HANUMANT versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 23 September 1952 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1091 | 1952 INSC 41
Key facts
- Decided
- 23 September 1952
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 56/1951
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1091
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 41
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1091
HANUMANT
1952
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.
Sepl. ZJ,
v
I
RAOJIBHAI
ti,
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BHAGWATI JJ.]
'
Criminal trial-Circumstantial evidence-Sufficiency of evidence for conviction-Caution against basing conviction on guess or
suspicion-Admission-Must be taken as a whole.
In dealing with circumstantial evidenee there is always the
danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal
proof. It is therefore right to remember that in cases where the
evidence is of a circumstantal nature, the circumstances from
which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first
instance be fully established and all the facts so established
should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency, and they should be such as to exclude
every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other
words; there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not
to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that
within all human probability the act must have been done by
the accused.
Reg. v. Hodge [(1838) 2 Lew. 227] referred to.
An admission made by a person whether amounting to a
confession or not cannot be split up and part of it used against
him. It must be used either as a whole or not at all.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JuRISDicTION
Criminal
Appeal No. 56 of 1951.
Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 9th March, 1950, of the High Court of
Judicature at Nagpur (C. R. Hemeon J.) in Criminal
Revisions Nos. 152 and 153 of 1949 arising out of
Judgment and Order dated the 24th March, 1949, of
the Court of the Sessions: Judge, Nagpur, in Criminal
Appeals Nos. 26 and 27 of 1949 and Judgment and
Order dated the 15th January, 1949, of the Court of
the Special Magistrate, Nagpur, in Criminal Case No. 1
of 1948.
15-1 O S. C. India 71
1092
1952
Hanumant
'v:"·
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh,
Sl]PRE!vfE COURT REPORTS
[19?2]
N. C. Chatterjee (B. Bannerjee and A. K. Datt, with
him) for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of
1951.
Bakshi Tek Chand (K. V. Tambay, with him) for the
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1951.
T. L. Shiv de, Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh
(T. P. Naik; with him) for the respondent.
1952. Sept. 23.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MAHAJAN J.-This 1s a consolidated appeal by
special kave from the two orders of the High Court of
Judicature at Nagpur passed on the 9th March, 1950,
'in Criminal Revisions Nos. 152 and 153 of 1949.
, On a complaint filed by the Assistant InspectorGeneral
of Police, Anti-Corruption Department,
Nagpur, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of
1951 . (H. G. Nargundkar, Excise Commissioner,
Madhya Pradesh), and tne appellant in Criminal
Appeal No. 57 of 1951 (R. S. Patel) were tried in the
court of _Shri B. K. Chaudhri, Special Magistrate,
Nagpur, for the offence of conspiracy to secure the
contract of Seoni Distillery from April, 1947, to March
1951 by forging the tender, Exhibit P-3A, and for
commission of the offences of forgery of the tender
(Exhibit P-3A) and of another document, Exhibit
P-24. The learned-Special Magistrate convicted both
the appellants on all the three charges. He sentenced
R. S. Patel to rigorous imprisonment for one year
under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs.
2,000, and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third
charges respectively.
The appellant Nargundkar
was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months
under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs.
2,000 and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third
charges respectively.
Each of the appellants appealed
against their respective convictions and sentences to
_the Court of the Sessions Judge, Nagpur. The learned
.Sessions Judge quashed the conviction of both the
appellants under the first charge of criminal conspiracy
under section 120-B, I. P. C., but maintained ~he
l
S.C.R.
.'
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1093
conv1ct1ons and sentences under section 465, I.P.C., on
the charges of forging Exhibits P-3 (A) and P-24. Both
the appellants went up in revision against this decision to the H'.1gh Court but without any success. An
application was then made under article 136 of the
Constitution of India for special leave to appeal and
this was allowed by this Court on 24th March, 1950.
The appellant, Nargundkar, 1s a member of the
Central Provinces & Berar Provincial Service and held
the substantive post of Deputy Commissioner for
several years. In April, 1946, he was appointed Excise
Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, and continued to hold
that office till tl.ie 5th September, 1947.
The appellant, R. S. Patel, is a sugar Technologist
and Chemical Engineer. He received his technical
education and practical trainirtg in America and after
working as Chief Chemist and General Manager in
factories in Madras for five years, came to the Central
Provinces m 1944, when the Provincial Government
gave him a licence to set up a distillery for the manufacture of industrial spirit.
On the 11th September, 1946, Nargundkar m his
capacity as Excise Commissioner invited tenders for
working the Government distillery at Seoni and supplying spirit to certain specified districts for a period
of four years from 1st April, 1947, to 31st March, 1951.
The last date for submitting the tenders was the 31st
October, 1946. In response to this tender notice, five
tenders were filed including those filed by ( 1) appellant,
R. $. Patel, (2) K. B. Habibur Rahman, (3) Zakirur
Rahman, and (4) Edulji P. Doongaji (P. W. 4), in
sealed covers with the Excise Commissioner on the
31st October, 1946, and he handed them over with the
seals intact to the office superintendent, S. W. Gadgil
(P. W. 13), for safe custody. Gadgil took them to
his room and kept them under lock and key in the
office safe.
The case for the prosecution 1s that on the gth
November, 1946, accused Nargundkar took these
sealed tenders home, that the tenders were opened b-y
him at his house, that the rates of the tender (Exhibit
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
1094
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
P-6) of E. J. Doongaji (P. W. 4) were divulged to
accused 2 (R. S. Patel), who was allowed to substitute
another tender (Exhibit P-3A), containing rates
lower than those of Doongaji, that thereafter these
open tenders were brought to the office on the 11th
November, 1946, and given to Amarnath (P.W. 20) who
was the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, for submitting a report and that on the recommendation of
Nargundkar the tender of accused 2 (Patel) was
accepted and the contract was given to him. In May,
1947, on receipt of. an application (Exhibit P-1) from
one Dilbagrai (P. W. 14), enquiries were started by
the Anti-Corruption Department.
Both the accused
became aware of the enqmry. In order to create
evidence in their favour they brought into existence
a letter (Exhibit P-24) and antedated it to 20th
November, 1946. This document was forged with the
intention of committing fraud and of causing injury
to, Amarnath (P. W. 20) and also to Doongaji
(P. W. 4). Exhibit P-24 is alleged to have been typed
on a typewriter (Article A) which was purchased on
the 30th December, 1946, by the National Industrial
Alcohol Co., Nagpur, of which accused Patel was the
managmg director. It was further alleged that the
endorsement made by accused 1 (Nargundkar) in the
said letter "No action seems necessary. File'', and
marked to Superintendent "S" was not made on the
21st November, 1946, which date it bears. This letter
was handed over by accused 1 to the Office Superintendent, S. W. Gadgil (P. W. 13) about the middle
of August, 1947, and thereafter accused 1 wrote a letter
(Exhibit P. 26), on the 2nd October, 1947, to Sri
S. Sanyal (P. W. 19) who was then the Excise Commi5.'ioner, requesting that this letter (Exhibit P-24)
and a note sheet (Exhibit P-27) be kept in safe
custody.
Both the accused denied the commission of the
offences of criminal conspuacy, forgery and abetment thereof.
Nargundkar denied having attended
office on the 9th November, 1946. He denied having
taken the tenders home.
According to him, the
tenders were opened by him in the office on the
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/
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1095
11th November, 1946.
Accused 2 denied that the
). tender of Doongaji was shown to him by accused
1 between the 9th and 11th November, 1946. He stated that the tender (Exhibit P-3A) was the original
t tender submitted by him on the 31st October, 1946.
As regards Exhibit P-24, it was denied that it was
fabricated or antedated. Accused 2 stated that it was
not typed on article A. He also alleged that the allegat tions made in exrubit P-24 were correct. Accused
' Nargundkar stated that the endorsement was made by
him on the 21st November, 1946. The first charge
..
having failed, nothing need be said about it herein.
In order to prove the second charge the prosecution
had to establish that Gadgil, P. W. 13, handed over
the sealed tenders on the 9th November, 1946, to
accused Nargundkar, that the latter took them home,
that between the 9th and the 11th November he met
Patel at his house or elsewhere and that accused
Nargundkar showed or communicated the particulars
of the tender of Doongaji to accused Patel who substituted Exrubit P-3A for his original tender before
)
the 11th November, 1946. Admittedly there is no direct
evidence to prove any of these facts except the first
one, and the nature of the case is such that recourse
could only be had to circumstantial evidence to establish
those facts. The fact that the sealed tenders were
handed over by Gadgil to accused Nargundkar on the
9th November has been held proved solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Gadgil as against the denial
of Nargundkar, Gadgil was himself a suspect in the
case. He was kept by the police away from the office
for alxmt eight months during the · investigation, he
I was asked to proceed on leave at the instance of the
police and ills leave was extended at their request.
On the expiry of his leave he was kept off duty
without salary for a period of about five months but
:.. later on he was paid his full salary after he had given
evidence in support of the prosecution. He made additions and improvements on vital points from stage to
,. stage of his deposition and in certain particulars his
-. statement was contradicted by Ramaswami, P. W. 30.
.•'~ On his ,own admission he is an accomplice in respect
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
'
.
1952
Hanumant
v.
The Stat.e of
Madhya
Pradesh.
,-.
Mahaian ].
1096
'
.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952)
of the forgery of Exhibit P-27, one of the documents
alleged to have been forged for purposes of. the defence ~, I
'
but concerning which no prosecution was started.
Exhibit P-27. bears date 31st October, 1946. Gadgil's
statement about it is as follows :
'
.
"He (Nargundkar) put down his signature and the
date 31st October, ,1946. This. order was actually written
by Sh. Nargundkar \n the note-sheet, Exhibit P-27, '
in the month of July or August, 1947. The dates were
antedated. In the margin of the note sheet I have put
down my .,initials S. W. G. and put the date 31st
...
October, 1946. This note-sheet was not prepared on
31st October, 1946. He asked me to keep it in my
custody."
The wit:lless admittedly became a party to the preparation of a forged document. Whether he was telling the truth, or he was telling a lie, as appears likely
from his cross-examination, he is in either event, not
a person on whom any relian.ce could be placed. It is
curious that this aspect of the evidence of Gadgil has
not been noticed by any of the three courts below.
When the ~ourt of first i~stance a~d the court of
appeal arnve .. ~t concurrent. findings of fact after believing the evidence of a witness, this court as the final
court does not disturb such findings, save m most
exceptional cases. But where a finding of fact is arriv~d at on the testimony. of a witness of. the character
of Gadgil and the courts below depart from the rule of
prudence that such . testimony should not be accepted.
unless it is corroborated by some other evidence on
the record, a finding of that character in the circum,
stances of a particular. case may well be reviewed even.
OU ,special leave if the other circumstances in the c;l.Se
require . it,, and sµbstantial and grave injustice has
resulted.. After £ully examining t;he material on tht;
record we have reached the conclusion that the courts
below were in error in accepting the uncorroborated
testimony of Gadgil to find . the. fact that he handed, ..
over the tenders . to Nargundkar. on . the 9tli .,
November, 1946. The witness was not allowed to live
ill a free atmosphere and was kept under poliC:e
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1097
surveillance during the whole of the period of investi·
gation and the trial and was rewarded with payment
of his full salary after he had given evidence to the
satisfaction of the prosecution. He ~s a person who
(elt no hesitation in deposing on oath that he willingly'
became a party to the forgery of Exhibit P-27.
t..
•
Assuming that the accused Nargundkar had taken
the tenders to his house, the prosecution, in order to
bring the guilt home to the accused, has yet to prove
the other facts referred to above. No direct evidence
was, adduced in proof of those facts. Reliance was
placed by the prosecution and by the courts below on
certain circumstances, and intrinsic eyidence contained in the impugned document, Exhibit P-3A. In
dealing with circumstantial evidence the rules specially
applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind.
In such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or. suspicion may take the place of legal proof
and therefore it is right to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson to the jury in Reg v. Hodge (1)
where lie said :"The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting
.circumstances to one another, and even in straining
them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts
of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the
mind of the individual, the more likely was ii:, considering such matters, to overreach and mislead itself,
to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for
granted some fact consistent with its previous theories
and necessa·ry to render them complete."
It is well to remember that in cases where the
evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circum~
stances from which the conclusion of guilt is fo be
drawn should in the first instance be fully established,
and all the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,
the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency and they should be such as to exclude every
hypothesis, but the one proposed to be proved.
In
(1) (1838) 2 Lew. 227.
1'952
Hanumant
v.
The State df
Maahya·
Pradesh;
Mahaian /.
1098
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
Hanumant
conclµsion consistent with the innocence of the accus.v.
ed and it must be such as to show that within all
The State of
Madhya
human probability the act must have been done by
Pradesh.
the accused.
In spite of the forceful arguments
addressed to us by the learned Advocate-General on
MahajiJ11 f.
behalf of the State we have not been able to discover
any such evidence either intnns1c within Exhibit
P-3A or outside and we are constrained to observe
that the courts below have just fallen into the error
against which warning was uttered by Baron Alderson
in the above mentioned case.
The trial magistrate was of the opinion that friendship between the two accused was of a very rapid
growth and that their relations were very intimate
and accused 2 was in a position to influence accused 1.
He thus found that there was motive for the commisThe learned Sessions Judge dission of the crime.
agreed with this finding and the High Court agreed
with the Sessions Judge on this point. It observed that
the evidence which tended to prove · friendship or
undue favour was not such as to form the basis for a
finding. It further found that there was nothing to
show that the appellant Nargundkar received any
illegal reward or the promise of one for showing
The first
Doongaji's tender to accused R. S. Patel.
circumstance therefore on
which the trial Judge
placed considerable reliance was negatived by the
court of appeal and in revision. It having been found
that there was no motive whatsoever for accused
Nargundkar to show the tenders to accused Patel and
to· take a substituted tender from him, the main link in
the chain of reasoning of the trial court vanishes.
Amiable relations between the two accused or their
official relationship could not be regarded· as sufficient
motive for committing the crime of forgery.
The mainstay of the prosecution case is the intrinsic
evidence of the contents of Exhibit· P-3A itself which
according to the courts below are unusual, peculiar
and strange and which according to the AdvocateGeneral could not be there if it was · a genuine
1952
,
~
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S.C.R.
f
·-
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1099
document. The argument would have force provided
the premises on which it is based are correct. Having
examined the contents of Exhibit P-3A, we do not
find anything very unusual or extraordinary in it
which could not be there without its author having
seen Exhibit P-6.
We now proceed to examine the s0-called peculiar
features m Exhibit P-3A. In order to appreciate the
points made by the learned Advocate-General it is
necessary to set out certain facts. Exhibit P-9 is the
notice calling for tenders for the supply of country
spirit in the Seoni distillery area.
The rates which
were called for by this notice were as follows :
1. Flat rate for four years.
2. Rates on sliding scale for four years,
3. All-in-rate on the sliding scale for one year
1947-48.
4. Flat rates on the basis of the price of mahua
flowers for three years 1948-51.
5. All-in-sliding scale rate on the basis of the price
of mahua flowers for three years 1948-51.
The trial magistrate held on a construction of it
that no rate or rates of separate years were asked for
in this notice and that one flat rate was only asked
Habibur Rahman and Zakirur
for, for four years.
Rahman in their tenders, Exhibits P-4 and P-5, quoted
one flat rate for four years and did not mention separate flat rates for separate years.
Doongaji m his
tender, Exhibit P-6, mentioned separate flat rates
for each separate year also. He did so because he
consulted one Mr. Munshi, Personal Assistant to the
Excise Commissioner, whether he should quote each
rate separately and Mr. Munshi told him that he could
give flat rate for the combined years as well as flat
rates and also sliding scale rates for each year separately.
Admittedly accused 2 was working as an
agent of Habibur Rahman and his son Zakirur
Rahman for the distillery contracts of Betul and
Seoni, and, therefore, he must have been the author
not only of his own tender but of the tenders submitted
bv Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman, Exhibits
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
llOO
1952
Hanumant
v.
The Stat~ of
Madhya
Pradesh,
Mahajan·/,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
P-4 and P-5. All of them were acting together with
the object of getting the contract though they were
submitting three separate tenders.
The trial magistrate held that as Habibur Rahman and Zakirur
Rahman gave one flat' rate for four years as called for by
Exhibit P-9, but accused 2, the author of all these
tenders, did not do it in Exhibit P-3A, but followed
the method of Doongaji in giving the rates of each
year separately as well as the rate for the combined
four years. He must have done so as he was shown the
tender Exhibit P-6.
The question arises whether the
circumstance that the accused Patel and Habibur
Rahman and' Zakirur Rahman were acting together
was such from which a necessary inference arises that
the accused Patel must have been the author
of all the three tenders and, if he were, that he
could not have departed from the method adopted
by him .in preparing· Exhibits P-4 and P-5 unless
and until he had seen Exhibit P-6. We are clearly
of. the opm10n that from the premises stated
this inference does not· necessarily follow. Doongaji
even . aft~r i;eadfr1g Eiil~ibii: P-9, could not make up his
mind whether to submit the tender with one flat rate
for all th~ four years or whether to submit it by giving
separate flat rates for .each of the four years and made
enquiry from .the office of the Excise Commissioner
and then quoted separate rates for each of the four years
separately also: Patel ~ho has admittedly considerable . experien~e ,of distillery contracts and about the
method. 0f submitting tenders might very well have
thought that it was best to quote a flat rate for all the
years as well as a flat rate for each year separately.
The circumstance that he did, not .do so in the other
two tenders prepared by him does not materially
advance. the prosecution case. . The very object of
submitting several tenders on behalf of three persons
acting. in unison was to indiCate to the excise authorities that they were being submitt,ed by three different
persons. If there . were no. variations whatsoever between tho;e tend~rs that woi'.il<l have ' defeated the ,/ery
purpose of submitting them.
Moreover,. a. variation
of this trifling nature between Exhibits P-3A and P-4
(
S.C.R.
f,_
)
SuPREME COURT REPORTS
1101
and P-5 cannot be said to be of such an unusual or of
such an extraordinary character as to warrant the
inference that it could not have been made except
without a look at the tender of Doongaji. The circumstance is of a neutral character and the trial magistrate
and the learned Sessions Judge gave undue importance to it being obsessed with the idea that such
'
a quotation' of flat rates for each year
could not be
mentioned in a tender by a contractor merely on a
construction of Exhibit P-9 and without any further
inquiry or without seeing the _tender of somebody else
who had followed that method.
The next <;ircumstance on which considerable reliance is placed is that accused 2 studiously maintained
rates below the rates of Doongaji throughout, that
when Doongaji lowered his rates for the second year
accused 2 did the same, and when Doongaji raised his
rates for the third and fourth years accused 2 also did
so, at the same time maintaining rates lower than
Doongaji's rat~s. , It is said that the system followed
by Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman and Patel
originally must have been the same as Patel was the
author of all the three tenders, that Habibur Rahman' s rates were higher .. than Zakirur Rahman's by
six pies and this variation was constant throughout,
that in Patel's original tender which must have follow~d the same. system his rates·. would be lower than
Habibur Rahman's by three pies throughout. Exhibit
P-3A, however, shows that this is not so.
Patel
abandoned . the system
when he . found that his
rates on his original scheme would be higher than the
~earned Advo~ate
corresponding rates of Doongaji.
General contended that it was impossible for Patel
unless he had seen Exhibit P-6, to quote rates of a
large number of items numbering about 197, in every
case lower than the rates given in Exhibit P-6 and the
circumstance that in not a single case. he has quoted a
higher rate than Exhibit P-6 is conclusive of the fact
that he had done so after he had seen Exhibit P-6. It
~as al.so said that there is no satisfactory explanation'
why Patel abandoned the scheme adopted by him in
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan J.
1102
1952
Hanumant
v.
Tht Stat• of
Madhya
Pradesh.
MahaJan /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
drawing up Exhibits P-4 and P-5 and his original
tender.
In our view, this circumstance again is not so
strange or peculiar as · was made out by the learned
Advocate-General or in the courts below. In the first
place, there is no material whatsoever for the assumption that the so-called original tender was drawn up
on the same scheme as Exhibits P-4 and P-5 or that
there was a constant variation in rates between it and
Habibur Rahman's tender.
It has been assumed on
!J1ere surmise that the first five rates in the tender,
Exhibit P-3A, are the rates that had been originally
quoted. The original "tender is not forthcoming and
there is no evidence at all about its contents. Moreover, in the deposition of Doongaji it was elicited that
in the year 1942 when tenders for the Seoni distillery
contract were called for, the rates quoted by Ratanshah were lower than his rates for all items. He, however, voluntarily added that Ratanshah obtained his
rates of the previous contracts before he submitted his
tender for the year 1942 and that he had made a
reduction of annas two to three in those rates but he
was forced to admit that the rate of Ratanshah in the
tender was not only lower than his but was also lower
throughout than ·the rates of Laxminarain, Haji Ismail
and Habibur
Rahman even without seeing their
tenders. From this statement it is quite clear that
even without seeing the tenders of different tenderers a
eontractor may quote rock-bottom rates of all items on
his own calculation or impelled by the desire of taking
the contract anyhow. We do not follow why Patel
could not do in 1946 what was done by Ratanshah in
his tenders in 1942 and quote rates lower in all particulars and regarding all items than the rates of Doongaji. If a person is out to give rockbottom rates and
his calculation is such that his rates work out lower
than tihe rates of others, it may well be that he may
.
quote lower rates in respect of all items.
It was then said that Patel had adopted a particular
plan in submitting the three tenders, . of himself,
Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman and that his
plan was that his rates should be l<Jss by three pies
(
S.C.R.
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f.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1103
1952
. than the rates he had quoted for Habibur Rahman,
that in the first five items of Exhibit 145 he stuck to
Hanumant
that plan and did not alter the rates of those items as
1'.
The State of
originally submitted by him, as those rates were lower
Madhya
than the rates of Doongaji but from the sixth item
Pradesh.
onwards he substituted new rates for the ones he had
originally submitted and he departed from the plan
Mahaian /.
so that his rates for each item were to be lower only by
three pies as compared with the rates of Habibur
Rahman.
It is no doubt true that Patel did not
adhere to the plan that he adopted in the first five
items of his tender but is that a circumstance
from which any inference can be drawn that the first
five items are a part of his original tender or that he
did so depart from them because he had seen Exhibit
P-6 and he wanted to underbid Doongaji. As we have
already said, the object of submitting three separate
tenders ostensibly by persons who were acting together
was to secure the contract in one or the other name
and Patel who was the author of all the three documents may very well in his own document have
quoted much lower figures than were quoted by
Habibur Rahman and Zakirur Rahman, in order
also to give the impression that all these tenders had
not been submitted by one and the same person.
Be
that as it may, a closer examination of the tenders of
Doongaji and
Patel
completely negatives
the
theory of the courts below.
The rates quoted
in the first five items of Exhibit P-145 are lower than
the rates of Doongaji by 102, 69, 18, 12 and 9 pies
respectively.
Even in the subsequent quotations
except in one case where the disparity in the rates of
Doongaji and Patel is only two pies, the disparity in
the rates is from 9 to 11 pies.
Patel is certainly a
businessman and the whole object of quoting the rates
was to earn the maximum profit. If he had seen the
tender of Doongaji he would have modelled the rates
in a manner that would give him the highest profit.
The learned Advocate-General could not suggest any
reason whatsoever why Patel would maintain his
quotation for the quantity of 50,000 gallons at
Rs. 2-10-6 when the rate of Doongaji was Rs. 3-3-0.
1104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•• ~
. i.
i ~
'j
-
•
.
~
[195~]
1952
,_,_
He, could easily raise the quotation to Rs. 3 and similarly
in all other cases he could have underbid DoonHanumant
gaji by 2, 3 or 6 pies at the most. He need not have
. v.
The State of
maintained a disparity of 9 to 11 pies between
' Madhya
his
rates and the rates of Doongaji.
In our
Pradesh.
opinion, therefore, no conclusion of any character
could be drawn from the disparity in the rates of
Mahajan /.
Doongaji or of Patel or of the expected uniformity in
the rates of Habibur Rahman or of R. S. Patel which
would establish that Exhibit P-3A had been prepared
by having a look at Exhibit P-6.
Another· circumstance on which reliance was placed
was that certain rates in Exhibit P-3A are lower than
the corresponding rates in Exhibit P-6 by only one or
two pies. There is no doubt that one or two rates are
lower by two pies than the rates in Exhibit P-6 but
'nothing follows from that innocent circumstance, unless one starts with a presumption of guilt. Once it is
assumed that the tender of Doongaji was shown to
Patel, all these circumstances might to some extent
fit in with the view that in certain respects it may
have been copied from Exhibit P-6. The courts below
fell into this error and departed from the rule that in
a criminal case an accused · person is to be presumed
to be innocent and that it is for thP. prosecution to
establish his guilt conclusively.
Next it was urged that in the covering letter
Exhibit P-3 sent by Patel he m·emions three appen·dices numbered 1, 2 and 3. The same expressioP. finds
place in the covering letter Exhibit P-4 of Habibur
Rahman and Exhibit P-5 of Zakirur Rahman, that
appendices 1 to 3 of the tender of Habibur Rahman
·and Zakirur Rahman correctly answer to the reference
in the covering letters but this is not so in Patel's
case; on the other hand, instead of appendix 1, Patel
has appendix l(a) and l(b) and the _number of his
appendices thus goes' up t<i four and this departure
from Exhibits P-4 and P-5 came about because of his
having seeri Exhibit P-6 and the number of appendices annexed to it. It was urged that 'the original
tender of Patel must ·have contained three appendices like· those of Habibur "Rahman amt
.' .
!
.
•
-
S.C.R.
-
SUPREME
COURT
.
. REPORTS
1105
Zakirur Rahman and not appendix l(a) and I(b) as
now found and that this circumstance showed substitution of the tender. The learned magistrate, in
our opinion, in giving importance to this circumstance mislead himself completely. In
the first
place, it is not accurate to say that the expression appendices 1, 2 and 3 was common to the
In Excovering letters Exhibits P-4 and P-5.
hibit P-5 the appendices are marked A, B and C.
Therefore, no uniform method was adopted by Patel
in marking the appendices to the tenders,
Exhibits P-4 and P-5. Secondly, there is no conflict in
the expression of the appendices of Habbibur Rahman
and Patel. They have been marked as 1, 2 and 3 and a
mere subdivision of the first appendix into (a) and (b)
could not be taken to be a departure from the method
It
adopted in the description of the appendices.
may further be observed that the covering letter
signed by Patel mentions four appendices, while the
covering letters of Habibur and Zakirur Rahman
only mention three appendices. The trial magistrate
as well as the Sessions Judge ignorc;d all these differences in the method of the description of the appendices and assumed that they had been uniformly
described.
The result therefore is that all these so-called
peculiar features found by the courts below in Exhibit P-3A should be eliminated from consideration
and it must be held that there are really no cucumstances inconsistent with
Exhibit P-3A
being a
genuine document.
It could have been made out
In this view of
without looking at Exhibit P-6.
the case the whole basis on which the judgments
of the courts below are founded vanishes, and
in the absence of any evidence of motive, we are of
the opinion that the facts did not on any just or legal
view of them warrant a conviction, and although the
proceedings are taken to have been unobjectionable
in form, justice has gravely and injurious1y miscarried.
We therefore set aside the convktion of both the appellants on the second charge and acquit them.
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
1106
1952
Hanumant
v.
The Stai. of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
In order to appreciate the third charge, it Is necessary to set out the terms of Exhibit P-24 which it IS
said was antedated in order tt> create evidence for the
defence of the accused and to miure Amarnath. It
is in these terms :
"
Congress Nagar,
Nagpur, 20th November, 1946.
The Commissioner of Excise,
C. P. & Berar, Nagpur.
Dear Sir,
I beg to submit few of my complaints for such
action as you may be pleased to take, which aie
as under.
I went to see Mr. Amarnath last week, at his residence in connection with Seoni Distillery work. I saw
Mr. Edulji and his partner with Mr. Amarnath in the
office room of his residence with some office files.
From the papers I could recognize my tender open on
the table in front of them. As soon as I went there,
all of them were astonished and they could not speak
with me for a moment, and then they carried on some
dry general conversation with me.
Same way after about a week, when I went to Seoni
for mahua bill, when Mr. Amarnath
visited for
sanctioning the advance, I had the opportunity to see
Mr. Amarnath in dak bungalow at about 9-30 p. m.
when I saw Mr. Mehta the ex-manager of Mr. Edulji
(who ii also the manager of Seoni Electric Co.) with
Mr. Amarnath near table with the same file of the
tender. No doubt after seeing the above two incidents I requested Mr. Amarnath to be fair in this
affair.
I am bringing these incidents to your notice, as I
fear that something underhand may not be going on,
and I am afraid that my tender may be tampered
with.
Hoping to get justice,
Yours faithfully,
Sd. R. S. Patel."
•
'
..
t
(
•
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S.C.R.
I
t
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1107
The words "Congress Nagar, Nagpur, 20th November, 1946" are in manuscr11pt, while the rest of the
letter has been typed.
The digit 6 of the year 1946
has been over-written on digit 7 written in continental
style and i't is apparent to the naked eye that originally the writer wrote 7 and subsequently changed it
to 6. It was contended by the learned AdvocateGeneral,-and this is the finding of the courts below,
-that this letter was written some time during the investigation of the case in July or August 1947, and
was antedated in order to implicate Amarnath and
to use it as evidence in defence. The point for decision is whether there is any evidence whatsoever to
establish this fact. We have not been able to discover any such evidence on the reconi; on the other
hand the instrinsic evidence in the letter proves that
most likely jn came into existence on the date It
bears. The relevant facts are that the tenders were
opened by accused Nargundkar on the 11th November, 1946, he handed them over after making the
endorsements to Amarnath and Amarnath had to
submit a report about them. It is alleged in thi~
letter· that "last week", i.e., during the week commencing on the 11th November, 1946, accused
Patel
went to see Amarnath and there he saw Edulji
Doongaji with him with his tender open on his table in
front of him and that he was astonished at it, that
about a week later he again went to Seoni and had
the opportunity to see Amarnath and Mr. Mehta, exmanager of Edulji Doongaji, was with him and the
tender file was lying there. It was stated that he had
requested Amarnath to be fair in this affair and the
Commissioner was asked that he should see that his
tender was not tampered with and he got justice. The
whole purpose and object of this letter was to protect
himself against any underhand dealing in the grant
ing of the contract. In his statement under section 342, Cr. P. C., Patel said that he saw Amarnatt
on the morning of the 15th or 16th November, 1946,
and he met Amarnath at Seoni at the distillery premises on the 16th November, 1946, and on the sam<!
16-10 S. C. India 71
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Prades/J.
Mahajan/.
1108
1952
Hanumant
v.
TheState of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1952]
day he met him at about 9 p.m. at: the Seoni dak
bungalow and that he agam met Him on the 17th
November, at 10 a.m. He also stabed that he had
gone to see Amarnath at his residence at Nagpur between the dates 12th and 18th November. It was contended by the learned Advocate-General that his
statement was inconsistent with the recitals contained
111
Exhibit P-24. We see nothing inconsistent between this statement and the recitals.
If accused
Patel saw Amarnath on the 12th, the letter having
been written on the 20th November, it would be quite
a correct thing to say that he saw him "last week"
and the next recital when he said that about a week
thereafter he saw him again is quite consistent with
his going and seeing him on the 16th or 17th November. That would be about a week after the first visit.
To draw any conclusion adverse to 'the accused from a
slight inaccuracy in the description of dates and to
conclude therefrom that it was established that the
accused Patel had seen Amarnath on the 9th November, 1946, amounts to unnecessarily
stretching a
point against the accused. The recitals m the letter,
true or false, are quite consistent with the letter
bearing date 20th November, 1946.
The magistrate
observed that the vagueness about the date and the
week shows that the allegations therein are not
correct. We have not been able to understand how
the vagueness about the date could lead to the conclusion arrived at. Emphasis was laid on the overwriting of the figure 6 over the figure 7 in the manuscript part of the letter. It was said that the normal
expenence is that it becomes a subconscious habit
•o automatically write the year correctly when several
months have elap~ed after · the change of the year
2nd that by sheer force of habit the correct year must
have been put down when the date was entered in the
letter Exhibit P-24 and that the figure was subsequently changed to 6 and this fact was an indication
tliat the letter was written some time in the year 1947.
In our view this argument again involves an element
'•
'
\_
S.C.R.
I
r
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1109
of conjecture.
The mistake may well have been
inadvertently made and the correction made there and
then. That such mistakes are not very uncommon
or unusual and occur in official documents is fully
established on the record, in para 93 of the judgment
of the learned Sessions Judge and it is said as
follows:
"The appellants have produced a file which is
Exhibit ID-35. It contains a sheet which bears pages 9
and 10. On the 10th page there are two office notesone is written by A. M. Naidu and the other by
the appellant Nargundkar.
A. M. Naidu below his
signature has written
'6-4-1948'.
The appellant
Nargundkar below his signature has written '6-4-1947'.
The other notes in the office file show that the
correct date of the two signatures was 6th August,
1947. Thus in this sheet there are two mistakes in
mentioning the number of the month and one mistake
in mentioning the number of the year. The appellants
contend that such mistakes are possible. Nobody can
deny that such mistakes are possible ; but it has to be
decided what inferences can be drawn from such mistakes, if there is other evidence also."
We have looked in vain for other evidern;e to prove
that the letter was not written on the date it bears.
Even Gadgil could not explain why he said that the
letter was written in July, 1946. It is clear that he
is not telling the truth in this respect. The endorsement made on the letter by accused Nargundkar
clearly bears the date 21st November, 1946, and if
this letter was not given to him on the date of the
endorsement and was given to him several months
afterwards he would in ordinary course have made
some note either on the letter or in the receipt register
of his office when that letter was received by him.
Then it was said that this letter was not in the file of
the tenders which were kept separate. The Commissioner had noted that the letter be filed and he sent it
to the office. If the office people did not put it in the
file, from that circumstance no adverse inference could
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pr.adesh.
Mahajan /.
lllO
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
be drawn as to the date that the letter bears. It is
clear that no forger would have in such a clumsy
manner corrected 1947 into 1946 so as to leave the
original figure "7" intact and thus leave evidence of
its suspicious character writ large on its face. There
was no hurry about it, and a second letter without the
alteration could easily have been typed.
Next it was argued that the letter was not typed on
the office typewriter that was in those davs, viz.,
article B, and that it had been typed on the typewriter article A which did not reach Nagpur till the
end of 1946. On this point evidence of certain experts
was led. The High Court rightly held that opinion of
such experts was not admissible under the Jndian
Evidence Act as they did not fall within the ambit of
section 45 of the Act. This view of the High Court
was not, contested before us. It is curious that the
learned Judge in the High Court, though he held that
the evidence of the experts was inadmissible, proceeded
nevertheless to discuss it and placed some reliance on
it. The trial magistrate and the learned Sessions
Judge used this evide1ice to arrive at the finding that,
as the letter wa~ typed on article A which had not
reached Nagpur till the end of December, 1946,
obviously the letter was antedated. Their conclusion
based on inadmissible evidence has therefore to be
ignored.
It was further held that the evidence of experts was
corroborated by the statements of the accused recorded under section 342. The accused Patel, when
questioned
about this letter, made the following
statement:
"Exhibit P-31 was typed on the office typewriter
article B. Exhibit P-24 being my personal complaint
letter was typed by my Personal Assistant on one of
the typewriters which were brought in the same office
for trial, with a view to purchase. As this was my
personal complaint no copy of it was kept in the Correspondence Files Exhibit P-34 and Exhibit P-35 just
:i
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1111
as there is no copy in these files of my tender Exhibit P-3A.......... In the month of September,
October
and
November, 1946, several
machines
were brought for trial from various
parties in our
office till the typewriter article A was purchased by
National Industrial Alcohol Ltd. Company."
r
If the evidence of the experts is elimimated, there is
no material for holding that Exhibit P-24 was typed
on article A. The trial magistrate and the learned
Sessions Judge used part of the statement of the
accused for arriving at the conclusion that the letter
not having been typed on article B must necessarily
have been typed on article A. Such use of the statement of the accused was wholly unwarranted.
It is
settled law that an admission made by a person
whether amounting to a confession or not cannot be
split up and part of it used against him.
An admission must be used either as a whole or not at all. If
the statement of the accused is used as a whole, it
completely demolishes the prosecution case and, if it is
not used at all, then there rema.ins no material on the
record from which any inference could be drawn that
the letter was not written on the date it bears.
For the reasons given above we hold that there is
no evidence whatsoever on the record to prove that
this letter Exhibit P-24 was antedated and ttl1at being
so, the charge in respect of forgery of this letter also
fails. Read as a whole, this letter cannot be said to
have been written with the intention of causing any
injury to Amarnath or for the purpose of creating a
defence in respect of the second charge.
The letter
read as a whole is an innocuous document and its
dominant purpose and intent was to safeguard the
interests of accused Patel and to protect him against
any underhand or unfair act of his ri!val contractors.
We cannot infer any intent to defraud or any intention
to injure Amarnath, though in order to protect himself
accused Patel maL!c certain allegations against him.
We therefore set aside the conviction of both the appeallants under the third charge and acquit them.
1952
Hanumant
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan/.
1112
1952
Hanumant
v.
·Tlie State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahaian /.
1952
Oct. 16.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952]
The result is that the consolidated appeal is allowed,
the judgments of all the three courts below are set
aside and the appellants are acquitted.
r
Appellants acquitted.
Agent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 56
of 1951 : Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 57
of 1951 : Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.
'\
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
'
OTHERS
v.
THE BOMBAY CO. LTD.
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
ANOTHER
v.
MICHAEL FREDERICK AND BROS.
STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN AND
ANOTHER
v.
STAGBROOK RUBBER AND TEA
ESTATES LTD.
UNION OF INDIA, STATE OF BOMBAY,
STATil OF
STATil OF HYDERABAD, STATE OF PUNJAB,
STATil OF MYSORE, STATE OF 0RISSA AND STATE OF
UTIAR PRADESH-Interveners.
MADRAS,
[PATANJALI SAsrn1 C.J., MuKHERJEA, DAs,
VIVIAN BosE and Gnm.AM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution of India, Article 286( I) ( b )-Sales tax-Exemp.
tion of sales in the course of export or import-Meant"ng of "in the
course of"-..'iolcs tvhel'e property passes and sale is co1nplete before
L
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