SYED QASIM RAZVI versus THE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 January 1953 | [1953] 1 S.C.R. 589 | 1953 INSC 4
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 January 1953
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR*, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 172/1952
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1953] 1 S.C.R. 589
- Neutral citation
- 1953 INSC 4
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME , COURT REPORTS
589
SYED QASIM RAZVI
v.
THE STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHERS
(and other cases)
[PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MuKHERJEA, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE and GHULAM
HASAN JJ.]
' •
Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 13, 14, 21-Special Tribunal
Regulation (V of 1358-F, Hyderabad)-Trial under Regulation
commenced before 26th January, 1950-Trial continued after that
date-Validity of conviction-Regulation, whether discriminatory
and void-Question whether discriminatory provisions were applied
in fact after 26th January, whether relevant.
The Military Governor of the Hyderabad State promulgated
on October 30, 1948, a Regulation called the Special Tribunal
Regulation, V of 1358 Fasli, under which a Special Tribunal was
constituted consisting of three members appointed by the Military
Governor. The Regulation provided that the Military Governor
may, by general or special order, direct that any offence or class
of offences should be tried by such Tribunal, and the procedure for
trial laid down in the Regulation differed from the provisions of
the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code in the following material particulars among others, viz., the Tribunal had power to
take cognisance of offences without committal, there was no provision for trial with jury or assessors, the language of the Tribunal was to be English, only a memorandum of the evidence need
be taken, there was no provision for de novo trial on change of
personnel, and there was no provision for transfer, revision or
confirmation of sentences. The cases against the petitioners, who
were charged with rioting, dacoity, arson and other offences, wern•
directed to be tried by the Special Tribunal on' October 6, 1949.
The accused were convicted in September, 1950, and the conviction on some of the charges was upheld by the High Court on
appeal in April, 1951. The accused appealed to the Supreme
Court and also applied under art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for quashing the orders of the High Court and the Special Tribunal on the ground that the Special Tribunal Regulation became
void on the 26th January, 1950, as its provisions contravened
articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution which came into force on
that date, and the continuation of the trial and conviction of the
petitioners after that date was illegal:
Held, per PATANJALISASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. (BOSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ. dissenting). (i)
Article 13 of the Constitution had no retrospective effect and, even
77
1963
Jan. 19.
590
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
though some of the provisions of the impugned Regulation contravened art. 14, the Regulation must he held to be valid for all
Syed Q,;,si1n
past transactions and for enforcing rights and liabilities accrued
R11zvi
before the advent of the Constitution, and on this principle the
v.
order made by the Military Governor referring the cases to the
The State of Sp~cial Tribunal cannot be impeached, and the Special Tribunal
Hyderabad
must be deemed to have taken cognisance of the cases properly
and OthtJrs.
and its proceedings up to the date of the coming in of the Constitution must be regarded as valid.
(ii) In a case like this where part of the trial could not be
challenged as bad, it is incumbent on the court to consider, first,
¥vhether the discriminatory provisions of law could be separated
from the rest and even without them a fair measure of equality
in the matter of procedure could be secured to the accused and
secondly, whether the procedure actually followed did or did not
proceed upon the discriminatory provisions. A mere threat or
possibility of unequal treatment is not sufficient to invalidate the
subsequent proceedings.
(iii) On the facts the accused had substantially the benefit of
a normal trial, though there wer6 deviations in ce:rtain particulars
and the conviction of the petitioners could not be set aside merely
because the Constitution of India came into force before the·
completion of their trial.
BOSE J.-(i) Under Art. 13 (1) of the Constitution atrial cannot be legally continued after the Constitution on the basis of a law
which offends the fundamental provisions of the Constitution and
therefore wbich 1 though good when made, would have been bad if
it had been passed after the Constitution, because the most vital
part of a trial is its conclusion and therefore a conviction after
the Constitution based on matter, or as ·a result of procedure,
which is abhorrent to the Constitution would be bad. This is not
giving retrospective effect to the Constitution because the conviction in such a case is after the Constitution and would be based
on matter which offends its £unB.amental guarantees.
(ii) In testing the validity of a law it is irrelevant to consider what has been done under it, for a law is either constitutional or not and its validity or otherwise cannot depend on what
has been accomplished under its provisions.
(iii) The provisions of the Special Tribunal Regulation which
confer an unfettered discretion on the l\1ilitary Governor to direct
any case or cases to the Tribunal without laying down any basis
for classification of the cases, the absence of committal Proceedings, the depr"ivation of the rights of revision and transfer and of
the right to a de nova trial, the right of the Tribunal to adopt a
summary procedure, and in particular the elimination of the
Urudu language which is the Court language of Hyderabad and of
the right to have sentences confirmed, are all discriminatory provisions; most of these provisions cannot he separa;~e4 fro~ th~
S.C.R.
..
..'
...
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
1953
good portions of the Regulation. The whole Regulation therefore
became void on the 26th of Ja.nuary, 1950, and the trial of the
petitioners after that date was under a void law; there was also Syed Qasim
Razvi
discrimination in fact after the 26th January as the proceedings
v.
were conducted in English even after that date. The conviciion
The
State
of
of the petitioners was consequently illegal.
Hyderabad
GHULAM HASAN J.-The discriminatory provisions of the
and Others.
Regulation stood in the way of the petitioners even after the 26th
J auuary, 1950, and prevented them from exercising their right to
apply for bail, for transfer or for revision and this was quite sufficient for holding that the Regulation violated art. 14 and was
therefore void under art. 13. The question whether the discriminatory provisions were in fact applied to the petitioners' cases
after the 26th January, 1950, was irrelevant. The discriminatory
provisions are not severable from the rest of the Regulation and
the tria~ held under the Regulation· was therefore void under
art. 13 read with arts. 14 and 21 and the conviction of the
petitioners was illegal.
Anwar Ali Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal ([1952) S.O.R.
284), Lachmandas Kewalram Ah1ija v. The State of Bombay ([1952]
S.O.R. 710) explained and dittinguished.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. Petitions Nos. 172 and
368 of 1952 under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Cases
Nos. 276, 277, 278, '279 and 280 of 1951, being
appeals under Arts. 132 (1) and 134 of the Constitution from the Judgment and Order of the 13th April,
1951, of the Hyderabad High Court in Criminal
Appeals Nos. 1449 and 1453 of 1950 were also heard
along with these petitions.
A. A. Peerbhoy and J. B. Dadachanji for the petitioners-appellants.
V. Rajaram Iyer, Advocate-General of Hyderabad
(K.S.R. Chari, with him) for the respondent (State of
Hyderabad).
1953. January 19. 'l'he Judgment of Patanjali
Sastri O. J. and Mukherjea and Ohaudrasekhara
Aiyar JJ. was delivered by Mukherjea J. Vivian
Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ. delivered separate
judgments.
(Petition No. 172 of 1952 and Case No. 276 of 1951).
MuKHERJEA J.-Syed Qasim Razvi, the appellant
in this appeal, was one of the accused in what i~.
1592
1953
Syed Qasim
Razvi
v.
Th~
State of
Hyderabad
and Others.
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
known as the Bibinagar dacoity case which took
place within the State of Hyderabad and in which,
according to the prosecution, a serious raid was committed by a party of armed Razakars in village Bibinat:ar, about 21 miles from. the city of Hyderabad,
attended with robbery, looting, arson, assault and
other violent acts on the afternoon of 10th January,
1948. The First Information Report was lodged pn
the day following, but the police administration of
the State of Hyderabad was at that time under the
complete control of the Razakars and they tried to
minimise the gravity of the occurrence as far as possible and there was neither any proper police investigation nor any serious attempt to arrest the culprits
or bring them to trial. It was on the 28th of August,
1949, that is to say, after a lapse of 19 months after
the occurrence, that a charge-sheet was presented
before the Special Tribunal No. 4 at Trimulgherry,
Secunderabad, against the appellant and six other
persons. The Tribunal was constituted in accordance
with the provisions of the Spec~al Tribunal Regulation (Regulation V of 1358F) and as provided fo"r in
section 2 of the Regulation, it consisted of three
members appointed by the Military Governor. Under
section 3 of the Regulation,.it was competent to tile
Military Governor by general or special order to
direct that any offence or class of offences should be
tried by such tribunal and the procedure to be followed by such tribunal was laid down in section 4 of the
Regulation. The case against the appellant and his
co-accused was formally referred to the Special Tribunal by an order of the Military Governor dated the
6th of October, 1949; but as the charge-sheet had
been submitted on a previous date, anoth.er order was
passed on 8th of October, 1949, validating the
presentation of the charge-sheet. The trial commenced before the Special Tribunal on 24th October,
1949, and on that day the Special Public Prosecutor
opened the case on behalf of the prosecution. The
procedure followed in the case was the warrant procedure and the prosecution examined 40 witnesses in·
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
593
1958
all before closing its case. The examination-in-chief
of all these witnesees was finished on the 21st Novem- Syed Qasini
ber, 1949, and the appellant, at that stage, chose to
Razvi
cross-examine only one witness, namely, the fortieth
v,
or the last one and this was done on the 22nd N ovein- The Stote of
ber, 1949. On 29th November, 1949, the accused Hyderabad
was examined under section 273 of the Hyderabad and Others.
Criminal Procedure Code which corresponds to Mukherjea J,
section 342 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code,
and on the 5th of December following, charges were
framed against him under sections 123, 124, 330 and
177 read with section 66 of the Hyderabad Penal
Code. The cross-examination of 18 prosecution witnesses was finished before the 26th of January, 1950,
and the rest of the witnesses were cross-examined
after that date. The accused was examined again on
26th February, 1950.
By their judgment dated the 11th September, 1950,
the Special Tribunal convicted the appellant on all
the charges mentioned above and sentenced him to
2 years' rigorous imprisonment under each of the
sections 123, 124 and 177 read with section 66 and to
7 years' rigorous imprisonment under section 330,
the sentences to run concurrently. There was an
appeal taken by the appellant against this decision to
the High Court of Hyderabad. The High Court by
its judgment dated the 13th of April, 1951, allowed
the appeal to this extent only, namely, that it acquitted the accused of the charge under section 123 of
the Hyderabad Code, but otherwise dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence
passed by the Special Tribunal. On 6th of August,
1951, the High Court gave leave to the accused to
appeal to this court under ar~icles 132 and 134 of the
Constitution; and an appeal has been filed in pursuance of this certificate. The records of the appeal
have not been printed as yet, but in the mean
time the appellant presented an application under
article 32 · of the Constitution praying for a writ in
the nature of certiorari for quashing the orders of
the High Court as well as of the Special Tribunal
.
\
594
1953
SUPREME COURT REPQRTS
tl953j
referred to above and for releasing him on the
ground that the proceedings before the Special TribuSyed Qasim
nal became void after 26th of January, 1950, as they
Razvi
co,nflicted with the provisions of articles 14 and 21 of
v.
The State of the Constitution.
As the trial became bad in law
Ifyderabad
a.fter 26th Jannary, 1950, the resulting conviction
and Others.
and sentence were, it is said, illegal also, and the
MukhCrjea J. appellant is entitled to be released from his imprisonment.
When this petition came up for hearing, a question
was raised by the learned Advocate-General for the
State of Hyderabad as to whether a petition under
article 32 wonld be the proper remedy in a case like
this having regard to the fact that the High Court,
which was a properly constituted court and was competent to go into the question of jurisdiction of the
Special 'fribunal, had already dealt with this matter.
Without expressing any opinion on this point, we
decided to hear arguments on the questions raised
treating them as preliminary points in the appeal
itself. Whether the appeal will be heard further on
its merits will depend upon the decision we arrive at
in the present hearing.
'l'he contention of Mr. Peerbhoy, who appeared in
support of the appeal, mainly is that the procedure
laid down in the Special Tribunal Regulation for
trial of offences departs, in material particulars, from
that under the ordinary law obtaining in Hyderabad
and these differences do abridge the rights of the
accused and deprive them of benefits to which otherwise they would have been entitled under the general
law. Prirna facie, therefore, the procedure for trial
under the Special Tribunal Regulation is discriminatory. It is urged that this discrimination could not
be justified on any reasonable principle of classification. No attempt was made in the Regulation to
classify the offences either with regard to their nature
or the area in which they were committed. An unfettered discretion was left to the Military Governor
to refer any and every case as he liked to be tried by
the Special 'fribnnal without any rule or principle to
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...
-
\_
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
595
1953
guide his discretion. The whole procedure, therefore, was void according to the principles laid Syed Qasim
down by this court in the case of Anwar Ali Sarkar
Razvi
v. The State of West Bengal(1). It is true that in
v.
this case the Constitution had not come irito The State of
force when. the trial was commenced and a Hyderabad
portion of the trial had already been gone and Others.
through prior to the 26th of January, 1950; but it is Mukherjea J,
urged that as the continuance of the procedure
became void on and from the date of the Constitution,
the conviction and sentence resu !ting from the adoption of such procedure could not be upheld. In this
connection, reliance bas been placed upon the case of
Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of
Bombay( 2 ) decided by this court which the learned
counsel contends exactly covers the present point.
The questions raised are uni:J.oubtedly important
and they involve an examination of some of the
earlier ,pronouncements of this court.
The first question that requires consideration is as
to whether the procedure for trial of criminal offences
laid down in the Special Tribunal Regulation is discriminatory in its character and offends against the
provision of article 14 of the Constibution? If it is
found that some of the provisions at least are discriminatory, the question would then arise as to what
exactly is the legal position in a case like this where
admittedly a considerable portion of the trial was
gone through prior to the coming into force of the
Constitution and that portion is immune from
challenge on the ground of discrimination, as the
rights guaranteed under the Constitution are not
retrospective in their operation. If the procedure
subsequently followed was also discriminatory, it is
not disputed that the conviction of the accused could
not stand. But if it is found that there was no occasion
after the 26th of January, 1950, to apply any of the
provisions of the Regulation which are discriminatory
in their character and if as a matter of fact the
procedure that was actually followed was substantially
(r) ~r952j S.C.R. 284.
(2) [r952] S.C,R, (ro,
.
596
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
(1953]
1958
the same as obtains under the ordinary law, could it
be said that the whole trial is vitiated and the result-.
Syed Qasim
ing conviction and sentence must necessarily be set
Razv_i
aside?
v
The State of
°Looking first of all to. the provisions of the Special
Hyderabad
Tribunal Hegulation, it is to be noticed that the preand Others.
amble to the Hegulation does not specify the object
Mukherjaa J. of the enactment or the legislative policy behind it.
Apparently an unfettered discretion has been vested
in the Military Governor and he can send any offence
or class of offences to be tried by the Special Tribunal in any way he likes and there is no objective
expressly stated in the statute itself in relation to
which his discretion is to be guided or controlled. It
is indeed a matter of common knowledge that this
Hegulation was promulgated just after the termination
of the police action i.n Hyderabad when a most alarming and unsettled state of affairs prevailed in the
State. There was undoubtedly ample justification for
a special measure like this; but the question still
arises whether there are provisions iu the Regulation,
which being repugnant to the fundamental rights
enunciated in the Constitution, could not be enforced
after the Constitution came into force? The provisions in the Regulation were undoubtedly intended
to shorten criminal trials and constitute special courts
which would be left in entire charge of the cases
referred to them, leaving the ordinary courts to do
their normal work. Under section 6 of the Hegulation, a Special Tribunal has been given all the powers
which are conferred on a court of session by the
Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code. Section 4(1)
provides that it can take cognizance of offences
without the accused being committed to it for trial;
and under sub-section (7) of this section, the tribunal
is enjoined to follow the procedure prescribed for
summary trials by Magistrates, though it may, when
it considers proper, follow the warrant procedure. It
is open to the 8pecial Tribunal to direct that the
proceedings before it should be conducted in the
English language. The Tribun1>l is not bonni\ tQ
\
J
S.C.R.
..
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).
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
597
take down evidence at length in writing and it need
only cause a memorandum of the substance of what
each witness deposes to be taken down in English.
But here again if it considers proper, it can direct
that the entire evidence should be taken d€>wn.
Among other changes, the Regulation provides that
the tribunal would not be bound to adjourn any trial
for any purpose, there would be no de nova trial if
there is a change in its personnel, it can try any
accused person in his absence if it is satisfied that the
absence has been brought about by the accused himself with a view to impede the course of justice, and
if it considers proper, it can exclude the public from
any proceeding. Section 7 provides that the tribunal can pass any sentence authorised by law and an
appeal would lie against its orders to the High Court
in the same way as orders of the Sessions Court would
be appealable under the provisions of the Hydernbad Criminal Procedure Code. The powers of revision
and transfer are wholly taken away and so also are
the provisions relating to confirmation of sentences.
These, in brief, are the features of the procedure laid
dcfwn for trial before the Special Tribunal.
It is admitte~ that at present no system of jury
trial obtains in the State of Hyderabad; there is no
doubt the provision for trial with the aid of assessors
in the city of Hyderabad itself. but there is no such
provision for areas outside the city. Under the
ordinary procedure, the present case could not have
been tried with the aid of assessors and the appellant
cannot complain of inequality in this respect .• The
committal proceedings are undoubtedly eliminated
)Jut it has been brought to our notice by the learned
Advocate-General appearing for the State of
Hyderabad that the preliminary enquiry before committal is not compulsory under the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code; and under section 267-A of.
the Code, a Magistrate is competent without recording any evidence, or after recording some portion of
the evidence, to commit an accused for trial by the
78
1953
Syed Qasim
Razvi
v.
The State of
Hyderabad
and Others.
Mitkherjea J.
598
19~3
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953)
Sessions Court if he is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for such committal. It appears thereSyed Qasi1n
fore that the elimination of the committal proceedRaz vi
v.
ing is not by itself a substantial departure from the
The State of. norrf!al procedure.
Hyderabad
·Mr. Peerbhoy laid much stress upon the provision
and Others.
of the Regulation which authorises the tribunal to
Mukherjea. J. direct that the proceedings before it shall be conducted in the English language. This again cannot be
held to be discriminatory as the Hyderabad Code
nowhere prescribes any particular language to be
the language of the court. There is no doubt that
ordinary court proceedings in Hyderabad are
conducted in Urdu, but Urdu is certainly not the
spoken language of even the majority of the people
within the Hyderabad State .. If the accused in a
particular case is not acquainted with the English
language and if by reason of the absence of adequate
arrangements to have the proceedings interpreted
to him in the language he understands, he
is prejudiced in his trial, obviously it might be
a ground which may be raised en his behalf in an
appeal against his conviction. But in our opinion
it cannot be said that the provision in the Regulation
relating to proceeding being conducted in .English if
the tribunal so desires per se violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.
The power of granting adjournment rests, even
under ordinMy law. in the exercise of a sound discretion by the court and is not a matter of much consequenoe. The court can also under the ordinary law
exclude members of the public or particular persons
from the court room in such circumstances as it considers proper (vide section '283 of the Hyderabad
Code). As regards denovo trial, when there is a change
in the personnel of the court, the provision of section
350 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code is to the
effect that when a case after being heard in part goes
for disposal before another Magistrate, the accused
has the right to demand, before the second Magistrate commences the proceedings, that ~he witnesses
-
..
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
599
1958
already examined should be re-examined and reheard.
Under the corresponding section (section 281) of the Syed Qllsim
Hyderabad Code, however, though the accused can
Razvi
demand re-exammation of the witnes:ies, the Magisv.
trate can disallow such prayer if he considers pr'oper, The State of
although the disallowing of such prayer may be a Hydernbnd
ground for ordering a retrial by the High Court. llnd Others.
Obviously, the provision in the Special Regulation Mukherjea J.
deviates only to this extent from the ordinary procedure. The continuance of a trial in the abJence of
the accused when the court is satisfied that the
absence has been brought about by the accused himself to impede the course of justi~e, is another special
feature of the trial before the Special Tribunal. Th,e
two material departures from the normal procedure
are to be found in the provisions contained in subsections (2) and (7) of section 4 of the Regulation.
Sub-section (2) authorises the tribunal to dispense
with recording the evidence in extenso and provides
that a record of the memorandum Df the substance
of the deposition of each witness would be sufficient.
There is a. proviso introduced by sub-section (2) (a)
which says that the above provision shall not preclude a special Tribunal from directing in respect of
any trial that the evidence should be taken down at
•
length. Sub-section (7) lays down that unle~s something to the contrary has been provided for in the
llegulation, the tribunal should follow the procedure
of summary trial, though even here it can adopt
the warrant procedure for reasons which it has got to
record in writing.
.
The provision relating to summary trial irrespective of the nature of the offence and also that relating
to recording of evidence in a summary manner may
be considered prejudicial to the accused and may
norma.lly deprive him of benefits which are enjoyed
by other persons similarly situated who are tried
under the ordinary law. One thing noticeable in the
Special .Regulation with regard to these provisions is
that an option has been given to the Special Tribu11al to adopt the warrant procedure in such cases as
,.
600
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
1958
.it considers necessary and it can also direct that the
evidence should be taken down in extenso. In the
Syed Qasim_
case before us it is admitted that evidence was recordRazvi
ed in full and the procedure followed was the warrant
v,
The State of and "not the summary procedure.
Mr. Peerbhoy
Hyderabrld
argues that a law, which allows the summary proceand Others.
dure to be followed or the recording of evidence to
be
dispensed with at the discretion of the court withMukherjea J.
out any attempt to specify the .class of cases where
such exceptional provisions should be applied, is
prima facie discriminatory and is invalid under article
14 of the Constitution irrespective of the fact as to
. whether or not such provisions were actually applied
ip a particular case. Whatever may be the position
where provisions of this character are laid down in a
statute enacted after the Ccmstitution came into force,
in a case like the present, where the proceedings
prior to 26th January, 1950, would have to be assumed
to be valid, the question as to what procedure was
actually followed after that date may be relevant for
the purpose of determining whether the trial could
be regarded as vitiated on the ground of infringement
of the equal protection rule. We will have to deal
with this matter more fully later on.
Mr. Peerbhoy argues that even the substitution of
•
warrant procedure for sessions procedure constitutes
a substantial difference. We cannot accept this contention as sound. If we leave out the committal
proceeding, which is not compulsory under the
Hyderabad law, the accused could not be in a really
worse position by reason of the warrant procedure
being followed instead of the sessions procedure. In
the case before us it appears that the prosecution
had examined all their witnesses before the framing
of the charge and the accused was given an opportunity to cross-examine them at that stage. He chose
to cross-examine only one of these witnesses and
after the framing of the charge all the prosecution
witnesses were cross-examined by him. Our a.ttention
has been drawn to the provision of section 267-A (2)
(b) of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code which
j
S.C.R.
stJPRE1ME1 cotJRT REPORTS
601
1958
speaks of recross-examination by the accused in a
sessions case. It appears that under the provisions .Syed Qasim
of the Hyderabad Code, in a sessions trial the prosecution witnesses are first examined and as soon as the
v.
examination-in-chief of each one of them is finished The State of
they cou Id be cross-examined on behalf of the accused. Hyderabad
After the prosecution has closed its case and before and Other&.
the acc,µsed produces his defence witnesses, he is Mukhsrjoa J.
allowed to recross-examine, if he so desires, any of
the prosecution witnesses, though such recross-examination is limited to matters which were not put to the
witnesses in the previous cross-examination. Neither
side cou_ld enlighten us on the point as to whether
this is allowed only when the committing Magistrate
does not exam~ne any witness before the commitment
order or it is applicable also when the prosecution
witnesses are examined and cross-examined at the committal stage. We do not think, however, that it is correct to say that during the sessions trial itself there are
three rights of cross-exmination given to the accused
as Mr. Peerbhoy contends. The accused can crossexamine the prosecution witnesses as and when they
are examined by the prosecution and he has a right
of second cross-examination at the end of the prosecution case and before he calls his own witnesses,
though the l{l,tter right is a thin and attenuated one·,
being confined to such matters as were omitted during
the first cross-examination. In the warrant procedure which has been followed in the present case,
the accused also got two rights of cross-examination,
one before the framing of the charge and the second
after the charge was framed. In our opinion, this
cannot be said to be a substantial difference in the
procedure resulting in prejudice to the accused.
Mr .. Peerbhoy further argued that the provision
for appeal contained in the RegulatiQn deprived him
of the right of second appeal which is allowed under
the Hyderabad Code. This argument, in our opinion,
is based upon a misconception. It appears from secti9n 355 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code
that there are second appeals allowed under the
602
1958
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
Hyderabad law even in criminal cases; and when it
is
said that an appeal lies to the High Court from
Syed Qasim
the
order of a Sessions Judge, it contemplates that
Razvi
the order of the Sessions Judge may be passed by him
v.
, The State of tiither as au original court or in appeal from the deciHyderabad
sion of a District Magistrate or Assistant Sessions
and Others.
Judge. But in the present case the original trial
was
by the Special Tribunal which was invested with
Mukhsrjea J.
the powers of a sessions court and consequently only
one appeal would lie to the High Court. It is said
that the case could have been tried .by the District
Magistrate and in that case the accused could have
one appeal to the Sessions Judge and a second one
to the High Court under the Hyderabad law. 'I'his
contention rests on a pure speculation and is hardly
tenable. One of the charges against the accused was
a charge of dacoity under section 330 of the Hyderabad Penal Code. On a conviction under this section
the court is empowered to sentence the accused to a
term of rigorous imprisonment which may extend up
to 10 years. Unless,
therefore, the District Ma11is•
•
0
trate was of the opm10n that the case did not merit a
sentence beyond 4 years of rigorous imprisonment,
he was bound to refer the case to be tried by a cour·t
of session. This is not a matter of which really any
~rievance could be made.
The other departure noticeable in the Special
Regulation is the withdrawal of the provisions relating to revision and transfer. Another thing that
has been omitted from the Special Tribunal Regulation is the provision relating to the confirmation of
certain sentences which under the ordinary law have
to be confirmed by higher authorities. According to
the Hyderabad Code, the High Court has not only to
confirm death sentences, but also sentences of transportation for lifll and of imprisonment for a period
exceeding 10 years. The death sentences have got
to be further confirmed by the Nizam.
It would appear from what has been stated above
that there are a few provisions in the procedure
for trial by a Special Tribunal appointed under the
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1958
Regulation mentioned above, which differ from ordinary procedure, and they are prima facie prejudicial to Syed Qastm
the accused. Under article 13 (1) of the Constitution,
Razvi
all laws in force iu the territory of India immediately
v.
before the commencement of the Constitution in so The State of
far as they are inconsistent with the fundamental Hyderabad
rights under Part III of the Cou.~titution shall, to and Othera.
the extent of such inconsistency, be void. The Mukherjea J.
argument of Mr. Peerbhoy seems to be that it may
be that all the provisions relating to trial by a Special
Tribunal are not bad, but as some of them undoubtedly are, the whole law on the face of it is discriminatory and must be held to be void as conflicting with
the equal protection clause, and the question as to
how it was actually worked out iu a particular case is
not a material fact for consideration at all. In support
of this contention the learned counsel relies upon
·the view accepted by the majority of this court in
the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar('). In our opinion, the position here is
materially different from that iu Anwar Ali Sarkar's
case('). Iu Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (') the opinion
expressed by the majority of this court was that
section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act
was ultra vires the Constitution iu so ·far as it
authorised the State Government to direct any case
to be tried by the Special Court. The clause was
held to be invalid, as the Act, which was passed after
the coming into force of the Constitution, did not
mention in what cases or offences such directions
could be given, uor did it purport to lay down the
criterion or the basis upon which the classification
was to be made. As this portion of section 5 (1) of
the statute was ou the face of it discriminatory, the
question as to how it was applied on the facts of a
particular case could not and did uot arise.
Iu the case b~fore us, the impugned Regulation
was in operation from long before the date of the
Constitution. Section 3 of the Regulation, which is
similar to section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special
(1) (1952] S.C.R. 284.
~.
603
,I
604
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1968
•
[1953]
Courts Act, might be in conflict with the provision
of article 14 of the Constitution, but as has been held
Syed Qasim
by
this court in Keshavan Madhava Menon's case (1),
Razvi.
the effect of article 13 (1) of the Coustitution is not
v.
The Stat• of to obliterate the entire operation of the inconsistent
Hyderabad
laws or to wipe them out altogether from the statute
and Others.
book; for to do s9 will be to give them retrospective
effect
which they do not possess. Such laws must
Mukherjea J.
be held to be valid for all past transactions and for
enforcing rights and liabilities accrued before the
advent of the Constitution. On this principle, the
order made by the Military Governor, referring this
case to the Special Tribunal, cannot be impeached
and consequently the Special Tribunal must be
deemed to have taken cognizance of the case quite
properly, and its proceedings up to the date of the
coming in of the Constitution would also have to be
regarded as valid. To quote the observation of our
brofoer Das J. in Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v.
The State of Bombay (2 ), " as the Act was valid in its
entirety before the date of the Constitution that part
of the proceeding before the Special Judge which up
to that date had been regulated by the special procedure cannot be questioned." The question now
arises, how is the validity of the proceedings subsequent to the date of the Constitution to be
determined ?
It is not disputed that· under article 13 (1) of the
Constitution those provisions of the Special 'rribunal
Regulation which are in couflict with article 14of the
Constitution, became void as soon as the Constitution
came into force; but article 13 (1) does not make the
whole statute invalid, it invalidates only those provisions which are inconsistent with the fundamental
rights guaranteed under Pa,rt III of the Constitution
and simply because the trial was continued even after
26th January, 1950, under the same Regulation,
would not necessarily render the subsequent proceedings invalid. All that the accused could claim
is that what remained of the trial must not deviate
(1) (1951) S,C.R, 228,
(2) [1952] S.C.R.710.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
605
1963
from the normal standard in material respects so a.s
to amount to a denial of the equal protection of laws Syed Qa.!im
within the meaning of article 14 of the Constitution.
Ra~vi
For the purpose of determining whether the accused
v.
The
Stat•
of
was deprived of such protection, we have got to see
Hyderabad
first of all whether after eliminating the discriminatory
provisions in the Regulation it was still possible to and Others.
secure to the accused substantially the benefits of a Mukherjea J.
trial under the ordinary law; and if so, whether that
was actually done in the present case?
Mr. Peerbhoy argues that once it is held that there
are in the Special Tribunal Regulation provisions
which are obnoxious to the equal protection clause,
any proceeding under the Regulation after the 26th
of January, 1950, must be held to be totally invalid
under article 13 (1) of the Constitution, and it is not
material to enquire whether the trial could go on
without the discriminating provisions or whether as a
matter of fact these provisions were at all applied. It
is the possibility of unequal application of law or the
threat to equality that makes the Regulation invalid
after the Constitution comes into force and consequently the question of actual prejudice to the
accused is not a relevant matter for consideration.
In support of this contention the learned counsel
relies strongly upon the decision of this court in
Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of.
Bombay (' ). We are not convinced that this line of
reasoning is correct. In Lachmandas's caso( 1) the
trial was held before a Special Tribunal constituted
under section 10 of the Bombay Public Safety
Measures Act, 1947, and in accordance with the procedure laid down in that Act. The procedure was
pronounced to be discriminatory in material particulars and though that part of the trial, which was
held prior to 26th January, 1950, could not be
assailed, the continued application of the discriminatory procedure after that date was held to be illegal;
and the result was that the conviction of the accused
(1) [195z] S.C.R. 710,
79
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·1958
[1953)
was set aside and a retrial ordered. It appears to us
Syed Qasim that in Lachmandas's case(!) the present question was
neither raised nor considered, namely, as to whether
Bazvi
v.
after eliminating the discriminatory provisions in the
The State of statute it was still possible to go on with the trial
Hyderabad
and secure to the accused substantially the benefits
and Others.
of a trial under the normal procedure. On the other
Mukherjea J, hand, it was assumed throughout that it was not
possible to proceed with the trial without following
the discriminatory procedure and as that procedure
became void on the coming into force of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Special Judge practically came to an end. Das J. who delivered the
majority judgment of this Court in Lachmandas's
case(•) expressly observed as follows:
"Indeed in a sense the Special Judge's jurisdiction
came to an end, for he was enjoined to proceed only
according to the special procedure and that procedure
having become void as stated above, he could not
proceed at all as a Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act."
Whether this assumption was well-founded or not
· it is not profitable for us to discuss at the present
stage; but it is clear that this aspect of the case
was not presented to the court at all by the learned
counsel on either side and so was not considered by
·the court. The decision in Lachmandas's case(')
cannot, therefore, be put forward as an authority
against the view which we have indicated above. In
cases of the type which we have before us where
part of the trial could not be challenged as bad and
the validity of the other part depends on the question
as to whether the accused hai been deprived of equal
protection in matters of procedure, it is incumbent
upon the court to consider, firstly, whether the discriminatory or unequal provisions of law could be
separated from the rest and even without them a fair
measure of equality in the matter of procedure could
be secured to the accused. In the second place, it
has got to consider whether the procedure actua.lly
(1) [195z] S.C.R, 710,
(;) [t9.I•) S.C,R. 710, 735,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
607
1958
followed did or did not proceed upon the basis of the
discriminatory provisions. In our opinion, a mere
Syed Qasim
threat or possibility of unequal treatment is not
Rasvi
sufficient. If actually the accused has been disv.
criminated against, then and then only he can com- The State of
Hydorabad
plain, not otherwise.
and Otht.ra.
We may mention here that the impossibility of
giving the accused the substance of a trial according Mukherj.a J.
to normal procedure at the subsequent stage may
arise not only from the fact that the discriminatory
provisions were not severable from the rest of the
Act and the court consequently had no option to
continue any other -than the discriminatory procedure; or it may arise from something done at the
previous stage which though not invalid at that time
precludes the adoption of a different procedure subsequently. Thus if the normal procedure is trial by
jury or with the aid of assessors, and as a matter of
fact there was no jury or assessor trial at the beginning, it would not be possible to introduce it at any
subsequent stage. Similarly having once adopted
the summary procedure, it is not possible to pass on
to a different procedure on a later date. In such
cases the whole trial would have to be condemned
as bad. As has been said above, the case of Lachmandas Kewalram Ahujci v. The State of Bombay (1)
proceeded on the assumption that it was not possible .
for the Special Court to avoid the discriminatory
procedure even after 26th January, 1950. The
matter was not investigated but that was the assumption upon which this court proceeded. One reason
why this assumption was not combated might have
been that the ordinary trial in that case should have
been with the aid of assessors and as there was no
assessor trial at the beginning, it was not possible to
adopt it afberwards.
We will now proceed to examine the facts of this
case in the light of the principles enunciated above.
It may be mentioned here that after the learned
counsel on both sides.bad finished their arguments
~I)
'I.
[r952]S C.R. 7ro,
608
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
on questions of law, we gave the appellant an opportunity
to place materials before us for the purpose of
Syed Qasi1n
showing
to what extent he had been actually discriRfl&Vi
minated against and prejudiced in the trial that was
v.
The' State of held after the coming into force of the Constitution.
Hyderabad
He ha3 filed a long affidavit setting out in an elaboand Othe.rs.
rate manner his alleged grievances and we gave the
parties a further hearing upon it.
Mukherjea J.
As we have already stated, no exception could be
taken to the Special Tribunal's taking cognizance of
the case under an order of the Military Governor as
all this happened long before the advent of the
Constitution; and it cannot be urged that the creation of a Special Court by itself was an inequality in
·the eye of law. Apart from other circumstances, the
present case was undoubtedly a big one and the trial
was expected to take a considerable period of time
before it could be completed. To allow it to go before
tbe ordinary court would mean nothing else but
blocking the hearing of all other cases for an indefinite length of time. There was nothing per se unreasonable in appointing a Special Court and section
13 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code
expressly empowers the Government to confer the
powers of a court on any Government servant in any
local area or with respect to a particular case or cases
. and such person is denominated a special judge. As
regards the procedure to be followed by the Special
'fribunal, the Regulation undoubtedly prescribes the
procedure for summary trial by a Magistrate. If the
tribunal had adopted that procedure, we would have
no other alternative but to declare the whole trial as
invalid for although the summary procedure could
uot have been challenged as illegal prior to the
coming in of the Constitution, it could not possibly
have been changed to a different procedure after 26th
January, 1950. The entire procedure would then
have to be held as invalid as conflicting with the
equal protection clause. The tribunal however
adopted the warrant procedure which it was entitled
oo do under the Regulation itself; and as we have
8.0.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
609
1953
indicated already, the committal proceeding not
being compulsory under the Hyderabad Code, the
difference between a warrant procedure and a ses- Syed
Qasim
Razvi
sions procedure is not material. The recording of a
v.
memorandum of evidence in a snmmary manner is The State of
another discriminatory feature in the Regulation, Hyderabad
but here again the Regulation gave an option to the and Others.
tribunal to direct the recording of evidence in extenso
and the tribunal actually did give that direction in Mukherj•a 1 •
the present case. There can be no doubt that if the
option had been exercised in the other way, it would
have been impossible to give the accused the
substance of an ordinary trial alter the passing of
the Constitution. The use of the English language
during the trial is not at all discriminatory as we
have already said and so far as the present appellant
is concerned, he could not possibly make any grievance of it. No complaint has been made by the
appellant that the Special Tribunal refused to grant
any adjournment that he prayed for and as there was
no change in the personnel of the tribunal during the ·
whole period of the trial, no que.>tion of de novo trial
could at all arise. There was also no occasion for
holding the trial in the absence of the accused; the
appellant however in his affidavit has made a grievance of the fact that when the second local inspection was held by the court, neither he nor his lawyer
was present and he merely gave a note of certain
places and things for information of the tribunal.
In reply to this it is stated in the affidavit filed on
behalf of the State that the appellant did not want
to be present and he gave a note to the tribunal
stating therein all that he wanted to state. Whatever
the actual facts might have been, it seems to us that
this is not a matter which is connected in any way
with the provision of the Regulation which enables
the tribunal to proceed with the trial in the absence
of the accused. The Regulation authorises the
tribunal to go on with a trial in the absence of· the
accused only when it is satisfied that the absence has
been brought about by th'e accused himself to impede
610
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1968
the course of justice. Obviously it was not under
this provision that the tribunal went to inspect the
Syed Qasim
spot of occurrence in the absence of the accused. In
Raevi
fact, the Regulation does not say anything at all
v.
Th• State of about local inspection.
The. provision for local
Hyderabad inspection is contained in section 528 of the Hyderaand Others.
bad Code which corresponds to section 539A of the
Indian Code. It is important to note that the
Mukhorjea J,
Hyderabad Code does not say anything about giving
notice to the parties before holding any local inspection, though that is necessary under the Indian law.
It may be said that it is eminently desirable that the
court should make the local inspection in the presence of both parties. But if there was any irregularity in this respect, that is a point which could be
raised on the merits of the appeal ; it has nothing
to do with any provision of the Regulation in regard
to which a question of conflict with the equal protection clause can arise.
The omission of the provisions relating to revision and transfer in the Regulation apparently seem
to be discriminatory, but even on this point the
grievance of the appellant appears to be more
imaginary than real. When a Special Court is
validly set up to try a particular case, a transfer of
that case to some other court cannot normally be
contemplated. The absence of the right of transfer
in such cases is an incident of the establishment of
the Special Court. Under the Regulation there is
plenary power of transfer given to the Military
Governor and he can exercise such power in any way
he likes without any restriction or limitation. It
may be that this provision was deemed sufficient to
meet any exceptional circumstance that might arise.
As regards the right of revision, it appear8 that there
was only one application for revision filed by the
appellant sometime before 26th of January, 1950.
The. allegations were want of jurisdiction of the
Special Court and also irregularity of the trial by
reason of misjoinder of charges. That application
was dismissed on 27th February,, 1950, and the order
.I'
S.C.R.
SUPREME 00.URT REPORTS
611
shows that it was not rejected on the ground that the
Regulation does not allow any revision to the
accused, but that it was not proper to interfere with
the proceeding at that stage. The questions which
the appellant wanted to raise were all raised by him
in the appeal from the final judgment and they have
been considered by the High Court. If there is any
error committed by the High Court in this respect,
the appellant would be at liberty to raise that point
when the appeal is heard on its merits. Considering
all these facts, we have no hesitation in holding that
although there were deviations in certain particulars,
the accused had substantially the benefit of a normal
trial in this case. The question of confirmation of
sentence, we may say, is not at all relevant, for the
sentences, which have been passed upon the accused,
do not require any confirmation under the Hyderabad
Criminal Procedure Code.
'
In cataloguing his grievances the appellant has
stated inter alia in his affidavit that he was kept in
military custody and also in a solitary cell, that he
was separated from his fellow prisoners, that the tribunal was completely dominated by the Executive
and that a stenographer was kept sitting behind him
all the time that the trial was going on who took
down every word that passed between him and his
counsel. It is not at all necessary for us to inquire
into the truth or falsity of these allegations, for even
if they are true, they are irrelevant to the present
enquiry. These are matters not related in any way
to the question of inequality in connection with the
provisions of the Special Tribunal Regulation.
Finally Mr. Peerbhoy raised an objection based
on article 21 of the Constitution and contended that
the appellant was not tried in accordance with the
procedure established by law. What he said is, that
the Military Governor had no authority under
section 3 of the Regulation to refer an individual case
to the Special Tribunal for trial, for it authorised
him to direct the Special Tribunal to try "any offence
'\
1953
Syed Qasim
Basvi
v.
The State of
Hyderabad
and Others.
Mukherjea J
612
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
whether committed before or after the commencement of this Regulation or any classes of offences",
Syed Qasitn
but not any individual case. A distinction is made
Ra~vi
between an "offence" aud a "case", and the learned
v
Th• Slat• of counsel points out that an offence could be described
Byderabad
as a case only when it is connected with a parand Other&.
ticular perwn who is alleged to have committed it.
The direction to try "any offence" must, therefore,
Mukher;'~a J.
mean a direction to try an offence described as such
in the Hyderabad Penal Code, no matter by whom it
is committed and not an offence committed by any
particular person which is a case. We see no force
in this argument. WhA.tever interpretation may be
put upon the words "offence" and "case" in a
context where both are used in the same provision,
as for instance, in section 5 of the West Bengal
Special Courts Act, which was under consideration in
Anwar Ali Sarkar's caseC) we are of opinion that
section 3 of the Regulation contemplates no such
distinction and that it empowers the Military Governor to direct a Special Tribunal to try an offence
committed by a particular person, in other words, to
try an individual case. This view derives support
from the language employed in the Hyderabad
Special Tribunals (Termination) and Special Judges
(Appointment) Regulation, 1359 F., whereby it was
provided that a Special Judge appointed under that
Regulation shall try "suc::i" offences of which the
trial was pending before a Special Tribunal immediately before its dissolution as were "made over" to
him for trial by specified authorities [section 5(1) ].
This is clearly a provision for transfer of the cases
pending trial before the Special Tribunals dissolved
under that Regulation to Special Judges appointed
in their place. As both th8 B.egulations must be
read together dealing as they do with the constitution and termination of the same bodies and, as the
later Regulation clearly uses the word "offences" in
the sense of cases, it must receive the same meaning
in the earlier Regulation V of 1358 F.
1958
(1) [1952) s.c.R 284.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
613
The result, therefore, is that the preliminary point
raised by the appellant cannot succeed. The
petition under article 32 shall stand dismissed and
the appeal will be posted for hearing on its merits in
the usual course.
(Petition No. 368 of 1952 and Cases
Nos. 277 to 280 of 1951).
MuKHERJEA J.-The above order in Criminal
Appeal No. 276 of 1951 will govern connected
Appeals Nos. 277, 278, 279 and 280 of 1951, which
have been preferred respectively by Kbadar Ali Khan,
Mohd. Hazi Khan, Mab bat Khan and Syed Nazir
Ali, the four co-accused of Qasim Razvi in the Bibiuagar dacoity case, who were tried along with him
by the Special Tribunal No. IV at Trimulgherry.
They were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment on charges of dacoity, rioting, etc. by the
Special Tribunal and the convictions and sentences
were affirmed with slight modification by the High
Court of Hyderabad in appeal. 'rhey have now come
up to this court on the strength of a certificate granted by the Hyderabad High Court under articles 132
and 134 of the Constitution.
The appeals are not yet ready for bearing, but as
in Qasim Razvi's case, the appellants have filed a
petition under article 32 of the •Constitution-being
Petition No. 368 of 1952-attackiug the validity of
the trial by the Special Tribunal on the same cousti·tutioual grounds as have been urged by Qasim Razvi
in bis petition. We beard arguments on these questions treating them as preliminary points in the
appeals. 'rhe points are identically the same as in
Qasim Razvi's case; only in the affidavits, which have
been filed by the petitioners at the conclusion of the
hearing on questions of law, each one of them bas
attempted to state in his own way bow be was actually
prejudiced at the trial by reason of the procedure
adopted by the Special Tribunal. We have been
taken through these affidavits and we find nothing in
So
1908
Syed Qasim
Baavi.
v.
The Stat1 of
Hyderabad
and Othera.
Mukherjea J~
614
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
them which would justify us in taking a view different
from that taken in Qasim Ra.zvi's case.
Syed Qasim
It has been conceded by Mr. Peerbhoy that the
Razvi
v.
cases of Khadar Ali Khan and Mahbat Khan stand
The State of exactly on the same footing as that of Qasim Razvi.
Hyderabad
With regard to Syed Nazir Ali and Hazi Khan the
aiid Othe1·s.
special facts alleged are that both of them were unMukherjea J. defended during the trial by the Special Tribunal
and no lawyer was engaged on their behalf. It is said
further that they were both ignorant of the English
language in which the proceedings were conducted,
that the presiding Judge Mr. Pinto did not understand Urdu and consequently they had no opportunity of making themselves heard. Without entering
into the truth or otherwise of these allegations, it
would be enough to state for our present purpose
that they do not involve any constitutional point,
and as we have said in the main case, the direction to
conduct proceedings in English does not per se offend
against the provision of article 14 of the Constitution. If as a matter of fact the accused did not get a
fair trial or were prejudiced in their defence, these
matters can very well be raised when the appeals are
heard on their merits. These, however, are not questions which arise at the present stage when we are
concerned only with infraction, if any, of the fundamental rights guara~teed under Part III of the Constitution. The result, therefore, is that the pre liminary points raised in these appeals are overruled and
the appeals would be posted for hearing on their.
merits in the usual course. The application under
article 32 will stand dismissed.
(Petitions Nos. 172 and 368 of 1952 and Cases
Nos. 276 to 280of1951.)
1963
BosE J.-J am unable to distinguish these cases in
principle from The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar('), Kathi Baning Rawat v. The State of
Saurashtra( 2 ) and Laohmandas Kewalram Ahuja and
Another v. The State of Bombay(') and in particular
(1) [1952] S,C,R. 284,
(2) (1952] S.C.R. 435.
(3) (1952] s.c.R. 710,
J
S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
1953
from the last which is more akin to these in that
there also there was a trial under a special law ..yhich
Syed Qasim
held good until the Constitution of India came into
Ras vi
force, but which was held to be bad after that date
v.
because it offended article 14 (1).
Th• Stat• of
Before 'he Constitution the State of Hyderabad Hyderabad
and Others.
was not part of the Dominion of India. Its ruler, the
Nizam, was sovereign in all material respects and had
Bose J.
a.bsolute powers over his subjects, including the power
to legislate as he wished at his will and even at his
caprice, if he so chose.
Soon after the partition of India, and in particular
in the year 1948, there occurred grievous disturbances
in the State which led to what is popularly known as
"police action" on the part of India. In the course
of these disturbances many grievous crimes were
committed, and in particular, complaints were laid
before the authorities of a series of grave offences
said to have been committed on the 10th of January,
1948. Those are the offences with which we are concerned. The first information report relating to them
was lodged the following day.
Some eight months later, namely on 13th September, 1948, there came the police action. It lasted
for three days and swift on its conclusion a Military
Governor was appointed for the State of Hyderabad.
The Governor was immediately invested by the
Nizam, who was still in law the absolute rular of the
State, with authority to legislate for the State by way
of Regulation. In exercise of those powers the Military Governor promulgated the Regulation, which is
now impugned, on 31st October, 1948.
Sections 2 and 3 of the Regulation empowered the
Military Governor to constitute Special Tribunals by
general or special order, to direct them to try any
offences or classes of offences he chose to name and,
further, to transfer the trial of any particular case he
liked from the ordinary courts of the State to one or
other of these Special Tribunals. The Regulation
also prescribed a special procedure which differed
from the procedure of the ordinary cour~~.
616
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953)
1968
In pnrsnance of these powers the Military Governor made an order on 21lth June, 1949, constituting
Syed Qa.sim
certain
Special Tribunals, among them the one with
Razvi
v.
which •we are concerned. Later, on 6th October, 1949,
The State of he made another order in which he selected the
Hyderabad
offences which the present appellants and their ooand Others.
accused were suspected to have committed, namely,
dacoity, grievous hurt, wrongful confinement, arson,
Bose J.
riot and destruction of evidence, he furnishe_d particulars of time and place and gave a general descripticn of the victims included, he named the appellants
:tnd others as accused in relation to these specific
occurrences and directed that they be tried by the
Special Tribunal for these offences.
I am not able to regard this as a general oraer
directing that all offences of dacoity, grievous hurt,
arson, riot, enc., by whomsoever commi·0ted, shall be
tried by the Special Tribunal. The order, in my
opinion, is a specific, and, what I might call "unclassified", selection of these special handpicked offences
suspected to have been committed by these particular
accused.
The trial proceeded. The charge was framed on
5th December, 1949, and up till 26th January, 1950,
(the date of the Constitution) forty witnesses were
examined for the prosecution. Of them, eighteen
were cross-examined before 26th January, 1950, and
twenty-two were cross-examined after. The appell8'nts were convicted on 11th September, 1950, and
their convictions were upheld on appeal by the High
Court of Hyderabad on 13th April, 1951. It is conceded that the trial was valid and regular up to the
26th of January, 1950. The question is whether it
could be validly continued by the same Tribunal and
under tbe same proceaure, after that aate.
This, to my mind, involves consiaeration of three
distinct things: (1) does the Regulation itself, or
any part of it, contravene article 14 (1)? (2) does
the Order maae on the strength of the Regulation do
so? and (3) does the procedure adopted by the Tribunal do so?
J
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
617
As to the first, namely the Regulation itself, article
13(1) falls to be considered. It runs:
"All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution,
in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions
oi this l:'art, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency,
be void."
That, to my mind, raises this query: if this law had
been passed after the Constitution and the present
trial had commenced after it, would either have been
valid? If not, I cannot see how a conviction can be
• based after the Constitution on a procedure and on
matter which is abhorrent to its fundamental chapter
howevermuch all that was done may have been good
up to that date. This, to my mind, is not giving
retrospective effect to the Constitution because the
vital part of a trial is its conclusion. I am not prepared to construe these fundamental provisions in a
narrow way. Paraphrasing them broadly, they breathe
a message of hope to those who have not known equality of treatment before, and give a guarantee of
security to those who have, a guarantee which came
into effective being the moment the Constitution was
born. Assuming this Regulation to be a law which
offends the Comtitution and therefore which could
not have been upheld after it, we have the Constitution saying to every man who can claim its protection: "You shall not be convicted, nor will you be
sent to jail, under laws which infringe the fundamental rights hereby guaranteed to you." In my judgment, it is a breach of this fundamental guarantee to
convict on the basis of a law which cannot hold good
after the Constitution. This, to my mind, is the
decision in Lachmandas's case('). I refer in particular
to the following passages in the majority judgment :
"As the Act was valid in its entirety before the
date of the Constitution, that part of the proceeding
before the Special Judge, which, up to that date, had
been regulated by this special procedure cannot be
(1) [•95•] $.C.R. 710,
\
1959
Syed Qasini
Razvi
v.
The Stat• of
Hyderabad
and Other&.
Bose J.
618
1958
Syed Qasim
Rasvi
v.
The State of
Hyderabad
and Oth6rs.
Boae J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
questioned, however discriminatory it may have been,
but if the discriminatory procedure is continued after
the date of the Constitution, surely the accused person
may legitimately ask: 'Why am I today being treated
differently from other persons accused of similar
offences in respect of procedure?'
•
*
*
It is therefore clear ............ that such continuation
of the application of the discriminatory procedure to
their cases after the date of the Constitution constituted a breach of their fundamental right guaranteed
by article 14 and being inconsistent with the provisions of that article the special procedure became
void under article 13 ............ Their complaint is npt
for something that had happened before 26th J anuary, 1950, but is for unconstitutional discriminatwn
shown against them since that date.
*
*
*
Therefore, the continuation of the trial after that
date according to the discriminatory procedure resulting in their conviction and sentence cannot be supported. Indeed in a sense the Special Judge's jurisdiction came to an end, for he was enjoined to proceed only
according to the special procedure and that procedure
having become void as stated above, he could not proceed
. at all as a Judge of a Special Court constituted under the
impugned Act."
I now proceed to consider whether this Regulation
could have been upheld as good law if it had been
promulgated after the Constitution; and here it is
necessary to emphasise tha1; in testing the validity of
a law it is irrelevant to consider what has been done
under it, for a law is either constitutional or not and
its validity or otherwise cannot depend upon what
• has been accomplished under its provisions. That, to
my mind, is self-evident, but it also seems to follow
from that portion of the majority decision in the West
Bengal case(') which is summarised iri headnote (ii) at
page 285 and head-note (v) at page 286.
(I) [1952] S.C.R. 284.
8.0.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
Now in Laohmandas's case( 1) there is this important
passage at page 733:
"Further, the supposed basis of the alleged classification, namely the fact of reference to the Special
Court before the Constitution came into effect, has no
reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act."
This, in my opinion, shows that the majority considered it relavant and important to determine the
post-constitutional validity of an enactment which
was valid up to the date of the Constitution by
the. application of post-constitutional standards and
tests.
In the present case, the impugned Regulation does
not set out any objects. I do not think that is fatal
but I do think that when that is the case, the Courts
are called upon to determine what the objects are
from t'he Act itself and the surrounding circumstances, as best they may, and if the objects so determined cannot be reasonably related to the basis of
the classification, the Regulation must, on the authority of Laohmandas's case(1), be considered postconstitutionally improper.
Now, looking to the surrounding circumstances, I
can only conceive of two objects: (1) speedier trials,
(2) more convenient disposal of certain unspecified
cases. The first has been condemned as discriminatory in the West Bengal case(•) in the following
words:
"Assuming that the preamble throws any light on
the section, the necessity of speedier trial is too
vague, uncertain and elusive a criterion to form a
rational basis for discrimination."
By parity of reasoning the second is even more
objectionable.
The next point on which the West Bengal Special
Courts Act was considered objectionable by at least
four of the seven Judges wa.s that the Act did not
Jay down any basis for classification of the cases
(1) [1952) S.C.R. 710,
(2) (1952) S.C.R. 284.
1953
Sy•d QaS1m
Ra1vi
v.
Th• State of
Hydsrabad
and Othera.
Bose J.
620
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]
1953
which could be sent to the Special Court for trial
under a procedure which varied substantially from
Sy•d Qasim
that of the Criminal Procedure Code and that it left
Razvi
the selection of the offences and the cases to the unv.
Th• Stal• of controlled discretion of the State Government.
Hyderabad
In the Saurashtra case(') the majority of the Judges
and Others.
held that the mere fact that an Act authorises a
Bos~ J.
State Government to direct that offences or classes
of offences or classes of cases are to be tried by a
special court does not offend article 14. Reading
this with the earlier judgment, I conclude that the
true principle is that it is not the setting up of spe.cial
courts which matters, unless of course their composition is objectionable, but the procedure which they
are directed to follow. If the special judges are selected from a class of judicially qualified and experienced men of recognised impartiality and they are
enjoined to follow a procedure which does nob differ
substantially from that of the ordinary courts, there
can be no reasonable objection, but if the procedure
deprives the accused of substantial ad vantages which
other accused similarly placed can demand, then
article 14 comes into play.
The impugned Regulation in the present case
suffers from the same defects. Under it the Military
Governor is authorised ho direct that any offence,
whether committed before or after the commencement of the Regulation, or any class of offences,
shall be tried by a Special Court, also to transfer
any particular case from the ordinary criminal courts
to a Special Tribunal. His discretion is unfettered
and absolute.
So far as the special procedure is concerned, three
of its features have been considered in one or other
of the three earlier decisions and criticised as abhorrent to article 14. Those features are (1) an absence
of committal proceedings, (2) deprivation of the right
o! (a) revision, (b) transfer and (c) of the right to
demand a de nova trial in certain circumstances, 9-lld
111 fr95•j s.c.~. 435.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
(3) the right of the Special Tribunal to adopt a sum-
1953
mary procedure iu cases where that would uot ordiSyed Qasim
narily be permissible.
Raz vi
In the present case, the question of a de nova trial is
v.
not only linked up with the absence of a right of trans- The State of
fer but with the fact that even when the constitution Hyderabad
Of the Special Bench is changed by an alteration of its and Others.
personnel there is no right to demand a denovo trial.
Boss J.
In addition to these, there are certain features of discrimination in the Regulation which are peculiar to
Hyderabad, namely the elimination of the Urdu language, which in practice is the language of the Courts
there, and the right to have certain sentences confirmed.
The Hyderabad High Court made an attempt to
cut out those objectionable portions and re-write the·
Regulation without them in Abdur Rahim ct others v.
Joseph A. Pinto ct others('), but that can only be.done
if it is possible to sever the bad from the good in such
a way as to leave the Act a workable whole so that
on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed
that the legislature would have enacted what survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires at
all. That is the test accepted in The State of Bombay
v. F. N. Balsara(').
It is however diffieult to see how this cutting out
process could be made to work. Consider but one
feature. The Regulation prescribes that the proceedings are to be summary, though for spec.ial reasons
(to be recorded in writing) the warrant procedure
may be followed. Which of these two is to be struck
out as bad? Until an actual case arises and is sent
to the Special Tribunal for trial it would be impossible to say. Further, if we strike out the portion
relating to the summary procedure, then cases of
simple hurt would have to be tried by the more
cumbrous warrant procedure; on the other hand, if we
strike out the clause which covers the warrant procedure then we will get serious offences which would
(I) A.I.R. I95I Hyd. "•
~!
(2) [1951] S.C,R, 682 at 727,
622
SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS
[1953]
normally be committed to sessions tried summarily. I
cannot see how the good can be separated from the
Syed Qasim bad in this particular case and the Regulation still be
Raevi
left workable.
v.
However, all that is based on the classification
The State of
Hyderabad hypothesis of which I am not enamoured. I prefer
and OthtJrs. to found on the narrower issue, namely, was there discrimination in fact and did it continue after the
Bose J.
Constitution? 'l'he most glaring instance of this lies
in the fact that the proceedings were conducted in
the English language whereas Urdu is the language
of .the courts in Hyderabad, at any rate in practice.
One of the appellants knows English but at leas& one
does not and a third has only a smattering knowledge
of it. That of course would not have mattered much
had the court language in that area been English,
for in that event there would have been no discriminatio.n. It would only have been one of the accidents
of fortune which befall many an accused who is tried
in an area where the court language is one which he
does not understand. But when the de facto language
of the courts is his own mother tongue and all other
Urdu knowing persons in that area are tried in the
language which they and he understand and he alone
is discriminated against by being sent for trial to a
court whose proceedings are conducted in a language
which he does not know, or, at best, understands but
imperfectly, the matter assumes a very different hue.
In Hyderabad the court language in practice is
Urdu a nil so great is the importance attached to it
that neither judges nor counsel are permitted to function there unless they know that language. Indeed,
the matter was carried to such lengths that one of
the appellant was refused the services of an eminent
King's Counsel from England on the ground that the
latter did not know the court language Urdu. But at
the same time the appellants were tried in a language
which the gentleman in question did know and which
was the language of the Special Tribunal. And an
even greater anomaly, the President of the Tribunal
bims!)lf did not know Urdu, l a!ll.. unable
to brush
this
..
.
....
-
s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
aside as a matter of no consequence. It is to my
mind material and vital and cuts at the root of this Syed Qaaim
trial. I find it impossible to say that this is not disRa.vi
crimination within the meaning of article 14 and it
v.
is patent that the discrimination continued after the The State of
Hyderabad
Constitution.
and Others.
I still prefer to base broadly on what I called, in
an earlier case, the social conscience of a sovereign
Bose J.
democratic republic as seen through Indian eyes and
as reflected in the Constitution of India. The judges
of the land are the keepers and interpreters of that
conscience even as the r~ord Chancellor was, and in
theory still is, the keeper of the King's conscience
in England. I can find no more difficulty in determining a case along these lines than do judges and
juries who are called upon to apply the standards of
a reasonable man to a given case where that is required. In my view, there is something fundamentally wrong in guaranteeing a man equality before
the law with one hand and with the other permitting
an arbitrary discrimination which could not have
been supported after the Constitution to continue
after it just because it had commenced at an earlier
date. There is to my mind something grotesquely
fantastic in insisting on Urdu knowing counsel in a
tribunal whose proceedings are to be conducted in
English and at the same time rigidly excluding
counsel who do not know Urdu and who do know
English. It may be that these are the rules of the
Hyderabad Bar but that is based on the assumption
that the language of the courts is Urdu. If the one
rule can be waived or relaxed or altered, so also can
the other. To apply both at tbe 8ame time makes,
in my judgment, for the type of discrimination which
article 14 forbids, for either Urdu has special significance in this area or it is an unimportant fact. If
it is material and important, then we have grave
discrimination. If it Is not, then again there is grave
discrimination in not allowing the accused counsel of
his choice which others simil.arly situated could claim,
on the sole ground that the counsel chosen knows
624
SUPREME COORT REPORTS
191i8
[1953
the language in which the proceedings are to be conducted and does not know a·nother language which
Syed Qasim
not the court language for the purposes of this
is
Razvi
special
trial.
v.
The. State of
I must not be understood to say that the appelHyderabad
lants were treated unfairly by the Tribunal. As far
and Others.
as I can see, much was stretched in their favour, aud
in the matter of counsel to defend them funds were
Bose J,
provided and spent by the State on a lavish scale. I
have little doubt that the conduct of the appellants
in discharging those eouusel after they had been
generously paid by the State evidences their bad faith
and their desire to thwart a fair and proper trial, fair
and proper that is to say before the Constitution.
But the issue before us is not fairness but discrimination within the meaning of article 14. The money
and time which would .be wasted were my view to
prevail would be unfortuna.te but all that is part of
the price to be paid for the maintenance of the principles which our Constitution guarantees, part of the
price of democracy.
As regards the question of revision and confirmation of sentences and transfer and bail, it is in my
opinion no answer to say that the sentences imposed
would not have been subject to confirmation even in
an ordinary court and that there were no applications
for transfer or revision or bail after the Constitution.
The point is that the Regulation forbids all this and,'
therefore, in the words of the majority decision in
Lachmandas's case( 1), the Special Judge's jurisdiction
came to an end. 'l'he diserimination lies in the trial
itself, or the continuation of it, and the accused does
not have to wait till its conclusion on the ground that
he might after all be acquitted or granted a nonappealable sentence. His right is to complain of a trial,
or a material portion of it, by a tribunal which, according to the decision in Lachmandas's case('), ceases to
have jurisdiction after the Constitution.
·
In my opinion, all these convictions should be
set aside and a fresh trial in accordance with the
(1) [•95'] S.C.R. 710.
8.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
625
normal procedure of the State in that area should
be ordered.
19M
Syed Qasim
Rasvi
GHULAM HASAN J.-The question which is canv.
vassed before us on behalf of the petitioner Syed The Stat• of
Qasim Razvi raises the constitutional point whether Hyderabad
his trial and conviction by the Special Tribunal IV and Oth1rs.
at Trimulgherry, Secunderabad, in respect of certain
Ghu.la.m
offen0es alleged to have been committed by him are Hasan J.
void as being in contravention of articles 14 and 21,
read with article 13 of the Constitution. The Special
Tribunal consisting of a President and two members
was constituted by the Military Governor of Hyde'rabad under section 3 of the Special Tribunal Regulation V of 1358-Fasli. It is common knowledge that
the police action took place in Hyderabad on September 13, 1948. The Regulation in question was pro~
mulgated by the Military Governor on October
30, 1948.
An armed dacoity was committed on January 10,
1948, between 5 p.m. and 7-30 p.m., at Bibinagar
village and its Railway Station, about 21 miles from
Hyderabad, and Syed Qasim Razvi and his co-accused
were charged with the offences of rioting, rioting
with deadly weapons, dacoity, arson, causing grievous
injuries to persons and destroying evidence of the
crime. The First Information Report of the occurrence was made on the following day but the charge-,
sheet was not submitted to the Special Tribunal till
August 28, 1949, as some of the accused were
absconding and the investigation bad to be carried
out under difficult circumstances. On October 6,
1949, the Military Governor acting under section 3
of the Regulation directed that the 'l'ribunal shall
try the offences specified as Serial Nos. 1 & 2. Serial
No. 1 mentioned the offence of murder of one
Shoebulla Khan alleged to have been committed by .
S'yed Qasim Raz vi and his co-accused and Serial No.
2 referred to the offences in respect of the Bibinagar
dacoity against Syed Qasim Razvi and 20 other
persons. ·we are not concerned with the first incident
B26
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953j
and we understand that Razvi was acquitted of the
charge of murder.
Sy•d Qasim
In the second case forty prosecution witnesses were
Raev1
examined-in-chief up to November 21, 1949, eighteen
v.
The State of were cross-examined between this date and January
Hyderabad
26, 1950, and 22 were cross-examined after that date.
and Others.
Razvi was exa.mined on November 29, 1949, and
again ou February 26, 1950. The charges were
Ghulant
HasanJ.
framed on December 5, 1949. He was convicted on
September 11, 1950, and was sentenced to 7 years'
rigorous imprisonment under section 330 of the
Hyderabad Penal Code, corresponding to section 395
of the Indian Penal Code, and 2 years' rigorous imprisonment under each of the _following sections,
section 124 corresponding to section 148, Indian Penal
Qode, section 177 corresponding to section 201,
Indian Penal Code, and Bection 177 /66 corresponding
to section 109, Indian Penal Code, the sentences to
run concurrently. Similar sentences were passed
against the co-accused. Their convictions and sentences were upheld on appeal by the High Court at
Hyderabad on April 13, 1951. In August, 1951, they
obtained leave to appeal to this court under articles
132 and 134 of the Constitution.
While these appeals were pending and the record
was in course of preparation, Razvi filed a petition
under article 32 of the Constitution praying for the
issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the record of
the High Court and quashing the orders dated
September 11, 1950, and April 13, 1951, and ordering
his release. The petition challenges Regulation V
of 1358-Fasli, as having become void after the 26th
of January, 1950, as the procedure laid down by the
Regulation is discriminatory against the petitioner
and violates his fundamental right under article 14
of the Constitution. The petition also challenges
the continuation of the trial of the petitioner unde.I'.
the provisions of the said Regulation after the 26th
of January, 1950, as being an infringement of his
rights under articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
The conviction an.d sentence are sought to be set
1969
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
627
1958
a.side as being illegal and without jurisdiction. This
contention is also raised in the appeal bnt as the
. . d
Syed Qasim
appeal is not rea dy, we were mv1te by Mr. Peerbhoy,
Ra.vi
counsel for the petitioner, to decide the question of
v.
the validity of the impugned Regulation without Th• State of
waiting for the printing of the record. Accordingly Hyderabad
we decided to hear the question of jurisdiction as a and Others.
preliminary point in the appeal.
GhuZam
Mr. Peerbhoy, counsel for the petitioner, before Hasan J.
giving us a detailed list of the discriminatory features
in the impugned Regula~ion attacked the Regulation
as being without a preamble specifying the objects
of the Regulation such as promotion of speedy trial,
maintenance of public order, safety of the State etc.
which form a common feature of Security Acts and
Regulations. This defect need not be fatal, for it is
possible to gather the object of the Regulation from
its provisions considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 'fhere is little douhb that in view
of the disturbed conditions prevailing in the State a.t
the time, the commission of numerous offences and
the threat to commit further acts of violence, the
Military Governor may well have been advised to
simplify and shorten the procedure for trial of offenders so as to bring them to speedy justice. 'fhe
appointment of Special Judges or Special Tribunals
was conceived in the same spirit, i.e., to expedite the ·
disposal of cases, so that justice may not be
delayed.
By section 3 of the "Regulation it was provided that
the Military Governor" may by general or special
order direct that the special Tribunal shall try any
offence whether committed before or after the commencement of the Regulation, or any class of offences
and may by any such order direct the transfer to a
special Tribunal of any particular case from any
other special Tribunal or any other Criminal Court
or direct the transfer from a special Tribunal of any
particular case to any other Criminal Court." It is
contended not without force that no notification was
issued
in pursuance
of section 3 as -to what offence
or
.
.
.
..
-
628
1968
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
class of offences shall be tried by the Tribunal. The
petitioner, it is urged, would have had no grievance
Syed Qasim
if
a certain class of offences in the State or in any
Raevi
particular
portion thereof, committed by all and
v.
Th• State of sundry, were with a view to expeditious disposal
HyderaJJad tried by a Special •rribunal, but the particular case
and Others.
of the petitioner was alone singled out for trial by
the Special Tribunal, while all offences, irrespective
Ghulam
of
their nature or gravity committed in Bibinagar
Hasan J.
village before or after the occurrence, were tried in
the ordinary courts according to the normal procedure, laid down in the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code. There was no basis, much less any
rational basis for the exceptional treatment. The
trial of the petitioner by the Tribunal, according to
a special procedure, was, it was contended, discriminatory, and took away his right of equality before the
law. l tis further objected that ths Regulation prescribed no qualifications for the members of the
Tribunal and their appointment was left to the
unfettered discretion of the Military Governor. No
procedure requiring any academic qualifications and
legal training has been referred to.and this point may
be regarded as unsubstantial. The Tribunal constituted for the trial of the present case may not
perhaps be open to the criticism that fit and proper
· persons were not appointed except the fact that the
President was not acquainted with the language of
the accused, but there was nothing to prevent the
Military Governor from appointing any one who
lacked proper qualifications. His power of appointment was not circumscribed by any restrictions and
it would be no answer to say that he did not abuse
this power.
Mr. Peerbhoy attacked the following provisions of
the Regulation as discriminatory.
1. The right of the Special Tribunal to take
cognizance of offences without the accused being
committed to it for trial.
2. There is no provision that the trial shall be
qelcl with the aicl _;if jury or witl\ assessors,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
3. English shall be the language of the Tribunal.
4. Evidence shall not be taken down at length,
but only a memorandum of the substance of the
evidence shall be prepared.
5. The Tribunal shall not be bound to adjourn
the case.
6. There is no provision for a de nova trial by
reason of change in personnel.
7. A Special Tribunal is entitled to follow summary procedure but it may follow the procedure
prescribed for the trial of warrant cases.
8. Trial is permitted in the absence of the accused.
where such absence is due to his behaviour in or outside court for the purpose of impeding the course
of justice.
9. Right to bail or habeas corpus is taken away.
10. There is no right to re-cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses before the accused opens his
defence.
11. The Special Tribunal is treated under the
Regulation as a Court of Sessions exercising original
jurisdiction, hence there is only one right of appeal
to the High Court. If the case had been tried by a
Magistrate of the 1st Class or a District Magistrate,
a second appeal would have been competent where
the sentence did not exceed four years.
12. There is no right of transfer.
13. There is no right of revision.
14. There is no right of confirmation of sentence
which existed under the Hyderabad Code in favour
of the High Court, the Government and the Nizam
in certain cases.
Without minimizing the importance of the other
provisions, I shall prefer to deal with the more sub·
stantial ones given as Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 13 and
14.
1. The relevant provision of the Hyderabad
Criminal Procedure Code hereinafter called the Code
~~
1968
Syed Qasoim
Ra•vi
v.
The State of
Hyderabad
and Others.
Ghulam
Hasan J.
630
1968
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
is section 267 A, which unlike Chapter XVIII of the
Indian Code docs not make it obligatory that every
Syed Qasim
case
triable by a Cour; of Sessions should be comRasvi
mitted
to it by a Magistrate. Direct commitment to
v.
The State of the Sessions without a preliminary inquiry is, howHyderabad
ever, permissible where the accused himself does not
and Others.
want such an inquiry, or where on being questioned,
he admits facts which constitute an offence fit to be
Ghulam
tried by a Sessions Court. Barring these two cases
Haaan J.
the Magistrate without recording any evidence or
after recording some portion of the evidence may, if
satisfied, that there are sufficient grounds for committing the case to the Sessions, commit the accused.
Section 4 ( 1) of the Regulation definitely excludes
the commitment proceedings.
2. Section 414 of the Code empowers the Government by a notification to direct that any particular
class of cases shall be tried in the High Court by
Jury and in any Court of Sessions either by Jury or
with the aid of assessors. This power is absent in the
Regulation. It is true that there is no general procedure of trial by Jury or with the aid of assessors in
the State, but it is open to the Government to exercise
its powers and direct that any particular class of cases
shal 1be so tried.
3. By section 286 the evidence of witnesses is to
be recorded in the language of the court and by sections 294 and 295 the judgment of the court shall be
writt'en and pronounced in the language of the cour·t.
Neither party referred to any provision of the Code
showing what was the language of the court, but
Mr. Peerbhoy stated that it is Urdu. He sa,id that
the State laws are enaoted in Urdu, the arguments
are addressed in Urdu, judgments are given in Urdu
and the reports of decisions are also published in
Urdu. The Code which was referred to us was in
Urdu but the only section which specifically refers
to Urdu is section 230 which requires that every
charge which is framed shall be written i'n Urdu. It
is not improbable that the court language is Urdu
which was the language of the ruling class, though
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631
1953
it may not be spoken by the majority of the people
iu the State.
Syed Qasim
4. Section 286 of the Code requires that the
Rasvi
v.
evidence of each witness shall be taken down in the
language of the court in the form of a continuous The State of
Hyderabad
statement, whereas section 4, sub-section (2) of the and Oth13rs.
Regulation states that the Special Tribunal need not
take down the evid'ence at length but it shall take
Ghulam
down the substance of what each witness deposes. Hasan J.
Power is, however, given to the Tribunal to direct in
respect of any trial that the evidence shall be taken
down at length. It is obvious that while the Code
lays down peremptorily that the evidence shall be
recorded at length, the Regulation provides to the
contrary and makes it directory in respect of certain
trials only.
6. Section 281 of the Code corresponding to section 350 of the Indian Code provides for the right of
a de nova trial a~ the instance of the accused, in cases
where the Magistrate having heard and recorded the
whole or any part of the evidence in any case ceases
to exercise jurisdiction therein and is succeeded by
another Magistrate. The Magistrate has, however,
got the power to reject the accused's demand either
wholly or partly but in that case he is bound to
record reasoua. It is true that the right to demand
a de novo trial is subject to the Magistrate's power
of refusal, coupled with the obligation to record
reasons, but the language of the Code appears to
suggest that such a refusal should be au exception
rather than the rule. It is pointed out by the learned
Advocate-General for the State that the question of
a de novo trial did not arise in point of fact but the
possibility of a vacancy arising by reason of circumstances beyond human control could not be eliminated.
9. Under section 468 of the Code any person
accused of a non- bailable offence may be released ou
bail, unless there appears reasonable ground for
believing that he has been guilty of an offence
632
SUPREME cotJRT REPOR'rS
19~8
[1953]
punishable with death or transportation for life. 'fhe
right to ask for bail is excluded by section 6, subSyed Qasim
section
(2) of the Regulation which clearly says that
Razvi
no court shall have any jurisdiction of any kind in
v.
The State of respect of any proceedings before a Special Tribunal.
Hyderabad
l 2. Chapter XXXVIII of the Code deals with
and Others.
the power of transfer and section 494 confers a wide
power upon the High Court to transfer cases from
Ghulam
Hasan J,
one court to another, whereas under section 3 of the
Regulation, the Military Governor alone has got the
power of transfer. That power is apparently to be
exercised suo motu, but an accused has no right to
move for transfer.
13. Section 360 of the Code confers the power of
revision upon the High Court, the Court of Sessions
and the District Magistn;,te against the orders of the
subordinate courts, but section 7, sub-section (2) of
the Regulation excludes the right of revision.
14. Section 20 of the Code lays down that no
sentence passed by a Sessions Judge shall be enforced,
unless it is confirmed
(a) in the case of a sentence of imprisonment
exceeding ten years, by the High Court;
(b) in the case of life imprisonment, by the
Government and
(c) in the case of death by his Exalted Highness the N izam.
Section 7, sub-section (2) of the Regulation,
excludes the power of confirmation by any authority
whatsoever.
Mr. Peerbhoy, counsel for the petitioner, strongly
relies upon the case of Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja
v. The State of Bombay (1) in support of his contentiou that the impugned Regulation is void under
article 14 and submits that the case should be decided
in accordance with the principles laid down by the
majority in that case. Fortunately for me it is not
necessary to at.tempt an exposition of the principles
which should regulate the decision of a case like the
(I) [1952]_ S.C.R. 710.
S.C.R
SOPREME COURT REPOR'J!S
63S
1958
present, as the matter has been exhaustively dealt
with in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar (1) where my Lord the Chief Justice and my
Rasvi
other learned brothers in this Bench have expressed
v.
views separately and collectively on the exact mean- The State of
ing and scope of article 14. So far as I am con- Hyderabad
cerned, the majority view expressed by Mr. Justice and Others.
Das iu the Bombll;y case with which Mukherjea,
Ghulam
Chandrasekhara Aiyar and Bose J J. concurred, my Hasan J.
Lord the Chief Justice dissenting, is conclusive.
I shall take np Lachmandas's case(') first. It
appears that a broad daylight robbery took place at
'Ahmedabad in which a driver and a peon of the
Central Bank were shot dead on May 26th, 1949,
while they were carrying bank money in a motorvan. By section 12 of the Bombay Public Safety
Measures Act, 1947, which was in the same terms as
section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Act and section 11
of the Saurashtrn Ordinance it was provided that "a
Special Judge shall try such offences or class of
offences or such cases or class of cases as the Provincial Government may by general or special order
in writing direct."
i:lection 10 empowered the
Government by notification in the Official Gazette
to constitute special courts of criminal jurisdiction
for such areas as may be specified in the notification.
Accordingly by a notifica.tion issued in August, 1949,
the i:ltate of Bombay exercising its power under section 11 appointed the District and Sessions Judge of
Ahmedabad as the Special Judge to try the accused.
The charges against the accused were framed on
January 13, l\!50, without any committal by the
Magistrate. Seventeen prosecution witnesses were
examined before January 26, 1950, and 45 after that
date. The accused were convicted on March 30,
1950, and sentenced to death. 'rheir appeal was
dismissed by the Bombay High Court, but they preferred appeals to this court after obtaining a certificate under article 132 (1) of the Constitution. '.l'he
question which arose for consideration was whether
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 284.
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 710.
634
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1968
[1953)
the Bombay Act or that part of section 12 which
authorises the State Government to direct specific
Syed Qasim
cases to be tried by a Speci:tl Judge appointed under
Ra1vi
that Act offends against the equal protection of law
v.
The State of guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution, and is
Hyderabad
as such void under article 13 on the princi pies laid
and OthiJrs.
down by this court in two previous cases, The State
of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (')and Kathi
Ghulam
Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (').
Mr.
Hasan J.
Justice Das who delivered the judgment of the majority in which Mahajan, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. concurred answered the question in
the affirmative and held that the accused are entitled·
after the Constitution not to be discriminated against
in the matter of procedure and are entitled to be
tried according to the ordinary law. A retrial there- ·
upon was ordered. Mr. Justice Das examined the
provisions of the Act in detail, summarising the position at page 726 as follows:"Thus besides providing for enhanced punishment and whipping the Act eliminates the committal
proceedings (seetion 13 (1)), permits the Special
Judge to record only a memorandum of the evidence,
confers on him a larger power to refuse to summon
a defence witness than what is conferred on a court
by section '257 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and also deprives the accused of his right to apply
for a transfer or for revision. That these departures
from the ordinary law cause prejudice to persons
subjected to the procedure prescribed by the Act
cannot for a moment be denied. This court has, by
its decisions in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar
Ali Sarkar(') and in Kathi Raning Rawat v. The
State of Saurashtra ('), recognized that article 14
condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure and that the
procedure prescribed by the corresponding provisions
in the West Bengal Special Courts Act and the Saurashtra Ordinance which introduced similar departures from the ordinary law of procedure constituted
(I! [1952] S.C.R. 284.
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 435.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
a. discrimination against persons tried by thA Special
1958
Judge according to procedure prescribed by those
Syed Qa•im
pieces of legislation and finally that, in any event,
Rasvt
section 5 (I) of the West Bengal Act and section 11
v.
of the Saurnshtra Ordinance, both of which corres- The State of
ponded to section 12 of the Bombay Public Security Hyderabad
Measures Act, in so far as they authorised the and Others.
Government to direct specific and particular 'cases'
Ghulam
to be tried by the Special Judge, was unconstitutional HasanJ.
and void. In view of the departures from the ordinary law brought about by the Bombay Public Safety
Measures Act, 1947, which are noted above, it cannot
but be held, on a parity ofreasoning, that at any rate
section 12 of the Act, in so far as it authorises the
Government to direct particular 'cases' to be tried
by a Special Judge, is also unconstitutional."
Dealing with the argument that the special procedure prescribed by the impugned Act constitutes a
departure from the ordinary law of procedure and is,
in some important respects, detrimental to the
interest of the persons subjected to it and as such is
discriminatory he observed:"The discrimination does not end with the taking
of cognizance of the case by the Special Judge without the case being committed to him but continues
even in subsequent stages of the proceedings in that
the person subjected to it cannot, even at those subsequent stages, have the benefit of having the evidence
for or against him recorded in extenso, may not get
summons for all witnesses he wishes to examine in
defence only on the ground that the Special Judge
does not consider that such evidence will be material
and cannot exercise his right to apply to a superior
court for transfer of the case even though the Special
Judge has exhibited gross bias against him or to
apply for revision of any order made by the Special
Judge. As the Act was valid in its entirety before
the date of the Constitution, that part of the proceeding before the Special Judge, which, up to that·
date, had been regulated by this special procedure
cannot he questioned, however discriminatory it may
636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
have been, but if the discriminatory procedure is
continued after the date of the Constitution, surely
Syed Qasim
the accused person may legibimately ask : vVhy am
Razvi
I to-day being treated differently from other persons
v,
Tho State of accused of similar offences in respect of procedure ?"
Hyderabad
After holding that there was no nexus which conand Others.
nected the basis on which the supposed classification
was founded with the objects of the Act he went on
Ghulam
Hasan J.
to observe :"In the absence of a rational basis of classification,
as explained above, there can be no justification,
after the advent of the Constitution, for depriving
the appellants of the right to move the Court for
transfer or for revision or to obtain process for the
attendance of defence witnesses or of having the
evidence of the witnesses recorded as in an ordinary
trial which is available to other persons accused oi
similar offences aud prosecuted according to the
ordinary procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is, therefore, clear that in this
case the discrimination continued after the Constitution came into force and such continuation of the
application of the discriminatory procedure to their
cases after the date of the Constitution constituted a
breach of their fundamental right guaranteed by
article 14 and being inconsistent with the provisions
of that article the special procedure became void
under article 13 and as there is no vested right or
liability in matters of procedure, the appellants are
entitled to be tried according to the ordinary procedure after the date of the Constitution. 'rheir
complaint is not for something that had happened
before 26th January, 1950, but is for unconstitutional discrimination shown :Lgainst them since that
date.
19/iB
*
•
•
*
Indeed in a sense the Special Judge's jurisdiction
·came to an end, for he was enjoined to proceed only
according to the special procedure and that procedure
qa,vin& become voiq as stiited a,bove, he could not
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
637
proceed at all as a Judge of a Special Court constituted under the impugned Act ....... The poiut for
decision now is whether the continuation of the procedure by the Act after the Constitution came into
force operates to the prejudice of the appellants aud,
as such, offends against their newly acquired fundameutal right of equal protectiou of law guaranteed
by article 14. The Constitution has no retrospective
operation to invalidate that part of the proceedings
that has already been gone through but the Constitution does not permit the special procedure to stand
in the way of the exercise or enjoyment of post-constitutional rights and must, therefore, strike down the
discriminatory procedure if it is sought to be adopted
after the Constitution came into operation."
The view taken by my Lord the Chief Justice
was that the provisions of the Constitution relating
to fundamental dghts have no retrospective operation and do not affect the criminal prosecution
commenced before the Constitution came into force
even though section 12 of the Bombay Act is held to
be discriminatory and void.
I have given not without reluctance copious
quotations from the majority judgment because its
meaning has been the subject of much controversy
before us. While on the one hand, Mr. Peerbhoy
contends that the Act was condemned as bad by the
majority because of the discriminatory provisions
appearing on the face of it and the question whether
such provisions were applied in fact to the accused
of that.case after the coming into force of the Constitution was considered entirely irrelevant the learned
Advocate-General urges that the court did not apply
its mind to the question whether the Act should be
declared void even when the discriminatory provisions are not applied. The whole trend and the
reasoning of the judgment to my mind point to the
conclusion that the court did not consider it necessary to go into the question whether the discriminatory provisions were applied as that question was irrelevant in view of their finding that the Act became
8~
1958
Syed Qasim
Razvi
v.
The State of
Hyderabad ·
and Others.
Ghulam
Hasan J.
638
1958
Syed Qasi1n
Razvi
v.
The Stale of
Hyderabad
and Others.
Ghulam
Hasan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
void after the coming into force of the Constitution
on the simple ground that it contained discriminatory provisions on the face of it. There
were four identical features which are common
in the two cases, namely absence of committal
proceedings, power to record only a memorandum of
the evidence, absence of a right to apply for transfer
or for revision. It is not easy to see how the right
to' apply for a transfer or for revision could be exercised under the Regulation after the 26th of January.
During the course of cros>-examination of 22 witnesses if the Tribunal overruled the objection of the
accused or passed any adverse order, the accused
could not challenge it by way of revision, nor if it
showed any bias in the recording of the evidence,
could the accused apply for transfer. Indeed there is
evidence that an order of the Tribunal dated the 15th
of December, 1949, was cs.rried in revision to the
High Court, but the revision was dismissed on
February 27, 1950. The office, it appears, noted
that under section 7, clause 2 of the Regulation there
could not be any revision but the learned Chief
Justice in rejecting the revision petition merely said
that he saw no reason to interfere "at this stage".
I do not think that the order of rejection meant that
the stage of interference was not appropriate and
that he would have the right to interfere at a later
stage, say at the time of the appeal. The learned
Chief Justice could not have been unaware of the
fact that no revision was competent against an order
of the Tribunal under the Regulation. It is significant that this order was passed after the ·coming
into force of the Constitution. Simil:i.rly if the
accused had asked for bail, and it had been refused,
he could not have been able successfully to move
the High Court in revision against the order of
refusal. It is obvious therefore that just as in
Lachmandas's case (1) the procedure under the Regulation could not be continued without eliminating the
right to apply for transfer 9r for revision, in the same
\') [1952) S.C.R. 28'1·
s.c.n.
'
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
639
1953
way the trial of the petitioner could not go on without bhese discriminatory provisions after the 26th of
Syed Q•"m
Jan nary. Again the right to confirmation of the
Rasvi
sentences passed by the Tribunal could not be given . v.
effect to as the Regulation definitely negatived such The Stat• of
a right. Whether in the events that happened the Hyderabad
question of confirmation did not arise is besides the and Others.
point. It could well have arisen if a sentence exGhulam
ceeding ten years had been passed by the Tribunal. Hasan J.
I can see no real ground for any distinction between
Lachmandas's case(') and the present case. My learned
brothers are certainly in a better position to interpret
the decision in Lachmandas's case (1) aud to say
whether their intention was not to declare the Act
bad, whether or not its discriminatory provisions were
applied in fact. It is impossible for me to go behind
the actual words used in the decision and.my conclusion is based entirely upon the language and the
reasoning adopted in that case.
The conclusion I have arrived at is fortified by the
observations of Mr. Justice M ukherjea in Anwar Ali
Sarkar's case('), at page 3::H, "but when the statute
itself makes a discrimination without any proper or
reasonable basis, the statute would be invn.lidated for
being in conflict with the equal protection clause,
and the question as to how it is actually worked ou\
may not necessarily be a material fact for consideration." My learned brother Mr. Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar also emphasised in that case" that the
question which falls to be considered under article
14 is whether the legislation is discriminatory in its
nature and this has to be determined not so much
by its purpose or object; but by its effects"
(page 349).
It will be convenient to refer to the West Bengal
case(') at this stage. In this case the accused who were
charged with various offences committed by them
in the course of an armed raid on the Jessop Factory
at Dum Dum were convicted by a Special Court
appointed under section 5 .(1) of the West Bengal
(1) [195•] S.C.R. 710.
(z) [1952] S.C.R. zB1·
640
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953j
1953
Special Courts Act No. X of 1950. The Full Bench
of
the Calcutta High Court which was moved by the
Syed Qasim
accused
uuder article 226 for the issue of a writ of
Razvi
certiorari
to quash the conviction and the sentence
v,
Tne State 'of held that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to try
Hyderabad
the case, as section 5 (lJ of the Act was void under
and Others.
article 32, as it denied to the accused the equal protection of the laws enjoined by article 14. On
Ghulam
appeal by the State the majority of six learned Judges
Hasan J.
of this court upheld the view, my Lord the Chief
Justice dissenting. The observations of the learned
Judges constituting the majority deal effectively with
the contentions raised in the present case and may
best be reproduced in their own words:" Mahajan J. -That the Special Act lays down
substantially different rules for trial of offences and
cases than laid down in the general law of the land,
i.e., the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be
seriously denied. It short-circuits that procedure in
material particulars ........ .
Not only does the special law deprive them of the
safeguard of the committal procedure and of the trial
with the help of jury or assessors, but it also deprives
them of the right of a de novo trial.in case of transfer
and makes them liable for conviction and punishment for major offences other than those for which
they may have been charged or tried ....... '11 0 a certain
extent the remedies to which an accused person is
entitled for redress in the higher courts have been
cut down. Even if it be said that the statute on the
face of it is not discriminatory, it is so in its effect
and operation, inasmuch as it vests in the executive
government unregulated official discretion, and therefore has to be adjudged unconstitutional."
"Mukherjea J.-T agree with the Attorney-General that if the differences are not material, there may
not be any discrimination in the proper sense of the
word and minor deviations from the general standard
mi?ht not amount to denial of equal rights. I find
8.0.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
641
1953
it difficult, however, to hold that the difference in
the procedure that has been introduced by the West SytJd Qasim
Bengal Special Courts Act is of a minor or unsubRaevi.
stantial character which has not prejudiced the
v,
The Stat• of
interest of the accused.
·
Hyderabad
The first differeuce is that made in section 6 of the and
Other!.
Act which lays down that the Special Court may
take cognizance of an offence without the accused
Ghulam
being committed to it for trial, and that in trying Hasan J.
the accused it has to follow the procedure for trial! of
warrant cases by Magistrates. It is urged by the
Attorney-General that the elimination of the com·
mittal proceedings is a matter of no importance and
that the warrant procedure, which the Special Court
has got to follow, affords a scope for a preliminary
examination of the evidence against the accused be·
fore a charge is framed .......
Under section 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
when a case after being heard in part goes for disposal before another Magistrate, the accused has the
right to demand, before the second Magistrate com:
mences the proceedings, that the witnesses already
examined should be re-examined and re-heard. This
right has been taken away from the accused in cases
where a case is transferred from one Special Court to
another under the provision of section 7 of the
Special Courts Act. Further the right of revision·
to the High Court does not exist at all under the
new procedure, although the rights under the Constitution of India are retained. It has been pointed
out and quite correctly by one of the learned counsel
for respondents that an application for bail cannot
be made before the High Court on behalf of an
accused after the Special Court has refused bail.
These and other provisions of the Act make it clear
that the rights of the accused have been curtailed in
a substantial manner by the impugned. legislation;
and if the rights are curtailed only in certain cases
and not in others, even though the circumstances in
the latter cases are the same, a question of discrimiqation may certainly arise ....... As I have said already
642
19.53
Syed Qasim
Rq,svi
v.
Th• State of
HydBrabad
and Others.
Ghultitn
Has'ln J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
.
[1953)
in the present case the discrimination arises on the
terms of the Act itself. The fact that it gives unrestrained power to tl:e State Government to select
in any way it likes the particular cases or offences
which should go to a Special Tribunal and withdraw
in such cases the protection which the accused normally enjoy under the criminal law of the country,
is on the face of it discriminatory."
"Das J.-'fhe elimination of the committal proceedings and of trial by jury (section 6), the taking
away of the right to a de novo trial on transfer
(section 7), the vesting of discretion in the
Special Court to refuse to summon a defence
witness if it be satisfied that his evidence will
not be material (section 8), the liability to be
convicted of an offence higher than that for which
the accused was sent up for trial under the Act (section 13), the exclusion of interference of other courts
by way of revision or transfer or under section 491
.of the Code (section 16) are some of the glaring instances of inequality brought about by the impugned
Act."
"Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.-Preliminary inquiry
before committal to the sessiona, trial by jury or
with the aid of assessors, the right of a de novo trial
· on transfer of a case from one court to another, have
been taken away from the accused who are to be tried
by a Special Court."
"Bose J.-We find men accused of heinous crimes
called upon to answer for their lives and liberties.
We find them picked out from their fellow;;, and however much the new procedure may give them a few
crumbs of advantage, in the bulk they are deprived
of substantial and valuable privileges of defence
which, others similarly charged, are able to claim".
I do not propose to go into the question that discriminatory provisions were not as a matter of fact
applied to the petitioner's case as contended for by
the learned Advocate-General for the State. ·I have
already observed that the discriminatory provisions
8.0.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
643
1968
stood in the way of the petitioner even after the 26th
of January and prevented him from exercising the Syed Qasim
right to apply for bail, for transfer or for revision
v.
and this in my opinion is quite sufficient for holdiug
that the Regulation violates article 14 and is, there- Ths State of
Hyderabad
fore, void under article 13.
and Others.
I do not think that the discriminatory provisions
are severable from the rest of the Regulation. Iudeed
Ghulani
it is doubtful whether the Military Governor would Hasan J.
ha..ve promulgated the Regulation in the truncated
form if these provisions are taken out. For us to do
so would be to assume the power to legislate and to
frame a new Regulation in place of the one promulgated by the Military Governor. Having regard to
the scheme and objects underlying the Regulation, a
severance of the discriminatory provisions would
affect the integrity of the Regulation itself. The
object of expediting the trial will be defeated if the
discriminatory provisions are eliminated. The Regulation stands as a whole and falls if those provisions
are eliminated. In Attorney-General for Alberta v.
Attorney-General for Canada(') the Privy Council had
to deal with two parts of the Act of the Alberta Bill
of Rights Act, 1946, Part I of which declared certain
existing righto of Alberta citizenship described therein and Part II provided a method of making effective
the provisiom of Part I by conferring certain powers ·
on the province. It was held that Part II was ultra
vires being beyond the powers of the provincial legislature to enact; that Part I of the Act was not
severable, that the whole Act hung together and
therefore the whole was invalid.
I hold that the trial held under the Regulation is
void under article 13, read with articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution, and the conviction and sentence
of the petitioner should be set aside. Following the
view taken in Lachmandas's case(') I direct that the
petitioner shall be tried according to law.
This order will govern petition No. 368 relating to
the other petitioners.
(t) [1947) A.C. ,;o~,
•
(•) [19,;2) S.C.R. 710,
644
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
1958
ORDER.
Syed Qasim
Razvi
BY THE CounT :-As the Constitutional issue~
raised in the petitions have also been raised in the
appeals preferred by the petitioners they have been
dealt with in the appeals by consent of parties, and
the petitions are dismis•ed. The constitutional points
in the appeals having been decided against the
appellants by the maiority the appeals will be
heard on other points when the appeals are ready for
hearing.
'
v.
The Stat• of
Hyderabad
and Others.
Petitions dismiss ea.
Agent for the petitioners/a,ppellants: Rajinder
Narain.
Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
1952
Dec. 5.
SISIR KUMAR DUTTA
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
UNION OF INDIA-Intervener.
[PATANJALI SASTRI, C.J., MuKHERJEA, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE and GHULAM
HASAN JJ).
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, s. 4-Extension of Act up to 31st March, 1951, by resol!ttion of Constituent
Assembly - Validity-Powers of Constituent Assembly-India
(Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, ss. 4, 4·k-India
(Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947-Constitution of India,
1950, Arts. 372, 379 (1), 394.
The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, a
temporary Act which was being extended from time to time after
the date of its first expiry, for a year at a time, was extended up
to the 31st March, 1951, from the 31st March, 1950, by a resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) at a meeting held on the 20th December, 1949. The appellant who was
convicted for an offence committed under the Act on the 24th
October, 1950, contended that the Constituent Assembly had no
power to extend the Act in view of the provisions of Art. 379 (1)
of the Constitution, and that at any rate it had no power to
~11tend the duration o! the Act beyond the 26th January, 1950;
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