RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH versus THE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 May 1952 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1056 | 1952 INSC 27
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 May 1952
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR*
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 283/1951
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1056
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 27
Text of the judgment
1056
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1952
RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH
May 2, 5.
v.
[1952]
THE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER
(AND OTHER CASES)
[PATANJALI SASTR! C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA, DAs
and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]
Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
(I of 1951 )-Law for abolition of zamindaries and intermediate
tenures-Validity-Provision for compensation and public purpose
-Necessity of-Right of eminent domain-Jurisdictfrm of Court
to enquire into validity of Act-Constitution of India, 1950-Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B,
362; Sch. VII, List II, entries 18, 36, List l/l, entry 42-De/egation of legislative powers-Fraud on the Constitution-Spirit of the
Constitution-Meanings of "public purpose "law", "legislature" Compulsory acquisitiq_n of Crown grants, charities and private pro~
perty of Rulers under covena~t of merger-Legality.
11
,
(PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MAHAJAN,
and CHANDRASEKHARA
AtYAR
JJ.).-The
Uuar Pradesh Za1nindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950, is valid in its entir.ety. The jurisdiction of the court to
question its validity on the ground that it does not provide for
payment of compensation is barred by arts. 31(4), 31-A and 31-B
of the Constitution. The said Act is not a fraud on the Constitution ; it does not delegate essential legislative power to the
executive ; and is not liable to be impugned on the ground of
absence of a public purpose.
Held by the ·Full Court
MuKHERJEA,
DAs
Per MAHAJAN J.-(i) The expression "public purpose" is
not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning.
It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. The definition of the expression is elastic and takes its
colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying
with the time and the state of society and its needs. The point
to be determined in each case is whether it is in the interest of
the community as distinguished from the private interest of an
individual.
(ii) There, _is nothing in law to prevent the subject-matter
of a Crown grant being compulsorily acquired for a public pur~
pose and land held by the taluqdars of Oudh does not therefore
stand on a higher footing than that of other owners of Oudh.
(iii) Property dedicated to charity by a private individuals is
not immune from the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire
property for a public purpose.
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1057·
(iv) Recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution
when its provisions are explicit ; and when the fundamental law
has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the
general powers conferred on the legislature it is not proper to
~ deduce a limitation from something supposed to be inherent in
the spirit of the Constitution.
(v) The provisions of art. 31(2) do not stand repealed by
art. 31-A. On the other hand the proviso to art. 31-A keeps them
-> alive.
The only difference is that with regard to estates the
'-' President has been constituted the sole judge for deciding
whether a State law has complied with art. 31(2).
(vi) When a whole estate is being acquired and payment of
_...
compensation is based on the net income of the whole estate, it
cannot be said that the legislation is of a confiscatory character
merely because there are non-income fetching properties also in
the estate.
DAs J.-(i) The existeince of a public purpose and the
necessity for payment of compensation cannot be said to be an
inherent part of the spirit of any particular form of Government.
;, The Indian Constitution has in art. 31 (2) recognised these two
c
elements as a pre-requisite to the exercise of the po~rer of eminent
domain, and as the impugned Act has been expressly taken out
of the operation of those provisions, the question of invoking
any imaginary spirit of the Constitution cannot be entertained.
The invocation of such an imaginary spirit will run counter to
the express letter of arts. 31( 4), 31-A and 31-B. (ii) The claim
of the Rulers with regard to their private properties is not within
• art. 362; by offering compensation their ownership is recognised;
in any event, art. 362 imposes no legal obligation on the Parliament or State Legislature, and art. 363 bars the jurisdiction
of the court with respect to disputes 'arising out of covenants
of merger.
J
·
~
CIVIL APPELLATE
295 of 1951.
•
-t
JuRrsmcTION.
Cases Nos. 283
to
Appeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India from the judgment and decree dated 10th May,
1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
(Malik C. J., Mootham, Chandiramani, Agarwala and
Bhargava JJ.) in Writ Application Nos. 23, 25, 3330,
3329, 3331 and 3332 of 1951 and Miscellaneous Judicial <;ases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1951 and Civil Miscellaneous
Nos. 335, 340, 345 of 1951 (Luck.now Bench) and from
the judgment and order dated 9th July, 1951, of
Sapru and Agarwala JJ. in Writ Application No. 3403
of 1951.
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
1058
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
u. p.
and Another.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
The facts that gave rise to these appeals and petitions are stated in the judgment.
P. R. Das and S. K. Dar (B. Sen and Nanakchand,
with them) for the appellants in Cases Nos. 283 to
286, 289 and 290 of 1951.
B. R. Ambedkar and Bishan Singh for the appellants
in Cases Nos. 285 and 288 of 1951.
N. P. Asthana and (K. B. Asthana, with him) for
the appellants in Cases Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951.
Prem Mohan Varma for the
No. 295 of 1951.
appellants
in
Case
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
Kanhaiya Lal Misra ( Gopalji Mehrotra and Lakshmi
Saran, with them) for the respondents.
1951. May 2, 5. The judgment of the CHIEF JusncE
printed at pp. 893-916 supra covers these cases also.
MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA
ArYAR JJ. delivered separate jugdments.
MAHAJAN J.-These appeals under article 132(1) of
the Constitution concern the constitutionality of an
Act known as the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act (U.P. Act I of 1951), and fan
be conveniently disposed of by one judgment.
The appellants in most of them are owners and proprietors of extensive landed properties in the State of
Uttar Pradesh. Some of them are holders of estates
in Oudh under taluqdari sanads granted to their
ancestors by the British Government. H. H. Maharaja Paramjit Singh of Kapurthala, appellant in
Appeal No. 285 of 1951, is the holder of an estate in
Oudh, the full ownership, use and enjoyment of which
was guaranteed to him by the Government of India
under article XII of the Pepsu Covenant of Merger.
Appeals Nos. 291 to 295 of 1951 have been preferred
by religious institutions holding endowed properties.
On 8th August, 1946, the United Provinces Legislative Assembly passed the following resolution :-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1059
"This Assembly accepts the principle of the abolition of the zamindari system in this Province which
involves intermediaries between the cultivator and the
State and resolves that the rights of such int~rmedi
aries should be acquired on payment of equitable
compensation and that Government should appoint a
committee to prepare a scheme for this purpose."
•·
A committee was appointed to give effect to the resolution and to prepare the necessary scheme. It
made its report in July, 1948.
A Bill was introduced in the United Provinces Legislative Assembly
on the 7th July, 1949, was referred to a Select Committee which made its report on 9th January, 1950,
and was read before the Assembly for the first time
on 17th January, 1950. On the 21st January, 1950,
the Assembly was prorogued. It reassesmbled on the
2nd February, the Bill was reintroduced on the 7th
February, 1950, and was read for the second time on
28th July, 1950, and for the third time on 4th August
1950. On 6th September, 1950, it came before the
Legislative Council and the Council passed it with certain amendments on the 30th November, 1950. The
Legislative Assembly was prorogued on the 13th October, 1950, and in view of the amendments made in the
Legislative Council, the Bill was reintroduced in the
Legislative Assembly on 26th December, 1950, and
was passed in its amended form on 10 January,
1951. It was subsequently passed by the Legislative
Council and after having received the assent of the
President came into force on or about the 25th January, 1951.
The Preamble of the Act declares that"Whereas it is expedient to provide for the abolition of the zamindari system which involve.<i intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and the State
in the Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their
rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating
to land tenure consequent on such abolition and acquisition and to make provision for other matters
connected therewith."
13-10 S. C. India 71
1952
Raja SNriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahaian f.
1060
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and A nothcr.
Mahajan J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Sub-section (1) of section 4 provides that as from
such date as the State Government may by notification declare, all estates situated in the Uttar Pradesh
shall vest in the Sta~e free from all encumbrances.
"Estate" is defined in section 3 (8) as meaning "the .
area included under one entry in any of the registers
prepared and maintained under clause (a), (b), ( c) or
(d) of section 32 of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, or in the registers maintained under
clause ( e) of the said section in so far as it relates to a
permanent tenure holder and includes share in or of
an estate." Section 6 enacts that subject to certaii:
very minor exceptions, upon the publication of a notification under section 4, the rights, title and interest of
all intermediaries in everv estate in the area referred
to in the notification, and· in all sub-soil in such estates
including rights, if any, in mines and minerals, shall
cease and shall be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh
free from all encumbrances. The expression "intermediary" is defined in section 3(2) as meaning with
. reference to any estate, "a proprietor, under-proprietor,
sub-proprietor, thekadar permanent lessee in Avadh,
and permanent tenure-holder of such estate or part
thereof."
The intermediaries whose ;ights, title and interest
are thus acquired become entitled to receive compensation at eight times the net assets mentioned in
the Compensation Assessment Roll prepared in
;ccordance with the provisions of tl1e Act. The Act
further provides that the State Government shall pay
to every intermediary other than a thekadar, whose
estate or estates have been acquired under the Act, a
rehabilitation gram on a graduated scale provided
that the land revenue payable by such an intermediary does not exceed Rs. 10,000. The scale of the
grant is given in Schedule I. Save in the case of
wakfs, trusts and endowments which are wholly for
religious or charitable purposes, the highes• :inultiple
is for class paying land revenue up to !.<s. 25, the
multiple being twenty, while the lowest is for the class
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S.C.R.
.
J
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1061
paying land revenue exceeding Rs. 5,000, but not exceeding Rs. 10,000 when the multiple is one.
Part I of the Act includes provisions for the vesting
of all estates in the State, for assessment of compensation, for payment of compensation to all intermediaries and of rehabilitation grant to those of them
who pay Rs. 10,000 or less as land revenue and similar
matters. Part II deals with consequential changes
that become necessary by reason of the vesting of all
estates in the State and provides for the incorporation
in each village of a gaon samaj and the vesting of
certain lands in the gaon samaj ; it divides the cultivators into four classes, viz., bhumidars, sirdars,
asamis and adhivasis, determines their rights and
provides for the payment of land revenue; it further
contains provisions designed to prevent the fragmentation of holdings or their division into holdings of
uneconomic size, and to facilitate the establishment of
co-operative farms, and other similar matters.
The following provisions of the Act which came in
for severe criticism during the course of the arguments
addressed to us may be set out in extenso.
Section 6 (a) provides for the vesting in the State of
all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in
every estate in such area including land (cultivable or
barren), grove land, forests whether within or outside
village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village
abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, wells (other than
private wells in village abadi, holding or grove), tanks,
ponds, water channels, ferries, pathways, abadi sites,
hats, bazars and melas.
Clauses ( e) and (g) of this
section are in these terms : "(e) All amounts ordered to be paid by an intermediary to the State Government under sections 27
and 28 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934,
and all amounts due from him under the Land
Improvement Loans Act, 1883, or the Agricultural
Loans Act, 1884, shall notwithstanding anything contained in the said enactment, become due forthwith
and may, without prejudice to any other mode of
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahaian /.
1062
1952
~aia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
,.,.d Another.
Mahaian f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
recovery provided tharefore, be realised by deducting
the amount from the compensation money payable
to such intermediary under Chapter III.
(g) (i) Every mortgage with possessiop ex1stmg
on any estate or part of an estate on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall, to the extent
of the amount secured on such estate or part, be deemed without prejudice, to the rights of the State
Government under section 4, to have been substituted
by a simple mortgage ;
(ii) notwithstanding anything contained in the
mortgage deed or any other argreement, the amount
declared due on a simple mortgage substituted under
sub-clause (i) shall carry such rate of interest and from
such date as may be prescribed."
Section 7 saves certain rights at present held by the
proprietors from the purview of the Act. The rights
included are in respect of mines which are being worked
by the zamindars. Section 9 provides that private
wells, trees in abadi and buildings situate within the
limits of an estate shall continue to belong to or be held
by such intermediary. Section 10 makes every tenant
of land belonging to an intermediary and paying land
revenue up to Rs. 250, a hereditary tenant thereof
at the rate of rel).t payable on the date of vesting.
Section 12 gives the same privilege :to thekadars.
Similarly section 15 confers the status of hereditary
tenants on occupants of lands in which such rights did
not exist. Section 18 provides that all land in the
possession of intermediaries as sir, khudkasht or an
'intermediary's grove shall be deemed to qe settled by
the State Government with such intermediary etc.,
subject to the provisions of the Act and he will be entitled to possession of it as bhumidar thereof. Land
held by any person as a tenant is deemed to be settled
by the State Government on such person as sirdar.
Section 27 and 28 are in these terms ·"27. Every intermediary,
whose rights, title or
interest in any estate are acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be entitled to receive and be
paid compensation as hereinafter provided.
S.C.R.
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1063
28. ( 1). Compensation for acqms1t10n of estates
under this Act shall be due as from the date of
vesting subject to determination of the amount
thereof.
(2) There shall be paid by the State Government
on the amount so determined interest at the rate of
two and half per centum per annum from the date of
vesting to the date of(i) in the case of the amount to be paid in cash,
determination,
(ii) in the case of the amount to be given in
bonds, the redemption of the bonds."
Section 39 lays down the method of determination
of the gross income of the land comprised in a mahal,
while section 42 provides for the determination of the
gross assets of an intermediary. Section 44 lays down
the manner of assessing the net income of an intermediary. It provides as follows :"The net assets of an intermediary in respect of
a mahal shall be computed by deducting from his
gross assets the following, namely :
(a) any sum which was payable by hini in the
previous agricultural year to the State Government
on account of land revenue ............. .
(b) an amount on account of agricultural incometax, if any, paid for the previous agricultural year ....... .
( c) cost of management equal to 15 per centum of
the gross assets."
Provision has been made for the appointment of
assessment officers and for the preparation of draft
compensation assessment roll by them after hearing
objections. Right of appeal has also been provided
against their decision.
Chapter IV concerns itself with the payment of
compensation.
Section 65 of this chapter provides
that there shall be paid to every intermediary as compensation in respect of the acqui~ition of his rights,
title and interest in every estate the amount declared
in that behalf under section 60. Section 68 is in these
terms:-
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan/.
1064
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
"The compensation payable under this Act shall
be given in cash or in bonds or partly in cash and
partly in bonds as may be prescribed."
Section 72 empowers the State Government to make
rules on all matters which are to be and may be prescribed. Sections 113 and 117 provide for the establishment and incorporation of a gaon samaj and for the
vesting of all lands not comprised in any holding or
grove and forests within the village boundaries, trees,
public wells, fisheries, ·hats, bazars etc., tanks and
ponds in the gaon Mmaj, which is to supervise and
manage and control the lands subject to supervision
by the Government. Other provisions of the Act relate
to acquisition of bhumidari rights and of sirdari
rights by tenants, thekiadars etc., on payment of a
certain amount mentioned in the Act. A bhumidar
has the status of a peasant proprietor in direct
relation to Government and these agrarian reforms
contemplated by the Act aim at converting the
zaminclari tenure system into a ryotwari system.
The main questions for consideration 111 these
appeals are the following :validly
1. Whether the impugned
Act
was
enacted.
2. Whether thee acquisition of properties contemplated by the Act is for a public purpose.
3. 'Vhether the delegation of power in the various
sections of the Act is within the permissible limits.
4. Whether the taluqclari properties held under
"sanads" from the British Government can be the
'subject-matter of acquisition.
5. Whether the properties of the Maharajah of
Kapurthala in Oudh could in view of the article 12 of the
Pepsu Union Covenant be acquired under the Act.
6. Whether the said Act constitutes a fraud on
the Constitution.
The validity of the Act was attacked on a variety
of grounds by the learned counsel appearing 111 the
different cases and the grounds urged were by ne>
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1065
means uniform or consistent and ~me of these were
destructive of one another.
,
Mr. P. R. Das, who opened the attack, reiterated
the arguments he had addressed to us in the Bihar
appeals and urged that the obligation to provide for
compensation is implicit in the power conferred on
the State Legislature by entry 36 of List II with
respect to acquisitions, that the words "subject to the
provisions of entry 42 of List III" in entry 36 compel
the court to construe entry 36 of List II along with
entry 42 of List III and, when so construed, it is clear
that compensation has to be provided for whenever
power is exercised under entry 36, that there is no
provision for payment of compensation in the impugned Act, the
word
"compensation" meaning the
equivalent in money of the property compulsorily
acquired, that the U. P. Legislature had no power to
enact this Act without making provision for payment
of: compensation and in legal contemplation the Act is
lh>t law, that article 31 (2) confers a fundamental
right but has nothing to do with legislative, powers
which have been conferred by articles 245 and 246
read with the three lists, that: article 31(4) does not
in any way affect the rights conferred by article 31(2),
which exist notwithstanding article 31 ( 4), and it only
bars the remedy to challenge the Act on the ground
that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2), that
the Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution, and
lastly that the Act is void by reason of delegation of
essential legislative power.
On the question of the invalidity of tl1e Act for
want of a provision for payment of compensation,
Mr. P. R. Das reinforced his arguments by reference
to legislative practice in India and England and contended that even without any express provision for
compensation in the different enactments to which
our attention was drawn, the mere use of the word
"purchase" implied that compensation was a concomitant obligation of the exercise of the power to
compulsorily acquire
property.
For the reasons
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan f.
1066
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
given by me in the Bihar appeals I cannot accept this
contention. If the Constitution was silent on the
point and
provided for compulsory acquisition, the
position might have been different.
Mr. Dhar, who appeared ·in some of the appeals,
supplemented the arguments of Mr. Das on this
point. He contended that regarding half of the
properties acquired, the Act was a piece of confiscatory legislation as these properties were nonincome bearing, and that as regards the other
half, though compensation at eight
times the net
income is provided, it is a mere sham inasmuch as
the Act makes payment of compensation discretionary
at the will and pleasure of the Government; the provision being that Government will pay when it chooses
to do so and it may never make the choice. He further
contended that the provisions of the Act regarding
compensation are colourable because they completely
ignore the potential incomes of the zamindars, take
notice only of the income recorded in the khatuni
entries which do not include the sir income, and
acquire rent-free holdings and undeveloped mines
without any compensation, that the deduction of agricultural income-tax . from the gross-income was unjust
and the object of deduction was to artiiicially reduce
the net income, and the same procedure had been
adopted in the case of forests.
Dr. Ambedkar, who appeared m some of the
appeals, suggested a new approach for declaring the
Act to be bad.
He contended that qua "estates"
defined in article 31-A, Part I of the Constitution
should be deemed as repealed and struck off from the
Constitution. In deciding these appeals, therefore, we
are to look at the Constitution without the chapter on
Fundamental Rights ; but as the Constitution aims
at securing liberty and equality for the people and
gives only a restricted power to the State, the obligation to pay compensation when private property is
taken is implicit in the very spirit of the Constitution.
Mr. Das found the obligation to pay compensation
implicit in entry 36, but Dr. Ambedkar could not see
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S.C.R.
•
(
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
1067
eye to eye with him though he supported his contention by urging that the prohibition to acquire property
by legislation without payment of compensation was
implicit in the spirit of the Constitution.
Mr. Varma, who appeared in some other appeals,
supported Mr. Das's argument that entry
36
should be read subject to the provisions of entry 42
and further contended that the impugned Act
was the culminating point of a series of enactments
passed as a device to confiscate the properties of the
zamindars after the passing of the resolution in 1946
by the U. P. Legislature.
Having negatived the contentions of Mr. Das, I
cannot for the same reasons accept the contentions of
Mr. Dhar as sound. It is convenient now to examine
the point made by Dr. Ambedkar that the obligation
to pay compensation is implicit .in the spirit of the
Constitution. It is well-settled that recourse cannot be
had to the spirit of the Constitution when its provisions are explicit in respect of a certain right or matter.
When the fundamental law has not limited either in
terms or by necessary implication the general powers
conferred on the legislature, it is not possible to deduce
a limitation from oomething supposed to be inherent
in the spiirit of the Constitution. This elusive spirit is
no guide in this matter. The spirit of the Constitution
-cannot prevail as against its letter. Dr. Ambedkar
Telied on the observations of Nelson J. in People v.
Morris ('), quoted in the footnote, at p. 357 of Cooley's
Constitutional Limitation. The footnote states :"It is now considered an uni versa! and fundamental proposition in every well regulated and properly administered government, whether embodied in
a constitutional form or not, that private property
cannot be taken for strictly private purposes at all
nor for public uses without a just compensation; and
that the obligation of contracts cannot be abrogated or
essentially impaired.
These and other vested rights
of the citizen are held sacred and inviolable, even
(1) l3 Wend. 325.
-
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Annther.
Mahajan
J.
1068
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan
f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
against the plenitude
department."
of
power
of
the
[1952]
legislative
Those observations of the learned Judge, however,
do not lend support to the contention urged; on the
other hand, it seems to me that the proposition stated
by Dr. Cooley at page -351 (Vol. I) that the courts are
not at liberty to declare an Act void, because in their
opinion it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade
the Constitution but not expressed in words, has an
opposite application here. It is difficult upon any
general principle to limit the omnipotence of the
sovereign legislative power by judicial interposition
except so far as the express words of a written constitution give that authority.
The argument of Dr. Ambedkar cannot be accepted
for the further reason that it is based on an unwarranted assumption that qua the estates of the zamindars,
Part III of the Constitution stands repealed and is non
est. The truth is that Part III of the Constitution is
an importa11t and integral part of it and has not been
repealed or abrogated by anything contained in article 31-A of the Constitution ; on the other hand
article 31-A, while providing that no law providing
for the acquisition by the State of any estate, shall be
deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent
with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III, clearly
provides that where such law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not
apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for
the consideration of the President has received his
assent. This proviso in express term5 keeps alive the
alternative provisions of Part III of the Constitution
'm article 31 (3) for judging whether the State law has
or has not complied with the provisions of article 31
(2). The provisions of article 31(2), therefore, <lo not
stand repealed by article 31-A. On the other hand,
they are kept alive. The difference is that persons
whose properties fail within the definition of the
expression "estate" in article 31-A are deprived of
their remedy under article 32 of the Constitution and
•
•
S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1069
the President has been constituted the sole judge of
deciding whether a State Law acquiring estates under
compulsory power has or has not complied with the
provisions of article 31 (2). The validity of the law in
those cases depends on the subjective opinion of the
President and IS not justiciable.
Once the assent IS
given, the law is taken to have complied with the provisions of article 31(2).
..
It is true that the principles of payment of compen-
•
..,,
.
_.J
•
sation stated in the Act do not give anything like an
equivalent or quid pro quo for the property acquired
and provide only for payment of what is euphemistically described in the resolution of the U. P. Legislature as
"equitable
compensation".
Properties
fetching no income pass to the State without payment
of any separate compensation and as comprising part
of an estate which yields some net income to the
proprietor. According to the affidavit filed in the
Balrampur Raj case, actual income of Rs. 1,42,000
that the owner receives at present, works out to a sum
of Rs. 10,000 under the provisions of the Act and property worth several crores is being acquired for a mere
fraction of it~ true value.
Culturable waste which
for~ twenty per cent. of the entire area of the estate,
trees, sen:ral lakhs m number, water channels and
irrigation works etc., are being acquired along with
the cultivated lands and income-fetching properties
without :my separate provision for payment of compensation. But from those facts the conclusion cannot be drawn that the provisions as to compensation
in the Act are illusory.
In none of the cases could it be said that the provisions of the impugned Act would result m nonpayment of compensation. Great emphasis was laid
on the circumstance that nothing was being paid fornon-income fetching properties.
It has, however, to
be observed that these non-income fetching properties
are integral parts of
an esate as
defined m
article 31-A and it cannot be said when payment of
compensation is provided for on the basis of the net
income of the whole of the estate, that the legislation
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahaian /.
1070
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
is of a confiscatory character.
Different coruiderations might have prevailed if the estates as a whole
were not being acquired but different pieces of property were made the subject-matter of acquisiticn.
Properties comprised in an estate may be incomefetching and non-income fetching, the value of these
to the owner in the market may well be on the basis
of income and if the Act has laid down the principle
of payment of compensation on the foot of net income,
it cannot be said tha.t the kgislattion is outside the
ambit of entry 42 of List III.
Dr. Ambedkar frankly conceded that he was not
prepared to go to the length of contending that the
compensation ~provided for in the Act was illusory.
He, however, said that it was inadequate, whether
tested subjectively or objectively.
During the period
that the Balrampur Raj was under the supervision of
the Court of Wards, part of the property acquired was
purchased on payment of Rs. 24,09,705 fetching a net
income of Rs. 25,915. This property, however, under
the Act would be acquired on payment of Rs. 2,08,000.
Under the U. P.
Encumbered Estates Act the
Government itself had valued properties in various
places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act on
standard multiples, viz., from 37 to 20 times the net
income. Price of part of the property acquired on
this basis comes to Rs. 47,14,696, while compensation
according to the Act payable would be about onefourth of this amount. Be that as it may, article 31
(4) is a complete answer to all these contentions, as
held by me in the Bihar appeals. This Bill was pending in the legislature of the State on the 26th January,
1950, when the Constitution came into force and this
circumstance makes article 31 ( 4) applicable to all
these cases. It was contended by Mr. Varma that the
U. P. Assembly was prorogued on the 21st January,
1950, and the Bill was reintroduced on the 7th February, 1950, and on the 26th January, 1950, when the
Constitution came into force it could not be said to be
pending as it had lapsed. This contention seems to be
based on a misapprehension as to the provisions of the
•
•
~-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1071
Constitution Act of 1935 and the provisions of the
present Constitution. Section 73 of the Government
of India Act, 1931, and article 196 of the present
Constitution provide in unambiguous terms that a Bill
pending in the legislature of a State shall not lapse by
reason of the prorogation of the House or Houses thereof. In view of these clear provisions the content~on of
the learned counsel that the Bill was not pending on
26th January, 1950, has to be rejected. Further the
provisions of articles 31-A and 31-B completely shelter
this law from any attack based on any of the provisions
of Part III of the Constitution. This proposition was
not disputed. As the validity of the Act could not be
impugned on any of the provisions of Part III of the
Constitution, that was the reason why the attack on
its constitutionality was made on other groundsingenious but unsubstantial-lying outside the ambit
of Part III.
As regards the
contention that the provisions
with regard to payment of compensation would
result in non-payment of it as it is payable at the
pleasure of Government and the debts of the
zamindars are to be deducted out of it, my view is
that both these contentions are unsound.
Under
the provisions of the Act above cited, compensation
becomes, due on the date of the vesting of the estate.
Interest at two and a half per cent. runs from that
date and becomes payable forthwith.
Section 27 of
the Act makes it obligatory on the Government to
pay compensation. Section 65 in clear terms provides
that there shall be paid to every intermediary as compensation the amount declared in that behalf und_e.r
section 60. Section 68 gives option to the Government to pay compensation either in cash or in bonds,
or partly in cash and partly in bonds as: may be
prescribed. If the Government does not prescribe
anything, it is obvious that CClffipensation will be
payable forthwith.
If, on the other hand, Government makes any rules and prescribes that compensation will be payable at some remote time and not
within a reasonable period it will be open to the
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan /.
1072
1952
.Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
parties affected to challenge the validity of the rules
on the ground of abuse of power. These provisions,
however, do not vitiate the Act and affect its validity.
So far as the debts are concerned, they were payable
in certain instalments out of the income of the lands,
they have been made payable at once and provision
has been made that the amount be deducted from the
amount of compensation.
Instalments had been fixed
because of the fact that they were recoverable from
the income of the land. When the lands are converted
into money, it follows as a matter of course that the
right to recover the debts from the income of the
lands is transferred to the compensation money and
the provision
regarding instalments becomes
infructuous by the fact of acquisition. Dr. Ambedkar
further contended that in fixing the amount of compensation the State was a judge in its own cause and
this was against the spirit of the Constitution.
There
is no substance in this contention as the actual
amount of compensation is to be determined by the
compensation officer and his adjudication on the point
is subject to an appeal. Government is not the judge
of the actual amount of compensation. So far as the
law is concerned, it is the act o~ the legislature and
being within its competence, no challenge can be
made against the validity of the Act on this ground.
The question that the Act does no postulate any
public purpose and is
thus unconstitutional was
argued by Mr. Dhar and Dr. Ambedkar with some
vehemence and it was contended that there was no
public purpose behind this legislation. Mr. Dhar
urged that the sole purpose of the acquisition of
zamindars' estates was for increasing the revenues
of the State and for selling the intermediaries' interests
to private individuals, the intention being to make
money by trading activities and at the same time root
out the zamindars- who constitute one-fourth of the
population of Uttar Pradesh.
It was contended that
no community in Uttar Pradesh derived any benefit
from the provisions of the Act because the tenants
whose status was intended to be raised, had been given
•
•
·-
S.C.R.
•
,
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1073
sufficient relief
under statutes already passed and
what was humanly possible to do for them had been
done, that they were at present more prosperous than
the middle class: people and that the creation of a
classless society by destroying a class was not a public
purpose. Dr. Ambedkar on the other hand argued that
he would have been content had the State nationalised
the zammdaries because then the acquisition would be
for a public purpose, but as under the impugned Act
the State had merely constituted itself a trustee for
distribution of the intermediaries' interests amongst
I
"h ave nots ", t.e.,
.
th e "h aves " an d not amongst tie
amongst the bhumidars, sirdars, asamis and adhivasis
and not amongst the landless, the Act was not for a
public purpose at all but was an unfortunate piece of
legislation as property was being acquired for the
private benefit of persons and not for public use and
that giving of property to gaon samaj also could not
be held to be for public benefit or public use.
In my opm10n, as already stated by me in the
Bihar appeals, these arguments are unsound. The
expression "public purpose" is not capable of a precise
definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only
be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and ex,
clusion. In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in
which it occurs, the concept varying with the time
and state of society and its needs. The point to be
determined in each case is whether the acquisition is
in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual.
Prof. Willis has summarized the present position in
the United States on this subject, at pages 817 and
818 of his book, in these words :-
"What is public use ? On this question there have
been two view-points. One may be called the older
view-point and the other newer view-point.
According to the older
view-point, in order to have
a public use, there
must be the use by the
public . . . . . . . . . . According to the newer view-point there
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v•
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
1074
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
is a public use if the thing taken is useful to the
public. This makes public use for eminent domain
practically synonymous with public purpose for taxation and somewhat like social interest for police
power. Under this rule ·it is not necessary for the
benefit to be for the whole community, but it must
be for a considerable number."
•
The High Court took the view that acquisition of
property under compulsory powers for securing an
aim declared in the Constitution to be a matter of
State policy is an acquisition for a public purpose.
The following observations from the judgment of
Bhargava J. may be quoted with advantage:"The effect of the impugned Act is to vest the
ownership and control of a considerable part of the
material resources of the community in the State
Government ; .............. the vesting in the State of the
estate of the intermediaries is an indispensable preliminary to the pursuit of measures for the eradication
or mitigation of the principal causes of agricultural
poverty. Two of such measures are embodied in the
Act, which makes provision for three new classes of
tenure-holders, bhumindar, sirdar and .asami, "and for
t'll.e formation of co-operative farms.
The provisions
of Chapter VII of the Act, which depend in some
measure for their efficacy on the transfer of property
to the State effected by Part I of the Act, are clearly
directed
to the development of village self-government. It can, we think, be inferred from the Act that
the scope is given for more effective development of
the State's agricultural resources than is at present
possible. . . . . . . . . . . . . Reading the Act as a whole there ' .,.' "'-.,_ +. can, we think, be no doubt that the primary object of
the legislature is to effect a radical change in the
system of the land tenure now prevailing in this
State."
•
•
In my opinion, legislation, which aims at elevating
the status of tenants by conferring upon them the
bhumidari rights to which status the big zamindats
have also been levelled down cannot be said as wanting
•
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1075
in public purposes in a democratic State. It aims at
destroying the inferiority complex in a large number
of citizens of the State and giving them a status of
equality with their former lords and prevents the
accumulation of big tracts of land in the hands of a
few individuals which is contrary to the expressed
intentions of the Constitution.
Dr. Ambedkar combated this view and urged that
the expression "public purpose" was not a new
concept when the Constitution of India was framed ;
on the other hand, it had a settled meaning in the
past legislative history of this country and it must be
presumed that the Constitution used the expression in
the same sense in which it had been used in the earlier
Acts and in the Government of India Act, 1935, and
that it should not be construed in the light of the
directive principles laid down in Part IV of . the
Constitution. He contended that had the constitution, makers intended to give this concept a different
meaning than it had acquired in .the past, they would
have clearly given expression to that intention by
saying that the expression "public purpose" includes
purposes which aim at implementing the directive
' principles of State policy and that Part IV of the
Constitution merely contained glittering generalities
which had no justification behind them and should
not be taken into consideration in construing the
phrase "public purpose".
In my opinion, the contentions raised by Dr.
Ambedkar, though interesting, are not sound because
they are based on the assumption that the concept of
• public purpose is a rigid concept and has a settled
~ meaning. Dr. Ambedkar is right in saying that in the
concept of public purpose
there is a negative
element in that no private interest can be created
in the property acquired compulsorily ; in other
words, property of A cannot be acquired to be
given to B for his own private purposes and that
theI'C is a positive element in the concept that
the property taken must be for public benefit.
Both these concepts are present in the acquisition
l+-10 s. a. India 71
1952
Ra;a Suriya
Pal Singh
Y.
T lie State of
U. P.
Rnd A·notlier.
Mahaian /.
1076
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
~nd Another.
Mahajan /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Zamindaries are not being
of the zamindari estates.
taken for the private benefit of any particular individual or individuals, but are being acquired .by the
State in the general interests of the communit}'.
Property acquired will be vested either in the State or
in the body corporate, the gaon samaj, which has to
function under the supervision of the State. Tenants,
sirdars, asamis etc., · are already in possession of the
lands in which their status is to be raised to that of
bhumidars, Zamindars who are being reduced to the
status of bhumidrs are also in possession of the lands..
There is no question in these circumstances of taking
property. of A and giving it to B. All that the Act
achieves is the equality of the status of. the different
persons holding lands in the State. It is not correct
to say· that Government is acquiring the properties for
the purpose of carrying on a business or a trade. The
moneys received from persons
seeking bhumidari
status or from the income of zarnindari estates will .be
used for State purposes and. for the benefit of the community at large. For the reasons given above I hold
that the impugned Act is not void by reason of the
circumstance that it does not postulate a public
purpose.
As regards the question of delegation, our attention
was drawn particularly to the proviqions of sections 6
( e) and (g) and 68. These sections provide for the
prescription of the rate of interest by the executive
government on mortgages and they also authorize the
local government to determiille the period of redemption of the bonds and the fixation of the ratio between
payment of compensation in bonds and payment in
cash. In my opinion, the delegation is within the
permissible limits and does not amount to delegation
of essential legislative power. The main principles on
these matters have been laid down in the Act and
matters of detail have been left to the rule-making
power.
As regards the appeal of the Maharaja of Kapurthala (Appeal No. 285 of 1951), the facts are these: By
article 12 of the Covenant of Merger dated the ·5th
..
'\_ -
-
S.C.R.
'
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1077
May, 1948, entered into between the Rulers of the
States now comprised in the Pepsu Union, the properties which are the subject-matter of the appeal were
declared and guaranteed as the private properties of
the . Mararaja. The Maharaja was also guaranteed a
It was. suggested that
privy purse of Rs. 2,40,000.
the Maharaj:a accepted this sum which was smaller in
amount than what was allowed to other Rulers as
privy purse because he was assured of the income of
th.e Oudh estate. On these facts it was contended that
the impugned Act contravened the provisions of
article 362 of the Constitution inasmuch as it has not
paid due regard to the guarantees contained in article 12 of the Covenant. As already held by me in
the Madhya Pradesh
petitions, this contention is
devoid of force. The impugned Act has fully respected
the Covenant of the 5th May, 1948, inasmuch as it
has treated the Oudh estate as the private property of
the Maharaja as disitingui:shed from th~ State Properties
and it is on that basis that it has proceeded to acquire
it on payment of compensation.
The allegation that
the income of this estate was tlo supplement the privy
purse and that the appellant accepted a lower sum by
way of privy purse than given to the other ·Maharajas
has been denied by the Government and we see no
reason to hold in the asbence of any material to the
contrary, that this denial is not true. This Act, therefore,· constitutes no breach of the guarantees given in
article 362 of the Constitution. It was urged by the
learned Attorney-General that article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of this Court from going
into this question. Dr. Ambedkar, on the other hand,
contended that this article has no application because
of the fact that the Government of India was not a
party to this Covenant. As at present advised, I see
goOd deal of force in the point raised by the learned
Attorney-General. Not only did the Government of
India sign the Covenant as a guarantor but it also
signed it as a concurring party and that being so, the
provisions of article 363 seem to be altracted to the
case. The appeal of the Maharaja. therefore fails on
this point.
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
.v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan
f.
1078
1952
Raja Suriy«
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Mr. Bishan Singh, who appeared in Appeals
Nos. 284, 285, 288, 289 and 290, argued the special
cases of the taluqdars of Oudli. It was contended
that the taluqdars were absolute owners of these
holdings at the time of the annexation of Oudh in
February, 1856, that subsequently the British Govern•
ment under the directions of Lord Dalhousie tried
to take away the taluqdars' rights, but that after the
mutiny they were reinstated in their earlier status
and that status was reaffirmed by the enactment of
the Oudh Estates Act, I of 1856, that the permanent
and hereditary rights of the appellants under that
Act in the lands granted to them under the sanads
could not be affected by any legislation made by the
succes.sors in interest of the British Government and
that Government could not derogate from its grant. It
seems to me tl1at the lands held by nhe taluqdars
stand on no higher footing .than the properties of other
owners in Oudh. Be that as it may, the matter seems
to have been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakur fagannath.
Baksh Singh v. United Provinces ('). At page 119 of
the report it was observed as follows :"It is, however, desirable to examine the particular grounds on which it is sought to induce the
court to arrive at tliis paradoxical conclusion. Some
of these are said to be based on tl1e general principle of
law tliat tlie Crown cannot derogate from its own
grant, others are said to depend on particular provisions of the Government of India Act. It has not
been possible for tlie appellant to adduce any autliority for tlie principle involved. which tlieir Lordships
apprehend to be tl1at Parliament,. whether Imperial,
Federal or Provincial, in tlie absence of express prohibition, is debarred from legislating so as to vary
the effect of a Crown grant."
The Crown carmot deprive a legislature of its leg'islative authority by the mere fact that in tlie exercise
of its prerogative it makes a grant of land within tlie
territory over which such legislative authority exists
(1) [1946] F.C. R.111,
•
~'9
S.C.R.
I
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1079
and no court can annul the enactment of a legislative
body acting within the legitimate scope of its
sovereign competence. If therefore it be found that
the subject-matter of a Crown grant is within the
competence of a provincial legislature, nothing can
prevent that legislature from legislating about it, unless the Constitution Act itself expressly prohibits
legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally.
Dr. Asthana, who appeared in Appeals Nos. 291 to
294 of 1951, argued the case of the religious institutions. He contended that the properties held by these
institutions had already been dedicated for public
purposes, that the income of these properties was being
used for holding melas, feeding sadhus and other
charitable purposes and tihat any reduction in that income would adversely affect those institutions imd the
properties. that were already dedicated for public purposes could not be acquired under compulsory powers
of acquisition. The argument is fallacious. A charity
created by a private individual is not immune from
the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire that
It is incorrect to say
property for public purposes.
that the vesting of these properties in the State under
the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity
adversely because the net income that the institutions
are deriving from the properties has been made the
basis of compensation awarded to them.
Mr. Varma, who appeared in Appeal No. 295 of 1951,
raised several new and ingenious points, none of which,
however, he was able to substantiate. He contended
that the impugned Act may not be void but the
noti1ication which the Government was authorised
to issue under the powers conferred on it by the
statute would be void because the executive
government could not infringe fundamental rights
by a notification which remained unaffected by articles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-R The argument does not
seem to be valid because it suffers from the defect that
if the statute is good, the notification which is of a
consequential nature cannot be held to be bad. It was
. 1952
Raja Suriy•
Pal Singh
....
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
•
1952
R•i• Suriya
P•l Singh
.v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan . /.
1080
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
next contended by the learned counsel that the zamin-'
daw had vested rights in existing law, namely, the
Land Acquisition Act and the impugned statute could
not deprive them of the benefits of the provisions of
that Act. Similar argument was raised in the Bihar
appeals and for the reasons given therein it is repelled;
It was then contended that in view of the provisions
of the Religious Endowments Act, lands of religiowi
endowments could not be acquired under the provisions·
of the impugned statute.
This contention seems to
have been raised on some misapprehension as. to the
scope and extent of the
Religious Endowments
Act, XX of 1863. It is not. proved that that Act has
any application to the properties sought to be acquired
under the impugned Act.
Moreover, that Act only
deals with management of certain properties and does
not stand in the way of their acquisition.
;-.
.J
Great effort was made by Mr. Varma to establish
that the impugned Act was a piece of fraud on the
Constitution. It was contended that the U. P. Govern~
ment had been &ince a long time enacting laws with
the fraudulent intention of depriving the zamindars
of compensation by reducing their incomes,-he made
mention of half a dozen Acts that were enacted iri
U. P. prior to the impugned Act. The argument, to
my' mind, is based on a confusion of thought. The
enactments referred to were enacted by · the legislature
of U. P. ·between 1939 and 1949, before the Constitu'.
tion came into force, and have no Connection whatever with acquisition of properties.
Mr. Vanna attacked the validitv of section 340 of ,~ the Act which enacts that,
"where any orders had been made ................ or
jurisdiction exercised under the provisions of th/!
U. P. Agriculture Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges)
Act, 1949, the provisions· of· the said Act shall be so
read and construed as if the amendments mentioned
in Schedule IV had · been made thercin and were in
•
force from the commencement of the said Act'"
It wa~ contended that tpe U. P. Agriculture T~nants
(Acquisition of 'Privileges) Act, 1949, was an existing
....
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1081
law in U. P. and had not been repealed by the impugned Act and that being so, this Act could not validate
notifications made under that existing law. I have
not been able to see the force of this suggestion. Be
that as it may, the constitutionality of this section
does not affect the legislation as a whole. The
point was never raised before the High Court and has
no substance.
•
•
•
It was also contended that mere rights in land
apart from the lands themselves could not be acquired
uD:der compulsory power and that the U. P. Legislature
could not acquire proprietary rights in lands and
leave the bhumidari rights with the landlords. This
proposition sounds strange. It is open to Government to acquire the whole of the rights of an owner or
a ,part of that right.
Leasehold and other similar
rights can always be acquired and if a person owns
the totality of rights, it is not necessary to acquire
the whole interest of that person if it is not needed
for public purposes .
Lastly, it was urged that in truth the legislation in
question fell under legislative power conferred by
·entry 18 of List II and this power could only be exer.
cised subject to the freedom guaranteed by article 19(f)
of the Constitution, that the total abolition of the
zamindaris could not be protected by the · provisions
of clause 6 of article 19 in that it could not be regarded a reasonable restriction. on the exercise of the right
to hold property. . This argument lose.'l sight of the
fact that no help can be oought in these cases from
any of the provisions of Part III; moreover, the legislation in question has been enacted under legislative
powers given by entry 36 of List II and not under
entry 18 of that List. Mr. Varma raised some other
contentions also but during · the discussion he
eventually abandoned them.
,. ·' The result therefore is·· that there is no substance
in any one of the appeals and I ·would accordingly
dismiss a:ll of them. I would however, make no order
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Si11gA
v.
The State of
U. P.
find Another.
Mahajan J.
'
1082
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
tMld Another.
Das /.
.SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
as to costs in any of them in view of the peculiar circumstances of these cases.
The Constitution was
amended during the pendency of the litigation and
any costs allowed to the Government would further
'1"educe the inadequate compensation that the Government is paying for the acqwsition .of these estates.
MUKHERJEA J.-1 agree that these appeals should
be dismissed.
DAs J.-This group of appeals arises out of various
proceedings instituted in the High Court of Allahabad
under article 226 of the Constitution questioning the
validity of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U. P. Act No. I of 1951)
hereinafter referred to as The Act.
On 8th August 1946, the United Provinces Legislative Assembly passed a resolution accepting the.
princip1e of the abolition of the zarnindari system
in the 'Province involving intermediaries between the
cultivators and the State and reoolving that the rights
of· such intermediaries should be acquired on payment
of equitable compensation. To prepare the necessary
.scheme a committee, called the Zamindari Abolition
Committee, was appointed.
That committee submitted its r.eport in August, 1948, making various
recommendations which have been summarised ·by
Mr. S. K. Dhar appearing for some of the appellants·
as follows :(1) Abolition of zamindari on payment of Rs. 137
crores at 2i per cent. mterest ;
(2) Establishment of gaon samai;
.(3) Supply of rura:l credit by Government ;
('I) iintroduction of a modified form of peasant
proprietorship combined with voluntary co-oper:nivc
fanning;
(5) Introiluccion of a restricted form of 'land
lordism;
{6) Pr.ohibiting sub-letting and permitting alienation only to 'llhe extem .that the alienee will not get
more than 35 acres including n'is previous possessions.
'
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1083
To give effect to the recommendations of the committee a Bill which eventually became the Act was
introduced in the U. P. Legislative Assembly on 17th
July, 1949.
After having been passed by the U. P.
Legislature the Bill received the assent of the
President on 24th January, 1951. There is no dispute
in this case that the provisions of article 31 (3) have
been complied with. It is also clear, notwithstanding
that at one stage it was disputed by one of the learned
counsel evidently out of some misapprehension, that
the Bill was pending before the Legislature at the
commencement of the Constitution and comes within
article 31 ( 4) of the Constitution.
The title and preamble of the Act follow the wording of the resolution of the Legislature. The preamble
recites that it is expedient to provide for the abolition
-of the zamindari system which involves intermediaries
between the tillers of the soil and the State in the
Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their rights,
title and interest and to reform the law relating to
land tenure consequent upon such abolition and
:acquisition and to make a provision for other matters
connected therewith. The body of the Act is divided
into two parts, each part containing six chapters.
Chapter TI of Part I deals with acquisition ; Chapter
III with assessment of compensation and Chapter IV
with payment of compensation. Chapter V is concerned with rehabilitation grant, while Chapter VI deals
with mines and minerals. Chapter VII, which is in
Part II, deals with the constitution of gaon samaj and
gaon sabha, Chapter VIII relates to tenure, Chapter IX
to ·Adhivasis, Chapter X is concerned with land
revenue and Chapter XI with co-operative farms.
Chapter XII deals with miscellaneous matters. · Broadly
speaking, the Act provides for acquisition of the
interest of intermediaries for a compensation calculated at eight times the net income arrived at by deducting from the:. gross assets (which are the same as the
gross income) the Government revenues, cesses and
local rates, agricultural income"tax and costs of
management.
1952
Raia Suriy•
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Anothtl'.
Das /.
1084
1952
Rlli• Sun'ya
...
Pal Singh
The State of
U •.P.
1md Another.
Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952)
Before notification was issued by the State Government under section 4 of the Act, the intermediaries
filed petitions under article 226 of the Constitution
praying, inter aJia, for the issue of a writ in the nature
of mandamus or other appropriate directions, orders
or writs calling upon the State to forbear from giving
effect to or acting in any manner by virtue of or. under
the Act. By a judgment of a Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court delivered on 10th May, 1951, the
petitions were dismissed. The High Court, however,
certified; under article 132 (1), that the cases involved
substantial questions of law as to the interpretation
of the Constitution. The intermediaries accordingly
have come up on appeal before us.
Mr. P. R. Das who appears in support of several of
these appeals raises the same questions as were raised
by him in the Bihar appeals. Other learned counsel
appearing for the other appellants mainly supported
Mr. P. R. Das and also sought to reinforce. the appellants' cases on some additional grounds.
Mr. S. K. Dhar has taken us through the provisions
of the Act and drawn our attention to the facts and
figures appearing in the affidavit of Sri J. Nigam
filed in Appeal No. 285 of 1951 and the Report of
the Zamindari Abolition Committee. He has contended
that of the 20, 16, 783 zamindars in U. P. about
20,00,000 are tillers of the soil also; that one-fourth
of the cultivable lands is· with peasant proprietors and
the remaining three-fourths is with tillers who pay
rent to the zamindars. •Most of the tillers have OCCU'
pancy rights and cannot be ejected. Since 1947, the
Congress Government has carried out extensive
agrarian reforms ; the zamindars' profits have gone
down from 1108 crores in 1939-40 to 1,069 crores in
1945-46, that is to say, there has been a drop of about
39· crores ; cess has been raised by 27 lacs and incometax has been imposed to the exte,;t ·of about one crore
of rupees. The price of agricultural produce has gone
up by 400 per cent. so that the price ~f produce aggregates· to about rupees 851 crores while the rent payable by the tenants is only 17 crores. Therefore; it is
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1085
contended that there does not appear any essential or
urgent public purpose for which the impugned Act
was necessary at all.
Dr. Ambedkar appearing for the appellants in
Appeals Nos. 285 . and 288 of 1951 has addressed us
at length as to the meaning of the expression "public
purpose" as explained in various judicial decisions
and. text books. He has contended that it is wrong to
say that the Act proposes to acquire the zamindaries
for the State. What, he asks, is the destination of the
property acquired ? Under the Act the State assumes
the. function of a trustee for distributing the property.
The main purpose of the Act is to convert the tenants
The net result
into bhoomidars, sirdars and so on.
of the Act, according to him, is that the property of
the zarnindars is taken away and vested in the
tenants. He points out that the Act makes no prov1s1on for the landless labourers.
Dr. Ambedkar
maintains that this cannot be called "acquisition for
a public purpose". He submits that public purpose
must be distinguished from a mere public interest or
public ·benefit or public utility. He further contends
that the establishment of gaon samaj cannot be said
to be a public purpose.
As regards compensation Mr. Dhar points out that
in fixing compensation under Table A regard is to
be had only to income.
Non-income yielding property goes without any compensation, e.g., culturable
waste. In point of fact Government acquired a large
area of culturable waste at Rs. 300 per acre and yet
no compensation will be paid under the Act for culturable waste. Abadi sites also will bring no compensation. Even income yielding property, e.g., irrigation
works like 600 miles of canal in Balrampur and 14.J.!
miles in Bird estate, will yield no compensation
although the Government will get additional revenue
qut of them. Scattered trees in Balrampur alone will
The income of Seyer
coine up to 85,000 .in number.
property will only be taken :i.t the figure recorded iri,
Khataunis, although ii: is well-known that actual
Seyer and khud·
incomes are not recorded therein.·
Raia Suriya
1952
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
D•s f.
1086
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
.,,,j Another.
Das/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
khast were never assessed to revenue, but under the
Act they will be so assessed. No compensation is,
however, provided for the loss of status from Zamindari to Bhoomidari. Rent-free holdings granted by the
zamindar which at present yield no income are not
taken into account althougb there is always a possibility of tbeir resumption.
Agricultural income-tax is
rlcducted and forest is valued on an average of 20 t10 40
years' income although forest industry is of a very
recent growth. Finally, the income of mines is to be
computed on an average of 12 years' income. The
undeveloped mines or mines which have not started
yielding any income will not fetch any compensation.
These are, in short, the main objections of the landlords
as summarised by Mr. S. K. Dhar as to the method of
assessment of compensation. As regards the manner
of payment of compensation Mr. S. K. Dhar points
out that the Act does not really provide for payment
of compensation at all in the eye of the law. Under
section 68 no time is fixed for payment. It is left to
be prescribed by rules, but no rules have been made.
Compensation payable, say in 40 years or SO years or
200 years, may be a charity or a dole but is certainly
not compensation, prompt and certain such as is
·contemplated by the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Sweet v. Rachel (') and several other
•cases cited by him. He maintains that the compensation is illusory because-
(i) it is based not on the actual income but on
arbitrarily determined income ;
(ii) the determination of time and manner of payment is left entirely at the discretion of the appropriator, and
(iii) the source of payment is not the community
as a whole but the expropriated proprietors' own
property.
In my judgment in the Bihar appeals I have dealt
at length with the meaning of "public .purpose" and I
ha¥e also dealt with the question or compensation.
(I) 40 L. Ed. 188 at pp. 196-97.
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s.e.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1087
It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to reiterate the
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,principles as I apprehend them.
For reasons stated
by me in that judgment the impugned Act cannot be
questioned on the ground of ablience of a public purpose or absence of just compensation. If anything, the
public purpose in the impugned Act is much .more
evident and pronounced than it is in the Bihar Land
Reforms Act.
It is impossible to say that the impugned Act is not . a law with respect to principles on
which compensation is to be determined and the
manner of its payment. If the Government dpes not
prescribe how much of the compensation will be paid
in cash and how much will be paid by bonds as mentioned in section 18, the intermediaries will not suffer
because under section 65 their right will remain enforceable.
I have also dealt with the questions of fraud on the
Constitution and the improper delegation of essential
legislative power in my judgment in the Bihar
appeals and I need not repeat the answers given by
me. Suffice it to say that for reasons stated in my
judgment in the Bihar appeals the main grounds on
which the Act is impugned must be rejected.
Dr. Ambedkar has urged that the spirit of the
Constitution is a valid test for judging the constitutionality of the impugned Act. He maintains that our
Constitution being one for establishing liberty and
equality and a government of a free people it must be
held to contain an implied prohibition against the taking
of private property except for a public purpose and on
payment of just compensation.
The necessity for the
existence of a public purpose and for providing for
compensation are, as I have said in my judgment in the
Bihar appeals, provisions of article 31 (2) and, therefore,
it is not necessary to have recourse to any spirit of the
Constitution, for the letter of the Constitution itself requires the two requisites. Dr. Ambedkar, however,
argues that, so far as the appellants are concerned, Part
III of the Constitution does not exist and, therefore,
the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum does not
apply. I am not prepared to accept this argument u
1952
Raja Suriya
Pa/Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Das f.
1088
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1952
sound. It is true that. the appellants cannot question
the impugned Act on the ground that it is inconsistent ,
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conv.
ferred by any provisions of Part III, but this circum1."he State of
stance does not imply tha,~ Part IiI is wholly erased
U. P.
~f the Consti~tion. It exists for all other purposes.
out
1111d Another.
For instance, article 31-A protects a law providing foi:.
Das J.
acqui.-;ition by the State of any estate, but it does not
protect a law providing for acquisition by the State oc
any property which does not come within the expre~
sion "estate" as defined in that article. For all laws
for acquisition of all other properties Part III certainly
exists and if it is conceded that the provisions of
Part III exist in so far as such other laws are concerned
the provision of article 31 (2) requiring the existence
of a public purpose and the provision for compensation
must exclude any theory of the implied existence of
those two requirements. In the next place, the spirit
of the Constitution has to he inferred from some provi&ion, express or implied, of the Constitution. Mr. P. R.
Das based his argument on the implications to be
deduced from the language of entry 36 in List II and
entry 42 in List III. · Dr. Ambedkar, however, says
that it is not necessary for him to go to any entry at
all. He points out that the American Courts have
held that where in a Constitutlion there is a representative form of government in which there is liberty and
equality and when the government is a limited one such
a Constitution carries with it the implication that the
State cannot take private property except for a public
purpose and on payment of compensation. I find it
very difficult to accept this argument.
The existence
of a public purpose and the necessity for payment of
compensation have been insisted upon from very old
times when the
constitutions of governments in
different countries were entirely different from the
Constitution of the United States. It follows, therefore, that these two elements cannot be said to be an
inherent part of the spirit of any particular form of
government. Our Cons.titution has in article 31 (2)
recognised the · existence of the two elements as a
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1089
prerequisite to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The impugned Act having been expressly taken
out of the operation of those provisions, the question of invoking any imaginary spirit of· the Constitution cannot be entertained. Indeed, invocation of
such an imaginary spmt will run counter to the
express letters of articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B.
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Dr. Ambedkar appearing for the Maharaja of
Kapurthala, who is the appellant in Case No. 289 of
1951, has also raised the point that the private property of the appellant is protected by article 362 of
the Constitution and as the impugned Act does not
pay any regard to those rights , it is void. On 5th
May, 1948, certain covenants of merger were entered
into between the Rulers of seven Punjab States. {Jnder
article 12 of the covenant each Ruler is to be entitled
to the . ownership, use and enjoyment of all private
properties. A list was furnished to .the Rajpramukh
in which certain Oudh properties belonging to the
appellant were shown as his private property. ·The
appellant states that the amount of his privy purse
was fixed at a low figure in consideration of the
· income of the Oudh estate.
These allegations are
not admitted by · the respondents.
I have already
dealt with the correctness of a similar argument raised
by Dr. Asthana on behalf of the Ruler of Khairagarh
in petition No. 268 of 1951 which was concerned with
the Madhya Pradesh Act.
Shortly put, my view is
that this claim to the private property is not within
article 362, that by offering him compensation the Act
has recognised his ownership, that, in any event, that
article imposes no legal obligation on the Parliament
or the State Legislature and, finally, that article 363
bars the jurisdiction of this Court with respect to any
dispute arising out of the covenant of merger. Those
covenants were entered into by the seven Rulers and
the Government of the Dominion of India was a party
thereto in that it concurred in the covenants and
guaranteed the same.
In my opinion, for reasons
stated in my judgment in the Madhya Pradesh petitions, there is no s.ubstance in this point.
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Das /.
'il
1090
1952
Raja Suriya
Pa/. Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Das/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952]
Dr. Asthana appearing for certain religious institutions which are appellants in Appeals Nos. 291 to 294
of 1951 contended that their property already dedicated to a public purpose cannot be acq_uired for another
public purpose. I see no substance in this contention.
The property belonging to the religious institutions
will only change its form, namely, from immovable
property into money.
Certain subsidiary points raised by Mr. Bishun
Singh and Mr. Prem Manohar Varma have been dealt
with by my learned brother Mahajan J. and it is unnecessary for me to add anything thereto.
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In. my judgment, for reasons stated in my judgments in the Bihar appeals and the Madhya Pradesh
petitions and those mentioned above, these appeals
should be dismissed.
CHANDRASEKHARA
AYYAB.
appeals should be dismissed
costs.
J.-I agree that the
without any order ·as to
Appeals dismiSS1:tl•.
Agent for the appellant : S. S. Sukla.
Agent for the respondents: C. P. Lal.
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