STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND OTHERS versus THE BOMBAY CO. LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 October 1952 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1112 | 1952 INSC 42
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 October 1952
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, GHULAM HASAN
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 25/1952
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1112
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 42
Text of the judgment
1112
1952
Hanumant
v.
·Tlie State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahaian /.
1952
Oct. 16.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952]
The result is that the consolidated appeal is allowed,
the judgments of all the three courts below are set
aside and the appellants are acquitted.
r
Appellants acquitted.
Agent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56
of 1951 : Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57
of 1951 : Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.
'\
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
'
OTHERS
v.
THE BOMBAY CO. LTD.
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
ANOTHER
v.
MICHAEL FREDERICK AND BROS.
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
ANOTHER
v.
STAGBROOK RUBBER AND TEA
ESTATES LTD.
UNION OF INDIA, STATE OF BOMBAY,
STATil OF
STATil OF HYDERABAD, STATE OF PUNJAB,
STATil OF MYSORE, STATE OF 0RISSA AND STATE OF
UTIAR PRADESH-Interveners.
MADRAS,
[PATANJALI SAsrn1 C.J., MuKHERJEA, DAs,
VIVIAN BosE and Gnm.AM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, Article 286( I) ( b )-Sales tax-Exemp.
tion of sales in the course of export or import-Meant"ng of "in the
course of"-..'iolcs tvhel'e property passes and sale is co1nplete before
L
S.C.R.
"•
J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1113
goods move out of State, whether exempt-Interpretation of article
286 (!) (b)-Decisions on Commerce and Import-Export clauses
of American Constitution-Speeches of Members of Constituent
Assembly-Relevancy.
Whatever else may or may not fall within art. 286( 1) (b)
of the Constitution, sales and purchases which themselves occasion the export or the import of the goods as the case may be,
out of or into, the territory of India come within the exemption.
The view that no sale or purchase can be said to take place
in the course of export or import unless tho property in the goods
is transferred to the buyer during their actual movement, as for
instance, where the shipping documents are indorsed and
delivered within the State by the seller to a local agent of the
foreign buyer after the goods have been actually
shipped or
where such documents are cleared on payment, or on acceptance,
by the Indian buyer before the arrival of the goods within the
State, puts too narrow a construction upon art. 286(1)(b) and is
not correct.
A sale by export involves a series of integrated activities
commencing from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and
ending with the delivery of the goods to a common carrier for
transport out of the country by land or sea. Such a sale cannot
be dissociated from the export without which it cannot be
dtectuated an<l the sale and the resultant export form parts of a
single transaction. Of these two integrated activities which to·
gether constitute an export sale. whichever first occurs can well
he rer1rded as taking place in the course of the other. Even in
cases where the property in the goods passed to the foreign
buyers and the sales were thm completed, within the State before
the goods commence<l their journey from the State, the sales
must be regarded as having taken place in the course of the
c~port and therefore ,.,;empt under art. 286(1)(h).
The Commerce clause (article l, section 8(3)) and the
Import-Export clauses [article I, sections 9 (5) anJ 10 (2)] of
the American Constitution are widely different in language, scope
and purpose, .rnd a varying body of doctrines and tests have
grown around them interpreting, extending or restricting from
time to time, their operation and application in the context of
I he expanding American commerce and industry
and much help
qnnot be derived from them in the solution of the problems arising under article 286 of the Indian Constitution.
Speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly
in the course of the debates on the draft Constitution cannot be
used as aids for interpreting the Constitution.
Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem Nath Mullick [22
LA. 107 at 1181, A. K. Gopalan v. The State [(1950) S.C.R. 881,
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association [ 169 U.S. 290
at 318) referred to.
143
1952
State of
TravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
1114
1952
State of
Travancore·
Cochin
11nd Others
v.
TAc Bombay
Co. Ltd.
CIVIL
25 of 1952.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
APPELLATE
JuR1snicTioN : Civil Appeal
[1952]
No.
Appeals from the Judgment and Order dated the
10th day of January, 1952, of the High Court of
Judicature
of Travancore-Cochin
at
Ernakulam
(Kunhiraman C.J. and Subramania Iyer J.) in Original Petitions Nos. 4, 23 and 24 of 1951 respectively.
T. N. Subramania Iyer, Advocate-Genet',a/ of Travancore-Cochin, (T. R. Balakrishna Iyer and M. R. Krishna
Pillai, with him) for the State of Travancore-Cochin.
N. C. Chatterjee (C.R. Pattabhirainan, with him) for
the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1952.
C. R. Pattabhi112man for the respondent m Civil
Appeal No. 28 of 1952.
N. C. Chatterjee (Thomas Vellappally, with him) for
the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1952.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
C. K. Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India ( G. N. foshi,
with them) for the Union of India.
1952. October 16. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
PATANJALI
SAsmI
C.J.-These
arc
connected
appeals from the judgment and order of the High
Court of Travancore-Cochin quashing the assessments
under the United State of Travancore and Cochin Sales
Tax Act (No. 11 of 1125 M.E.) (hereinafter referred to
as "the Act"') on the respondents on the turnover of
the sales of the commodities ( coir products in C.A. 25,
lemon grass oil in C.A. 28 and tea in C.A. 29) in which
they respectively deal.
The dealings followed more or less the same pattern
in all the cases and consisted of export sales of the
respective commodities to foreign buyers on c.i.f. or
f.o.b. terms as the case may be.
The respondents in each case claimed exemption
from assessm<;nt in respect of the sales effected by
them on the ground, inter alia, that such sales . took
place "in the course of the export of the goods out of
the territory of India" within the meaning of article
....
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1115
286(1) (b) of the Constitution. The Sales Tax Authorities rejected the contention as, in their view, the
sales. were completed before the goo<ls were shipped
and could not, therefore, be considered to have taken
place in the course of the export.
Thereupon the respondents by separate petitions
applied t'O the High Court of the United States of
Travancore and Cochin (hereinafter referred to as the
State) under article 226 of the Constitution for issue
of writs of certiorari and prohibition quashing the
assessments made on them and
prohibiting such
The applications were heard,
assessment in future.
along with nine 9ther applications for similar reliefs
by dealers iri cashew nuts, by a Division Bench
(Khunhiraman C.J. and Subramania Iyer J.) who upheld the claim of exemption and quashed the assessment orders in respect of the transactions subsequent
to the commencement of the Constitution. From that
decision the State has preferred appeals in all the
cases on a certificate granted by the High Court under
article 132 ( 1) of the Constitution.
As the appeals involved important questions of law
which may have a bearing on the sales tax legislation
Qf the various States in India, this Court directed
notice of these proceedings to the Attorney-General
for India and the Advocates-General of those States,
and they have intervened and participated m the
debate at the hearing of these appeals.
When the argument had proceeded for some time, it
was discovered that the material facts relating to the
·course of dealings in cashew nuts, which were more
complex in character, had not been clearly ascertained
and consequently the relative appeals were remitted
to the High Court for findings on certain points
·agreed upon by the parties. These three appeals were,
'however, fully heard as they were found to admit of
·disposal on the materials on record.
Article 286(1), on which the respondents
their claim to exemption, runs thus :
found
1952
State of
TravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Patanjali
Sastri C. /.
1116
1952
State of
Travancorc·
Cochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Patanjali
Sastri C. /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the
imposition of, a t!lx on the sale or purchase of goods
where such sale or purchase takes place( a) outside the State; or
(b) in the course of the inwort of the goods into,
or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.
Explan11tion.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a),
a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place
in the State in which the goods have actually been
deliYered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for
the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating
to sale of goo<ls the property in the goods has by
reason of such sale or purchase passed m another
State.
On the scope and meaning of clause (b ), the learned
Judges expressed their view as follows :"The words 'in the course of' make the scope of
thi.s clause very wide. It is not restricted to the point
of time at which goods are imported into or exported
from India. The series of transactions which necessarily precede export or import of goods will come
within the purview of this clause. Therefore, while in
the course of that: senes of transactions, the sale has
taken place, such a sale 1s exempted from the levy of
sales tax. The sale may have taken place within the
boundaries of the State. Even then sales tax cannot
be levied if the sale had taken place while the goods
were m the conrse of import into lndia or Ill the
conrse of export out of India. We arc stressing
this point because both parties 111 what we may
describe as the cashew nut cases entered into a
lengthy discussion as to the exact point of time
when the sale became completed and as to the exact
place where the goods were when the sale became a
completed transaction."
On this interpretation, local purchases "made for
the purpose of export" were held by the learned Judges
to be "integral parts of the process of exporting". In
support of this construction the learned Judges referred
•
f
...
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1117
~ to the debates in the Constituent Assembly on clause
264-A of the draft Constitution which corresponded
to article 286 and quoted from the speech of one of
t the members who unsuccessfully moved an amendment defining export as meaning the last transaction
and import as meaning the first transaction.
In view of the wide construction thus placed upon
clause (b) of article 286 ( 1), the arguments before us
ranged over a large field, and as many as four different
':) views as to its scope and meaning were pressed upon
us for our acceptance :( 1) The exemption is limited to sales by export and
purchases by import, that is to say, those sales and
purchases which occasion the export or import as
the case mav be. and extends to no other transactions
-• however diiectly- or immediately connected, in intention or purpose, with such sales or purchases, and
wheresoever the property in the goods may pass to the
buyer. Thi~ is the view put forward on behalf of the
' State of Madras. The Advocate-General thought that
a State_ could not impose sales tax though title passed
within State limits while the goods were still under
• transport on the high seas and no question of exemption could •herefore arise. He said. however, that no
such case had actually arisen.
~
-
(2) In addition to the sales and purchases of the
kind described above, the exemption covers the last
purchase by the exporter and the first sale by the importer, if any, so directly and proximately connected
with the export sale or import purchase as to form
_) part of the same transaction. This view was sponsored
by the Attorney-General who was also inclined to
think, as advised at the moment, that sales or purt- chases made while the goods were on the high
seas
would be exempt, but he would prefer not to go into
the wider question,
because,
whatever view was
'\ taken, sales such as those involved m lhe present
-• cases must, in any event, be exempt.
•
(3) The exemption covers only those sales and
purchases under which the property m the goods
1952
State of
TravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Pataniali
Sastri C. /.
1118
1952
State of
T ravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Patanjali
Sastri C. /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952)
concerned is transferred from the seller to the buyer ('
during the course of the transit, that is, after the goods
begin to move and before they reach their foreign
destination. This view is supported by the State of •
Bombay and certain other States.
(4) The view which found favour with the learned
Judges of the High Court in the passage already ex- ~
tracted.
It will be seen that the construction first mentioned
1s the narrowest and the last mentioned the widest.
We arc clearly of op11110n that the sales here in
question, which occasioned the export in each case,
fall within the scope of the exemption under article
286(1)(b). Such sales must of necessity be put through
by transporting the goods by rail or ship or both out •
of the territory of India, that is to say, by employing
the machinery of export. A sale by export thus involves a series of integrated activities commencing
from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and ~
ending with the delivery of the goods to a common
carrier for transport out of the country by land or sea.
Such a sale cannot be dissociated from the export with- •
out which it cannot be effectuated, and the sale and
resultant export form parts of a single transaction.
Of these two integrated activities, which together
constitute an export sale, whichever first occurs can
well be regarded as taking place in the course of the
other. Assuming without deciding that the property
in the ·goods in the present cases passed to the foreign
buyers and the sales were thus completed within the /
State before the goods commence<! their journey a~ \.c..
founcl by the Sales Tax Authorities, the sales must,
nevertheless, be regarded as having taken place in the
course of the export and are, therefore, exempt under 1
article 286(1) (b ). That clause, indeed, assumes that
the sale had taken place within the limits of the State
and exempts it if it took place in the course of the (
·
export of the goods concerned.
In the foregoing discussion we have assumed that
the word "sale" used in the Constitution has the same
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1119
'"'\meaning as in the law relating to the sale of goods,
but it has been suggested in the course of the argument that it imports a wider concept than the passing
• of title from the seller to the buyer which under that
law is determined by highly technical rules based
upon the presumed intention of the parties and liable
to be displaced by their expressed intention. We
' leave the point open as it is unnecessary for the
purpose of these appeals to pronounce any opinion
upon it.
It was said that, on the construction we have indicated above, a "sale in the course of export" would
become practically synonymous with "export'', and
would reduce clause (b) to a mere redundancy, because
article 246 (1), read with entry 83 of List I of the
Seventh Schedule, vests legislative power with respect
.. to "duties of customs including
export duties" exclusively in Parliament, and that would be sufficient
to preclude State taxation of such transactions.
We
sec no force in this suggestibn. It might well be argued,
), in the absence of a provision like clause (b) prohibiting in terms the levy of tax on the sale or purchase of
• goods where such sales and purchases are effected
through the machinery of export and import, that
both the powers of taxation, though exclusively vested
in the Union and the States respectively, could be
exercised in respect of the same sale by export or purchase by import, the sales tax and . the export duty
being regarded as essentially of a different character.
A similar argument induced the Federal Court to hold
in Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons(')
that both central excise duty and provincial sales tax
could be validly imposed on the first sale of groundnut
oil and cake by the manufacturer or producer as "the
_. two taxes are economically two separate and distinct
imposts".
Lest similar reasoning should lead to the
imposition of such cumulative burden on the export"'-import trade of this country which is of great impor_w:ance to
the nation's economy, the
Constituent
ft\ssembly may well have thought' ;t necessary to exempt
J
(J) [1942] F.C.R. 90.
1952
State of
TravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Pataniali
Sastri C. /.
1120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
r
1952
in terms sales by export and purchases by import
from sales tax by inserting article 286 (1) (b) in the
State of
Constitution.
"Travancore~
Cochin
We are not much impressed with the contention t
.and Others
that no sale or purchase can be said to take place "in
v.
the course of" export or import unless the property
The Bombay
in the goods is transferred to the buyer during their
Co. Ltd.
4
actual movement, as for instance, where the shipping
Patan1ali
documents are indorsed and delivered within the State .
.Sastri C. f.
by the seller to a local agent of the foreign buyer after
the goods haYc been actually shipped, or where such ff
documents are cleared on payment, or on acceptance,
by the Indian buyer before the arrival of the goods
within the State. This view, which lays undue stress
on the etymology of the word "course" and formulates a mechanical test for the application of clause (b ),
places, in our opinion, too narrow a construction upon ~
that clause, in so far as it seeks to limit its operation
only to sales and purchases effected during the transit
of the goods, and would, if accepted, rob the exemption of much of its usefulness.
j
I
V'fe accordingly hold that whatever else may or may
not fall within article 286 (l)(b), sales and purchases
which themselves occasion the export or the import of
the goods, as the case may be, out of or into the territory of India come within the exemption and that is
enough to dispose of these appeals.
Our attention was called, in the course of the debate,
to various American decisions which hold that the
power "to regulate" inter-State commerce vested exclusively in the Congress by article 1 section 8(3) of;
the American Constitution (the Commerce clause) ex- \L
eludes by implication the States' power of taxation
only when the goods enter "the export stream", and
until then such goods form part of "the general mass .,
of property in the State" subject, as such, to its jurisdiction to tax, and that this principle was also applicable to cases arising under article 1 section 9(5) and/
section 10(2) (the Import-Export clause), [see e.g.,
Empresa Sidernrgica v. Merced Co.(1)]. These clauses{
t
(1) 337 U.S. 154.
S.C.R.
•
-.
•
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1121
are widely different in language, scope and purpose,
and a varying body of doctrines and tests have grown
around them interpreting, extending or restricting,
from time to time, their operation and application in
the context of the expanding American commerce and
industry, and we are of opinion that not much help
can be derived from them in the solution of the problems
ansmg
under article 286 of the Indian
Constitution.
It remains only ~o point out that the use made by
the learned Judges below of the speeches made by
the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course
of the debates on the draft Constitution is unwarranted. That this form of extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statutes is not admissible has been generally
.iccepted in England, and the same rule has 1been
observed in the construction of Indian statutes-see
Administrator-Genet<al of Bengal v.
Prem
Nath
Mallick(1). The reason behind the rule was explained
by one of us in Gopalan's case(2) thus :"A speech made in the course of the debate on a bill
could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of
the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate
mental process lying behind the majority vote which
carried the bill. Nor is it reasonable to assume that
the minds of all those legislators were in accord,"
or, as it is more tersely put in an American case"Those who did not speak may not have agreed with
those who did; and those who spoke might differ from
each other-United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Association (3)."
This rule of exclusion has not always been adhered
to in America, and sometimes distinction is made between using such material to ascertain the purpose of a
statute and using it for ascertaining its meaning.
It
would seem that the rule is adopted in Canada and
Australia-see Craies on Statute Law, 5th Ed., p. 122.
(!) (1895) 22 I.A. 107, 118.
(2) [ 1950] S.C.R. 88.
(3) 169 U.S. 290, 318.
1952
State of
TravancoreCochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Patanjali
Sastri C. ].
1122
1952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
In the result, agreeing with the conclusion of the
High Court, though on different grounds, we dismiss
the appeals with costs.
Appeals dismissed.
State of
Travancore~
Cochin
and Others
v.
The Bombay
Co. Ltd.
Agent for the appellants : P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the respondent in C. A. No. 25 of 52 :
M. S. K. Sastri.
Patanjali
Sastri C. /.
Agent for the respondent in C. A. No. 28 of
Sardar Bahadur.
52 :
Agent for the respondent in C. A. No. 29 of 52 :
V. P. K. Nambiyar.
.
Agent for the Interveners (Union of India, State
of Bombay, State of Madras, State of Hyderabad,
State of Punjab, State of Mysore, and State of Orissa) :
P. A. Mehta.
•
Agent for the State of Uttar Pradesh : C. P. Lal.
SHRIMATI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS
1952
v.
•
DISTRICT BOARD, SHAHJAHANPUR
Oct. 20.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, CHANDRASEKHARA
ArYAR and BHAGWATI JJ.)
U. P. District Boards Act (X of 1922), ss. 71, 90-District
Board-Dismissal of secretary-Resolutions far dismissal, and
suspension pending decision of appeal to Government-Validity of
suspension.
Section 71 of the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922, as amend~
cd in 1933 provided that a resolution of the Board for the dis~
missal of its secretary shall not take effect until the period of
one month has expired or until the State Government have passed orders on any appeal preferred by him. A District Board
passed a resolution for dismissal of its secretary and also for his
suspension till the matter oi his dismissai was deci<led unde:r
section 71 of the Act on an appeal if any preferred by the
secretary : H'lld, that under section 90 of the Act a secretary
could be suspended only as a punishment or pending inquiry or
(
~
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