found that the material facts relating to the course of
business of the respondents in the present appeals had
not been clearly ascertained, these appeals were
remitted to the High Court for further enquiry and
1953
..
·•
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
59
findings in regard to those matters. The connected
lfl.SIJ
appeals, however, in which the materials on record
State of
were found sufficient for their disposal were finally Travancoredecided, and the decision is reported in The State of
Cochin
Travancore-Gochin v. The Bombay Go. Ltd. (') (herein- and Other•
after referred to as the previous decision).
v.
. .
f:
h
h
h
Skanmugha Vilas
Be£ore cons1dermg how art e cas ew-nut pure ases
cashew
made by the respondents are, on the findings returned Nut Factory,
by the High Court, entitled to the protection of article and Others.
286( 1)(b ), it is necessary first to ascertain the scope of
such protection. That clause, so far as it is material Patanjali
here, reads thus :
Sa.tri c. J.
286. (1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise
the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of
goods where such sale or purchase takes place(a)
*
*
*
*
(b) in the course of the import of the goods into,
or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.
In the previous decision this Court referred to four
different views then adumbrated in the course of the
argument as to the meaning and scope of the said
sub-clause as follows:
(1) The exemption is limited to sales by export and
purchases by import, that is to say, those sales and
purchases which occasion the export or import, as the
case may be, and extends to no other transactions
however directly or immediately connected, in intention or purpose, with such sales or purchases, and
wheresoever the property in the goods may pass to
the buyer.
(2) In addition to the sales and purchases of the kind
described above, the exemption covers the last purchase by the exporter and the first sale by the importer,
if any, so directly and proximately connected with the
export sale or import purchase as to form part of the
same transaction.
(3) The exemption covers only those sales and purchases under which the property in the goods concerned is transferred from the seller to the buyer during
(r) (1952] $.C.R. irr2;
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
the transit, that is, after the goods begin to move and
before they reach their foreign destination.
State of
Travancare·
( 4) The view which found favour with the learned
Cochin
Judges of the High Court, namely, "the clause is not
and Others
restricted to the point of time. at which goods are
v. v·l· imported into or exported from India; the series of
Shanmugha 'as
.
cashew
transact"10rrn w h'10h n~ce~sari'ly prece.d e export. or impo~~
Nut Factory. of goods will come w1thm the purview of this clause.
and Oth:ers.
This Court, however, found it unnecessary for the
urpose
of the cases then before it to go any further
P
Pata.njali
Sastri c. J. than to hold that" whatever else may or may not fall
within article 286 ( 1) (b }, sales and purchases which
themselves occasion the export or import of the goods,
as the case may be, out of or into the territory of
India come within the exemption" and that the third
view set out above, which was put forward on behalf
of the State of Bombay and which seeks to limit the
operation of the clause exclusively, to sales and pur.chases effected during the transit of the goods, was
too narrow and could not be accepted.
It may be mentioned at once, to clear the
ground, that if the Bombay view was considered to be
too narrow, the view expressed by the Court below
cannot but be regarded as too wide. This, indeed,
was recognised by learned counsel who appeared
in the cases, none of whom made any serious attempt
to support it. Nor was any question raised or argument advanced as to the scope and effect of clause (2)
of article 286, for, although the respondents in two of
these appeals(') purchased cashew-nuts in the adjoining
districts of the ::ltate of Madras during the period in
question, it was not disputed that such purchases
unless they were exempt under article286(l)(a), would
fall within the explanation to clause (l)(a) as interpreted in the majority decision .of this court in the recent
case of The State of Bombay v. United Motors (India)
Ltd.('), or under the Sales Tax Continuance Order,
1950 (C. O. No. 7 of 1950), issued by the President on
January 26, 1950, in exercise of the powers conferred
by the proviso to clause (2) of article 286, and would,
in either case, be taxable.
19S&
(1) Civil Appeals Nos. 33 and 36 of r952.
(2) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.
·~
·~
?·
S.C.R.
.+ .
#
1
...
SUPREME COURT REPORrs
61
1953
With reference to the aforesaid decision, it may be
mentioned in passing that in order to remedy what was
State of
felt to be the unsatisfactory position in regard to the Travancorelevy of tax by the States in America on sales in interCochin
state commerce, the North Carolina Department of and Others
Revenue proposed that Congress should pass legislations
vh V'l
authorising the States to tax certain sales in inter- han~~;h:w i as
state commerce. The proposed bill ran thus:
Nut Factory,
" That all taxes levied by any State upon sales of pro- and Others.
perty or measured by sales of property may be levied Patanjali
upon or measured by sales of property in inter-state sastri a. J.
commerce by the state into which the property is
moved for use or ·consumption therein, in the same
manner and to the same extent that said taxes are
levied upon or measured by sales of property not in
inter-state commerce. Provided: that no State shall
discriminate against sales of property in inter-state
commerce ; nor shall any .state discriminate against
the sale of the products of any other state. Provided,
further: that no state shall tax the sale in inter-state
commerce of property transported for the purpose of
resale by the consignee as a merchant or as a manufacturer. Provided, further: that no county, city, or
town, or other subdivision of any State shall levy a tax
upon or measure any tax by sales of property in interstate commerce "(2).
It is interesting to note that the bill sought to bring
about substantially the same result as the combined
operation of article 286 clause (1) (a) explanation,
clause (2) and article 304 as they were interpreted by
the majority in that decision would produce. It is
possible that these provisions of our Constitution were
inspired by the proposed bill.
The only question debated before us was whether in
addition to the export-sale and import-purchase, which •
were held in the previous decision to be covered by the
exemption under clause(l)(b), the following two categories of sale or purchase would also fall within the
scope of that exemption :
(2) See Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, Vol. I, Book V, p. 367
published by the Association of American Law Schools, 1938 .
•
62
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
1863
(1) The last purchase of goods made by the exporter
for the purpose of exporting them to implement orders
State of
Travancorea lrea d y receive d f rom a foreign buyer or expected to
Cochin
be received subsequently in the course of business, and
and Others
the first sale by the importer to fulfil orders pµrsuant
v.
. ' to which the goods were imported or orders expected
Shanmuuha Vilas to be received after the import.
Cashew
Nut Factory,•
(2) Sales or purchases of goods effected within the
and Others. \ State by transfer of shipping documents while the goods
are in the course of transit.
Patanjali
As regards the first mentioned category, we are
Sastri 0. J.
of opinion that the transactions are not within
the protection of clause (1) (b). What is exempted under the clause is the sale or purchase of
goods taking place in the course of the import
·of the goods into or export of the goods out of the
territory of India. It is obvious that the words
"import into" and "export out of" in this context do
not refer to the article or commodity imported or
exported. The reference to "the goods" and to
"the territory of India" make it clear that the
words "export out of" and "import into" mean the
exportation out of the country and importation into
the country respectively. The word "course" etymo. logically denotes movement from one point to another,
{ and the expression "in the course of" not only implies
a period of time during which the movement is in progress but postulates also a connected relation. For
instance, it has been held that the words "debts due
to the bankrupt in the course of his trade" in section 15(5) of the English Bankruptcy Act, 1869, do not
extend to all debts due to the bankrupt during the
period of his trading but include only debts connected
with the trade [see In re Pryce, ex parte Rensburg(').]
A sale in the course of export out of the country
should similarly be understood in the context of
clause (l)(b) as meaning a sale taking place not only
during the activities directed to the end of exportation
of the goods out of the country but also as part
of or connected with such activities. The time
...
(1) 4 Ch. D. 685 and Williams on Bankruptcy, 16th Edn., p. 307,
•
r·
S.O.R.
.,.
J..
. ,...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1953
factor alone is not determinative. The previous
decision proceeded on this view and emphasised
State of
the integral relation between the two where the Travancore·
contract of sale itself occasioned the export as the
Cochin
ground for holding that such a sale was one taking andOthers
place in the course of export. It is, however, contended
v.
.
.
.
l
f
t
d
.
t
t
d
t'
·
ShanmughaVilas
th at on th is prmc1p e o connec e or m egra e · ac iv1Cashew
ties a purchase for the purpose of export must be Nut Factory,
regarded as covered by the exemption under clause (1) a..d Others.
(b). We are unable to agree.
Patanjali
The phrase "integrated activities" was used in the Sastri c. J.
previous decision to denote that "such a sale" (i.e., a
sale which occasions the export) "cannot be dissociated
from the export without which it cannot be effectuated,
and the sale and the resultant export form parts of a ,
single transaction." It is in that sense that the two
activities-the sale and the export-·were said to be
integrated. A purchase for the purpose of export like
production or manufacture for export, is only an act
preparatory to export and cannot, in our opinion, be
regarded as an act done "in the course of the export of
the goods out of the territory of India", anymore than
the other two activities can be so regarded. As pointed out by a recent writer "From the legal point of
view it is essential to distinguish the contract of sale
which has as its object the exportation of goods from
this country from other contracts of sale relating to the
same goods, but not being the direct and immediate
cause for the shipment of the goods ...... When a
merchant shipper in the United Kingdom buys for the
purpose of export goods from a manufacturer in the
same country the contract of sale is a home transaction; but when he resells these goods to a buyer abroad
that contract of sale has to be classified as an export
transaction"('). This passage shows that, in view of
the distinct character and quality of the two transactions, it is not correct to speak of a purchase for export
as an activity so integrated with the exportation that
the former could be regarded as done "in the course
of" the latter. The same reasoning applies to the first
(r) Schmittof!-Export Trade, 2nd Edn., !'· 3 .
•
63
64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
sale after import which is a distinct local transaction
effected
after the importation of the goods into the
State of
Travancorecountry has been completed, and having no integral
Cochin
relation with it. Any attempt therefore to invoke the
and Others
authority of the previous decision in support of the
v.
. suggested extension of the protection of clause (l)(b)
ShanmughaVila•to the last purchase for the purpose of export and the
N.utCashew
Factory, first sale after import on the ground of integrated actiand Others.
vities.must fail.
Nor is it correct to say that it is necessary to extend
Patanjali
the
exemption to these transactions to avoid double
Sastri 0. J.
taxation. It is true.that in the previous decision it
was indicated that the object underlying the exemption
, was the avoidance of double taxation on the foreign
trade of this country which is of great importance to
the nation's economy. But the double taxation sought
to be avoided consisted in the imposition of export
) duty by the Central Government and the imposition of
I sales tax by the State Government on the same transaction in its different aspects as an export and a sale.
Such double taxation is already avoided by our
holding that the export-sale and the import-purchase
are exempt under clause (b) from the levy of sales tax
by the State. The foreign trade of this country thus
already enjoys immunity from double tax burden and
suffers only one tax, namely, the export or import duty
as the case may be. The claim now made for extension of the exemption under clause (l)(b) in the name
of avoiding double taxation cannot be supported.
Not the least among the reasons for rejecting the
view that the last purchase for the purpose of export
and the first sale after import are also within clause ( 1)
(b) is the practical difficulty in giving effect to the
exemption in regard to these transactions, having
regard to the general pattern of sale-tax legislation in
this country of which our constitution-makers must
have been well aware. The tax is usually levied on
the annual turnover of the seller who is allowed under
certain conditions to pass it on to the buyer by adding
it to the price charged for the goods at each individual sale. Supposing A is the seller from whom
•
;(,
•
•.
•
S.C.R.
...
.;f.
·• ·"
+
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
B the export merchant purchases the goods for
1953
export. If the sale is to be exempt, how is A to be
satisfied that the goods would actually be exported Tr~~~~:!.,_
subsequently? And even if they were, it must be
Cochin
difficult for A to prove to the Sales Tax Officer that and Others
they were so exported by B if proof was required. On
v.
the other hand, B might be keeping the goods, Shanmugha Vilas
waiting for orders to come, or might change his Naashaw
.
h
ll
ut Ji' actory
mmd and not export t e goods at a but sell them and Others.
locally. In that case, what would be the position
of A vis· a vis the Sales Tax Officer demanding Patanjali
the tax ? Could A escape liability, if he failed to Sastri a. J .
collect the tax from B at the time of the sale? Or is A
to collect the tax, ignoring B's declaration of his intention to export and leaving him to apply for refund by
producing evidence of actual export, whenever that
takes place? Even if a sales tax enactment provides
for adjustment on those lines, would not such legislation, in so far a;s it, compels B to suffer the tax until he
actually exports the goods, contravene clause (l)(b)
which ex hypothesi exempts the transaction from sales
tax ? And what would be the position if the goods
were burnt or otherwise lost in the meanwhile, and the
export never took place ? Athough, as pointed out in
the previous decision, American cases are not of much
assistance in interpreting article 286 because of the
different wording of the import-export clause of the
Federal Constitution, it is interesting to see that such
uncertainties led the American courts to lay down the
rule that"lt is the entrance of the articles ,into the export
stream that marks the start of the process of exportation. Then there is certainty that the goods are headed for their foreign destination and will not be diverted
to domestic use. Nothing "less will suffice." : Empresa
Siderurgica, S. A. v. Merced(').
Similar difficulties and uncertainties are encountered
in bringing within the exemption the first sale after
import. How is the exemption to be applied to the
(1) 337 U.S. 154·
.,.,._
9
"'>
65
66
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ll954]
.
1953
goods imported from abroad after they are mingled
with other goods and lose their distinctive character as
State of
Travancoreimports? Here again, the American courts, with their
Cochin
practical approach to such problems, have evolved the
and Others
doctrine of "original or unopened package", that is to
v.
.
say, the rule that the first sale of imported goods will
Shanmugha Vilas be exempt from State taxation provided only such sale
Cashew
is made in the original packao:es
in which the goods
Nut Factory
.....,
and Others.
have arrived. Any sale of such goods made after the
package is opened does not enjoy such exempPatanjali
tion. Are we to import the same doctrine here
Saatri O. J,
to make the exemption workable ? Even in America,
as pointed out in Balsara' s case('), difficulties
arose from time to time in applying the doctrine
as "sometimes very intricate questions arose before the
courts such as whether the doctrine applied to the
larger cases only or to the smaller packages contained
therein or whether it applied to smaller paper packages
of cigarettes taken from loose files of packages at the
factory and transported in baskets." Hence this
court has unanimously decided that "the doctrine has
no place in this country" following the lead of
Gwyer C. J. in the earlier case of Boddu Paidanna(').
It was said that clause (1) (b) should be construed in the light of the constitutional purpose
and the commercial background and reference
was made to the manner in which a large proportion of the export trade of the country was carried
on by merchant houses who purchased goods from the
producers and manufacturers to resell them to buyers
abroad by ·means of contracts concluded with them .
. Similarly with regard to import trade, large import
houses imported machinery and consumer goods. wholesale and sold them to retail dealers or, in some cases,
to the customers direct. This practice, it was argued,
must have been well known to the makers of our
Constitution, and it was reasonable to assume that
they realised the importance of the foreign trade to
the well-being of the country and would not have
desired to cripple the same by allowing the States to
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 682, 699.
(2) [194'] F.C.R. 90.
•
..
S.C.R.
....,,..
'
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
67
tax such purchases and sales by the export and import
1953
merchants in this country. Such general considerState of
ations based largely on speculation are not of much Travancore.
assistance in construing the scope and effect of a
Cochin
specific constitutional provision seeking to restrict the and Others
power of State taxation. It is true, as pointed out in
v.
.
the previous decision, that the export-import trade is Shanmugha Vilas
.
t an t t o our na t'10na1 economy, b u t I't is
• no 1ess NutCashew
nnpor
Facwry
true that the State power of taxation is essential for and Others.
carrying on its administration, and it must be as much
the constitutional purpose to protect the one as not Patanjali
unduly to curtail the other. The question really is, Sastri c. J.
how far did the constitution-makers want to go in
protecting the foreign trade by restricting the power
of taxing sales or purchases of goods,which they conferred on the States under entry 54 of List II. The
problem before them was one of balancing and reconciling the rival claims of foreign trade in the interests
of our national economy and of the State's power of
taxation in the interests of the expanding social welfare
needs of the people committed to its charge, and we
have their solution as expressed in the terms of clause
(I) (b ). It is for the court to interpret the true
meaning and scope of those terms without assuming
that the one constitutional purpose was regarded as
more important than the other. This court has already
held in the previous decision that clause (1) (b) protects
the export-import trade of this country from double
taxation by prohibiting the imposition of sales tax by
the State on export-sales and import-purchases, and
we find no warrant in the language employed to extend
the protection to cover the last purchase before export
or the first sale after import.
As regards sales or purchases effected in the State
by transfer of shipping (c.i.f.) documents while the +
goods are still in_ transit, we have already observed .
that the words "in the course of" imply a movement
or progress and, therefore, a beginning and an end of
such movement or progress. As clause (1) (b) is concerned only with exempting certain sales or purchases
from taxation by the States in this country, it is
68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
sufficient to determine where the course of export
State of
begins and where the course of import ends. In this
Travancore·
connection, it is useful to remember that the power to
Oochin
make laws with respect to duties of customs including
and Others
export duties (entry 83 of List I) and also with respect
v.
.
to ·import and export across customs frontiers and the
Shan~ug; Vilas definition of customs frontiers (entry 41 of List I) is
Nut";:C%ry vested exclusively in the Central Legislature, and
and Others.
detailed provisions have been made in the Indian Sea
Customs Act, 1878, for the levy of customs duties by
Patanjali • the officers of the Central Government who are stationed
Sa.tri a. J.
along customs frontiers as defined by the Central
Government where, after appraising the goods exported
or imported, the duties chargeable, if any, are computed and levied, and it is not until this process is
completed that the goods can be shipped for
• transportation or cleared by the consignee or his
, representatives as the case may be. It would seem,
therefore, logical to hold that the course of the export
out of, or of the import into, the territory of India
J does not commence or terminate until the goods cross
the customs barrier. It is, however, to be noted that the
question of imposing sales tax on transfer of goods
in the course of export would not often arise in practice
for, where the goods are transported pursuant to a
contract of sale already concluded with a foreign buyer
and the shipping documents )lave been forwarded to
him, any further sale of such goods by the Indian
seller is impossible, and where the export trade is
conducted through representatives or branch offices,
the sale by the latter of the exported goods usually
takes place abroad and would not then be subjected
to tax by the State in India. It is in relation to import
' of goods from abroad that the question of exemption
assumes practical importance. It is well known that
sales or purchases by transfer of shipping documents
\ while the goods are in transit are a characteristic
feature of foreign trade and as they take place in the
course of import as defined above, and are regarded
commercially as incident to the import transaction,
they fall within the terms of clause (1) (b) and would
' be eni;J.tled, in our view, to the protection of that
•
•·
•
S.C.R.
69
clause, if the State is constitutionally competent to tax
1953
such sales, as to which we express no opinion·
State of
Our conclusions may be summed up as follows:Travancore·
(1) Sales by export and purchases by import fall a:!a0~~~rs
within the exemption under article 286 (1) (b). This
v.
was held in the previous decision. ·
·
Shanmugha Vilas
(2) Purchases in the State by the exporter for the N caFshew
. t hS
utactory
purpose of export as wel1 as sa1es m
e tate b y t h e and
Others.
importer after the goods have crossed the customs
_
barrier are not within the exemption.
' Patanjali
(3) Sales in the State by the exporter or importer Sastri a. J .
by transfer of shipping documents while the goods are
beyond the customs barrier are within the exemption,
assuming that the State power of taxation extends
to such transactions.
It remains to consider in the light of the foregoing discussion how far the cashew-nut purchases made
by the respondents are within the exemption under
article 286. It will be recalled that these purchases
fell into three groups:
I. Purchases made in the local market,
II. Purchases from the neighbouring districts of
the State of Madras, and
III.Imports from Africa.
As- regards Group I, the High Court finds that
"the purchases of raw nuts whether African or Indian
are all made with the object of exporting their kernels"
though there were some negligible sales in the local
market of what are called "factory rejects". The
High Court further finds that the bulk of the kernels
were in fact exported by the respondents themselves,
a small quantity being sold by the respondents to
other exporters who also subsequently exported the
same. Thus, on the whole, respondents could be said
to have purchased the raw nuts for the purpose of
exporting the kernels and to have actually exported
them. But, it will be seen, the purchases are not
covered by the exemption on the construction we have
placed on clause (I) (b), even if the difference between
the raw materials purchased and the manufactured
l
...
...
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
10
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
t1954j
w53
State oI
goods (kernels) exported is to be ignored. It may,
however, be mentioned here that the High Court has
Trnvancore·
found that the raw cashew-nuts and the kernels manuGovhin
factured out of them by various processes, partly
and Others
mechanical and partly manual, are not commercially
v.
the same commodity. This finding, which is not
Shanmugha"Vilas
·
1y d"ispu t ed b eiore
c
·
,,.
serious
us, wou Jd b e an a dd.it10nal
0
Nut ';a,:ry ground for rejecting the claim to exemption in respect
and Othm.
of these purchases, as the language of clause ( 1) (b)
clearly requires as a condition of the exemption that
Patanjali
the export must be of the goods whose sale or purchase
Sast'i c. J.
took place in the course of export.
As regards Group II, the High Court has found that.
such purchases were made only by the respondents in
Civil Appeals Nos. 33 and 36 of 1952. The High Court's
finding as to how these purchases and the deliveries
under them· were effected is by no means clear. The
respondent's contention was that the purchases were
effected and the deliveries taken by their own paid
servant-s outside the State of Travancore-Cochin, and
it was thus a case of a person buying goods and
taking delivery thereof outside the State and bringing
them across the border after the transaction was
completed in all respects outside the State. On the
other hand, the contention on behalf of the State was
that though the purchases were made outside the
State in the neighbouring districts of Madras, deliveries
were effected through the ordinary commercial channels
by employing commission agents who made the
purchases and arranged for the deliveries at the
respondents' depots at Trichur or Quilon. All that can
be said here is that, if the transactions took place in the
manner alleged by the respondents in these two appeals, they would be exempt under clause {l} (a). This
indeed was not disputed by the Advocate-General of
the appellant State. On the other hand, if, as claimed
by the Advocate-General, the purchases wore effected
by the employment of firms doing business as commission agents outside the State, and the deliveries were
made through normal commercial channels, the
transactions would partake of an inter-State character
and fall under clause (2). In that case, it would be un-
•
.,
s.c.R.
...
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
71
1953
necessary to inquire further whether they would be
covered by the explanation to clause {l)(a), as they
State of
would be clearly taxable under the President's Order Travancore·
(C. 0. No. 7 of 1950) to which reference has been made
Cochin
already, as it was admitted that sales tax was validly and Others
levied on such purchases before the commencement of
v.
f
h pureh ases Shanmugha
t h e Const i't u t'10n. As th e t axa b"l"t
1 1 y o sue
CashewVila•
on either view of the facts was not disputed, no argu- Nut Factory
ments were addressed to us on the scope of clause (2) and Others.
and the explanation to clause (l)(a), as has been
stated.
Patanjali
Sastri C. J .
Group I II may be su b -d ivid ed into two categories
according to the findings of the High Court: (a) purchases made through intermediaries called in these
proceedings as "the Bombay party" doing business as
commission agents at· Bombay, who acted as agents
for the respondents charging commission. The dealings
are thus described by the High Court : "The goods are
purchased when they are in the high seas and shipped •
from the African port to Cochin or Quilon. Goods are
never landed at Bombay. The Bombay party only
arranges for purchases on behalf of the assessees, gets
delivery of the shipping documents on payment at
Bombay through a bank which advances money against
the shipping documents and collects the same from the
assessees at destination", and (b) the Bombay party
indented the goods on their own account and sold the
goods as principals to the respondents and other 1
customers ; but the goods were shipped direct to Cochin
or Quilon on c. i. f. terms. The shipping documents
were made out in the name of the Bombay party as
consignees and were delivered to them against payment
through bankers at Bombay. The Bombay party
cleared the goods through their own representatives at
the port of destination and issued separate delivery/
orders to the respondents and other customers for the •
1
respective quantities ordered.
It will be seen that in respect of the purchases falling
under (a), the Bombay party acted merely as the agents
of the respondents, privity being established between
the latter and the .African sellers, The purchases are
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
73
were heard together immediate! y after the hearing of
C.A. No. 204 of 1952 [The State of Bombay v. The
United Motors (India) Ltd & Others( 1 )] had been concluded and judgment had been reserved by another Constitution Dench.
The question of construction ·of
article 286 of the Constitution which is invoked in the
present appeals was also raised in the Bombay appeal.
That Constitution Bench has since delivered judgments
in that appeal. The majority of that Bench have put
upon clause (1) (a), the Explanation thereto and clause
(2) of that article a meaning which, in spite of my profound respect for their opinions, I am unable to accept
as correct. It is again my misfortune that I am
unable to agree to the interpretation my learned
brethren are now seeking to place upon clause (l)(b) of
that article. As the questions involved in these
appeals are of very great importance and as the draft
of this judgment was prepared before the judgments in
the Bombay appeal had been delivered I consider it
right to keep my views on record for whatever they
may be worth. It is, however, needless for me to say
that the majority decision in that Bombay appeal, so
lo,-,g as it stands, is binding on me.
The respondents in each of these appeals carry on
business in what is now the United State of Travancore-Cochin. They buy raw cashew-nuts locally and
in neighbouring States and also import them from
Africa and after putting them through a certain process they obtain cashew-nut oil and edible cashew-nut
kernels. They export the edible kernels to foreign
countries in· large quantities.
In compliance with the requirements of the relevant
Sales Tax -Act then in force the. repondents filed
returns in the prescribed forms of their respective
t'-lrnovers for the period between the 17th August, 1949,
and the 29th May, 1950.
Each of the respondents
claimed exemption from sales tax on their respective
purchases made between the 26th January, 1950, when
the Constitution came into force, and the 29th May,
(1)(1953] S. C.R. 1069.
1953
State of
Travancore·
Cochin
and Others
v.
Shanmugha Vilas
Cashew
}tut Factory.
and Others ...
Das]·
s.o.R.
,.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
were heard together immediately after the hearing of
l9.53
O.A. No. 204 of 1952 [The State of Bombay v. The
State of
United Motors (India) Ltd. & Others(')] had been con- 7'ravancore·
cludedand judgment had been reserved by another ConCochin
Rtitution Bench. The question of construction of and Others
article 286 of the Constitution
which
is involved in the 8 nan:m,ug1Ml
v", f' 1.1as
,
.
.
present appeals was also raised m the Bombay appeal.
cashew
That Constitution Bench has since delivered judgments Nut Factory
in that appeal. The majority of that Bench have put and Others.
upon clause (l){a), the Explantion thereto and clause
·(2) of that article a meaning which, in spite of my proDa.• J .
found respect for their opinions, I am unable to accept
as correct. It is again my misfortune that I am
unable to agree to the interpretation my learned
brethren are now se-eking to place upon clause (l)(b) of
that article. As the questions involved in these
appeals are of very great importance and as the draft
of this judgment was prepared before the judgments in
the Bombay appeal had been delivered I consider it
right· to keep my views on record for whatever they
may be worth. It is, however, needless for me to say
that the majority decision in that Bombay appeal, so
long as it stands, is binding on me.
The respondents in each of these appeals carry on
business in what is now the United State of Travancore-Cochin. They buy raw cashew-nuts locally and
in neighbouring States and also import them · from
Africa and after putting them through a certain process they obtain cashew-nut oil and edible cashew-nut
kernels. They export the edible kernels to foreign
countries in large quantities.
'In compliance with the requirements of the relevant-...,
Sales Tax Act then in force the repondents filed
returns in the prescribed forms of their respective
turnovers for the period between the 17th August, 1949,
and the 29th May, 1950. Each of the respondents
claimed exemption from sales tax on their respective
purchases made between the 26th January, 1950, when
t.he Constitution came into force, and the 29th May,
(1) (1953] S.C.R. 1069 .
•
73
74
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
19.53
1950. The claim, however, was rejected by the Sales
Tax
Officer. On a.P..peal the Assistant Commissioner
State o)
Travancor<upheld the assessment orders. The respondents appealOochin
to the High Court. By its judgment dated the 10th
and Othm
January, 1952, the High Court accepted the appeals,
v. , . quashed the assessment orders in so far as they includ8"""~"~"" 1 ·das ed tax on the purchases made after the date of the
Nu/;~','.:,,, Constitution and directed a refund of the tax over.
and Other.;.
paid. The State has now come up on appeal before
us ..
Das J.
As the questions involved in these appeals are of
general importance and the other States as well as the
Union of India are; interested in the decision, notices
were directed to be issued by this court to the
Advocates-General of all interested States and to the
Attorney-General for India. Many of these States as
also the Union of India intervened and participated in
the general discussion on the legal points involved in
these appeals. After several days' hearing before us
in September and October, 1952, it was found that the
parties were seriously at variance on several material
facts and it was felt that the appeals could not be
satisfactorily disposed of without proper findings on
those facts. Accordingly on the 8th October, 1952,
the appeals were remitted to the High Court with
directions to investigate into the disputed facts under
certain heads set forth in the annexure to the order of
remand. The High Court has now returned the
records with their findings and the appeals are before
us again for final disposal.
The assessments in question were made under the
Travancore General Sales Tax Act, 1124 (Act XVIII
of 1124). That Act came into force on the 7th March,
1949, and was, after the commencement of the Constitution, contimwd in force subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and it was in operation
during the period of assessment .. After the integration
of Travancore and Cochin that Act was replaced by
the United State of Travancore and Cochin General
Sales Tax Act, 1125 (Act XI of 1125) but we are not
concerned with the latter Act, for it came into force
..
•·
,_
•
,,
s.c.:R.
.
·~
.'
;
'
.. .
~
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
75
on the 30th May, 1950, that is to say, immediately
1053
after the expiry of the period relevant for the purposes
State of
of these appeals.
TravancrtreThe relevant provisions of Act XVIII of 1124 have
Cochin
been summarised in the judgment just read by my Lord and Others
,
the Chief
forth again.
v.h. v·i
. Justice and need not
f be set d
A 8 rutnniug
a i as
Suffice it to say that the rules ramed un er. the ct
cashew
prescribed that in the case of cashew and its kernels Nut Factory
the gross turnover of a dealer would be the amount for . and Othcn.
which those goods were purchased by him and, thereDasJ.
fore, sales tax was payable on the purchase and not
on the sale of cashew and its kernels.
The respondents do not contend that it was not
within the power of H.H. the Maharaja of Travancore
to enact that law at the time he did so but they maintain that, as after the commencement of the Constitution Travancore-Cochin became a Part B State and as
such amenable to and bound by the Constitution, that
law, in view of article 286, could no longer impose or
authorise the imposition of any tax on their purchases
of raw cashew-nuts. This contention, therefore, raises
important questions as to the extent of the power of
the States under the Constitution to impose a tax on
the sale or purchase of goods. In order, however, to
correctly appreciate the meaning and import of the
relevant provisions of the Constitution it will be
helpful to bear in mind what the position was prior to
the commencement of the Constitution.
Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the
:Federal Legislature alone could make laws, under
entry 19 in List I, with respect to import and export
across customs frontiers as defined by the Federal
Government and, under entry 44 of the same List,
with respect to duties of custom including export
duties. On the other hand the Provincial Legislatures
alone could make laws, under entry 26 in List II, with
respect to trade and commerce within the Province,
under entry 29, with respect to production, supply
and distribution of goods, under entry 48, with
respect to taxes on the sale of goods and under entry
49, with respect to cesses on the entry of goods into a
•
76
195.l
SUPREME coui-i'f l~EPORTS
[i954j
local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Section
State of
297 of that Act, however, prohibited the Provincial
Travancore· . Legislature or Governments from imposing. certain
restrictions on internal trade and ended by saying
that any law passed in contravention of that section
v.
would, to the extent of the contravention, be invalid.
Shan~u~ha Vilas It should.be noted.that clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
0
Nut
that section was directly and expressly related to and
and Others,
constituted a restriction on the legislative power of
the Province under entries 27 and 29 and not entry 48
DasJ.
in List IL That section obviously was inserted in
that Act for the purpose of achieving, as far as possible,
free trade within India by preventing the Provinces
from checking or hampering the distribution of goods
or frorri setting up barriers against internal trade in
India regarded as one economic unit.
Pursuant to the legislative power thus conferred
on them the Provincial Legislatures enacted Sales Tax
Acts for their respective Provinces. In enacting the Sales
Tax Acts, the Provincial Legislatures, however, did
not confine the operation of their legislation to sales
or purchases which took place exclusively within
their respective territories. Although in most of those
Acts "sale" was first defined as meaning a transfer of
the property in the goods, so as to make the passing of
the property within the Province the principal basis
for the· imposition of the tax, yet by means of Explanations to that definition, they gave extended
meanings to that word and thereby enlarged the scope
of their operation. Thus some of those Acts purported
to tax a sale or purchase irrespective of the place
where it took place, if only the goods were within the
Province at the time the contract for sale or purchase
was made or the goods were produced or manufactured
within the Province after the contract had been made.
In short, if any one or more of the ingredients of sale,
e.g. the. contract, delivery, payment of price, or the
passing of property etc., took place within a particular
Province or the goods were produced or manufactured
or· otherwise found there that Province felt free to
impose a tax on that. transaction of sale or purchase
aochin
and Others
;.::,Y
+
•
..
..
•
S.C.R.
J.
.•
..'
··'
•
st:ri>REME COURT REPORTS
77
1953
although all the other ingredients thereof took plaee
outside that Province.
&ate of
The Indian States were not governed by the distri- Travancorebution of legislative powers contained in the GovernCochin.
ment of India Act, 1935, and were, therefore, generally and Others
free to make whatever laws they thought fit to make. 811anniugv.ha,,"' i.1a8
They, h owever, enact ed S a1es T ax A cts on t h e mod e1
cashcui
of the Sales Tax Acts of neighbouring Provincell in t»ut Factory
British India. Thus the Travancore Act XVIII of and Others.
1124 was substantially a reproduction of the Madras
Das J.
Sales Tax Act.
The result of the imposition of tax on the sale or
purchase of goods on the basis of a very slight
connection or nexus between the sale or purchase and
the taxing Provinces or States was that in some cases
one single transaction of sale or purchase became liable
to be taxed in different Provinces or States. This
imposition of multiple taxes was certainly calculated
to h~mper and discourage free .. trade within India,
which section 297 of the Government of India· Act,
1935, was designed to achieve. This was the position
immediately ·before the Constitution of India came
into operation. Our Constitution makers were well
aware of this evil.
Articles 245 and 246 distribute legislative power between Parliament and the State Legislatures as per three
Lists set forth in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Thus Parliament alone is empowered to make
laws, tfnder entry 41 in the Union List, with respect
to trade and commerce with foreign countries, under
entry 42, with respect to inter-State trade and
commerce and under entry 83, with respect to duties
of customs, including export duty. The State Legislatures, on the other hand, are alone authorised to make
laws, under entry 26 in the State List with respect to
trade and commerce within the State, under entry 27
.vith respect to production, supply and distribution of
goods, under entry 52 with respect to taxes on the
entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use
or sale therein and under entry 54 with respect to taxes
on sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers,
78
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
It may be mentioned in passing that in List I
in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India
State of
TravanooreAct, 1935, there was no separate or specific entry
Oochin
corresponding to entry 42 in the Union List in the
and Others
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. This shows
v; i· . that our Constitution has deliberately assigned interSh anniug,i,a 'i 1as S
••
Oashew
tate tra d e and commerce, l'k
1 e .£'1ore1gn
trad e, to t he
.vui l!'actory exclusive care of Parliament and, therefore, out of the
and Others.
reach of the Jaw-making powers of the State Legislatures. Having thus distributed legislative powers
DasJ.
between Parliament and the State Legislatures, article
265, which is in Part XII of the Constitution and
headed "Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits",
provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except
by authority of law. Article 286, which is also in Part
XII, imposes some restrictions on the legislative
competency of the State Legislatures. That article ,
runs as follows:
" 286. Restrictions as to imposition of tax on the sale
or purchase of·goods. (1) No law of a State shall
impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the
sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase
takes place(a) outside the State; or
(b) in the course of the import of the goods into or
export of the goods out of, the territory of India.
Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a) a
sale or purchase shall be deemed to have take•1 place
in the State in which the goods have actually been
delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase
for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating
to sale of goods the property in the goods has by
reason of such sale or purchase passed in another
State.
•
(2) ]~xcept in so far as Parliament may by law
otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or
authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase
of any goods where such sale or purchase takes place
in the course of inter-State trade or commerce:
.
•
-
.
S.C.R.
-
•
>
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
79
Provided that the President may by order direct
1953
that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which
State of
was being lawfully levied by the government of any Travancore·
State. immediately before the commencement of this
Cochin
Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition and Othm
of such tax is contrary to the provisions, of this clause,
v.
.
t o b e 1evie
. d un t"l
th e th".1rt y- fi rs t d ay o fShanmugha
Vilas
continue
I
Cashew
March, 1951.
Nut Factor;
(3) No law made by the Legislature of a State and Other•.
imposing, or authorising the imposition of a .tax on
the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been
Da.• J.
declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the
life of the community shall have effect unless it has
been reserved for the consideration of the President
and has re.ceived his assent."
In these appeals we are not concerned with sales or
purchases of essential commodities and, therefore,
nothi.o.g further need be said about clause (3). Leaving out that clause, the rest of the article, broadly
speaking, enjoins that no State law shall impose or
authorise the imposition of tax on sale or purchase of
goods made(a) outside the State,
(b) in the course of the import of the goods into
or the export of the goods out of India,
(c) in the course of inter-State trade and
commerce.
I may here mention that in the exercise of the
powers conferred on him by the proviso to clause (2)
of article 286 the President did, by the Sales Tax
Continuance Order, 1950, direct that any tax on the
sale or purchase of any goods which was being lawfully
levied by the Government of any State immediately
before the commencement of the Constitution should,
until the 31st March, 1951, continue to be levied notwithstanding that such imposition was contrary to the
provisions of clause (2) of article 286.
Quite apart from the marginal note to article 286, a
cursory perusal of that article will show that its avowed
purpose,i is to put a restriction on the power of the
80
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
ma
State Legislatures to. make a law imposing tax on the
sale or purchase of goods under entry 54 in the State
Stale of
Travancore·
List. It may be roca]]ed t hat t h e p rovincial Legisla.
Oochfo.
tures purporting to act under entry 48 in List II of the
and ot11m
Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act,
v.
1935, enacted Sales Tax Acts imposing tax on sales or
Shaniiiugha v ilas purchases of goods on the basis of one or more of tho
. Oasl"w
.
d'ient s of sale h avmg
.
Nut
Fcwtory
mgre
some connec t•ion w1'th t h e
and Others.
Province and that this practice resulted in the imposition of multiple taxes on a single transaction of sale or
D 08 .J.
purchase thereby raising the price of the commodity
concerned to the serious detriment to the consumer.
That evil had to be curbed. and that is what has been
done by clause (l)(a) of article 286. It imposes a ban
that no law of a State shall impose or authorise the
imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods
where such sale or purchase takes place outside the
State. This provision clearly indicates that in making
it our Constitution proceeds on the footing that a sale
or purchase has a location or situs. The explanation to
clause (1 )(a) theu goes on to say that for the purpose
of sub-clause (a) a sale or purchase shall be deemed to
have taken place in the State in which the goods have
actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale
or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that
State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general
law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods
has, by reason of such sale or purchase, passed in
another State. The non obstante clause in the Explanation also clearly implies that the framers of the
Constitution adopted the view that a sale or purchase
has a situs and further that it ordinarily takes place at
the place where the property in the goods passes. The
Explanation, however, provides that, in spite of such
general law, a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have
taken place in the •State in which the goods have
actually been delivered as a direct result of snch sale or
purchase for the purpose of consumptioh in that State.
Jn effect, therefore, the Constitution, by this Expla.
nation. to clause (l)(a), acknowledges that under the
geµernl
law the_ sale or pl!rchase of the kiµd therein
.
.
•
S.C.R.
>
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1953
mentioned may not really take place in the delivery
State, but nevertheless requires it to be treated as if it
State of
did. That is to say, the Explanation creates a legal Travancorefiction. Reference may be made to Income-tax ComCochin
missioner' Bombay v. Bombay Trust Corporation( 1 ) and Others
where Viscount Dunedin explains the meaning of a
v.
legal fiction.
Shanm ughha Vilas
0 as e1v
When a legal fiction is thus created, for what pur- Nut Factory
pose, one is led to ask at once, is it so created? In and Others.
In 1'e Coal Economising Gas Company( 2 ) the question
DasJ.
arose as to whether under section 38 of the Companies
Act, 1867, a shareholder could get his name removed
from the register on the ground that the prospectus
was fraudulent in that it did not disclose certain facts,
. or whether his remedy was against the promoter only.
James L.J. said at pages 188-9:
"The Act says that an om1ss10n shall be
deemed fraudulent. It provides that something which
under the general law would not be fraudulent shall
be deemed fraudulent and we are dealing with a case
of that kind. Where the Legislature provides that
something is to be deemed other than it is, we
must be careful to see within what bounds and for
what purpose it is to be so deemed. Now the Act
does not say that the prospectus shall be deemed
fraudulent simpliciter but that it shall be deemed
fraudulent on the part of the person wilfully making
the omission as against a shareholder having no notice
of the matter omitted ; and I am of opinion that the
true intent and meaning of that provision is to give a
personal remedy against the wrongdoer in favour of
the shareholder."
So it was held that the fiction did not operate as
against the company and there could, therefore, be no
rectification of the register. A.gain, in Ex parte
W alton( 3 ), referring to section 23 of the English Bankruptcy Act, 1869, James L.J. said:
"When a statute enacts that something shall be
deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth
(1) [1929] L.R. 57 I.A. 49 at p. 55·
(2) [1875] L.R. I Ch. D. 182.
II
•
81
(3) [1881] L.R. 17 Ch, D. 75Ci.
82
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
'·
was not done, the court is entitled and bound to
ascertain for what purposes and between what persons
T~:::n:L. the statutory fiction is to be resorted to."
Cochin
The above observations were quoted with approval
and Others
by Lord Cairns and Lord Blackburn in Arthur Hill
v.
v. The East and West India Dock Company('). Lord
Shanmugha Vilas Bl kb
Oa•hew
ac urn went on to a dd at page 458
., :
Nut Factory
"I think the words here 'shall be deemed to have
and Others.
surrendered' ............... mean, shall be surrendered so
far as is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
.DasJ,
Act and no further ; ............... "
In the case now before us, we have fortunately not
to speculate as to the purpose for which the Explanation has introduced the fiction. It will be noticed that
the Explanation does not say simpliciter that the sale
or purchase is to be deemed to take place in the
delivery State. By its opening words it expressly says
that the sale or purchase is to be deemed to take place
in the delivery State for the purposes of clause (l)(a).
Therefore, the only effect of this assignment of a
fictional location to a particular kind of sale or purchase in a particular State is to attract the ban of
clause (l)(a) and to take away the taxing power of all
other States in relation to such a sale or purchase even
though the other ingredients which go towards the
making up of a sale or purchase are to be found within
these States or even if under the general law the property in the goods passes in any of those States. The
purpose of the Explanation ends there and cannot be
stretched or extended beyond that purpose.
It is said by some of the Advocates-General that a
sale or purchase which falls within the Explanation is
subject to the taxing power of the State in which the
property in the goods passes under the general law as
well as to the taxing power of the State in which, by
virtue of the Explanation, the property in the goods is
to be deemed to pass. On the other hand some of the
other Advocates-General contend that by virtue of the
Explanation the latter State alone becomes entitled to
tax such a _sale or purchase. Both these contentioirn
1953
(t) [1884] L.R. 9 App. Cas. 448.
'
.
..
-·.+
•
f;i.O.R.
•
•
SUPRE_M:E COURT REPORTS
83
appear to me to be founded on a misapprehension as
JfiaJ
to the real purpose of clause (l)(a) and the Explanation
thereto. As I have already said, the only object of Tr~~~~ 0°fr•.
clause (l)(a) is to prevent the imposition of multiple
Cochin
taxes on a single sale or purchase and, therefore, it and Others
provides that no law of a State shall impose a tax on
v.
sale or purchase which takes place outside the State. ShanmughaVilas
Thus by one stroke the ta:x:ing power of all States N ittCashew
Factory
outside whose territories the sale or purchase is, by the and Others.
fiction, deemed ·to take place is eliminated. To say
that the effect of clause ( l) (a) read in the
Das J.
light of the Explanation is to permit both States,
namely, the State where the property passes under the
general law as well as the State in which, by force of
the Explanation, the sale or purchase is deemed to
take place, to tax such sale or purchase is to stultify
the very purpose of that clause, for, then it will fail to
prevent the imposition of multiple taxes which it is
obviously designed to prevent. It is quite clear also
that clause(l)(a) in terms only takes away the taxing
power of all States with respect to a sale or purchase
which, by reason of the fiction introduced by the
Explanation, is to be deemed to take place outside their
respective territories. The purpose of the Explanation
is only to explain the scope of clause (l)(a). By fictionally locating a sale or purchase in a particular State it,
in effect, says that it takes place outside all other
States so as to give it the benefit of the exemption of
clause (l)(a). The Explanation is neither an exception nor a proviso. It is not its purpose nor does it
purport, substantively and proprio vigore, to confer any
power on any State, not even on the delivery State, to
impose any tax. The fiction of the Explanation
.cannot be extended to any purpose other than the
purpose of clause (l)(a), that is, to any purpose other
than the purpose of taking away the taxing power of
all States outside whose territories the sale or purchase
is, by the fiction, deemed to take place. There its
purpose ends and it cannot be used for the purpose of
giving any taxing power on the delivery State, for
that is quite outside its avowed purpose. Whether the
•
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
1953
[1954]
delivery State can tax the sale or purchase of the kind
mentioned in the Explanation will depend on other
State of
.
.
Travancoreprovis10ns
of t h e Constitut10n.
Neither clause (1) (a)
Cochin
nor the Explanation has any bearing on that
and Others
question.
"~h .
It is urged that even if by virtue of clause (l)(a) all
'
S "anmug aVvlasS
·
· by
Cashew
ta tes m
re1a t'10n t o wh'IC h a sa1e or pureh ase is,
Nut Factory the Explanation, to be 'deemed to take place outside
and dthm.
their limits are precluded from taxing such sale or
purchase and assuming that the Explanation does not,
·DasJ.
by implication or otherwise, permit even the delivery
State to tax such sale or purchase, nevertheless the
delivery State has the power under entry 54 in the
State List read with article 100(3) of the Constitution
to make a law imposing a tax on such sale or purchase.
This certainly would be the position if there was
nothing else in the Constitution. It should be borne
in mind that the State Legislatures may make laws
with respect to taxes on sale or purchase of goods
(entry 54). If in purported exercise of powers under
those entries a State Legislature makes a law imposing
taxes on sale or purchase which partakes of the character of a sale or purchase made in the course of interState trade or commerce it may quite easily encroach
upon the Union Legislative field under entry 42 in the
Union List and such encroachment may conceivably
give rise to questions as to the validity of the State
legislation: It is in order to protect the free flow of
inter-State trade, which is placed in the care of
Parliament alone, against any interference by State
taxation and to prevent a recourse to the argument of
pith and substance in justification of such encroachment by a State on the Union field that the
Constitution, by article 286 (2), has expressly placed a
restriction on the legislative power of the State in
relation to tax on inter-State sale or purchase. Clause
(2) of article 286 provides that, except in so far as
Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of
a State shall impose a tax on the sale or purchase of
goods when such a sale or purchase takes place in the
course of inter-State trade or commerce. Clause (2),
,,
r
•
S.C.R.
....
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
85
1953
therefore, places yet another ban on the taxing power
of the State under entry 54 read with article 100 (3),
State of
in addition to the ban imposed by clause (1) (a). A Travancore·
sale or purchase contemplated by the Explanation to
Cochin
clause (1) (a) undoubtedly partakes of the nature of a and Others
sale or purchase made in the course of inter-State
v.
trade and, therefore, no State, whether it is the State Shan~ug:a Vila•
in which the property in the goods passes under the Nut U:a;:ry
general law or the State where the goods are delivered and Others.
as mentioned in the Explanation, can impose a tax on
DasJ.
such sale or purchase, unless and until Parliament lifts
this ban. This appears to me to be the purpose and
design of clause (2).
It is said that if the sale or purchase referred to in
the Explanation is to be hit by clause (2) then clause
(1) (a) was wholly redundant, for there was no point
in exempting it from the ban imposed by clause (l)(a)
and hitting it by clause (2). As already stated
the purpose of clause (l)(a) is to place a sale or purchase taking place outside a State beyond the taxing
power of that State. The Explanation only explains,
by an illustration as it were, the scope of that ban .
Clause (1) (a) only contemplates one aspect of a sale
or purchase, namely, its territorial location, and by
imposing a ban on the taxing power of a State with
respect to a sale or purchase, which takes place
outside its limits, it purports to remedy the particular
evil of multiple taxation founded on the nexus theory
to which reference has been made. That is the limited
purpose of clause (1) (a) and that purpose is fulfilled
by placing a ban on those States in relation to which
a sale or purchase is, by reason of the Explanation,
deemed to take place outside their territories. Whether
the delivery State where the sale or purchase is deemed
to take place can tax such a sale or purchase is not,
as I have said, the concern of clause (1) (a) or the
Explanation. It is only when the question of the
competency of a State Legislature under entry 54 of
the State List to make a law imposing a tax on a sale
or purchase which by the fiction is deemed to take
place within its territory is raised that clause (2) comes
86
[1954]
1953
into play. That clause looks at a sale or purchase in
its inter-State character and imposes another ban in
State of
7'ra,ancorethe interest of the freedom of internal trade. The
Cochin
immediate purpose of the two bans are, therefore, essenandOthers
tially different and I see no reason to hold that
,.
v.
.
although clause (l)(a) read with the Explanation does
Shan~u~ha Vilas not expressly authorise the State, in which the sale or
Nut ; 0:~ory purchase is, by the Explanation, to be deemed to take
and Others.
place, to tax such sale or purchase, it must nevertheless, by implication, be regarded n6t only as having
Da8J.
authorised that State to do so but as having also
exempted it from the ban imposed by clause (2). To
adopt this course is to resort to the fiction created by
the Explanation for quite a different and collateral
purpose which is entirely beyond its avowed purpose.
This, as I have explained, is, on principle and on
authority, not permissible for the court to do.
The same argument is advanced in a different antl
more attractive language. It is urged that once it is
determined, with the aid of the fiction introduced by
the Explanation that a particular sale or purchase has
taken place within the delivery State, it must follow
as a corollary that the transaction loses its inter-State
character and falls outside the purview of clause (2),
not because the definition in the Explanation is used
for the purpose of clause (2) but because such sale or
purchase becomes, in the eye of the law, a purely local
transaction. I ·am unable to accept this argument
which appears to me to overlook the declared purposes
of clause (l)(a) and of the Explanation. In all interSta te sale or purchase the property passes and the sale
or purchase takes place in one or the other State
according to the rules laid down in the Sale of Goodl'\
Act and the inter-State character of the sale or purchase is not affected or altered by the fact of the
property passing in one State rather than in another.
'Vhat is an inter-State sale or purchase continues to be
such, irrespective of· the State where the property
passes. While, therefore, to locate a sale or purchase,
by a legal fiction, in a particular State, is to make it
appear to be an outside sale or purchase in relation to
0
...
•
S.C.R.
.,.
..,
'
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
87
all other States, so as to attract the ban of clause ( 1)(a)
19sa
on those States, such location cannot possibly alter the
;;;;
8
01
intrinsic inter-State nature or character of the sale or Travancore·
purchase. A sale or purchase which falls within the
Cochin
Explanation does not become, in the eye of the law, a and Others
purely local sale for all purposes or for all times. It is
v. v.
. t h e d el'ivery S tate onI y Shanmugha ilas
to be d eeme d to tak e p1ace m
0 1
for the purpose of clause (l)(a), i.e., for tak.ing Nut;::t~ry
ing away the taxing power of all other States. I can and Others .
see no warrant for the argument that the fiction
Da1J.
embodied in the Explanation for this definitely expressed purpose, can be legitimately used for the entirely
foreign purpose of destroying the inter-State character
of t,he transaction and converting it into an intra-State
sale or purchase for all purposes. Such metamorphosis
appears to me to be completely beyond the purpose
and purview of clause (1) (a) and the Explanation thereto. To accede to this argum<:Jnt will mean that the
Sales Tax Officer of the delivery State will have jurisdiction to call upon dealers outside that State to submit returns of their turnover in respect of goods
delivered by them to dealers in that State under
transactions of sale made by them with dealers within
that State. Thus a dealer in, say, Pepsu who delivers
goods to a dealer in, say, Travancore-Cochin will become
subject to the jurisdiction of the last mentioned State
and will have to file returns of their turnover and
support the same by producing their books of account
there. I cannot imagine that our Constitution-makers
intended to produce this anomalous result. On the
contrary, it appears to me that they enacted clauses (I)
(a) and (2) for the very purpose of preventing this
.anomaly. I repeat that it is not permissible, on principle or on authority, to extend the fiction of the
Explanation beyond its immediate and avowed purpose
which I have explained above. In my judgment, until
Parliament otherwise provides, all sales or purchases
which take place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce are, by clause (2) of article 286, made
immune from taxation by the law of any State, irrespective of the place where the sales or purchases may
take place, either under the general law or by virtue
•
88
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
i 9 .13
State of
TrnvancoreCochin
and Others
v.
of the fiction introduced by the Explanation to clause
(1) (a). If a particular inter-State sale or purchase takes
place outside a State, either under the general law
or by virtue of the fiction created by the Explanation, it is exempted from taxation by the law
of that State both under clause (1) (a) and clause
Shanniugha Vilas (2) •
If sue Ji m
· t,er- St a t e sa Je or pureh ase tak es p 1ace
0 1
"w
within a particular State, either under the general
Nut as
Factory
and Others.
law or by reason of the Explanation, it is still exempt
from taxation even by the law of that State
Das J,
under clause (2), just as a sale or purchase which takes
place within a State, either under the general law or
by reason of the Explanation, cannot be taxed by the
law of that State, if such sale or purchase takes place
in the course of import or export within the meaning of
clause (1) (b).
It is next contended that the ban imposed by
article 286 (2) is itself. subject to the provisions of
article 304. That article is one of the seven articles
(articles 301 to 307) grouped under the heading "Trade,
commerce and intercourse within the territory of
India" in Chapter XIII. Article 301 proclaims that,
subject to the provisions of Part XIII, trade, commerce
and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall
be free. Article 302 empowers Parliament to impose
. by law such restrictions on the freedom of trade,
commerce and intercourse between one State and
another as may be required in public interest. Indeed,
entry 42 in the Union List gives exclusive power to
Parliament to make laws with respect to inter-State
trade and commerce and clause (2) of article 286 also
recognises this power of Parliament. Article 303
prohibits both Parliament and State Legislatures from.
showing preference to one State over another, or
discriminating between the States. Then comes
article 304 which runs as follows:. "304. Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or
article 303, the legislature of a State may by law(a) impose on goods imported from other States
any tax to which similar goods manufactured or
produced in that State 11r~ subject, so 1 however as not
'-
.
,.
""
..
S.C.R.
..
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS·
89
1953
to discriminate between goods so imported and goods
so manufactured or produced, and
Stale of
· (b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the Travancore.
freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or
Oochin
within that State as may be reqilired in the public and Others
interest:
.
S'
vh. V .
,1anmug a i 1aa
Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purpose
Oashew
of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Nut Factory
Legislature of a State without the previous sanction and Others,
of the President."
Das J.
The argument is that the ban imposed by clause (2)
of article 286 should, like article 301, be subordinated
to article 304. I am unable to accept the correctness
of this argument. Article 301 is expressly made subject
to the other provisions of Chapter XIII which includes
article 304 but no part of article 286 is so subjected.
Article 304 (a) gives power to the State Legislatures to
put a tax on goods imported from other States whereas article 286 restricts their taxing power on sale or
purchase, i.e., the transaction itself as distinct from the
goods. Article 304 appears to me to be closely related
to entry 52 in the State List and restricts the State's
powers under that entry but article 286 controls the
State's powers under entry 54 in the State List.. In the
circumstances article 304 cannot properly be read into
article 286. Article 304, of course, can have no bearing
whatever upon clause (1) (b) of article 286.
An argument is advanced suggesting that if all sales
or purchases that take place in the course of interState trade and commerce are put beyond the taxing
power of the States then that fact will very seriously
and prejudicially affect the economy of the States and
may prevent them from discharging the responsibilities,
which all welfare States are expected to do. Apart
from the benefit that a free flow of trade is likely to
bring to the public generally the apprehended danger
appears to me to be more assumed than real. The
proviso to clause (2) empowers the President to direct
the continuation, up to the 31st March, 1951, of the
sales tax whi9h was being levied before the commencement of the Constitution l:l<nd in fact the President, on
12
90
1953
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1954]
the same day as the Constitution came into force,
actually
made an order in exercise of this power as
8tat'e of
hereinbefore stated. There was, therefore, no immediate
1'ravancoreO~chin
danger to State revenue and the statits quo was mainand Othern
tained. :Further' clause (2) itself em powers Parliament
v.
•.
to lift the ban imposeil by it, should Parliament, in the
,%anmugha 1 .las interest of State economy, think fit to do so.
The
Oae/iew
C
·
t'
h
J
't
If
'd
ff'n
1
£
Nut Factory
onst1t~ ion as t ms l se . prov1 qu .,,m.P e sa eguar d s
and 011"'""
and this court need not assume unto itself the fimctions of Parliament and indirectly under the guise of
DasJ.
interpretation seek to secure the safety of State finance
which Parliament itself has adequate direct power
to do .
. Finally, it is said that the effect of holding that
the ban imposed by clause (2) extends to all sales
or purchases which take place in the course of
inter-State trade or commerce will be to place at
a disadvantage the consumers of similar goods manufactured or produced locally, for the actual consumer
will have to pay no tax if he buys similar goods
manufactured in another State direct from the manufacturers or sellers in that other State. I do not
think this objection has much force. Very few actual
consumers take the trouble of importing goods for
their own consumption direct from the manufacturers
or sellers outside their State. Further, the cost of
carriage, handling charges and the risk of loss and
damage in transit will effectively deter actual consumers
from procuring goods direct from outside, for in all
probability the cost of such enterprise will exceed the
sales tax which the consumer will save by not buying
the local goods. Besides, if India is to be regarded as
one economic unit there can be no objection to a
consumer in one State getting goods cheaply from a
neighbouring State.
I now pass on to another important object of article
286 which is to encourage our foreign trade. Power is
given exclusively to Parliament to make laws under
entry 41 with respect to trade and commerce .with
foreign countries and under entry 83 with respect to
duties of custom including export duties. If in addition to the import or export duty, which :Par)iame11t
•
s.c.i~.
•.
-•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91
alone can impose, the State Legislatures were left free
19°3
to make a law under entry 54 in the State List levying
State of
another tax on a sale or purchase which takes place in Travancorethe course of the import of the goods into or the export
Cochin
of the goods out of the territory of India such double and Others
taxation will necessarily increase the price of the goods.
v.
.
Such imposition may easily result_ in our not getting Shanniugha VilM
ca .. hew
imported goods which may be of everyday requirement Nut Factory
at a reasonable price or our not being able to compete and Others .
in the world market with our exported goods. This
Da• J.
will discourage and hamper our foreign trade and
eventually affect the Union revenue. It is to avoid
that calamity that article 286( 1) (b) was introduced in
the Constitution.
Article 286 (1) (b) has to be construed in the light of
its afor~said constitutional purpose and against its
commercial background. Import and export trade
is principally carried on by big mercantile houses.
They purchase goods locally either against orders
secured from overseas buyers or in anticipation of such
orders and send the goods out of India by ]and or sea
to be delivered eventually to the overseas buyers. They
purchase goods in foreign countries against orders
secured from local Indian buyers who may be wholesale
or retail dealers or in anticipation of such orders and
bring them into India by land or sea to be delivered to
their constituents. In some cases the manufacturers
or producers in India may themselves export their
goods direct to overseas buyers and the retail ·dealers
or even actual consumers in India may occasionally
import goods direct from overseas sellers. Export and
import transactions of this clause are, however, comparatively speaking, smaller in volume than the great
bulk of foreign trade put through by the big export
and import houses. The constitutional purpose is to
foster this foreign trade and to preserve the Union
revenue. For achieving that purpose, the Constitution
has by clause (1) (b) of article 286 imposed a ban on the
State Legislatures preventing them from impinging
upon the Union field of foreign trade and imposingtax
on sales or purchases made in the course of import or
e~po~·t under the guise or pretence of making laws
92
[i954j
with respect to taxes on sale or purchase of goods under
entry 54 in the State List.
State of
TravaucoreThe question arises: what is the scope of the ban
Cochin
thus imposed on the States ? The answer will depend
and Othm
on the meaning that may be ascribed to the phrase "in
<'h
v; v .l the course of" occurring in clause ( 1) (b ). It should be
anmugria t as
1 same p h rase 1s
· a1so use d m
· c1ause (2)
cashew
note d t h a t tie
Nut Fadory of that article.
In '1.'he State of Travancore-Oochin v.
and Othm.
The Bomba;y Company Ltd.('), this court has held that
" Whatever else may or may not fall within article
286(1 )(b) sales and purchases which themselves occasion
the exports or imports of the goods, as the case may
be, out of or into the territory of India come within
the exemption ...... " In other words, this court has held
that sales or purchases which themselves occasion the
imports or exports are sales or purchases which take
place " in the course of" import or export. This was
sufficient to dispose of that case and it was not then
necessary to decide what else might fall within that
phrase. This court is now called upon to decide that.
point.
Article 286(l)(b) exempts from taxation by a State
law all sales or purchases which take place "in the
course of the import of the goods into or the export
of the goods ont of the territory of India." . The word
"course" conveys to my mind the idea of a gradual and
continuous flow, an advance, a journey, a passage or
progress from one place to another. Etymologically
it means and implies motion, a forward movement.
'The phrase "in the course of" clearly has reference to a
• period of tinie during which the movement is in progress. Therefore, the words "in the com·se of the
import of the goods into and the export of the goods
out of. the territory of India" obviously cover the
period of time during which the goods are on their
I import or export journey. This view, which has been
said to be founded on mechanical test, is accepted by
the Advocate-General of the appellant State and,
indeed, by all Advocates-General other than those of
Utta1' Pradesh and Mysore. The Advocates-General
of the two last mentioned States seek to limit the
1953
IJ
(I) (I9>2l
s c.n. I1I2.
•
..'
"?
.+
•
S.C.R.
-
I'
SUPREME COURT R"nORTS
.93
exemption only to such sales or purchases as themscl ves occasion the export or import. That narrow
view, however, fails to take note of the etymological
meaning of the word "course" and the very large
number of sales or purchases that take place while the
goods are on the high seas by the endorsement and/or
delivery against payment from hand .·to hand of the
relative shipping documents covering goods worth
crores of rupees. In the case of exports from India,
such sales or purchases in India will not be many for
the shipping documents will ordinarily be sent to the
foreign country and the sales or purchases, if any,
during transit, by delivery of the shipping documents
will take place there. In some cases, however, where
the goods ar.e shipped to the exporter-himself··or his
agent without any previous sale, such sale · by delivery
of shipping documents may take place in India.. But
take the case of an Indian importer who places an order
or indent with an overseas merchant for the supply
of a large quantity . of goods. The goods are shipped and the shipping documents are sent by · air
mail and presented to the Indian importer by the
overseas merchant through his bank. The Indian
importer receives the shipping documents against pay-.
. ment. The goods are, however, on the high seas on
their import journey and it will take some time before
the steamer will arrive. The market may fluctuate in
the meantime. Is the importer to wait patiently with
folded hands trusting to luck that the market may be
in his favour when the goods actually arrive ? Is he
not · to be allowed to make a gain in case there is a rise
in the market rate or cut his loss if there is a downward
tendency in the . market price ? Is he to keep his
money locked up all this time ? The exigencies of
foreign trade require that he must be permitted to sell
the goods by delivering the shipping documents and
realise his money and to again invest it in fresh imports.
This is how foreign trade is done. It is stated in
Halsbury's Law of England (Hailsham Edn.), Vol. '29,
p. 210:
"280. The commercial reason for the evolution of
the 'c.i.£.' contract lies in the length of the time taken
1953
SW.if
TratJal1£0'r~
Cochin
andOtkrs
v.
Shanmuglza Vilas
.
CashmJ
Nu1 Factmy
and Ot/iers.
DasJ.
94
1 953
SUPi~EME COURT REPOR'l S
in the carriage of goods by sea.
1
•
[i954j
It is to the advantage
State of
of neither seller nor buyer that the goods, the subject
Travancore·
matter of the contract should remain en dehors comOochin
merce while they are in course of shipment. It is to
and oa,,,.
the seller's interest to receive the money equivalent to
v.
the goods as soon as possible after the date of the
S/,aa~u~ha Vilas contract of sale, and until he has received actual pav-
Nut ~;:,Y ment of the price he normally desires to be able, if he
and Othm.
Da8 J.
wishes, to obtain credit upon the security of the transaction. The buyer, on the other hand, . normally
desires to be able to deal with the goods, for resale or
finance, as soon as possible. To meet these business ·
necessities on the part of both buyer and seller the
'c.i.f.' contract was evolved."
Such sales or purchases, by delivery of shipping
documents while the goods are on the high seas on their
import journey were and are well recognised species of
transactions done every day on a large scale in big
commercial towns like .Bombay and Calcutta and are
indeed the necessary and concomitant incidents of
foreign trade. To hold that these sales or purchases
do not take place "in the course of" import or export
but are to be regarded as purely ordinary local or home
transactions distinct from foreign trade, is to ignore
the realities of the situation. Such a construction will
permit the imposition of tax by a State over and above
the customs duty or export duty levied by Parliament.
Such double taxation on the same lot of goods will
increase the price of the goods and, in the case of
export, may prevent the exporters from competing in
the world market and, in the case of import, will put a
greater burden on the consumers. This will eventually
hamper and prejudicially affect our foreign trade and
will bring about precisely that calamity which it is the
intention and purpose of our Constitution to prevent.
It is, therefore, clear, to my mind, that the ban imposed
by article 286(l)(b) protects all sales or purchases of
goods that take place during the period the goods are
on the high seas. This construction appears to me to
be imperative not only etymologically but also commercially and constitutionally. Indeed, this view is
implicit in our judgments in the case of The State of
..
s.c.R.
•
SUPREM].l COURT REPORTS
Travancore-Cochin v. The Bombay Company Ltd.(1)
19.;~i
referred to above, in which we said at page 1120:-~
State of
"We are not much impressed with the contention Travarworethat no sale or purchase can be said to take place 'in
Cochin
the course of' export or import unless the property in and Other•
the goods is transferred to the buyer during the actual
v.
.
movements, as for instance where the shipping docu- Shan'/Ju~ha Vila•
ments are endorsed and delivered within the State by Nut as
ew
Factory
the seller to a local agent of the foreign buyer after the and Others.
goods have been actually shipped or where such
documents are cleared on payment or an acceptance by
Da .. J.
the Indian buyer before the arrival of the goods within
the State. This view which la vs undue stress on the
etymology of the word 'coi'.trse' and formulates a
mechanical test for the application of clause (b) places;
in our opinion, too narrow a construction upon that
clause in so far as it seeks to limit its operation only to
sales and purchases effected during the transit of the
goods, and would, if accepted, rob the exemption of
much of its usefulness."
The question immediately arises as to how the period
of time covering the "course" of import or export is to
be measured. When does it begin and when does it
end? The learned Advocate-General of TravancoreCochin contends-and in this he is supported by all the
Advocates-General other than those of Uttar Pradesh
and Mysore-that this period is confined within two
terminii, namely, when the journey of the goods begins
and when it ends. They maintain that the process of
import or export ordinarily begins and ends at water's
edge, although the period of journey of the goods from
th{} port to the place of the importer or his representative in case of import or to the port from the place of
the exporter or his representative in case of export may
be added to the period of the actual voyage on the high
seas. This contention cannot be accepted in view of
our decision in the case of The State of TravancoreOochin v. The Bombay Co. Ltd.(') referred to above.
According to that decision the phrase "in the course of"
is not limited within these two terminii, i.e., from the
point of time the goods are handed over to the c;trrie:r
(r) [l952] S.C.R, r n2,
•
95
96
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
19 •53
up to the time they are delivered by the carrier. By
adopting the principle of integrated activities we have
included the agreement for sale to, or purchase from,
the foreign merchant as taking place within the period
and01hm
connoted by that phrase. The agreement for sale or
v.
purchase, which occasions the export or import as the
Shanrnugha l'il"s
· ob v10us
· l y, m
. pomt
. of time,
.
. to
h
case may be, 1s
anter10r
0
Nu,";.',~ory the actual and physical handing over of the goods to
and Othera.
the carrier for taking the goods out of the country or
for bringing them into the country as the case may be,
DaRJ.
but, nevertheless, such a sale or purchase has been
held to have taken place "in the course of" export or
import and as such exempt from taxation by the
States. The question is how far backward we can trace
the commencement of the "course" of export and how
far forward we can fix the termination of the "course"
of import.
In my judgment the purchase made by the exporter
to implement his agreement for sale with the foreign
buyer is to be regarded as having taken place "in
the course of" export.. I take this 'view, not because
I read the words "in the course of" as synonymous
with the words "for the purpose of" but because
I regard the purchase by the exporter as an activity
so closely integrated with the act of export as to
constitute a part of the export process itself and,
therefore, as having taken place " in the course of "
the export. The learned Attorney-General accepts
this position but the Advocates-General of the
States demur. They maintain that in this view
of the matter one cannot ,stop at the last purchase
by the exporter but has to include the purchase by the
person who sells to the exporter and all previous sales
or purchases until one reaches the producer. I find no
substance or cogency in this line of reasoning. In t.he
last purchase by the exporter we have at least one
party who is directly concerned with or interested in
the actual export. The exporter is the connecting link,
the commercial vinculum, as it were, between the last
purchase and the export. But in the earlier sales or
purchases neither the sellers nor the purchasers are
personally concerned with or interested in the actual
State of
Tra,,ancoi·e·
Gocliin
..
..
.
•
S.C.R.
..
97
1953
export of the goods at all. Therefore the earlier sales
or purchases may be too remote and may not be
State of
regarded as integral parts of the process of export in Travancorethe same sense as the last purchase by the exporter
Cochin
can be so regarded. The line of demarcation is easily and Others
perceptible.
·
Shanmu~i,a Vilas
Let me explain my meaning step by step. As I have
Cashew
already stated, in some cases the exporters receive Nut f!'actory
orders from the foreign buyers and then export the and Others.
goods. It has been held by us that these orders themDas J.
selves occasion the export and, therefore, they take
place "in the course of" export. But these orders can
occasion the export only if the exporters have the
goods to export. The exporters are not necessarily the
producers or manufacturers and in great many cases
they have to procure the goods to implement the
foreign orders. The overseas orders in such cases
immediately necessitate the purchase of the goods and
eventually occasion the export. The three activities
are so intimately and closely connected, like cause and
elfect, with the actual export that they may well be
regarded as integral parts of the process of export
itself. As according to our previous decision the
contract for sale with the foreign buyer starts the
export stream and occasions the export, the purchases
by the exporter to implement such contract necessarily
take place, chronologically speaking, after the export
stream has started and, therefore, must be an activity
undertaken in the course of the export. Logically there
can be no getting away from this conclusion. Therefore,
these purchases to implement the sale which occasions
the export must be immune from sales tax.
Is there any compelling reason to confine this
immunity to sales or purchases to implement a foreign
order or sale? It cannot be overlooked that in a great
majority of cases the export merchants, who, as I have
said, are not, generally speaking, the actual producers
or manufacturers of goods, start purchasing goods in
advance, after taking into account the estimated
quantity of the year's total production, the prevailing
local prices, the likely demi:i,nd from foreign countries
13
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
98
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
..
[1954]
1953
and the prices ruling or likely to rule in the foreign
markets. Such anticipatory purchases form by far the
largest part of the activities of the export merchants
and are regarded by businessmen as necessary incidents
of the export trade. Is there any logical reason why
Shanmn~i, 0 Vilas purchases by the exporters in anticipation of future
Cashew
foreign orders should not also be taken as starting the
Nut Fact°'y
" course " of the flowing stream of the export trade ?
and Othm.
The goods, it is true, are stored in godowns for a while
awaiting actual exportation but that is like a stream
DallJ,
falling into a lake and getting out by an outlet at the
other end so that the undercurrent of the flow, even
if imperceptible on the surface, is nevertheless continuous. One cannot overlook or ignore these well known
preliminary but essential activities of the export
merchants which necessarily precede and lead up to
and, indeed, occasion or eventually make possible the
ultimate physical movement of the goods. To hold
that these purchases are independent local purchases
totally distinct from the export trade will be to unduly
narrow down the wide meaning of the flexible phrase
" in the course of".
I find support for the views I have expressed above
hy the recent decision of the High Court of Australia
in The Queen v. Wilkinson: Ex parte Brazell, Garlick
and Coy(') to which reference may now be made.
Section 11(:3) of a New South Wales statute called the
Marketing of Primary Products Act, 1927-1940, provides, inter .alia, that every producer who, except in
the course of trade or commerce between the. States,
sells or disposes of or delivers .any commodity, in
respect of .which a Board has been appointed, to
persons other than the Board, and every person other
than the Board who, except as aforesaid, buys, accepts
or receives any such commodity from a producer
.shall be guilty of an offence. Brazell, a producer of
potatoes in New South Wales at Dorrigo in New
.South 'JI/ales agreed to sell 48 bags of potatoes of
Garlick Coy & Co., who were buying agents for J. E.
Long & Co., general produce merchants, whose head
,office was at Jennings on the New South Wales side of
State of
1'ravancore·
Cochin
and Others
,_
..
..
S.U.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
99
1.963
the border of that State and Queensland and who
carried on business of purchasing and selling potatoes
State of
in both States. It was a term of the sale that the Travancorepotatoes should be delivered from Brazell's lorry on
Cochin
trucks at Dorrigo in New South Wales. The potatoes and Others
were loaded at Dorrigo railway station into a truck 'h
v.
·
d
b
G
l'
l
C
&
C
J
E
L
&
8 anmugha Vilas
l
anc cons1gne y ar IC { oy
o. to . . . ong
Cashew
Co. at Wallangarra on the Queensland side of the Nut Factory
border adjoining Jennings. The potatoes arrived at and Others.
Wallangarra and were sold by J.E. Long & Co. to a
DasJ.
purchaser in Queensland. Brazell was charged with
the offence of disposing of and Garlick and Coy, the
two partners of Garlick Coy & Co. were charged with
the offence of receiving the potatoes in contravention
of section 11(3) of the Act. The question was whether
the sale by Brazell to Garlick Coy & Co. in New South
Wales was in the course of trade and commerce
between the States. It was found that it was no part
of the contract of sale between Brazell and Garlick
Coy & Co. that the potatoes would go to any ascertained buyer in New South Wales or in any other
State other than Garlick Coy & Co. who were, as
Brazell believed, acting as agents for J. E. Long & Co.,
that Brazell was onlv concerned with the sale of his
potatoes and that when he received his money he had
no further interest in the potatoes, that there was no
evidence that at the time Garlick Coy & Co. received
the potatoes from Brazell there was any contract in
existence for sale of them to any person in Queensland
or any other State or that J. E. Long & Co. had any
definite orders for the supply of them to any ascertained inter.-State buyers or that the potatoes purchased
by Garlick Coy & Co. were to fill any such orders.
There was no binding agreement between Brazell and
Garlick Coy & Co. or J. E. Long & Co. that the
potatoes would be sold to buyers in Queensland. The
Magistrate answered the question in the negative and
convicted Brazell, Garlick and Coy, who thereupon
moved for a writ of prohibition to restrain the informants and the Magistrate from further proceeding on
those convictions. In a joint judgment Dixon,
M:cT.ierman, Fu.Hager and Kitto, JJ. said:-
•
100
SUPI~EME COURi' REPORTS
[1954]
1953
"In our opinion on the foregoing facts the disposal
and
the receiving made the subject of the informations
State of
were
in the course of trade and commerce between the
TravancoreOochin
States, within the meaning of the exception in section
and Others
11( 3). Under the agreement for the sale and purchase
v.
. of the potatoes the agents buying were required to
Shanmugha Vilas consign the potatoes to a railway station in Queens·
Cashew
Nut Factory land, and they did so consign them.
For the purpose
and others.
of the exception the delivery of the potatoes from the
lorry into the railway truck can bear only the aspect
DasJ.
of an essential and integral, even if initial, step in the
transportation of the potatoes to Queensland."
In a separate but concurring judgment Williams J.
said:"It was submitted to the Magistrate that the transaction must be looked at as a whole and not split up
into separate contracts of sale and purchase. The
·Magistrate rejected this submission. In doing so he
fell into error. He should have regarded the transaction as a whole. On this basis the facts proved tµa t
the acts done by the appellants were done in the course
of trade and commerce between the States."
After stating the facts shortly Webb J. said:-" The potatoes went to Queensland and were sold
by the principals in that State. It may be that there
was no binding stipulation that the potatoes would be
sold in another State, and that they could have been
resold in New South Wales without breach of agreement. But a legal nexus with inter-State trade, by a
contract with the grower, is not required to secure the
immunity given by section 92."
Reference was made in this case to the earlier case
of Clements .and Marshall Pty Ltd. v. Field Peas
Marketing Board(') where there were two sets of
contracts, the first being contracts of sale by the
producers to the dealers and the second contracts of
resale by the dealers to buyers in other States. After
pointing out that it was only the second set ofcontracts
which in themselves were inter-State transactions
Dixon J. said at page 429 :
(1) (1947) 76 C.L.R. 401.
..
.,
S.C.R.
strel~EME COURT REPOR'l'S
lOi
19/i3
"We should consider the commercial significance of
transactions and whether they.form an integralpart of
State of
. h
f
a continuous fl. ow or course of tra d e, wh ic , apart rom Travancorethe theoretical legal· possibilities, must commercially
Cochin
involve transfer from one State to another."
and Others.
The reasonings adopted by the learned Judges in the
v.
.
h
f
ll
.c
I
l
(
)
Shamnugha Vilas
2
l
a b ove cases app y wit u iorce not on y to c ause ·
Cashew
but also to clause ( 1)(b) of article 286 and we should Nut Factory
construe the words "in the course of" in the same way and Others.
as it has been done in the case of Queen v. Wilkinson(').
DasJ.
So construed, the purchases made by the exporter even
without any previous order for export form "an essential and integral, even if initial, step" in the exporta"
tion of foe goods. They form "an integral part of a
continuous flow" which is commercially involved in the
export process. No "legal nexus" between these
purchases and the actual physical export is required to
secure immunity from State taxation. In my
judgment the last purchases by the exporters-whether
in fulfilment of foreign orders already secured or in
anticipation of future orders-must, in a commercial
sense, ·be "in the course of" the export. The only way
to give business efficacy to article 286 (1)(b) is to
construe it in this commercial sense. Tax such purchases and you tax the export itself and by that process
eventually cripple our export trade and bring about an
adverse trade balance against us in the long run. It
must always be borne in mind that with our exports
we pay for our imports.
The same considerations apply to the first sale by the
importers of the imported goods. I leave out of
consideration the comparatively few cases of retail
dealers themselves importing goods direct from overseas sellers and the still fewer cases of actual consumers
importing goods for their own consumption. In by far
the largest majority of cases it is the import merchants
who bring goods into the country from abroad. Their
business is to bring in the goods and thereby augment
the general mass of goods in the country. In some
cases the importers secure orders from local dealers and
pursuant to such orders the importers import the goods
(1) (1952) 85 C.L.R. 467 .
•
102
[1954j
from foreign lands. In most cases, .however, the
importers, in intellige11t -a11ticipation of local ·demands
Traoancore·
for such goods, place orders or indents with foreign
Cochin
sellers who, pursuant to such orders, send out the
and Others
goods. Each of these orders or indents placed with the
v. . foreign sellers by the intending importers occasions the
BhamntrghaYilas import and these purchases by the importers are cerNn;a;.;;;~ry tainly "in the course of" import of the goods into India
and 011"•·•.
within the meaning of our previous decision, and as
such exempt from sales tax. We have also seen that
Das J.
the sale or purchase of goods during the period they
are on the high seas is also "in the course of" import
and as such immune from taxation by State law. The
question then arises as to where the course of import
ends. Does it end at the water's edge? If the sale by
the importers while the goods are on the high seas be
"in the course of" import and not liable to sales
tax, there can be no logical reason why the first sale by
the importers to dealers should not also be exempted.
If such sale is to be regarded as purely a local sale and
as such liable to taxation by the States, then, in effect,
the tax will be a burden on the import itself. The
importers have to pay the customs duty imposed by
Parliament and if again the States impose additional
taxes on the same goods such multiple taxation will
raise the price of the goods to the detriment of the
actual consumers and will eventually have an adverse
effect on our import trade which it is the purpose of
the Constitution to prevent. After all the business of
the importers who bring the goods into our country is
only to make the goods available to the internal trade,.
for they are not usually retail dealers who sell to the
consumers direct. That business is completed only by
the first sale by the importers to the dealers, wholesale
or retail. It is only after that first sale of the goods by
the importers to the dealers that the goods become
parts of the general mass of property in the State
concerned and thereafter subject to the taxing power of
that State. The first sale by the importers to dealers,
therefore, appears to me to be so inextricably wound up
with the import itself that it may be commercially
regarded as the culmination of the import activities and,
1953
State Of
JI'
'
,.
S.C.R.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
103
1953
therefore, the end of the course of import. I arrive at
this conclusion not by apply· ing the American doctrine· State oj
of unopened original package, which has now been Travancor•a bandoned even by the Supreme Court of America and
Cochin
has recently been rejected by us in the Prohibition and Others
Gase(') but on a construction of the phrase "in the
v.
.
.
th
l"
l
t
f
•t
t
1
.
th
fShanm.ugha
Vilas
"
course of m . e ig 1 o I s e ymo ogy, e purpose o
0 z
the Constitution and against the background of the Nuta;'::,ry
known notions and practices of businessmen engaged and Others.
in foreign trade. If, however, a particular importer
Das J,
himself happens to be a retail dealer of the goods a.nd
sells the goods to the actual consumers-and such
cases are comparatively few-then such retail sales
may, like local retail sales of similar goods, be liable to
sales tax by the State. Whether an importer is or is
not a retail dealer is a question of fact which is capable
of proof and, therefore, need not be regarded as
creating any insuperable difficulty in the matter of the
assessment of the sales tax. For reasons stated above,
I find no difficulty in holding that just like the last
purchases by the exporters themselves for the purpose
of sending the goods out of the country the
first sales by the importers to dealers of goods
brought by them into the country also come within
the somewhat elastic expression "in the course of"
export or import. As stated above, it is possible to
draw the line there.
Reference is made to Clive M. Schmitthoff's Export
Trad.e (2nd Edition, pagt. 3) where the learned lecturer
says:-"When a merchant shipper in the United Kingdom
buys, for the purpose of export, goods from a manufacturer in the same country the contract of sale is a
home transaction, but when he resells these goods to
a buyer abroad that contract of sale has to be classified
as an export transaction."
The argument formulated on this authority is that.
this passage clearly establishes that the last purchase
by the exporters and the first sales by the importers are
home transactions and cannot be classified as export
or import transactions at all. This distinction between
(r) [r95r] S.C.R, 682,
104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19.54 J
1963
a home transaction and an export transaction made by
the
learned lecturer for the purposes of his book takes
State of
Trnvancore·
us nowhere. Nor do the American decisions which
ao;hin
distinguish between intra-State trade and inter-State
and Othm
trade throw any light on the problem of construction
.
v.
.
of article 28fi (l)(b) which is couched in language quite
Slumniugha
Vilas
d'ff:
· tiie Amer1can
·
Cons t't
cashew
I erent .f ro1n_ th at u~e d _in
.1 ~ t'ion.
Nut l!actOTy
In Amen ca the quest10n is clear cut, namely, is it an
miil Othm. inter-State transaction or an intra-State transaction.
Our problem, on the other hand, is to find out whether
Das J.
a given sale or purchase has taken place "in the course
of" import or export. Simply to say that the particular sale or purchase is a home transaction does not
solve our problem, for to say so is not to say that it
cannot have taken place "in the course of" import or
export. Indeed, article 286 ( 1 )( b) postulates a home
transaction, that is, a transaction which takes place
within the State and then places it beyond the taxing
power of that State on the ground that the transaction,
has taken place "in the course of" import or export.
If the transaction is not a home transaction, i.e.,
if it takes place outside the ·State, clause ( 1) (b) need
not be invoked at all, for then clause (l)(a) will prevent
that State from taxing that outside transaction. It is
only when a particular transaction is a home transaction in the sense that it takes place within the State
that the further question arises, namely, whether that
home transaction has taken place "in the course of"
import or export within the meaning of clause ( 1)(b ).
The circumstance that a sale or purchase is a home
transaction does not, therefore, conclude the matter
and we have yet to solve that further question by the
proper construction of clause (l)(b) according to its·
natural meaning and in the light of the Constitutional
purpose and against the commercial back-ground as
explained above.
A second argument founded on that passage is that
if those home transactions are removed from the sphere
of State taxation then the States will be deprived of
one of the principal and fruitful sources of revenue and
the economy of tqe States will be crippled and may
•
S.C.R.
.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
105
1953
even collapse. It is pointed out that there is no provision in clause (l)(b ), such as there is in clause (2), under
State of
which Parliament may lift the ban and, therefore, to Travancoreplace these home transactions beyond the taxing power
Cochin
of the States will irretrievably deprive them of a very and Others
large part of revenue which they have been realising
v.
.
from these sales or purchases made by the big importers Shanmughha Vilas
£
•
There is
. Nut0 asew
or exporters many of wh om are 1ore1gners.
Factory
no reason, it is urged, why they should not be made and Others.
to pay sales tax like ordinary sellers or buyers in
Das.!.
the States. As already stated, the imposition of
double taxation may eventually hamper our own
foreign trade. The object of our Constitution, apparent from the distribution of legislative powers and
from article 286, 'is to place our inter-State trade and
our foreign trade beyond the taxing power of the
State. In the case of inter-State trade power is
expressly given to Parliament by clause (2) of that
article to lift the ban but in the case of foreign trade
no such power is given to Parliament by that article
to relax or lift the ban imposed by clause(l) (b) on the
legislative power of the State Legislatures. It is for
Parliament alone to make laws with respect to foreign
trade. If the import or export of particular commodities is not beneficial to our country then Parliament,
which is in a much better position than this court to
know and judge of such matters, will, I am sure, make
laws restricting or even prohibiting such imports or
exports. If our imports or exports may bear the
additional burden of taxation without any detriment
to the consumers and our foreign trade and without
any risk to the Union revenue, Parliament, I have no
doubt a_gain, will increase the customs or export duty
and augment the revenue of the Union. If on its
correct interpretation clause (I )(b) of article 286 causes
loss to the States' revenue by depriving them of the
taxes on such sales or purchases then such loss will
clearly and solely be attributable to the intention of
the Constitution as expressed in that clause. If that
clause results in any danger to the economy of the
States, I have no mll.nner of doll,bt that Parliament
•
•
106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
will make good the loss to the States on the recommendation of the Finance Commission under some
State OJ
Travancoreappropriate articl e out of articles 268 to 281 grouped
Cochin
under the heading " Distribution of Revenues between
and Others
the Union and the States " in the very chapter in
v.
. which occurs article 286 which is engaging our attenShaninugha Vilas tion. In any event, the court must construe the
Ni~a~~~%ry Constitution as it finds it and if the construction of
and Others.
the plain language leads to any inconvenience to the
States it will be for authority other than this court to
Das J.
rectify and remove the same.
It is said that it will be very difficult for the Sales
Tax Officer to ascertain how much of the goods purchased by the exporters had actually been exported or
how much of the goods imported by the importers had
actually been distributed amongst the dealers as
opposed to actual consumers. It is pointed out that
ordinarily sales tax is levied on sales and the sellers are
permitted to pass on the tax to the purchasers at the
time of such sales. How, it is asked, is the seller to
know whether his purchaser will actually honour his
representation that he wants the goods for the purpose
of export ? If the seller has no confidence in the
integrity of his purchaser he will not sell to him without sales tax. The purchaser who is really exporter
will not then perhaps buy from such a seller or if in
the case of urgency he buys on payment of the sales
tax may claim the refund, if there be any provision in
that behalf, on proof that he actually exported the
goods. It is said that exporters may change their
minds and sell the goods locally after obtaining the
exemption or the importers may sell the goods themselves in retail to the consumers after having got the
exemption. There is no substance in this line of
theoretical reasoning, for these are matters capable of
being proved. If the exporters or their sellers cannot
prove to the satisfaction of the officer that the exporters
purchased so much goods for export and did actually
export the same or the importers or their purchasers
cannot prove that the importers imported so much
goods and distributed so much amongst the dealers as
1953
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURi' REPORTS
io7
1 953
opposed to actual consumers, they will not get the
benefit of the exemption and that is all. If the Sales
Stat• of
Tax Officer finds no difficulty in ascertaining whether Travancore·
the goods are delivered in a State only for the purpose
Cochin
of consumption within that State or whether they and Others
were delivered for the purpose of resale out of thats,
v.h
.
. th e appl'ica b"l't
f th e E xp1a- ianmug
a Vilas
State so as to ascertam
I I y o
Cashew
nation to clause ( l) (a), why cannot the same offieer Nut Factory
find out what goods were purchased by the exporters and Others.
f r the purpose of export or what part of the
DasJ.
>i1ported goods were sold by the importers to the
dealers ? If the Income-tax Officer can without difficulty ascertain the income, profits and gains of a
business and work out the provisions of section 10
/ of the Indian Income-tax Act and also can ascerr' tain under section 42 of that Act the income deemed
to accrue or arise within the taxable territory, there
cannot be any insuperable difficulty in the way of the
Sales Tax Officer determining the turnover of a particular dealer and working out the exemptions he is
entitled to under article 286(1) (b). In any case the
assumed difficulty of the Sales Tax Officer cannot alter
or affect the correct construction of the constitutional
provisions in question.
To summarise: The State Legislatures, under entry
54 of the State List, have power to make laws with
respect to tax on the sale or purchase of goods. On
this general power article 286 places four restrictions,
namely, that no law ofa State shall impose or authorise
the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods
when such sale or purchase takes place (1) outside the
State, (2) in the course of import or export, (3) in the
course of inter-State trade and commerce and (4) in
respect of essential commodities. The Explanation to
elam;e (1) (a) only explains what is an outside sale or
purchase, for by saying that a particular sale or purchase is to be deemed to take place in a particular
State it only indicates that it is to be deemed to take
place outside all other States so as to attract the ban
of clause(l) (a) and thereby take away the taxing
power of those other States with respect to such sale
or purchase. The Explanation does not operate as an
108
1953
SUPREME COUR± REPORTS
[1954]
exception or a proviso but only explains sub-clause (a).
The
fiction created by the Explanation is only for the
State of
Travanwe·
purposes of sub-clause (a), so that sales or purchases of
Cochin
the kind which fall within the Explanation get the
and Others
benefit of the ban imposed by sub-clause (a). Therefore,
v.
. the purpose of the Explanation read with sub-clause (a)
Shan~ug:a Vila• is only to take away the power of taxation of those
Nut ";a;:ry States in relation to those sales or purchases which are
and Others.
to be deemed to be outside sales or purchases. Its
purpose is not and, indeed, it does not purport, to
DasJ.
confer any taxing power on any State, and it cannot
be resorted to for any such extraneous or collateral
purpose. It does not convert an inter-State sale or
purchase into an intra-State sale for any purpose
other than the limited purpose of sub-clause (a). If
a sale or purchase takes place outside a State, either
under the general law or by virtue of the fiction created
by the Explanation, then that State cannot, under
clause (1) (a), tax such sale or purchase. If a sale or
purchase takes place within a State, either under the
general law or by reason of the Explanation, then, if
such a sale or purchase takes place " in the course of"
inter-State trade and commerce, no State, not even
the State where the sale or purchase takes place as
aforesaid can tax it by reason of clause (2), unless and
until Parliament by law provides otherwise. A sale
or purchase "in the course of" import or export within
the meaning of clause (1) (b) includes (i) a sale or
purchase which itself occasions the import or export as
already held by this court, (ii) a sale or purchase which
takes place while the goods are on the high seas on
their import or export journey and (iii) the last
purchase by the exporter with a view to export and
the first sale by the importer to a dealer after the
arrival of the imported goods. If a sale or purchase
takes place within a State, either under the general
law or by reason of the Explanation, then, if it takes
place in the course of import or export as explained
above, no State, not even the State within which such
sale or purchase takes place can tax it by reason of
clause (1) (b). This, in short, is the true meaning and
import of article 286 as I read and understand it.
s.c.:R.
109
1953
I have already stated, however, that the majority
decision of this court in C. A. No. 204of1952 [The State
State of
of Bombay v. The United Motors (Indict) Ltd.(')] has Travancoretaken a different view of the meaning of clause (1) (a),
Cochin
the Explanation and clause (2) of article 286. In dis- and Others
posing of the present appeals, in so far as such disposal Sh
vh v .1
d.epends on those provisions, I am bound to follow the an~:;h':u, 'as
majority decision rather than my own view of them.
Nut Factory
Bearing in mind the principles laid down by this and Others.
court in The State of 'l.'ravancore-Cochin v. The Bombay
Da" J.
Company Ltd.(') and in C. A. No. 204 of 1952 [The
State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. and
others (')] and those explained above, I now proceed
to consider the rival claims on their respective merits.
There is really no substantial controversy as to the
nature of the business carried on by the respondents.
All of them are exporters of cashew-nut kernels on a
fairly big scale. They procure raw cashew-nuts from
three sources, namely, (i) from within the State of
Travancore-Cochin, (ii) from neighbouring States and
(iii) from Africa. Then they put the raw cashew-nuts
through a certain process and obtain oil and edible
kernels. These edible kernels they export to foreign
countries. It will be recalled that the Travancore Sales
Tax Act imposes taxes only on the purchase of "cashew
and its kernels" but not on the sale thereof. The respondents claim exemption from sales tax for the period
between'the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution
came into force and the 29th May, 1950, which
is the close of the assessment year. In support of
their claim for exemption they rely on article 286 of
the Constitution. It is necessary, therefore, to take
each of the three categories of purchases and see if they
or any part of them come within any of the exemptions provided by that article.
As regards local purchases of raw cashew-nuts there
is 110 controversy that those purchases take place within the State and are, therefore, not entitled to the
protection of article 286 (1) (a). These purchases do
not take place "in the course of" inter-State trade or
(t) [1953] S,C.R. 2069 .
•
(2) [1952] S.C.R. u12.
iio
S"UPREME COUit'l' ItEPOli'i's
[l954j
commerce and, therefore, are not within clause (2) of
that article. The only question is whether these local
Stateof
Travancore·
pureh ases can be said to ta k e p1ace " in the course of "
Cochin
export within the meaning of article 286 (1) (b ). There
and Others
is no dispute that the respondents do not sell the raw
v.
.
cashew-nuts or any portion of it within or without the
Shanmugha Vilas State of Travancore.
They do not sell the edible
Nu~·;:::,Y kernels, which they obtain as a result of the manuand Othm.
facturing process or any part of them within Travancore-Cochin or any other State in India except what
Da' J.
have been described as factory rejections of negligible
quantity which are not fit for export. All edible kernels
are exported to foreign countries. Therefore, the respondents claim that all their purchases, whether made
locally or in neighbouring States or from abroad, are,
"in the course of" export within the meaning of clause
(1) (b) in the sense explained above. The appellant
State, however, maintains that commercially "the
goods " exported are entirely different from " the
goods" purchased by reason of the process of manufacture they are put through and are, therefore, not
entitled to the benefit of the ban imposed by clause
1953
..
(1) (h).
The High Court has, on remand, enquired into the
process of manufacture through which the raw cashewnuts are passed before the edible kernels are obtained.
The High Court, in its judgment on remand, goes
minutely into the different processes of baking or roasting, shelling, pressing, pealing, and so forth. Although
most of the process is done by hand_, part of it is also
done mechanically by drums. Oil is extracted out of
the outer shells as a result of roasting. After roasting
the outer shells are broken and the nuts are obtained.
The poison is eliminated by pealing off the inner skin.
By this process of manufacture the respondents really
consume the raw cashew and produce new commodities.
The resultant products, oil and edible kernels, are well
recognised commerical commodities. They are separate
articles of commerce quite distinct from the raw cashewnuts. Indeed, it is significant that the respondents
place orders for " cashew-nuts " but orders are placed
•
S.C.R.
"·
•
·'-.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
111
with them for" cashew-nut kernels". In the circums1953
tances, "the goods" exported are not the same as the
State of
goods purchased. The goods purchased locally are not Travancoreexported. What are exported are new commodities
Cochin
brought into being as a result of manufacture. There and Others
is a transformation of the goods. The raw cashews are 8
v.
.
consumed by the respondents in the sense that a jute han~u~ha Vilas
mill consumes raw jute, or a textile mill consumes Nuta;~::,Y
cotton and yarn. The raw cashews not being actually and Others.
exported the purchase of raw cashews cannot be said
DasJ.
to have been made" in the course of" export so as to
be entitled to immunity under clause (1) (b).
As regards the purchases of raw cashew-nuts from
the neighbouring States, the position, as found by the
High Court on remand, is that the bulk of such purchases were made by the respondents or their agents
from sellers in the neighbouring States and the goods
so purchased were delivered by the sellers to the respondents or their agents in the States where the purchases
took place. The contract of purchase was fully implemented when as a direct result of the purchase delivery was given outside Travancore. The respondents
or their agents thereafter brought, the goods,
which by then had become their own goods, into
Travancore, by rail or otherwise. The delivery of the
goods under the C<?ntract for purchase having already
taken place outside Travancore, the subsequent despatch of those goods to Travancore cannot possibly be
said to have been delivery within that State as a direct
result of the purchase within the meaning of the
Explanation. Indeed, the learned Advocate-General
of Travancore-Cochin concedes that as purchases of
this type did not fall within the Explanation they must
be regarded as having taken place outside TravancoreCochin and must, accordingly, be exempt from taxation by Travancore-Cochin under article 286 (1) (a).
If it could be shown that although such sales or purchases took place entirely in those other States yet
they were made between two parties residing or carrying on business in two States and for the purpose of
consumption or of sale in the purchasers' State then
these sales or purchases might have been said to ha,vl;l
112
SUP.REME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
been made "in the course of" inter-State trade and comState of
merce and as such exempt from taxation by both the
TravancoreStates under article 286 (2). The transactions of sale or
Oochin
purchase withwhich we are concerned having taken place
and Others
within the period covered by the President's order made
Shamnu~;, 0 Vilas under the proviso to that clause, no protection under
oash<w
clause (2) can be claimed for these transactions. FurNut Factory ther, if the cashew-nuts purchased in neighbouring
and Others.
States were for the purpose of exporting them out of
the territories of India and were actually so exported,
DaaJ,
then these purchases would be " in the course of "
export and as such exempt from tax under article 286
(1) (b). As a matter of fact, however, the cashew-nuts
purchased in the neighbouring States were not actually exported but were put through a process of manufacture and the goods that were exported were not the
same as those that were purchased as explained above
and, therefore, clause (1} (b) gives no protection to these
purchases. On the facts of these cases, these purchases,
however, took place outside Travancore-Cochin and as
such are, therefore, immune from taxation by Travancore-Cochin only under clause (1) (a) which is not
affected by the President's order made under the
proviso to clause (2).
The learned Advocate-General of Travancore-Cochin
says that there is another type of purchase from neighbouring States where the seller in the ·neighbouring State
directly delivers the goods under the contract for sale
or purchase to the respondents in Travancore. Learned
counsel for the respondents maintains that there is
actually no case of purchase of this type. It is not
necessary at this stage to go into this controversy, for,
the matter having been fully argued, it is just as well
to lay down the correct principle applicable to such
purchases, if any. If there is no such purchase where
the seller from the neighbouring State delivers the
goods as a direct result of such purchase to the respondents in Travan core, no question will arise. Assuming
that ther are cases of such purchases, then it is clear
that the first condition of the Explanation is satisfied,
namely, the goods are delivered within the State as a
direct resqtt 9f such purchase, The 11ext question is
;
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
113
1958
-was such delivery for the purpose of consumption in
the State? The raw cashew-nuts, after they reach the
Stat• of
respondents, are put through a process and new articles Travancoreof commerce, namely, cashew-nut oil and edible
Cochin
cashew-nut kernels, are obtained. It follows, there- andOthers
fore, that the raw cashew-nut is consumed by the
v.
.
respondents in the sense I have mentioned. Conse- ShanmughaVzlas
quently, such purchases will fall squarely within the N~a;~:":ory
Explanation and will be deemed to take place in an4 Others.
Travancore so that under clause (l)(a) the neighbourDasJ.
ing States will not be entitled to impose any tax on
these sales or purchases. According to my view, and
on the reasonings adopted in the Australian case, these
purchases are "in the course of" inter-State trade and
as such will he protected by clause (2) but according to
the majority view in the Bombay appeal, which must
prevail, such purchases will become, as a result of the
Explanation, an intra-State purchase in Travancore
and consequently out of the protection of clause (2) and
liable to taxation by Travancore law. Even if according to my view these purchases fall within clause (2)
they will nevertheless be liable to be taxed under the
Travancore Act, in spite of that clause, by virtue of
the order made by the President in exercise of the
powers conferred on him by the proviso to that clause.
These purchases will not get any protection under
clause (1) (b) because the goods purchased were not the
goods that were exported. These purchases, if any,
will, therefore, be liable to be taxed under the Travancore Act.
The third source from which the respondents purchase raw cashew-nuts is Africa. The respondents
place orders for the purchase of raw cashew-nuts
with commission agents in Bombay and the Bombay
agents pass on the orders to the African sellers or
their agents in Bombay. The African sellers then send
the goods by steamer and send the bills of lading,
invoice etc. to their bank in Bombay. The bank
presents the documents to the Bombay agents of the
respondents and the Bombay agents pay the price
•
114
SUPREME· COURT REPORTS
fl954]
1953
and · take delivery of the shipping documents in
Bombay. The Bombay agents then prepare their
own invoice showing the amounts paid by them on
account of the respondents and their own commission
. mvoice
.
.
t oge th er w1'th the sh'1ppmg
.
and sen d t'ne1r
Shvmnu~ha Vilas documents to their Travancore bank. The Travancore
cashew
bank presents all these documents to the respondents
Nut Faetory
who pay the Bombay agents' invoice amount and take
and Othern.
delivery of the shipping documents. All these generally
happen while the goods are on the high seas. On
DrtR J.,
arrival of the goods at Travancore port, the respondents
clear the goods on presenting the bill of lading etc.
This is the main type of purchase of African raw
cashew-nuts. The appellant State concedes that these
are not liable to tax. In the first place the purchases
were outside the State and, therefore, clause (l)(a)
applies. In the next place these purchases took place
"in the course of" import and as such are exempt from
taxation under article 286(1 )(b ), because (i) they themselves occasioned the import as already held by this
court and (ii) the property in the goods passed and
the purchases took place when the goods were on the
high seas. These purchases, however, cannot be said
to have taken place "in the course of" export, for
reasons a.lread y explained.
There is another type of purchase of African raw
cashew-nuts. There the African sellers ship raw
cashew-nuts on their own initiative or at the instance
of their Bombay agents and while the goods are on the
high seas, they are sold by endorsement and delivery of
the bills of lading etc. at Bombay to the Bombay agents
of the respondents and then the same procedure is
followed as in the first case. Here the purchase by the
respondents did not occasion the import, but, nevertheless, the sale or purchase was outside the State and
further the goods being on the high seas at the time
when the property passed such sale or purchase must
be regarded as having taken place "in the course of"
import of the. goods according to the mechanical test
explained above. The learned Advocate-General of the
appellant State does not dispute that such purchases
;J,re also to go free from sales tax,
State of
Trovancore·
Cochin
and Others
-~.
•
. S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
115
1953
..
•
The next type of purchase of African raw cashewnuts is as follows: The different respondents place
State of
separate orders with the same Bombay commission Travancoreagents and the Bombay commission agents place one
Cochin
consolidated order for the entire quantity of the goods and Others
with the African sellers. The African sellers there- "I
v.h v·i
• 1ot of goo d s un d er one b"ll
a i a•
. t h e entire
upon sh ip
1
of" ianmug
cashew
lading and they send the bill of lading and invoice etc. Nut Factory
to their Bombay bank and the Bombay bank presents and Others.
the same to the Bombay agents. The Bombay agents
Da1J.
pay for the entire lot of goods and obtain delivery of
the shipping documents and then they prepare separate
invoices for each of their constituents, namely, the
respondents, including their own commission and split
up the consignment in the sense that they draw separate delivery orders covering the respective quantity of
goods ordered by each respondent and send such invoice
and delivery orders to the Travancore bank, who
presents the same to the respondents who receive the
delivery orders against payment. The goods are then
cleared on the original bill of lading on arrival of the
steamer at Travancore and thereafter the respondents
take delivery of the goods from the warehouse of sellers
or the Bombay agents against their respective delivery
orders. A purchase of this type cannot properly be
said to occasion the import of the goods. What really
.:iccasions the import of the goods is the order placed
by the Bombay agents. The Bombay agents not
having pass.ed the orders placed by the respondents
separately to the African sellers and the African sellers
not having shipped the respective quantities of goods
under separate bills of lading none of the orders can be
said to have occasioned the import, for in such a case
there is no privity between the African sellers and the
individual respondents and the import is referable only
to the orderplaced by the Bombay agents which in the
eye of the law is not the order of any of the respondents
but a consolidated order placed by the Bombay
agents on their own responsibility and account with
the object of eventually distributing the goods amongst
the different respondents in fulfilment of their respective
orders. In the next :place the delivery of the biU of
.
116
1953
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
lading covering the entire goods to the Bombay agents
cannot be said to be a delivery to the respondents of
State of
Trauancorethe goods separately ordered by each of the respond aochin
ents. The sale in such a case takes place in Travanand Others
core on the handing over of the delivery orders to the
v.
.
respective respondents and the delivery of the goods
Slwnnmgha Vila« thereunder from the warehouse in Travancore.
These
Oa.sl"w
i'
. exempt10n
• f rom tax
Nut Factor~
goo ds, th
· ere1ore,
canno t . c]aim
and Other;,
under the provisions of article 286 ( l) (a) or 286 (1) (b)
or 286 (2).
DasJ.
The last type of transaction in African raw cashewnuts is where the purchase takes place after the
cashew-nuts arrive in Travancore port and are thereafter sold and delivered ex-godown to the respondents.
This is clearly a case of intra-State sale and clauses ( 1)
(a) and (2) of the article can have no application to it. ·
The respondents cannot claim exemption under clause
(I )(b) for reasons stated above.
As the respondents do not claim any exemption
from taxation with respect to pre-Constitution purchases, the same need not be discussed separately.
For reasons stated above, the decision of the High
Court must be upheld only to the extent that the
assessments should be quashed. The matter must,
however, go back to the Sales Tax Officer who must
make a reassessment in the light of the principles
laid down in the two previous cases referred to regarding clause (I) (a), the Explanation and clause (2)_ and
in the light of the principles discussed above regarding
clause (1)(b ).
Agent for the appellants in all the appeals: G. H.
Rajadhyaksha.
Agent for the respondents in Appeals Nos. 26 and
33 : Ra.iinder Narain.
Agent for the respondents in Appeals Nos. 27, 30 to
32 and 34 to 36: S. Subrarnanian.
Agent for the Union of India and the States of
Madras, Hyderabad, Punjab and Mysore: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
·
Agent for the St,ate of U. P. ; C, P, Lal,
•
•..
•
J
~
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org