ASWINI KUMAR GHOSH AND ANOTHER versus ARABINDA BOSE AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 27 October 1952 | [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1 | 1952 INSC 49
Key facts
- Decided
- 27 October 1952
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 160/1952
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1953] 1 S.C.R. 1
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 49
Text of the judgment
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS
---~-------
-
.
'
.
ASWINI KUMAR GHOSH AND ANOT]IER
v.
ARABINDA BOSE AND ANO'rHER
[PATAN.JALI SASTHI O.J., MuKHElLTEA, DAs,
VrvrAN BosE AND GHULA~r HASAN JJ.]
1952
Oct. 27.
Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951,
s. 2-Advocate of Supreme Court-Right to appear in Ori(Jinal Side
of Calcutta High Court without attorney-"Practice", rneaning ofIntei11retation of s. 2-Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, ss. 4(2),
5(1), 8(1), 9(4), 14-Calcutta H1:gh Court Orir1inal Side Hules,
Chapter I, rr. 87, 88-Bombay High Court Original Side Rules,
Chapter I, r. 40-1?1terpretatio11 of Stat·utes-Refere11ce to title,
statement of objects, punctuation, speeches, original Bill.
Section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High
Courts) Act, 1951, provided that "notwithstanding anything contained ill the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (XXVIII of 1926), or
any other law regulating the conditions subject to which a person
not entered in the roll of advocates of a High Court may be permitted to practise in that High Court every advocate of the
Supreiµe Court shall be entitled as of right to practise in any
High Court whether or not he is an advocate of that High Court":
Held by the Coul't (PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., VIVIAN BOSE and
GHULAM HASAN .JJ.-MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ. dissenti1ig).-The practice of law in India generally involves the exercise
of both the functions of acting and pleading on behalf of litigant
parties, and when s. 2 of the abovesaid Act conferred upon an
advocate of tbe Supreme Court tbe right to "practise" in any
High Court, it is legitimate to understand that expression as ,
authorising him to appear and plead as well as to art on behalf of
suitors in all the High Courts including tbe Original Side thereof.
It is fallacious to relate that expression as applied to an advocate
either, on the one hand, to the court in which the advocate is enrolled, pr, on the other, to the court in which he seeks to exercise
the statutory right conferred 011 him. It must be related to the
general constitution of tbe Bar in India as a single agency in dealing with the litigant wblic. A rule made by a Hig!t Court which
denies to an advocate the right to exercise an essential part of his .
. function by insisting on a dual agency on the Original Side is much
more than a rule of practice and constitutes a serious invasion of
his statutory right to practise. and the power of making such a
rule, unless expressly reserved (as it was reserved by the Bar
Councils Act) would be repugnant to the right conferred bv.~ s ~ 2 ·'
and as the Act does not reserve any such power,_ the statutory
right of a Supreme Court advocate under s. 2 to plead as well as
ho act in the Hi~h Courts of Calcutta and Bombay in the exercise
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1952
of their Original Jurisdiction cannot be taken away or curtailed
by the rules of those courts, and any. rule which the Calcutta High
Aswini K untar Court may have made in the past purporting to exclude any .advocate
Ghosh
from prat!tising on the Original Side or from appearing and pleading
and A '~other unless he is instructed by an attorney cannot affect such right.
11
v.
~IUIIBERJEA J .-The word
practise" v.rhen used with
Arabi1ida Bose
reference to an advocate is an elastic expression having no rigid or
and A Jiother.
fixed connotation and the precise ambit· of its contents can be as~
certained only by reference to the rules of the particular forum in
which the profession is exercised. When s. 2 of the Supreme Court
Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951, speaks of a Supreme
Court advocate being entitled as of right to practise in
any High Court, \vhat it actually means is that he would be
clothed hy reason of this statutory provision v•:ith all the rights
which are enjoyed by an advocate of that court, and his right to
plead and to act wouln depend on the Bar Councils Act and the
rules validly framed by that court, subject to this that no rule or
provision of la\v Y.lould be. binding \Vhich would affect in any way
his statutory right to practise in that court solely, by reason of
his heing enrolled as an advocate of the Supreme Court.
DAS J .~The words "to practise", used in relation l=o la\vyers
ft.S a class, mean "to ex0rcise their profession" \Vhicb is their
dictionary n1eaning and \vhich is '\vide enough to cover the activities of the entire genus of lawyers. They are \vords of indeterminate i1nport and have no fixed connotation or content. In their
application to particular species of lawyers their n1eaning varies
according to the scope and ambit of the profession of the particular
species in relation to whom they may be used and such meaning
•
has to be ascertained by reference to the subject or context .
A Suvre1ne Court advocate being entitled only "to appear and
plead" in that court, \vhen s. 2 authorised him "to practise" in
any High Court, it must be taken to have meant that he \Vas
authorised to do in the High Courts all t.hat ho \vas entitled to do
in the Supre1ue Court, namely, to appear and plead only. ~"1lter
natively the section must be taken to authorise every Supreme
Court advocate to practise as of right in any High Court as advocates of that High Court do and the exercise of the profession of
an advocate in 0, High Court by a Supren1e Court advoca~e must
involve the observance of the rules of practice of that High
Court except to the extent they are abrogated by s. 2. That section has mad0 the Supre1ne Court advocat~ a statutory advocate
.of the High Court \Vherehe goes to practise and as such he is
bound by the rules of such High Court except such of them as are
contrary to this nev.r statutory right. Whichever of the two constructions is adopted, a Supreme Court advocate cannot appear in
the Original Side of the Calcutta or Bombay High Courts unless
he,is instructed by an attorney.
Queen y, Do1.tre (L.R. 9 App. Oas. 745), Powers of Advocates,
In re (I.L.R. 52 Mad. 92) and Laurentius Ekka v. Dukhi Koeri
(I.L.R. 4 Pat. 166) refened to .
•
'.
j
,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3
l9.511
Per PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., VIVIAN BOSE and GHULAM
HASAN JJ.-Tbe non-obstaiite clause in s. 2 can reasonably be
read as overriding "anything contained" in any relevant existing Aswini Kuma1·
Ghosh
law which is inconsistent with the n~w enactment. Se~tions 9(4)
and 14(3) of the Bar Councils Act ands. 2 of the new Act cannot an,d A n,other
v.
stand together. Whether by force of the non-obstcmte clause
liberally construed or of the well established maxim of construc- Arabi/Ida Bose
tion that the enacting part of an Act must, when it is clear, and Anothm-.
control the non-obstante clause when both cannot be read harmoniously, the new Act must have the effect of abrogating the
powers reserved and continued in the High Courts by ss. 9( 4) and
14(3) of the Bar Councils Act. Mmrn.ERJEA and DAS JJ.-The
non-obstante clause in s. 2 of the said Act removes only those
provisions contained in the Bar Councils Act, 1926, and in any
other law, which regulate the conditions subject to which a person
not entered in the roll of advocates of a High Court may be
permitted to practise in that High Court. Other provisions contained in the Bar Councils Act or other statutes, which lay down the
conditions under which an advocate enrolled in the High Court is
entitled to practise in the Original Side of that court stand unaffected by the Act. Even if the entire Bar Councils Act is
excluded for the pmpose of s. 2, the rules framed by the Calcutta
and Bombay High Courts under their Letters Patent would
remain valid and effective of their own force. even without the
saving provision contained in the Bar Councils Act and the Letters
Patent would also remain in full force.
Per PATANJALI SASTRI C ..J., MUKHERJEA, DAS, VIVIAN
BOSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.-Speeches made by members of
the House of Parliament on the floor of the House are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutory provisions.
State of Travancore-Oochin and Another v. Bombay Go. Ltd. etc.
([1952] S.C.R. 1112), Adn1inistrator-General of Bengal v. Pren! Lal
( (1895] 22 I.A. 107), Krishna Aiya11gar v. Nella Perurnal ( [1920]
47 I.A. 33), A.K. Gopalan v. The Stnte of Madras ( [1950] S.C.R.
88) and Debendra Narain Roy v. Jogesh Ohand1"a Deb (A.LR. 1936
Cal. 593) referred to.
Helcl per PATANJALI SAS'rRI C.J., DAS, VIVIAN BOSE and
GHULAM HASAN JJ .--The statement of objects and reasons annexed to a Bill, the form of the original Bill and the fact that certain
words or phrases were added to or omitted from the original Bill
are also not admissible as aids to the construction of a statute.
MUKHERJEA J.-Judicial opinion on the point whether in construing a statute the statement of objects and reasons or the
original form of the Bill or repbrts of committees can be referred
to is not uniform. English Courts and the Privy Council have laicl
down that such extrinsic aids must be dismissed from consideraticm. Ent there are American decisions to the effect that the
general history of a statute and the various steps leading up to a.n
enactment including amendments or modifications of the original
Bill and reports of Legislative Committees can be looked .at for
4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
ascertaining the intention of the legislature 'vhere it is in doubt.
rrhe legislative history is, ho"'6\'6}', clearly inadmissible where
there is no obscurity in the meaning of a statute.
Gho.-;h
fer MUKHER,JEA and DAS JJ.-Punctuation is after all a
a.nd Another minor elen1ent in the construction of a statute, and evr:;n if the
v.
orthodox viev.• that it forms no part of the statute is to be regard·
Ara.binda Bose ed as of i1nperfect obliga.tion and it can be loooked at as conterri1u~d -A nothtw,
poranea expositio, it is clear tha.t it cannot be allo\ved to control
the plain meaning of a text.
Stephenson v. Taylor ( (1861] 1 B.S: 101), Clawdon v. Green
( (1868] L.R. 3 0.P. 511), Duke of Devonshire v. Conor (L.R. 1890
Q.B.D. 468), Maharani of Burdwan v. i'tlurtanjmJ Singh ( (1886]
14 I.A. 30), Pugh v. ABh1ttosh Sen ( [1928] 55 I.A. 63) referred to.
Judgment of the Calcutta High.Court reversed.
1952
•
ORIGINAL JunrsDIOTioN: Petition (No. 160 of
1952) under article 32 of the Constitution of India
for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The facts
of the case and arguments of the counsel are stated
fully in the judgment.
Petitioner No. 1 (Aswini Kumar Ghosh) in person.
B. Sen for tl1e respondents.
N. 0. Chatterjee (S.N. Mukherjee and B. Sen, with ·
him). !or the Incorporated Law Society, Calcutta
High Conrt (Intervener No. 1)
Dr. N. C. Sen Gitptn (A. K. Dutt and V. N. Sethi,
with him) for the Secretary, Bar Association, Calcutta
High Con rt (Intervener :No. 2).
N. C. Chatterjee (B. Sen, with him) for Secretary,
Bar Library, Calcutta High Court (Intervener No. 3).
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (G. N.
Joshi and J. B. Dndachanji, with him) for the
Secreta1·y, Bar Association, Bombay High Court
(Intervener No. 4).
K. B. Naidu for Secretary, Advocates' Association,
Madras High Court (Intervener No. 5).
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Intervener No. 6).
1952. October 27. The judgment of Patanjali
Sastri C.J. and Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ.
was delivered by Patanjali Sastri C.J. Mnkherjea and
Pas JJ. delivered separate judgments.
•
J
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5
19511
PATANJALI SASTRI c. J.-This is an application
under article 32 of the Constitution for relief in res- Aswini Kumar
pect of an alleged infringement of the fundamental
Ghosh
right of the petitioners under article 19 (I} (g) or, and Another ·
\".
alternatively, under article 136 for special leave
to appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Arabinda Boss
Judicature at Calcutta rejecting their application for and Another.
the same relief under article 226.
Patan}ali
As the petitioners would clearly be entitled to re- Sastri C. J.
lief under the one or the other form of remedy if
their claim was well-founded, no objection was taken
to the maintainability of the present proceeding, and
we desire to guard ourselves against being taken to
have decided that a proceeding under article 32 would
lie after an application under article 226 for the same
relief on the same facts had been rejected after due
enquiry by a High Court. We express no opinion on
that point.
The facts leading to this proceeding are not in dispute and may be briefly stated. The first petitioner is
an Advocate of this Courb and his name is also on the
roll of Advocates of the High Court of Calcutta. As
an Advocate of the latter Court he is entitled, under
the relevant rules there in force, both to act and to
plead on the Appellate Side but not to act or to appear,
unless instructed by an Attorney, on the Origi;nal Side.
On 18th July, 1951, he filed in the Registry on the
Original Side a warrant of authority executed in his
favour by the second petitioner to defend the latter
in a pending suit. The warrant was returned on 27th
July, 1951, with the endorsement that it "must be filed
by an Attorney of this Court under the High Court
Rules and Orders, Original Side, and not by an Advocate". The return was made by an Assistant in
charge of Suit Registry Department, who is called as
the first respondent te this petition. The second respondent is the Registrar, Original Side, who is alleged to have refused on the same ground to accept a
warrant filed earlier in a company mtltter. It is conceded that the action of the respondents would be
~
6
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
1 952
valid apart from the right claimed by the first peti1 .~
tioner as an Advocate of this Court under the
'sw'/;1'. 0 , 1~"'"" Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts)
. and Anot.hcr Act, 1951, (hereinafter. i·eferred to as the new Act)
v.
which provides that such Advocates are "entitled as
Mabinda Bo" of right to practise" in filly High Court in India. The
a.ndAnother. petitioners,
·
h owever, c1anne
· d t h at t h e ng
· h t to prac·
l'atanjati
tise thus conferred included also the right to act as
Sast•·i o..r.
well as to appear without the intervention of an
Attorney on the Original Side, and moved the High
Court under article 226 for issue of appropriate writs,
orders or directions to the respondent for enforcement of the right denied to them. A Special Bench
consisting of 'rrevor Harries O.J., Chakravartti and
Banerjee J J. heard the motion and dismissed it, holding that the first petitioner did not, on being enrolled
as an Advocate of the Supreme Court, become entitled to act on the Original Side of the Court.
The second petitioner has since dropped out of
these proceedings, and the first petitioner, who appeared in person and argued his case before us, is hereinafter referred to as the petitioner.
As the issues involved are of far-reaching importance to certain sections of the Bar at Calcutta and at
Bombay, this Court directed notice of the proceeding
to be served on the Incorporated Law Society, Secretary Bar Association, and Secretary, Advocates' Association, Calcutta High Court, and Secretary, Bar
Association, Bombay High Court, and all of them
appeared by their learned counsel, while the AttorneyGeneral appeared in person as intervener. We have
thus had the advantage of a fnll argnment from all
points of view.
A brief historical survey of the fnnctions, rights
and duties of legal practitioners in this country may
facilitate appreciation of the contentions of the parties. Before the Indian High Courts Act of 1861 (24
and 25 Vic. Ch. 104) was enacted, there were, in the
territories subject to the British rule in India,
Supreme Courts eit:ercising jurisdictiOn m[!,inly in the
;
,
.,
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7
1951!
Presidency Towns and Sudder Courts exercising juris1
diction over the mofussil. '1. hough the Supreme Aswiwi Kumar
Courts were given, by the .Charter Acts •and the
Ghosh
Letters Patent establishing them, power to enroll and Another
Advocates who could be authorised by the rules to act
v.
as well as to plead in the Supreme Courts, rules were Arabinda Bose
made empowering Advocates only to appear and plead and Another.
and not to act, while Attorneys were enrolled and Patan}ali
authorised to act and not to plead. In the Sudder Sastri C. J,
Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto, pleaders
who obtained a certificate from those Courts were
allowed both to act and plead. When the Supreme
Courts and the Sudder .Courts were abolished and
their jurisdictions were transferred to High Courts
nuder the statute of 1861, this differentiation in the
functions of legal practitioners was continued in the
High Courts under the notion, apparently, that the
High Court, in the exercise of !ts Ordinary Original
Jurisdiction, was the successor of the Supreme Court,
ancl that, on the Appellate Side, it inherited the jurisdiction and powers of the Sudder Courts, with
the result that Advocates were allowed only to appear
and plead instructed by Attorneys empowered to act
on the Original Side as in the Supreme Uourt, while
on the Appellate Side, they were allowed both to act
and plead as in the ,Sudder Courts. There was also
another class of practitioners known as Vakils who were
neither allowed to act nor to plead on the Original
Side, but were allowed both to act and plead on the
Appellate Side. ·within a short time, however, the
Vakils at M.adras were permitted by a rule made by
the :High Court to appear, plead and act on the Original Side as weU-vide In the Matter of the Petition
of the Attorneys(1)-but the cleavage betwe~n the two
jurisdictions, Original and Appellate, was maintained
in the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts with modifications by means of rules framed by the resp1wtive
High Courts from time to time. While this was the
position in the High Courts in the three Presidency
Towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, no distinction
(l) (1876°78) I.L.R. l Mad. 24.
i3
SUPREME CbURT REPOR'l1 s
1952
[1953]
was drawn between Advocates and Vakils (except in
the matter of authorisation· by their clients) as
Aswini Kitmar
1;heir right to ;1ppear, plead and act in the
regards
Ghosh
other
High
Courts subsequently established in British
and Another
v.
India without original jurisdiction. The position in
Arabi1ida Bose these Courts was correctly stated by a Full Bench of
and Another.
the Allahabad High Court thus:Patanjali
"Not only by the Letters Patent but by the Civil
Sastri C. J.
Procedure Code, an Advocate may act for his client
in this Court in the manner in that statute set forth
and do all things that a Pleader, that is, a Vakil, may
do, provided always tlliat he he upon the Roll of the
Court's Advocates''.: Bakhtawar Singh v. Sant Lal(').
In this situation, the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879,
(Act XVIII of 1879) which consolidated and amended the law relating to Legal Practitioners was passed.
By section 4 it empowered the Advocates and Vakils
enrolled in any High Court to "practise" in all subordinate courts and in any other High Court with the
"permission" of the latter Court. No Vakil or Pleader,
however, was to be entitled to "practise" in a High
Court exercising jurisdiction in a Presidency Town.
By section 5 all persons enrolled as Attorneys in any
High Court became "entitled to practise" in all courts
subordinate to such High Court and in any court in
British India other than a High Court established by
Royal Charter on the roll of which he is not entered.
It is worthy of note that the right to practise thus
conferred included the right to plead as well as to act
in all the courts referred to above.
Then came the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926,
which was enacted in response to a demand by the
legal profe~sion for unification and autonomy of the
Bar, and it achieved a certain measure of both, eliminating the .two grades of practitioners, the Vakils and
the Pleaders, by merging them in the class of Advocates who were "entitled as of right to practise" in
the High Courts in which they were enrolled and in
any other court in British India, subject to certain
111 (1887) 9 All. 617, 6z1.
s.c ..R.
SUPREME COURT ·REPORTS
9
1952
exceptions. It also provided for the constitution of
Bar Co.uncils for ·the High Courts with power to Aswini K uniar
regulate the admission of Advocates, to presci>ibe their
Ghosh
qualifications and to inquire into any case of miscon- and:Another
v.
duct that may be referred to them. But the right to
Arabinda
Boss
practise and the power to make rules were not to limit
and Another.
or in any way affect the unlimited powers of the High
Courts at Calcutta and Bombay to make rules allow- Patanjali
ing or disallowing Advocates to practise on their Sastri G. J.
Original Side: (vide section 9 (4) and section 14).
While such was the position of Advocates in the
courts in what used to be known as British India, it
is not a matter of dispute that Advocates practising
in the courts of what were known as Indian States
were allowed to appear, plead and act on behalf of
suitors .
...
It will thus be seen that legal practitioners, by
whatever name called, practising in all the High
Courts in India, except on the Original Side of the
Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, and in the innumerable su.bordinate courts all over India were always
entitled to plead as well as to act. In the Original
Side of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts alone,
where the cleavage between the Original and Appellate jurisdictions continued to be marked, due, as we
have seen, to historical reasons, the functions of
pleading and acting, which a legal practitioner normally combines in his own person, were bifurcated
and assigned, following "the usage and the peculiar
constitution of the English Bar" (per Lord Watson
in the case cited below), to Advocates and Attorneys
respectively.
-
In this situation, the establishment of the Supreme
Court of India, exercising appellate jurisdiction over
all the High Courts naturally stimulated the demand
for the unification of the Bar in India, and Parliament enacted the new Act as a step towards that end.
It is a brief enactment intituled "an Act to authorise
Advocates of the Supreme Court to practise as of
right in any High Court" and consists of only two
}
,
10
1952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
rI953]
sections. Section 1 describes the short title of the
Act and section 2 enacts (so far as material here:Ghosh
"Notwithstanding anything contained in the
and Another
Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, or in any other law
v.
regulating the conditions subject to which a person
Arabinda Bose
d
000 Another. not entere in the roll of Advocates of a High Court
may, be permitted to practise in that High Court
Patanjali
every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled
Sastri o. J.
as of right to practise in any High Court whether or
not be is an Advocate of that High Court:
Provided that nothing in this section shall be
deemed to entitle any person, merely by reason of
bis being an Advocate of tbe Supreme Court, to prnctise in any High Court of which be was at any time
a judge, if he had given an undertaking not to practice therein after ceasing to bold office as such
judge."
According to the petitioner's contention, an Advocate of the Supreme Court becomes entitled as of
right to a pp ear and plead as well as to act in all the
High Courts including the High Court in which be is
already enrolled, without any differentiation being
made for this purpose between the various jurisdictions exercised by those courts. The word "practise"
as applied to an Advocate in India includes both the
functions of acting and pleading, and there is nothing
in section 2 to warrant the cutting down of that statutory right to pleading only on the Original Side of
the Calcutta High Court as the respondents seek to
do. On the other hand, the respondents contend that
the non obstante clause in the first part of the section
furnishes the key to the proper interpretation of its
scope, and inasmuch as that clause supersedes only
those proviaions of the Bar Councils Act, and of any
other law which exclude persons not entered in the
roll of Advocates of a High Court from the right to
practise in that Court, the enacting clause must be
construed as conferring only a right co-extensive with
the disability removed by the opening clause; that is
to say, the section is designed only to enable Advocates of the Supreme Court who are not enrolled as
AsJ11ini Kumar
S.C.R.
-'
'r
.....
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11
1952
Advocates of any High Court to practise nevertheless
in that High Court. The petitioner, who is already Aswini Kuniar
an Advocate of the Cafcutta High Court, could derive
Ghosh
no additional right from the section in reiation to ancl Another
v.
that Court, as he does not fall within the purview of
Arabinda Bose
the section. Alternatively, even if the provision is and Another.
read as conferring on Advocates of the Sn preme Court
the right to practise in relation to all the High Patanjali
Courts in India, including the High Courts in which Sastri C. J.
they are already enrolled, the section does no more
than entitle th em to practise in conformity with the
conditions subject to which advocates are permitted
to practise in those Courts, for the word "practise"
is a term of indefinite import and, as applied to an
Advocate, it may mean pleading or acting or both,
according to the conditions under which the profession of an Advocate is exercised in the court concerned. Both branches of this contention have found
favour with the learned Judges of the court below.
A third view was also· suggested in the course of
the debate before us. An Advocate of the Supreme
Court is entitled under the Rules of that Court only
to appear and plead and not to act, while Agents who
are enrolled as such are entitled only to act but not
to appear and plead. In dealing with the right of
Advocates of the Supreme Court to "practise" in the
High Courts, Parliament must therefore be taken to
have used that word in the sense only of appearing
and pleading, the object of section '2 being only to
confer on the Supreme Court Advocates the right to
appear and plead in all the High Courts and no
further or other right.
Having given the matter our most careful and
anxious consideration, we have come to the conclusion that the petitioner's contention is correct and
must. prevail.
As we have already seen, there are in this
country more than '20 High Courts (including the
Judicial Commissioners' Courts which are treated
11is High Courts for this purpose), and in all these
12
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1952
High Courts excepting the original jurisdiction of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts and
Astvini Kumar
in all the numerous subordinate courts, both civil
Ghosh
and Another and criminal, existing all over the country, an Advov.
cate combines in himself both the functions of acting
Arabinda Bose and pleading which constitute the normal activities
and Another.
of all legal practitioners except members of the
English
Bar whose "usage and peculiar constitution"
Patanjali
allow them only to appear and plead and not to act.
Sastri C. J.
It would seem that this peculiar British system of
division of functions between Barristers and Attorneys
is not in vogue even in all the British Dominions and
Colonies. For instance, in the report of the case
Queen v. Doutre(' ), we find counsel for the respondent
stating in the course of his argument that "In all the
Provinces of Canada the functions of Barristers and
Solicitors are united in the same person and the rules
of the English Bar do not apply there". In upholding in that case tbe right of counsel to sue for and
recover on a q1tantum meruit in respect of professional
services rendered by him, the Judicial Committee
remarked:"Their Lordships entertain serious doubts whether
fo an English Colony where the common law of
England is in force, tbey (i.e., general considerations
of public policy) could have any application to the
case of a lawyer who is not a mere advocate or pleader
and who combines in his own person various functions which are exercised by legal practitioners of
every class in England all of whom, the Bar alone
excepted, can recover their fees by an action at law."
It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that the
practice of law in this country generally involves the
exercise of both the functions of acting and pleading
on behalf cif a litigant party; in other words, the Bar
in India, generally speaking, is organised as a single
agency. Accordingly, when the Legislature confers
upon an Advocate "the right to practise" in a Court,
it is legitimate to understand that expression as
authorising him to appear and. plead as well a.s to
-
·-·
\I) (188~) 9 App. Cas. 74~·
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME CODRT REPORTS
13
1952
act on behalf of suitors in that Court. It is true that
the word "practice" usf\d in relation to a given proAswini Kumar
fession means simply the pursuit of that profession
Ghosh
and involves the exercise of the functions which are and Another
ordinarily exercised by the memberg of the prov.
fession. But it seems to be fallacious to relate that A•·abinda Bose
expression, as applied to an Advocate, either, on the . and Another.
one hand, to the Court in which the Advocate is Patanjali
enrolled or, on the other, to the Court in which he Sastri C. J.
seeks to exercise the statutory right conferred on him.
It must, in our opinion, be related to the general
constitution of the Bar in India as a single agency in
dealing' with the litigant pub lie, a system which prevails all over this vast country except in two small
pockets where a dual agency imported from England
was maintained, owing, as we have seen, to historical
reasons.
We are accordingly unable to· accept the suggestion that because the Advocates of the Supreme Court
are not, under the Rules of that Court, entitled to
act, the word "practise" as used by Parliament in
section 2 must be understood in the restricted sei;ise
of appearing and pleading only. Parliament was,''of
course, aware that the right of the Advocates ·of the
Supreme Court to practise in that Court was confined
only to appearing and pleading, but the object of
section '2 was to confer upon a designated body of
persons, namely, the Advocates of the Supreme Court,
a right to practise in other courts, viz., the various
High Courts in India, whether or not they were
already enrolled in such courts. 'l'his statutory right,
which is conferred on the Supreme Court Advocates
in relation to other courts and which they did not
have before, cannot, as a matter of construction, be
taken to be controlled by reference to what they are
allowed or not allowed to do in the Supreme
Court under the Rules of that . Court. Such
Rules are liable to be altered at. any time in
exercise of the rule-making power conferred by
article 145 of the Constitution.. The scope and
3
14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
content of the new statutory right ,conferred in relation to the High Courts cou l~ not have been intended
Aswini Kumar
Ghosh
to depend on the varying scope of the functions
and Another which the Supreme Court Advocates are allowed to
v.
exercise in that Court from time to time. Besides,
Arabinda Bose the consequences of such a construction would be
and Another. somewhat starthng.
For instance, if an Advocate of
the
Supreme
Court
not entered on the Roll of the
Patanjali
Sastri a. J, Allahabad High Court desired to practise in the
latter Court whe're there are no Attorneys or Agents,
he would find himself in a difficult situation. It was
said that a local Advocate could be engaged to instruct him, acting for the client. Even if it were
permissible to substitute a local Advocate for an
"Agent" to overcome the disability imposed by
Order IV, Rule 11, of the Supreme Court Rules which
prohibits im Advocate from appearing "unless he is
instructed by an Agent", it would be tantamount to
introducing a new type of dual agency where it does
not exist at present, an innovation which, we think,
could hardly have been contemplated. Such an interpretation would also render the right conferred by
the new Act largely illusory in practice.
The construction adopted by the learned Judges of
the High Court, which relates the word "practise" in
section 2 to the High Court in which the Supreme
Court Advocate seeks to exernise his right, seems to
us to be equally open to objection. In their view,
that word as applied to the same Advocate should be
understood in a wider or narrower sense in relation
to different High Courts, and indeed, to different
jurisdictions of the same High Court, according to
the rules there in force. They say:"Since the section applies to a number of 'different
High Courts where different conditions of practica
prevail, the word 'practice' has no one particular
and invariable meaning in the section but its meaning mnst vary according as the section is applied to
one High Court or another. In its application to
each High Court it will have the meaning which an
Advocate's right to practise b~ars in tll~t Qourt ~Ii
1952
·1
S.O.R.
-
_,
SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
15
1952
the time under the local rules and regulations. This
meaning may be wider in relation to one High Court Aswini Kumar
and narrower in relation to another, and even in
Ghosh
relation to the same High Court it may not" always and Another
v.
remain the same, for a High Court may enlarge the
professional rights of its Advocates and if it does so, Arabinda Bose
Advocates of the Supreme Court will, thereafter, and Another.
have the enlarged rights in that Court. But at any Patanjali
given point of time the rights of an ·Advocate of the Sastri 0, J.
Supreme Court to practise in any particular High
Court in exercise of the power conferred on him by
section 2 can at most be co-extensive with but no
greater than the right which Advocates of that
Court themselves possess at the time."
We are unable to agree with this ambulatory interpretation of section 2. It may be that the full sense
of the word "practise" as including both acting and
pleading may be cut down by the context in which it
is used in a particular statute. But we do not find
any such context in the language of the new Act or
in its object as we conceive it. 'rhe construction
which the learned Judges have placed on section 2
was supported before us by attributing to the word
"practise" the "dictionary meaning", as it was called,
of exercising a profession and postulating the exercise
by the Advocate of the Supreme Court of different
professions in different High Courts in which be may
seek to appear. Thus, he exercises the profession of
a Madras Advocate while appearing iu Madras; the
profession of an Appellate Side Advocate or of au
Original Side Advocate, as the case may be, while
appearing on those sides of the Calcutta and the
Bombay High Courts, and so on. The object of this
curious differentiation is to read the different conditions under which an Advocate exercises' his profession in each of those Courts or jurisdict;ions into the
word "practise" itself as the necessary implication of
it8 dictionary meaning so as to bring in the exclusion
Gf acting on the Original Side as part of its connotation. We find it difficult to appreciate this view.
11 be Advocate of the Supreme Court in all the cases
i6
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[i953]
1952
referred to above seeks to practise only one profession,
namely, the profession. of an Advocate. As
Aswiwi K urnar
such
he
would be bound to observe the rules of
Ghosh
the prescribed
and Another practice of each Court, that is,
v.
procedure for conducting legal proceedings in the
Arabinda Bose Court concerned; but a rule which denies to him
and Another.
the right to exercise an essential part of his function
by insisting on a dual agency on the Original Side is
Patanjali
much
more than a rule of practice and the power of
s·astri c. J.
making such a rule, unless expressly reserved by the
new Act, as it was reserved in section 9 (4) and section 14(3) of the Bar Councils Act, would be repugnant to the right conferred by section '2. In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that the power of
the High Courts to make rules of practice regulating
the procedure to be followed in the conduct of pro;
ceedings before them and the power to frame rules
regulttting the admission and conduct of legal practitioners were always deri.-ed from distinct sourcesoriginally under different clauses of the J,etters Patent
establishing them and later from the Civil Procedure
Code and the Bar Councils Act.
The learned Judges have also overlooked an imc
portant distinction between the position of an
Advocate of the Calcutta or the Bombay High Court
in relation to his Court and that of an Advocate- of the
Supreme Court in relation to those Courts. The
former is not entitled to practise "as of right" on the
Original Side of his High Court as his right to practise
is made nuder section 14(1) (a) expressly subject to
section 9( 4) which reserves the power of those Courts
to exclude him from such right so far as the Original
Side is concerned. In other words, the local Advocate
is not entitled "as of right" to practise on the Original
Side of those two High Courts, whereas it is open to
argument and indeed is now argued that the Advocate
of the Supreme Court becomes under the new Act
entitled to practise "as of right" in all High Courts
without any distinction in the matter of the jurisdictions exercised by them, because no such power is
preserved and continued in the new Act. In view of this
)
y
S.C.R.
....
-
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
17
1962
difference, which is vital to the petitioner's contention,
it is not correct to say t.hat the right conferred on the Aswini Kumar
Supreme Court Advocate "can at most be co-extensive
Ghosh
with but no greater than the right which Auvocates and Another
v.
of that Court themselves possess at the time". Here,
Arabinda Bo•e
indeed, we reach the crux of the whole case.
and Another.
Now, section 14(1) (a) of the Dar Councils Act
Patanjali
enacts:Sastri 0. J.
"14. (1) An Advocate shall be entitled as of right
to practise-(a) subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of section 9, in the High Court of which
he is an Advocate," and
Section 9( 4) proYides :"Nothing in this section or in any other prov1s10n
of this Act shall be deemed to limit or in any way
affect the powers of the High Courts of Judicature at
Fort William in Bengal and at Bombay to prescribe
the qualifications to be possessed by persons applying
to practise in those High Courts respectively in the
exercise of their original jurisdiction or the powers
of those High Courts to grant or refuse, as they think
fit, any such application, or to prescribe the conditions under which such persons shall be entitled to
practise or plead."
Section 14(3) reads :"Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or
in any way affect the power of the High Court of
Judicature at Fort William in Bengal or of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay to make rules determining phe persons who shall be entitled respectively
to plead and to act in the High Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction."
It is to be noted that by virtue of the last two provisions to which the right of local Advocates is made
expressly subject, the High Courts of Calcutta and
Bombay have the power to "grant or refuse as they
think fit" the application of any person applying to
practise in the Original Side of those Courts. and the
power to make rules laying down who shall plead and
•
18
SUPREME COUR'l' REPOR'l'S
(1953]
who shall act on that side. It is in exercise of these
powers that the High Courts !iave framed the rules,
"Asw-iwi Kn11uir
to
which reference has been made, cutting down the
Ghosh
right
oi the Advocates of those Courts to practise on
?1.1ul Another
the Original Side to appearing and pleading only and
v.
Aral>·inda. Bose otherwise imposing restrictions on that right, such as,
and Another. that they shall not appear unless instructed by an
Attorney. 'l'hat is to say, the Advocates of those
Pa-tanjali
Sa-s"tri C. J. Courts are not entitled to practise as of right on the
Origina_l Side. As the powers thus reserved are exercisable only in regard to the Ori gin al Side, the
Advocates of these Courts are under section 14(1) (a)
entitled as of right to practise in the r1ppellate and
other jurisdictions exercised by tliose Courts. Similarly, under section 2 of the new Act every Advocate of the Supreme Court is entitled as of right to
practise in 1Lny High Court. But it is significant
that no power is reserved to the Calcutta or
tho Bombay High Courts to cnt down this statutory
right and confine it _to pleading alone on the Original
Side. vVby were the reservations which the Legislature took care to insert in the Bar Councils Act in
conferring a statutory right of practice on Advocates
of the High Courts omitted in the new Act in conferring a similar right in similar te1·ms on the Advocates
of the Supreme Court in relation to the H.igh Courts?
Why this departure from the pattern of what is, in
this respect, a closely analogous piece of legislation?
The respondents made two answers to this question
neither of which seems to us satisfactory. One was
that the word "practise" itself connoted, in relation
to the Original Side of the Calcutta and Bombay High
Courts, only pleading and not acting, as Advocates
of those Courts practising on that side bad long been
only appeaTing and pleading instructed by Attorneys
who acted for the suitors. 'l'bis argument we have already rejected. But, eyen so, why insert section 9(4)
in the Bar Councils Act and make the right nuder
section 14(1) (a) subject to the overriding powers
under section 9(4)? If the argument were valid, such
provisions would have been wholly unnecessary, for,
1952
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19
1952.
even in their absence, the word "practise" would connote only pleading and .not acting. 'fhis indeed is an As10ini Kumar
additional ground for rejecting that construction. It
Ghosh
is legitimate, therefore, to conclude that the Legisla- and Another
ture used the word' 'practise" both in the Bar Councils
v.
Act and in the new Act in its full sense of acting and Arabinda BosB
pleading, but while in the case of Advocates of the and Another.
Calcutta and Bombay High Courts it has expressly Patanjali
preserved and continued the power of those courts to Sast1'i a. J,
restrict or exclude the right of practice on the
Original Side, it has reserved no such overriding
power under the new Act with the result that any
restrictive rule cutting down the statutory right would
be repugnant to section 2 and therefore void and
inoperative.
A similar vie\f of the effect of section 14( 1) (a) of
the Bar Councils Act was expressed by a Full Bench
of the Madras High Court in Powers of Advocates, In
re ('),where it was held that a rule made by that
•
Court excluding the Advocates enrolled there from
acting on the Insolvency Side became invalid
and inoperative after the enactment of that
Act, and we entirely agree with that decision. The
learned Judges below attempted to distinguish that
case, as Mr. Chatterjee for the respondents did before
us, by observing that because the Bar Councils Act
made no distinction between the different jurisdictions
of the Madras High Court and the rules of that Court
allowed the Advocates to act and plead on the Original as well as on the Appellate jurisdiction thereof,
the learned Judges construed the word "practise" in
section 14 to mean both acting and pleading. That
is not a correct view of the reasoning employed by
the Full Bench. The learned Judges failed to see
that such reasoning would indeed lead to the opposite
conclusion. As a matter of fact, there was a rule
under which the local Advocates were prevented from
acting and they had accordingly not acted in the
insolvency jurisdiction of that Court, so that if
11
practise" in section 14(1) (a) were to be construed
(r) (1928) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 92,
•
'20
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
in the light of what the Advocates had been doing in
• -~x
the past tinder the rules of that Conrt, the Conrt
A swini utnar
.
Ghosh
would h.ave ha d to hold that t h e Advocates acqmred
and Anothei· no new right by virtue of section 14(1) (a).
But the
v.
Full Bench held that they did and the gist of their
Arabinda Bose reasoning was thus pu1: by Kumaraswami Sastri J.
and Another. who delivered the leading judgment:·
Patanjali
"The word 'practise' ordinarily means 'appear, act
Sastri a. J.
and plead', unless there is anything in the subject or
context to limit its meaning ...... I am of opinion that
where an Act confers rights to a party in general
terms and entitles him to perform more than one
function, the cutting down of those rights by a rule
would make that rule repugnant to the provisions of
the Act."
It was next suggested that no sup~ort for the petitioner's contention could be derived from the absence
in the new Act of reservations like those contained in
•
sections 9 (4) and 14 (1) (a) of the Bar Councils Act
because the power of framing rules regarding legal
practitioners given to the Chartered High Courts
under their respective Letters Patent could be exercised only in respect of the Advocates enrolled in
those Courts, and the reservation of a power so limited
would be meaningless in the new Act which deals with
the rights of the Supreme Court Advocates. This
a1·gument overlooks that those High Conrts had
unfettered discretion to admit or to refuse admission
to any person to practise as an Advocate, Vakil or
Attorney. Clause 9 of the Letters Patent of the
Calcutta High Court, for instance, empowers that
Court "to approve, admit and enroll sucb .........
Advocates, Vakils and Attorneys as to the said High
Court shall seem meet". The Bar Councils Act also
assumed that a power to exclude any person from
practising on the Original Side existed in the High
Courts, as is shown by section 9 (4) which provides
that nothing contained in that Act shall be deemed to
affect the power of the Calcutta and the Bombay High
Courts to grant or refuse the application of "persons" applying
to pn19tise on the Original
Side of
.
.
.
19M
.
,
S.C.R.
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
21
1952
·those Courts or their power to prescribe the conditions under which ''such persons" could practise on Aswini Kumai"
that side. Be it noted that the word used .is not
Ghosh
"Advocates" which, in view of the definition in sec- ancl A;,,othor
v.
tion 2 (1) (a), would indicate a power confined to the
Arabinda
Bo&a
Advocates of those Courts. And when that Act proand Another.
ceeded to empower by section 14 (1) (a) an Advocate
enrolled in a High Court to practise as of right in Patanjali
that Court, it took care to make it clear that the Sastri 0. J.
right so conferred was subject to the exercise of the
power reserved under section 9 (4). But, as pointed
out already, it is significant that Parliament, in conferring a similar right under the new Act on tho
Supreme Court Advocates, did not reserve any such
overriding power. In the absence of such reservation,
the statutory right of a Supreme Court Advocate to
plead as well as to act in the High Courts of Calcutta.
and Bombay in the exercise of their original juriEdiction cannot be taken away or curtailed by tlio&e
Courts, and any 'rules which they may have made in
the pa~t purporting to exclude any Advocate from
acting on their Original Side or from appearing and
plead~ng unles'l he is instructed by an Attorney cannot affect such right.
1'urning now to the non obstante clause in section 2
of the new Act, which appears to have furnished the
whole basis for the reasoning of the Court belowand the argument before us closely followed that
rea.:;oning-we find the learned Judges begin by in, quiring what are the provisions which that clause
seeks to supersede and then place upon the enacting
clause such construction as would make the right
conferred by it co-extensive with the disability imposed by the superseded provisions. '' 'rhe meaning
of the section will become clearer'', they observe, "if
we examine a little more closely what the section in
fact supersedes or repeals ....... The disability which the
section removeR and the right which it confers are coextensiYe." This is not, in our judgment, a correct
approach to the construction of section 2. It should
t
22
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
first be ascertained what the enacting part of the section provides on a fair construction of the words used
Aswini Kumar
accordipg
to their natural and ordinary meaning, and
Ghosh
andlAnother the non obstante clause is to be understood as operT.
ating to set aside as no longer valid anything con"Arabinda Bose tained in relevant existing laws which is inconsistent
and Another.
with the new enactment. We will revert to this clause
again presen.tly.
. Patanjal1
Sastri C. J,
Following their line of approach, the learned
Judges reached two conclusions: first, that section 2
confers no new right ou an Advocate of the Supreme
Court in relation to the High Court in which he is
already enrolled, but gives him the right to practise
in the High Courts in the roll of which he was not
entered as an Ad·vocate. 'l'he petitioner was accordingly not within the purview of the section in relation
to the Calcutta High Court of which he was already
an Advocate; and secondly, that the only provisions
superseded by the non obstante-clause are section 8 (1)
and section 14 (2) of the Bar Councils Act and
Rule 38 of Ch. V of the Original Side Rules of the
Calcutta High Court and a similar rule framed under
section 15 (b) of the Bar Councils Act by the. Calcutta Bar Council, which prescribe the conditions
subject to which Advocates of other High Courts are
permitted to practise on the Original and Appellate
Sides of that Court and the corresponding rules then
in force in the Bombay High Court. 'l'hese provisions alone, it was said, fell within the description
"regulating the conditions subject to which a person
not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High Court
m&y be permitted to practise in that High Court."
All .other provisions of the Bar Councils Act, including sections 9 (4) and 14 (3), as well as other rules of
the Original Side of both Calcutta and Bombay High
Courts lrnve not been superseded or repealed by section 2 of the new Act but continue in force. We now
prooeed to examine whether these conclusions are
well-founded.
Much ado was made on both sides about the
comma .occurring. just before the word "or " jn the
1952
S.C.R.
,•
'
/
...
,.I
SUPREME 00 URT REPORTS
23
1962
non obstante clause, the petitioner stresJing its importance as showing that the adjectival cbuse "regulat- Aswini K uniar
ing the conditions etc." does not qualify th~ words
Ghosh
"Indian Bar Councils Act" which are separated by and Another
v.
the comma and that, therefore, the whole of that Act
Arabinda
BosB
is superseded, while learned counsel for the respondand Another.
ents insisted that in construing a statr t;e punctuation
marks should be left out of considera ,ion. Nothing Patanjali
much, we think, turns on the comPia, as it seems Sastri C. J.
grammatically more correct to take the adjectival
clause as qualifying "law". Having regard to the
words "anything contained" and the preposition "in"
used after the disjunctive "or'', the qnalifying clause
cannot reach back to the words " Bar Councils Act ".
But, whichever way we take it, it must be admitted
that, in framing the non obstante clause, the draftsman had primarily in mind those provisions which
stood in the way of an Advocate not enrolled in any
particular High Court practising in that Court. It
does not, however, necessarily follow that section 2 is
concerned only with the right of Advocates of the
Supreme Court to practise in the High Courts in
which they are not enrolled. The true scope of the
enacting clause must, as we have observed, be determined on a fair reading of the words used in their
natural and ordinary meaning, and in the present
case, there is not much room for doubt on the point.
The words " every Advocate" and "whether or not
he is an Advocate of that High Court" make it plain
that the section was designed to apply to the Advocates of the Supreme Court not on!:; in relation to
the High Courts of which they are no'.i Advocates but
also in relation to those High Courts in which they
have been already enrolled. The learned Judges
below dismissed the words "whether or not etc." with
the remark that "tbey are not very apposite'', as
" no one who is an Advocate of a p~aticular High
Court requires to be an Advocate of the Supreme
Court in order to prnctise in that Court". While it
may be true to say that section 2 does ~10t give Advocates of many of the High Courts any a.dditioual right
24
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
[1953]
1952
in relation to their own Courts, it would, according to
the petitiouer's contention, give at least to the AdvoA.swini K u11uir
cates
o.f the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts some
Ghosh
and Another additional right in the Ori~inal Side of those Courts,
v.
and that may well have been the purpose of using
Arttbinda Bose those words.
It is not a sound principle of construcand Another.
tion to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate
P(ttanjali
sdstri c. J. application in circumstances conceivably within the
contemplation of the statute.
Nor can we read the non obstante clause as specific:
ally repealing only the particular provisions which
the learned Judges below have been at pains to pick
out from the Bar Councils Act and the Original Side
Rules of the Ca.lcutta and Bombay High Courts. If,
as we have pointed out, the enacting part of section 2
covers all AdYocates of the Supreme Court, the 1wn
obstante clause can reasonably be read as overriding
"anything c01itained" in any relevant existing law
which is inconsistent with the new enactment,
although the draftsman appears to have had primarily in his mind a particular type of law as conflicting
with the new Act. 'l'he enacting part of a statute
must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non
ob~tante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously; for, eYen apart from such clause, a later law
abrogates earlier laws clearly inconsistent with it.
Posteriores leges p1··iores contrarias abrogant (Broome's
Legal Maxims, 10th Edu., p. 347). Here, ·section 2
entitles every Advocate of the Supreme Cdurt as of
i·ight to practise in any High Court in India. The
phrase "entitled as of right" bas evidently been
adopted from the Bar Councils Act, and we have
already indicated our view that the word "practise"
as applied to a legal practitioner in India includes, in
the absence of any limiting or restrictive context,
both the functions of acting and pleading. The
phrase " entitled as of right to practise " is an emphatic affirmation of. a right to plead and to act
independently of the will or discretion of any other
person. Could it be said that seetions 9 (4) ftnd l4 (8)
•
\
(
'
('
'
j
ta..•./
..
)
~.
I
f
.
.•·
8,0.R.
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
1953
of the Bar Councils Act are consistent with the
existence of such a right? As we have seen already, Asw·ini Kumar
section 9 ( 4) preserves the powers of the High Courts
Ghosh
at Calcutta and Bombay, among other thin°gs, "to and Another
grant or refuse, as they think fit" the applications of · .. v.
persons to practise in those High Courts in the ex er- Arabinda Bose
· d ict10n.
·
H ow coul d a person and Anothe1·.
cise· of t h eir origina 1 juns
be said to be entitled as of right to practise in a High Patanjali
Court if that Court has unfettered power to reject his Sastri c. J .
application to practise on an important side of its
jurisdiction? Similarly, bow could a person be said to
be entitled as ·of right to plead in a High Court if
that Court has the power to frame a rule wl_lich precludes him from pleading in the original jurisdiction
of that Court unless he is instructed by an Attorney?
Obviously, sections 9 (4) and 14 (3) of the Bar
Councils Act and section 2 of the new Act entitling
an Advocate of the Supreme Court as of right to
practise in any High Court cannot stand together.
\Vhether by force of the non obstante clause liberally
construed as indicated above or of the wellestablished maxim of construction already referred
to, the new Act must have the effect of abrogating
the powers reserved and continued in the High Courts
by the aforesaid provisions of the Bar Councils Act.
We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned Judges
below that the said two provisions have not been
superseded or repealed by section 2. As we have
already observed, if such reservations had also been
inserted in the new Act, the analogy with section 14
(1) (a) of the Bar Councils Act would have been
complete, and the petitioirnr as an Advocate of the
Supreme Court could be prevented by rules made in
appropriate terms from acting on the Original Side of
the Calcutta aud the Bombay High Courts. But, in
the absence of such reservations in the new Act, his
claim in these proceedings must succeed.
It has been saiJ in the course of the argument that,
notwithstanding t.he absence of such reservations in
the new Act, it must be assumed that the Advocates of
the Su pre me Con rt bave become en ti tied _to practise
26
SUPREME COURT REPOR·rs
[195)3]
in any High Court only snbject to the rules and
regnlations of that Court or,.as the High Court pnt
Asw·<"i Kumar it "section '2 does not confer an uncharted freedom
Ghosh
•
and Another on the Advocates of the Supreme Court to prnctise
v.
in any High Court in any way they like, but only
Arabinda Bose puts them, in each different High Court, on a par
and Anoth"" with the Advocates of that Court, where they must
submit to the same terms and conditions as bind those
Pata1ijali
Advocates". Otherwise, it was said, the Supreme
·sastri C. J.
Court Advocates would be "let loose" to practise in
all Courts freed of all obligations to observe the rule
and regulations of those Courts and the result would
be conft\sion and chaos. Therefore, it was urged, the
rules of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts,
which preclude Advocates of those Courts from acting
on the Original Side of their jurisdiction or from
pleading without the intervention of an Attorney, are
binding upon Supreme Court Advocates as well. We
see no force in the argument which seems to proceed
on a misconception. 'l'he right of an Advocate to
practise, as we have seen, normally comprises the
exercise of his two-fold function of acting and pleading without the intervention of anybody else. Any
rule or condition that prevents him from exercising
one of those functions is plainly a cutting down of
his right to practise and, affecting as it does the substance of his right, is in its operation, quite unlike
the rules and conditions of practice under which all
Advocates normally carry on their business in courts.
No one suggests that a Supreme Court Advocate is,
by becoming entitled to practise in the High Courts,
freed from all obligation to conform to the rules of
practice and regulations as to costume and such other
matters, according to which the profession of law
must be exercised in the various High Courts. There
is a vital distinction between such rules and regulations and the rules which seek to cut down the substance of an Advocate's right to act and to plead by
excluding him from the ~xercise of the one or the
other of those two functions. The Bar Councils Act
recognises this distinction by expressly reserving the
1952
'
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
1952
power of the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay to
exclude or impose restrietions upon the right of Advo- Aswini Kumar
cates to plead and to act on the Original Side,.whereGhosh
as no similar reservation has been considered neces- a11d Another
v.
sary in respect of the power to make rules and regulations of the former type, because they were not Arabinda Bose
regarded as derogating from the substance of the and Another.
statutory right to practise. Suppose, for instance, Patanja!i
the Calcutta High Court made a rule that no person Sastri 0. J.
other than those mentioned in Rule 2 (1), Chapter I
of the. Original Side Rules (i.e., practising Barristers
in England, N. Ireland, etc.) will be entitled toappear
a.nd plead on its Original Side, could it reasonably be
suggested that such a rule was only a matter of
"internal administration" and, as such, would bind
all Advocates practising in that Court even apart
from section 9 ( 4) ?, Any rules which prevent an
Advocate from acting on the Original Side or appearing on that side without the intervention of an
Attorney constitute a serious invasion of his statutory
right to praqtise, and unless the power to make such
rules is reserved in the statute which confers the right
they cannot prevail against that right.
Reference was also made in this connection to the
difficulty of exercising disciplinary control over the
Supreme Court Advocates practising in the High
Courts in which they are not enrolled but such difficulty, if any, may arise under both the interpretations
contended for before us. It is not denied that a
Supreme Court Advocate is entitled to appear and
plead and act on the Appellate Side of all the High
Courts and the question as to how disciplinary jurisdiction is to be exercised over him in relation to his
activities on the Original Side will have to be determined on the same lines as in relation to his activities
on the Appellate Side and the possibility of any such
difficulty arising cannot be more of an objection to
the one construction than to the other.
rrh1m~ WIUl much argument before US as to the ob-
ject which Parliament had in view in passing the new
Act, each side suggesting an object which wou!q
:'JS
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l953]
support the construction which it sought to place upon·
section 2. Each side relied·npon the "statement of
Aswin,i Ku/niar
objects. and reasons" annexed to the Bill in support
Ghosh
of
its own contentions. Reference was also made to
and Another
speeches
made on the floor of the Honse by members
v
Ar11.f>inda Bose during the debate 011 the Bill. Our attention was also
and Another. called to the form of the Bill as originally introduced
in the House and its amendment by omitting part (a)
Patanjali
of the proviso to clause (2) thereof.
Sastri C. J,
As regards the speeches made by the members of
the House in the course of the debate, this Court has
recently held that they are not admissible as extrinsic
aids to the interpretation of statutory provisions: The
State of Travanoore-Qochin ct Another v. The Bombay
Go. Ltd. etc.(').
·
As regards the propriety of the reference to the
statement of objects and reasons, 'it must be remembered that it seeks only to explain what reasons
induced the mover to introduce the Bill in the Honse
and what objects be sought to achieve. But those
objects and reasons may or may not corre·spond to the
objective which the majority of members had in view
when they passed it into law. 'l'he Bill may have
undergone radical changes during its passage through
the House or Houses, and there is no guarantee that
the reasons which led to its introduction and the
objects thereby sought to be achieved have remained
the same throughout till the Bill emerges from the
House as an .Act of the Legislature, for they do not
form part of the Bill and are not voted upon by the _
members. We, therefore, consider that the statement
of objects and reasons appended to the Bill should be
ruled out as an aid to the construction of a statute.
The omission of part (a) of the proviso to clause (2)
of the Bill seems to us to stand on no higher footing.
It sought to exclude from the purview of the Bill the
• right of an Advocate of the Supreme Court to plead
or to act in any High Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. Its omission was strongly relied
on by the petitioner a,s indicatin"g the intention of
1952
~r) (t952J S.C.R~ 1112:
S.C.R.
•
..
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
29
1952
Parliament that the right of a Supreme Court Advocate to plead and to act should prevail also on the Aswini Kumar
Original Side of a High Court. It was urged. that
Ghosh
acceptance or rejection of amendments to a Bill in and Anoth•r·
v.
the course of Parliamentary proceedings forms part
of the pre-enactment history of a statute and as such Ara-binda Bose
might throw valuable light on the intention of the and Another.
legislature when the language used in the statute Patanjali
admitted of more than one construction. We are Sastri C. J •
unable to assent to this proposition. The reason why
a particular amendment was proposed or accepted or
rejected is often a matter of controversy, as it happened to be in this case, and without the speeches bearing upon the motion, it cannot be ascertained with
any reasonable degree of certainty. And where the
legislature happens to be bicameral, the second
Chamber may or may not have known of such reason
when it dealt with the measure. We hold accordingly
that all the three forms of extrinsic aid sought to be
resorted to by the parties in this case must be excluded from consideration in ascertaining the true object
and intention of the Legislature.
In the result, treating this proceeding as an appeal
from the judgment of the High Court, we set aside
the order of that Court and direct the respondents to
receive any warrant of authority which the first petitioner may produce from the legal representative of
the second petitioner who is reported to have died in
the course of the proceeding. We make no order as
to costs.
\_
.....
MuKHERJEA J.-This case has been argued before
us with elaborate fulness by the petitioner No. 1,
Mr. Aswiui Kumar Ghosh, who appeared in person,
as well as by a number of eminent counsel representing the Barristers' and Advocates' Associations
in the three principal High Courts in India. Having
given their learned arguments the best consideration
that I am capable of, I have come to the conclusion
~h[lit this application, c[linnot succeed.
?
30
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
[1953]
The matter in controversy is a very short one. The
petitioner No. 1 is an Advoeate of the Calcutta High
Aswini l(umar
·
·
· ·
Gho'h
Courl; entitled
to practise both on its
Origmal
an d
and Another Appellate Sides. '!.'his means, that he can both plead
v.
and act on the Appellate Side of the Court and plead
Arabinda Boso only on its Original Side.
Mr. Ghosh later got himand Another. self enrolled as an Advocate of the Supreme Court
MukhcrjeaJ. and after the passing of the Supreme Court Advocates
(Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951, he asserted his
right, on the strength of the provision of that enact~
ment, to "act" also on the Original Side of the
- Calcutta High Court. He actually filed "a warrant
of power and appearance" on behalf of the petitioner
No. 2 in a suit pending in the Original Side of that
Court in which the latter figures as the defendant.
The warrant was returned to him by the Suit
Registrar, Original Side, with an endorsement on it,
that it must be filed by an Attorney of the Court
under the mies and orders of the Original Side of the
High Court, and not by an Advocate. Being aggrieved by this refusal, the petitioners presented an
application before the Calcutta High Court under
article 226 of the Constitution, complaining of infraction of the right conferred upon the first petitioner
by Act XVIII of 1951 and praying for an appropriate
writ or order to enforce the same. A rule was granted on this application by Bose J. sitting singly;
and eventually, having regard to the importance
of the question involved in the application, the rule
was heard by a Special Bench of three Judges, consisting of Trevor Harries C.J. and Chakravartti and
Banerjee JJ. By the judgment, which was delivered by
Mr. ,Justice Chakravartti on 21st December, 1951, the
rule was discharged and the application of the petitioner was dismissed. The petitioners have now come
up to this conrt on a substantive petition under
Mticlc 32 of the Constitution and have also prayed
for special leave to appeal against the judgment of
the Calcutta High Court. We admitted the petition
and issued notices to the Attorney-General of India
as well as to the Barristers' and Advocates' Associations in those High Courts in India which are likely
1952
S.U.R.
...
SCTPREJYII~ COUR'r REPORTS
Si
to be affected by the decision in the case. A number
1952
of them, as said above,. appeared before us through
A .. K
.
swini uma.r
counsel and we had also the advantage of 11eanug
Ghosh
the learned Attorney-General on the points that a"d Another
were raised in course of hearing.
v.
The sole point for consideration in this case is, Arabinda Base
a"d Another.
whether the petitioner No. 1, who is au Advocate of
the Supreme Court, can, in addition to exercising his Mukherjea.J.
right of pleading on the Original Side of the Calcutta
High Court wh.ich is not challenged by anybody,
claim, by virtue of the provision of section 2 of Act
XVIIL of 1951, the right to "act" on the Original
Side of that Court, although according to the rules
framed under the Letters Patent an Advocate of the
Calcutta High Court may not appear in the Original
Side unless instructed by an Attorney: (vide Chapter
I, Rule 37, of the Original Side Rules). To decide
this question we will have to investigate the precise
extent of the right that has been conferred upon the
Supreme Court Advocates by section 2 of the Act
mentioned above, and ascertain what exactly is the
meaning of the word "practise" as used in that secc
tion. ·
The Act i8 a very short one and consists only of
two sections. The first section gives the name and
description of the Act which is intituled "The
Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts)
Act" and the object, as stated at the outset before
the enacting clause commences, is to "authorise
Advocates of the Supreme Court to practise as of
right in any High Court". The entire provision of
the Act is c0ntained in section 2 which mus thus:"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian
Bar Councils Act, 192f.i (XXXVIII of 192ti), or in
any other law regulating the conditions subject to
which a person not entered in the roll of Advocates
of a High Court may be permitted to practise in that
High Court every Advocate of the Supreme Court
sh_all be entitled as of right to practise in any High
Court whether or not he is an Ac1v.ocate of that High
·Court".
32
SUPRl!JME COURT REPOR11 S
[1953]
Upon this, a proviso is engrafted to the following
effect
that "nothing in this section shall be deemed
Aswini Kumar
to entjtle any person merely by reason of his being an
Ghosh
a1id Another Advocate of the Supreme Court to practise in a High v.
Court of which he was at any time a J uclge, if he had
Arabinda Bose given an undertaking not to practise therein after
and Another.
ceasing to holcl office as such Judge". 'fhen follows
Mukherjoa J. a short explanation which simply llbj's clown that the
expression "High Court" in the section includes the
Court of a J uclicial Commissioner ancl the statute
ends there.
It may be mentioned at the outset that the
Supreme Court was established in the year 1950 ancl
article 145 (1) of the Constitution empowered the
Court to make rules "for regulating generally the
practice and procedure of the court" including (a)
'rules as to the persons practising before the Court'.
'fhe Supreme Court Advocates were not entitled to
practise as of right in any of the High Courts in
Inclia. 'l1 he rules made by the different High Courts
impose considerable restrictions and disabilities upon
the Advocates of other High Courts who wanted to
appear and conduct cases before them. The power
to grant or withhold permission to these outside Advocates lay for the most part in the exercise of an unfottered discretion by the Chief Justice of the Court,
and that too in individual cases, and instances were
not rare of such permission being refused to lawyers
of acknowledged eminence belonging to other High
Courts. After the establishment of the Supreme
Court in India and with the prospect of a united Bar
looming in the minds of the people, this was felt
to be extremely unjust and anomalous. It was
primarily to remedy this defect in the exiSting
law, that this particular enactment was passed
by the legislature and the legislative purpose, as
is disclosed in the language of the enactment, is to
allow tlie Supreme Court Advocates access to the
other High Courts i~ India as of right, untrammelled
by any restriction or condition that the High Courts
vhemselve~ migh£ lay down in respect to the outside
-
1962
\
>
.
-I
•.
-
J
'
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l1S
33
1952
Advocates. So far there is little room for any controversy. The dispute .centers round the point as to Aswin.i K uniar
the extent of right that the legislature conferr,!:ld upon
Ghosh
the Supreme Court Advocates in achieving this legis- and Another
v.
lative purpose. The question is, what meaning is to
be attributed to the word "practise" as used in the Arabinda Boso
and Another.
section ?
Mr. Ghosh argues that the word "practise" in its Mukherjea J.
ordinary and literal sense would mean the right to
appear, plead and to act as well; and it is an established rule of construction that a literal interpretation should not be departed from unless there are
adequate grounds for such departure. It is said next
that the literal meaning of the word "practise" cannot be cut down or controlled in any way by the
language of the opening clause in section 2 of the
Act ; and that clause which may be described as a
non-obstante clause is not confined in its operation to
removal of the disabling provisions affecting those
whose names are not entered as Advocates on the roll
of a particular High Court, but has the effect of excluding all the prov.isions of the Bar Councils Act for
purposes of this enactment. It is further argued that
the words "whether or not he is an Advocate of that
High Court" occurring in section 2 unmistakably
indicate that the legislature had not in mind the removal of disabilities attaching to outside Advocates
merely, but that it intended to confer certain privileges on domestic Advocates as well who happened
to be enrolled as Advocates of tho Supreme Court. All
these matters require to be examined carefully.
· 'I'he word "practise" when used with reference to a
profession means "to follow, pursue, work at, or exercise such profession". The profession of an Advocate may contemplate both acting and pleading;
under certain circumstances it may mean pleading
alone witho.ut acting. but it can never mean acting
simply, for those who are entitled to act only and have
no right to plead do not come within the description
of AdYocates at all. There are other classes of nonAdvocate lawyers who like Solicitors and Agents can
34
SUPRE1ME COURT HEPORTS
[1953]
act only but cannot plead, and to the carrying on of
their
profession also the same expression "practise"
Aswi.ni Kumar
Ghosh
is appl~ed. Vi7 hat is to he remembered iu this connecand Another tion i., that the profession of an Advocate can be
v.
carried on only in a court of law and within the frameArabind• Bose work of the rules and regulations that obtain in such
and Another. court. The word "practise" when used with reference
!tl1dcherjea
J. to an Advocate is an elastic expression, having no
rigid or fixed connotation and the precise ambit of its
contents can be asce1·ta.ined only by reference to the
rules of the particular forum in which the profession
is exercised.
1952
'fhus in the Supreme Court Rules the expression
"Advocate" has been defined to mean "a person
entitled to appear and plead before the Supreme
Court". He has no right of acting at all. In
Order IV, Rule 31, of the Rules, this right of an
Advocate to appear and plead has been spoken
of as the right of "practising"; while in the rule
that follows, the function of an Agent, who can
only act and not plead, has also been spoken of as
"practice" before the Court.
In the Bar Councils Act the right of prnctice as an
Advocate bas been defined in section 14 (1) which lays
down that "an Advocate shall be entitled as of
right to practise-(a) subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of section 9, in the High Court of. which
he is an Advocate''. 'fhe word "practise" has apparently been used here in the general sense of both
pleading and acting and these rights have been limited
by and made subject to the rules which the Higl3.
Courts of Calcutta and Bombay may make determin- .
ing the persons who shall be entitled to plead and to
act in these High Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction. Sections 9 (4) and 14 (3) of the
Bar Councils Act expressly reserve to the Calcutta. and
the Bombay High Courts the power to make rules in
this respect and under the rules framed by them an
Advocate is not permitted·to appear on the Original
Side unless he is instrncted by art Attorn~y.
S.C.R.
-I
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
1952
The words "entitled to practise as of right" which
occur in section 14 (1) mentioned above have also Asw·ini K unia..r
been used in other parts of the Bar Councils Act, to
Ghosh
wit, in sections 4 (2), 5 (1) and 8 (I) of the Act; but and Another
v.
the word ''practise" in all these provisions does not
Arabinda
Bose
mean pleading and acting in an unlimited sense. It
a"d Anoth.r.
connotes the same rights and the same limitations
which are prescribed in section 14 of the Act. The ]fokherj ea J.
same expression has been used in section 2 of the
Supreme Court Advocates Act apparently in the same
sense and with the same implications and it cannot
be argued that it connotes an unrestricted right of
pleading and acting because the reservations mentioned in section 14 (1) of the Bar Councils Act have not
been repeated th ere.
Mt. Ghosh has in this connection drawn our attention to two reported cases, one of which is a pronouncement of the Patna High Court and ~he other of the
Madras High Court.
In the Patna case(1) the question arose as to whether an Advocate or Vakil whose name appeared on
the roll of any High Court could "act" on behalf of
his client by presenting an application for review of
a judgment in a case which was tried by a court subordinate to the High Court. The question was
answered in the affirmative and reliance was placed
upon section 4 of the T_Jegal Practitioners Act which
lays down that "an Advocate or Vakil enrolled on any
High Court shall be entitled to practise in all courts
subordinate to the court on the roll of which he is
entered". This case, it is to be noted, deals with
Advocates' right to practise in subordinate courts
where no distinction at all exists between pleading
and acting. Consequently, the word "practise" in
this context does include both pleading and acting.
In the Madras case(2) the point for consideration was, whether an Advocate enrolled in the High
Court of Madras under the Indian Bar Councils
Act Wl1\; entitled not only to appear and plead
(r) Ldurentiua Ekka v. Dhuki, [r925] I.L.R. 4 Pat. 766.
(2) In re the Powers of the Advocates, [1928) I.L.R. 52 Mad. ?2 1
36
SUPREME COUR1' REPOR'l'S
[1953]
but ~lso to "act" in the insolvency jurisdiction of
the court, in spite of the provision in Rule 128 of
h
h H.
.
t e Insolvency Rules of t e igh Court, whwh gave
such right only to the Attorneys. It was held that the
Advocate had the right to "act" by reason of the provision contained in section 14 (1) of the Bar Councils
Act which entitled an Advocate to practise as of
Mnkherjea J. right in the High Court in which he is an Advocate;
and because so far as the Madras High Court was concerned the Bar Councils Act made no distinction
between different jurisdictions of the court and did not
save the powers of the court to frame rules in respect
of the original and insolvency jurisdictions. In these
circumstances, a rule which cut down th@ right conferred by sections 8 and 14 of the Bar Councils Act
would be deemed to be repealed under section 19 (2)
of the Act as being repugnant to its provisions. It
was expressly stated in the judgment that the position
was different in· regard to the Bombay and Calcutta
High Courts and so far as these courts were concerned,
their powers were expressly saved by the Bar Councils
Act. This decision clearly showil that the expression
"practise" would not include "acting" if with regard
to particular jurisdictions of a High Court there are
valid rules to the contrary.
The question for our consideration really is, what
exactly is the position of a Supreme Court Advocate
who wants to avail himself of the right of practising
in any High Court in India in terms of section 2 of
the Supreme Court Advocates Act? Is he to exercise
the right only as a Supreme Court Advocate and in
accordance with the rules which the Supreme Court
itself has laid down in this respect, or is his position,
when he appears before a High Court, the same as
that of an Advocate enrolled in the said court and he
has the same rights and disabilities which attach to
such persons under its rules? The only other alternative that is or can be suggested and has been put
forward on behalf of the petitioner is that he is not
fettered by any rules either of the Supreme C~mrt or
of the particular High Court in which he appears;
1952 •
.. K
A swiwi. u1nar
Ghosh
and Another
v.
Arabinda Bose
""d Another.
.S.C.R.
SUPRE;\IE COURT REPORTS
37
1953
and as the extent of his right depends· upon the
fanguage of the section itself, the legislature by using Aau7ini Ku1nar
the word "practise" has conferred upon him the right
Ghosh
of both pleading and acting in any High Court he and Another
v.
chooses,_irrespective of the rules of practice·which
Arabinda Bos•
obtain in such court.
and:;Anotlier.
The first view does not appe.ar to me to be tenable.
If it i11 held, that '"hat the section contemplates is that .lilukherjea J.
a Supreme Court Advocate in exercising llis right of
practice in any High Court should be governed by
the Supreme Court Rules,· the Act itself would be
altogether unworkable. It is laid down iri Order IV,
Rule 12, of the Supreme Court Rules that "no person
shall appear as Advocate in ariy case unless he is
instructed by an Agent. By "Agent" is meant an
Agent of the Supreme Court and under no provision
of law is such· Agent entitled to ·act. in any High
Court in India. 'l'he result, therefore, is that if the
Supreme Court Rules are applied, no Advocate would
.be entitled to appear in·any High Court at all.
It cannot be argued that even though the rules o·f
the Supreme Court may not be strictly applicable, the
intention of the legislature is that a Supreme Court
Advocate in appearing before a High Court either on
the Original or on the Appellate Side shall have only
the right of pleading and he has to be instructed by
an Attorney or a local Advocate who is competent to
act. Whatever the merits of this view might otherwise be, the language ·of the section does not at all
-- .
warrant such a construction and it . cannot seriously
be suggested that the word "practise'', must in all
cases be confined to pleading only. The result 'of
such a construction would be to extend the dual
system which is at present confined to the Original
Sides of the Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts to
all the High Courts in India, in all their jurisdictions
and to the subordinate courts as .well-a possibility
which the legislature could never have contemplated.To me it seems that when section 2 speaks of a
Supreme Court Advocate being entitled as of right to
practise in any Hi~h Court 1 wh11t it actually means is
..
~
.
-
.
.
..
i
38
1952
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
[1953]
that be would be clothed by reason of this statutory
provision with all the righ b$ which are enjoyed by an
Aswini J(u11iar
Advof(ate of that Court and his right to plead or to
Ghosh
and Another act would depend upon the provisions of the Bar
v.
Councils ~ct and the rules validly framed by the said
Arab·inda Bose Court, subject to this thab no rule or provision of
and Another.
law would be binding, which would affect in any way
his
statutory right to practise iu that Court solely by
Mukherjea J.
reason of bis being enrolled as an Advocate of the
Supreme Court.
It is suggested that if this was the intention of the
legislature. nothing could have been easier for it than
to state explicitly that a Supreme Court Advocate
would have the right to practise in any High Court
in the same way as anAdvocate of that Court. In my
opinion, that is the implication of the general word
" practise" thn,t bas been used. As said already, the
practice of an Advocate must always have reference
to a court and it must imply the carrying on of the
profession according to the rules which are binding
on that court, except to the extent that the rules
themselves are invalidated expressly or by necessary
implication. If the legi;lature had expressly stated
that an Advocate qualified under section '2 of the Act
would have the right of both pleading and acting in
any High Court in India or if that was the clear intendment and implication of the language used, any
rule conflicting with that provision could certainly
have been held to be invalid; but I am unable to say
that the use of the word "practise" which has only
a general import, by itself, would have that effect.
Looked at from this standpoint, the third view
indicated above, which has· been pressed vehemently
on behalf of the petitioner, cannot certainly be supported. So long as the rules relating to pleading and
acting in particular jurisdictions of spscified High
Courts are allowed to remain valid and binding, no
intention can be imputed to the legislflture, without
clear words to that effect, of abrogating these rules
with regard to the few persons who happen to be
enrollet) as ,Advocates of the 8e1preme Court. 1!'ar
8.0.R.
SUPREME COUR'l' REPOR'l'S
39
1952
from achieving uniformity in any sense of the word,
such step would lead to siorious anomaly and practi- Aswini ](tt,nar
cal difficulties of au enormous character. la the
Ghosh
original jurisdictions of the Calcutta and the "Bom- and Another
v.
bay High Courts, where the dual system subsists,
there are elaborate rules regarding the functions of Arabinda Bose
the Solicitors who alone are competent to act on that and Another.
side, both in relation to the courts and to the liti- Mukherjea J,
gants. The whole procedure is of a different type,
dissimilar in many respects to that which is laid down
in the Civil Procedure Code. It would be difficult, if
not impossible, for an Advoca'te of the Supreme
Court, who chooses to act on the Original Side of the
Calcutta or the Bombay High Court, to fit himself
within the framework of these rules. He cannot
possibly carry on unless a fresh set of rules is prepared and the framing of new rules, which must exist
side by side with the old rules, would lead to further
complications and diversities. The position would
certainly have been understandable if it could be held
that the legislature wanted to do away with the dual
system altogether and introduce one set of rules
which would apply uniformly to all classes of lawyers.
Speaking for myself, I would consider that to be an
extremely desirable change; but I look in vain for
expression of any such legislative intent either in the
enactment itself or even in its historical background.
The object of the legislation is quite simple. It is
only to allow Advocates of the Supreme Court the
right to practise in all the High Courts in India irrespective of the rules framed by them imposing restrictions on the right of Advocates whose nametl do not
appear on their rolls. From the mere use of the word
"practise", the connotation of which is not at all
definite, I am unable to hold that it was the intention
of the legislature to introduce such sweeping changes
in the existing rules which the acceptance of this
view would imply.
'This leads me to an examination of the other parts
of section '2 of the Act to discover, what light, if any,
they throw upon the present question.
4o
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
It is one of the settled rules of construction that to
the legislative intent, all the constituent
ascertain
Aswini Kumar
parts
of
a
statute are to be taken together and each
Ghosh
word,
"phrase
or sentence is to be considered in the
a1id Another
v.
light of the general ·purpose and object of the Act
Arabinda Bose itself. Mr. Justice Chakravartti of the Calcutta High.
a?id Anothe1·.
Court laid very great stress on the opening clause
of
section 2 of the .Act which excludes the operation
Mukherjea J.
of certain statutory provisions, and this negative part
of the section constitutes, according to the learned
Judge, the measure and criterion of the right which
the posi·tive part formulates. 'fhe first question is, to
what extent the provisions of any existing law have
been eliminated by the opening clause of section 2.
The language of the clause is as follows:"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bar
Councils Act (XXXVIII of 1926), ·or in any other
law regulating the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High
Court may be permitted to practise in that High
Court, ..................... "
Mr. Justice Chakravartti is of opinion that this
clause purports to remove all those provisions of the
Bar Councils Act or of any other law which imposed
restrictions upon persons not enrolled as Advocates
of a particular court in the matter of practising in that
court. 'l'he exclusion is to this extent and no further; and consequently all the other provisions contained in the Bar Councils Act or other statutes
\vhich lay down the conditions unde1· which an Advocate enrolled in a High Court is entitled to practise in the Original Side of that Court, stand unaffected by that clause. If these provisions remain
valid and effective, it is quite reasonable to hold that
the word "practise " in the section must mean
" practise " in accordance with these rules and not in
supersession of them.
·
'fhe contention of Mr. Ghosh is that on a proper
construction of the language of the clause, the whole
of the Bar Councils Act and not merely those provisions in it, which relate to disabilities attaching to
1951
S.C.R.
<
SUPRE.l\LFJ COUR'l1 REPORT'S
4i
1952
Advocates of other High Courts, must be deemed to
be eliminated, so that the right of practising that is Aswini K'ltmar.
conferred by the sectio1i is to be exercised without
Ghosh
the restrictions or limitations flowing from• any of and Anothoi·
v.
the provisions of the Bar Councils Act. In support
of his contention that the whole of the Bar Councils Arabinda Bose
Act is excluded by the opening clause, Mr. Ghosh and Another.
lays great stress on a comma, which separates the Mukhe,.jtaJ.
Bar Councils Act and the figures and words that
follow, from the expression "or in any other law"
which comes immediately after that. He says further
that under the ordinary rules of interpretation the
adjectival phrase " regarding the conditions etc."
should be taken to apply to the word or phrase immediately preceding it and not to the remoter antecedent term or expression. These arguments, though
they have an air of plausibility about them, do not
impress me much. Punctuation is after all a minor
element in the construction of a statute, and very
little attention is paid to it by English courts.
Cockburn C.J. said in Stephenson v. Taylor (1): "On
the Parliament Roll there is no punctuation and we
therefore are not bound by that in the printed
copies". It seems, however, that in the Velltim
copies printed since 1850 there are some cases of
punctuation, and when they occur they can be looked.
upon as a sort of contemporanea expositio( 2 ). When a
statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt
about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be
given to the punctuation( 3 ). I need not deny that
punctuation may have its us.l3s in some cases, but it
cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element
and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning
of a text( 4 ).
•
Similarly, although a relative or a qualifying
phrase is normally taken with the immediately pre·
ceding term or expression, yet this rule has got to be
discarded if it is against common sense and natural
(I) (I86I) I B. & S. page IOI.
(z) Soe Craies on Statute Law, page I85,
(3) Vide Crawford on Statutory Construction, page 343.
(4) Ibid.
42
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l953j
meaning of the words and the expressions used. I
find considerable force in the. opinion expressed by
.4.swini Kumar
Chakravartti J. that in the present case the effect of
Ghosh
the
position of the comma or the particular array of
and Another
v.
words in the sentence has been completely neutralised
Arabinda Bose by the use of the word "other" occurring in the
and Another. phrase "or in any other law".
'rhe result is, as the
learned
Judge
has
said,
that
the
Bar Councils Act
Mukherjea J.
has been posited as au alternative to other laws and
both have been subjected to the qualification contained in the qualifying clause.
Assuming, however, for argument's sake that
Mr. Ghosh is right and that the whole of the Bar
Councils Act is eliminated by the opening clause of
the section, I do not think that even then it really
improves his position. The Bar Councils Act itself
does not make any provision relating to the rights of
pleading and acting in the Original Side of any High
Court. Sections 9(4) and 14(3) of the Act save only
the rights of the High Courts of Calcutta ana Bombay to make rules in reh1tiou thereto; and these rules
are made by these courts in the exercise of their
powers under the Letters Patent. Section 19(2) of
the J3a1· Councils Act lays down as follows:"When sections 8 to 16 come into force in respect
of any High Court of Judicature established by
Letters Patent, this Act shall have effect in respect of
such Court notwithstanding anything contained in
such r~etters Patent, and such Letters Patent shall,
in so far as they are inconsistent with this Act or
any rules made thereunder, be deemed to have been
re pea !eel."
If the entire Bar Councils Act is excluded for purposes of section 2 of Act XVIII of 1951, the rules
framed by the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay
under the Letters Patent. would rnmain valid and
effective of their own force even without the saving
provision contained in the above-mentioned section
of the Bar Councils Act, and section 19(2) of the Act
being out of the picture, the Letters PR,tent wonld
1953
S.C.R.
)
.
SUPREME COUR'l1 REPOR'I.;S
43
also remain fully ·alive. The result will be that
1952
Roule 37, Chaptecr I, of thRe 01 rigi1(ia)l SidecRules orfrthe Aswini Kumar
alcutta High ourt or u e 40 2 of hapter
of·
Ghosh
the Bombay High Court Rules, under wliich no and Another
Advocate can appear in the Original Side of these
v.
courts unless instructed by au Attorney, would not Arabinda Boss
come within the purview of the opening clause of and Another.
section 2, as they do not relate to matters regulating !fukherjea J.
the conditions of outside Advocates. Rule 6,
Chapter I, of the Bombay High Court Rules, to
which our attention was drawn by the learned
Attorney-General, lays down that an Advocate of any
other High Court may appear in a particular case,
with the permi~sion of the Chief Justice, on the
Original Side of the Court, provided he is instructed
by an Attorney, and an Advocate of the Bombay
High Court appears along with him. In my opinion,
the whole of this provision must be deemed to be invalid for purposes of section 2 of Act XVIII of 1951,
and a Supreme Court Advocate., who wants to appear
and plead in a case in the Origina.I Side of the
Bombay High Court, has neither to take the pennission of the Chief Justice nor is it necessary that he
should have along with him an Advocate of that
court. He should certainly be instructed by an
Attorney, but tha.t is because of the other provisions,_
which I have already mentioned, and which apply to
the Advocates of the Bombay Bigh Court itself.
I would be quite prepared to hold that what has
been excluded by the opening clause of section 2 of
the Act may not be the exact measure of the new
right that the section purports to create. In my
opinion, the section on its negative side eliminates so far as the Supreme Court Advocates are concerned, all disabling provisions existing under any
law in regard to persons who are not enrolled as
Advocates of any particular High Court. On the
positive side, the section confers on Supreme Court
Advocates the statutory privilege of practising as of
right. in any High Court in India, no matter whether
he is enrolled as an Advocate of that court or not.
44
SUPREME COUHT REPORTS
[1953]
It is this positive aspect that has been emphasised
by the words "whether or not he is an Advocate of
A swi.n-i. u1nar I
,, I . I
h
.
Gho'h
• t iat court w uc 1 occur at t e conclus10n of the second ,foother tion.
l:t may not be strictly correct to say that these
v.
words are altogether inappropriate, for the section
Arabinda Bose aims at conferring, though indirectly, certain priviand Another. j
eges on t h ose wh o are enrolled as Advocates of the
}lfakherjeaJ. particular High Court as well.
Section 9 (4) of the
Bar Councils Act lays down:"Nothing in this section or in any other provision
of this Act shall be deemed to limit or in any way
affect the powers of the High Courts of J ndicature at
Fort William in Bengal and at Bombay to prescribe
the qualifications to be possessed by .persons applying
to practise in those High Courts l'espectively in the
exercise of their original jurisdiction or the powers
of those High Courts to grant or refuse, as they
think fit, any such application (or to prescribe the
conditions under which such persons shall be entitled
to practise or plead)."
Provisions of this type are to be found in the
Rules of both the Bombay and the Calcutta High
Courts. Under Rule 1, Chapter I, of the Calcutta
Original Side Rules, even an Advocate of that court
has to make an application for being entitled to
·appear and plead on the Original Side and he can
exercise that right only after that permission is granted. Such rules would have no effect after the passing of Act XVIII of 1951 and an Advocate of the
Supreme Court will be entitled to plead in the Original
Side of the Calcutta High Court as a matter of right
and without complying with any of the formalities
that may be prescribed by the rules of that court.
Mr. Justice Chak,avartti expressed doubt as to
whether an Ad>'ocate of the Supreme Court, who
presumably is not an Advocate of the Calcutta High
Court, can, as such, plead in the Original Side of the
Calcutta High Court. In my opinion, there is no
room for doubt on this point at all. He is entitled
to appear and plead as a matter of right under the
express provision of section 2 of the Act,
19oz
.. K
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
45
Mr. Ghose finally attempts to support his conten1952
tion that the intention o.f the legislature was
to
confer
,
..
K
.
aswini umar
upon the Supreme Court Advocates the right to plead
Ghosh
as well as to act in all High Courts in India by call- and Another
ing in aid three other facts. It is said first of all that
v.
in the statement of objects and reasons which accom- Arabinda Bosa
panied the original bill, the right to practise was ex- and Another.
pressly stated to include both pleading and acting. Mukherjea J.
In the second place it is pointed out that proviso (a)
to section 2 which occurred in the original bill and
which excluded the right of both pleading and acting in the Original Side of the High Courts from
the operation of section 2 was dropped altogether
and the Act was passed without that proviso. Lastly
it is urged that the expression "practise", which has
been employed in the existing proviso to the section,
obviously means both pleading and acting, and it is
against sound rules of construction to attach different meanings to the same word used in two parts of
the same section.
'l'here are weighty pronouncements of English
courts as well as of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council which lay down that in construing a
statute all negotiation previous to the Act or the
original form of the bill must be dismissed from consideration. "We cannot interpret the Act" said
Lord Halsbury, "by any reference to the bill. nor
can we determine its construction by any reference
to its original form"(1). It is not permissible to ascertain the meaning of the word used in an Act by
reference to the proceedings in the Legislative
Council, and the language of a "Minister of the
Crown" in proposing a measure in Parliament which
eventually becomes law is inadmissible( 2). In a
Calcutta case the learned Judges refused to look into
the statement of objects and reasons accompanying
an enactment as an aid to its construction( 3). 'l'he
(I) Vide Her•on v. RathmineR [18Q2] A.C. 492 at 502.
(2) Vide Krishna Ayy·ingur v, NtU •p&rumal, [1920] 47 I.A. 33: Ass~m
Railway & f'mding Co. Ltd. v. In/'lnd Revenu• Oommissi?nera, [1935] A.C,
H5; Administrator General of Bengql v. Premlal, [1895] 22 I.A. 107.
(3) Vide Debendra v. Jogendra, A.LR. 1936 Cal. 593.
·
7
,
46
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
196B
judicial opiuion on this point is certainly not quite
Aswini Kumar uniform and there are American decisions to the
effect that the general history of a statute and the
Ghosh
and Another various steps leading up to an enactment including
v.
amendments or modifications of the original bill and
Arabi1ida"Bose
reports of Legislative Committees can be looked at
nnd :inother,
for ascertaining the intention of the legislature where
it is in doubt; but they hold definitely that the legislative history is inadmissible when there is no
obscmity in the meaning of the statute('). Even
assuming that the latter view is correct, it does not
appear to me that the first and the second contentions of the petitioner indicated above are really of
any assistance to him. It is true that in the statement of objects and rea~ons which was circulated
along with the original bill, the word "practise" was
said to include both pleading and acting; bnt at the
same time the original bill did not purport to confer
at all upon the Supreme Court Advocates the right
either of pleading' or of acting in any High Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction. 'Ihis was
expressly laid down in the original proviso (a) to
section 2 and the concluding portion of the statement
of objects and reasons stood thus:
"The present bill is intended to achieve such
unanimity by providing that every Advocate of the
Supreme Court _shall be entitled to practise as of
right in any Higih Court otherwise than on its
Original Side."
Conceding that Mr. Ghosh is entitled to rely on the
fact that the first proviso, which excluded the original
jurisdiction of the High Courts from the purview
of section 2 was subsequently dropped the dropping
of the proviso by itself proves nothing. What
the proviso intended was to confine the right of
practising which section 2 of the Act conferred on
Supreme Court Advocates exclusively to the appel-·
late jurisdiction of the High Courts. A Supreme
Court Advocate as such was not entitled under the
proviso to act or plead in the Original Side of any
(1) Vidc Cn.wford on Statutory Con$truction, page 383.
I
-
S.C.R.
\
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
47
1952
High Court in India. It is to be noted that this prohi,
bition had nothing to dp with the dual system that Aswini K urnar
exists in the original jurisdiction of the Calcutta and
Ghosh
the Bombay High Courts and it was totally irncon- and Anothe1·
v.
nected with the provisions of the Bar Councils Act
or the rules of the Calcutta and the Bombay High Arabinda Bose
Courts in relation thereto. On the other hand, if, as and Another.
I have already stated, section 2 of the Act purported Mukherjea J,
to confer on the Supreme Court Advocates the right
of practice in the different High Courts in India in
the same way as the Advocates enrolled in those
courts are entitled to do, the original proviso (a) purported to cut down that right to a considerable
extent. Under this proviso the Supreme Court
Advocates were denied the right of pleading on the
Original Side of the Calcutta and the Bombay High
Courts and they could neither act nor plead on the
Original Side of the Madras High Court, although
they would have those rights under the Bar Councils
Act. The dropping of the proviso might mean
nothing else than this that this restriction was withdrawn and the rights created by the section without
the proviso stood intact.
Be that as it may, it is, in my opinion, a most risky
thing to attempt to construe the meaning of a word
in a statute with the aid of a non-existent provision.
We do not know the reasons why the legislature
deleted this clause and it is not permissible for us to
speculate on these matters. A reference to the legislative debates or the speeches that were actually
delivered in the floor of the House is, in my opinion,
inadmissible to ascertain the meaning of the words
used in the enactment.
The use of the word "prrtctise" in the proviso to
section 2, as it now stands, is also a matter of no importance. Section 2 confers certain additional rights
upon the Supreme Court Advocates and they have the
right of practising in all the High Courts in India
subject, as I have said, to the rules and regulations
binding on the Advocates in each one of them. The
proviso makes an exception to this rule and in case
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1952
an Advocate of any particular High Court, who became a Judge of that court, gave an undertaking at
Aswini Kumar
the time when he assumed his office that he would
Ghosh
and Another not practise in that court after he ceased to be a Judge,
v.
the provision in the section could not be availed of
Arabinda Bose by him in the face of his undert11king.. This is the
and Another.
plain meaning of the proviso. Apparently the legislature was not in the least concerned when it e.nacted
this proviso with the extent of right which such
Advocate possessed when he became a Judge; and
the extent of the right would certainly depend upon
the rules and regulations of the High Court in which
he carried on his practice.
My conclusion is that the view taken by the
Calcutta High Court is the right and proper view to
take and this application must fail. I make no order
as to costs.
DAS J.-'rhe present proceedings before ns have
been initiated on a petition by two petitioners. The
first petitioner is Sri Aswini Kumar Ghosh who is
an advocate of the Calcutta High Court enrolled
on the Original Side as well as on the Appellate Side
of that Court. As such advocate of the Calcutta High
Court, he is entitled to act and plead on the Appellate
Side, but only to plead on the Original Side. He has
since been enrolled also in this Court as au advocate
which term is defined in Order I, rule 2, of the Rules
of this Court as meaning a person entitled to appear
and plead before the Supreme Court. On May 26,
1951, petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh served notices
on the Registrars of the Original Side as well as of the
Appellate Side of the Calcutta High Court intimating
that, in exorcise of the right conferred by the Supreme
Court Advocates (Practice in the High Courts) Act,
1951, he would thenceforth "practise, i.e., act and
plead", in the said High Court at Calcutta also as a
Supreme Court advocate. On July 14, 1951, petitioner Aswiui KiJmar Ghosh, as a Supreme Court
advocate, tendered what he calls a warrant of appearance under rule 58 of the Indian Companies Rules
framed by the Calcutta High Court in the matter of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
49
1952
a winding up petition regarding a company. That
"warrant of appearance': was returned by the Regis- Aswini Kumar
trar evidently because rule 58 requires a person who
Ghosh
intends to appear on the hearing of the winding up and Another
petition to leave with or sent to the petitioner or to
v.
his attorn'ey a notice of such intention signed "by him Arabinda Bose
or by his attorney" and does not authorise the filing and Another.
of a notice signed by an advocate. 'fhe second petiDas J.
tioner is one Sri Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee who is
the defendant in Suit No. 2270 of 1951 pending on
the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court. On
July 18, 1951, petitioner Jnanendra 1\ath Chatterjee
as defendant in the said Suit No. 2770 of 1951 executed a "warrant of appearance and power" in the saiid
suit in favour of the petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh.
'l'he petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh as advocate for
the petitioner Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee filed the
warrant with the Assistant in charge of the Suit
Registry Department of the Original 8ide. This was
clearly done in purported compliance with the provisions of Chapter 8, rule 15, of the Original Side
Rules. That rule, however, requires the defendant to
enter his appearance to a writ of surumons by filing
a memorandum in writing containing the name and
place of business of the defendant's attorney or
stating that the defendant def ends in person and containing his name and place of business. That rule
does not in terms contemplate an ad vacate acting for
a defendant. It is, therefore, not surprising at all that.
on July 27, 1951, the "warrant of appearance'.' was
returned by the respondent Arabinda Bose, the Assistant in the Suit Hegistry Department of the Original
Side of the Calcutta High Court, with the endorsement that "the warrant must be filed by an attorney
of this Court under High Court Rules and Orders 1
Original Side, and not by an Advocate". The petitioner Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee thereupon entered
appearance in person on July 30, 1951, and has been
defending the suit in person.
'11he two petitioners, however, moved the Calcutta.
High Court undel' article 226 of the Constitution
50
zrm1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953j
and obtained a Rule calling upon the two respondents
Sri Arabinda Bose, the Dep·artmental Assistant, ancl
AswMi Kumar S . S N B
. e, t h e R eg1stra1:
..
• 1 S.i d e,
Ghosh
n 1 • • anerJe.
o f t.h e 0_ri. gma
aiid Another to sho.,v cause why an order or d1rect10n m the nature
v.
of an appropriate writ should not be issued for the
A?·abinda Bose enforcement of the fun.d amental right of the petian.a Another.. tioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh "to practise, i.e., to act
and plead on the Original Side of this Court", as conDas J .
ferred on him by Act XVIII" of 1951 and guaranteed
by article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India and
why consequ ential orders t he rein mentioned should
not be made. The Rule was heard by a Special
Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of
Harries C.J. and Chakravartti and Banerjee JJ. who
discharged the R .u le on December 21, 1951, and dismissed the petition. As will appear from the judgment of the High Court, the argument addressed to
it "made no reference to the alleged fundamental right
and that the petitioner confined bis argument to the
provisions of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice
in the High Courts) Act, 1951." The powers of the
High Court under article 226 not being confined to
the enfoi·cement of fundamental rights, it was possible
for the petitioner to rely on the i·ights under the la.st
mentioned Act.
The petitioners did not apply for or obtain the
leave of the High Court to appeal to this Court.
Long after the time fi xed by the rules for applying
for special leave to appeal to this Court had expired
the petitioners filed the present petition against the
same respondents. The petition is intituled as au
application under articles 22 (1), 32 (1) and (2) , 135
and 136 (1) of the Constitution of India. In the
prayer portion of th e petition , the petitioners ask for
directions, orders or appropriate writs on the respondents for the enforcement of their fundamental rights
guaranteed under articles 19 ( 1) (g) and 22 (1) of the
Constitution, an order declaring the right of the
petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh to act on behalf of
his clients on the Original Side of all High Courts in
Jndia including Calcutta, an or.der upboldi~19 the
.-.-
S.C.R.
:
..
SUPREME COURT REP':nTS
-,
51
1952
right of the petitioner Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee to
be defended in the said suit by the petitioner Aswini Aswini K uniar
Kumar Ghosh and other consequential reliefs. There
Gho"h ·
is an alternative prayer asking this Court to treat the and Another
petitfon as an application, under article 136, for
v.
special leave to appeal against the judgment and order Arabinda Boss
of the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court dis- and Another.
missing the petitioners' application under article 226
Dai ;r.
of. the Constitution and for condonation of the delay
in presenting the present petition.
At the hearing before us it has not been
seriously suggested that the rights of the petitioner
Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee, fundamental or otherwise,
have in any way been in£ringed. Nor was the petition
presented before us as one for the enforcement of any
fundament;il right of the petitioner Aswini Kumar
Ghosh guaranteed by article 19 of the· Constitution.
What was pressed before us by the. petitioner Aswini
Kumar Ghosh, who appeared in person, was the right
said to have been conferred on him as an advocate of
this Court by section 2 of the Supreme Courh Advocates (Practice in the High Courts) Act (Act XVII
of 1951) hereinafter in this judgment referred to as
"the Act". _In the circumstances the petition has not
seriously been presented before us as one under
article 32 of the Constitution and it is not necessary
for me to express any'opinion as to whether a petitioner whose application for enforcement of an alleged
fundamental right under article 226 has been rejected
by the High Court can maintain an application under
article 82 to this Court for the same relief based. on
precisely the same facts and grounds. The petition,
however, has been presented before us as an applica·tion under article 136 of the Constitution for special
leave to appeal from the judgment of the Special
Bench of the Calcutta High Court. We have been
pressed to proceed with the matter on the footing ·
as if special leave to appeal has been gi'len and the
delay in the presentation thereof has-been condoned
by this Court. I deprecate this suggestion, for I do
not desire to encourage the belief that an intending
•
52
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
1952
appellant who has not applied for or obtained the
Ghosh
and Another
v.
· Arabinda Bose
and Another.
wor y way o exp ana 10n m e pe t 10n as to w y
he dia not apply to the High Court and as to why
there has been such delay in applying to this Court
should nevertheless get special leave from this Court
for the mere asking. As, however, the matter has
been proceeded with as an appeal, I express my views
on the questions that have been canvassed before us.
There is no dispute that the Act has conferred
some new rights on the Supreme Court Advocates.
The controversy is as to the ambit and scope of the
right so conferred and it has centred round the expression "to practise" used in section 2 of the Act.
In order to resolve that controversy we have to ascertain the true meaning of that expression as used in
the Act.
The provisions of the Act quite clearly apply to
and affect all High Courts in India. It is, therefore,
necessary to bear in mind the status and position of
advocates as they prevail in the different High Courts.
The Indian High Courts Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vic. C.
104) by section 1 authorised Her Majesty, by Letters
Patent, to erect and establish High Courts for the
three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay.
Section 9 of that statute provided that each of the
High Courts to be so established should have and
exercise civil, criminal and other jurisdiction, original
and appella'te, as therein mentioned and all such
powers and authority for and in relation to the administration of justice in the presidency for which it
is established, "as Her Majesty may by such Letters
Patent as aforesaid grant and direct." Section 16 of
that statute also empowered Her Majesty to establish
a High Court in and for any portion of the territories
within Her Majesty's dominions in India, not included
within the limits of the local jurisdiction of another
High Court. Pursuant to tJ:is authority High Courts
were established by Letters Patent at Fort William
in Bengal, Madras and Bombay. Clause 9 of the
Letters Patent of e9-ch of the three Presidency High
-
.-:-K leaved bof the High
Court apd who does not say a
Aswin• umar
f
1 t•
. th
t•t•
h
Das J.
.•
-
-
S.C.R.' SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1952
Courts authorised and empowered each of the said
High Courts:
Aswini Kum.ar
"to approve, admit, and enrol such and so .many
Ghosh
Advocates Vakils and Attorneys as to tbe said High andAnotlwr
V
Court shall seem meet; and such Advocates, Vakils Ara:b·inda Bo••
and Attorneys shall be and are hereby authorised to and Another.
appear for the suitors of the said High Court, and to
pa., J-.
plead or to act, or to plead and act, for the said suitors,
according as the said High Court may by its rules
and directions determine, and subject to such rules and
directions."
Subsequently 0th.er High Courts were eBtablished
from time to time by Let ters Patent at different places,
e.g., Allahabad, Patna, Labore and Nagpur, and
similar· power was, by clause 7 of the respective
TJetters Patent, conferred on each of the said High
Courts to make siniilar rules. It is well known that
each of the High Courts actually framed rules for the
admission of ad rncates, vakils and attorneys. The
High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay divided
their jurisdictions into two broad categories, namely,
original jurisdiction ai;id appellate jurisdiction, and by
their Rules made an internal classification of the
.e
advocates, yakils and attorneys. Thus the advocates
or vakils enrolled on the Appellate Side were empowered "to.appear, act and plead" but the advocates
enrolled on the Original Side were permitted only "to
appear and plead", the "acting" on the Original Side
being reserved for the attorneys for whom a separate
roll was maintained. The.. Madras High Court has,
however, done away with. this internal classification
and advocates of that High Court may now appear,
act and plead on the Original Side as well as on the
Appellate Side. The Ualcutta and Bombay High
Courts, however, maintained the distinction. Chapter I,
rule 37, of the Rules of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court provides that persons to whom the
rules contained in that chapter are applicable may
not appear_un\egs instructed by an attorney. Chapter
I. rule 40, of the E1:1les of the Original Side of the
)
)
I
1
...
53
?
54
1952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
Bombay High Court is on the same lines. Although
the
remaining IJetters Patent High Courts iu India
.Aswini Kumar
have
extraordinary original jurisdiction, both civil
Ghosh
and
criminal,
they did not make any distinction betand A1iother
v.
ween original and appellate jurisdiction as in Cal.Arabinda Bose cutta and Bombay and the advocates enrolled in those
an.d Another.
High Courts were and are permitted "to appear, act
and plead" in all their jurisdictions. Apart from the
Das J.
several Letters Patent High Courts other High Courts,
e.g., the High Courts of Assam and Orissa and the
High Courts of Part B States, also have framed rules
, of their own for admission of advocates and according
to those rules the advocates of all these High Courts
can "appear, act and plead". The position, therefore,
was that, at the date of the Act, all advocates of all
High Courts including those of the Appellate Side of
Calcutta and Bombay High Courts but excluding
only the Original Side advocates of Calcutta and
Bombay could "appear, act and plead" in their own
High Courts in all jurisdictions but the advocates of
the Original Side of those two High Courts could
only "appear and plead" on the Original Side.
· Apart from the bar against' acting imposed by the
•
High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay on their own
Original Side advocates, all the High Courts, by their
respective rules, prescribed certain cond.itions subject
- to which alone an advocate who was not on their rolls
could "appear and plead" in such High Courts.
Chapter I, rule 38, of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court provides as follows:"An Advocate of any other High Court or Chief
Court may with the permission of the Chief Justice
appear and plead for parties in matters arising in or
out of the original jurisdiction, or in or out of appeals
therefrom, provided he is a member of the Bar of
England or of North'ern Ireland, or a member of the
Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, or a person entitled
to appear and plead on the Original Side of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay, and that he is pro·
perly instructed by an Attorney."
(
s.c.R:
•
SUPli~EME
COURT REPORTS
55
There is also a rule framed under section 15 (b) of
1952
the Indian Bar Councils Act which a pp lies to the Aswini Kumar
Appellate Side of the Calcutta High Court prescribGhosh
ing that an advocate of another High Court can and Anothor
"appear and plead" on the Appellate Side of the
v.
Calcutta High Court in a particular case or cases only Arabinda Bos1
with the previous permission of the Chief Justice. and Another.
Reference may in this connection be made to Chapter
Das J.
I, rule 6, of the Bombay Rules applicable to the
Original Side and the rule framsd under the Indian
Bar Councils Act which applies to the Appellate Side
of Bombay High Court and is set out in Schedule II
of Part II of the Appellate Side Rules. There is no
dispute that each of the other High Courts have rules
in pari materia ie1posing conditions on advocates not
on its roll in the matter of their appearing and pleading in such High Court. Thus it is clear phat an
advocate not on 1;he rolls of a particular High Court
could not as of right "appear and plead" in that High
Court. He had to satisfy the conditions laid down by
that High Court before he could "appear and plead"
in that High Court. It should be particularly noticed
that under these rules foreign advocates who satisfied
the conditions were permitted only to "appear and
plead". 'l'here never was any question or claim of a
foreign advocate being permitted to "act" in a High
Court of which he was not an advocate.
The legislature which enacted the Act now under
our consideration had full knowledge of the internal
classificat'.on of the advocates of the Calcutta and
Bombay High Courts into Original Side advocates•
and Appellate S.ide advocates, the disability of the
Original Side advocates of those two High Courts,
namely, that they were not permitted "to act" on the
Original Side and could only "appear and plead" on
the instruction of 2rn attorney and that the attorneys
alone were permitted "to act" on that side of those
two .High Courts. Further the legislature was well
aware of the bar imposed on foreign advocates, i.e.,
advocates not on the roll of a High Court in the
matter of their appearing and pleading in that High
56
1952
SUPREME COURT Rl£PORTS
[1953]
Court and the !act that eminent advocates of one
High Court were not, on mooy occasions in the past,
Aswini Kumar
"to appear :>nd plead" in another
given.permission
Ghosh
High
Court.
'l'he
legislature knew that under Order
an.cl Another
v.
I, rule 2, of the Supreme Court Rules an advocate
Arab:nda Bose had been defined as a person entitled "to appear and
.and Anothe,.. plead" before the Supreme Court and that Order IV,
rule 30, precluded an advocate from acting as agent
Das J.
and an agent as advocate in any circumstances whatsoever. Finally, the legislature was cognisant of the
fact that a Supreme Court advocate w:>s a foreign
advocate in al 1 High Courts other than the one where
he was enrolled and as such was not entitled as of .
right "to appear and plead" in those High Courts.
vVith knowledge of all these facts and circumstances
the legislature proceeded to enact this Act and,
therefo.re, the provisions of the Act have to be
considered in the light of these prevailing· circumstances which undoubtedly form the background
of this enactment and which cannot be overlooked or
ignored.
Turning now to the text of the Act, one cannot but
be impress~d at once with the wording of the full
title of the Act. Although there are observations in
earlier ~nglish cases that the title is not a part of
the statute and is, therefore, to be excluded from
considerati9n in construing the statute, it is now
settled law that the title of a statute is an important
part of the Act and may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining its general scope and of throwing
•tight on its construction, although it cannot override
the clear meaning of the enactment. (See Maxwell on
the Interpret,.tion of Statutes, 9th Edn., p. 44 and
the cases cited therein). The full title of the Act
now under consideration runs thus:
"An Act to authorise Ad,vocates of the Supreme
Court to practise as'of right in any High Court."
One cannot fail to note the words "as of right"
~nd the words "in any High Court" which follow
immediately. Those two sets of words at once convey
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT 'REl::POR'l'S
51
1952
to my miud that the Act is directly and intimately
concerned with the disability imposed by a High
K u1nar
Court on advocates not on its roll in the way of their Aswini
Ghosh
appearing and pleading in such High Court without a.n.d Another
the permission of the Chief Justice and without
v.
satisfying other conditions, if any, and that their 11ra.binda. Bose
purpose is to .remove and supersede that disability, so and Another.
, far as the Supreme Court advocates are concerned,
Das J.
by authorising them to do so as of right. 'l'he words
" as o.f right " are quite clearly indicative of an ind~
pendent statutory right as opposed to the conditional
right dependent on the sweet will of the Chief Justice
concerned. Those words are used by way of antithesis
and bring out prominently the object of the Act. In
view of that well-known disability which naturally
was irksome, those words cannot fail to convey to
one's mind the conviction that the purpose of the
Act, as indicated by its title, is to confer on the ad vocates of the Supreme Court a right which was denied
to them by the Rule~ of the High Courts referred to
above. '11 he language in which the title of the Act
has been expressed appears to me to be a good and
cogent means of finding out the true meaning and
import of the Act, and, as it were, a key to the under' standing of it.
The matter, however, does not rest on the title of
the Act alone and I pass 011 to section 2 of the Act
which is expressed in the following terms:
" Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (XXXVIII of 1926), ·
or in any other law regulating the conditions subject
to which a person not entered in the roll of Advocates
of a High Court may be permitted to practise in that
High Court every Advocate of the 8upreme Court
shall be entitled as of right to practise in any High
Court whether or not he is an Advocate of that
High Court.
Provided that nothing in this section shall be
deemed to entitle any person merely by reason of his
being an Advocate of the Supreme Court to practise
'r
58
SUPREM:8 COURT REPORTS
[1953)
1952
in a High Court of which he was at any time a
Judge, if he had given an un.dertaking· not to practise
Aswini Kuniar
therein
after ceasing to hold office as such Judge."
Ghosh
and Another
•
It will be noticed that the main body of the section
v.
consists
of two parts, namely, a non-obstante clause
Arabinda Bose
beginning
with the words '·Notwithstanding anyand Another.
thing" and ending with the words "permitted to
Das J.
practise in that High Court" and a positive part
beginning with the words "every Advocate of the
,Supreme Court" and ending with the words" of that
High Court." To clear the ground it will be useful,
at the outset, to ascertain the scope and ambit of the
non-obstante clause.
The controversy on this clause has raged round the
question whether the adjectival clause, namely,
"regulating the conditions subject to which a person
not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High Court
may be permitted to practise in that High Court"
governs the words " the Indian Bar Councils Act " as
well as the words "any other law" which immediately
precede that clause. If that clause also attaches to
and qualifies the words "the Indian Bar Councils Act"
then there can remain no manner of doubt that the
ambit, scope and purpose of the non-obstante clause
are to supersede, not the whole of the Indian Bar
Councils Act but, only that part of it which regulates
the conditions subject to which a person not entered
in the roll of Advocates of a High Court may be
permitted to practise in that High Court, that is to
say, that the supersession of the Indian Bar Councils
Act is only to the same extent to which that adjectival
clause supersedes "any other law". Conscious that
such a construction will run counter to his contention, it has been the endeavour of the petitioner
Aswini Kumar Ghosh to keep the adjectival clause
separated from the words "Indian Bar Councils Act".
For this purpose he fastens on the comma appearing
after the bracket and before the word "or" and coBtends that the comma indicates that the qualifying
clause does not goyeru the Indian Bar Councils Act.
J
$.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
59
1952
The High Court has rejected the contention of the
petitioner Aswini Kumf!>r Ghosh on two grounds. In
Aswini Kumar
the first place it has been said that the cQmma was
Ghosh
· no part of the Act. That the orthodox view oi" earlier and Anot her
v.
English Judges was that punctuation formed no part
of-the statute appears quite clearly from the obser- Arabinda Boso
vations of \iVilles J. in Claydon v. Green(1). Vigorous and Another.
expres,sion was given to this view also by Lord Esher,
Das J.
M. R. in Duke of Devonshire v. Connor( 2 ) where he
said:
" In an Act of Parliament there are no such
things as brackets any more than there are such
things as stops."
This view was also adopted by the Privy Council
in the matter of interpretation of Indian statutes as
will appear from the observations of I-'ord Hobhouse
in Maharani of Burdwan v. Murtunjoy Singh( 3 ),
namely, that "it is an error to rely on punctuation.in
construing Acts of the Legislature." Same opinion
was expressed by the Privy Council in Pugh v.
Ashutosh Sen( 4 ). If, however, the rule regarding the
rejection of punctuation for the purposes of interpretation is to be regarded as of imperfect obligation
and punctuation is to be taken n.t least as contemporanea expositio, it will nevertheless have to be disregarded if it is contrary to the plain meaning of the
statute. If punctuation is without sense or conflicts
with the plain meaning of the words, the Court will
not allow it to cause a n;ieaning to be placed upon the
words which they otherwise would not have. This
leads me to the second ground on which mainly the
High Court rejected the plea of the petitioner Aswini
Kumar Ghosh, namely, that the word "other" in the
phrase "any other law" quite clearly connects the
Indian Bar Councils Act with other laws as alternatives and subjects both to the qualification contained
in the adjectival clause. I find myself in complete
(I) (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 5II at p. 522,
(2) (1890) L.R.Q.B.D. 468,
(3) (1886) L. R. 14 I.A. 30 at p. 35.
\4) (1928) L.R. 56 I.A. 93 at p. 100,
•
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
agreement with the High Court on this point. If the
intention was that the adjectival clause should not
Asw~~o~~<mar qualify tlrn Indian Bar Con11°cils Act, then the use of
and Another the weird "other" was wholly inapposite and unnecesv.
sary. The use of that word unmistakably leads to
Arabinda Bose the conclusion that the adjectival clause also qualifies
and Another. something other than "other law".
If the intention
were that the Indian Bar Councils Act should remain
unaffected by the qualifying phrase· and should be
superseded in toto for the purposes of this Act the
legislature would have said "or in any law regulating
the conditions etc." It would have been yet simpler
not to refer to the Indian Bar Councils Act at all and
to drop the adjectival clause and to simply say "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law". In
the light of the true meaning of the title of the Act
as I have explained above and having regard to the
use of the word "other" I have no hesitation in
holding, in agreement with the High Court, that what
the non-obstante clause intended to exclude or supersede
was not the whole of the Indian Bar Councils Act
but to exclude or supersede that Act and any other
law only in so far as they or either of them purported
to regulate the conditions subject to which a person
not entered in the roll of advocates of a High Court
might be permitted to practise in that High Court
and that the comma, if it may at all be looked at,
must be disregarded as being contrary to this plain
meaning of the statute.
Assuming, however, that the qualifying clause does
not attach to the words "Indian Bar Councils Act",
that circumstance will, never·theless, make no difference in the legal position. Section 8(1) of the
Indian Bar Councils Act provides as f6llows :
" No person shall be entitled as of right to
practise in any High Court, unless his name is entered
in the roll of the advocates of bhe High Oonrt maintained under this Act :
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall
apply to any attorney of the High Court."
1952
)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
61
19511
I
Section 14(2) runs thus:
"Where rules have been made by any High Court Aswini Kumar
within the meaning of clause (24) of section. 3 of
Ghosh
the General Clauses Act, 1897, or in the case of a and Another
High Court for which a Bar Council has been con- A b. vd. B
.
d un der t h'is A ct, b Y sue h B- ar C ounci'l un der and
ra iii
a o&s
st1tute
Another.
section 15, regulating the conditions subject to which
Das J,
advocates of other High Courts may be permitted to
practise in the High Court, such advocates shall not
be entitled to practise therein otherwise than subject
to such conditio~s."
Section 15(b) authorises the Bar Council, with the
previous sanction of the High Cour~, to make rules to
provide for and regulate "the conditions subject to
which advocates of other High Courts may be permitted to practise in the High Court". As already
stated, a rule has been framed under this section by
the Calcutta Bar Council as well as by the Bombay
Bar Council. These three provisions are the only
provisions of the Indian Bar Councils Act or the rules
thereunder which place a bar against an advocate,
not on the roll of a High Court, from practising in
such High Court. It is interesting to note that the nonobstante clause in section 2 of the Act we are construing is couched in language which has unmistakably
been taken from sections 14 (2) and 15.(b). There
can be no question that a supersession of the Indian
Bar Councils Act will supersede those provisions of
that Act and the rules thereunder which "regulate the
conditions subject to which advocates of other High
Courts may be permitted to practise in the High
Court". Apart from this I find nothing in the Indian
Bar Councils Act which has any direct bearing on
section 2 of the Act we are construing or whose supersession is necessary to give effect to it. It is said that
the rules of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts do
prescribe the qualifications to be possessed by persons
applying to practise in those Courts and the conditions under which such persons will be entitled to
practise and reserve to those Courts the right to grant
•
62
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)
•
1952
or refuse any application for enrolment. It is also
.~K
pointed out that. the rules of the· Original
Sides
A swini u1nar
.
Ghosh
of tliose two High Courts do determme the persons
and A"oth"· who shall respectively plead and act in those High
v.
Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdictions.
ArabindaBose It is next pointed out that sections 9 (4) and 14 (3)
a1td .Another. of t h e I n d'tan B ar C ounm'l s A ct preserve t h ese ru les
and it is contended that a supersession of the Indian
Das J.
Bar Councils Act· in its entirety will do away· with
sections 9(4) and 14(3) and the protection of those
sections having been withdrawn, those rules will consequently stand abrogated, so a·s to facilitate the
operation of the provisions of section 2 of the Act
under review. I am unable to accept this argument
as sound. Sections 9(4) and 14(3) do.not purport to
give any fresh validity to the rules of the Calcutta
and Bombay Higb Courts. All that those sections
do is Lo declare that nothing in the Indian Bar
Councils Act shall be deemed to limit or affect the
powers of those two High Courts which exist independently of those two sections and fl.ow from
their respective Letters Patent. 'fherefore, if the
whole of the Indian Bar Councils Act including sections 9(4) and 14(3) stand abrogated such abrogation
will not affect the existence or validity of the rules of
those High Courts which will, ueverthe.less, continue
in full force' on the strength of the Letters Patent of
those High Courts. It is clear, therefore, that ev~u
if the adjectival clause does not qualify the Indian
Bar Councils Act and if, consequently, the nonobstante clause under review is taken to supersede the
whole of the Indian Bar Councils Act, the effect of
such supersession will, for the purposes of section 2,
be only to do away with the provisions of ·sections
8(1) and 14(2) and the rule made under section 15(b)
of the Indian Bar Councils Act in so far as they
"regulate the conditions subject to which advocates
of other High Courts may be permitted to practise in
the High Court" just as it will abrogate all other laws
in so far as they regulate those very conditions. The
supersession of tbe whole of the Indian Ba,r Cc;m~ci\s
I
S.C.R.
63
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Act will not, therefore, affect the validity of the rules
1952
framed by the High CDurts under their respective A . -.Ku,,.ar
. . t h e persons wh o w1'll act swini
L etters P atent determmmg
Ghosh
and who will plead or who will act and plea d and and Another
those rules will prevail on their own strength and
v.
efficacy, although the rules regulating' the conditions Arabinda Bose
subject to which foreign advocates can be permitted to 'and Another.
appear and plead will stand abrogated by reason
Das J,
of the non-obstante clause. In the premises, the
result of the construction sought to be founded by the
petitioner Aswini Kumar, Ghosh on the existence of
the comma in the non-o'6stante clause will be precisely
the same as it would have been if the comma had
not been there and the adjectival clause "regulating
the conditions etc." also attached to and qualified the
words "Indian Bar Councils Act." In short, there is ·
no escape from the conclusion that the ambit, scope
and effect of the non-obstante clause are to supersede
the Indian Bar Councils Act and any other A'ct only
in so far as they regulate the conditions referred to
therein. I again emphasise that the rules of the
different High Courts regulated the conditions subject
to which a foreign advocate would be permitted "to
appear and plead." 'rhere was no question of the
foreign advocate "acting" in a High Court of which
he was not an advocate. The purpose of the nonobstante clause is to supersede only the provisions of
the Indian Bar Councils Act and the rules which
regulated those identical conditions. It is not
seriously disputed that the legislature in passing the
non-obstante clause had only those conditions in mind.
There can be no manner of doubt, therefore, that the
words "to practise" in the non-obstante clause mean,
in the context, "to appear and plead".
The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh then falls back
on a•second line of reasoning. He urges that whatever
may be the meaning, scope and effect of the nonobstante clause, it cannot possibly cut down the meaning of the positive words in the operative part of the
section. His contention is that the High Court was
wrong in holding that the non-obstante clause was
0
. 'r
I
.
.
64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)
'
1952
coextensiye with the operative part. ·while it may be
.~K
true that the non-obstante cla.me need not necessarily
A
•w•n•
· wit
'l1 t h e operative
. part, t h ere can b e
Ghosh""'°'b e coctx t ens1ve
and Another no doubt-and the petitioner and Dr. N. C. Seu
v.
Gupta appearing for the Calcutta Bar Association
Arabinda Bose and supporting the petitioner do not dispute~that
and Another.· ordinarily there should be a close approximation
Da• J.
between the two. \Vhat he urges is that the Court
should not create an ambiguity in the operatiYe part
and then use the non-obstante clause to en t down the
meaning of the plain words used in the operative part
of the section. The argument is that the words
"to practise" cover both acting and pleading and that,
therefore, the operative part of the section authorises
the advocate of the Supreme Court as of right "to
practise", that is, "to act and plead", in any High
Court. 'The whole case of the petitioner is founded
on this plea. It is necessary, therefore, to consider
whethei· the critical words have that invariable and
fixed meaning when used in relation to an advocate.
'l'he verb "practise" according to the Oxford
English Dictionary, Vol. VIII, p. 1220, means:
to work at, exercise, pursue (an occupation, prnfession or ar.t);
to exercise the profession of law or of medicine.
Similar meaning is to be found assigned to the
word in Dr. Annandale's New Gresham Dictionary.
According to this meaning doctors "practise'', consulting architects "practise" as well as lawyers "practise" but we know that each of them does different
things. Coming to lawyers we find that there are
different categories of lawyers all of whom "practise",
although all of them do not do the same thing. 'rhus
attorneys "practise" in the Original Sides of the High
Coiuts of Calcutta and Bombay and the agents
"practise" in the Supreme Court but we know that
under the rules of those Courts the attorneys and
agents only "act". 'rhe advocates also "practise"
bntwe know that all of them do not perform the same
functions. The advocates of all High Courts including those of the Appellate Sides of the. Calcutta and
\
'
l
)
S.C.R.
•
...
...
SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
65
Bombay High Courts, under the rules of their resJ96!J
pective High Courts; '~act and plead" and, as the
ambit of the professiou of such advocates extepds to A•wini Knma.acting and pleading, the words "to practise" in their·
lGAhoslt'
. . to t h ose a dvocates un dou b te di y mean " to anc v.no 1ior
app 1icat10n
act and plead". The advocates of the Original Sides Arabinda Bos•
of those two High Courts can, under the rules, only and .1nothor.
"plead" on the Original Side and the ambit and scope
Das J.
of the p.rofession of these Original Side advocates
being limited only to pleading, the words "to pra.ctise"
used in reference to these advocates must mean "to
plead" only. 11 here are thus different species of
lawyers, some of whom, e.g., attorneys of the Original
Sides of Calcutta and Bombay High Courts and
agents of this Court, only "act", some others
of whom, e.g., the Original Side advocates of ·
those two High Courts and of this Court, -only
"plead"· and all the remaining advocates of all the
High Courts both "act and plead". The scope of the
professional activities of the different categories of
lawyers· thus varies but, nevertheless, they are all
said "to practise". 'fhese words, therefore, connote
the general idea of exercising the legal profession,
which is their di.ctionary meaning, and in that general
sense apply to all lawyers as a class or genus but at
the same time they are capable, in their application
to particular species or categories of lawyers, to connote the different professional attributes of those
different categories or species.
'fuming to the Indian Bar Councils Act we find
that the expression "to practise" has been used in
various sections in the generic sense I have mentioned. Let me illustrate my meaning by reference to a
few sections. Section 4 of that Act deals with the
composition of Bar Councils. Sub-section (1) provides that every Bar Council shall coflsist of 15 members of which 10 shall be elected by the advocates.
Sub·section (2) then provides: "(2) Of the elected members of every Bar
Council not less than five shall be persons who have
for not less than ten years been entitled as of right to
66
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
1952
practise in the High Court for which the Bar Council
has
been constituted."
Aswini Kumar
If
wy, give the general dictionary meaning to the
Ghosh
and Another words 'to practise" used in this sub-section then this
v.
sub-section becomes easily intelligible, but if we say
Arabi.nda Bose
that
they mean "to act and plead" then the eligibility
and Another.
will be confined to the advocates who, under the rules,
-·can "act and plead", i.e., to the Appellate Side advoDas J.
cates, and the result of that construction will be that
the advocates of the Original Sides of Calcutta and
Bombay High Courts even though they are of ten
years' standing will not be eligible for election, for
such advocates do not and indeed cannot, under the
rules, "act and plead". Such surely cannot be the case.
It follows, therefore, that the words "to practise" in
this sub-section have been used in their generic sense
although they connote different things when applied
to different categories of advocates all of whom are
within the sub-section. Sub-section (3) runs thus:
" (3). Of the elected members of the Bar Councils to be constituted for the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal and at Bombay such
proportion as the High Court may direct in each case
shall be persons who have for such minimum period
as the High Court may determine, been entitled to
practise in the High Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, and such number as may be fixed
by the High Court out of the said proportion shQ,ll
be barristers of England or Ireland or members of the
Faculty of Advocates in Scotland."
If we give the words "to practise" their ordinary
dictionary meaning, then the sub-section will be quite
easy of comprehension but if we say that those words
mean "to act and plead", then the sub-section will
become meaningless, for those words in that sub-section refer to the -practice of the Original Side advocates only who do not and, indeed,. under the rules;
cannot at all act on the Original Side. It is, therefore, clear that the words "to practise" have been
used in both sub-sections in their generic meaning
which is also their dictionary meaning, namely, "to
I
>
•
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1952
exercise their profession", although in their a pp lication to the different species who are within the sub- Aswini Kurnar
sections they mean different professional att~ibutes.
Ghosh
Thus, in sub-section (3) which applies to Original and Another
v.
Side advocates only they must mean "to plead" whereArabinda
Bose
as in sub-section ('2) which applies to all categories of
and Another.
advocates the words have different meanings, that is to
say, in relation to advocates other than Original Side
Das J.
advocates they mean "to act and plead" and in relation to the Original Side advocates they mean only
"to plead". Same remarks apply to section 5 (1). It
will be futile .to refer to the principle that the same ·
word should be given the same meaning wherever it
occurs in the Act, for the context excludes the application of that principle. 'l'ake section 8 ('2) of the
Indian Bar Councils Act which provides:
"8. (1) ...................... ..
('2) The High Court shalt prepare and maintain a roll of advocates of the High Court in which
shall be entered the names of(a) all persons who were, as advocates, vakils or
pleaders, entitled as of right to practise in the High
Court immediately before the date on which this section comes into force in respect thereof; ............... "
If we do not give to the words "to practise" in
clause (a) their dictionary meaning but read them as
meaning "to act and plead" the advocates practising,
i.e., only pleading on the Original Sides of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, will not find their
names in the rolls maintained by their respective High
Courts under this section. That exclusion is certainly
not the purpose of this sub-section. Therefore, in
this sub-section also the words "to practise" means
"to exercise their profession". Samo remarks apply
to the proviso to section 8 (3) (b). I come next to
section 14 which provides inter alia:
"14. (1) An Advocate shall be entitled as of right
to practise- ·
(a) subject to the provisions of sub-section (4)
of section 9, in the High Court of which l:ti;i is !Jill
Aclvoca.te ; ... ,!, .... ,,.,,"
,.
67
68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
By sub-section (3) nothing in this section shall be
deemed to limit or affect the power of the Calcutta
.~sw·iwi K uniar
· h Courts to ma ke rules d etermmmg
· ·
Gho.•h
and B om bay H 1g
nnd .foother the persons who are respectively to plead aud to act
on the Original Sides of those High Courts. Both
v.
A1·abinda Boso those High Courts have made rules under which an
and Another. Original Side advocate can only "plead", the acting
having been reserved exclusively for the attorneys.
Das J.
In the light of the context what is the meaning of
the words "to practise" in sub-section (1) above? If
we put the ordinary dictionary meaning on the words
"to practise", namely, "to· exercise his profession",
the section will be found to be. quite intelligible and
workable; but if we take them to mean only "to act
and plead" then the Original Side advocates who do
not "act" but only "plead" will not, strictly speaking,
be within the section and consequently will not be
able to avail themselves of the protection of section
14 (1) (a). Can it, for a moment, be said that the
section gives protection and security to all advocates
other than the Original Side advocates and that the
latter are not entitled as of right "to practise'', i.e.,
"fo plead'', in the High Court of which he is an advocate? 'rhat cannot be so. The very fact that the right
is subject to the provisions of section 9 (4) and that
the rule-making power of the two High Courts is not
affected by virtue of section 14 (3) quite clearly show
that the Original Side advocates who cannot act on
the Original Side are intended also to be included in
the term advocate used in sub-section (1). If, therefore, this secliion is to give any security to the Original Side advocates, as it does to the Appellate Side
advocates, then we must read the words "to practise"
in their ordinary dictionary lnen.ning, namely, "to
exercise his profession". It is thus clear that the words
"to practise" have been nsed. throughout the Indian
Bar Councils Act in their general dictionary meaning
mentioned above except at the end of section 9 ( 4).
In the same way the word -"practising" has been used
in Order IV, rule 31, of the Supreme Court Rules in
Hie same generic sense and bein!l' used in reiation to
1952
I
S.C.R.
•'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
advocates of this Court it must mean "appearing and
1952
pleading". In the next following rule the same word A . . K
has been used ip its dictionary meaning altpough swi;;;. 08 ;mar
having been used in relation to agents of this and Another
Court it must mean "acting". The same generic
Y.
meaning given to the words "to practise" will make Arabinda Bos•
section 4 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, easily and Another.
intelligible and workable.
Das J.
The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh, on the other
hand, relies on article 220 of the Constitution and
points out that while the words used in the body of
the article forbid judges "to plead or act" the marginal
note to the article describes the subject-matter of the
article as "prohibition of practising" and concludes
that "to practise" means "to act and plead". In
agreement with the High Court· I am unable to accept
this reasoning. Even assuming that the marginal
note may by looked at in considering the article it only
means that the draftsman of the marginal note considered that the single word " pract~se" would be a
compendious one. Nobody disputes that the words
"to practise" may, in a particular context, mean "to
plead or act" but it does not follow that it invariably
has that meaning. Further it is clear, as the B;igh
Court points Gut, that wha_t the draftsman did was to
find a word which would cover both acting and pleading without attempting to bring out the technical
distinctiorr between the two. Nor do I think, for
reasons stated by the High Court, that entry 78 of
List I in the Seventh Schedule lends any support to
the petitioner's contention.
The petitioner then r~fers us to the decision in
Laurentius Ekka v. Dhuki Koeri(1) in support of his
contention that the judici:i,lly accepted meaning of the
words "to practise" is "to appear, act and plead".
In that case the question was whether an adYocate
on the roll of the Patna High Court could present and
move a review petition in a subordinate court unless
he filed a Vakalatnama or was instnicted by a pleacl~i;
(1) (1925) I.L.R. 4 Pat. 766,
l
10
'
70
w52
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
of the subordinate court.
[1953]
It was held that an advo-
.-.cate of the High Court, unlike a pleader, did not need
A""n' Kumar
. dm
. wntmg
..
Ghosh
to be ~ppomte
to act ~n be h a If o f h"is
and Another client and even when verbally appointed he could
v,
. A•·abindaBose
and Another.
.Das J.
•
under Order III, rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure appear, plead and act on behalf of his client and,
therefore, when section 4 of the Legal Practitioners
Act, 1879, provided that every person entered as an
advocate or vakil on the role of any High Court under
the Letters Patent should be entitled to "practise" in
all Courts subordinate to such High Court, the word
"practise" as applied to an advocate of the Patna
High Court meant "appear, plead and act". The ratio
of the decision is obvious. The scope and ambit of
the Patna High Court advocate's profession covered
acting and pleading and when such an advocate was
given the right to "practise" in the subordinate court
he was authorised to exercise his profession in full,
i.e., to act and plead in the subordinate court. In short .
lihe advocate carried the attributes of his profession
- with him even when he went to exercise his profession in the lower court. This decision is no authority
for the proposition that the words "to practise" have
a fixed and invariable meaning comprising acting
and pleading in all cases.
The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh then referred
us to the case of In re Powers of Advocates("). In
Madras the High Court in exercise of its powers under
clause 9 of the Letters Patent framed a rule empowering advocates to appear, act and plead on the Original Side. That rule was held to have been validly made
in two earlier decisions. But Rules 128 and 129 of the
Insolvency Rules permitted an advocate only to
"appea1: and plead" in the Insolvency jurisdiction and
the attorney to act there. In these circumstances the
question arose in the Madras case whether advocates
enrolled under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926,
were entitled to "act" in the Insolvency jurisdiction
of the Madras High Court, notwithstanding that
under the rules framed by the High Court they were
\2) (1928) l.L.R. 52 Mad. 9Z,
S.C.R.
..
•
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
11
1952
only entitled to "plead" and the Full Bench answered
the question in the affirmative. The reasoning under- Aswini Kumar
lying this decision, as I understand it, was that the
Ghosh
general ambit and scope of the profession of a nl:adras arid AJ>Othor
High Court advocate being, according to its rule, "to
. v.
appear, act and plead" in the Original Side, the words Arabinda Bos•
"to practise" used in section 8 (1) and section 14(1) and Aiwther.
of the Indian Bar Councils Act must, in relation to him,
Das J.
mean "to appear, act and plead". Rules 1'28and129,
however, said that he could only appear and plead but
not act. There being no saving of the power of the
Madras High Court as there was of that of the Calcutta
and Bombay High Courts by section 9 (4) and section 14-(3) and those'insohency rules being inconsistent with the provisions of s-ections 8( l) and 14(1) as
construed by the Full Bench, that rule should, under
sections 19(2) be deemed to have been repealed. I am
·unable to accept the correctness of this reasoning.
The combined effect of the two sets of rules was that
a Madras advocate was entitled to act and plead
throughout the Original Side except in Insolvency
Court which was also a part of the Original Side. It
was, therefore, not correct to say that the Madras
advocate was entitled to act and plead in the Original ·
Side. 'l'he passage in the judgment of Kumaraswami
.Sastri J. at p. 103, namely that "the word 'practise'
ordinarily means 'appear, act and plead', unless there
is anything in the subject or context to limit its meaning" is not supported by any authority and appears
to me to· be too wide. Indeed, the learned Judge
himself recognised this, for throughout the judgment
it was emphasised that the word "practise", when
applie_d to a Madras Advocate, meant "to appear, act
and plead". It is clear from that judgment that,
according to the learned Judge, the words had not
that wide meaning in their application to the Original
Side Advocates of the Calcutta and Bombay High
Courts. In any event, that passage should, in the
context, be limited in its appli_cation to the Madras
High Court advocates and all advocates of all other
High Comb ';ho, b;y their rules, are permitted to act
72
SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS
[1953)
and plead, for it cannot possibly have that meaning in
relation tq an Original Side .advocate who is permittAawini Kumar
Ghosh
ed only to plead. This passage in the Madras decision
a 11 d Another could not have been intended as an enumeration of
v.
the professional activities of au advocate as forming
Arabinda Bose the invariable contents of the words "to practise" or
and Another. as an enunciation of a fixed meaning of general application. In this country where there exists, as a hisDa3J,
torical fact, a clear di vision of legal practitioners into
three separate classes, namely, those who act only,
those who only plead and those who do both act and
plead such a definition will be wholly inaccurate. It
is necessary, therefore, to give to those words their
generic meaning I have mentioned. In this view of
the matter, I agree with the High Court that the
-- petitioner can derive no support for his contention
from.either of these two decisions.
My attention has also been drawn to the case of
The Queenv. Doutre(') where it was held tha1Lin Canada
where the functions of Barristers and Solicitors are
united in the same person, the rules of Bnglish law
which precludes a Barrister to sue for his fees do not
apply and that a Quebec advocate could sue for his
remuneration on a qitantum meruit basis. I do not see
how that case throws any light on the problem before
us. In Quebec all advocates "act itnd plead" and as
regards Quebec advocates the critical words may cover
both acting and pleading, but how can that circumstance assist us in ascertaining the meaning of those
words in enactments of our country where we have a
clear division of the legal practitioners into three
categories I have mentioned?
The result of the foregoing discussion as to the
meaning of the words "to practise" appears to me to
be that in relation to lawyers as a class they mean
"to exercise their profession" which is their dictionary
meaning and which is wide enough to cover the activities of the entire genus of lawyers. They are words
of indeterminate import and have no fixed connotation or content. In their application to particnlar
1953
0
{1! (1883) 9 App. Cas. 745.
•
S.C.R.
'
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
73
1959
species of lawyers their meaning varies according to
the scope and ambit of tpe profession of that particular species in relation to whom they may be used, Aswini Kumar
Gho•h
and such meaning has to be ascertained by ren,rence a,.d Another
to the subject or context. Further, the Legislative
v.
technique, as is evident from the Indian Bar Comicils Arabinda Bo 80
Act, the Legal Practitioners Act and the Rules of and Another.
the Supreme Court to which reference has been made,
DasJ.
is to use these n~uter words in a generic sense although
in their application to specific categories or species of
lawyers they have different connotations which are
to be ascertained from the context in which they are
used. The question, therefore, at once arises: ·what
in the context and on a true construction of the Act
we are considering, is the meaning of the words "to
practise"?
'rhe petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh urges that the
words "to practise," in relation to all advocates of all
the 20 High Courts, except the Original Side advocates of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts only,
mean "to act and plead" and seeing that this is the
meaning applicable to the vast majority of advocates,
those words must be given that meaning. Am I to
apply the rule of majority in construing a statute?
Am I to assume that the Legislature bad forgotten or
deliberately ignored the hard historicalfact that there
exists a large body of advocates of not inconsiderable
importance who "practise", that is only "plead" on
the Original Side of two premier High Courts in
India? Or am I to assume that the Legislature intended, by the use of a dubious expression of indefinite
import, to swamp one whole class of legal practitioners,
namely, the Attorneys of those two High Courts?
I find not the slightest indication of such intention
anywhere in this Act. On the contrary, the title of
the Act and the non-obstante clause of section 2 itself
run counter to such contention. I have already
pointed out that the words "to practise" have been
used in the non-oostante clause in the sense of "appearing and pleading" only and that nobody can for a.
moment
doubt that in the non-obstante clause the'
.
.
74
SUPREME COURT REP.ORTS
[1953]
Legislature bad in mind the provisions of the Indian
Bar Councils Act and the mies of the High Courts
4
sw;;.osl~··ar regulating the conditions subject to which a foreign
•0 ,.,z ~tnother
advoc!1te was permitted "to appear and plead" in a
v.
High Court of which he was not an advocate. If that
Arnbinda Bose be so, it is legitimate to infer that the J,egislature in
and Another. the operative part of the section gave expression and
Das J.
effect to what it bad in its mind when enacting the nonobstante clause. If the intention of the Legislature were
otherwise, why did not the Legislature say openly
and in a straightforward way that it gave the
Supreme Court advocate the right "to act and plead"
iµ any High Court ? ·why did it use the dubious
words "to practise"? It is not correct to say that
those words have been used in the Indian Bar
Councils Act only in the sense of "acting and pleading". As already explained, those words have been
used in their ordinary dictionary meaning, namely,
"to exercise his or their profession" so as to cover the
entire genus or class of Advocates, although in their
application to different categories or species they have
different connotations as explained abo\·e. Seeing
that the legislative practice is to use those words in
their general dictionary meaning, there is no reason
to suppose that the Legislature intended to depart
from this practice while enacting this piece of legislation. It is asked: why did not the Legislature then
insert iu this Act a saving clause like sections 9(4)
and 14(3) ol the Indian Bar Councils Act? 'rhe
argument is that the absence of such a saving clause
in this Act constitutes a departure from the legislative practice followed in the Indian Bar Councils
Act. and, therefore, the words "to practise" in the
operative part of section 2 must have their widest
meaning. A little reflection will show that this
argument is not sound. The rule-making power of
the High Courts under clause 9 of the Letters Patent
was and is with respect to advocates, vakils and
attorneys admitted and enrolled by the High Courts.
The Indian Bar Councils Act dealt with advocates
- enrolled by the High Courts and; therefore, it was
1952
.
. --:-;
) .
;
i
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPO:RTS
75
1952
considered safer to provide that nothing in that Act
should affect or limit the. rule making powers of the Aswini Ku•mar
High Court. Indeed, if the critical words wer~, as I
Ghosh
think, used in a generic sense, the saving clauses must and Another
have been inserted ex abundanti cautela. Be that as
v.
it may, as the High Courts' power to make rules Arabinda Bose
under clause 9 extended only to the advocates, vakils and Another.
and attorneys enrolled by them and as the Indian Bar
Das J.
Councils Act also dealt with advocates enrolled by
the Hig,h Courts, the insertion of the'saving clauses
in the last mentioned Act is intelligible. But a
saving of the rule-making powers of High Courts
over their own advocates etc., is entirely out of place .
in an f...ct which is concerned not with High Court
advocates but with Supreme Court advocates only.
The High Courts have no power under clause 9
of the Letters Patent to make any rule to govern the
conduct and activities of the Supreme Court advocates and this Act only deals with Supreme Court
advocates and confers a new right on them. Therefore,
a saving of the High Courts' rule making power over
their advocates would have been wholly meaningless
and inappropriate, for such saving clause would not
have given the High Courts any power to make any
rules with respect to the Supreme Court advocates.
There was, therefoie, no necessity or occasion for
inserting any saving clause on the lines of sections 9
(4) and 14 (3) of the-Indian Bar Councils Act. Nothing can, therefore, be founded on the absence of i
saving clause on the lines of that Act.
The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh argues that
the text of the original Bill, the statement of objects.
and reasons over the signature of the Law Minister
attached thereto and the debates in the Legislature
resulting in the deletion of what was clause (a) of the
proviso as it existed in the original Bill will clearly
show what the intention of the Legislature was. In
the original Bill as introduced in the Legislature there
was a proviso to section 2 which ran thus:
"Provided that nothing in this section shall be .
deemed to entitle any person, merely by reason of his
l:ieing an Advocate of the Su.Preme Court,-
76
1 52
9
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
(1953]
(a) to plead or to act in any High Court in the
, .--:-K
exercise of its original i'urisdiction; ur
.ri.swini. uniar
(b) to practise in a High Court of which he was
at any time a Judge, if he had given an undertaking
not to practise therein after ceasing to hold office as
such J udg~."
and Another.
The argument is that the objects and reasons clearDas J.
ly show that the intention was that section 2 should
not affect the Original Sides of the two High Courts,
and clause (a) was inserted in the proviso in erder to
achieve that purpose. This shows that if clause (a)
was not· there, section 2 would have entitled the
·Supreme Court advocate "to practise", i.e., "to appear,
' act and plead" in all High Courts in all their !leveral
jurisdictions. 'fhis conclusively shows that the words
"to practise" were used in that larger sense. Indeed
in the objects and reasons those words were expressly
stated to be ·synonymous with "to act and plead".
The argument is apparently formidable but on reflection will be found to be devoid of any substance.
There is authority for the proposition that the
proceedings of the Legislative Council are to be
excluded from consideration 'in the judicial construction of an Act and that the debates in the Legislative
Council, repOTts of select committees and statements
of objects and reasons annexed tc1 a Bill may not be'
referred to: Administrator-General of Bengal v. Prem
£al('). When construing section 68 of the Indian
Companies Act, 1882, the Privy Council in Krishna
Ayyangar v. Nella Perumal(') observed that no statement made on the introduction of the measure or its
discussion can be looked at as affordil).g any guidance
as to the meaning of the words. It is neither necessary nor profitable to go into the numerous decisiol).s
all of which it may be difficult to reconcile but it is
quite clear· from the decision of this Court in the
case of A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras(') that
the debates and speeches in the Legislature which
reflect' the individual opinion of the speaker cannot
Ghosh
and Another
v.
Arabinda Bo"
(1) (1895) 22 I.A. 107.
t~) (1920) 47 l.il,. 33·
(3) (1950] S.C.R. 88,
•
S.O.R..
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
77
1952
be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act
as it finally emerged from the Legislature and so the Aswini Kumar
debates must be left out of consideration.
•
Ghosh
The statement of objects and reasons attached to and Another
v.
the Bill only depicts the object which the sponsor of
Arnbinda Bose
the Bill had in mind, but it throws no light on and Another,
the object which the Legislature as a body had in
mind when passing the Bill into an Act. If I may
Das J.
borrow and adapt the felicitous language used by my
Lord the present Chief Justice in that case those
objects and reasons may at best be indicative of the
subjective intention of the Law Minister who sponsored the Bill but they could not reflect the inarticulate mental processes lying behind the majority
vote which carried the Bill. Nor is it reasonable to
assume that the minds of all those legislators were in
aecord. The first Privy Council decision referred to
above rejected any reference to the debates or the
objects and reasons. So did M. N. Mukherji J. in
Debendra Narain Roy v. Jogendra Narain Deb(1).
Referenc-e may also be made to Craies on Interpretation of Statutes, 5th Edu., at p. 1-23, regarding the
memoranda attached to the Bill. In my opinion it
is safer to follow the orthodox English view and
leave the objects and reasons out of consideration.
The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh points out
that in Gopalan's case (supra) this Court did look at
the original draft of what eventually became article
21 of the Constitution as throwing some light on the
construction of that article and urges that we should
look at the original Bill and draw appropriate inferences from the fact of the omission of clause (a) of
the proviso from the Act. What was looked at in that
case was the Report of the Drafting Committ@e appointed by the Constituent Assembly. That Report
was akin to a Report of a Select Committee made after
consideration of a Bill referred to it by the Legislature for consideration. In that Report the Drafting
Committee recommended the substitution of the expression "except according to procedure established
(r) (1936) A.LR, 1936 Cal. ,593 at p. 619.
II
78
·1952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
by law" taken from the Japanese Constitution for the
words "without due process.of law" which occurred in
•w•;~ 0 ,:ma• the Qriginal draft "as the former is more specific."
and Anotlie• The Drafting Committee further explained that they
v.
had attempted to make the fundamental rights conMabinda Bose !erred by the article in question and the limitations
and Anothe..! to which they must necessarily be subject as definite
Das J.
as possible since the Courts may have to pronounce
upon them. The Constitution as it was finally adopted
showed that the Constituent Assembly had accepted
the amendment suggested by the Drafting Committee.
The fact that the Drafting Committee was, in a sense,
the agent of the Gonstituent Assembly, and that the
amendment proposed by the Drafting Committee
was in fact adopted by the Constiiuent Assembly,
may conceivably lead to the inference that the
reasons given by · the Drafting Committee were
also accepted by the Constituent Assembly and
that the intention of the agent, the Drafting Committee, reflected the intention of the principal, the
Constituent Assembly. This, I apprehend, was
the underlying reason why the majority of this
Court expressed the view that the Report of the
Drafting Committee could be looked at as historical
material throwing some light on the question of construction of the article 21. That underlying reasoning
does not, however, apply to the present case. This
'Court, consistently with the principles laid down in
numerous judicial decisions, some of which I have
cited above, held that recourse could not be had to
the debates in the Legislature in construing the Act.
To keep out the debates which may, in some degree,
have disclosed the considerations operating on the
minds of the vocal section of the Legislature and the
intention with which they moved the amendment and
then to refer to the text of the original Bill and the
fact that some words or clauses thereof do not find a
place in the Act as eventually passed in order to
ascertain the state of mind of the members of the
Legislature who passed the Act will, to my mind, be
indicative of a mental process which call hardly be
A
.. K
s.C.R.
\
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
called logical. While, by reason of my utmost respect
1952
for my learned colleagues- who had pronounced upon A . -.the admissibility of the Report of the Drafting Com- swi~~~~mar
mittee, I feel pressed to adhere to and abide by the and An:ther
views expressed by them on that point, I am certainly
v.
not pre pared to go further and to extend the principle ArabindaBose
of that decision OU that question by permitting a and Another.
reference to the original Bill.
!)as J,
Assuming that the reasoning of the decision in
Gopalan's case(1) regarding admissibility of the Report
as an aid to construction may, in certain circumstances, be applicable to the original Bill, we have yet to consider whether in the case now before us the
original Bill should be referred to. In Gopalan's case(1)
Kania C. J. said at p. 110 :" 'rh·e report may be read not to control the
meaning of the articles, but may be seen in case of
ambiguity."
Again at p. 111 the learned Chief Justice stated:"Resort may be had to these sources with great
caution and only when latent ambiguities are to be
resolved."
In point of fact the learned Chief Justice did not
find the words of article 21 to be ambiguous so as to
require recourse to the Report of the Drafting Committee to ascertain the intention of the Constituent
Assembly. My Lord the present Chief Justice and Faz!
Ali J. and Mukherjea J. did refer to the Report. In the
view taken by Mahajan J. "it was .not necessary for him
to express any opinion on this instant problem. I did
not refer to the debates or to the Report of the Drafting
Committee and stated at p. 297 and at p. 823 that I
would express no opinion as to the admissibility of the
Report or the debates. It is, however, clear from the
passages I have quoted from the judgment of the
late Chief Justice. that the Report of the Drafting
Committee could be looked at only to resolve ambiguity and not to control the meaning of the article
if it was otherwise plain, for the inteution of the Constituent Assembly was to be gathered primarily from
(1) (1950] S.C,R. 88.
)
79
SO
SUPRJl]ME COURT REPORTS
t1953)
the words used in the Constitution. The question at
once arises: is there any ambiguity in section 2 as it
Asw';;; ~umar now s.tands which requires a reference to the original
a:nd _;::;lier Bill for its solution? Having regard to the state
v.
of the law as it existed before this Act was passed,
Arabinda Bos• namely, that by the rules of all High Courts an
and Another. advocate of one High Court could only "appear and
llas J.
plead" in another High Court if he could obtain the
permission of the Chief Justice of the latter Court,
the mischief that followed from these rules and was
unprovided for, namely, that even eminent advocates
. were not accorded such permission for no apparent
reason and the fact that the object of this Act, as
indicated in the full title and the non-obstante clause
in s.ection 2 was undoubtedly to remedy this defect.
So far as the Supreme Court advocates were concerned- all which circumstances are to be taken into
consideration in constrning an Act as stated in
Heydon's case (')-and finally the legislative practice
of using the words "to practise" in their ordinary
dictionary meaning, as I have explained already, I find
no ambiguity whatever in the operative part of section 2. 'l'he meaning and intent of the section appear
to me reasonably plain and I do not consider it necessary to have recourse to the original Bill at all to
ascertain the meaning and intent of the words used in
the section. It is wrong to imagine or create ambiguity and tben to call in aid the original Bill and to
speculate as to the intention.of the Legislature.
Again, assuming t-hat ·the original Bill has to be
looked at in ascertaining the meaning of section 2,
I do not derive any assistance from the mere circumstance that clause (a) of the proviso which appeared
in the original Bill does not find a place in the Act
as it finally emerged from the legislative anvil. The
mere fact that that proviso was omitted from the Act
as finally passed does not by any means lead us to the
conclusion t.hat the construction put upon the section
by the petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh must be
correct. There is no reason to assume that the
i952
.
.-·.-·
(1) (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7b,
{
'
-
S.C.R.
-·
....
•
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS
81
195!1
legislators read the words." to practise" as meaning
"to appear, act and ple:id". If they read the words to , -~x
mean ". to appear an d p1ea d"
. · on 1y, wh"IC h.is t h e amb"it aSW""
Ghoshumar
.
and scope of the profession of Supreme Court· advo- and Anothsi
cates under the rules of this Court and of the Original
v/
Side advocates of those two Hjgh Courts then, in so Arabi1<ila Boso
far as the proviso purported not to extend the appli..: •lid Another:
cation of the section to "acting" on the Original SideDas J:
it was wholly unnecessary and may have accordingly
been deleted as not being necessary. Further, if the
intention was to give the Supreme Co_urt advocates a
right to appear and plead only in any High Court
in any of its jurisdictions, then the proviso, in so far
as it purported not· to extend the section to··pleading
on t4e Original Side of those two High Courts, could
not be retained. If, therefore, the intention o_f the
operatfre part of the section was that the Supreme
Court advocate would have the right only "to appear
and plead", which is consonant with the functions of·
a Supreme Court advocate and also co~extensivewith
the rights of the Original Side advocates of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts under the rules, the
proviso had to be deleted in full and, therefore, no
argument can be founded on the fact ofsuch deletion.
We have, therefore, to construe the operative part of
the section by reference to the intention we can gather
primarily from the language used in the section and
other parts of the Act itself.
The Legislature "!hich enacted th~·. statute was·
well aware of the -state of the l{IW as embodied in the
rules of different High Courts preventing ari advocate
of one High Court from, as of right; "appearing and
pleading" in another· High Court cif which he was
not :in advocate. The mischief of withholding of the
permissicin by the Chief Justices on no better ground·
than the absence of recip.rocity between the High·,
Courts was notorious. The Act set out to remedy that·
mischief as is obvious from the full title and the iwn~
obstante clause in section 2 of the Act as I ha ye hereinbefore explained. ··It was known to the Legislature·
that an advocate was by Order[, rule 2, of the Supreme
\
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l1953]
\''
Court Rules defined as a person entitled only" to ap. .
pear and plead" before the Supreme Court, that under
A•w:;~ ~:'""' Order IV, rule 11, no person could appear as an advocate
••d A~•other unless instructed by an agent and that under Order IV,
v.
. _rule 30, such an advocate could in no circumstances
.frabinda Bosa "act" as an agent.
~n short, the Legislature knew
and Anotku. ·that the scope or ambit of the Supreme Court advoDa• J.
cate's profession·was only "to appear and plead".
\Vith all this knowledge the Legislature enacted section 2 authorising every advocate of the Supreme
Court "to practise as of right in any High Court". ·
Applying the dictionary meaning to the word.
"practise," the section authorises every Supreme Court
advocate "to exerci~e his profession as of right in any
High Court". The scope and ambit; of the Supreme
Court advocate's profession beingonly"to appear and
plead" there can be no escape from the -conclusion
that the section authorises the Supreme Court advocate only "to appear and plead" in any High Court.
The reasoning is the same as that adopted or involved
in the Patna case referred to above .. An advocate of
the Patna High Court was, under its rules, entitled
"to appear, act and plead" in that High Court.
When section 4 of the r,egal Practitioners Act
authorised such. advocate "to practise'.' in the subordinate Court it was held in the Patna case to mean
that the advocate could do all that he could do in the
High Court, namely, ''appear, act and plead''. The
words "to practise" were held to cover all these activities· not because those words had that invariable
meaning but because' those words had that meaning
only in relation to advocates who by the rule of the
High Courts were entitled "to appear, act and plead".
In short, the content of those words varies with tb.e
ambit and scope of the profession of the advocate with
regard to whom they are used. On a parity of reasoning, the Supreme Court advocate being entitled only ·
"to appear and plead'', when section 2 authorised him
"to practise" in any High Court, it must be taken
to have meant that he was authorised to do in the
High Courts all that he was entitled to do in the
19s1
...
..
S.O.R.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
83
1952
Supreme Court, namely, "to appear and plead" only.
This construction appeai:s to me to be quite logical and Aswini Kumar
calculated to give effect to the object of the Act. It
Gho•h
brings about a close approximation between the non- and Another
obstante clause and the operative part of the section
v.
which should be the aim of every well drawn statute. Arabinda Bose
It is asked: bow can a Supreme Court advocate, and Another.
who can only "appear and plead" when he is instructDas J.
ed by an agent, "appear and plead" in any High Court
where there are no Supreme Court agents to instruct
him ? This, in my opinion, is taking an extremely
narrow view of the matter. The Supreme Court advocate's profession being confined only to appearing
and pleading, when he is authorised "to practise'', i.e.,
to exercise his profession in any High Court, he must
carry with him his professional limitations but must
be governed by those rules of High Courts which
regulate the practice of advocates who can only'
"appear and plead" in the· High Courts, for he cannot practise in vacuo. Seeing that there are persons
authorised "to act" in every High Court who may
instruct another advocate, no practical difficulty can
arise in the way of the Supreme Court advocate
appearing and pleading in the High Court. Under
Ch. I, rule 38, of the Calcutta Original Side Rules a
Barrister advocate of any other High Court or an
Original Side advocate of Bombay is permitted to
"appear and plead" in the Origin?>! Side ofthe Cal' cutta High Court with the permission of the Chief
Justice. Surely, nobody has ever suggested that such
a foreign advocate must carry with him an instructing advocate or attorney of his own court who is
competent to act in order to instruct him when he
appears and pleads in the Calcutta High Court. He is
instructed by an attorney of the Original Side of the
Calcutta High Court without any difficulty. Same
remarks apply when an Original Side advocate of
Calcutta goes to appear and plead on the Original
Side of Bombay under Oh. I, rule 6, of the Bombay
rules, for surely such an advocate does not carry a
Oalcu tta attorne1 with him but is quite satisfactorily
84
1952
SUPREME COUR11 REPORTS
[1953]
instructed by a Bombay attorney. An Original
Side advocate of the Calcutta or Bombay High Court
.Aswini Kuniar
who
canuot appear on the Original Side unless inGhosh
and Another structed by an attorney can and frequently does appear
v;
and plead on the Appellate Side on the instruction of
A.rabinda Bose an advocate of the Appellate Side who being entitled
tlnd· AnoOier.
to act can instruct the Original Side advocate to
appear
and plead. · If we adopt this construction, the
Das J.
Act becomes workable, but if we adopt the construction suggested by the petitioner, then the Supreme
Court advocates practising in High Courts by virtue
of the Act will become freelances creating chaos and
confusion as I shall hereinafter more fully explain.
In my opinion there is no substance at all in this
objection of the petitioners.
It is next pointed out that the result of this construction will be to make the new right illusory in that
a Supreme Court advocate will not be entitled to
"act" even on the Appellate Side of a High Court
where he is not enrolled and such a result will militate
against the principle of the unification of the Indian
Bar. This objection is obviously based on the assumption that the object of this Act is to bring about such
a drastic and far-reaching result. There is no warrant
which I can see for any snch assumption. I have
already mentioned that the point of controversy on
this subject was that an advocate on the roll of one
High Court could not as of right "appear and plead"
in other High Courts bnt had to .depend on the .good
graces of the Chief Justices of snch other High
Courts who frequently withheld the requisite permission even to very eminent advocates. There was
hardly ever any claim made ·by an advocate of one
High Court "to act" as an advocate of another.High
Conrt of which he was not an advocate. 'rhe limited
object of this Act appearing from its fnll title and the
niJn-obstante clause as explained above was to remedy
only this particular defect by providing that an advocate of the Supreme Court would be entitled as of
right "to practise", i.e., exercise his profession, i.e., "to
appear and plead'', in any High Court even though
S.C.R.
,J
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
85
1952
he was not .on the roll of that High Court. 'rhis
certainly was au important step iu· the process of Aswi1ti Kumar
!:>ringing about uniformity in the Indian Bar, for it
Ghosh
did bring into being a category of advocates who and Another
might "appear and plead" in all Courts throughout
v.
India and form the nucleus of an all India. Bar. lVI ore Arabinda Bose
and Another,
than this was not within the scope and object of this
Act as I apprehend it. 'fo adopt a construction which
Das J.
will permit a Supreme Court advocate who is also
enrolled in the High Court of, say Travancore·Cochin
in t'he south or of the State popularly called Pepsu
in the north, to go and "act" in the Original Sides of
the High Court of Calcutta or Bombay which the
advocates of those High Courts cannot do, will lead
to no end of confusion as will be explained more fully
hereafter and that consideration alone should induce
me to discard the petitioner$' construction and adopt
a construction which will not give rise to practical
inconvenience.
It is pointed out that while this construction may
bring about a perfect i1pproximation between the nonobstante clause and the operative part of section 2 by
entitling only. fornign Supreme Court advocates "to
appear and plead" in any High Court as of right, it
runs counter to the conQluding words of the operative
part of section 2, namely, "whether or not he is an
Advocate- of that High Court", for, it is urged, those
words· clearly indicate that the section purports to
confer on a Supreme Court advocate the right to
practise not only in a High Court of which he is not
an advocate, but also to give him some right in relation to his own High Court. The Court below has
held that the words "whether or not" are not quite
apposite and that what was meant was that a right
was given to every Supreme Court advocate "to
practise" in any High Court even if he was not an
advocate of that High Court. In other words, the
Act itself gives a right to the Supreme Court advocate
to practise as of right in any High Court and that
being so it was immaterial to consider whether he was '
Rin advocate of a particular High Court or not, i.e.,
IZ
86
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
irrespective of his being or not being an advocate
of that High Court. I am inclined to agree with this
Aswini Kumar
view. Let . me, however, test the soundness of.
Ghosh
the petitioner on the
and Another the view propounded by
v.
strength of the words "whether or not etc." Take
Arabinda Bose the case of an advocate of the Madras High Court.
and Another,
Under the rules of the Madras High Court he is
entitled "to appear, act and plead" in all its jurisdicDas J.
tions. When such an advocate is enrolled as an
advocate of the Supreme Court, section 2. of the
Act, as construed by the petitioner, really gives him
no additional right in relation to his own High
Court, for already he, is entitled "to appear, act
and plead" there. That is the position also with
regard to the advocates of all High Courts, other than
the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay in the
matter of their right to practise in their respective
High Courts. Seeing that the advocates of 18 High
Courts did not in fact get any new right in their
respective High Courts, it cannot reasonably be said
that the object of the Act was to give any right to an
advocate of a particular High Court in respect of his
own High Court. It is pointed out that an advocate
enrolled on the Appellate Sides of the Bombay and
Calcutta High Courts is not, as of right, entitled to
appear, act and plead on the Original Side and the
object of the Act was to give those Appellate Side
advocates of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts
some additional rights in the Original Side of their
own High Courts. In view of the fact that the Act
gives no additional right to the advocates of any of
the. 18 High Courts in relation to their respective
High Courts it is difficult to imagine that the object
of'the Act was to bestow some special favours only on
the advocates of the Appellate Sides of the Calcutta
and Bombay High Uomts. 'l'herefore, it appears to
me that the words "whether or not etc." read in the
light of the purpose of the Act appearing from the
full title and the non-obstante clause only emphasise
that the object was to give the Supreme Court advocate a statutory right to practis~ in any High Court
1952
i
.
S.C.R.
i
SUPREME COURT R~jPORTS
81
1952
of which he was not an advocate, irrespective of his
other rights, if any. It is a new right given by tbe Aswini Kumar
Act proprio vigore to a class of foreign advocates.
Ghosh
Further, if the use of the words "whether or not etc." a11d A11other
v.
must necessarily mean that the object of the Act was
Arabinda
Bose
to· give a special right to an Appellate Side advocate
and Another.
of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts in relation
to his own High Court it does not necessarily follow
Das J.
that the words "to practise" must be given such a
wide meaning as would also cover acting, for if the
words "to practise" are read as extending only to
appearing and pleading, even then the App~llate
Side advocates of the Calcutta and Bombay High
Courts would get some additional right in their
own High Courts in that they become entitled by
virtue of their position as Supreme Court advocates
"to appear and plead" on the Original Side without
having to take steps under tbe respective rules of those
High Courts to entitle them to appear and plead on the
Original Side. In this view of the matter also the concluding words "whether or not etc." cannot affect the
construction put by me on the operative part of the
sect"ion.
Even if I am wrong in adopting the foregoing line
of reasoning, the petitioner will yet have to meet an
alternative construction which has commended itself
to the learned Judges of the High Court and my
learned brother Mukherjea, and which I am also prepared to accept as a cogent alternative. 'rhe Act
authorises every advocate of the Supreme Court as
of right "to practise " in any High Court .. The use
of the words "to practise " in relation to an advocate
clearly indicates that he is to exercise ·the profession
of an advocate. To exercise the profession of an
advocate in a High Court must involve the observance
of the rules of practice of that High Court. It is
urged that this construction amounts, in reality, to
adding words to the section, namely, "as an advocate
of that Court" or "according to the rules of that
Court." 'rhis contention is founded on a clear misapprehension, for I am really not adding anything at
88
SUPREME COURT REPOH1'S
[1953]
all but I am only stating what is implicit in the section as it stands. In other .words, I am construing
ASW>U•
uniar h
.
. .
.
Ghosh
t e wor ds o f t h e sect10n
an d ascerta111111g
its
true
•nd A>wther meaning and import.
'l'he necessary implication of
v,
the fact that the Supreme Court advocate is to exer. Arabinda Bose cise his profession in any High Court may well be
and Another. that he becomes entitled to do whatever an advocate
Das J.
of that particular High Court can do under the
rules of practice of that High Court. .Thus when
the Supreme Court advocate goes to practise in the
Appellate Side be will be entitled to act and plead as
an Appellate Side advocate does and when he goes
to prnctise in the Original Side he will only plead as
an Original Side advocate does and in either case he
must abide by the relevant rules, for he must prnctise
as an advocate of the particular High Court does,
namely, under and subject to the rules. · Nobody has
ever suggested that an advocate or vakil authorised
to practise in subordinate courts or in any otlier High
Court under section 4 of the Legal Practitioners Act
, was not bound by the rules of the Court where he
went to practise.
It is argued that the rules of the High Co1irts
of which the Supreme Court advocate is riot an
advocate cannot in terms apply to him when he
chooses to exercise the right given to him by the
Act, for those mies apply to the ad voe ates of those
High Courts. 'l'his again, I conceive, is taking a
narrow view of the matter. The rules of the High
Court certainly apply to the advocates entitled to
practise in that High Court and when an Act invests
an advocate, who is not an. advocate of a particular
High Court,· with the right to practise in that High
Court, for all intents and purposes such an advocate
becomes, as it were, a statutory advocate of that High
Court and as such becomes invested with the rights as
well as the obligations of an advocate of that Court.
In other words, the Act proprio vigore makes him a
person entitled to practise in that· Court and as such
amenable to and governed by all the rules applicable
to and regulating the practice of persons entitled to
1952
'
.. K
S.C.R.
\.
-
SUPREME COtJR'r REPORTS
89
1952
practise in that Court, except, of course, such of the
rules as are contrary to,· i.e., destructive of this new tlswini Kitniar
statutory right and which must, therefore, as r~ards
Ghosh
him, be deemed to be inoperative. Surely the Sup- and Another
v,
reme Court advocate cannot practise in vacuo. 'l'o
accede to the contention of the petitioner is to say Arabinda Bose
that a body of professional men, namely, thf) Supreme and Another;
Court advocates, have been let loose "to practise", i.e.,
Das J:
to "act and plead" in all High Courts in all their
jurisdictions untrame!led by any rules -0£ practice-a
proposition which, in my opinion, has only to be
. stated to be rejected. It is fraught with grave dangers and, at any rate, will inevitably lead to practical
inconvenience and to no end of utter confusion. If
that view were accepted the Supreme Court advocate
will be entitled to walk in and walk out of the High
Court in any' costume tha,t his fancy may choose.
He may throw to the winds the rules of precedence
of advocates including that of the Advocate-Genera!.
According to the ru !es of the Original Side of Calcutta
an attorney.is authorised to cause service of notice of
motion and chamber summons but the opposite party
will not be bound to accept service from the Supreme
Court advocate who is not so authorised. According
to the Calcutta Original Side rules an attorney is
personally responsible (or the requisition fees, deposition fees etc., but a Supreme Court advocate acting in the Original Side will not be so responsible
at all. Nor will the High Court be able to get at
the Supreme Court advocate to realise the fees if
he is not to be governed by the rules governing the
conduct of persons who act on the Original Side.
'fhe attorneys acting in the Original Side cannot
charge the client with a pice over and above the fees
prescribed in the rules of taxation as between attorney
and client but a Supreme C~rnrt advocate acting in
the Original Side, not being in terms bound by the
taxation mies, will be free to fleece the client to any
extent he can. The attorneys being officers of the
Court a.re under the rnlec; and the Letters Patent
amenable to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High
90
SDPREME-cOtJR11 REPOR'11 S
[1953]
Court but a Supreme Court advocate may with impunity snap his fingers at th-e High Court, for under
Asw•n•
· ·
· t s excep t sec t'ion 2 o f
Gh Kumar
h
no prpv1s10n
o f· 1aw as t· t ex1s
and A::ther the Act can the High Court exercise disciplinary
v.
jurisdiction on such advocates. It is unnecessary to
Arabi1<da Bose multiply instances of confusion.
This one consideraand Another. tion of iµconvenience and confusion is enough to
discard the construction sponsored by the petitioners,
Da.s J,
for the true rule of construction is that if two constructions are possible, that which leads to absurdity and
brings about practical inconvenience and encourages
confusion and chaos must be eschewed. Neither of
the two constructions suggested by me will have any
such consequence and either of them will make the
section workable in practice and at the same time
accomplish a considerable measure of unification of
the Indian Bar. The petitioners see the difficulty and
to get over it suggest that the Supreme Court advocate practising in a High Court will and can be bound
by the "Bxisting ordinary rules of practice except those
that prevent him from acting and pleading or that
the High Court may frame separate ru-les for the
Supreme Court advocates practising before them.
This very concession at once gives away the whole
case of tha petitioners .. As I have already stated
clause 9 of the Letters Pa tent empowers the High
Courts to approve, admit and enrol advocates, vakils
and attorneys and such advocates, vakils and attorneys
- I emphasisa the word " such "-are authorised to
appear in the High Courts and to plead or to act or
to do both according to the rules made by the High
Courts. 'l'he High Courts' rule-making power as to
enrolment of advocates, vakils and attorneys and their
respective functions and powers is thus quite clearly
confined to advocates, vakils and attorneys admitted
and enrolled by them and does not and cannot extend
to Supreme Court advocates who are not on their
rolls.· Section 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure
excludes the application of th·e rules of practice relating to advocates and pleaders from Original Side of
High Courts unless adopt'ed by them by rnles framed
1952
.-.-
./
-
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
91
1952
under the Letters Patent which, as already stated,
governs only their own advocates. The Supreme .{swini Kumar
Court of India, under article 145, can only make
Ghosh
rules for regulating generally the practice and· pro- and Another
v.
cedure of the Supreme Court including rules as to the
persons practising before it. That article does not Arabinda Bos•
authorise the Supreme Court to make rules regulat- and Anot her.
ing the practice and procedure of High Courts or the
Das J,
conditions subject to which thlll Supreme Court advocates may practise before the High Courts. The Act
we are considering does not confer any power on the
High Courts to frame rules subject to which the
Supreme Court advocates shall exercise in the High
Court their newly acquired statutory right under this
Act. The Bar Councils' rule;making power under
section 15 is limited o'nly to High Court advocates,
clause (b) having been su persed-ed by section 2 of
this Act. There is, therefore, no provision of law
except section 2 itself which will enable the High
Courts to prescribe any rules of conduct for the
Supreme Court advocates or to oblige them to conform to any rule of practice when they go to practise
in any High Court. Therefore, if we accept either
of the two com,tructions suggested by me it will prevent this absurd and undesirable result, for then the
Supreme Court advocates when they go to practise
in any High Court will appear and plead or, alternatively, do what an advocate of the High Court can
do, and in either case be subject to the relevant rules
by which the advocates of the particular High Court
are bound. If that were not the meaning of section 2,
then the Supreme Court advocates will be untrammelled by any rule of practice at all. Further, on the
petitioners' construction, even if the High Courts
have power to make rules with· regard to Supreme
Court advocates practising before them, any the
least obligation or restriction imposed by such
rules on the Supreme Court advocates by way
of making them personally liable for any fees
etc., or bringing them under the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Hi1:5h Courts will certainly be
92
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
challenged as-a fetter placed on.their statutory right
to practise in the High Com;t and as such not binding
Aswm•Kumar
th em. u·
I
Gh
on
.c• ma II y, t l1ere w1'11 b e · t wo se t so f rues,
1
and A~,:;her namety, the existing rules governing the attorneys
y.
who act on the Original Side and some new rules to
Arabinda Bose be made for the Supreme Court advocates who may
and Another. choose to act on the Original Side.
The resulting
creation
of
a
new
and
distinct
class
of
actors in the
Das .r.
Original Sides of the two High Courts will indeed be
a sad commentary on the supposed intention of the
Legislature to achieve uniformity and unification of
the Indi.an Bar. The petitioners' construction must,
therefore, be rejected.
·
It is next said that on this alternative construction
the rights of a Supreme Court advocate will vary from
High Court to High Conrt and' that will not be consistent with the policy of uniformity underlying the
Act. In the first place it is 'an assumption, without
any warrant, that the Act was out to achieve perfect
symmetry and uniformity of the kind which we may
consider desirable. Secondly, no ~erious inconvenience
will follow if the rights of a Suprnme Court advocate
vary from High Court to High Court. The status
and rights of advocates of different High Courts do
vary under their respective rnles and such variation
has existed for long time without any inconvenience.
This Act does not at all purport to eliminate those
differences amongst the advocates of the different
High Conrts which will yet continue. 1'he construction sought to be put on the section by the petitioner
Aswini Kumar Ghosh will, therefore, only create
fresh differences by bringing into being a new variety
of pra9titioners who will have yet different rigihts in
all the High Courts. On the other hand, the construction suggested above will cause the least·possible
inconvenience and at the same time remedy the longstanding grievance of advocates of High Courts on
account of the bar against their "appearing and
pleading" in High Courts of which they are not
advocates by authorising them, after being enrolled
i>s Snpreme Col1rt 11dvocates to do so as of right and
J952
. -.-
S.C.R·.
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
93
'
·r
_,
"
1952
without the necessitY, of their obtaining the sanction
of the Chief Justices of the High Courts concerned. Aswi.ni K·unia.-r
The Act permits a well defined body of professional
Ghosh
men, namely, the Supreme Court !Ldvocates, to tlxer- and A not her.
v.
cise the profession of an advocate in any High Court.
That this certainly was a forwarq step in achieving A.-abinda Bose
uniformity cannot possibly be denied. N otbing more and Another.
was within the purview of the Act as expressed in its
Das J.
full title and the non-obstante clause.
Finally, reference is made to the proviso as it now
appears in section 2 and it is claimed· that the word
"practise" in·tbe opemtive part of the section must
mean "appear, act and plead" because that word as
appearing in the proviso obviously has that meaning,
and reliance is placed on the rule of construction that
the same word should be given the same meaning
wherever it occurs in the Act. All that this proviso
says is that nothing in this section shall be deemed
to entitle a post-Constitution Judge who might be an
advocate of the Supreme Court to practise in a High
Court of which he was at any time a Judge, if he had
gi veu an undertaking not to practise there after
ceasing to bold office as such Judge. In other words,
all that the proviso does is to say that the right created
by the section sha 11 not extend to a Judge if he had
given an undertaking not to practise in that Court.
In the first place this proviso was wholly redundant
in view of the constitutional prohibition contained
in article 220. Further, the language of the proviso
is inept in that it seems to suggest that if such a
Judge had not given an undertaking he would be free
to praetise which certainly is contrary to article 220.
Finally, there is no difficulty in giving to the word
"practise" occurring in the proviso the same general
meaning given to that word in the operative part of
the section, namely, "to exercise the profession".
It is said that if the words "to practise" mean only
"to plead", then a post-Constitution Judge after his
retirement. would be entitled "to act" in the High
Gonrt of which he \Yas at any time a.Judge. There
is no force in this argument beca.use such a. Judge
J,
•
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953)
'
1952
will be prevented from acting aµd pleading anywhere
,
.~K
by virtue of the provisions of article 220 of the
aswm•
·
·r t 1·s, th ere f ore, no t necessary t o give
·
Ghoshumar Cons\1•t u t10n.
and Another the "7ord "practise" the wider meaning contended for
v.
by the petitioner Aswini Knmar Ghosh. We must
Arabinda Bose also remember that the general rnle relied npon may •
and Another. be excluded by the subject or context.
Das J.
For reasons stated above, whether we adopt one or
the other method of construction suggested above,
in my opinion, this petition cannot succeed and must
be dismissed.
·
.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the respondents: P. K. Bose.
Agent for Intervener No. 1: P. K. Mukherjee.
Agent for Intervener No. 2 : Sukiimar Ghose.
Agent for Intervener No. 3: I. N. Slirojf, for
P. K.Bose.
Agent for Intervener ·No 4: Rajinder Narain.
PALVINDER KAUR
v.
Oct. 22.
'I'HE STATE OF l'UNJAB
(RUF SINGH-Caveator)
(MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
and BHAGWATI JJ.]
Criminal trial-Circumstantial evidence-Duty of cou,rts to
safeguard themselves against basing decision on suspicions-Co1ifes·
sion-Must be accepted or rejected as a whole-Self exculpatory
state·ment containing admission of incriminating facts-Ad'1nission
of incriminating portion as true rejectiug exculpatory portion as false
-Legalit·y-Indian Penal Gode, 1860, s. 201-Essential ingredients
of offence.
In cases depending on circumstantial evidence courts should
safeguard themselves against the danger of basing their conclusions on suspicions howsoever strong.
Rex v. Hodge (1838) 2 Lew. 227, and Nargnndkar v. Slate of
Madhya Praclesh [19521 S.C,R, 1091 referred to.
.....
r
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org