THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER versus THE UNITED MOTORS (INDIA) LTD. AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 30 March 1953 | [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1069 | 1953 INSC 27
Key facts
- Decided
- 30 March 1953
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 204/1952
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1069
- Neutral citation
- 1953 INSC 27
Text of the judgment
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1069
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
AND ANOTHER
v.
THE UNITED MOTORS (INDIA) LTD.
AND OTHERS.
UNION OF INDIA,
. STATE OF BIHAR,
STATE OF MADRAS,
STATE OF MYSORE,
STATE OF WEST BENGAL,
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH,
STATE OF PUNJAB and
STATE OF TRAVANCORECOCHIN
[PATANJALI SASTRI
I
II
'
I'
)- Interveners.
I
I
j
i
c. J., MUKHERJEA,
VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI ,JJ.l
Bombay Sales Tax Act (XXIV of 1952). ss. 2 (14), 5, 6, 7, 11
-Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, l'I'. 5, 6-State law imposing
sales tax-Validity-Powei· of States to levy tax on inter-State sales
-Limitations-Rules-Whether form part of Act-Constitution of
India, 1950, arts. 286 (Z) and (2), 14, 301, 304, 226 -ilieaning and
scope of art. 286 (1) and art. 286 (2)-Application under art. 226
-D11ty of High Court to find whether fundamental rights have been
infringed.
The Legislature of Bombay passed an Act entitled the Bombay Sales Tax ,\ct, 1952, which imposed (by s. 5) a general tax on
every dealer \Vhose turnover in resper;t of saJes within tho State
of Bombay during the prescribed period exceeded Rs. 30,000 and
(by s. 10) a special tax on every dealer whose turnover in respect
of sales of special goods made within the State of Bombay exceeded Rs. 5,000 during the prescribed period. 'fhe term 'sale' was
defined [in s. 2 (l4)] as meaning any transfer of property in goods
for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and
an Explanation to this definition provided th·;t the sale of auy
goods which have actually been clelivered in the State of Bombay
as a direct result of such sale for the purpose of consun1ption in
the said State shall be deemed, for the purposes of the Act, to
have taken place in the said State irrespective of the fact that
the property in the goods has 1 hy reason of c;nch sn.le, passed in
139
1963
Mar~h JO
•
1070
SUPREME coeRT REPORTS
[1953]
another fltate. Rules 5 and 6 of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules,
1952, which were brought into force on the san~e day on which
The State of Bom- ss. 5 and 10 of the Bombay Sales Tax \ct came into force providtm11 aml Another ed for the deduction of the following sales in calculating the taxv.
able turnover, ·viz., sales which take place (a) in the course of the
The Unih'd
import o! the goods into, or the export of the goods out of, the
.\lotor« (India) territory of India, and (b) in the course of inter-State trade or
Ltd. and Other-» commerce (being the two kinds of sales referred to cl. (l)(b) and cl.
(2) respectively of art. 286 of the Constitution). Rule 5 (2) (i),
however, required, as a conditon of the aforesaid deductions, tho,t
the goods should be consigned by a railway, shipping or aircraft
company or country boat registered for carrying cargo or public
motor transport service or by registered post. In •n application
under art. 2% of the Constitution challenging the validity of the
Act and praying inter alia for a writ against the State of Bombay
and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, restraining them from
enforcing the provisions of the Act, the High Court of Bombay
held that the definition of 'sale' in the Act was so wide as to include the three categories of sale exempted by art. 286 of the
Constitution from the imposition of tax by the States, and as
the Act imposed a tax on all such sales, it was wholly void. On
appeal
Held, per (Pata;ija.li Sastri 0. J., Nukherjea, Ghulam
Rasan and Bhagwati JJ,-Bose J. dissenting)-that the Bombay
Sales Tax Act (XXIV of 1952) was not nltra vires the State Legislature on the ground that it contravened art. 14 or art. 286 of the
Constitution. Bui clause (i) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of the Bombay
Sales Tax Rules, 1952, was nltra vires in so far as it provided
that in order that sales mentioned in clause (1) (b) and clause (2)
of art. 286 of the Constitution may be exempt from tax, the goods
shall be consigned only through a railway, shipping or aircraft
1953
company or country boat registered for carrying cargo or public
motor transport service or by registered post. These provisions
of Rule 5 (2) (i) were, however, severable from the other provisions
of the Act and could be ignored.
Per Bose J.-The Bomba)' Sales Tax Act, 1952, is wholly
ultra vires.
Per Patanjali Sastri O.J., Mukherjea and Ghulain Hasan JJ.
-Arbicle 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution read with the Explanation thereto and constrned in the light of art. 301 and art.
304 prohibits the taxation of sales or purchases invo!Ying inter.
State elements by all States except the State in which the goods
are delivered for the purpose of consu1nption therein.
The latter
State is left free to tax such sales or purchases and it derives this
power not by virtue of the Explanation to art. 286 (1) but under
art. 246 (3) read with entry 54 of List II. The view that the
Explanation does not dep1·ive the State in which the p1·operty in
the goods passed, of its taxing power and that consequently both
the State in which the property in the goods passes and t]je State
•
s.c.R.
SUPREME COUR'l' REPOH'l'S
1071
in 'vhich the goods are delivered for constunption lHt\'e the pu\'·ler
to tax, is not corl'flct.
")
(11
.
"
1953
'1.'hcState ofBu1n·
for the purpose of consumption in ba" ,,,~ '· ti
.., ! r"'" 11 no i.cr
derstood as having reference not merely to the individual importer
J'lw u ·iei
or purchaser but as contemplating distribution eventually to \lotors 1 ~·
The expression
" ·
E 1
·
()
.
that Slate m the xp anat10n to cl. 1 of art. 286 must be un-
;7
consumers ~n general within the State, and all buyers 'vit~in the itd. aud 0 ,ih:;:!
Sta to of dehvery from out-of-State sellers, except those buy mg for
re-export out of the State, would he liable to be taxecl by the
State.
(iii) Clause (:l) of art. 286 does not affect the power of the
State in which deliyery of goods is made to tax inter-State sales
or purchases of the kind mentioned in the Explanation to cl. (i).
The effect of the Explanation is that such transactions are sayed
from the ban imposed by art. 286 (2).
(iv) The fact that sales which take plt1Ce (a) in the course
of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, tho
territory ol India and (h) in the course of inter-State tracle or
commerce, are not expressly exempted by the Born hay Sales Tax
Act could not render the Act 1!ltra vires inasmuch as the Rules
framed under the Act and brought into force simultaneously must
be read as a part of the Act and Rules 5 and 6 of these Rules
exempt •uch sales. Delhi Laws Act, In re ([1951] S.C.R. 747)
referred to.
(\') The fact that the Bombay flales Tax Act dues not expreHsly exclude from its operation the transactions mentioned in
art. 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution, vi .. , sales and purchases outside the State, l1oes not render the A.ct u,ltra vires inasmuch as)
on a true construction of the Explanation to art. 286 (1) (a) sales
or purchases in respect of goods delivered for consuinption outside
Bombay are not lttxable under the Act, eyen if the goods are in
Bombay and the sale is effected there.
(vi) The provisions of the charging sections 5 and 10 of tbe
Act fixing Rs. 30,000 and Rs. 5,000 as tbe minimum taxable turnover for general tax and special tax resPectively are not dis·
criminatory and void under art. 14 rea1l with art. 13 of the Constitution aS snch classification is perfectly reasonable and no discrimination is involved in it.
(vii) Taxing statutes imposing tu,x on subjects divisihle in
their nature which do not exclude in express ter1us subjects
exempted by the Constitution, should not for that_~eason be declal'ed wholly nltra vires and void, for, i:1 such (jases it is al\vays
feasible to separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those
levied on exempted subjects and to exclude tbe latter in the
assessment to tax. In such cases the statute itself should bo
allowed to stand, the taxing authority being prevented by injunction from imposing the tax on subjects exempted by the Constitution.
•
1072
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
>
[1953]
Bowman v. Continental Co. (256 U. S. 642; 65 L. l!ld. 1130)
relied on. Punjab Province v. Dattlat Singh tind Another ([1942]
The State of Boin- F.C.R. 67) distinguished.
bay and Anothe,r
(viii) A sale "in the course of inter-State trade" in art.
' vu. .
286 (2) of the Constitution includes a sale by a trader in one
T
0
mted
· ;.s
· no t con·
.., "' (I
a· ) otate
to a consumer in
another S tate. Tlie expression
~n.otor8
11 ia
Ltd. aiul Others fined to sales between t"'O traders only.
(ix) The expression "for such State 01· any part thereof"
in art. 246 (3) of the Constitution cannot be taken to import into
entry 54 of List II the restriction that the sale or purchase referred to must take place within the territory of that State. All that
it means is that the laws which a State is empowered to make
must be for the purposes of that State.
(x) It is always desirable when relief under art. 226 is
sought on allegations of infringement of fundamental rights, that
the Court should satisfy itself that such allegations are well
founded before proceeding further with the matter.
1963
Bose J.-(i) Article 286 (2) cannot be construed in the light
of art. 304 (l) as the two articles deal with different matters.
(ii) The basic idea underlying art. 286 is to prohibit taxation in the case of inter-State trade and commerce until the ban
under cl. (2) of the said article is lifted by Parliament, and
always in the case of imports and exiiorts. When the ban is
lifted, the l!lxplanation to cl. (l) of 286 comes into play to determine the situs of the sale. This Explanation does not govern cl. (2)
of art. 286 and, as it can only apply to transactions which in
truth and in fact take place in the course of inter-State trade and
commerce, there is no need to call it in aid until the ban is
removed.
(iii) Explanation (2) to the definition of sale in s. 2 (14) of
the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952, which embodies word for word
the provisions of the l!lxp!anation to art. 286 (1) directly offends
cl. (2) of the said article as the ban under cl. (2) has not been lifted by the Parliament.
(iv) Assuming that the Bombay Sales Tax Rules exclude
all sales which are exempt from taxation under the Constitution,
they cannot save the Act, for the Rules are made by a subordinate authority which is not the legislature and the validity of an
Act of the legislature cannot be made to depend on what a
subordinate authority choses to do or not to do.
(v) The good portion of the Act cannot be separated from
the bad in this case, even if the Explanation to s. 2 (14) is
expunged and the whole Act is therefore ultra vires.
Bllagwati J.-(i) Under the general law relating to sale of
goods, a sale must be regarded as having "taken place" in the
State in which the property in the goods sold bas passed to the
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1073
1953
purchaser and that State is entitled to tax the sale or purchase
as having taken place inside the State. The Explanation to art.
-286 (1) does not take away the right which the State in which TJ,, "'"'' 0/Bom·
the property in the goods passed has to tax the sale or purchase bn!f and Another
but only deems such purchase or sale, by a legal fiction, to haYe
v.
taken place in the State in which the delivery of the goods bas
The Unitcrl
been made for consumption therein so as to enable the latter ,\lotvrs (India)
State also, to tax the sale or purchase in question. The Explana· Lid. and Others
tion only lifts the ban imposed by cl. (1) (a) on taxation of s>eles
or purchases which take place outside the State, to the extent of
the transactions mentioned in the Explanation to enable the delivery State also to tax them.
(ii) Delivery of the goods for the purpose of consumption
in the delivery State means delivery for the purpose of use by
the consumers, and does not include delivery to a dealer purchasing the goods across the border for dealing with or disposing of
the same in the ordinary course of trade, and the J<lxplanation to
art. 286 (1) therefore only covers those cases where, as a direct
result of the sale or purchase, goods are delivered for consumption
in the delivery State by the consumer and the delivery State can
tax only this limited class of transactions under the Explanation.
(iii) The genernl provision enacted in arL 286 (2) against
the imposition 'Of tax on the sale or purchase of goods in the
course of inter-State trade 01· commerce should give way to the
special provision which is enacted in the Explanation to art. 286
(1) {a) enabling the delivery State to tax such sale or purchase in
the limited class of cases covered by the Explanation, the transactions covered by the Explanation lJeing thus lifted out of the category of transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and assimilated to transactions of sale or purchase \vhich
take place inside the State and thus invested with the character
of an intra-State sale or purchase so far as the delivery State is
concerned.
CIVIL APPELLATE J URISDIC'l'lON : Civil Appeal
No. 204 of 1952.
Appeal under article 132 (l) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated 11th December, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Dixit J.) in Miscellaneous Application No. 289 of 1952. The material facts are stated
in the judgment.
1vf. P. Arnin, Advocute·General of Bornbuy, (M ..ilf.
Desai and G. N. Joshi, with him) for the appellants.
N. ltf. Seervai and J.B. Dadachanji for the respondents.
•
.
,
SUPREME COUR'r REPOR'fS
1074
[1953]
Jvl. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (Porus
A. 1l1ehta, with him) for the Union of I1'idift.
~-~-. Sinha
,.
.
bay aud Another
Lal Narain
for the State of B1har.
v. .
V. K. '!'. Chari, Advowte-General of Jl!Iadms, (A.
The Umtcd_
Kuppuswami, with him) for the State of Madras.
1953
,
Jlotors (Indra)
Ltd. ""'l Othcro.
.
A. R. Soinanatha Iyer, Advocate-Cleneral of 1l1ysore,
(R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the State of Mysore.
B. Sen for the State of West Bengal.
K. L. 1lfisro, Adrncate-General of Uttar Pradesh,
K. B. Asthanrt, with him) for the State of Uttar
Pradesh.
S. JV]. Sikri, Advocate-Geneml of Punjab, (111. L.
Sethi, with him) for the State of Punjab.
'l.'. N. Subrahmanya Iyer, Advocate-Cleneml of
'L'ravancore-Oochin State, (1vl. R. Krishnrt Pillrti, with
him) for the State of Travancorc-Oochin.
1953. l\farch 30. The judgment of Patanjali
Sastri 0. J., Mukherjea and Ghulam Hasan JJ. was
delivered by Patanjali Sastri 0. J. Vivian Bose and
Bhagwati JJ. delivered separate judgments.
PATANJALI S,1sTR1 C. ,J.-This is an appeal from the
judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay <leclaring the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952,
(Act XXIV of 1952), itltra vires the State Legislature
and issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus against the
State of Bombay and the Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay, appellants herein, directing them to forbear and
desist from enforcing the provisions of the said Act
against the respondents who are dealers in motor cars
in Bombay.
The Legislature of the State of Born bay enacted the
Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to
as "the Act") and it was brought into force on October 9, 1952, hy notification issue\! under section 1 (3)
of the Act, except sections 5, 9, 10 and 47 which came
into operation on November 1, 1952, as notified under
section 2 (3). On the same day the rules made by the
State Government in exercise of the power conferred
by section 45 of the Act also came into force.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1075
On November 3, 1952, the respondents 1 to 6, who
1953
are companies· incorporated unrlPr the Indian Com- Ti 8 ---. """ct,
'
l\T
w tateofBompames
1.9 l 3, and respomIent "'o.
7, a partners h'ip l>mi
and Another
firm, all of whom are carrying on business in Bombay · '"
of buying and selling motor cars, presented a petition The Unitfd
to the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution Motors (India)
challenging the validity of the Act on the ground that Ltd. and Othm
it is ultra vires the State Legislature, inasmuch as it J)afanjnli
lnu·1Jorted to tax sales ancl rmrchases of '--'goods regard._,
8aNtti C,J,
less of the rc8trictions imposed on r-ltate legislative
power by article 28G of the Constitution. It was also
alleged that the provisions of the Act \VC;re discriminatory in their effect and, therefore, void under article
14 read with article 13 of the Constitution. The respondents accordingly prayed for the issue of a writ in
the nature of mandamus against the appellants preventing them from enforcing the provisions of the Act
against the respondents. A further ground of attack
was added by amendment of the petition to the effect
that the Act being wholly ultra vires and void, the
provisions requiring dealers to apply for registration
in some cases and to obtain a licence in some others
as a condition of carrying on their business, infringed
the fundamental rights of the respondents under
article HJ (1) (g) of the Constitution.
In the affidavit filed in answer the appellants
traversed the allegations in the petition and contended, inter alia, that the Act was a complete code and
provided for special machinery for dealing with all
questions arising under it, inclurling questions of constitutionality, and, therefore, thr petition was not
maintainable, that the present case was not an
appropriate one for the issue of a writ under article
226 as the validity of the imposition of a tax was
questioned, that no assessment proeeedings having been
initiated against the respondents and no demand
notice having been iswed, ihe respondents had no
cause of action, and that, properly construed, the Act
and the Rules did not contravene ai·tiele 286 or any
other provisions of the Constitution and did not
infringe :my fundamental right of the respondents,
•
1076
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1963
The petition was heard by a Division Bench of the
The State of Bom. High et;urt co~sistin& o: Chagla _C. J: and
J.
bay. and Another Chagla C. J., \\ho delivered the Judgment, D1x1t J.
v.
concurring, overruled the preliminary objection disTke United
tinguishing the decisions cited in support thereof by
Motors (Indw) pointing out that the principle that a (;()Hrt would
Ltd. and
·
_ Othm not issue
a preroga t"1ve wr1"t wJien an ad equat e a1terPatanjali
native remedy was available could not apply where,
sa,,tri o.J.
as here, a party came to the court with an allegation
tliat his fundamental rights had been infringed and
sought relief under article 226. The learned Judges
however thought, in view of the conclusion they had
come to on the question of competency of the State
Legislature to pass the Act, it was "not necessary to
consider the challenge that has been made to the Act
under articles 14 and 19" and expressed no opinion on
the alleged infringement of the respondents' fundamental rights.
D!x!t
On the merits, the learned .Judges held that the
definition of "sale" in the Act was so wide as to
include the three categories of sale exempted by
article 286 . from the imposition of sales tax by the
Rtates, and, as the definition governed the charging
sections 5 and 10, the Act must be taken to impose the
tax:; on such sales also in contravention of article 286.
The.Act must, therefore, be declared wholly void, it
being impossible to sever any specific offending provision so as to save the rest of the Act, as "the defini.
tion pervades the whole Act and the whole scheme of
the Act is bound up with the definition of sale". The
learned .Judges rejected the argument that the Act
and the Rule(must be read together to see whether
the State has made a law imposing a tax in contravention of article 286, remarking that "if the Act itself is
bad, the rules, made under it cannot have any
greater efficacy". Nor was the Government, which
was authorised to make rules for earrying out the
purpose of the Act, under an obligation to exclude
the exempted sales. The rules, too, did not exclude
all the three categories of exempted sn,les but only
two of them, anrl even stwh exrlnsion was hedged
,.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1077
19 3
In view of the importance of the issues involved,
"
notice of_ the appeal was issued to the Advocates-The State of Bom.
General oi States under Order XLI, Rule l, and many bay and Another
of them intervened and appeared before us. The
v.
Attorney-General of India, to whom notice was also The United
sent, intervened on behalf of the Union of India. We ~~0" ~~·~ia)
have thus had the assistance of a full argument deal· "..'.'._ t ers.
ing with all aspects of the case.
Patanjali
Sastri ~0 .J.
The Advocate-General of Bombay, appearing on
behalf of the appellants, took strong :exception to the
manner in which the learned Judges below disposed of the objection to the maintainability of the
petition. He complained that, having entertained
the petition on the ground that infringement of fundamental rights was alleged, and that the remedy ·under
article 226 was, therefore, appropriate, the learned
Judges issued a writ without finding that any.fundamental right had in fact been infringed. Learned
counsel for the State of West Bengal also represented
that parties in that State frequently got petitions
under article 226 admitted by alleging violation of
some fundamental right, and the court sometimes
issued the writ asked for without insisting on the
allegation being substantiated. We are of opinion
that it is always desirable, when relief under article
226 is sought on allegations of infringement of fundamental. rights, that the court should satisfy itself that
such allegations are well founded before proceeding
further with the matter. In the present case, however, the appellants can have no· grievance, as the
respondents' allegation of infringement of their fundamental right under article 19 (1) (g) was based on
their contention that the Act was ultra vires the State
Legislature, and that contention having been accepted
by the Court below, there would clearly be an unauthorised restriction on the respondents' right to
carry on their trade, registration and licence being
required only to facilitate collection of the tax imposed. As !\fr. Seervai for the respondents rightly submitted, the fact that the Court below left the question
undecided, though the point was concluded by the
140
1078
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
i9 3
[1953]
decision of this Court in .'l!ohammad Yasin v. Tlze
--.,B
Town Area Committee,
Jalalabad ('); which was
.
Th e 8 tate oJ 01nbay and Another brought to the notice of the learned Judges, was not
v.
the fault of the respondents and gave no real cause
The United for complaint.
11Iot<>rs (India)
.
.
.
Ltd. and Others
Before cons1dermg whether the appellant State has
made a law imposing, or authorising the imposition
Patanjali
of, a tax on sales or purchases of goods in disregard
8ast1'i O.J.
of constitutional restrictions on its legislative power
in that behalf, it is necessary to aseert.ain the scope of
such power and the nature and extent of the restrictions placed upon it by article 286. The power is
conferred by article 246 (3) read with entry 54 of List
II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The
Legislature of any State has, under these provisions,
the exclusive power to make laws "for such State or
any part thereof" with respect to "taxes on the sale
or purchase of goods other than newspapers". The
expression "for such State or any part thereof" cannot, in our view, be taken to import into entry 54 the
restriction that the saJe or purchase referred to must
take place within the territory of that State. All that
it means is that the laws whieh a State is empowered
to make must be for the purposes of that State. As
pointed out by the Privy Council in the Wallace Brothers case (') in dealing with the competency of the
Indian Legislature to impose tax on the income arising abroad to a non-resident foreign company, the
constitutional validity of the relevant statutory provisions did not turn on the possession by the legislature of extra-territorial powers but on the existence
of a sufficient territorial connection between the taxing State and what it seeks to tax. In the case of
sales-tax it is not necessary that the sale or purchase
should take place within the territorial limits of the
State in the sense that all the ingredients of a sale
like the agreement to sell, the passing of title, delivery
of the goods, etc., should have a territorial connection
with the State. Broadly speaking, local activities of
buying or selling carried on in the State in relation to
local goods would be a suffieient basis to sustain the
taxing power of the State, provided of course, such
s
Ir) [1952] S.C.R. 572.
(2) [1948] S.C.R. r.
•
S.C.R.
SUPRE~1E COUR'l' UE.PORTS
1079
1953
activities ulti1?ately resulted in a concluded sale or
purchase to be taxed.
'}_'he State of Boniln exercise of the legislative powor conferred upon bay "'"1 Another
them in substantially similar terms by the Governv.
ment of India Act, 1935, the Provincial Legislatures The United
.£"
il'.lotor;.: (India)
enacted sa1es-tax laws 1or their respective Provinces, Ltd. and Other.•.
acting on the principle of territorial nexus referred to
above; that is to say, they picked out one or more of Patanjat1.
the ingredients constituting a sale and made them the 8a.•tri O.J.
basis of their sales-tax legislation. Assam and Bengal made among other things the actual existence
of the goods in the Province at the time of the contract of sale the test of taxability. In Bihar the production or manufacture of the good~ in the Province
was made an additional ground. A net of the widest
range perhaps was laid in Central Provinces and Berar
where it was sufficient if the goods were actually
"found" in the Province at any time after the contract
of sale or pure hase in respect thereof was made.
Whether the territorial nexus put forward as the basis
of the taxing power in each case would be sustiiined
as sufficient was a matter of doubt not having been
tested in a court of law. And such claims to taxing
power led to multiple taxation of the same trnnsaction bv difforent Provinces and cumulation of the
burdei; falling ultimately on the consuming public.
This situation posed to the Constitution makers the
problem of restrieting the taxing power on sales or
purchases involving inter-State elements, and alleviating the tax burden on the consumer. At the same time
they were evidently anxious to maintain the State
power of imposing non-discriminatory taxes on goodH
imported from other States, while upholding the
economic unity of India by providing for the freedom
of inter-State trade and commerce. In their attempt
to harmonise and achieve these somewhat conflicting
objectives they enacted articles 286, 301 aml 304.
These articles read as follows :
286. (1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of
good8 where sueh sale or purchase takes place-
1080
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953j
(a) outside the State ; or
(b) in the course of the i~port oft!1e go_ods iu~o,
1'heStateofBombay and Another or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.
v. .
Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a),
1
,} " U(nlttedd. J a sale or 1mrchase shall be deemed to have ta ken
,1.r.1.otors n 1a
·
.
.
1
Ltd. and Others place in the State m which the goods have actual y
- . been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purPatanjali
chase for the purpose of consumption in that State,
SaslYi o.J.
notwithstanding the fact that under the general law
relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has
by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another
State.
(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law
otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or
authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce :
Provided that the President may by order direct
that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which
was being lawfully levied by the Government of any
State immediately before the commencement of this
Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this
clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day
of March, 1951.
(3) So law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the
sale or purchase of any such goods as have been
declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the
life of the community shall have effect unless it has
been reserved for the consideration of the President
and has received his assent.
301. Subject to the other provisions of this Part,
trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.
304. Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or
article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law(a) impose on goods imported from other States
any tax to which similar goods manufactured or
1953
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
108i
produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not
J&5J
to discriminate !Jetween '-'goods so imported and goods
Tl s· -.,
,
w tate oJ 8 01n·
so manufactured or produced ; and
bay and Another
(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the
v.
' t ercourse wit
· h or }J'l'hc
Unite4
f.ree d om of trad e, commerce or Ill
t
(I d' J
within that State as may be required in th0 public ~t~. ;:d 0;,.;~.
interest:
Provided that no Bill or amendment for the pur- Patan}ali
8astri O.J.
poses of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the
Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of
the President.
It will be seen that the principle of freedom of inter8tate trade and commerce declared in article 301 is
expressly subordinated to the State power of taxing
goods imported from sister States, provided only no
discrin1ination is made in favour of similar goods of
local origin. Thus the States in India have full power
of imposing what in American State legislation is called
the use tax, gross receipts tax, etc. not to speak of the
familiar property tax, subject only to the condition
that such tax is imposed on all goods of the same kind
produGed or manufactured in the taxing State,
although such taxation is undoubtedly calculated to
fetter inter-State trade and commerce. In other words,
the commercial unity of India is made to give way
before the State-power of imposing "any" non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from sister States.
Having thus provided for the freedom of inter-State
trade and commerce subject to the important qualification mentioned above, the authors of the Constitution had to devise a formula of restrictions to be
imposed on the State-power of taxing sales or purchases
involving inter-State elements which would avoid the
doubts and difficulties arising out of the imposition of
sales-tax on the same transaction by several Provincial
Legislatures in the country before the commencement
of the Constitution. This they did by enacting
clause (1) (a) with the Explanation and clause (2) of
article 286. Clause (1) (a) prohibits the taxation of all
sales or purchases which take place oul8ide the State,
0
•
1082
1953
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
but a localised sale is a troublesome coi;i.cept, for, a sale
B
is a composite transaction involving as it does several
The Stateo1 om· ]
h
11
c
f
bay and Another e ements sue as agreement to se , trans1er o ownerv.
ship, payment of the price, delivery of the goods and
Tlte United
so forth, which may take place at different places.
Motor• (India) How, then, is it to be determined whether a particular
Ltd. and Others. sale or purchase took place within or outside the State ?
Pa~injalt
sastri o.J.
It is difficult to say that any one of the ingredients
mentioned above is more essential to a sale or purchase than the others. To solve the difficulty an easily
applicabie test for determining what is an outside sale
had to be formulated, and that is what, in our opinion,
the Explanation was intended to do. It provides by
means of a legal fiction that the State in which the
goods sold or purchased are actually delivered for consumption therein is the State in which the sale or
purchase is to be considered to have taken place,
notwithstanding the property in such goods passed in
another State. Why an " outside " sale or purchase is
explained by defining what is an inside sale, and why
actual delivery and consumption in the State are made
the determining factors in locating a sale or purchase
will presently appear. The test of sufficient territorial
nexus was thus replaced by a simpler and more easily
workable test: Are the goods actually delivered in the
taxing State, as a direct result of a sale or purchase,
for the purpose of consumption therein ? Then, such
sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place
in that State and outside all other States. The latter
States are prohibited from taxing the sale or purchase;
the former alone is left free to do so. Multiple taxation
of the same transaction by different States is also thus
avoided.
It is, however, argued on behalf of Bombay that the
Explanation does not say that the State of delivery is
the only State in which the sale or purchase shall be
deemed to have taken place. If that was the intention,
it would have been easy to say so. On the other hand,
the non-obstante clause in the Explanation is said to
indicate that, apart from cases covered by the legal
fiction, the passing of property in the goods is to determine the place of sale. Thus, both the State of delivery
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1083
and the State in which the property in the goods sold
1953
passes are, it is'claimed, empowered to tax. We are
--unable to accept this view. It is really not necessary 7'he State of Boin•
·
• .
.
bay and An.other
m the context to use the word "only ·' m the way
v.
suggested, for, when the Explanation says that a sale The United
or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in Motors (l11dia)
a particular State, it follows that it shall be deemed Ltd. and Others,
lilso to have taken place outside the other States. Nor
Patanjali
can t.lie non-obstante clause be understood as implying Sast•i o.J.
that, under the general law relating to the sale of
goods, the paosing of the property in the goods is the
determining factor in locating a sale or purchase.
Neither the Sale of Goods Act nor the common law
relating to the sale of goods has anything to say as to
what the situs of a sale is, though certain rules have
heen la id down for ascertaining the intention of the
contracting parties as to when or imder what conditions
the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer. That
question often raises ticklish problems for lawyers and
courts, and to make the passing of title the determining factor in the location 0f a sale or purchase would
be to replace old uncertainties and difficulties connected with the nexus basis with new ones. Nor would
the hardship of multiple taxation be obviated if two
States were still free to impose tax on the same transaction. In our opinion, the non-obstante clause was
inserted in the Explanation simply with a view to make
it clear beyond all possible doubt that it was immaterial where the property in the goods passed, as it
might otherwise be regarded as indicative of the place
of sale.
It is also to bP noted in this connection that, on the
construction suggested by the Advocate-General of
Bombay, namely, that the Explanation was not
intended to deprive the State in which the property in
the goods passed of its taxing power, but only to
exclude the sales or purchases of the kind described in
the Explanation from the operation of clause (1) (a)
which prohibits taxation of outside sales or purchases,
the Explanation would operate, not as an explanation,
but ris an exception or a proviso to that clause. It
•
1084
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
may be that the description of a provjsion cannot be
--JB
decisive of its true meaning or interpretation which
Th e S tate o omd
d
1
d
d h · b
h
bay and Another must epen Ont le WOr S USC t erem, ut, W en two
v.
interpretations are sought to be put upon a provision,
The United
that which fits the description which the legislature
Motors (India) has chosen to apply to it is, according to sound canons
Ltd. and Othm of construction, to be adopted provided, of course, it is
consistent with the language employed, in preference
Patanjali
h
to
the one which attributes to t e provision a different
Sastri 0.J.
effect from what it should have according to its description by the legislatnre.
It was then said that the formula of delivery for
consumption within a State could only cover the comparatively few cases of sales or purchases taking place
directly between the consumers in the delivery State
and dealers in other States, and inter-State sales or
purchases between dealers in either State, which must
be larger in number and volume, would still be outside the scope of the Explanation, which could not,
therefore, have been intended to empower only one
State, namely, the delivery State, to tax all inter-State
sales or purchases. We see no force in this objection.
It is to be noted that the Explanation does not say
that the consumption should be by the purchaser
himself. Nor do the words " as a direct result "
have reference to consumption. They qualify "actual
delivery". The expression " for the purpose of consumption in that State" must, in our opinion, be
understood as having reference not merely to the
individual importer or purchaser but as contemplating
distribution eventually to consumers in general within
the State. Thus all. buyers within the State of delivery
1from out-of-State sellers, except those buying for
re-export out of the State, would be within the scope
of the Explanation and liable to be taxed by the State
on their inter-State transactions. It should be remembered here that the Explanation deals only with interState sales or purchases and not with purely local or
domestic transactions. That these are subject to the
taxing power of the State has never been questioned.
We are therefore of opinion that article 286 (1) (a)
read with the Explanation prohibits taxation of sales
ma
'
I
•
•
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1085
or purchases involving inter-State elements by all
I96J
States except the State in which the goods are deli-c
th
f
•
h . . h The State of BomV~re d 1or
e purJ.>OSe o consumpt10n t erem m t e bay and Another
wider sense explamed above. The latter State is left
v.
free to tax such sales or purchases, which power it The United
derives not by virtue of the Explanation but under Mot<w• (India)
article 246 (3) read with entry 54 of List II.
Ltd. and Other•-.
We will now consider the effect of article286(2) on
Patanjali
the taxability of inter-State sales or purchases of the Sastri a.J.
kind envisaged by the Explanation to clause(l)(a).
As both the Explanation and clause (2) deal only with
inter-State transactions, it may appear at first blush
that whatever taxing power the Explanation may have
reserved to the State of delivery is nullified by clause
(2), at any rate until Parliament chooses to lift the
ban under the power reserved to it by the opening
words of clause (2). As one way of avoiding this result
it was suggested by the Advocate-General of Bombay
that the expression "inter-State trade and. commerce"
in clause (2) may be construed as meaning dealings
between a trader in one State and a trader in another,
so that the clause would be applicable only to sales or
purchases in the course of dealings between such
traders. The ban under clause (2) could not, in that
view, affect the taxability of a sale by a trader in one
State to a consumer or user in another. We cannot
agree with this restrictive interpretation of the expression " inter-State trade and commerce". The sale by
a trader in one State to a user in another would be a
sale "in the course of inter-State trade" according to
the natural meaning of those words, and we can see no
reason for importing the restriction that the transaction should be one between two traders only. This is,
however, not to say that the ban under clause (2)
extends to the taxing power which the delivery State
is left free, under the Explanation, to exercise. We
are of opinion that the operation of clause (2) stands
excluded as a result of the legal fiction enacted in the
explanation, and the State in which the goods are
actually delivered for consumption can impose tax on
inter-State sales or purchases. The effect of the
141
•
1086
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
Explanation in regard to inter-State de,alings is, in our
view, to invest what, in truth, is an inter-State transacThe State of Bom- tion with an intra-State character in relation to the State
ba11
£
have no
· and Another of del"ivery, and clause (2)
· can, t hereiore,
1'/w ~nited
application. It is true that the legal fiction is
Motor., (Iadia) to operate "for the purposes of sub-clause (a) of
Ltd. aad oaie,.s. clause (1)", !mt that means merely that the Explanation is designed to explain the meaning of the expresPatanjati
· c.Ja use (1) (a ). Wh en once,
sion "outs1"de t h e ,State' ' m
,"o'astri G.J.
d
h
. l fi .
however, it is etermined with t e aid of tie ctwnal
test that a particular sale or purchase has taken place
within the taxing State, it follows, as a corollary, that
the transaction loses its inter-State character and falls
outside the pm-view of clause (2), not because the definition in the Explanation is used for the purpose of clause
(2), but because such sale or purchase becomes in the
eye of the law a purely local transaction. It is sttid that
even though all the essential ingredients of a sale took
place within one State and the sale was, in that sense,
a purely intra-State transaction, it might involve
transport of the goods across the State-boundary, and
that would be sufficient to bring it within the scope of
clause (2). 'Ve find it difficult to appreciate this
argument. As already stated, the Explanation envisages sales or purchases under which out-of-State goods
are imported into the State. That is the essential
element which makes such a transaction inter-State in
character, and if it is turned into an intra-State transaction by the operation of the legal fiction which blots
out from view the inter-State element, it is not logical
to say that the transaction, though now become local
and domestic in the eye of the law, still rebiins its
inter-State character. The statutory fiction completely
masks the inter-State character oft.he sale or purchase
which, as a collateral result of such making, falls outside the scope of clause (2).
It is said that, on this view, clause (2) would become
practically redundant, as clause (1) (a) read with the
explanation as construed by us would itself preclude
taxation by other States of inter-State sales m· purchases of the kind referred to in the explanation. · As
1953
8.C.R.
SUPREME UOURT REPORTS
1087
1953
we have already pointed out, the Explanation does not
cover cases of inter-State sales or pmchases under 1'hc.Stateof Bomwhich the goods are imported into the State for re- bay and Anothn·
export to other States and possibly other categories of
v.
sales or purchases which do not satisfy all the require- 1'he United
rnents of the explanation. W'hether such transactions ~1;;",.': ~;~ta)
are sufficiently numerous for the Omstitution to take
· "_"_ "'·
note of is a matter of opinion and it cannot have much Patanjali
bearing on the question of construction.
Sastri GI
On the other hand there are, in om judgment,
cogent considerations which tend to support the view
we have expressed above that clause (2) was not
intemkd to affect the power of the delivery State to
tax inter-State sales or purchases of the kind mentioned in the Explanation. As we ha1•c seem, in our
Constitution the principle of freedom of inter-State
trade and commerce is made to give way before the
8tate-powp1· of imposing non-discriminatory taxes on
go<ids imported from othel' States. Now, article 286(2)
is but one phase of the protection aceorded to interState tmde anrl l'ommerce from the fettering power of
State taxation. As ari.icle 286 deals with restrictions
on the power of the St>itcs to impose tax on the sale
or purchase of goodH, the Constitution makers evidently
thought that it should contain also a specific provision
safeguarding sales or purchases of an inter-State
<'haracter a.gainst the taxing power of the 8tatl's.
It is, howrver, reasonable to suppose that this particnlar form of protection to inter-State trade and
commerce provided in article 286(2) was not intended
to have a wider operation than what is contemplated
in Part XIII which declares the general principle of free·
dom of inter-State connnerc:c and defines the measure of
constitutional protection it should enjoy. 1f sueh protection is intended to give way before the State-power
of taxing goods imported from sister 8tates, subjeet
only to the condition against discrimination. it is
legitimate to suppose that the ban under article 286(2)
should not operate so as to nullify that power. True,
article 304 (a) deals with the restrictions as to
imposition of tax on goods, while article 286
•
1088
SUPREME COUR;r REPORTS
.
.
[1953]
deals with the restrictions as to imposition of tax
on sales or purchases of goods. Bu't this distincThe State of Bom· tion loses its practical importance in the case of
~-hv.
sales-tax imposed by the delivery State under t he
The United
conditions mentioned in the Explanation, for, if we look
Motors (India) behind tho labels at the substance of the matter, it
Ltd. and Oth<rs. becomes olear that a tax on sales or purchases imposed
by the State in which the goods are delivered for con·
PatanJllli
' d, is, m
·
Saatri o.J.
sum ption, in t he sense a]r·eady exp1ame
economic effect practically indistinguishable from a tax
on the consumption or use of the goods. The words
"in which the goods have actually been delivered"
ensure that the goods have come into the State, and
the expression " for the purpose of consumption in the
State" shows that, though the tax is formally laid on
sales, its incidence is aimed at the consumers in the
State. Discussing the true nature of a duty of excise
and a tax on the sale of goods, Gwyer C. J. observed
in the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax case (1 ) :
"It is common ground that the Court is entitled to
look at the real substance of the Act imposing it, at
what it does and not merely at what it says, in order
to ascertain the true nature of the tax. Since writers
on political economy are agreed that taxes on the sale
of commodities are simply taxes on the commodities
themselves, it is possible to regard a tax on the retail
sale of motor spirit and lubricants as a tax on those
commodities". Therefore, sales-tax, the incidence of
which is really directed against the consumer, is, in
substance, a tax on the goods imposed, no doubt, on
the occasion of the sale as a taxable event. It will now
be seen why the Explanation insists on actual delivery
of the goods in the State and their consumption in the
State, and why an " outside" sale or purchase is
explained by defining what is an inside sale. The object
clearly is to assimilate the conditions, under which
the delivery State is left free to tax inter-State sales or
purchases, to those under which a State is empowered
to impose tax on goods imported into the State from
other States under article 304 (a). If then, a non-discriminatory use or consumption tax imposed under
1953
(1) [1939) F.C.R. 18, 42.
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1089
196J
article 304 on goods imported from other States does
not infringe the freedom of inter-State commerce
tlec]~recl by ar t'ICJe 301 , pan'ty of reason ancl pol'ICY The
State of Bombay and Anoth6r
reqmres that a tax on sales or purchases imposed by
v.
the State in which the goods are actually delivered for 1'he United
consumption in the State should not be regarded as Motors (India)
violative of the ban under article 286 (2), and that is Lrd. and Othm.
what the statutory fiction enacted in the Explanation Patanjali
was, in our judgment, designed to achieve by divesting Sastri o.J.
the sale or purchase of the kind referred to in the
Explanation of its inter-State eharacter in relation to
the State of delivery.
There is another important consideration which strongly supports the view we have indicated above, namely
article 286 (2) does not affect the taxation of such
sale or purchase by the State of delivery. If both the
exporting State and the delivery State were entitled,
notwithstanding article 286(2), to tax the inter-State
sale or purchase, as suggested by the Advocate-General
of Bombay, it would mean that the transaction is subjected to double taxation as compared with a sale by
a local dealer which pays only one tax. It is precisely
this type of discriminatory lmrtlen which the principle
of freedom of inter-State commerce seeks to avoid,
for, it places inter-State tra<,l.e at a disadvantage in
competition with local trade. On the other hand, if
neither State could tax such sale or purchase as is
referretl to in the explanation, until Parliament lifted
the ban, as the Advocate-General of Madras was
inclined to think, the result would be that consumers
could get out-of-State goods more cheaply than local
goods, and local dealers would suffer competitive disadvantage as compared with outside dealers. Does
the principle of freedom of inter-State commerce
require that a State should foster such commerce to
the detriment of domestic trade 'I It is one thing to
avoid impeding inter-State commerce by imposing
discriminatory burdens upon it which internal trade
does not have to bear, but quite another to place local
produc~s and local business at a disadvantage in competition with outside goods and dealers. It would be
•
1090
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
a curious perversion of the principle pf freedom of
inter-State commerce to drive local custom across thf~
TheStateoJBmn·border to ontside dealers, and that, in our opinion,
bay an~. Another could not have been contemplated.
The United
The view which we have expressed above avoids
Motors (India) either anomitly and would place local trade and interLtd. and
·
n'h
del'1very ,~"ta t e
__Othm.
· S
, tate tra de on an equa1 ctootmg.
.L e
Patanjali
would tax both local and out-of-State goods equally
sa,tri c.J. without discrimination against either and that, we
think, is the only measure of protection which article
286 could reasonably be supposed to accord to interState sales or purchases, when it is constrned in the
light of articles 301 and 304.
The question next arises as to whether the Act contravenes all or any of the restrictio1rn imposed by article
286. It is the respondents' case that the sales and
purchases made by them in Bomba.y, in the course of
their business, include all the three categories excluded
from the scope of State-taxation by article 286, and the
Ad seeking to bring all of them within its scheme of
taxation is bad. It is, therefore, necessary to make a
brief smvey of the main provisions of the Act and of
the rules made thereunder, in order to see whether
the respondents' complaint is well-fonnded, and, if so,
whethet· the whole or any part of the Act is to be
declared unconstitutional and void.
The Act provides for levy of two kinds of taxes,
nalled the "general tax" and the "special tax", by
the two charging sections 5 and 10 respectively.
"Dealer" is defined in section 2 (7) as a person who
carries on the business of selling goods in the State of
Bombay whether for commission, remuneration or
otherwise and includes a State Government which
carries on such business and any society, club or association which sells goods to its members. The Expla. nation (2) to this definition provides that the manager
or agent of a dealer who resides outside the State of
Bombay and carries ou the business of selling goods
in the State of Bombay shall, in respect of such
business, be deemed to be a dealer for the purpose of
the Act. "Sale" is defined by section 2 (14) with all
1:153
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1091
its grammatim~l variations and cognate expressions as
1953
meaning a. ny transfer of property~ in 0o·oodR. for •cash or Th e 8 tate
o18uni·
deferred payment or other valuable cons1derat1011 andb"'' and Another
includes any supply by a society, a club, or an asso- · v.
ciation to its members on payment of price or of fees 1•1oe United
or subsrriptions but does not include a mortgage, Moto1w (India)
hypothecation, diarge or pledge. The words "buy" LM. and Othm.
and "purchase" are to be construed accordingly. l'a-;:,,,jaU
There arr two Explanations attached to this definition 3,,,11 ; o.J.
of which tht· seeond, which is ohviouslv hasell on the
Explanation to clause (1) (a) of articl~· 286, provides
that the sale of any goods which have actually been
delivered in the l:ltate of Bombay as a direct result of
sueh sale for the purpose of consumption in the said
::-ltate, shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act,
to have taken place in the said State, irrespective of
the fact that the property in the goods has, by reason
of such sale, passed in another State. "Turnover" is
defined by section 2(21) as tho aggregate of the
amount;; of sale price received and receivable by
a dealer in l'espect of an~· sale of goods made
1luring a given period
after deducting the
nmount, if any, refunded by the dealer to a purchaser
in respect of any goods purchased and returned by the
purchaser within th1· prescribed period. Section 5
imposes the general tax on every dealer whose tmnover in respect of sales within the Rtate of Bombay
during any of the three consecutive years immediately
preceding the first day of April, 1952, has exceeded
Rs. 30,000 or whose turnover in respect of such sales
exceeds the said. limit during the yc>ar commencing on
the first day of April, 1952. The tax is to be levied
on his taxable turnover in respect of sales of goods
made on or after the appointed day, i.e., 1st November,
1952, at the rate of 3 pies in the rupee (section 6). By
section 7 the taxable turnover is to he determined by
first deducting from thP turnover of the dealer in respect of all his sales of goods during any period of his
liability to pay the general tax, his turnover during
that period, in respect of (a) sales of any goods declared from time to time as tax-free under section 8 and(b)
"such other sales as may be prescribed." No dealer
•
'
1092
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
liable to pay the general tax shall carry•on business as
The State of Bom- a dealer unless he ha.s ~pplied for r~gistrat.ion (section
bay and Anotl<er 9). A more or less s1m1lar scheme 1s provided for the
v.
levy of a special tax on the sale of certain special
The United
goods specified in Schedule IL By section IO every
Motors (India) dealer whose turnover in respect of sales of special
Ltd. and!!_thers. goods made within the State of Bombay has exceeded
Patanjali
Rs. 5,000 during the year ended 31st March, 1952, or
sa.,tri c.J.
exceeds the said limit during the year commencing
from 1st April, 1952, is charged with a special tax at
the rate specified in Schedule II on his taxable turn·
over in respect of the sales of special goods made on
or after the appointed day, i.e., 1st November, 1952.
By section 11 the taxable turnover is to be determined
by first deducting, from the turnover of the dealer in
respect of his sales of special goods during any period
of his liability, his turnover in respect of (a) sales
of special goods purchased by him on or after the
appointed day at a place in the State of Bombay from
a dealer holding a licence under section 12 and (b)
" such other sales as may be prescribed." Every
dealer liable. to pay the special tax is required to
obtain a licence as a condition of his ca.rrying on his
Then follow certain probusiness (section 12).
visions for returns,. assessment, payment and recovery
of tax. Section 18 imposes a purchase tax at the rate
of 3 pies in the rupee on the purchases of such goods
as may be notified by the State Government from
time to time which have been despatched or brought
from any place in India outside the State of Bombay
or are delivered as a direct result of a sale to a buyer
in the State of Bombay for consumption therein,
and also an additional tax if the goods are special
goods. Section 21 (2) prohibits any person selling
goods from collecting from the purchaser any amount
by way of tax unless he is a. registered dealer or a
licensed dealer and is liable to pay the tax under this
Act in respect of such sale. Chapter VI contains
provisions for production of accounts, supply of infor.
mation and cancellation of registration or licence.
Chapter VII deals with proceedings including appeals
1953
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1093
and revision and the determination of certain ques1953
tions of law by 'reference to the High Court. Section
45 empowers the State Government to make rules "for The Stateaf Bom. out t he purposes of t h'1s A ct." In particular,
.
bay and Another
carrymg
such rules may prescribe, among other things, "the The ;;,ited
other sales, turnover in respect of which may be Motors (India)
deducted from a dealer's turnover in computing his Ltd. and Othcro.
taxable turnover as defined in section 7 and in section
-11" [sub-section (2) (e)].
Patanjali
Sastri C.J.
In exercise of the powers conferred by this section,
the State Government made and published rules called
the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, which were
brought into force on the same day on which the charging sections 5 and 10 of the Act were also brought
into force, namely, :N"ovember 1, 1952. Of these,
Rules 5(1) and 6(1) are important, and they provide
for the deduction of the following sales in calculating
taxable turnover under section 7 (general tax) and
section 11 (special tax): (i) sales which take place (a)
in the course of the import of the goods into or
export of the goods out of the territory of India or (b)
in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. ·It is
to be noted that these are the excluded categories of
sales or purchases under article 286 (1) (b) and (2)
respectively. Rule .5(2) (i) requires, as a condition of
the aforesaid deductions, that the goods should be
consigned by certain specified modes of transport.
Clause (v) lays down a rule of presumption to be acted
upon in the absence of evidence of actual consignment
of the goods within three months of the sale, that the
sale has not taken place in the course of export or of
inter-State trade as the case may be. It is not necessary to refer to the provisions of the other rules.
Now, it will be seen from the provisions summarised
above that the Act does not in terms exclude from its
purview the sales or purchases taking place outside
the State of Bombay while it does include, by
Explanation (2) to the definition of "sale", the sales or
purchases under which the delivery and consumption
take place in Bombay which, by virtue of the Explanation to article 286(l)(a), are to be regarded as local
112
•
1094
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
sales or purchases. On the construction we have
placed upon that Explanation, sales or purchases
7'he SiateofBom- effected in Bombay in respect of croods in Bombay but
boy and Anolhri· d l'
· · out s1.Ode Bomb ay are no t
v
e ivered f'or consumption
The United
taxable in Bombay. :N"ow, the respondents complain
Motors (India) that the latter category of sales or purchases thus held
Ltd. and Othc,.s. not to be taxable are not expressly excluded by the Act
which, therefore, contravenes article 286 (l)(a). No
0
s:~:;,n~ ~. doubt, there is no provision in the Act excluding in
express terms sales of the kind referred to above, but
neither is there any provision purporting to impose
tax on such sales or purchases. On the other hand,
the two charging sections of the Act, section 5 and
section 10, purport, in express terms, to impose the
tax on all sales made "within the State of Bombay",
and section 18, which lays the tax on purcha3es, is
limited in its operation to purchases of goods delivered
to a buyer in the State of Bombay for consumption
therein, that is to say, to purchases which unquestion,
ably are taxable by Bombay according to both parties.
'The charging sections cannot, therefore, be taken to
cover the class of sales or pmchases whieh, on our
construction of the Explanation, are to be regarded as
taking place outside the State of Bombay. vVe see no
force, therefore, in the argument that the Act contra,
venes the provisions of article 286(l)(i.) by purporting
to charge sales or purchases excluded by that article
from State-taxation.
As regards the other two categories of sales or pnr,
chases excluded by article 286 (1)(b) and (2), it is
true that the Act taken by itself does not provide for
their exclusion. But, a,s pointed out akeady, rules 5
and 6, which deal respectively with deduction of certain sales in calculating the taxable turnover under
sections 7 and 11 exclude these two categories in
express terms, and these rules were brought into force
simultaneously with the charging sections 5 and 10 on
November 1, 1952. The position, thereforn, was
that, on the date when the general tax and the special
tax became leviable under the Act, sales or purch,ises
of the kind described under article 286( 1) (b) and (2)
stood in fact excluded from taxation, and the State of
1953
-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
Bombav cannot be considered to have made a "law
195a
imposiI~g 01' authorising the imposition of a tax" on
sales or purchases excluded under the aforesaid clausesbTheStadteoAif Btohm·
,
'
of :irtrnle
286. The Act :ind the rnles havmg
been ~- v. M •
hrought into operation simultaneously, there is no The United
olwious reason why the rules framed in exercise of Motor• (India)
the power delegated by the Legislature should not be Ltd. and Others,
re 0"arded as part of the "law" made by the State. lrsee Patanjali
-observations at page 862 in the Delhi Laws Act Sastri a.J.
case(1 )]. The position might be different if the rules
ht~d come into operation sometime later than the charging sections of the Act, for, in that case, it is arguable
that if the legislation, without excluding the two
classes of siiles or purchases, was beyond the competence of the Legislature at tho date when it was
passed, the exclusion subsequently effected by the
rules cannot validate such legislation. But, as already
stated, that is not the position here, :tnd the learned
Judges below foll into an error by overlooking this
crucial fact when they say "If the Legislature had no
competence on the date the Jaw was passed, the rules
subsequently framed 0a1111ot uonfer competence on the
Legislature".
Even so, it was contended, the exclusion of the sales
covered by clause (l)(b) and clause (2) of article 286
was hedged round with conditions and qualifications
which neither the Legislature nor the rule-making
authority was competent to impose on the exclusion
and, therefore, such rules, even if read as part of the
Act, could not cure the constitutional transgression. The
conditions and qualifications complained of are mostly
found to relate to mere matters of proof, e.g., rule 5(2),
Explanation (2), which insists on the production
of a certificate from an appropriate authority, before
a motor vehicle, despatched to a place outside the State
of Bombay by road and driven by its own power, could
be exempted as an article sold in the course of interState trade. ~o objection can reasonably be raised if
the taxing authority insists on certain modes of prooi
being adduced before a claim to exclusion can be
allowed. Objection was also taken to clause (i) of
v
•
1095
(1)
(1951] s.c.R. 747.
•
1096
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
sub-rule (2) of rule 5 as imposing an unauthorised limitation upon the exemption of sales and purchases
TheState 0! Boni-allowed by rule 5(1), that is to say, while rule 5(l)(i)
bay and Another allows the deduction of the sales covered by clause ( 1)
The ;nited
(b) and (2) of article 286 in calculating taxable turnMotors (India) over, sub-rule (2) (i) of the same rule provides that, in
Ltd. and Othere. order to claim such deduction the goods shall be
consigned only through a railway, shipping or aircraft
Patanjali
company or country boat registered for carrying cargo
Sastri 0 .J.
or public motor transport service or by registere d post.
It is said that there is no reason why sales of goods
despatched by other modes of transport should not
also be deducted from the taxable turnover, because
article 286 (2) in exempting sales in the course of
inter-State trade, makes no distinction between
modes of transport by which the goods are despatched. This limitation, it was claimed, was beyond the
competence of the rule-making authority. The argument is not without force, and it must be held that
rule 5(2)(i) is ultra vires the rule-making authority and
therefore void. But it is clearly severable from rule
5(l)(i). The restriction regarding the mode of transport of the goods sold or purchased in. the course of
inter-State trade, to which alone sub-rule (2)(i) relates,
can be ignored and the exemption under rule 5(l)(i)
may well be allowed to stand.
Finally, Mr. Seervai attempted to make out that the
provisions of the charging sections 5 and 10 fixing
Rs. 30,000 and Rs. 5,000 as the minimum taxable turnover for general tax and special tax respectively were
discriminatory and void under article 14 read with
article 13 of the Constitution, and he gave us
several tables of figures showing how the imposition
of the tax actually works out in practice in hypothetical cases. It is unnecessary to go into the
details of these cases which have been worked out
in figures, for it must be conceded that the general
effect of fixing these minimum limits must neces>arily
be to enable traders whose taxable turnover is below
those limits to sell their goods at lower prices to their
customers than dealers whose turnover exceeded
1953
•
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1097
those limits, for the latter have to add the sales-tax
W53
to the prices o'f their goods. But no discrimination is,
involved in this classification which is perfectly reason- The StateoJB.om·
. 1s
. b orne m
. mm
. d t hatt he State may not bay andv. Another
h
a ble wen
it
consider it administratively worthwhile to tax sales The United
by small traders who have no organisational facilities Motors (India)
· for collecting the tax from their buyers and turn it Ltd. and Others.
over to the Government. Each State must, in imposing Patanjali
a tax of this nature, fix its own limits below which it sa,tri a.J.
does not consider it administratively feasible or worthwhile to impose the tax. It is idle to suggest that any
discrimina.tion is involved in such classification.
Apart from the considerations set forth above which
tend to support the constitutional validity of the Act,
it was broadly contended before us that taxing statutes
imposing tax on subjects divisible in their nature
which do not exclude in express terms subjects exempted by the Constitution, should not, for that reason, be
declared wholly ultra vires and void, for, in such cases,
it is always feasible to separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those levied on exempted
subjects and to exclude the latter in the assessment of the tax. In such cases, it is claimed, the
statute itself should be allowed to stand, the taxing
authority being prevented by injunction from imposing
the tax on subjects exempted by the Constitution.
Our attention was called to certain American cases
where this principle has been consistently followed: (see
Bowman v. Continental Compdny( 1 ), where all the previous cases are collected). In the present case the tax
is imposed, in ultimate analysis, on receipts from
individual sales or purchases of goods effected during
the accounting period, and it is therefore possible to
separate at the assessment the receipts derived from
exempted sales or purchases and allow the State to
enforce the statute with respect to the constitutionally
taxable subjects, it being assumed that the State
intends naturally to keep what it could lawfully tax,
even where it purports to authorize the taxation of
what is constitutionally exempt. The principle, as it
(r) · 256 i::.s. 642 ; 65 L. Ed. rr30.
•
1098
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
[i953J
is tersely put in the American case, is that severability
in such cases includes separability in· enforcement.
The Stat6 of Honibay and Another
Our attention was drawn to the decision of the Pri\-y
": .
Council in Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh and
The United
Others(') as condemnatory of this principle. The case
Motors (lndia) .
.
. h a ble'. Th eir
. Lordsh'ips
itJ nd 011
is h owever, c]e3,r1y d'JStmgms
· "·-- wrs. were dealing with a Provincial miactment providing
Patanfali
for the avoidance of benami transactions as theres""'' o.J. in specified and tho question was whether it was ultra
vires the Legisla tnre as contravening section 298( l) of
the Government of India Act, 1935, which forbade
the prohibition, inter alia, of disposition of property
by an Indian subject on certain grounds which included "descent". It was found that in some cases the
impugned enactment would operate as a prohibition
on the ground of descent alone. The .Federal Court(')
by majority expressed the view that the Act could not,
for that reason, be invalidated as a whole but that
the circumstances in which its provisions would be
inoperative must be limited to cases where the statute
actually operated in contravention of the constitutional inhibition. Disagreeing with this view their
Lordships made the following observations which
were strongly relied on before us :
" The majority of the Federal Court appell.r to have
contemplated another form of severability, namely,
by a classification of the particular cases on which the
impugned Act may happen to operate, involving an
inquiry into the circumstances of each individual case.
There are no words in the Aet capable of being so
construed, and such a course would in effect involve
an amendment of the Act by the court, a course which
is beyond tho competency of the court, as has long
been well established."
The subject of the constitutional prohibition w3,s
single and indivisible, namely, disposition of property
on grounds only of (among other things) descent and
if, in its actual operation, the impugned statute was
found to transgress the consti tu tiona] mandate, the
whole Act had to be held void as the words used
1963
·-
!r) [1946] F.C.R. r.
(2) [1942] F.C.R. 67.
,
•
S.C.R.
SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS
1099
covered both what was constitutionally permissible
19.;3
and what was'not. The same principle was applied
hy this court in the Cross Roads case(1). It was, TbheStadteoA'.f Bothem. d d
·
·
m
ee , applied
also m
Bowman's case(') with respect ay an v. no r
to the licence tax imposed generally on the entire 1'he Unitw
business conducted includin"0 inter-State commerce Motors ! India)
as well as domestic business, but was not applied, as Ltd. and Others.
stated above, with respect to excise tax which was Patanjali
laid on every gallon of gasolene sold and was thus Sastri o.J.
divisible in its nature. It is a sound rule to extend
severabi!ity to include separability in enforcement in
such cases, and we are of opinion that the principle
should be applied in dealing with taxing statutes in
in this country,
We accordingly set aside the declaration made by
the court below and quash the writ issued by it
except in regard to rule 5 (2) (i). An injunction shall,
however, issue restraining the appellants from imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax on sales and
purchases which are exempted from taxation by
article 286 as interpreted above.
Each party will hear its own costs throughout.
BosE J.-I have had the advantage of reading the
judgments of my Lord the Chief Justice and my
learned brother Bhagwati. I regret I am unable to
agree with either. The range of disagreement is not
large but unfortunately it vitally affects the result.
I agree with the construction which my Lord has
placed upon entry No. 54 of List II. I also agree
that the object of the Explanation is to fix the locus
of a sale or purchase by means of a fiction, hut with
respect I cannot agree with my brother Bhagwati that
the non-obstante clause enunciates the general law on
this point. I know of no general law which fixes the
situs of a sale, not even the Sale of Goods Act. What
the gcnerallaw does is to determine the place where
the property passes in the ttbsence of a special agreement, but the place where the property passes is not
necessarily the place where the sale takes place, nor
(I) [1950] S.C.R 59·1·
•
M 256 U.S. 642 .
•
'
llOO
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
has that ever been regarded as the determining factor.
What, in my opinion, happened was this.
The State of Boni.
bay and Another
Before the passing of the Constitution, different
v.
States (or Provinces as they then were) claimed the
The United.
right to tax the samo transaction for a variety of reasons
Motors (India) which have been pointed out by my Lord the Chief
Ltd. and
· of cer t am
·
_ Others. J us t"ICe. Th e resu1t was tha t the prwe
Bose J.
commodities became inordinately high. Take, for
ex.ample, the case of steel rails manufactured by the
Tata Iron and Steel Works at Tatanagar and purchased by the Government of India for its railways.
The Central Government found itself called upon to
pay a sale or purchase tax to different States on a
single transaction of purchase. I am not sure how
many times over it. had to pay but on the notions
then current it was open to Bihar to claim the right
to tax because the goods were manufactured there, to
Bengal because the transaction of sale took place at
Calcutta where the head offices of the company were,
to a third Province because the goods were delivered
there and to a fourth because they were "found" there.
It hardly matters whether all or any of this would
have stood scrutiny in a court of law because the
fact remains that various States were actually taxing
the one transaction of sale on the nexus theory and a
real danger existed of more and more of them coming
in to claim a share of the spoils. It seems to me that
the Constitution makers considered this detrimental
to the development and exercise of trade and commerce and so determined to put a stop to the practice
but at the same time left Parliament a discretion to
restore a part of the status quo .if and when it should
think it safe and desirable to do so.
The narrowing of the powers was accomplished by
stating in article 286 that no State can impose a tax
on a sale or purchase which takes place outsi'.de the
State, by stating that it cannot tax a sale or purchase
in the course of import or export and by prohibiting
taxes on sales and purchases which take place in the
course of inter-State trade or commerce unless Parliaµient chooses to lift the ban. Reading these together
1953
-
•
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1101
in a simple and straightforward way it seems clear to
1963
me that the id.ea was to permit States to tax only Th 8 ,, 8
· h t ca]J mtra-1
·
State saIes an d pure h ases, at baye and
tateo, om.
wh at I m1g
Another
any rate, to begin with.
v.
·
· ]ega ] enac t ment s s1mp
· ]'101•t Y of ]anguage Motors
The United
B ut m
(India)
seldom evokes clarity of thought. So long as the ban Ltd. and Others.
imposed by clause (2) remains, there is no difficulty
Bose J.
because when parts of a sale take place in different
States the transaction is inter-State and no tax can
be imposed. On the other hand, when all the ingredients are intra.State clause (2) is not attracted.
Complications only arise when the ban is lifted. The
Constitution makers had before them the existing
practice of the States based on the nexus theory, and
so it became necessary to define just where a sale
takes place in order to carry out the main theme
that only intra-State sales can be taxed.
The difficulty is apparent when one begins to split
a sale into its component parts and analyse them.
When this is done, a sale is found to consist of a
number of ingredients which can be said to be essential in the the sense that if any one of them is missing
there is no sale. The following are some of them: (1)
the existence of goods which form the subject-matter
of the sale, (2) the bargain or contract which, when
executed, will result in the passing of the property in
the goods for a price, (3) the payment, or promise of
payment, of a price, (4) the passing of the title.
V\'hen all take place in one State, there is no diffi.
culty. The situs of the sale is the place in which all
the ingredients are brought into being. But when one
or more ingredients take place in different States,
what criterion is one to employ ? It is impossible to
say that any of these ingredients is more essential
than any other because the result is always the same
the moment you take one away. There is then no
sale. Therefore, one either has to adopt the ultra
logical view and hold that the only State which can
tax is the one in which all the ingredients take place
and that no State can tax when a single ingredient
143
•
1102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1953
[1953]
takes place elsewhere, or resort to the ,old view and
The State of Bom- hold that every State in which any single ingredient
bay and Another takes place can tax. The only alternative to these
v.
extremes is to make an arbitrary selection or to
The United
introduce a fiction. The Constitution chose the
Motors (India) latter course and enacted the Explanation.
Ltd. and Others.
.
~
I have deemed it proper to refer to the then existBose J.
ing practice regarding taxation because in construing
a statute it is legitimate to take into account exist.
ting laws and the manner in which they were acted
upon and enforced. [See Gwyer C. J. in In re The
Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938(')
and Croft v. Dunphy(')]. I think this rule is even
more appropriate in the case of the Constitution
because the Constitution itself continues in force all
laws which were in existence at the date when it came
into being except those which are inconsistent with
itself.
I am with respect unable to agree that article 286
(2) is to be interpreted in the light of article 304 (a).
In my opinion, the two articles deal with different
things. Article 286 is concerned with sales and purchases, while article 304 relates to goods imported
from other States. The stress in the one case is on
the transaction of sale or purchase ; in the other, on
the goods themselves and on the act of import. Article 286 is related to Entry No. 54 of List II and to
Entries 41 and 42 in List I. Article 304(a) to Entries
26 and 27 of List II read with Entry 33 in List III
and to Entries 51, 52 and 56 of List II. The distinction is, I think, clear when it is realised that (apart
from the Explanation) a sale or a purchase can be
taxed even though the goods are never actually delivered and even if they never reach the taxing State,
for the right is to tax the sale or purchase and that
is something quite independent of actual delivery.
The goods might be destroyed by flood or fire before
there is any chance of actual delivery. They might,
as in the case of the steel rails purchased by the
(1) [1939] F.C.R. 18 at 53.
(2) [1933] A.C. 156 at 165.
•
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1103
Government of India, be delivered in a totally different
1968
State, but the "tax could still be levied if there was no
Explanation to stop it. I find it difficult to see how bThe /SeadteoA'.f 801hm·
. t o euect1ve
"' . p1ay 1'f ay an v. 110 "
artic1e 286(2) .couId ever come m
article 304 is applied to sales and purchases which take The United
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Moror• (I>Zdia)
I do not think·the change in language, "a tax on the Led. and Othm.
sale or purchase of any goods" in the one case and a
Bose J.
tax on "goods imported from other States" was accidental, nor do I think we will be justified in ignoring
the fact that the two are placed in different parts of
the Constitution. I therefore prefer to hold that
articles 286 and 304 deal with different things and to
construe article 286 without reference to 304. In this
I agree with my brother Bhagwati.
Coming back to the Explanation, its object is, I
think, to resolve the difficulty regarding the situs of a
sale. The Constitution having decided that the only
State which can tax a sale or a purchase is the State
in which the transaction takes place, and having before
it the conflict of views regarding nexus and situs,
resolved the problem by introducing the fiction embodied in the Explanation. The purpose of the
Explanation is, in my view, to explain what is not
outside the State and therefore what is inside. With
respect I cannot agree that the Explanation is really
an exception, and I do not think the non-obstante clause
means that under the general law the place where the
property passes was regarded as the place where the
sale takes place, for that in itself would be a fiction.
There is no such law. In my opinion, all it means is
that there was a school of thought' which regarded
that as the crucial element on the nexus view and that
the Constitution has negatived that idea.
I am also unable to agree that the Explanation
governs clause (2) of article 286, for it limits itself in
express terms to sub-clause (a) of clause (1). It says
that is an Explanation "for the purposes of sub-clause
(a)". In view of that I do not feel justified in carrying it over to clause (2) and holding that it governs
there as well. In my judgment, the only purpose of the
•
_)
•
1104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
Explanation is to explain where the sitU§ of a sale is.
Clause (2) has a different object. Its purpose is to
The State
nd Aof Bom·
ther proh'b'
i it taxa t'10n on sa1es an d pureh ases wh'ic h t a k e
bay a
no
1
' t h e course of mter·
State tra d e or comv.
p ace m
The United
merce.
Motors (India)
If t h_e E xp.anat10n
1
· is
· carr1e
· d over t ? cause
1
(2) i't
Ltd. and Other•.
__
must, m my Judgment, be equally applicable to subBose J.
clause (b) of clause (1). As I understand the argument, the reasoning is this. The Explanation turns
an inter-State sale into an intra-State sale by means
of a fiction. Having served its purpose it follows as a
corollary that there is no inter-State transaction left
and so clause (2) is not called into play. In my opinion, by parity of reasoning, if the sale is intra-State
and cannot now be regarded as external to the State,
it equally cannot be said to take place in the course of
export or import in a case of that kind, for export and
import predicate the movement of goods across a
boundary just as surely as inter-State trade and commerce. But such a contention would militate against
our decision in The State of Travancore-Oochin & Others
v. The Boinbay Co. Ltd.(1).
This line of reasoning does not appeal to me for
another reason also. It concentrates on the situs of
the sale and does not give sufficient weight to the
words "in the course of". When we apply a fiction
all we do is to assume that the situation created by
the fiction is true. Therefore, the same consequences
must flow from the fiction as would have flown had the
facts supposed to be true been the actual facts from
the start. Now, even when the situs of a sale is in
truth and in fact inside a State, with no' essential
ingredient taking place outside nevertheless if it takes
place in the course of inter-State trade and commerce,
it will behit by clause (2) just as surely as it is hit by
sub-clause (b) when it takes place in the course of
export or import. When we examine clause (2) and
sub-clause (b), it is not enough, in my judgment, to
see where the sale took place. We have also to see
1953
(1) [19;.zJ .s.c.R. ' " "
•
•
S.C.:R.
i
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1H)5
whether it was in the course of inter-State trade and
!968
commerce in the one case, or in the course of export or Th St-·'B .
.
. he oth er, 1or
,. t h e stream of mter.
State tra de baye andateo,Another
om
import
mt
and commerce, as also that of export and import, will
v.
catch up in its vortex all sales which take place in its The United
course wherever the situs of the sale may be. All Motors (India)
that the Explanation does is to shift the situs from Ltd. and Others.
point A or B or C in the stream to a point X, also in
Bose J.
the stream. It does not lift the sale out of the stream
in those cases where it forms part of the stream.
I have also another criticism to meet. The Explanation can only come into play when the transaction
is in truth and in fact inter-State, and the argument
runs that if clause (2) is to ban taxation in every such
case, the Explanation becomes useless. The answer
to that is two-fold. Clause (2) has a proviso. Under
it the President is empowered to direct the continuation for a period of a tax which was being lawfully
levied at the date of the Constitution even though
the transaction is of an inter-State character ; and we
find that in some of the cases which have come before
us that was done the moment the Constitution
came into force. Therefore, the Explanation operated
from the start on that kind of case. But of course
that means that the empowering can only be in favour
of the State in which the goods are actually delivered
for the purpose of consumption in that State as a
direct result of a purchase or sale effected for that purpose. It will be noticed that the proviso is limited to
cases in which the imposition of the tax would be
"contrary to this clause", that is clause (2) and not to
the Explanation to clause (l)(a).
In the second place, Parliament is empowered to
lift _the ban imposed by clause (2). So long as the ban
exists there is no need for the Explanation, for the
explanation only covers sales or purchases which are
inter-State. But the moment the ban is lifted, the
difficulties I have mentioned above arise and have to
be met. I am clear that the Constitution makers
envisaged this and resolved the don bts in the manner
•
•
1106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[i953]
I have indicated; nor can I see anything inconsistent
-:-, B
or illogical in this. The basic idea ' is to prohibit
Tl" Stateo, om.
.
J
.
Stat.e tra de an d
bay and Another taxation 111 t Je
case of mterv.
commerce unless and until the ban under clause
The United
(2) is lifted, and always in the case of exports and
MotoTB (India) imports ; and when the ban is lifted, the Explanaf.td. and Others, tion is there to settle a matter of considerable controBose J.
versy regarding the situs of a sale. It is true it
makes an arbitrary selection but then almost any
selection would have to he arbitrary and this is as
good as any other.
The question however arises what is to happen to
clause (l)(a) while the ban lasts if the Explanation is
to be ignored during that period? How is the situs
of a sale to be determined in the difficult class of cases
which arose before the Constitution and which, in my
view, occasioned the ban. My answer is that that
class of case can only arise in the course of inter-State
trade and commerce, for the moment any one of the
essential ingredients of a sale occurs in a State different from the taxing State and the goods are contracted to move across a boundary, you get a sale in the
course of inter-State trade and commerce. Therefore,
the problem about situs does not arise. Sales and
purchases which are in truth and in fact intra-State
(and the bulk of sales and purchases in the States are
of that character) can of course be taxed. The ban
does not apply and there is no need to call in aid the
Explanation, for I repeat that the Explanation is
limited to cases which in truth and in fact take place
in the course of inter-State trade and commerce. On
the view I take the need for the Explanation only
arises when the ban is lifted.
I now come to matters of greater detail. "\-Vhat do
the words "for the purpose of consumption" mean?
This is best understood by reference to a concrete case:
A, a dealer in Bombay, actually delivers goods to B, a
dealer in Madras, for the purpose of sale by B, the
Madras dealer, to purchasers C, D and E in Madras.
Can either the sale by A to B or the purchase by .B
I91iJ
•
•
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1107
from A be taxed? In my view, it cannot, for Bis in my
I9S3
judgment, as much a consumer as C, D and E. It is l'h 8 - 8
.
'd
]]
e tateof om.
true t he word can b e use d m a w1 e as we as a nar- bay and Another
row sense but I see no reason to restrict its meaning
v.
in the present case. \Vhat after all does "consump- The United
tion" mean? In its economic sense it is just the use which Motor. ! India)
a purchaser chooses to make of the goods purchased Ltd. and Other•.
for his own purposes. He does not have to destroy
Bose J.
them nor does he have to ..diminish their value or
utility. A man who purchases a valuable piece of sculpture or painting for preservation in a national museum does not destroy it nor does he use it himself except for the purposes of presenting it to the museum.
But he is a consumer. In the same way, a man who
purchases goods for use in his business so that his business can be carried on by the constant feeding of a
stream uses the goods and therefore "consumes" them
even though he does not keep them himself. This of
course means that a dealer who purchases from another dealer outside the State is a "consumer" and can
be taxed if the ban is lifted even if he purchases for reexport outside the State. But when he re-exports,
his sale to the outside consumer cannot be taxed if
the Explanation is attracted.
I cannot agree that goods cannot be "consumed"
more than once. It all depends on how you view the
matter. Little fishes swallow smaller fishes and are in
turn eaten by fishes larger than themselves. In the
end, the smallest of the series is consumed by the biggest. Consider the case of a curio dealer who collects
antiques for the purposes of sale. The older they are
and the more they have been used, the more valuable
they become, but that would not prevent them from
being "consumed" over again when a "collector" buys
them for display in his house. Broadly speaking, the
object here is to stop multiple taxation on any
single act of sale or purchase made in the course of
inter-State trade and commerce. I would therefore construe "consumption" to mean the usual use made of
an article for the purposes of trade and commerce.
When dealer buys from dealer that is "consumption"
•
•
1108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
for the purposes of the purchaser dealer's trade; when
an ultimate purchaser buys from a retailer, that is also
TheStoteofBom·
·
" 1'
1'
•
bay ana Another "consumpt10~
ior h"ts purposes. "'h
1. e_re1ore,. m my
v.
judgment, neither the sale by A to B m the 1llustraTlw United
tion put nor the purchase by B from A can be taxed
Motors (India) so long as the ban under clause (2) remains. But the
Lta. aml Others. sales by B to U, D and E can each be taxed by the
-State of Madras as they are intra-State sales. If this
-~
is found to work hardship on t he States in practice,
then Parliament, which has been given the power to
regulate inter-State trade and commerce under Entry
42 of List I, can step in and lift the ban. In that
event, the Explanation comes into play and Madras
can tax both transactions but Bombay cannot.
On the other hand, if A, the Bombay dealer, sells
direct to the consumers 0, D and E in Madras and
actually delivers the goods to them for the purpose of
consumption in Madras, neither State can tax unless
the ban is lifted, and then Madras alone will be able
to tax.
Next, what do the words "actually been delivered"
mean? In the normal course, a dealer in Bombay,
who sends goods either to a dealer or consumer in Madras, would put them on a train or send them by a
public or a private carrier. The cases in which a dealer
would take them himself to Madras and hand them
over in person or send one of his own men there would
be exceptional. In the former class of case, the carrier
would normally be regarded as the agent of the Madras
purchaser and the result would be that delivery would
in that event be deemed to be delivery in Bombay and
that would give Bombay the right to tax and not
Madras. See Bad·ische Anilin Und Soda Fabrik v.
Basle Chemical Works, Bindschedler ('),Badische Anilin
Und Soda Fabrik v. Hickson ('). But such a construction would make the Explanation useless. I think
that is the reason why the words "actually" and "consumption" have been used. If the normal rule were
to apply, there would be no need for the word "actual",
as delivery to the carrier in Bombay would of course
1953
(I) [1898] A.C. 200.
12) ;1900] A.C. 419.
•
•
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1109
be actual in the sense that it would be physical and
1953
not notional. 1 think therefore that the words "act1
ually delivered" and "as a direct resul.t" ~f the sale or:.~ !'.~ '~',,!1~::·
purchase "for the purpose of consumpt10n m the State"
v.
have been used to signify that in such a case the carrier The United
must be regarded as the agent of the Bombay seller.
Motors (India)
So far as the words " in the course of" in clause Ltd. and Others
(2) are concerned, the "course" we have to consider
Bose J.
is the course of the inter-State trade and commerce.
In my opinion, the inter-State character of the course
ends when the goods reach the first consumer in the
taxing State. When he in turn sells to the ultimate
consumer in that State, a different course begins,
namely the course of intra-State trade. It is necessary
to draw this distinction because inter-State trade and
commerce is a matter for the Centre, intra-State for
that of the States. We have therefore to determine
where the inter-State course ends and the intra-State
course begins. I think the point at which I have
drawn the line is logical and convenient. I do not
think the same considerations will apply in the next
set of cases where we are dealing with the TravancoreCochin law relating to export and import. But it is
not necessary to explain why in this case.
It was contended in argument that the view I
take of the ban on inter-State trade and commerce imposed by clause (2) would place the local dealer at a
disadvantage. But that would only arise in one class
of case and I cannot see how inequality of this kind
can be avoided in every case even on my Lord the
Chief Justice's view. There are bound to be some inequalities, whichever view is taken.
Consider these concrete cases. We have A, a dealer
in Bombay, B, a dealer in Madras, and C, a consumer
also in Madras. If A sells directly to C in such a way
as to satisfy the Explanation, then, assuming always
that the ban is still in existence, this sale is not taxable on my view. But if B in Madras sells to C in
Madras, it is. Of course, B is then at a disadvantage
vis-a-vis A. But so is A vis-a-vis B with regard to
141
•
•
1110
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
consumers in Bombay. Consequently the tendency of
the consumer in one State to buy Hom a cheaper
The State of Bom· market in the other evens up in the Iona
run. But
0
/;ay and Another
h' f
v.
that apart, what happens on my Lord the C ie
Th• United
Justice's view?
Aiotors (India)
A very large volume of the feasibly taxable trade
[Jtd. and Others.
in this country, if not the bulk of it, at any rate in
most States, is in the hands of retail dealers resident
Bose J.
in the various States. They obtain their wares from
wholesale importers or large dealers in other States.
In the illustration I have put above, if B in Madras
gets his goods from A in Bombay, then, on the learned
Chief Justice's view, B pays a purchase tax on his purchase from A and again a sales tax on his sale to the
consumer C. The consumer is therefore saddled with
a double tax. But if C, still in Madras, purchases
direct from A in Bombay, there is only one tax in the
transaction on my Lord's view. That still gives A an
advantage over B. Therefore, there is a large class of
cases in which the local dealer is at a disadvantage
even on the other view.
The only class of case in which the local dealer is
not at a disadvantage on my Lord's view, and is on
mine, is when the goods are manufactured locally. In
that event, B, the manufacturer in Madras, pays no
initial sales tax. He only pays when he sells to the
consumer C in Madras. If the goods can also be manufactured locally in Bombay, then the dealer A in
Bombay does have a theoretical advantage over the
dealer B in Madras. But if the goods cannot also be
manufactured in Bombay, the advantage disappears,
for A then pays an initial tax on his purchase from
the outside State.
I do not think considerations of this kind should
influence the construction of these articles because, in
the first place, some inequalities are inevitable and, in
the next, the disadvantage is more theoretical than
practical. For example, a wholesale importer, who
also chooses to sell retail in the State of import, ha.s a
theoretical advantage over retailers who have to buy
19,53
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rs
11i1
through him. But that did not prevent this Court
1953
from holding in 'The State of Travancore-Cochin & Other8
v. The Bombay Co. Ltd.( 1) that the sale which occasion- b1'heStadteoA'.f Bo m·
. import
.
. free of tax. So here. I do not t h'111 k ay an v. not 1wr
ed !us
1s
this consideration should weigh.
The United
But apart from this, the matter is, I think, largely LMdotored(Oiihidia)
.c
. 1 save perliaps 111
. a 1ew
t heoretwa
excep t.10na] cases. t . au__ _t "'·
In this class of case, the trade usually adjusts its
Buse J.
own differences by allowing the local dealer a discount; in fact, in the case of many commodities, local
dealers have to give an undertaking not to sell below a
certain price in order to maintain a steady price level
over the local market and avoid cut throat competition. That is how most of the large motor agencies
work, mid the same a pp lies to radios and petrol and
kerosene oil. The price the ultimate consumer pays
is the same wherever he purchases in a given area.
Also the type of consumer who will take the trouble
to buy in a cheaper foreign market with all the annoyances of delay, transport, octroi and other import
restrictions, is small. Most people prefer to pay the
extra price and save themselves endless trouble.
I now come to the impugned legislatiun~tlie
Bombay Sales Tax Act (No. XXIV of 1952). As mine
is a dissenting view which will not affect the result, I
will content myself with very briefly indicating why I
consider the Act, or at any rate the relevant provisions in it, ultra vi res, and to begin with I will ignore
the rules altogether and consider what would happen
if the rules were not there at all or had been brought
into existence after the Act.
The taxing sections 5 and 10 empower a levy of tax
on all sales made within the Shitc of Bombay when
the turnover reaches a certain figure. This would include sales made in the course of inter-l:ltate trade and
commerce, sales made in the comse of export and import and sales falling within the Explanation made to
consumers in outside States. As I have explained
above, the mere fact that a sale is made in the State
(r) [ry52] S.C. R, IIIl.
•
r
•
i112
190
3
SUPREME COURT HEPORi'S
[i953]
of Bombay will not prevent it from being a sale effect-
-.,
ed in the course of inter-State
trade or ~ommerce or in
.
T'w S tate OJ 8 om·
bay and Another the comse of export or import.
Even when the whole
v.
transaction of sale is constituted in Bombay in the
'l'hc United
sense that every essential ingredient necessary to consMotors (India) titute a sale takes place there, (that is to say, even
Ltd. and Others. when the Explanation is not called into play), the sale
Bose J.
would, given other considerations, be in the course of
export or import or in the course of inter-State trade
or commerce. An illustration will make my point
clear.
A, a Bombay dealer, sells goods to B, a dealer in
Madras, for consumption in Madras. I will assume
that delivery is made to B himself in Bombay and that
he carries the goods across in person. If that is the
normal way in which trade and commerce in that
particular line of goods flows across the boundary,
then that would, in my opinion, be a sale in the course
of inter-State trade and commerce despite the facts, including delivery, mentioned above. Ordinarily, goods
of this nature are delivered to a carrier but that makes
my point all the stronger. So long as the ban imposed by clause (2) remains the situs of the sale and the
place of delivery are not material provided the sale is
caught up in the vortex of inter-State trade and commerce. Similar considerations apply in the case of
exports and imports.
On this view, the preamble to the Act and the
short title which limit the ambit of the law to the levy
of tax on sales and purchases of goods in the State of
Bombay, do not serve to save the Act, nor do the
definitions of the words "sale ", "dealer " and " turnover". Actually, Explanation (2) to the definition of
" sale" directly offends clause (2) of article 286. It
embodies almost word for word every provision of the
Explanation to article 286(1)(a). That would be unobjectionable if the ban imposed by clause (2) had
been lifted by Parliament. But as it has not been
lifted, the provision is ultra vire8 on the view which I
take of the Constitution.
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPRE~iE COUl'tT REPORTS
1113
The Act came into force on 9th October, 1952, with the
1953
exception of tl1e taxing sections. The rules were published in the Gazette on 29th October, 1952, and they, The State 01Boin·
·
·
t oge tl·, ier w1't]i the t axmg
sec t'10ns, came mto
eff'ect bay and"· Another
simultaneously on 1st November, 1952. It was argued 1'he United
that the rules save the Act in the following way. Under Motors (India)
sections 7 and 11 a dealer is entitled to deduct from his Ltd. and Others
taxable turnover sales which are from time to time
Bo8c J.
declared to be tax-free under section 8 and "such
other sales as may be prescribed." It is said that the
rules have excluded all sales which offend the Constitution, therefore under the "law" (by which is meant
the Act and the rules read together), which came into
being on 1st November, 1952, no sale exempted by the
Constitution can be taxed. It follows that the" law"
which is sought to be impugned is intra vires.
I need not examine the rules for this purpose. I
will assume without deciding that they do exclude all
sales which are exempt under the Constitution, nevertheless I am not prepared to agree that rules can save
an Act. Rules are made by a subordinate authority
which is not the Legislature and I cannot agree that
the validity of an Act of a competent Legislature can
be made to depend upon what some subordinate
authority chooses to do or not to do. The rules were
not passed by the Legislature and in theory the particular shape they took was not even in contemplation.
Say the rules were to be amended tomorrow by striking out these saving clauses, which would be ultra vires,
the Act or the rules ? It would be impossible to hold
that the rules are ultra vires the Act, for they would
not in the event I am contemplating travel one whit
beyond the Act. lt is the Act which would be bad.
And if the Act is held to be ultra vires in an event like
that, would it be competent to the rule-making authority to come to the rescue of the Legislature and rehabilitate the Act by re-enacting the rules which it had
deleted a few days before ? It would, in my judgment,
be no more competent for a rule-making authority to
do that than it would have been competent for it to
validate this Act if the rules had been brought into
•
•
'
1114
SUPI~EME
'
COURT REPOR'l'S
[1953J
being even one day after sections 5 and 10 came into
force.
•
The State of Bmn·
bay and Another
I can understand this court saying to a petitioner:
v.
'.'You are not yet hurt by this Act nor is there any
The United
immediate likelihood of your being hurt and until that
Motors (India} happens we are not aoing to entertain vour petition
Ltd. and Others. c
" oxammc
· hypo thet"·waJ. s1tua
•
t 10ns
· '
_
1or we are not here to
Bose J.
which may never arise." But that sort of objection
cannot lie in this case for the reasous my Lord the
Chief Justice has given. We are therefore called upon
to determine the validity of the Act and in doing so
~ve must, in my opinion, ignore the rules.
I have now to consider two more points. One is
about severability and the other is whether a taxing
statute is to be treated differently from other laws.
On the question of severability, I cannot sec how
the good can be separated from the bad in this case
even if the Explanation to section 2 (14) be expunged
unless the Constitution be read as part of the Act and
we are to read into the Act some such provision as
follows:
";\lotwithstanding t1nything which is si~id in any
part of this Act, all sales which the State is prohibited
to tax under the Constitution are excluded from the
srope of this Act.."
But, in my opinion, judges are not entitled to rewrite an Act. Offending provisions can be struck out
but if we do that the whole Act goes because the defect
here is that all sales are permitted to be taxed provided they are within the State of Bombay, and the rule.
making authority is not restricted to taxation which is
constitutionally permissible. On the contrary, section
45 says that the Government may make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and one of the purposes is to tax all sales which the State Government wishes
to tax.
The other matter is based 011 the American view
which treats taxing statutes differently from others
and holds that in a taxing statute one looks to the
1963
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1115
1963
individual item of taxation and not to the generality
of the powers. 'With all respect to the American Judges
who hold that view, I would prefer not to make excep- TbheStatde oAJ Bohm.
\"h
. is
. wheth er an Act of t l10 ay an 11ot "
t1011s.
·1' en t h e quest10n
V.
Legislature is ultra vires, the same principles should The u11 ited
govern throughout. I would therefore hold that the Motor" (India)
Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952 (Bombay Act No. XXIV Ltd. and Others
of 1952) is ultra vire.s the Constitution of India.
Hhagwat£ J,
BHAGWATl J.-I had tho benefit ofreading the judgment just delivered by my Lord the Chief J usticc.
While agreeing in the main with the conclusions reached therein I am however unable to subscribe to the
reasoning as also the constrnction put upon the Explanation to article 286(1) (a). I wish to place on record
therefore my points of disagreement and the reasons
for the same.
The power given to a State Legislature to tax the
sales or purchases of goods i;i derived from article 246
(3) read with Entry ii+ of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. That power has got to be
widely construed and it would embrace the power to
tax the sales or purchases of goods by reason of a sufficient territorial connection between the taxing f;tatc
and what it seeks to tax.
·
This was also the position which obtained before
the Constitution and was responsible for double or
muJt.iple taxation of the same transaction by different
States. The Constitution makers therefore thought it
fit to impose restrfrtions on the imposition hy the
States of taxes on the sales or purchases of goods by
enacting article 286. These restrictions were threefold :-( 1) no tax could be imposed on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place
outside the State, (2) no tax could be imposed on the
sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase
took place in the course of the import of goods into or
the export of the goods out of the territory of India,
and (3) no tax could be imposed on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase
took place in the course of inter-State trade or
•
•
1116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
commerce except in so far as Parliament. might by law
otherwise provide. These were the three categories of
The State of Bom- sales or purchases which came within the ban imposed
ba11 and Another
·
J
·
'
·
v.
by article 286. The phraseo ogy used m the article
The united
laid particular stress on the fact that the sale or purMotors (India) chase should " take place " so as to fall within one or
Ltd. and Othm. the other of these categories. The intention was that
the sale or purchase should take place, i.e., should be
Bhagwati J.
completed either outside the State or in the course
of import or export or in the course of inter.
State trade or commerce. Whereas before the
Constitution the taxing power could be exercised by
reason of a sufficient territorial connection involving
either one or more of the ingredients of a sale in the
shape of agreement to sell, the payment of price, transfer of ownership, delivery of goods etc. the completion
of a transaction of sale or purchase by the transfer of
ownership or the passing of the property in the goods
was enacted to be the sole criterion for taxability in
article 286. The sales or purchases could be divided
into two broad categories-( I) sales or purchases which
take place inside the State and (2) sales or purchases
which take place outside the State and those which
took place ,outside the State were certainly outside the
taxing powers of the State. In regard to the sales or purchases which took place inside the State, the sales or
purchases which took place in the course of import or
export and in the course of inter-State trade or commerce were also brought within the ban leaving the
taxing power of the State unfettered in regard to the
other sales or purchases which took place inside the
State. The restrictions which were thus imposed on
the taxing power of the State confined themselves to
sales or purchases which took place outside the State
and those sales or purchases which took place inside
the State but took place in the course of import or export and in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Once the transfer of ownership or the passin"
of the property in the goods was accepted as the sol~
criterion of taxability it was not necessary at all to
define what was a sale or purchase which took plaoe
19.;,1
-
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1117
inside the State. Whether a sale or purchase took
1963
place inside the State could be determined by applying
the general law relating to the sale of goods and ascer- TheStateof Bom·
. .
h.
bay and A nother
ta1mng where the transfer of owners 1p took place or
v.
the property in the goods passed. It was only when The United
the transfer of ownership took place or the property in Motors (India)
the goods passed that the sale or purchase was complet- Ltd. and Others.
ed and the sale or purchase took place and the situs or Bhagwati J.
t he 1ocation of the sale or purchase was in the place
where the transfer of ownership took place or the property in the goods passed under the generallaw relating
to the sale of goods. [See Badische Aniline Und Soda
Fabi'ick v. Basle Chemical Works, Bind Schedler(') and
Badische Aniline Und Soda Fabrick v. Hickson(').]
The situs or location of the sale or purchase therefore assumed an importance under article 286
and the Constitution makers had before them
not only the legislative practice prevailing in the
the varic;ms States before the Constitution but also the
concept of sale as defined in the Indian Sale of Goods
Act. They therefore incorporated in article 286 the
notion of a sale or purchase taking place, i.e., being
completed by the transfer of ownership or the passing
of property in the goods under the general law relating
to sale of goods and enacted that those sales or purchases which took place outside the State or which
even though they took place inside the State took place
in the course of the import or export or in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce should come within
the ban imposed therein.
The Constitution makers however took count of the
fact that even though the property in the goods by
reason of the sale or purchase passed in a particular
State the goods might as a direct result of such sale or
purchase be delivered in another State for the purpose
of consumption in that State. They wanted to give
the delivery State in that event the power to tax such
sale or purchase and therefore introduced by the Explanation to article 286 (l)(a) a legal fiction 'by which
(1) [1898] A. C. 200.
Ho
•
(2) [1906] A. C. ~19.
•
1118
SUPREME COURT l'tEPORTS
1%3
[1953]
the sale or purchase in that event was deemed to have
-.,B
taken place
in the delivery
State. What
otherwise
Tlieotnle oJ om•
.
lm•i and Another would have been a sale or purchase wluch took place
·
v.
outside the State within the meaning of article 286 (1)
The United
(a) was thus by legal fiction deemed to have taken
MotorR (India) place inside the delivery State, thus assimilating the
Ltd. and Othm. position to a sale or purchase which took place inside
Bhagwnti J.
the delivery State enabling the delivery State to tax
the sale or purchase in question. This legal fiction was
thus introduced not for defining what was a sale or
purchase which took place inside the State as distinct
from a sale or purchase which took place outside the
St~.te. The purpose of the enactment of the Explanation was not to provide a definition of a sale or purchase which took place inside the State. That was
determined under the general law relating to the sale of
goods by ascertaining where the transfer of ownership
took place or the property in the goods passed, which
was in another State and not the delivery State. ·what
was a sale or purchase which took place outside the
State was by reason of the Explanation and the legal
fiction enacted therein deemed to be a sale or purchase
which took place inside the State so as to enable the
delivery State to tax the sale or purchase in question.
The sale or purchase transactions which are covered
by the Explanation are moreover ofa limited character,
viz., those in which as a direct result of such sale or
purchase the goods have actually been delivered in the
delivery State for the purposes of consumption in that
State. They do not comprise all the transactions of
sale or purchase which take place inside the State
because besides those there are a large number of
transactions of sale or purchase which take place inside
the State and in which no element of inter-State trade
or commerce enters the transaction. The transactions
of sale or purchase which take place between dealers
:md dealers and dealers and custome~s all within the
State ar(\ really comprised in the category of transactions of sale or purchase which take place inside the
State and these transactions do not at all fall within
the purview of the Explanation. It would be surprising
0
•
•
S.C.R.
8UPREME COURT R8POR'l'S
1119
to find a defiuition of a transaction of sale or pur1953
chase which takes place inside the State given in the
· wh'ich i't is
· a11ege d to have been d one 111
· t he bThe Stated ofA Bommanner 111
1
. covermg
. only those transactions
. of sale or
~Explanation
v.
purchase in which the goods have actually been deliver- The United
ed in the delivery State as a direct result of such sale Motors (India)
or purchase for "the purpose of consumption in that Ltd. and Others.
8tatc. A definition, if at all it has any significance, Bhaywati J.
should cover all the transactions which come within
that particular category and cannot be enacted in the
form of a legal fiction in the manner it has been done
in the Explanation. It is no definition at all. It has
no reference to facts but it merely enacts a legal fiction
under which a sale which under the general law relating to sale of goods is completed outside the State by
the transfer of ownership or the passing of the property in the goods in another State is deemed to have
taken place inside the delivery State because of the
goods having been actually delivered as a direct result
of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in the delivery State. \Vhat is otherwise a sale or
pmchase which takes place outside the State is thus
deemed to have taken place inside the delivery State
and that is the only purpose of the enactment of the
Explanation. 'l'he contention of the Attorney-General
and Shri Seervai that the purpose of the enactment of
of the Explanation was to define what was a sale or
purchase which took place inside the State is therefore
unsound.
'l'he non-obstante clause really takes count of the
fact that under the general law relating to the sale of
goods the property in the goods by reason of
such sale or purchase would pass in another
State and that the situs or location of the sale
would accordingly be therefore in another State. Not·
withstanding that fact the Explanation enacts the legal
fiction that the particular transaction of s;ile or pur·
chase is deemed to have taken place within the delivery 8tate. 'l'he non-obstantc clause ba8 not been
incorporated in the Explanation with a view to
emphasise the particular aspect of the passing of
•"
•
•
1120
~
SUPREME COURT ltEPORT8
ll953)
property in the goods and negativmg the same
The State ofBom· because that was one of the ingredients which had
bay and Another been considered as important territorial connection
v.
between the taxing State and what it sought to tax.
The United.
Besides this ingredient there were various other ingreMotorBd( londhia) dients which had been similarly considered sufficient
Ltd. an t ers.
,
. 1
,
~terntona
connec t"10ns an d t o cons1"d er that the mgreBhagwati J.
dient of the passing of property in the goods was the
only ingredient which was considered important to be
mentioned in the non-obstante clause is to ignore the
facts and do violence to the whole conception underlying the incorporation of the non-obstante clause in
the Explanation. It would be a more natural way of
reading the non-obstante clause to read into it an
intention to state what according to the Constitution
makers was the basic idea of fixing the situs or the
location of the sale or purchase in the place where the
transfer of ownership 'took place or the property in the
goods passed and to indicate that notwithstanding
that fact a sale or purchase which fell within the category mentioned in the Explanation was none, the, less
to be deemed to have taken place inside the delivery
State.
If the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) is construed
in the manner indicated above it follows that notwithstanding the fact that under the general law
relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has
by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another
State the sale shall be deemed to have taken place in
the delivery State and the delivery State would be
entitled to tax the sale or purchase. That does not
however mean that it is only the delivery State which
will be entitled to tax the sale or purchase. Under
the general law relating to the sale of goods the property in the goods having by reason of such sale or
purchase passed in another State that State will no
doubt be entitled to tax the sale or purchase as having
taken place inside the State. That position will continue to obtain in spite of the fact that by the
enactment of the legal fiction in the Explanation
such sale or purchase will be deemed to have taken
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREM.E UOURT REPORTS
1121
place inside the delivery :::>tate. The object of the
1953
Explanation is not and could not be to take away l'h s -.,B
. h t wh'IC h th e State m
. W h'ICh t h c propert Y m
. th e b<1yc and
tate o, onit he ng
Another
goods passed had to tax the sale or purchase which
v.
took place inside that State. The object and purpose The United
of the Explanation could only to be to deem such pur- Motors (India)
chase or sale by reason of the legal fiction to have Ltd. and Others.
taken place in the delivery State so as to enable the Bhagwati J.
delivery State also to tax the sale or purchase in question. The object of article 286 is to impose restrictions
on the imposition of tax on sale or purchase of goods
and the only restriction which has been imposed in
connection with the sales or purchases which take
place in this manner is that a State shall not impose a
tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or
purchase takes place outside the State. That is a
general ban which has been imposed by article 286( 1)
(a) and what the Explanation seeks to do is to lift the
ban to the extent of the transactions of sale or purchase covered by the Explanation and enable the
delivery State also to tax such purchases or sales.
It is no doubt true that in the Explanation the word
'only' has not been used nor has the word 'also' been
used and we have to gather the purpose of the enactment of the Explanation from the words of the Explanation itself. In order to arrive at a conclusion
whether the object and purpose of the Explanation was
to enable the delivery State to tax such sales or purchases either in addition to the State in which the property in the goods had passed or in substitution thereof one has got to bear in mind the basic idea that a
State would normally be entitled to tax a sale or purchase where such sale or purchase took place inside
the State except in cases covered by article 286( l) (b)
and article 286(2). If that power of the State to tax
the sale or purchase where such sale or purchase took
place inside the State was in any manner whatever
sought to be taken away it could only be taken away
by an express enactment in that behalf as in article 286
(l)(b) and article 286 (2) and not by the backdoor as
it were by enacting a legal fiction as it has been done
•
•
1122
SUPREME COUR'l1 REPOWi'8
[1953]
in the Explanation. The two book cases illustration
which was submitted before the court by Shri Seervai
, ' 8 uueo, oin·. th
. a ve1·y spec10us
.
bay and Another m
e course of h"1s arguments 1s
one.
v.
l\Ierely because a book is by a legal fiction deemed to
The Unired
be in the book case ' B' it does not necessarily cease
Mowrs (India) to exist in the book case 'A'. As a matter of physical
Ltd. and Others. fact it is in the book case 'A'. It continues in the
Bltagwati J.
book case 'A' and the physical fact of its existence in
the book case 'A' can never be obliterated. The legal
fiction only operates to treat it as if it were in the book
case 'B' and to involve all the consequences of its
being in the book case 'B'. The two positions are not
mutually exclusive. They can co-exist side by side
and the legal consequences of the actual fact of the
book being in the book case 'A' can be worked out
simultaneously with the legal consequences of the
notional existence of the book in the book case '13' bv
reason of the operation of the legal fiction. If this
position is borne in mind it is clear that not only
would the State in which the property in the goods
passed continue to be entitled to tax the sale or purchase because of such sale or purchase having taken
place inside the State, but the delivery State would
also be entitled to tax such sale or purchase by reason
of the operation of the legal fiction in so far as the
goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of
such sale or purchase in the delivery State for the
purpose of consumption in that State. According to
the position as discussed above both the States would
thus be entitled to tax such sales or purchases.
Before I proceed to discuss the effect of article 286
(2) on the taxing powers of both the States it is necessary to consider what is the exact type of sale or purchase which is covered by the Explanation. That sale
or purchase has to be one as a direct result of which
the goods have actually been delivered in the delivery
State for the purpose of consumption in that ::State.
It is not every transaction which results in the goods
being delivered across the border that comes within
this category. It is only a transaction of sale or purchase which directly results in the delivery of goods
1953
mh
-.,B
•
•
S.C.R.
Sl'PREME COURT REPORTS
1123
for the purposr; of consumption in the delivery State
1'!53
that comes within the category of transactions covered Th 8 - .
Ad . .
S
e lateojBom.
by t 1JC E xplanat10n.
ea1er m the delivery tate bay and Another
purchasing from a dealer in the State where the prov.
perty in the goods passes by reason of such sale or 1'he United
purchase cannot be said to have purchased the goods Motors (India)
for the purpose of consumption in the delivery State Ltd. and Others.
because the obvious purpose for which he purchases Rhagwati J.
the goods is for dealing with those goods in the ordinary course of trade and not for consuming the same.
A dealer who deals with the goods after purchasing
the same does not consume the goods. He deals with
or disposes of the same in the ordinary course of trade
and he is a dealer or a trader in those goods. Ho is
not a consumer of those goods. The word "consumption" has been thus defined in 'Webster's New International Dictionary, Yo!. I, page 483 :" Oonsumption.-(3) Economics.-The use of
(economic) goods resulting in the diminution or destruction of their utilities; opposed to production.
Consumption may consist in the active use of goods in
such a manner as to accomplish their direct and
immediate destruction, as in eating food, wearing
clothes, or burning fuel; or it may consist in the mere
keeping, and enjoying the presence or prospect of, a
thing, which is destroyed only by the gradual processes
of natural decay, as in the maintenance of a picture
gallery. Generally, it may be said that consumption
means using things, and production means adapting
them for use."
In the Oxford New English Dictionary, Vol. II,
page 888, consumption is defined as :
"(l} The action or fact of consuming or destroying; destruction ............ (7) Pol. Econ. The destructive employment or utilisation of the products of
industry."
Delivery of goods for the purpose of consumption
in the delivery State therefore means the delivery for
the purpose of using by the consumer and it has no
application to the case of a dealer purchasing the
•
,
•
1124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
goods across the border for dealing witji or disposing
~B
of the same
in the ordinarv
course of trade. The
Th e otate oJ 01n•
•1
bay and Another Explanation therefore covers only those cases where as
v.
a direct result of the sale or purchase goods are deliThe United
vered for consumption in the delivery State by the
Motors (India) consumer and it is only that limited class of transacLtd. and Others. tions which are covered by the Explanation and which
Bhagwati J.
are liable to tax by the delivery State. I do not
accept the contention that the words "for the purpose of consumption" must be understood in a comprehensive sense as having reference both to immediate and ultimate consumption within the State and
ex.eluding only resale out of the State. In my opinion
they have reference only to immediate consumption
within the State and no further.
If the matters stood thus and there was no further
provision to be considered the position would be
that in a transaction of sale or purchase covered
by the Explanation construed as above both the
State in which the property in the goods passed
and the delivery State would be entitled to tax
such sale or purchase, the former by reason of the
property in the goods having passed inside that State
and the latter by reason of the goods having been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the
purpose of consumption in that State. We have however
got to take count of article 286 (2). The transaction of
such sale or purchase even though it be as between a
dealer in the one State and the consumer in the delivery State is none-the-less a transaction in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce. I do not agree with
the contention of the Advocate-General of Bombay
that article 286(2) should be interpreted as applying
to the cases of transactions of sale or purchase taking
place between dealers and dealers only and not as applying to the cases of transactions of sale or purchase
taking place between dealers on the one hand and consumers on the other. Whether a transaction of sale
or purchase takes place between a dealer on the one
hand and a dealer on the other or between a dealer on the
one liand and a consumer on the other in the respective
19°3
0
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1125
States all these transactions are in the course of
1968
inter-State trade or commerce and therefore hit by
article 286(2) and the transactions which are coveredbThe StadteoA'.f Bomthe..
ayannor
by t h e Exp1ana t10n to artic1e 286 (1)(a) would also be
v.
accordingly hit by the ban imposed under article The United
286 (2).
Mot"1's (India)
So far as the State in which the property in the Ltd. and Others.
goods has passed is concerned it could certainly not Bhagwati J.
tax the sale or purchase in question because the transaction of sale or purchase so far as the particular State
is concerned takes place in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce and could not be subjected to the
imposition of tax except in so far as Parliament might
by law otherwise provide. So far however as the delivery State is concerned the Explanation empowers the
delivery State to tax such transaction and if article
286(2) be construed as imposing a ban on the taxation
of such sale or purchase it will be tantamount to the
giving of the right to tax by one hand and the taking
away of it by another.
It was contended and rightly so by the AdvocateGeneral of Bombay that if the transactions which are
covered by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a) were
thus hit by article 286(2) in the absence of a provision
otherwise enacted by Parliament the Explanation to
article 286(1) (a) would be rendered nugatory and the
Constitution makers could not be held to have contemplated such a possibility at the very inception of
the Constitution leaving it to the Parliament by having recourse to the provision contained in article 286
(2) to remedy such a state of affairs. Such a possibility
could not be contemplated and an effort should therefore be made in so far as it was reasonably possible to
do so to reconcile the provisions of the Explanation to
article 286(1) (a) and article 286(2).
It is a well-known rule of the interpretation of
statutes that a "particular enactment is not repealed
by a general enactment in the same statute". (Beal
on the Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation, 3rd
Edition, Part VII, Section IX, page 516). Reliance is
116
•
l
•
1126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
placed in support of the above proposition on the fo!lowing
observations of Best C. J. in Churchill v. Grease(').
Th e S late o; oni·
bay and Anather
"The rule is, that where a general intention is exv. .
pressed, and the Act expresses also a particular intenThe U('I""ad· ) tion incompatible with the genera] intention, the partiMotorB 11 ia
1 . t t' . t b
'd d m
. t he na t ure of an
Ltd. and Others. cu ar m en 10n IS o e cons1 ere
exception."
Bhagwati J.
To the same effect also are the observations of Quain
J. in Dryden v. Overseers of Putney (') quoted at page
426 of the same work :"It may be laid down as a rule for the construction
of statutes, that where a special provision anda general
provision are inserted which cover the same subjectmatter, a case falling within the words of the special
provision must be governed thereby and not by the
terms of the general provision."
(See also Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition (1952)
at p. 205; Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes
9th Edition (1946) at p. 176 and Crawford on the Construction of Statutes (Interpretation of Laws) 1940
Edition, Ch. XVIII 'Construction of Statutes' at p.265
section 167). It therefore follows that the general
provision which is enacted in article 286 (2) against
the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods
in the course of inter-State trade or commerce should
give way to the special provision which is enacted in
the Explanation to article 286 (1) (a) enabling the delivery State to tax such sale or purchase in the limited
class of cases covered by the Explanation, transactions
covered by the Explanation being thus lifted out of
the category of transactions, in the course of interState trade or commerce covered by article 286 (2) and
assimilated to transactions of sale or purchase which
take place inside the State thus acquiring an intraState character so far as the delivery State is concerned.
It was suggested that this result could also be achieved by having resort to the principles which have been
enunciated in articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution
1968
-·'B
(r) (r828) 5 Bing, r77 at p. rSo.
(2) (r876) r Ex. D. 232 at p. i'6,
•
•
s.c.H.
SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
1127
which are included in Part XIII under the caption1953
Trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory Th 8 - " B
.
E Ven th ongh t h ese proVJSlOnS
..
f h COn- baye and
tate o, om·
0 f I n d ta.
0 t e
Another
stitution may by analogy support the conclusion that
v.
a transaction in the course of inter-State trade or com- The United
merce is thus lifted out of that category and assimilated Motor. (India)
to a transaction of sale or purchase which takes place Ltd. and Ot!tm.
inside the State the analogy must stop there and can- Bhagwati J.
not be worked any further. One cannot construe the
provisions of article 286 with reference to the provisions of article 304 (a) as is sought to be done. Article
286 and article 304 (a) refer to different states of
affairs. ',Yhereas article 286 provides restrictions on the
imposition of taxes on purchase or sale of goods,
article 304 (a) gives the 8tate Legislature power to
impose on goods imported from other States any tax
to which similar goods manufactured or produced in
that State arc subject so however as not to discriminate
between goods so imported and goods so manufactured
or produced. ',Yhereas article 286 refers to taxes on
sales or purchases of goods, article 304 (a) refers to
tax on imported goods. The two concepts are thus
entirely different. The only argument which was
addressed before us on articles 301 and 304 of the
Constitution was by the Government Pleader of Patna
who referred to these provisions in order to substantiate his point that only one State, viz., the delivery
State, should tax the sales or purchases covered by the
Explanantion and argued what the results would be if
it was held that both the States could tax or neither
of them could tax such sale or purchase. This aspect
was however not stressed or presented during the course
of the arguments and 1 would prefer not to express
any opinion on the scope or meaning of article 304.
I would therefore base my construction of the Explanation to article 286 (l)(a) and article 286 (2) on the
rule as to the interpretation of statutes which I have
referred to above, lifting the transaction of sale or purchase covered by the Explanation to article 286(1) (a)
out of the category of the transactions in the course
of inter-State trade or commerce and ussimilating: it to
•
•
1128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
a transaction of sale or purchase which. takes place in-B
side the delivery State thus investing it with the charThe stateof om·
•
1
h d j'
S
bay and Another acter of an mtra-State sa e qua t e e 1very tate.
1953
v.
The result therefore is that the delivery State only
Tthe u(niitedd. J would be entitled to tax the transaction of sale or purM o ors n ia
b
E
l'
S
·
Ltd. and Others. chase covered y the
xp anat10n.
ucl1 transact10n
Bhagwati J.
would be a transaction of sale or purchase where as a
direct result of such sale or purchase the goods are
delivered in the delivery State for the purpose of consumption in that State, i.e., where the transaction is between
a dealer in the State in which the property in the goods
passes and a consumer in the delivery State. The State
in which the property in the goods passes would not
be able to tax such sale or purchase in the absence of a
provision enacted by law by Parliament within the
meaning of article 286(2). Once that ban is lifted by the
appropriate legislation enacted by the Parliament the
State in which the property in the goods passes would
also be entitled to tax such sale or purchase but not
otherwise.
Save as above, I agree with the conclusions rea,ched
by my Lord the Chief Justice in the judgment just
delivered. I agree that the Bomba,y Sales Tax Act,
1952, and the rules made, thereunder except Rule 5(2)(i)
do not contravene the provisions of a,rticle 286, that
Rule 5(2)(i) is clearly severable and citn be ignored,
that there is no substance in the contention of Shri
Seervai tha,t there is a violation of the fundamental
rights guaranteed under article 14 and that the taxation statutes should be construed in a manner so as to
allow the statute itself to stand, the taxing authority
being prevented by injunction from imposing the tax
on subjects excluded by the Constitution from the purview of taxa,tion by the State.
In the result the declaration made by the court below will be set aside, the writ issued by it will be quashed a,nd the State of Bombay will be prohibited from
imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax on sales
or purchases which according to the interpretation put
above on article 286 are excluded from the purview
•
•
8.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1129
of taxation by.the 1:-itate of Bombay. Eal'h party \rill
1953
bear and pay its own costs throughout.
'l.'he State of BoniAppeal allowed:
bay and A not.her
v.
'llftc United
,\{ otors (India)
Ltd. and Others.
Bhagwari J.
RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SABI AND ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS
[PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MuKHERJEA, VrnAN BosE,
GHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 13, 14-Sathi Lands (llestoralion) Art, 1950-Law dcclarinu "ltlcment of land with partimlm· individtial void-Validity-Infrinuement of fundamental
riuht to cq1wl prntection of the laws - Di.1cri111ination-Pre.1mn1>tion
of rea8onablencss.
The Court of Waras granted to the appellants a large area
ol land belonging to the Bettiah Raj which was then under the
management of the Court of Wards, on the recommendation of
the Board of Revenue, at half the usual rates. A few years later,
\lie Working Committee of the Indian National Congress expressed the opinion that the settlement of the lands was against public
interest, and in 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called
the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950, which declared that,
notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time
being in force the settlement granted to the appellants shall be
null and void and that no party to the settlement or his successors in interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right
or incurred any liability thereunder, and empowered the
Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore the
lands. The appellants, alleging that the Act was unconstitutional,
applied under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of
mandamus against the State of Bihar restraining it from taking
any action under the Act. It was found that there were several
other settlements of lands belonging to the Bettiah Raj on similar
terms against which the Government had taken no action:
Held, that the dispute between the appellants and the Stale
was really a private dispute and a matter to be determined by a
judicial tribunal in accordance with the law applicable to the case,
and, as the Legislature had, in passing the impugll'ed enactment
singled out the appellants and deprived them of their right to
•
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