DATTATREYA MORESHWAR PANGARKAR versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 27 March 1952 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 612 | 1952 INSC 18
Key facts
- Decided
- 27 March 1952
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- Habeas Corpus Petition No. 683/1951
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 612
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 18
Text of the judgment
·612
:SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1952
DATTATREYA MORESHWAR PANGARKAR
. Maret.. 27.
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS
[PATANJALI SASTRI
c. J., MEHER CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA, DAs
and CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR
JJ.]
Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), s. 11 (1)-Confirmatioo
of detention order after report of Advisory Board-Period of ft<rther
detention not specified-Order not expressed to be in the name of
Governor-Validity of detention-Executive decisions-Mode of
er{lression-Constitution of India, Art. 166 (1) and (2)-Whether
directory or mandatory.
.
Section 11, sub-s. (I), of the Preventive Detention Act, 195(),
provided that "in any case where the Advisory Board has reJX>rt~
ed that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention
of a person, the appropriate government may confirm the deten~
tion order and continue the detention for such period as it thinks
fit". The case of the petitioner who was arrested under the Act
was referred to the Advisory Board and on receiving a report
from the Board that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for
the detention of the petitioner the Government decided to confirm
the order of detention and this decision was communicated to
the District Magistrate. by a confidential letter signed by the
Assistant Secretary to the Government for the Secretary to the
Government. The material portion of the letter ran thus:-11Thc
Government is accordingly pleased to confirm the detention order
against the detenue. Please inform the detenue accordingly and
report compliance." In an application for a writ in the nature
of habeas corpus it was contended on behalf of the petitioner
that his detention was illegal: (i) because the Government had at
the time of confirming the order omitted to specify the" period
during which, the detention should continue; (ii) because the
ordCr of confirmation was not expressed to be made in the name
of the Governor as required by Art. 166 (1) of the Constitution:
Held, per PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA, DAs and
CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR _JJ. (MAHAJAN J. dissenting)-that thet
Omission to state the period 9f further dete,ntion while confirming the detention order under s. 11(1) .of the Preventive Detention Act could not render the detention illegal because, per
PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J. and DAs J.~n a proper construction
of s. 11 (!), a specification of the period of continuation of the
detention is not necessary, however desirable it may be; per
MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.-though s. 11 (!)
docs contemplate that a period should be· inentioned during
0
-
(
>
•
S.C.R.
St1Pl{EME COURT REPORTS
613
which the further detention of the detenue is to Continue, mere
omission to do so would not make the order a nullity and
justify release of the detenue.
Held also, per PATANJALI SAsTRl C. J., MuKHERJEA, DAs and
CHANDRASEKHAR.A A1YAR, JJ ., that though the Preventive Detention Act contemplates and requires the taking of an executive decision for confirming a detention order tinder s. 11(1), omission to
make and authenticate that executive decision in the form mentioned in Art. 166 will not make the decision itself illegal for the
provisions in that article are merely directory and not mandatory.
Per MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.-Section 11(1) c;if the Preventive Detention Act does contemplate a
formal order of confirmation and Art. 166(1) of the Constitution
would apply to the case ; clauses ( 1) and (2) of the said article
must however be read together. While cl. ( 1) relates to the mode
of expression of an executive order or instrument, cl. (2) lays
down the way in which such order is to be authenticated, and
when both these forms are complied with, an order or instrument would be immune from challenge in a court of law on the
ground that it has not been made or executed by the Governor
Even if cl. ( 1) is taken to be in independent proof the State.
vision uµconnected with cl. (2) and having no relation to the purpose indicated therein, cl. ( 1) is directory and not imperative in
its character.
> '
MAHAJAN J.-Section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act
contemplates that when the report of the Advisory Board reaches
the Government it has to come to a decision and pass an order in
accordance with that decision against the detenue to the effect
that in view of the report of the Advisory Board the detention
order is continued for a certain period and failure to fix the
period of further detention would make the detention illegal.
.-
A. K. Gopalan v. The State ([1950] S. C.R. 88}, Makhan Singh
Tarsikha v. The State of Punjab ([1952] S.C.R. 368), S. Krishnan v.
The State of Madras ([1951] S.C.R. 621), Chakar Singh v. The
State of Punjab (Petition No. 584 of 1951) and /. K. Gas Plant
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Others v. King Emperor ([1947] F.C.R.
14 l) referred to.
'
ORIGINAL JuRrsmCTION. Petition (No. 683 of 1951)
under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ
in the nature of habeas corpus. The facts are set out
in detail in the judgment.
Bawa Shiv Charan Singh (amicus curiae) for the
petitioner.
M. C. Setdvad, Attorney-General for
Lal, with him) for the respondents.
3-7 S. C. India/71
lhdia
(/tndra
1951
Dattatrtytl
Moreshwar ·
Pangorlc.ar
. v.
The State of
Bombay
aml Others,
614
1952.
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangark_ar
.-v.
The State of
Bombay
11nd Other"1.
Da1 ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
1952. March 27. The Court delivered judgment
as follows :DAs J.-This is an application under article 32 of
the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of
habeas cr>rpus and for the immediate release of the
petitioner who is alleged to have been kept in illegal
detention in Baroda Central Prison.
· On February 15, 1951, the petitioner was arrested
under an order made on February 13, 1951, by the
then District Magistrate, Surat, in exercise of powers
·conferred on him by the Preventive Detention Act,
1950. A copy of the said order was served on the
petitioner at the time of his arrest. On the same date
grounds of detention were served on the petitioner as
required by section 7 of the Act. It was specifically
mentioned in the grounds that it was not in the public
interest to disclose further facts. The petitioner moved
the High Court of Bombay under article 226 of the
Constitution complaining that his detention was illegal
and praying that he should be forthwith released. In
that application one of the points urged was that the
grounds in support of the detention were false, vague
and fantastic and that the detention order was made
fu bad faith. Two affidavits were filed on behalf of
the State in support of the detention order. That application was, on April 17, 1951, dismissed by the Bombay High Court. In the meantime, the case of the
petitioner was placed before the Advisory Board which
on April 5, 1951, made a report stating that in its
opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of
the petitioner. According to the affidavit of Venilal
T ribhovandas Dehejia, Secretary to the Government of
Bombay, Home Department, filed in answer to the
present application, this report of the Advisory Board
was placed before the Government and, on April 13,
1951, the Government decided to confirm the order of
detention. This decision was, on April 28, 1951, communicated to the District Magistrate, Surat, in a confidential letter in the terms following :-
.
-
-<
$.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
615
Confidential letter
Home Department
No. B.D. II/1042-D (11)
(Political)
Bombay Castle,
28th April, 1951.
To
The District Magistrate,
Surat.
-
'
-.>
Subject :-Preventive Detention Act, 195~
Review of detention orders issued under theReference your letter No. Pol. 1187JP, dated the 23rd
February, 1951, on the subject noted above.
2. In accordance with section 9 of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950, the case of detenue Shri ·Dattatreya
Moreshwar Pangarkar was placed before the Advisory
Board which has reported that there is sufficient cause
for his detention, Government is accordingly pleased
to confirm the detention order issued against the
detenu. Please inform the detenu accordingly and
report compliance.
3. The case papers of the detenu are returned
herewith.
Sd/- G. K. Kharkar,
for Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Home Department.
It also appears from the aforesaid affidavit that Sri
G. K. Kharkar who signed the letter for the Secretary
to the Government of Bombay, Home Department,
was at the time an Assistant Secretary and, as such,
was, under rule 12 of the Rules of Business made by
the Government of Bombay under article 166 of the.
Constitution, authorised to sign orders and instruments
of the Government of Bombay.
The petitioner has now moved this Court under
article 32 of the Constitution complaining that he is
being unlawfully detained. The only question is
whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty
in accordance with procedure established by law. He
1952
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar
v.
'The State of
Bombay
and Oth"s.
li16
Dattatreya
Mbreshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State uf
Bombay
tmd Others.
_Das /.
is said to be detained by rhg State In exercise of powers
conferred on it by the Preventive Detention Att, 1950;
·as . amended in 1951. The State must, accordingly,
satisfy us that the procedure established by law has
been s~ictiy followed.
Although a supplementary
petition has been filed in this Court complaining that
the grounds supplied to him are false, vague, lacking
in particulars and insufficient to enable the petitioner
to make an effective representation against the order
of detention, it has not; however, been pressed before
us by learned counsel appearing as aniictls curiae in
support af the application. At the hearing before us,
learned counsel has confined his arguments to challenging the validity of detention of the petitioner on two
grounds, namely, (1) that the State Gdvernment has
•failed to cdmply with the requirements of section 11(1)
tJf the amended Act ih that at the time of confirming
the detention order it oniitted to specify the period
thitihg which the detention would contihik, and (Z)
that the order of confirmation is not in proper legal
form, in that it is riot expressed to be made in the
name of the Governor as required by article 166(1) of
the Constitution.
"'--
Ground No. 1. The validity of this ground of attack
depends ori :i j:iroper understanding of section 11 ( 1) of
the Prevehtive Detention Act, Which, as amended,
runs as follows :~
" ( 1) In any case where the Advisory Board has
reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for
the detention of a person, the appropriate Government
may confirm the detention order
and continue t.he
detention for such period as it thiks fit".
--
The argument is that the sub-section contemplates
a decision containing two things, namely, (1) a confirmatiol). of the detention order and (2) a direction fot
the continuantion of the detention. I do riot think this
arglimer\t is sound, for if the intention were that both
the thing. should be included in an order then the
sub-section would have been worded _ differently.
It
would have ended by saying that "the appropriate
.
-+:-'
-
I..
'
•,
-'
-
Goverpment !llay make an order cpnfirming the dei~J}.·
tion order and continuiqg the detention for suc;:h
period as it thinks fit". Grammatically section lJ (1)
confers two powers, namely (1)
the appropriat~
Government rnay confirm the detention order and (2)
the appropriate Government may continue the deten•
tion for such period as it thinks fit. The confirmation
of the detention order certainly contemplates the
taking of .an executive decision, but the detenu being
l).lready in custody and the detention order being coil~
firmed his detention continues automatically anq;
therefore, no further executive d~cision is called for to
continue the detention. It follow~ that it is not nece~
sary to include a direction for the continuation of the
detention iI). the decision confirming the detention
order.
It is next suggested that the words "such -period"
· in the sub-section dearly imply that it is necessary to
specify the period during which the detention would
continue, for if the intention of Parliament were otherwise, the section would have stopped after the words
''may continue his detention". It is urged that if, as
hdd by this Court in Petition No. 308 of 1951
(Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab), it is
illegal, after the amendment of the Act, to mention
any period of detention in the initial order of deten~
tion made under section 3 of the Act and if no period
of detention need be mentioned at the time of confirmation under secti9n 11 (1) then the ·appropri~te
Government will; after confirmation, lose sight of the
case and the detenu will be detained indefinitely. It
is suggested that if two constructions are possibie, the
ooe that advances the interests
the subject should
be adopted. I do not think ·that two constructions
are possible at all or that the suggested construction
will be of any advantage to the detenue for reasons
w)licl}. I proceed to state briefly,
There can be no two opinions that detention withi;>ut t,rial is odious at all times and that it is desirable,
fherdfore, in oases of preventive <letention that a
definite period of detention should, if possible, . ~
ot
Dauatreya
Mgreshw11r
Pnqgarkt1r
v.
'flze State of
Bombay.
atJd Othm.
Pas/.
6i8
l95i
Dattatreya.
Moreshwar.
P<ingark._ar
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
-·-
Da> J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
specified. But whether the Act, on a true construction of it, requires such a specification of period
is an entirely different question and to answer that
question regard must be had to the actual language used in the Act. If the intention of Parliament
were that the period during which the detention
would be continued must be specified then the
sub-section · 11 (1) would
have empowered the
appropriate authority to continue the detention for
such "period as it thinks fit to specify" instead of
~'as it thinks fit". Further, the notion that nonspecification of the period will continue the detention for an
indefinite period need not oppress us unduly because
.the Act itself being of a limited duration such detention must nece.sisarily come to an end on the expiry of
the Act. In A. K. Gopa!.an's case('), Kania C. J. at
page 126 said :"It was argued that section 11 of the impugned
Act was invalid as it permitted the continuance of the
detention for such period as the Central Government or
the State Government thought fit. This may mean anindefinite period. · In my opinion, this argument has
no substance because the Act has to be read as a
whole; The whole life of the Act is for a year and therefore the argument that the detention may be for an
indefinite period is unsound."
To the like effect were the following observations of
Mahajan J. at page 232 :.. "Section 11 of the Act was also impugneJ on the
ground that it offended against the Constitution inasmuch as it · provided for preventive detention for , an
indefinite period. This section in my opinion has to
be read in the background of the provision in subclause (3) .of section 1 of the Act which says that the
Act will cease to have effect on .1st April, 1951".
These observations were made on section 11 of the
Act as it stood before the amendment of the Act.
That section has been substantially, if not verbatim,
reproduced in section 11 (1) of the amended Act and
(I) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
.
-
'·
-+- •
S.C.R.
..
'
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
accordingly the above observations will apply to the
present section 11 (1) with equal force and cogency.
Indeed in S. Krishnan v. The State of ·Madras(1)
Sastri J., as he then was expressed himself as follows
in connection with the present section 11 (1) :"The objection to the validity of section 11 (1)
can be disposed of in a few words. The argument is
that the discretionary power given to the appropriate
Government under that sub-section to continue the
detention "for such period as it thinks fit" authorises
preventive detention for an indefinite period, which is
contrary to the provisions of ~tide 22 (4). But, if as
already observed, the new Act is to be in force only
up to 1st. April, 1952, and no detention under the Act
can continue thereafter, the discretionary power could
be exercised only subject to that over-all limit."
Two points clearly emerge out of these observations
as I comprehend them. The very argument as to the
invalidity of the section could not be raised at all
except on the basis that the section, by itself and on a
true interpretation of it, permitted an indefinite detention. Iii the second place, this argument was met by the
Court, not by saying that that was not the correct meaning of the section and that on the contrary the words
"such period" necessitated the fixation of a definite
period of detention but, by saying that the life of the
Act being limited, the duration of detention permitted
by the section was in any event co-terminous with
the life of the Act and could not go beyond it. This
answer of the Court makes it clear that the Court fully
recognised that the section, by itself and on its true
iriterpremtioo., stanctioned an indefinift1e d!etention oot
held that that contingency had been averted by the
fact that the Act itself was of a limited duration. It
is said that the section should be .construed irrespective of whether it occurs in a temporary statute or a
permanent one, and it is urged that if the statute
were a permanent one the section, on the aforesaid interpretation, would have permitted an indefinite detention.
The answer is given by Mahajan J. in the
(1. [1951] S.C.R. 621 at P. 629.
.
1952
E>attatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar
\·
v.
The State of
Bombay
and 0 thers.
Das/.
62Q
1952
Dqttatrey4
Mortshwar
Pangarkar
. v.
The Stai. of
and OtAttt.
Bombay
Das/.
StJJ'REME COURT REPORTS
[!952]
following passage in his judgment in S. Krishnan v.
'The State of Madras (supra) at page 639 with which I
concurred :"It may be pointed out that Parliament may well
have thought that · it was unnecessary to fix any
maximum period of detention in the new statute which
was of a temporary nature an.cl whose own tenure of
life was limited to one year. Such temporary statutes
~ease to have any effect after they expiJ'.e, they autoroatically come to an end at the expiry of the. period
for which they have been enacted and nothing further
pm be don; under diem. The dereptjon of the petitioners therefore is bound to c0 me to an end automatii:al\y with the life of the statute and in these cir~umstanc~s Parliament may .well have thought that it
would be .wholly ·unnecessary to legislate ;ind · provide
a maximum period of detention for those detained
under this law.''
For all I know, such drastic and extensive power to
i:ontiriue the detention· as long as it may think fit may
not be given by Parliament to the executive Government in a permanent statute. But if it does think fit
·to do so, it will not be for the Court to question the
knowledge, wisdom or patriotism ·of the Legislature
and to permit its dislike for the policy of the law to
·prevail over the plain meaning of the language used
by the Legislature. Apart from this consideration,
there is a period specified in the sub-section itself,
for as·. soon as the appropriate Government will cease
'tO think fit to continue the detention it will revoke
·the detention order under section i3 and the period
of detention will automatically come to an end. Again,
.if the idea of indefinite detention were so repugnant
·as to induce us to construe sub-section 11(1} by reading inti:> it the . requirement that the period of detention
must be specified at the time the ,order of detention is
confirmed; it will lead us to a situatio11 which cannot
-be maintained In view of a decision of this Court.
The section, ir will be noticed, does not authorise the
'.apprapriate · Government to "continue the ·detention
for such period as it thinks fit from tirn~ to time."
.
-
-•
S.C.R.
-
'
>
--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
l952
Therefore, the power conferred on the appropriate
Government by this sub-section will be exhausted by
Dattatreya
its single exercise and it will not be possible to extend
Moreshwar
the period of detention any longer. This view of the
Pangarka1
v.
matter will, however, run counter to our decision in
T
/le
State
pf
Petition No. 584 of 1951, Chakar Singh v. The State of
Bombay
Punjab, where it has been held that there is nothing and Others.
in section 11 ( 1) to prevent the appropriate Government from directing the detention of a person to
Das f.
continue further so long as the period fixed bv
the previous order has not expired and the person
has not been released. According to this decision
the appropriate Government may direct the
detention to continue even after the expiry of the period
fixed by the order confirming the detention order or
any subsequent order provided such directions are
:given before the expiry of the period fixed by the immediately preceding order. From what source does the
appropriate Government derive its power to direct the
further continuation of the detention after having, in
the order of confirmation, once specified the period of
petention ? Section B of the Act gives power to the
.appropriate Government to revoke or amend a detention order which must mean the initial order of detention under section 3 of the Act but not an order made
under section 11 (1) confirming a detention order or
fixing a period of detention. Therefore, the authority
to extend the period of · detention previously fixed
which, in view of our decision, must be held· to exist,
will have to be derived from the very words "may
continue such detention for such period as it thinks
fit". It follows, therefore, that the specification of the
period of detention .does not destroy or abridge the
wide over-all power of the appropriate Government to
direct the continuation of the detention as long as it
thinks fit. If the specification of the period of detention is not at all sacrosanct and the appropriate Govern,ment may nevertheles·s continue the detention as long
as it thinks fit to do so, why is the specification of a
.period to be regarded aJ> vitally or at all necessary ?
SP far as· the detenu. i~ concem~; · . his detention will
622
1952
Dattatreya
Mot:eshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
Das/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
not be any more definite and less irksome if it is open
to the appropriate Government to continue the detention by an indefinite number of orders made from time
to time until the expiry of the Act itself by affiux of
time in the case of a temporary statute or by its repeal
in the case of a permanent Act. It is said that if we
insist on a specification of a definite period when the
confirmatory order is made and thereafter each time
the period of detention is extended then the appropriate
Government will have to apply its mind to the case of
the detenu before it will make an order for further
continuation of the detention, but that if we say that
no. time need be specified, the appropriate Government
will lose sight of the case and the detenu will be detained indefiniltely. I do not see why we should impute
such dereliction of duty to the appropriate Government ;.
but even if we do so and insist on the specification of
the period. of detention we shall perhaps be driving the
appropriate Gqvernmen.t to fix the longest permissible
period of detention ending with the expiry of the Act
itself and then to lose sight of the case of the detenu•.
That, I apprehend, will do no good to the detenu. Section 13 gives ample power to the appropriate Government to revoke the detention order at any time and it
iS expected that it will apply its mind to each case and
revoke the detention order and release the detenu as
soon as it is satisfied that his detention is no longer
necessary. In any event, the considerations of, hardship urged upon us may make it desirable that a period
of detention should be fixed but this cannot alter the
plain meaning of the language of the section. The Court
is not concerned wi.th any question of policy. It has
to ascertain the intention of the Legislature from. the
language used in the Act. In my judgment, on a pr<>-per construction of section 11 ( 1), a specification of the
period of continuation of the detention is not necessary, however, desirable one may consider it to be .
.. Ground No. 2 : On this head the argument of learned
counsel for the petitioner . is. that no valid order of
confirmation has been made in proper legal form at
all and that a confidential communication from the-
.
-
··•
-.!<'-
-
S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
1952
Home Department to the District Magistrate cannot
be regarded as an order under section 11(1) of the Act.
Dattatreya
Learned Attorney-General urges that section 11(1) of
Moreshwar
the Act contemplates only the .taking of an executive
Pangarkar
v.
decision, namely, the confirmation of the detention
order and contends that the sub-section does not con- The State ol
template the making of a formal order. He draws our andBomhay
Dthers.
attention to section 3 of the Act which expressly refers
to an order of detention and points out .that section 11
Das/.
(1) does· not refer to any order of confirmation. Reference may, however, be made to section 13 which ·
authorises the appropriate Government to revoke or
modify the order of detention. In this section also
there is no reference to any order of revocation or
modification but nevertheless revocation or modification must imply an executive decision. Under section
11(1), as under section 13, the appropriate Government has to apply its mind and come to a decision.
Whether we call it an order or merely an executive
action makes no difference in the legal incidents of the
decision. Section 11(1) plainly requires an executive
decision as to whether the detention order should or
should not be confirmed. The continuation of the
detention as a physical fact automatically follows as
a consequence of the decision to confirm the detention
order and, for reasons stated above, does not require
any further executive decision to continue the detention.. It follows, therefore, that the Preventive Detention Act contemplates and requires the taking of an
executive decision either for confirming the detention
order under section 11 ( 1) or for revoking or modifying. the · detention order under section 13. But the Act
is silent as to the form in which the executive decision,
whether it is described as an· order or an executive
action, is to be taken. No particular form is prescribed
by the Act at all and the requirements of the Act will
be fully satisfied if it can be shown that the executive
decision has in fact been taken. It is at this stage that
learned counsel for the petitioner passes on to article
166 of the Constitution and contends that all executive action of the Government of a State must be
§24
195l
Dattatr.era
Moreshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
Dai/.
STJPREM~
COURT REPORTS
[1952]
expressed and authenticated in .the manner therein
provided. The learned Attorney-General poil)ts out
that there is a distinction between the taking of an
exec~tive decision and giving formal expression to the
dec1S1on so taken. Usually· executive decision is taken
on the office files by way of notings or endorsements
. made by the appropriate Minister or 9fficer. If every
executive decision has to be given a formal expression
·the wh61e governmental machinery, he contends, will
be brought to a standstill. I agree that every executive decision need not be formally expressed and this
is particularly so when one superior officer directs his
subordinate to act or forbear from acting in a particular way, but when the executive decision affects an
outsider or is required .to be officially notified or to be
communicated it should normally be expressed in the
form mentioned in article 166(1), i.e., in the na!IlC of
the Governor., Learned Attorney-General then fails
back upon the plea that an omission to make and
authenticate an executive decision in the form mentioned in article · 166 does not make the decision itself
illegal, for the provisions of that article, like their
counterpart in the Government of India Act, are merely
dire~tory and not mandatory as held in /; K. Gas Plant'.
Manufacturing Co. (Rampur) Ltd. and Others v. The
King-Emperor('). In my opinion, this contention of
the learned Attorney-General must pre,.,ail. It is well
settled that generally speaking the provis'ions of a
sJ:a;tute creating public .duties are directory and those
conferring priYate rights are imperative. When the
provisions of .a statute relate to the performance of a
public duty and the case is such that to hold null and
void acts done in neglect of this duty would work
serious general ·inconvenience or injustice to persons
who hav.e no control over those entrusted with the .duty
and at the same time would not promote the main
object .of the legislature, it has been the practice of th~
Courts to hold such provisions to be directory ·only,
the neglect ,,f them not affecting the validity of the
acts done. The considerations which weighed
twith
{1) [19l7] F.C.R. 141 (1449).
. ..:
S.C.R,
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
62'
their L.Ordships of the Federal Court in the case referred to above in the matter of interpretation of section
40 (1) of the 9th Schedule to the Government of India
Act, 1935, appear to me to apply with equal cogency
to article 166 of the Constitution. The fact that the
old provisions have been split up into two clauses in
artide 166 does, not appear to me to make any difference in the meaning of the article. Strict compliance
with the re.qilireinents of article 166 gives an immunity
to the order in that it cannot be challenged on the
ground that it is not an order made by the Governor.
If, therefore, the requirements of that article are not
complied with, the resulting immunity cannot be
claimed by the State. This, however, does not vitiate
the order itself. The position, t!herefore, is that while
the Preventive Detention Act requires an executive
decision, call it an order .or an executive action, for the
confirmation of an order of detention under section
11 (1) that Act does not itself pr~ribe any particular
form of expression of that executive decision. Article
166 directs all executive action to be expressed and
authenticated in the manner therein laid down but an
omission to comply with those. provisions does not
render the executive action a nullity. Therefore, all
that the procedure established by law requires is that
the appropriate Government must take a decision as to
whether the detention order . should be confirmed or
not undt::r section 11 (1). That such a decision has been
in fact taken by the appropriate Government is amply
proved on the record. Therefore, there has been, in the
circumstances of this case, no breach of the procedure
establitsed by law and the present detention of the
petitioner cannot be called in question.
For the reasons stated above, in my opinion, this
applica,tion must fail.
PATANJALI SASTRI
just delived by my
nothing to add.
c. J.-I agree with the judgment
learned brother Das and I have
MUKHERJEA J.-In
my opinion this application.
should be dismissed and I deem it proper to state
19$2
--·Dattatuyti
MlJreshwar
Pangatkar
v.
Thi! State of
Bombay
afld Others,
Das/.
626
1952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
succinctly my own' views on the questions that have
been raised in the case.
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State of
Bombay
.and Others.
Muf<herjea /.
The validity of the detention of the petitioner has
been challenged before us on a two-fold ground. The
first ground urged is that it was imperative on the
part of the appropriate Government, when it confirmed
the order of detention under section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act, to sepcify the period during
which the detention was to continue; and an omission
to state the period vitiates the order. The other contention raised is that the order of confirmation not
being expressed to be made in the name of the
Governor, as is required under article 166 (1) of the
Constitution, is void and inoperative.
.
So far as the first ground is concerned, it would be
necessary to advert to the language of section 11 ( 1) of
the Preventive Detention Act which runs as follows :"11. Action upon the report of Advisory Board.( 1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported
that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the
detention of a person, the appropriate Government
may confirm the detention order and continue the
detention of the person concerned for such period as it
thinks fit."
It is to be noted that section 3(1) of the Preventive
Detention Act under which the initial order of deten- .
tion is made i~ worded differently in this respect and it '
merely empowers the Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be, to make an order,
under the circumstances specified in the section,
directing that a person be detained ; and nothing is
said about the period for which such detention should
be directed. It is now settled by a pronouncement( 1 )
of .this court that not only it is not neces.sary for the
detaining authority to mention the period of detention
when passing the original order under section 3( 1) of
r the Preventive Detention AcJ, but that the order would
be .bad and illegal if any period is specified, as it might
(!) Vide Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab, Petition No· 308
of 1951.
_,.A:
-
S.C.R.
-
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
627
prejudice the case of the detenu when it goes up for
consideration before the Advisory Board. The Advisory
Board again has got to express its opinion only on the
point as to whether there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned. It is neither called upon
nor is it competent to say anything regarding
the
period for which such person should be detained. Once
the Advisory Board expresses its view that there is
sufficient cause for detention at the date when it makes
its report, what action ~ to be taken subsequently is
left entirely to the appropriate Government and it can
under section 11(1) of the Act "confirm the detention
order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit." In my opinion, the
words "for such period as it thinks fit" presuppose
and imply that after receipt of the report of the
Advisory Board the detaining authority has to make
up its mind as to whether the original order of detention should be confirmed and if .so, for what further
period the detention is to continue. Obviously that is
the proper stage for making an order or decision of this
description as the investigation with regard to a particular detenu such as is contemplated by the Preventive
Detention Act is then at an end and the appropriate
Government is in full posses,5ion of all .the materials
regarding him. It could not have been in the contemplation of the legislature that the matter should be left
indefinate and undetermined even then. This, in my
opinion, is the reason for the difference in the language
of section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act as
compared with that of section 3 (1) of the Act. I do
not think that once the appropriate Government in
making the order under section 11(1) specifies the
period during which the detention of the person concerned is to continue, it becomes functus officio and is
incapable of extending the detention for a further
period at a subsequent time if it considers necessary.
In my opinion, section 13 of the Act gives very wide
powers to the detaining authority in this respect and
it can revoke or modify any detention order at any
time it chooses and the power of modification would
1952
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
Mukherjea /.
r
628
Dattdtftyii
MMtsht/J/Jf
Pangatkal'
.v.
The State of
Bombay
Rnd Othel's.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
certainly include a power of extension. of the pericld of
detention, provided such power ~ exercised before the·
period originally fixed has expired and provided the
extended period does not exceed the over-all limit
which is co-extensive with the life or duration of the
Act itself. This is quite in accordartce with the view
taken by this court in Chakar Singh v. The State of
Punjab(').
The question now is whether the om1ss10n to state
the period of further detention while confirming the
detention order under section 11(1) of the Preventive
Detention Act makes the detention illegal ? The point
is not free from doubt, but having regard to the fact
that the new Preventive Detention Act iii a temporary
statute which was to be in force only up to the 1st of
April, 1952, and has only been recently extended to a
further period of six months, and no detention under
the Act can continue after the date of expiry of the
Act, I am inclined to hold that non-specification of the
further period in an order under section 11(1) of the
Act does not make the order of detention a nullity.
If no period is mentioned, the order might be taken
to imply that it would continue up to the date of the
expiration of the Act itself when all detentions made
under it would automatically come to an end. Of
course, the appropriate Government is always
at
liberty to terminate the order of detention earlier, if it
considers proper, in exercise of its general powers
under section 13 of the Act. I am not much impressed by the argument that the non-mentioning of the
period in the order of confirmation is . likdy to cause
serious prejudice to the interests of the detenu. It
may be that if a period is mentioned, the attention of
the Government is likely to he drawn to the case near
about the time when the period is due to expire and
the facts of the case may be reviewed by the appropriate authority at that .time before it decides to
extend the detention any further ; but it seems to me
to be clear from the provision of section 13 that the
Act contemplates review of individual cases by the
(\)Petition No. 584of1951.
. .,-
•,
S.C.R.
.;
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
appropriate Government from time to time , irrespective
of any period being mentioned in the order of detention. It can legitimately be expected that the detaining authority would discharge the duties which are
imposed upon it, but even if it does not, there is
nothing in the law which prevents it from fixing the
period of detention up to the date of expiry of the Act
itself which is by no means a long one, and in that
case the Court would obviousfr be powerless to give
any relief to the detenu. It is perfectly true that an
order for detention for an indefinite period is repugnant to all notions of democracy and individual liberty,
but the indefiniteness in the case of an order made
under section 11 (I) of the Preventive Detention Act
is in a way cured by the fact that there is a limit set
to the duration of the Act itself, which automatically
prescribes a limit of time beyond which the order
cannot operate. In my opinion, section 11(1) of the
Preventive Detention Act does contemplate that a
period should be mentioned during which the further
detention of the detenu is to continue and the Government should see that no om1ss10n occurs in this
respect, but I am unable to hold that this omission
alone would make the order a nullity which will justify
us in .releasing the detenu.
The other question for consideration is, whether the
order is invalid by reason of the fact that it has not
been expressed in the manner laid down in article 166
of the Constitution. Article 166 runs as follows:"166 (1). All executive action of the Government
of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name
of the Governor.
> -+
'.
(2) Orders and other instruments made and
executed in the name of the Governor shall be
authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the
validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground
that it is not an order or instrument made or executed
by the Governor.
4-7SCI/71
1952
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
Mukherjea /.
630
1952
D.uatrey11
Moresnu,.,
...
P=gark""
The State ot
Bombo1
1md Others.
M~/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
(3) The Governor shall make rules for the more con·venient transaction of the business of the Government
of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of
the said business in so far as it is not business with
respect to which the Governor is by or under this
Constitution required to act in his discretion."
ln the case before us the order confirming the detention purports to be signed by Mr. G. K. Kharkar, for
the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home
Department. The affidavit filed in this case by
V. T. Dehejia .shows that Mr. Kharkar was then the
Assistant Secretary to the Home Department and was
authorised under the rules framed under article 166
(3) of the Constitution by the Governor of Bombay to
sign orders and instruments for the Government of
Bombay. T:he order admittedly is not expressed to be
made in the name of the Governor and i£ article 166
(1) of the Constitution applies to this case, it certainly
does not fulfil the requirement of that provision. To
get round this difficulty the learned Attorney-General
has put forward a two-fold argument. He has argued
in the first place that article 166 ( 1) of the Constitution applies to a case where the executive action has
got to be expressed in the shape of a formal order ;
and it is only such order that requires authentication
in the manner laid down in clause (2) of the article.
Section 11·(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, it is
said, does not neces.sitate the passing of a formal
order at all. It is enough i£ the detaining authority
decides by any form of executive action that the
original .order of detention should be confirmed. The
other argument put forward is that the provisions of
clauses ( 1) and (2) of article 166 are directory and not
mandatory in the sense that even if a particular order
is not expressed or authenticated in the ·way mentioned
in these prm1isions, it would not be an ineffective or
invalid order ,provided it is proved to have been made
by ·the proper authority to ·whom that particular business has been allocated :by the rules framed under
clause (3) cl .article 166. The only result of such
omission may be that the order would not enjoy an
.
.•
+
-
S.C.R.
>.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
immunity from challenge on the ground
clause (2) of the article.
631
specified in
So far as the first point is concerned, it seems to
me to be quite correct to hold that article 166(1) of
the Constitution is confined to cases where the executive action requires to be expressed in the shape of a
formal order or notification or any other instrument.
I cannot, however, agree with the learned AttorneyGeneral that section 11 ( 1) of the Preventive Detention Act does not contemplate the passing of a formal
order. It is true that section 11(1) does not speak of
an order of confirmation but when there is an initial
order of detention made under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, it could normally be confirmed
only by passing another order. This would be clear
from the provision of section 13 of the Act which empowers the detaining authority to revoke or modify a
detention order any time it chooses. Neither revocation nor modification is possible without any order
being made to that .effect and yet section 13 like section 11 (I) does not speak of an order at all. The first
contention of the Attorney-General therefore cannot
succeed.
The other contention raised by the learned AttorneyGeneral involves consideration of the question as to
whether the provision of article 166 (1) of the Constitution is imperative in the sense that non-compliance
with it would nullify or invalidate an executive action.
The clause does not undoubtedly lay down how an
executive action of the Government of a State is, to be
performed; it only prescribes the mode in which such
act is to be expressed. The manner of expression is
ordinarily a matter of form, but whether a rigid compliance with a form is essential to the validity of an
act or not depends upon the intention of the legislature. Various tests have been formulated in various
judicial decisions for the purpose of determining whether a mandatory enactment shall he considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification
for disobedience. It is unnecessary for our present
1952
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar
v.
T /le State of
Bombay
and Others.
Muk,herjea /,
632
1952
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangark_ar
"·
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
Mukheriea /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
pu~p.ose to discuss these matters in detail.
In my
opm10n, article 166 of the Constitution which purports
to lay down the procedure for regulating business
transacted by the Government of a State should be read
as a whole. Under clause (3) the Governor is to make
rules for the more convenient transaction of such business and for allocation of the same among the Ministers
in so far as it does not relate to matters in regard to
w hi th the Governor is required to act in his discretion. It is in accordance with these rules that business
has to be transacted. But whatever executive action
is to be taken by way of an order or instrument, it
shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the
Governor in whom the executive power of the State
is vested and it shall further be authenticated in the
manner specified in the rules framed by the Governor.
Clauses (1) and (2) of article 166 in my opinion are
to be read together. Clause (1) cannot be taken separately as an independent mandatory provision detached
from the provision of clause (2). While clause ( 1)
relates to the mode of expression of an executive order
or instrument, clause (2) lays down the way in which
such order is to be authenticated ; and when both
these forms are complied with, an order or instrument
would be immune from challenge in a court of law
on the ground that it has not been made or executed
by the Governor of the State. This is the purpose
which underlies these provisions and I agree with the
learned Attorney-General that non-compliance with
the provisions of either of ·the clauses would lead to
this result that the order in question would lose the
protection which it would otherwise enjoy, had the
proper mode for expression and authentication been
adopted. It could be challenged in any court of law
even on the ground that it was not made by the
.Governor of the State and in case of such challenge
the onus would be upon the State authorities to show
.affirmatively that the order was in fact made by the
.Governor in accordance with the rules framed under
.article 166 of the Constitution.. This view receives
·support ·from a pronouncement of the Federal Court
'
•
•
s:c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
in /. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Company Limited
and Others v. King-Emperor(1), where a somewhat
analogous provision contained in section 49(1) of Schedule IX of the Government of India Act came up for
consideratipn and the provision was held !to be
directory and not imperative.
. Even if clause (1) of article 166 is taken to be an
independent provision unconnected with clause (2) and
having no relation to the purpose which is indicated
therein, I would still be of opinion that it is directory
and not imperative in its character. It prescribes a
·formality for the doing of a public act. As has been
said by Maxwell(2), "where the prescriptions of a
statute relate to the performance of a public duty and
where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them
would work serious general inconvenience or injustice
to persons who have no control over those entrusted
._with the duty without promoting the essential aims of
· the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally
. understood as mere instructions for the guidance an"d
government of those on whom: the duty is imposed, or
in other words as directory only." In the present case
the order under section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act purports to be an order of the Government·
of Bombay and is signed by the officer who was com. petent to sign according to the rules framed by the
Governor under article 166 of the Constitution, and
in these circumstances I am unable to hold that the
· order is a nullity even though it has not been expressed
to be made in the name of the Governor. The result
is that both the grounds fail and the petition is
dismissed.
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-1 concur in the order
just now pronounced by my learned brother
. Mukherjea J. and I have nothing useful to add.
MAHAJAN J.-The legality of the detention of the
·petitioners in all the above-mentioned petitions ts
challenged on two grounds: (1) That the order of
....._-t
(1) [1947] F.C.R. 142.
. . (2). Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, pp. 379-80.
1952
Dattatreya
Moreshwar.
Pangarkar
. v.
·rhe State of
Bombay
and Others..
Mukheriea /;
634
1952
Dattatreya
Uori!shwar
Pangarktlr
. v.
T
n• Stai. of
Bombay
and Others.
Mahaian f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
continuance of .the detention made under section 11
of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, as amended,
does not specify the period of detention. (2) That it is
not expressed "in the name of the Governor" as required by article 166 ( 1) of the Constitution. The
petitioners were informed through the District Magistrate that government had confirmed the detention
orders but they were not told for what period their
detentions were to continue. No order expressed in
the manner contemplated by article 166(1) was served
on them.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that
the requirements of the Preventive Detention Act
should be strictly complied with, that it was one of
the requirements of section 11 of the Act that the
government should at the time of confirming the detention order specify the period of the continuante of
such detention and that non-compliance in this particular vitiated the tontinuance order. It was further
urged th:it unless the order was expressed in the manner required under article 166(1) of the Constitution
and served on the person concerned it had no force.
The learned Attorney-General ontested both these
contentions. He argued that it was not incumbent on
government to make any formal order under section
1.1 and all that the section contemplates is an executive action indicating an intention of the government
to confirm the detention order and continue the detention after receipt of the report of the Advisory Board,
that there was nothing in the language of the section
which obliged the government to specify the period
of such ·detention and that any omission to mention
the period would not make the continuation of the
detention illegal. It was also argued that the action
of the government under section 11 need not necessarily be expressed as required in article 166( 1) that
these provisions were merely directory :ind not mandatory ~hd had been substantially complied with.
For a proper appraisal of these tOntentions it is
necessary to set out the relevant provisions elf the
S.C.R.
-
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
Constitution and of the Preventive Detention Act.
Articles 22 (4) and (5) of the Constitution are in these
terms:" ( 4) No law providing for preventive detention
shall authorise the detention of a person for longer
period than three months unless( a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who
are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as,
Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in
its opinion sufficient cause for such detention ........... .
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an
order made under any law providing for preventive
detention, the authority making the order shall as
soon as may be, communicate to such person the
grounds on which the order has been made and shall
afford him the earliest opportunity of making
representation against the order."
Sections 3, 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the Preventive Detention Act provide as follows :"3. The Central Government or rhe State Government may--(a) if satisfied with respect to any person
that with a view to preventing him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to ............ it is necessary so to do,
make an order directi'ng that such person be detained.
"9. In every case where a detention order has been
made under this Act, the appropriate Government
shall, within six weeks from the date specified in subsection (2) place before an Advisory Board constituted
by it under section 8 the grounds on which the order
has been made and the representation, if any, made
by the person affected by the order, and in Ca.<lje where
the order has been made by an officer, also the report
made by such officer under sub-section (3) of section 3."
"10. (1) the Advisory Board shall, after considering
the materials placed before it and, after calling for
such further information, as it may deem necessary,
from the appropriate Government at from the person
concerned, and if in any particular cise it considers
it essential, after hearing him in person, $Ubmit its
1952
Dtmatreyo
MMeshtvttr
PtmttJrlf.•
v.
Tiie Stt1te of
Bomh'lty
and Otkers.
636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952]
1952
report to the appropriate Government within ten week_s
from the date specified in sub-section (2) of section 9.
Dattatreya
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify
Moreshwar .
Pangarkar
in a separate part thereof the opinion of the Advisory
v.
Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for
The State of"
the
detention of the person concerned."
Bombay·
and Others. "
"11. (1) In any case where the Advisory Board
has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause
Mahajan/;,
for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue
the detention of the person concerned for such period
as it thinks fit.
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has
reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause
for the detention of the person concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order and
cause the person to be released forthwith."
"13. ( 1) Without prejudice to the prov1s1ons of
section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of
1897), a detention order may at any time be. revoked
or modified, ............ .
(2) The revocation of. a detention order shall not
bar the making of a fresh detention order under section 3 against the same person."
The answer to the first question depends on the
construction to be placed upon the words "such period
as it thinks fit" occurring in section 11 of the Act.
The words have to be given their plain meaning irrespective of the circumstances that they occur in a
temporary statute and have to be construed in the
same manner if they occurred in a permanent statute.
It has been held by this Court in Mak_kan Singh
Tarsikha v. State of Punjab, Petition No. 308 of 1951,
that fixing · of the period of detention in the initial·
order of detention under section 3 is contrary to the
scheme of the Act inasmuch as such a construction
tends to prejudice the case of the detenu when placed
before the · Advisory Board. It was · emphasized that
before a person is deprived of his personal. liberty, the
procedure ·established· by law must be strictly followed
.
, <
.
--
S.C.R.
.
-
,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
637
and must not be departed from to the disadvantage
of the person affected. The language employed in
section 11 of the Act is different from the language of
section 3 and to my mind, this difference indicates a
contrary intention. The words "such period as it
thinks fit" have the meaning that government has to
specify and fix the period of such detention. If these
words were construed in the manner suggested by the
learned Attorney-General, it will lead to the result
that the Preventive Detention Act would authorise
detention of a person without specification of the period
of such detention at any moment of time, subject of
course to the over-all limit fixed for the life of the Act
itself, and that the government would not be obliged
to apply its mind to the question of duration at all.
Such a conclusion, to my mind, has to be avoided
unless the language employed
conclusively points
to it.
llnder the Constitution, the detention of a person
under any law providing for preventive detention
cannot be for a period of more than three months
unless the Advisory Board is of the opinion that there
is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned. The Constitution itself has specified the
maximum limit of the initial detention and detention
for a period longer than three months can only be
made on the basiSi of the report of the Advisory Board.
The words "longer period than three months" to my
mind do not indicate that the period can be of indefinite duration, as it could be under the unique Regulation III of 1818. On the other hand, they indicate
a specified period, though longer than three months.
The Constitution visualizes, in my opinion, a period
of detention initially for three months, which may
subsequently be extended for a further period of time;
but it rules out the idea of detention without a fixed
duration, i.e., with a beginning but without an end.
Any notion of an indefinite period of detention is
wholly foreign to a democratic constitution like ours.
As pointed out by me in Gopalan's case(1), the law of
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
1952
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
Mahajan /.
638
1952
Dattatreya
Morcshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
MahajllfJ /.
SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS
[1952]
preventive detention during peace tirnes is an evil of
necessity as it deprives a person of his personal liberty
without a trial and even without a personal hearing
and that being so, the safeguards provided against
unregulated executive action have to be construed
as widely as possible for the benefit of a person
detained. The Word& "such period" [imply that
there has to be a beginning and an end of that period;
in other words, it has to be for a certain duration the
extent depending on the pleasure of the government.
Though the government is entitled to fix the period of
detention at its choice, it is bound to make a decision
about it. If this was not the ttue import and meaning
of the language employed in the section and the intention was that the government need not specify the duration of the detention, the section, in my view would
have been drafted differently. There was no necessity
to use the words "for such period as it thinks fit,.
therein at all. The intention would have been well
expressed if the section wa·s worded a:s follows :- ·
"The appropriate Government may confirm the
detention order".
It was on th·ese lines that rule 26 of the Defence of
India Rules was drafted and the saine was the scheme
of Regulation III of 1818. The warrant to the jailer
in the regulation directed him to reecive the person
into custody and to deal with him in conformity with
the orders of the Governor-General. The same phraseology could. have been employed in section 11.
It has been held by this Court in Chakkar Singh v.
The State of Ptmjab (Petition No. 584 of 1951), that
the power of the detaining authority under section 11
is not exhausted once it specifies the period of detention but that it can, before the expiration of the period
initially fixed, direcjt the detention of a person to
continue for a further period. I took this view for the
simple reason that it was in accord with the provisions
of the General Clauses Act which provide that the
authority which has the power to make a certain order
ot to give a certain dire·ctidn has also the power before
it becomes ff!nctus officio to revise and fecdnsider that
•
$.C.R.
SuPREME COUR.T REPORTS
639
order or to atriend or to alter it. That decision does
not by implications suggest that it was not obligatory
on government to specify the period of detention
under section 11. On the other hand, it presupposes
that sl.lch a period should be fixed but the Government
can change its mind if it considers necessary.
I
/
~
The conclusion that the section authorizes detention
for an indefinite period was negatived by the late Chief
Justice :ind by me in Gopalan's case(1). The learned
Chief Justice in that case in dealing wLth section 11
made the following observaitions :"It was argued that section 11 of the impugned
Act was invalid as it permitted the continuance of the
detention for such period as the central Government
or the State Government thought fit. This may mean
an indefinite period. In my opinion this argument has
no substance because the Act has 1to be read as a
whole. The whole life of the Act is for a year and therefore the argument that the detention may be for an
iridefiriite period is unsound."
In the same case I said as follows :-
"Section 11 of the Aat was also impugned on the
ground that it offened against the Constitution inasmuch as it provided for preventive detention for an
indefinite period. This section in my opinion has to
be read in clie background of the provision in sub.
clause (3) of section 1 of the Act which says that the
Act will ~ease to have effect on 1st April, 1951."
In S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras(2), the question
of the validity of section 11 was again examined. The
court took the view that the section was good. Bose J.
dissenting held that the sectit>n was bad as it provided
for an indefinite period of detention. Patanjali
Sastri J., as he then was, and with whom the learned
Chief Justice agreed as to the validity of the section
observed as follows :"The objection to the validity of section 11 (1) can
be disposed of in a few words. The argument is that
th~ discretionary p<ilwer given to the
appropriate
(1) {1950] S.C;R. 88.
(2) (1951] s,c.R. 621.
1952
Dattatreya
Mtireslttt1ar
Pdngarklir
v.
T !te State of
Bombay
imd Otltt:f'I.
M11haitin /.
640
1952
Dattatreya
Moreshwar..
Pangarl{ar
v.
The State. of
Bombay
and Others"
Mahajan 1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Government under that sub-section to continue the
detention 'for such period as it thinks fit' authorises
preventive detention for an indefinite period, which is
contrary to the provisions of article 22(4). But, if as
·already observed, the new Act is to be in force only up
to 1st April, 1952, and no detention under the Act can
continue thereafter, the discretionary power could be
exercised only subject to that over-all limit."
In the same case while upholding the validity of
·section 11, I made the following observations :"It may be pointed out that Parliament rooy well
have thought that it was unnecessary to fix any . maximum period of detention in the new statute which was
.of a temporary nature and whose own tenure of life
was limited to one year. Such temporary statutes
cease to have any effect after they expire, they aut0:matically come to an end at the expiry of the period
for which they have been enacted and nothing further
can be . done under them. The detention of the petitioners therefore is bound to come to an end automatically with the life of the statute and in these circumstances Parliament may well have thought that it
would be wholly unnecessary to legislate and provide
·a maximum period of detention for those detained
under this law."
The point for decision that case was whether it
·was necessary while enacting the Preventive Detention
Act to fix a maximum period for the detention of a
person as contemplated by article 22 (7) of the Constitution, and whether for want of such fixation the
statute was void. That contention was negatived. The
point that arises for determination in the present case,
however, is whether the Government when making an
.order under section 11 of the Act has got to specify a
period for the continuance of the detention. The question as to the meaning of the words "such period as it
thinks fit" was neither argued nor decided in either of
the cases mentioned above. The result of the above
not
decisions to my mind is this : that section 11
provide for an indefinite p~riod of detention and is not
bad on that ground, though Bose J. took a contrary
<loo
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
641
view. The section in view of these decisions should
read thus:"In any case where the Advisory Board has
reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for
the detention of a person, the appropriate Government
may confirm the detention order and continue the
detention of the person concerned for such period as it
thinks fit, (but not beyond the period of the life of the
Act itself)."
...
'
Within the period of the life of the Act the Government can fix any period for the duration of the detention. The words "such period as it thinks fit'', in my
opinion, oblige the Government to fix a period of the
detention of the person concerned within the over-all
limit of the period of the life of the Act. The government must make up its mind and decide in each individual case after the receipt of -the report of the Advisory Board whether a particular detenu has to be kept
in detention for the whole of the over-all period, or
for any period shorter than that. It cannot be presumed that every case requires detention for the maximum
period. That decision is however subject to review and
alteration before the time originally determined runs
out.
The contention that the Government need make no
order at all under section 11 and that it can indicate
its intention by some other method seems to me to be
unsound. This result was sought to be spelt out of the
phraseology of sections 3 and 11 of the Act. Section 3
provides for the making of an order of detention, while
section 11 does not use that phraseology. In my
opinion, however, tthis difference in the phraseology of
the two sections doe.Si not in any way support the contention raised. The making of an order is implicit in the
language of the section itself. Confirmation of an order
already passed can only be by making an order. The
section in another part provides for the revocation of an
order. Revocation of an order again can only be made
by passing an order of revocation and cannot be done
by any other process. Section 13 provides not only for
1952
Dattatrcya
Morcshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
Mahajan/.
642
1952
Dal!~!reya
· M,oreshrpty"
Pangark~r
v.
The Sta.te pf
BombaJI
ani! O.thers.
Mahajan /.
SUPREME COURT l,lEPORTS
[1952]
revocation of an order but for modification of the order
of detention. It is obvious that the modification . of an
order JS only possible by passing a fresh order and not
in any other manner. No particular significance can
attach to the omission of the words "make an order"
in section 11. The word "order" has numerous meanings but the meaning relevan.t in the present · context
is "decision". It also means "an au;thorij1<ative direction or mandate".
It cannot be contended that
Government can confirm or continue the detention
without taking a decision or issuing a direction. Such
a decision or direction is tantamount to an order. I am
therefore clearly of the view that it is the intention of
the law that when the report of the Advisory Board
reaches the Government, it has to come to a decision
and pass· an· order in accordance with that decision
against the detenu to the effect that in view of the
report of the Advisory Board the detention order LS
continued for a certain period.
Reliance was placed by the learned Attorney-General
in support of hi·s contention on two decisions of the
High Courts in India. In Prahlad Krishna v. The State
of Bombay('), it was held that it was not necessary to
mention the period during which the detenu will be
further detained after the State Government had confirmed the detention order. This conclusion was reached
on the following reasoning :"The words of the section are exactly similar in
effect to the words of a contract between two parties
ill which one said to the other that the latter should
keep a cycle lent by the former for such period as he
thought fit. There would be no necessity in such a case
£9r the person w whom the cycle was lent to say how
long he would keep the cycle ...... If the legislature
had intended that the appropriate Government should
make an order after receiving a report of the Advisory
Committee as to how long the d~tenu should be
,!letained, it -would ha~e said not that the detenu's
detention should continue as )ong as the appropriate
Government thoug)lt fit,. but 'pass an order for the
(I) A.LR. 1952 Bom. I.
....
•
S..C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
643
detention of the person concerned for such further
period as it deemed fit'."
The analogy of the cycle contract, in my opinion,
is neither happy nor apposite, in the construction of
section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act. Further I
am not able to see how the draft suggested by the
High Court would have more appropriately brought
out the intention of the legislature 1than the words of
the section as it now stands. The addition of the
word "further" does not necessarily indicate that the
Government is bound to specify a period if the original
words "such period" do not so indicate.
In Ram Adhar Misra v. The State(1), it was held
that an order of detention which does not specify the
period of detention cannot be regarded as illegal.
Reliance was placed on the observations of the late
Chief Justice and myself in Gopalan's case(2), and cited
earlier in this judgment. These observations do not
support the conclusion reached by the High Court, as
already observed. The decision is not supported on
any other independent reasoning.
The nearest analogy to the language employed in
section 11 is found in the provisions of Part IV of the
Code of Criminal Procedure relating to prevention of
offences. In sections 106 to 110 of this Part the
language employed is "a person can be called upon to
execute a bond for his good behaviour etc. for such
period not exceeding one year or three years as the
Magistrate thinks fit to fix." It is not possible to argue
that the magistrate can call upon a person to execute
a bond without fixing a period for which that bond is
to be good, and that in the absence of such de.termination it has to be presumed that the bond has to be
executed for the maximum period mentioned in the
section. In my opinion, failure to fix the period for
which the bond is to be operati<ve would make the
order ineffective and any default on the part of the
person called upon to give the bond would not be
punishable. The discretion given to Government by
(1) A.I.R. 1951 All. 18.
(2) [1950] S. C.R. 88.
J95Z
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
Mahajan/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1952}
the phrase "as it thinks fit" is limited by the
posed on it by the provisions of the section.
duty im-
644
1952
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar
v.
The State of
Bombay
and Others.
Mahajan ].
The next question that falls to be determined and
which is of some difficulty, is whether failure to fix the
period makes the detention illegal. After considerable
thought I have reached . the conclusion that the nondetermination by Government of the period of the
continuance of the detention operates prejudicially
against the detenus and makes the detention illegal. It
is possible and even probable that had the Government
on receipt of the report of the Advisory Board applied
its mind and come to a decision on the point, it might
well have fixed the duration of the detention at a point
of time that would have expired by now, though it is
also likely that it might not have expired by now. In
such a situation when the matter is in doubt it is not
right to hold that the detention of the petitioners at
the present moment is lawful. The onus of establishing
affirmatively that the detention of these petitioners is
lawful at the present moment rests on the detaining
authofiy and in the circumstances it has to be held
that this onus remains undischarged. The subsequent
conduct of the Government in resisting these petitions
is not relevant in this enquiry in the absence of an
order as presi::ribed by the statute. If the Government
finds that the detention of the petitioners is necessary
up to 31st March, 1952, it can gjve effect to that
intention in these cases by issuing a fresh order of
detention.
The result therefore is that, dissenting from the decision of the majority of the court, I hold that the peti~
tioners are not detained according to procedure established by law and are entitled
to their release. I
therefore direct that they be released forthwith.
In this view of the case I do not feel called upon to
decide the second point raised in these cases.
Petitions dismissed.
Agent for the respondents: P. A~ MehM.
.
•.
_,(/.
't'
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org