VISWESHWAR RAO versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 May 1952 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1020 | 1952 INSC 26
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 May 1952
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 166/1951
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1020
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 26
Text of the judgment
1020
1952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
VISWESHWAR RAO
v.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(AND OTHER CASES)
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]
Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates,
Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act (l of 1951)-Law for abolition of
proprietary estates and tenures-Compensation inadequate-/urisdiction of Court to inquire into validity of Act-Right of eminenr
tiomain--Necessity of provision for paynlent of compensation and
public purpose-Spirit of Constitution-Delegation of legislative
potuers-Fraud on the Constitution-Passing of Bills-Certificate
of Speaker that Bill was passed-Conclusiveness-Omission to note
on record that Bill was passed-Effect-Reserving law for astent
of President~Governor's signature to Bill, whether necessary-"Law", "Legislature", "Public purpose" f'eanings of-Compulsory
Requisition of 1nalguzari villages, and property set apart as private
property of ~"ler under covenant of merger-Legalit}'-Constitution
of India, 1950-Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B, 362, 363.
Held by the Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MAHAJAN,
DAs and
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR JJ.)-The
Madhya. Pradesh
Abolition of
Proprietory
Rights (Estates,
Mahals, Alienated Lands), Act (I of 1951) is valid in its entiret"
In view of the provisions contained in arts. 31(4), 31-A an.1
31-B of the Constitution the court has no jurisdiction to enquire
into an objection to the validity of the Act ·on the ground that
it drxs not provide for adequate compensation. The Act does.
not involve any de:legation of legislative powers and the provisions relating to compensation therein are not a fraud on the
Constitution.
•
•
MoKHERJEA,
Held also, that the certificate of the Speaker on the original
Bill when it was submitted to the President for his assent, th~t
the Bill was passed by the House was conclusive proof that the
Bill was passed, and the mere fact that there was nothing on the
record of the proceedings to show that the motion that the Bill
be passed was voted upon and carri,,d, as required by rule 20( l)
of the Rules of Procedure, could not invalidate the Act.
Per
PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.-In any case, the omission to put the
motion formally to the House, even if true, \Vas, in the circun1stances no more thap_ a mere irregularity of procedure as it was
not disputed that the overwhelming majority of the members
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1021
present were in favour of carrying the motion and no dissentient
voice was actually raised.
Held further, (i) that though art. 31(3) speaks of a "law"
being reserved for the consideration of the President; the
Constitution does not contemplate that before submitting a Bill
which has been passed by a Legislative Assembly for the assent
of the President, the Governor should give his assent to it;
(ii) that the President can perform both the duties entrusted
to him under art. 200 and art. 31(3) and (4) at one and the same
time; he need not give his assent twice, once to make the Bill a
law under art. 200 and then give his assent oncei more in order to
make the law effective against art. 31 (2); the word "Legislature"
used in this connection in art. 31 ( 4) means the House or Houses
of Legislature and does not include the Governor;
(iii) that though malguzari villages are not included in the
expression "estate" as defined in art. 31-A, art. 31-B (which is
not merely illustrative of art. 31-A, but an independent provision)
validated the Act even in respect of rnalguzari villages, and
since art. 31 ( 4) is not limited to "estates" its provisions also
saved the law in its entirety;
(iv) Article 362 does not prohibit the acquisition of properties set apart as private properties of a Ruler by a covenant
of merger.
Per MAHAJAN and DAs JJ.-In any event, the jurisdiction
of the Court to decide disputes which arise out of a covenant of
merger was barred by art. 363.
PETITIONS under article 32 of the Constitution of
Indi;i for enforcement of fundamental rights.
(Petitions Nos. 166, 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, 257, 268, 280
to 285, 287 to 289, 317, 318 and 487 of 1951). The
facts which gave rise to these petitions and the arguments of counsel are stated in the judgment.
B. Somayya (V. N. Swami, with him) for the
petitioner in Petition No. 166 of 1951.
N. S. Bindra (P. S. Safeer, with him) for the
petitioner in Petition No. 317 of 1951.
V. N. Swami for the petit10ners in Petitions
Nos. 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, . 280 to 285 of 1951, 257
and 287 to 289 of 1951.
K. B. Asthana for the petitioners 111 Petition
No. 26 of 1951.
S. N. Mukherjee for the petitioner in Petition
No. 318 of 1951.
1952
Viswcshwar R11Q
v.
The State of
Madhj'a
Pradesh.
1022
1952
Viscueshtvar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
M. N. Jog for the petitioner in Petition No. 487
of 1951.
T. L. Shivde (Advocate-General of Madhya
Pradesh), with T. P. Naik for the respondent.
1951. May 2, 5, The judgment of the CHIEF JusTICE
printed at pp. 893-916 supra. covers these cases also.
MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR JJ. delivered separate judgments.
l
MAHAJAN J.
Petition No. 166 of 1951.
This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India by Shri Visweshwar Rao, zamindar and
proprietor of Ahiri zamindari, an estate as defined in section 2(3) of the Central Provinces Land
Revi;nue Act, II of 1917, and situated in tehsil
Sironcha, district Chanda (Madhya Pradesh), for the
enforcement of his fundamental right to property under
article 31(1) of the Constitution by the issue of an
appropriate writ or a direction to the respondent State
restraining it from disturbing his possession of the
estate, and eighty malguzari villages situate in the
Garchiroli tehsil of the san1e district.
The petitioner and his ancestors have been owning
and enjoying these properties in full proprietary right
for several generations past. On the 5th April, 1950,
the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly enacted an
Act called the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary
·,Rights Act. The Act received the assent of the President
of India on the 22nd January, 1951, and was published
in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on the 26th January,
1951, as Act I of 1951.
By a notification in a gazette
extraordinary issued on the 27th January, 1951, the
Madhya Pradesh Government fixed 31st March, 1951,
as the date of vesting of the estates under section 3 of
the Act. The petitioner thus was to lose his estate
and lands on the 31st March, 1951. On the 9th March,
1951, i.e., before the vesting date, he presented the
present application to this court for the issue of appropriate writs against . the Government prohibiting it from
It was alleged
taking possession of his properties.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1023
that the Madhya Pradesh Act, I of 1951, was unconstitutional and void and infringed the fundamental rights
of the petitioner in a variety of ways.
For a proper appreciation of the ground on which
the validity of the Act is being challenged, it is necess:u-y to set out the relevant provisions of the Act and
to state the facts which Jed to this enactment.
Madhya Pradesh is a composite State, comprising
the Central Provinces, Berar and the merged territories.
By an agreement of merger made between the rules
of States and the Dominion of India dated the 15th
December, 1947, certain territories which at one time
were under the Indian States Agency and were held by
these rulers were integrated with the Dominion. The
integration actually took place on the 1st January,
1948. On the 1st August, 1949, the States were merged
in the Madhya Pradesh. There were in all 106 estates
in Madhya Pradesh as defined in section 2(3) of Act I
of 1951 aI1d held by zamindars. Most ot the lands are
owned by malguzars of mahals in the status of
"Malkan cabza".
The land system prevailing in Madhya Pradesh is
malguzari (except in certain areas where the ryotwari
system iis in vogue), the malguzar being an intermediary between the State and the tiller. Land is
also held on a variety of subordinate tenures by
absolute occupancy tenants, occupancy tenants, ryots,
thikedars, mafidars, ilaqadars, etc.
Land revenue in Madhya Pradesh was last assessed
under the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, II of
1917. The estate holders pay land revenue on the
lands comprised in the estates at a concession rate.
The payment is technically called "tekoli". In 1939
there was an ad hoc increase in the amount of tekoli
by the Central Provinces Revision of Land Revenue
Estates Act, I of 1939.
•
O;i the 3rd September, 1946, the Central Provinces
and Herar Legislative Assembly passed a resolution
for the elimination of intermediaries between the
State and the peasant. Soon after the passing of this
1952
Visweshwar RaO'
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahaian f.
1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
1952
resolution several laws were enacted, it is said, with a
view to achieve this result, the impugned Act being
Viswes hwar Rao
the_
last of that series. In 1947, the Central Provinces
.v.
Land Revenue Estates Act, :X:XV of 1947, was enThe State of
Madhya
acted. The revenue assessment, viz., tekoli, on the
Pradesh.
estates was, we are told, enhanced in some places from
thirty to fifty per cent. of the full jama and in others
Mahaian /.
from forty to sixty per cent. In the same year was
enacted the Central Provinces Land Revenue Revision
Mahals Act, XXVI of 1947. The land assessment on
malguzari villages ' was, it is alleged, raised to 75 per
cent. from 45 to 50 per cent. of malguzari assets. This
was done without . recourse to a settlement. In 1948
·came the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of
Exemptions Act, XXXVII of 1948 making persons
exempted from payment of land revenue liable for it.
This legislation, it is urged, resulted in the reduction
of the net income of the proprietor5 to a large extent.
On the 11th October, 1949, the impugned Act was
introduced in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly. It was
referred to a Select Committee on the 15th October,
1949; the Select Committee reported on the 9th March,
1950, the report was published on the 17th March,
1950, and was taken into consideration on the 29th
March, 1950, by the Assembly. On the 30th March,
1950, the opposition moved for the circulation of the
Bill. The circulation motion was negatived on the 3rd
April, 1950, and the Bill was discussed clause by
clause and the clauses were passed between the 3rd oE
April and .the 5tl1 of April. On the 5th April, 1950,
the member in charge of the Bill moved as follows:-
l
"Speaker Sir, I now move that the Central Provinces
Bera! Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates,
Mahals, Alienated Lands) Bill, 1949 (No. 64 of 1949)
as considered by the House be passed into law."
&
TI1e Hon'ble the Speaker said : "Motipn moved,
that· the Central Provinces & Berar Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands)
Bill, 1949 (No. 64 of 1949) as considered by the House
be passed into law."
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S.C.R.
t·
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1025
1952
. A number of speeches were made at the third reading stage. The opposition was in a hopeless minority.
·V istueshwitr Rao
The trend of the speeches was of a laudatory character,
v.
each member hailing the Bill as a piece of great reform
The State of
in the Madhya Pradesh land system. No motion of a
Madhya
Prailesh.
dilatory nature was tabled and as a matter of fact
there was no opposition whatsoever to the passing of
M11hajan f.
the Bill. Some members expressed the opinion that
the provisions of the Act did not go far enough, others
thought that the provi,sions as tci compensation should
have been more liberal, but there was none who was
for rejecting the Bill as it stood. The report of the
proceedings of the 5th April, 1950, does not cor1tain
the note that the motion tlhat the Bill be passed into
law was carried.
The omission of this note in the proceedings of the
legislature has furnished a basis for the argument that
the Bill was never passed into law. The proceedings
were printed Olil the 21st June, 1950, md were signed
by the Speaker on the 1st October, 1950. The original
Bill that was submitted to the President for his assent
was printed on the 29th April, 1950, and it bears on
it the certificate of the Speaker dated the 10th
May, 1950, stating that the Bill was duly passed by
the legislature on the 5th April, 1950. This certificate
Was signed by the Speaker a considerable time ahead
of his signing the proceedings. The Act, as already
stated, received the assent of the President on the
22nd January, 1951, and was published in the Madhya
Pradesh Gazette on the 26th January, 1951, as Madh}'a
Pradesh Act I of 1951.
Against the constitutionality of this Act a number
of petitiops were made in the High Court of Nagpur
but they were all dismissed by that court on the 9th
April, 1951, while this petition along with some others
was pending in this Court.
The preamble of the Act is in these terms :"An Act to provide for the acquisition of the
rights of proprietors in estates, mahals, alienated
villages and alienated lands in Madhya Pradesh and
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan].
1026
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952t
to make
therewith."
provi,sion
matters
connected
for
other
The legislation clearly falls within entry 36 of List II
of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The
Madhya Pradesh Legislature had therefore undoubted
competence to enact it. The Act is divided into eleven
chapters and three schedules. Chapter II deals with
the vesting of proprietary rights i.n the State and
states the consequences of the vesting. Section 3 is in
these ter.ms :"Save as otherwise provided in this Act, on and'
from a date to be specified by a notification by the
State Government in this behalf, all proprietary rights
in an estate, mahal, alienated village or alienated
land, as the case may be, in the area specified· in ri\.Cnotification vesting in a proprietor of such . estate,
mahal, alienated village, alienated land, or in a person
having interest in such proprietary right through the
proprietor, shall pass from such proprietor or •Ud1'
other person to and vest in the State for the purpose;
of the State free of all encumbrances .......... ".
Section 4 provides that after the publication of the
notification under section 3, all rights, title and interest
vesting in the proprietor or any person having interest
in such proprietary right through the proprietur in
such area including land (cultivable or barren}, grass
land, scrub jungle, forest, trees, fisheries, wells, tanks,
ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways, village sites,.
hats, bazars and melas; and in all subsoil, including
rights, if any, in mines and minerals, whether being
worked or not, shall cease and be vested in the State
for purposes of the State free of all encumbrantes ;·
but that the proprietor shall continue to retain the
possession of his homestead, home-farm land, and in
the Central Provinces, also of land brought under
cultivation by him after the agricultural year 1948-49'
but before the date of vesting. The proprietor is
entitled to recover any sums which became due to
him before the date of vesting by virtue of his proprietary rights. All open enclosures used for agricultural or domestic purposes, all buildings, places
-.
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•
•
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1027
1952
of worship, wells situated in and trees standing on
lands included in such enclosures or house sites etc. Visweshwar Rao
continue to remain in possession of the proprietor and
v.
are to be settled with him by the State Government
The State of
Madhya
on such terms and conditions as it may determine.
Pradesh.
Similarly, certain private wells, trees, tanks and
groves continue to remain in possession of the proMahajan f.
prietor or other person who may be interested in
them. Chapteir III deals with the as!essment of compensation. It is provided in section 8 that the State
Government shall pay compensation to the proprietor
in accordance with the rules contained in Schedule I.
Besides the amount so determined, Government has
to pay compensation for any amount spent on the
construction of a tank or well used for agricultural
purposes, where such tank: or well vests in the State
Government. In addition to all these amounts, the
State Government has to pay compensation for lands
within the area of a municirpality or cantonment in
accordance with the rules contained in Schedule II.
The compensation for divestment of proprietary rights
becomes due from the date of vesting and it is
enacted that it shall carry interest at the rate of tw(}
and a half per cent. per annum from the date of
' vesting to the date of payment.
Section 9 provides
as follows :-
"The compensation payable under section 8 may,
in accordance with the rules made in this behalf, be
paid in one or more of the following modes, namely :( i) in cash in full or in annual instalments not
exceeding thirty ;
(ii) in bonds either negotiable or not negotiable
carrying interest at the rate specified in sub-section ( 4)
of section 8 and of guaranteed face valJue maturing
within a specified period. not exceeding thirty
years."
The other sections in this chapter deal with interim
payment and appointment of compensation officers
and lay down the procedure for the determinatiqn of
compensation. Schedule I provides that the amount
11-10 S.C. India/71
1028
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1952
of compensation in the Central Provinces and in Berar
shall
be ten times the net income determined in accordVi'swes hwar Rao
ance with the rules mentioned in the schedule.
In
v.
The State of
merged territories the compensation is payable on a
Madhya
sliding scale varying from two times to ten times the
Pradesh.
net income. Schedule II lays down the measure of
compensation on a scale varying from five to fifteen
Mahajan /.
times the assessment on the land as specified in the
schedule. Section 2 of Schedule I provides for the
calculation of the gross income by adding the amount
of income received by a proprietor from the aggregate
of the rents from the tenants as recorded in the jamabandi for the previous agricultural year ; the siwai
income, that is, income from various sources such as
jalkar, bankar, phalkar, h<]ts, bazars, melas, grazing
and village forest calculated at two times the income
recorded in the current settlement of 1923 ; and the
consent money on transfer of tenancy lands-the
average of transactions recorded in the village papers
for ten years preceding the agricultural year in which
the date of vesting falls. The schedule also provides
,the method of determination of the gross income of a
mahal as well as of an alienated village or alienated
land separately. It also provides for the determination
of this income in the case of mines and forests. The
method suggested for assessing the net income is that
out of the gross income the following items have to be
deducted, i.e., the assessed land revenue, sums payable
during the previous agricultural year on account of
cesses and local rates> the average of income-tax paid
in respect of income received from big forests <:luring
the period of thirty agricultural years preceding the
agricultural year in which the relevant date falls and
cost of management varying from 8 to 15 per cent. of
the gross annual income on incomes varying from
Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 15,000.
It is further provided
that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule
(2) the net income shall in no case be reduced to less
than five per cent. of the gross income. - Chapter IV
deals with certain incidental matters in respect of
the determination of ·the debts of proprietors. Its
'
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1029
1952
provisions are analogous to the provisions 0£ Debt Conciliation or Relief of Indebtedness Act. It is provided
Visweshwar Rao
in Chapter V how the actual amount of compensation
v.
is to be determined and paid. Chapter VI deals with
The State of
Madhya
that part of Madhya Pradesh which is defined as
Pradesh.
Central Provinces in the Act. It is provided herein
that a proprietor who has been divested of his estate
Mahajan ].
will have malik-makbuza rights in
his homefarm
lands. Absolute occupancy tenants and occupancy
tenants can also acquire malik-makbuza rights. Provision is made for reservation of grazing lands and for
the collection of land revenue. Similar provisions are
made in Chapter VII in respect of management and
tenures of land in the merged territories. Chapter VIII
deals with management and tenures of lands in Berar.
Separate provision has been made for the determination of compensation payable to lessees of mines and
minerals. Under the provisions of section 218 of the
Central Provinces Land Revenue Act and section 44
of the Berar Land Revenue Code there is a presumption that all mines and minerals belong to the State
and the proprietary rights in them could be granted
by the State to any person. Wherever a right of
minerals has been so assigned, provision has been
made regarding its acquisition and the consequences
as resulting from such acquisition. The Act provides
for the giving of rehabilitation grant to expropriated
proprietors within a certain range provided for in
Schedule III. The last chapter in the Act deals with
miscellaneous matters including the power of making
rules.
" .)
The main purpose of the Act is to bring the actual
tillers of the soil in direct contaot wfrh the State by
the elimination of intermediary holders. In short, the
~ Act aims at converting malguzari into ryotwari land
system. It also aims at giving to the gram panchayats
the map;igement of common lands freed from the grip
,. of proprietors and contemplates the establishment of
,_ -<: self-government for the villages. The provisions of the
\
Ace in respect of payment of compensation, though
they do not in any way provide for an equivalent
'
1030
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahaian /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
in money of the property taken and in that sense
may not be adequate, cannot be called illusory. This
Act 'is a definilte improvement on the Bihar Act ;
it leaves the arrears of rents due in the hands
of the proprietors and do~ not operate artificially
to reduce the net income by any device.
It also
provides that in no case the net income should be
reduced below five per cent. of the gross income. The
result is that in every case some amount of money .
becomes payable by the State by way of compensation
co the proprietor and in no case does the compensation
work into a negative sum or to a mere zero or a minus
figure. In other respects the provisions of the Act
in· regard to compensation follow the pattern which is
common to all zamindari, legislation, which is to inflate
the amount of expenditure and deflate the actual
income. The siwai income from jalkar, bankar, etc.
and from village forests is calculated at two times the
siwai income recorded in the . settlement made in 1923.
This Act was passed in 1951. The siwai income recorded in the year 1923 is appreciably less than the actual
income of the proprietors from these sources in 1951.
Similarly the income from consent money has to be
calculated by taking the average income for ten years
preceding the date . of vesting and not the actual income
as in the case of. rent realized during the previous agricultural year. The expenditure has been infiared by
taking in respect of the big forests the average income
tax paid during the period of thirty agricultural years.
No agricultural income-tax existed during most of this
period. I~ only came into exi~tence recently. The
cost of management has been calculated at a flat rate
of eight to fifteen per cent. There can therefore be no
doubt that the principles laid down for determination
of compensation cannot be called equitable and they
do not provide for payment of just compensation to
the expropriated proprietor.
The petitioner's case is that under the formula stated
in the Act, a compensation of 25 lakhs which would be
due to him on the basis of the value of the property
taken, has been reduced to a sum of Rs. 65,000 and is
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1031
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1952
payable in thirty unspecified instalments and therefore
it is purely nominal and illusory. This figure of Visweshwar Rao
Rs. 65,000 is arrived at by the following proce_ss : v.
(a) Gross income from rents ... Rs. 55,000
(b) Siwai income ... Rs. 80,050 Actually (according to the affidavit the petitioner
re~lizing
was
4,65,000 from
this source) .
1,35,000
Total
Deductions permissible under the Act
following :-
are
the
(a) Revenue
... 45,000
(b) Income-tax on 30 years' average 66,600
(c) Cost of management
... 21,000
Total
. . . 1,32,600
2,400
Net income
T en times net income would be Rs. 24,000; but
as the net income cannot be reduced below five per
cent. of the gross income which comes to Rs. 6,500,
compensation payable is Rs. 65,000, while the yearly
income of the petitioner was in the neighbourhood of
Rs. 5,65,000 and the mar{Qet value of his property is
25 lakhs.
The first and the main objection to the validity of
the Act taken by the learned counsel is that the Bill
was never passed into law. As already indicated, this
objection is founded on the omission from the proceedings of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly
dated the 5th April, 1950, of a statement to the eff~ct
that the Bill was put to the House by the Speaker and
was passed by it. Reference was made to rules 20, 22,
34 and 115 of the rules regulating 'the procedure of the
legislature framed under the Government of India Act,
1935, in the year 1936, which provides as follows :"20( 1). A matter requiring the decision of the
Assembly shall be decided by means of a ques.tlion put
by the Speak;er on a motion made by a member.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
'J:1ahajan /.
1032
1952
Visweshwar Rao
• v.
The State of
Madhya
.Pradesh.
Mahajan ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
22. After a motion has been made, the Speaker
shall read the motion for the consideration of the
Assembly.
34 (1). Votes may be taken by voices or division and shall be taken by division if any member so
desires. The Speaker shall determine the method of
taking votes by division.
•(2). The result of a division shall be announced
by the Speaker and shall not be challenged.
115 (1). The Secretary shall cause to be prepared a f!u.11 report of the proceedings of the Assembly
at each of its meetings and
publish it as soon as
practicable.
(2) One impression of this printed report shall be
submitted to the Speaker for his confirmation and
signature and when signed
shall
constitute the
authentic record of the proceedings of the Assembly."
It was urged that the authentic report of the proceedings of the Assembly was conclusive on the point,
that the Bill was not put to the Assembly by means
of a question and was not voted upon, and hence it
could not be said to have been passed by the legislature.
It was said that even if there was no open
opposition to the passing of the Bill, it was possible
that if ix was put to the Assembly, it might have rejected it. As already pointed out, the proceedings
were signed by the Speak~r on the 1st October, 1950,
while the certificate that the Bill was passed was recorded by him on the original Bill when it was submitted to the President for his assent on the 10th May,
1950. The certificate of the Speaker is conclusive on
the point that the Bill was passed by the legislature
(Vide Cra\es' Statute Law, 4th Edn., p. 36). It ~eems
to me that by an oversight it was not recorded in the
proceedings that the motion was put to and passed by
the House and the Speaker while signing the proceedings six months after the event failed to notice
the error. There can be no doubt that the sense of the
House on the 5th April, 1950, was for passing the Bill
and there was no one present who was for rejecting it
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1033
1952
The motion before the House was that the Bill be
passed. The Speaker
could
not
possibly
have
Visweshwar Rao
appended a certificate on a Bill that it was pass.ed by
v.
the House if it had not been so passed. There are no
The State of
Madhya
grounds whatever for doubting the._ correctness of his
Pradesh.
certificate. In my opinion, the contention raised that
the Bill was not passed into law fails and must be
Mahajan/.
rejected.
•
•
Next it is contended that articles 31-A and 31-B
have no application to this Bill as it never became
law by following the Procedure prescribed in the Constitution and that those articles have only application
to a Bill that had become an Act. The Legislature of
Madhya Pradesh consists of the Governor and the
Legislative Assembly. It was said that even if the Bill
was passed by the Legislative Assembly, it was not
assented to by the Governor but was straightaway sent
to the President and that without the assent of the
Gqvernor: the Bill could not become law despite the
fact that it was assented to by the President and it
was pointed out that sub-clause (3) of article 31 of the
Constitution speaks of "law" being reserved for the
consideration of the President and not merely a "Bill" .
This argument, in my opinion, has not much force
having regard to the terms and scope of article 200.
The Governor under that article could assent to a Bill
or could reserve it for the consideration of the President
at his option.
The Governor being empowered to
reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President
and this having been done, it was for the President
either to assent to the Bill or to withhold his assent.
The President having given his assent, the Bill must be
held to have been passed into law. It does not seem
to have been intended that the Governor should give
his assent to the Bill and make it a full:.S.edged law
and then reserve it for the President's consideration
so that it may have effect.
Mr. Somayya pressed the point that the President
could not perform both his functions under article 200
and article 31(4) concerning this Bill at one and the
1034
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1952
same time, that first the procedure laid down in
article 200 for the passing of the Bill into law should
Visweshwar Rao
been followed, t.e., the Governor should have either
v.
assented
to the Bill or should have reserved it for the
The State of
consideration
of the President and if it was so reserved,
Madhya
Pradesh.
the President should then have given his assent and
the Bill would then become law, that after the
Mahajan].
Bill had become law, the Governor should again have
reserved this Bill for the consideration of the President
as required by the provisions of article 31 (3) in order
to make it effective law against the provisions of
article 31(2) and that if the President then gave his
assent, the law so assented to could not be called in
question in a court of law. It was said that only in
case where this double procedure is followed that it
could be said that the President l;i~d satisfied himself
that the law did not contravene the prov1S1ons of
article 31 (2). In my opinion, the argument is fallacious. It would be a meaningless formality for the
President to give his assent to the same Bill twice
over. I cannot see why the President cannot perform
both the duties entrusted to him by articles 200 and
31(3) and (4) at one and the same time. He is not
· disabled under the Constitution from applying his
mind to such a Bill once and for all and to see whether
it has to be passed into law and whether it fulfils the
requirements of article 31(2). The President's assent
therefore to the Bill attracts the application of
articles 31-A and 31-B to it and deprives persons
affected by it of the rights guaranteed in Part III of
the Constitution.
The provisions of article 31 ( 4) support the view of
the learned Attorney-General that what has to be sent
to the President is the Bill as passed by the legislature
and not the Bill after it has been assented to by the
Governor. T_l-1e article reads thus :"If any Bill pending at the commencement of this
Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it
has been passed by such Legislature, been reserved
for the consideration of the President and has received
his assent, then, · notwithstanding anything m this
S.C.R.
'
In this context the word "Legislature" means the
House or Houses of Legislature and does not include the
Governor within its ambit. This word has not the same
meaning in all the articles. In some articles it means
the Qoivernor as well as the Houses of Legislature,
while in a number of other articles it only means the
House or Houses of Legislature. Article 31(4) means
that i.f any Bill contravening the provisions of
clause (2) of article 31 is passed by the House or
Houses of Legislature but is reserved for the consideration of the President and receives his assent,
then it s}iall become law, not open to any objection
on the ground o{ such contravention.
.
!
lI
I
1035
1952
Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called
in question in any court on the ground that it conVisweshwar Rao
travenes the provisions of clause (2) ."
v.
'
/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Next it was contended that the obligation to pay
·compensation was implicit i;n the legislaltive power
contained in entry 36 of Ust LI and that the Act was
unconstitutional as it had provided for acquisition of
zamindaris without payment· of compensation, the provisions relating to it being illusory. This contention
fails for the reasons given in my judgment in the
Bihar case.
Moreover, the compensation provided for
in the impugned Act cannot be dubbed as illusory.
All that can be said is that it · is grossly inadequate
and it is not the equivalent of the value of the property acquired, but this issue is no justiciable in view
of the provisions of article 31(4). This Bill was pending at the commencement of the Constitution, it was
reserved for the consideration of the President and the
President gave his as,sent to it. The conditions for
the application of article 31 ( 4) thus stand fulfilled.
Besides the obstacle of article 31 ( 4), two further
hurdles, viz., of articles 31-A and 31-B introduced by
the amendments to the Constitution, stand in the way
-0f the petitioner and bar an enquiry into the question
·of the quantum of compensation.
The contention that there is no public purpose
.behind the impugned Act has also to be repelled on the
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /,
1036
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
same reasoning as given by me in the Bihar case. The
purpose behind the Act is to establish airect contact
between tillers of the soil and the Government and to
eliminate the intermediaries, as in the view of the
Government this is for the welfare of the society as a
whole. It is also the purpose of the Act to confer
and
malik maqbuza ~tatus on occupancy tenants
improve their present position and to vest management
of village affairs and cultivation in a democratic
village body. It ·is too late in the day to contend that
reform in this direction is not for general public benefit.
•
.\
rl
The next argument of Mr. Somayya that the Act is
a fraud on the Constitution in that in legislating under
entry 42 of List III, it has legislated for non-payment
of compensation has also to be repelled, for the reasons
given in the Bihar case. Under the provisions of
this Act compensation can in no case work out
into a mere nothing. On the other hand, in every
case some amount of compensation is payable and in
the majority of cases it is also not inadequate.
Mr. Somayya contended that payment of Rs. 65,000
as compensation to his client for property worth
twenty-five lakhs of rupees was purely illusory. The
assessment of value by rhe petitioner cannot be taken
at its full value. It cannot at any rate be held that
legislation which provides for the payment of a sum
of Rs. 65,00U provides for no compensation. The
amount of instalments, if payment is to be in instalments, is bound to be fixed by the rules made under
the statute and in case the rules are so made that they
amount to an abuse of the exercise of that power,
they can always be challenged on that ground.
The argument that the Act is bad inasmuch as it
·delegates essential legislative power to the executive
is negatived for the reasons given in the Bihar case.
A point was raised that the constitutional amendments in articles 31-A and 31-B could not affect the
petitioner's guaranteed rights contained in Part III of
the Constitution in so far as the eighty malguzari
villages were concerned, because those mah1ls did not
h
(
S.C.R.
•
•
,
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1037
1952
fall within the ambit of the word "estate" as defined
in article 31-A. In sub-clause (2) (a) the definition is Visweshwar Rar>
in these terms :v.
The State of
"The expression 'estate' shall, m relation to any
Madhya
local area, have the same meamng as that expression
Pradesh.
or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating
to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also inMahajan /.
clude any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant."
Section 2(3) of Act II of 1917, C. P. Land Revenue
Act, defines the expression "estate" thus :"an estate as declared by the State Government."
The learned Advocate-General conceded that these
villages are not within the ambit of this definition but
he contended that they are within the scope of the
definition of the expression given m article 31-A, as
mahals in Central Provinces are local equivalents of the
expression "estate'', though not so declared by the
Act. There is nothing on the record to support this
contention. The contention that those eighty mahals
are not "an estate" and are thus excluded from the
reach of article 31-A does not, however, very much
advance the petitiioner's case, because the hurdles
created in his way by articles 31-B and 31(4) stand in
spite of the circumstance that article 31-A has no
application. It was contended that article 3l~B was
merely illustrative of the rule stated m article 31-A
and if article 31-A had no application, that article
also should be left out of consideration. Reference was
made to the decision of the Privy Council in KingEmperor v. Sibnath Banerjee( 1 ) on the construction of
sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 2 of the Defence of
India Act. The material portion of section 2 considered in that case runs thus :" (I). The Central Government may, by notification
in the official gazette, make such rules as appear to it
to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence
of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of
public order or the efficient prosecution of war, or for
maintaining supplies and services essential to the life
of the community.
(1) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 241; [1945] F.C.R. 195.
1038
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
(2). Without prejudice to the generality of the
powers conferred by sub-section (1), the. rules may provide for, or may empower any authority to make
orders providing for, all or any of the following matters,
namely, ............ ".
Their Lordships made the following
observati0ns
aboµt. the meaning to be given to the language of subsection (2) :"the function of sub-section (2) is merely an illustrative one ; the rule-making power Is conferred by
sub-section ( 1), and 'the rules' which are referred to in
the opening sentence of sub-section (2) are the rules
which are authorized by, and made under, sub-section ( l) ; the provisions of sub-section (2) are not restrictive of sub-section ( 1), as, indeed, is expressly stated by the words 'without prejudice to the generality
of the power conferred by sub-section ( 1)'."
Article 31-B is in these terms :"Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31-A, none of the Acts and
Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any
of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void
........ on the ground that such Act, Regulation or
provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions
of this Part, and notwithstanding
any judgment,
decree or order of the court or tribunal to the
contrary, each of the said · Acts and Regulations
shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force."
On the basis of the similarity of the language in the
opening part of article 31-B with that of sub-section (2)
of section 2 of the Defence of India Act, "without prejudiC:e to the generality of the provisions contained in
article 31-A", it was urged that article 31-B was
merely illustrative of article 31-A and as the latter
was limited in its application to estates as defined
therein, article 31-B was also so limited.
In my
opinion, the observations in Sibnath Baneriee's case(')
(1) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 241; [1945] F.C.R. 195.
i
••
>.-,
S.C.R.
1039
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1952
far from supporting the contention raised, negatives
it. Article 31-B specifically validates certain Acts Visweshwar Rao,
mentioned in the schedule despite the provisions of
v.
article 31-A and is not illustrative of article 31-A but
The State of
Madhya
stands independent of it. The impugned Act in this
Pradesh.
situation qua the acquisition of the eighty malguzari
villages cannot be questioned on the ground that it
Mahajan/.
contravenes the provisions of article 31 (2) of the Constitution or any of the other provisions of Part III.
The applicability of article 31(4) is not limited to
estates and its provisions save the law in its entirety.
This petition is accordingly dismissed but
circumstances I make no order as to costs.
m
the
Petition No. 317 of 1951.
-~
-·
'
Mr. Bindra, who appeared for the petitioner, placed
reliance on the observations of Holmes C. J. in
Communications Assns. v. Douds(1 ), viz., "that the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical
formulas having their essence in their form ; they are
organic living institutions transplanted from English
soil. Their significance is vital, not formal ; it is to be
gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line
of their growth", and contended that if the Constitution of India was construed in the light of these observations, then despite the express provisions of article
31 (2) it would be found that there is something pervading it which makes the obligation to pay real compensation a necessary incident of the compulsory acquisition of property. It was said that the right to
compensation is implied in entry 36 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule and that article 31 (2) does not confer
the right but merely protects it. Mr. Bindra merely
tried to annotate the arguments of Mr. Das but with
no better result. The dictum of Holmes C. J. has no
application to the construction of a Constitution which
has in express terms made the payment of compensation obligatory for compulsory acquisition of property,
which again in express terms by an amendment of it,
(1) 339 U.S. 382, 384.
1040
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
has deprived persons affected by the impugned Act of
this right.
One further point taken by Mr. Bindra was that
"nationalization" of land is . a separate head of legislation and that "acquisition in general" does not fall
within the scope of entry 36 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule. This proposition was sought to be supported by reference to a passage from Stephen's Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. III, p. 541.
The passage, however, read in its entirety, negatives
the contention. It may be mentioned that under powers
of compul~ry acquisition a number of properties have
been nationalized in England and other countries.
Lastly, it was urged that the legislation in question
was not enacted bona fide inasmuch as in 1946 the
legislature having passed a resolution to end zamindaries, proceeded to enact laws with the purpose of
defeating the constitutional guarantees regarding payment of compensation by various devices. As a first
step in this direction the revenue was enhanced in
order to reduce the gross income of the zamindars,
then other Acts mentioned in the earlier part of the
main judgment were enacted with the same end in
view. In my opinion, this argument is void of force.
It was within tl1e competence of the Government in
exercise of its governmental power to enhance land
revenue, to w'i,thdraw exemption of land revenue,
wherever those had been granted, and to enact
other laws of a similar character. There is no
evidence whatsoever that all these enactments were
enacted witl1 a fraudulent design of defeating the provisions of paymenti of compensation contained in the
Constitution. The Constitution had .not even come into
force by the time that most of these statutes were
enacted.
The petition is therefore dismissed.
I, however,
make no order as to costs.
Petition No. 268 of 1951
This petition is concluded by my decision in Petition No. 166 of 1951 except as regards one matter,
j
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1041
1952
The properties belonging to the petitioner and acquired
under the statute were originally situate in an Indian Visweshwar Rao
State which became subseql,lently merged with Madhya
v.
Pradesh. It was contended that by the terms of the
The State of
Madhya
covenant of merger those properties were declared as
Pradesh.
the petitioner's private properties and were protected
from State legislation by the guarantee given . in
Mahajan f.
article 362 of the Constitution and hence the impugned Act was bad as it contravened the provisions of
this article. Article 362 is in these terms :-
"In the exercise of the power of Parliament or of
the legislature of a State to make laws or in the
exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a
State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or
assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (1) of article 291 with
respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities
of the Ruler of an Indian State."
~.
Article 363 takes away the jurisdiction of the courts
regarding disputes arising out of treaties, agreements,
covenants, engagements, sanads etc.
It is true that by the covenant of ~erger the
properties of the petitioner became his pnvate properties as distinguished from properties of the State
but in respect of them he is in no better position than
any other owner possessing private property. Article
362 does not prohibit the acquisition of properties declared as private properties by the covenant; of merger
and does not guarantee their perpetual existence. The
guarantee contained in the article is of a limited extent
only. It assures that the Rulers' properties decla~ed
as their private properties will not be claimed as State
properties. The guarantee has no greater scope than
this. That guarantee has been fully respected by the
impugned statute, as it treats those properties as their
private properties and seeks to acquire them on that
assumption. Moreover, it seems to me that in view of
the comprehensive language of article 363 this issue
is not justiciable.
1042
1952
Vi'sweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Mahajan /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
This petition is accordingly dismissed but there will
be no order of costs.
Petitions Nos. 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, 257, 280, 281,
282, 283, 284, 285, 287, 288 and 289 of 1951.
In all these fifteen petitions, Mr. Swami appeared
for the petitioners. Seven of these are by zamindars
from Madhya Pradesh who are owners of estates. The
petitioner in Petition No. 246 also owns
certain
malguzari villages.
Petitioner in Petition No. 237
is a malguzar of eighteen villages but owns no estate.
Petitions Nos. 280 to 285 and 257 relate to merged
territories.
The petitioner in Petition No. 282 was
ruler of a State (Jashpur) and the petition concerns his
private properties. Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 283,
284 and 257 are Ilakadars and in Petitions Nos. 280
and 285 they are mafidars. Petitioner in Petition
No. 281 is a Thikedar,. i.e., revenue farmer of three
villages. Mr. Swami reiterated the contention raised
by Mr. Somayya that the Act was not duly passed by
the legislature.
For the reasons given in Petition
No. 166 of 1951, I see no force in this contention.
Mr. Swami also reiterated Mr. Bindra's contention
that the legislation was not bona fide. For the reasons
given in Petition No. 317, this contention is not
accepted. Mr. Swami vehemently argued that the
Government has by this Act become a super-zamindar,
that there is no public purpose behind the Act, that
there is no change in the existing order of things,
that the Act has achieved nothing new, the tenants
remain as they were, the · malikan cabza were also
already in existence, that acquisition of that status
by occupancy tenants was possible under
ex1stmg
statutes and that they had also the power of transfer
of their holdings. In my opinion, the argument is
based on a fallacy. As already stated, the purpose of
the Act is to bring about reforms in the land tenure
system of the State by establishing direct contact
between the tillers of the soil and the Government.
These petitions are accordingly dismissed.
no order of costs in them.
I make
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1043
1952
Petition No. 318 of 1951.
Mr. Mukherji who appeared in this petition merely Visweshwar Ra<>
v.
adopted the arguments taken in other petitions. For
The State of
the reasons given therein this petition is also dismissMadhya
ed, but I make no order as to costs in it.
Pradesh.
Petition No. 487 of 1951.
Mr. Jog appeared in this petition and raised the
same points as in other petitions. This petition also
fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to
costs.
MuKHERJEA J.-1 agree with my Lord the
Justice that these petitions should be dismissed.
Chief
DAs J.-The Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands)
Act, 1950 (Act I of 1951) having on January 22, 1951,
received the assent of the President of India a Notification was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette
of January 27, 1951, fixing March 31, 1951, as the date
of vesting of all proprietary rights in the State under
section 3 of the Act. A number of applications were
made under article 226 of the Constitution to the
Madhya Pradesh High Court by or on behalf of different
persons variously described as Zamindars or Malguzars
or Proprietors of "alienated villages" praying for
the issue of appropriate writs against the State of
Madhya Pradesh prohibiting them from proceeding
under the Act the validity of which was challenged on
a variety of grounds. Eleven of these applications came
up for h~aring before a Full Bench of the High Court
(B. P. Sinha C.J. and Mangalmurthi and Mudholkar JJ.)
and were, on 9th April, 1951, dismissed. The High
Court certified under article 132 (1) that the cases
inv-0lved a substantial question of law as to the interpret~tion of the Constitution.
No appeal, however,
appears to have been actually filed presumably because
the present applications under article 32 had already
been filed in this Court.
It may be mentioned here that the States of Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh also passed legislation for the
12-10 S.C. India/71
Mahaian /.
1044
1952
Vistveshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
abolition of zamindaries in their respective States and
the validity of those legislations was also contested by
·the proprietors affected thereby.
While the High
Court of Allahabad upheld the validity of the Uttar
Pradesh Act, the High Court of Patna held the Bihar
Land Reforms Act, 1950, to be unconstitutional only
on the ground that it offended the fundamental right
of equal protection of the law guaranted by article 14
of the Constitution. In the circumstances, the Con(First
stituent Assembly · passed the Constitution
Amendment) Act, 1951, by sections 4 and 5 of which
two new articles, namely, article 31-A and article 31-B
were inserted into the Constitution. A new schedule
called the Ninth Schedule specifying 13 several Acts
and Regulations including the Madhya Pradesh Act,
The
I of 1951, was also added to the Constitution.
legal validity of the Constitntion (First Amendment)
Act, 1951, which was challenged, has however, been
upheld by this Court and all Courts must give effect
to the two new articles which are now substantive
parts of our Constitution. Article 31-A relates back
to the date of the ConstitlUtion and article 31-B to the
respective dates of Acts and Regulations specified
in the Ninth Schedule.
The present bunch of petitions has been filed in this
Court under article 32 of the Constitution challenging
the validity of the Madhya Pradesh Act and praying
for appropriate writs, directions and orders restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh from acting under
that Act and disturbing the petitioner's title to, and
possession of, their respective estates, villages or properties. Learned counsel appearing for the different
petitioners accept the position that as a result of the
Constitutional amendments the impugned Act has
been removed from the operation of the provisions of
Part III of the Constitution and that consequently
the attack on the Act will have to be founded on some
other provisions of the Constitution. Mr. B. Somayya
appearing for the petitioner in Petition No. 166 of
1951 (Visheshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pr1adesh)
•
•
1
.
I
....,
S.C.R.
_,
--...
'
>
•
,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1045
1952
challenged the validity of the Act on the following
grounds:Visweshwar Rao
(a) that the Bill itself was not passed by the
v.
The State of
Madhya Pradesh Legislature ;
Madhya
(b) that the procedure laid down in article 31 (3)
Pradesh
had not been complied with ;
Das].
( c) that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature was not
competent to enact the said Act, inasmuch as('i) the acquisition sought to be made under the
Act is not for a public purpose, and
(ii) there is no provision for payment of compensation in the legal sense ;
( d) that the Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution ;
( e) that the Act is unenforceable in that it provides for payment of compensation by instalments
but does not specify the amount of the instalments ;
(f) that the Act has delegated essential legislative
functions to the executive Government ;
(g) that the Act in so far as it purports to acquire
the Malguzari villages or Mahals is not protected by
article 31-A.
Learned counsel for other petitioners adopted and
in s9me measure reinforced the argume!lts of Mr.
B. Somayya.
Re (a) : In dealing with this ground of objection it
will be helpful to note the course which the Bill took
before it was put on the Statute Book. There is no
dispute as to the correctness of the dates given to us
by counsel for the petitioners. The Bill was introduced
in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly on 11th October,
1949. It was referred to a Select Committee on
15th October, 1949. The Select Committee made its
Report on 9th March, 1950, which was presented to
The Assembly
the Assembly on 29th March, 1950.
considered the Bill in the light of the Report between
that date and 5th April, 1950, during which period the
amendments proposed by the Select Committee were
moved and dfoposed of. It appears from the Official
1046
1952
V1sw~shwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh.
Das f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
of the Madhya
Pradesh
Legislative
Assembly of 5th April, 1950, that after the last amendment had been put to the House and accepted, the
Hon'ble Minister for Education (Sri P. S. Deshmukh)
moved that the Bill be passed into law and delivered
a short speech inviting the members to finally pass
the Bill. The Speaker then read out the motion.
Then followed speeches by 11 speakers congratulating
the Government and some of the members who took
an active part in carrying through this important
measure of land reform and relief to the tillers of the
soil. Nobody put forward any reasoned amendment
and the trend of the speeches shows that the House
accepted the Bill. From the Official Report of proceedings it does not, however, appear that after the
speeches the Speak.er formally put the motion to the
vote or declare it carried. It only shows that the
House passed on to discuss another Bill, namely,
the Madhya Pradesh State Aid to Industries (Amendment) Bill, 1950. The text of the Bill as it emerged
through the House was printed on 29th April, 1950,
and the Speaker signed a copy of the Printed Bill on
5th May, 1950, and certified that it had been passed
by the House and forwarded it to the Governor. By
an endorsement on that copy of the Printed Bill the
Governor reserved the Bill for the assent of the
President and the President, on 22nd January, 1951,
signified his assent by endorsing his signature at the
foot of that copy.. of the Printed Bill. The learned
Advocate-General has produced the original printed
Act signed by the Speaker, the Governor and the
President.
It appears that the Official Report of
Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of 5th April,
1950, was printed in June, 1950, and were on 1st
October, 1950, signed by the Speaker along with the
proceedings of many other meetings of the Assembly.
It is to be noted that the Speaker simply signed the
printed proceedings without stating one way or the
other whether the Bill in question was passed or not.
The objection formulated by learned counsel for
the petitioners is ·founded on the Rules of Procedure
~roceedings
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1047
1952
framed by the Assembly under section 84 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, which were continued Visweshwar &lo
in force until new rules were framed under article 208
v.
of the Constitution. That old rule 22 which required
The State of
Madhya
that after a motion was made the Speaker should
Pradesh.
read the motion for the consideration of the Assembly
What is
has been complied with is not disputed.
Das/.
contended is that the provisions of old rule 20(1)
have not been followed. That rule was in these
terms:
"A matter requiring the decision of the
Assembly shall be decided by means of a question
put by the Speaker on a motion made by a member."
It is urged that the question that the Bill be passed
into law was not put to the Assembly under rule 20
-and if it was at all put the result of the voting,
whether by voices or division, was never announced
by the Speaker as required by old rule 34. There
being a presumption of regularity attached to all
official business the onus is undoubtedly on the peti,.
tioners to allege and prove that the procedure
prescribed by the rules was not followed. There is
no evidence on affidavit by anybody who was present
at the meeting of the Assembly held on 5th April,
1950, as to what had actually happened on that date.
The petitioners rely only on the absence in the Official
Report of proceedings of any mention of the question
being put to or carried by the Assembly. The Official
Proceedings were prepared and confirmed in terms of
old rule 115 which was as follows : " (1) The Secretary shall cause to be prepared a
full report of the proceedings of the Assembly at each
of its meetings and publish it as soon as practicable.
(2) One impression of this printed report shall
be submitted to the Speaker for his confirmation
and signature and when signed shall constitute the
authentic record of the proceedings of the Assembly."
The argument is that the initial
on the petitioners has been quite
onus that was
adequately and
1048
1952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
effectively discharged by the authentic record of
the proceedings of the Assembly and consequently
Visweshwar Rao
it
must be held that the Bill did not actually
v.
become
law at all. I am not prepared to accept
The State of
Madhya
pointed
this contention as sound. I have already
Pradesh
out that the original printed Act produced before us
clearly shows that on 5th May, 1950, the Speaker
Das J.
certified that the Bill had
been
passed by the
Assembly. It is pointed out that old rule 87 under
which the Speaker certified that the Bill had been
passed did not give any finality or conclusiveness to
the speaker's certificate that the Bill had been passed,
such as is provided for in old rules 34(2) or 39(3) and,
therefore, the certification under old rule 87 cannot
affect the authenticity of the record confirmed and
signed by the Speaker under old rule 115. This does not
appear to me to be a correct approach to the problem.
The question before us is whether as a matter of fact
the Bill had been duly passed ~ccording to the rules.
The certification of the Speaker was within a month
from 5th April, 1950, while the conlirmation of the
proceedings took place on 1st October, 1950. There
can be no doubt that the memory of the Speaker was
fresher on 5th May, 1950, than it was on 1st October,
1950, when he signed a bunch of reports of proceedings. Therefore, as a statement of a fact more reliance
must be placed on the certlfication of the Bill than on
the confirmation of the proceedings and it will not be
unreasonable to hold that the omission of any mention of the question having been put to and carried by
the Assembly was an accidental slip or omission.
Further, the speeches delivered by the eleven speakers
clearly indicate that at that stage there was no opposition to the Bill. Therefore, putting the question at
the end of the third reading of the Bill would have
(See May's Parliabeen at best a mere formality.
mentary Practice, 14th Edn., p. 544). It is, after
all, a matter for the Speaker to declare the result.
The authentication by the Speaker on the printed Act
that the Bill was passed involves such a declaration
having been duly made.
In British Parliamentary
S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1049
1952
practice the Speaker's authentication is taken as conclusive. (See Craies' on Statute Law, 4th Edn., p. 36). The Visweshwar Ra<>
petitioners, as I have said, strongly rely on the Official
v.
Report of the Proceedings. It should, in this connection
The State of
Madhya
be borne in mind that article 208 of the Constitution
Pradesh
continued the old rules until new rules were framed.
It appears that new rules were framed and actually
Das f.
came into force on 8th September, 1950. New rule 148
does not reproduce sub-rule (2) of old rule 115. After
the new rules came into force it was no longer the duty
of the Speaker to confirm the proceedings at all.
Therefore, the purported confirmation of the proceedings by the Speaker on 1st October, 1950, cannot be
given any legal validity and the argument founded on
authentication under defunct rule 115 (2) must lose all
iits force. Finally, the irregularity of procedure, if
any, is expressly cured by article 212. I am not impressed by the argument founded on the fine distinction sought to be made between an irregularity of
procedure and an omission to take a particular step in
the procedure. Such an omission, in my opinion, is
nothing more than an irregularity of procedure. In
my judgment this ground of attack on the validity of
the Act is not well-founded and must be rejected.
Re (b) : Article 31 (3) on which this
attack is based runs as follows :-
ground of
" (3). No such law as is referred to in clause (2)
made by the Legislature of a State shall have effect
unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent."
Great stress is laid on the words "law" and "legislature of a State". It is said that this clause postulates
a "law" made by the "Legislature of a State". Reference is then made to article 168 which provides that
for every State there shall be a Legislatu~e which shall
consist of the Governor and, so far as Madhya
Pradesh is concerns:d, of one House, i.e., the Legislative
Assembly. The argument is that article 31 (3) requires
that a "law" must be reserved for the consideration of
If a Bill passed by the Assembly 1s
the President.
1050
1952
Visweshwar Rao
••
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh
Das [.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the
President without giving his own assent thereto, it
cannot be said that a "law" is reserved for the consideration 0£ the President, for up to that stage the Bill
~~ns a Bill and has not been passed into law. Therefore, it is urged, that after a Bill is passed by the
State Assembly, the Governor must assent to it so
that the Bill becomes a law and then that law,
to
have effect, must be reserved for the consideration
of the President.
This, admittedly, not having been
done, the provisions of article 31 (3) cannot be said to
have been complied with and, therefore, the Act cannot ·have any effect at all. I am unable to accept this
line of reasoning. For one thing, it assumes that a Eill
passed by the State Assembly can become a law only
by the assent of the Governor. That is not so. The procedure to be followed after a Bill is passed by the State
Assembly is laid down in article 200. Under that article,
the Governor can do one of three things, namely, he
may declare that he assents to it, in which case the
Bill becomes a law, or he may declare that he with"
holds assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls
through unless th~ .procedure indicated in the proviso
is followed, or he may declare that he reserves the
Bill for the consideration of the President, in which
case the President will adopt the procedure laid down
in article 201. Under that article the President shall
declare either .that he assents to the Bill in which case
the Bill ·will become law or that he withholds assent
therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through unless
the procedure indicated in the proviso is followed.
Thus it 'is clear that a Bill passed by a State Assembly
may become a law if the Governor gives his assent to
it or if, having been reserved by the Governor for the
consideration of the President, it is assented to by the
President. In the latter e'ient happening, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners will require
that what has become a law by the assent of the
President will, in order to be effective, have to be
again reserved for the consideration of the President, a
curious conclusion I should be loath to reach unless I
S.C.R.
)
I
_.I
·..-r-
,~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1051
1952
.am compelled to do so. Article 200 does not contemplate a second reservation by the Governor. The plain Visweshwar Rao
meaning of the language of article 31 (3) does not lead
v.
me to the conclusion. The whole argument is built on
The State of
Madhya
the word "law". I do not think that what is referred to
Pradesh
as law in article 31 (3) is necessarily what had already
become a law before receiving the assent of the PresiDas J.
·.dent. If that were .the meaning, the clause would have
said "unless such law, having been reserved for the consi<leration of the President, receives his assent". The
words "has received his assent" clearly imply and
point to an accomplished fact and the clause read as a
whole does not grammatically exclude a law that eventually became a law by having had received the assent
-0£ the President. The question whether the requirements of article 31 (3) have been complied with will
.arise only when the State purports to acquire the property of any person under a law and that person denies
that the asserted law ha& any effect. It is at that
point of time that the Court has to ask itself-"is it a
law which, having been reserved for the oOlllsideration
-of the President, has received his assent". I think it
'is in this sense that the word "law" has been used. In
·other words, the word "law" has been used to mean
what at the time of dispute purports to be or is assert·ed to be a law. The language of article 31 (4) also
supports this interpretation. In my judgment article
31 (3), on its true interpretation, does not require that
the Governor must first assent to the Bill passed by the
Assembly so as to convert it into a law and then reserve
that law for the consideration of the President. I have
already pointed out that article 200 does not contemplate a second reservation which will be necessary if
initially the Governor instead of himself assenting to
the Bill had reserved it for the consideration of the
J>resident. In my op1mon there is no substance in the
second objection which must, therefore, be overruled.
Re (c), (d), (e) and (f) : Similar heads of objections
were formulated and argued at considerable length by
Mr. P. R. Das in the Bihar appeals and learned counsel
1052
1952
Visweshwar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh
Das/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
appearing for the petitioners in the present proceedings have adopted the same. Shortly put, the argument
E_ that although the impugned Act cannot, in view of
articles 31(4), 31-A and 31-B be called in question on
the ground that it takes away or abridges or is inconsistent with the fundamental rights, it can, nevertheless, be challenged on other grounds. Thus it is open:
to the petitioners to show that the Legislature had n()
power to enact the law or that it offends against any
other provision of the Constitution. Mr. N. S. Bindra
and Mr. Swami have sought to reinforce those arguments by citing certain further passages from certain
text books and reported decisions. The provisions of
the impugned Act have been analysed and summarised
by Mahajan J. in the judgment just delivered by him
and it is not necessary for me to recapitulate the same.
Nor is it necessary for me to formulate in detail the
various heads of
arguments
founded
principally
on what is said to be the legislative incompetence of
the Madhya Pradesh Legislature to enact the impugned Act in view of the language of Legislative topics
set forth in entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List Ill
or on the ground that t11e Act is a fraud on the Constitution or that it delegates essential
legislative·
power to the executive Government which is not permissible. Suffice it to say that for reasons stated in
my judgment in the Bihar appeals I repel these heads
of objections. If anything, the existence of a public
purpose is more apparent in the Madhya Pradesh Act
than in the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Further, thecompensation provided in the Madhya Pradesh Act is
more liberal than that provided in the Bihar Act, for
under clause 4(2) of Schedule I the net income can in
no case be reduced to less than 5 per cent. of the gross
income. In any event the Act cannot, for reasons
stated by me in my judgment in the Bihar appeals, bequestioned on the ground of absence of public purpose
or of compensation. The fact that the Madhya Pradesh
Legislature passed several Acts OIJ.!' after another
e.g., C. P Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals
Act, 1947, enhancing the land revenue of the Mahals,.
•..
' -.
)'-:
..
j
./,/
. ~.
S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1053
1952
C. P. Revision of Land Revenue of Estates Act, 1939
and C. P. Revision of Land Revenue of Estates Visweshwar Rao
Act, 1947, increasing the land revenue of the estates,
v.
Revocations of Exemptions Act, 1948, revoking the
The State of
Madhya
exemptions from land revenue enjoyed by certain proPradesh
prietors and finally the impugned Act, has been relied
on as evidence of a systematic scheme for expropriatDas f.
ing the zamindars and it is contended that such a
conduct clearly amounts to a fraud on the Constitution. I am unable to accept this line of reasoning, for
the series of legislation referred to above may well
have been conceived and undertaken from time to time
in utmost good faith. It is true that section 9 of the
Act does not specifically indicate when the insttalments
will begin or what the amount of each instalment will
be but the section clearly contemplates that these
details should be worked out by rules to be framed
under section 91 of the Act. Further, under section IO
the State Government is bound to direct payment of
an interim compensation amounting to one-tenth of
the estimated amount of compensation if the whole
amount is not paid within a period of six months from
the date of vesting of the property in the State. I see
no improper delegation of legislative power at all. In
my opinion all these heads of objections must be
rejected.
Re (g) : The last ground of attack is that the 80
Malguzari Mahals belonging to the petitioner in
Petition No. 166 of 1951 are not estates and, therefore,
the impugned Act in so far as it purports to acquire
the Malguzari Mahals is not a law which is protected
by article 31-A. Learned Advocate-General of Madhya
Pradesh concedes that these Malguzari Mahals are not
estates within the meaning of the C. P. Land Revenue
Act but contends that the word "estate" has been used
in a larger sense in article 31-A. In any case the
impugned Act is protected by article 31-B. I do not
think it necessary to discuss the meaning of the word
"estate" as used in article 31-A for, in my opinion, the
argument of the learned Advocate-General founded on
article 31-B is well founded and ought to prevail.
1054
1952
Vjstveshiuar Rao
v.
The State of
Madhya
Pradesh
Das/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Mr. B. Somayya has drawn our attention to the words
"without prejudice to the generality of the provmons
of article 31-A occurring in the beginning of article
31-B and contended that •the interpretation put upon
these words by the Judicial Committee in Shibnath
Banerjee's case(') should be applied to them. I do
not see how the principles enunciated by the Judicial
Committee can have any possible application in the
interpretation of article 31-B. Article 31-B is neither
illustrative of, nor dependant on, article 31-A. The
words referred to were used obviously to prevent any
possible argument that article 31-B cut down the scope
or ambit of the general words used in article 31-A.
A question was raised by Mr. Asthana appearing
for the Ruler of Khairagarh who is the petitioner in
!Petition No. 268 of 1951. Khairagarh is one of the
States which formerly fell within the Eastern States
Agency. On 15th December, 1947, the Ruler entered
into a covenant of merger. In that covenant the properties in question were recognised as the personal properties of the Ruler as distinct from the State properties.
Reference is made to article 362 which provides that
in the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the
Legislature of a State to make laws or in the exercise
of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due
regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance
given under any such covenant or agreement as is
referred to in clause ( 1) of article 291 with respect to
the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the
Ruler of an Indian State. It is said that the impugned
Act is bad as it contravenes the above provisions.
There occur to me several answers to this contention.
The guarantee or assurance to which due regard is to
be had is limited to personal rights, privileges and
dignities of the Ruler qua a Ruler. It does not extend
to personal property which is different from personal
rights. Further, this article does not import any legal
obligation but is an assurance only.
AU that the
covenant does is to recognise the title of the Ruler as
owner of certain properties. To say that the Ruler is
(I) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 241; [1945] F.C.R. 195.
•
•
\'
\.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1055
1952
the owner of certnin properties is not to say that those
properties shall in no circumstances be · acquired by
Rao
the State. The fact that his personal properties are Visweshwar
v.
sought to be acquired on payment of compensation
The State of
clearly recognises his title just as the titles of other
Madhya
Pradesh
proprietors are recognised. Finally, the jurisdiction
of the Court to decide any dispute arising out of the
Das/.
covenant is barred by article 363.
In my judgment, for reasons stated above and
those stated in my judgment in the Bihar appeals,
these petitions must be dismissed.
CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR J.-I have nothing useful
to add and I agree with the orders made by my Lord
the Chief Justice and my learned brothers.
Petitz"ons dismissed.
>
\
Agents for the petitioners :
Petition No. 166 of 1951 : M. S. K. Sastri.
,,
No. 317 of 1951 : R. S. Narula.
,,
Nos. 228, 237, 245, 246 and 280 to 285 of
1951 : M. S. K. Sastri.
Nos. 230, 257 and 287 to 289 of 1951 :
"
"
"
"
Rajinder Narain.
No. 268 of 1951 : S. P. Varma.
No. 318 of 1951 : Ganpait Rai.
No. 487 of 1951 : Naunit Lal.
Agent for the Respondent (the State of Madhya
Pradesh) in all the petitions : P. A. Mehta.
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