RUBY GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD versus PEAREY LAL KUMAR AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 February 1952 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 501 | 1952 INSC 9
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 February 1952
- Bench
- SIR SYED FAZL ALI*, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 163/1951
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 501
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 9
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
1952
date of the agreement and having none he could not
have transferred it. The mortgagor's possession was
Kashinath
consequently not referable to the agreement.
Bhaslr..ar Datar
v.
The · appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Bhaslr,,ar
VishweshwM'
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai.
Karve.
Agent for the respondent: A. C. Dave.
-
RUBY GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.
1952
ti.
Fe/J. 25,
PEAREY LAL KUMAR AND ANOTHER.
[ SAIYID
FAZL Au and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]
lt1Jian Arbitration Act (X of 1940), s. 33-Arbitration clause-·
Wht'ther" disputt' "arises out of agrt't'ment"-Tests-Plea that agree•
1flt'11t is not applicable and does not subsist-No dispute about the·
existence or validity or meaning-Jurisdiction of arbitrator-Appli;
cation under s. 33-Maintainability.
-
The appellant company insured a car belonging to respondent'
No. 1 and issued a policy which contained, inter alia, the following_
tcrms:-"All differences arising out of this policy shall be referred
to the decision of an arbitrator to be appointed by the parties•
. . . . . . If the company shall disclaim liability to the insured for
any claim hereunder and such claim shall not within twelve
calendar months from the date of such disclaimer have been
referred to arbitration then the claim shall have been deemed
to have been abandoned and shall not be recoverable." The car
was lost, and the company through its Branch Manager disclaimed liability on· three different dates. The insured did not
take any action in regard to the appointment of an arbitrator until more than twelve months after the last disclaimer by the company. The case of the company was that the insured must be
deemed to have abandoned his claim by virtue of the contract
ef insurance policy while the respondent averred that there was
never any valid disclaimer by the company of its liability as the
Branch Manager had no authority to disclaim the liability and
it could have been disclaimed only by the resolution of the company. The company presented the present application under
sec. 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act praying for a declaration
that the reference to arbitration was illegal and the award if made
by the arbitrator would not bind the company. It was contended on its behalf that the arbitration clause had ceased to be
502
1952
1Ruby General
Insurance
Co. Ltd.
v.
Pearey Lal
Kumar
'llnd Anoth<r.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952)
operative and the question as to the existence and validity of the
Arbitration agreement was triable by the court under sec. 33 of
the Arbitration Act and not by the arbitrator.
Held, (i) that the point on which the parties were in dispute
was a difference "arising out of the policy", because recourse to
the contract by which both the parties were bound was necessary
for the purpose of determining the matter in dispute between
them as there was no contention raised in the present case by
either of the parties that there was no contract entered into at
all or that it was void ab initio, and therefore the arbitrator had
jurisdiction to decide the matter referred to him. A contention
'that the arbitration agreement has ceaseG to be applicable or
that it no longer subsists will not oust the jurisdiction of the
·arbitrator.
(ii) No question of determining the effect of the arbitration
:within the n1eaning of sec. 33 arose because there was no dispute
between the parties as to what it meant.
A. M. Mair and Co. v. Gordhandas Sagarmul/ [1950] (S.C.R.
'792), Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. ([1941] 1 ·A.E.R. 337), Mecaura v.
Northern Assurance Co. ([1925] A.G. 619), Stebbing v. Liverpool,
London and Globe Insurance Co. Ltd. ([1917], 2 K. B. 433)
referred to.
-
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION : Civil
Appeal
No. 163 of 1951. Appeal by special leave from
the Judgment dated the 10th April, 1951, of the High
Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla
(Kapur J.) in Civil Revision No. 286 of 1950 arising
out of Order dated the 24th March, 1950, of the Court
of Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Delhi, in an Application under Section 33 of Indian Arbitration Act, X of
1940.
Rattan Lal Chawla (K. N. Agarwal, with him) for
the appellant.
Som Nath Chopra for the respondent.
The Judgment of the court
1952. February 25.
was delivered by
FAZL Au J.-This is an appeal by special leave
against the i"udgment of the Punjab High Court upholding the decision of a Subordinate Judge of Delhi
relating to a petition filed by th~ 3:ppellant-comp~ny
under section 33 of the Indian Arb1trat10n Act against
the respondents.
'
S.C.R.
-
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
1952
The material facts are these. On the 22nd April,
1947, the appellant company insured a car belonging Ruby General'
to the first respondent and issued a policy which fully
Insurance
Co. Ltd.
sets out the terms and conditions of the agreement
v.
relating to the insurance. The first respondent left his
Pearey Lal
car in a garage at Lahore and came away to India on
Kumar
the 31st July, 1947.
Subsequently, he learned about and Another~
the loss of his car, and sent a legal notice dated the
Fazl Ali / ..
18th March, 1948, through his advocate Mr. A. R.
Kapur to the Head Office of the company at Calcutta,
claiming a sum of Rs. 7,000 for the loss of the car. On
the 10th April, 1948, Mr. Kapur received a letter from
the Branch Manager of the Company's office at
Amritsar asking for information regarding certain
matters stated in the letter. This information appears
to have been supplied on the 30th April, 1948. On the
26th May, 1948, the company's Branch Manager at
Amritsar wrote to the first respondent repudiating the
liability of the company for the loss of the car on the.
ground that the loss was "due to communal riots.
which were going on in the whole of Punjab" and was
not covered by the agreement of insurance. A similar
letter was written again by the Branch Manager on
the 3rd July, 1948, to the first respondent, and another
letter was written by one Mr. Rattan Lal Chawla
representing himself to be counsel for the company, to,
Mr. A. R. Kapur, on the 1st August, 1948. On the.
21st November, 1949, the first respondent wrote a
letter to the Branch Secretary of the Company's office
at Calcutta, stating that his claim was valid and
nominating Mr. T. C. Chopra, Assistant Manager,.
Lakshmi Insurance Company Ltd., Delhi, as arbitrator
on his behalf and requesting the company to appoint
another person as arbitrator on its behalf. Thereafter,,
the company presented an application on the 29th
December, 1949, in the court of the Senior Sub-judge,.
Delhi, under section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act,.
against the first respondent and Mr. T. C. Chopra, thearhitrator, who is the second respondent in tliis appeal,.
praying for-
504
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952]
1952
( 1) a declaration to the effect that the reference to
arbitration 1md the appointment of respondent No. 2
;Ruby Generol
as sole arbitrator was illegal;
Insurance
Co. Ltti.
(2) a declaration to the effect that if the respondv.
ent No. 2 made any award it would not be binding
Pear<y Lal
. on the company; and
Kumllf'
.-nJ Another.
(3) an injunction restraining the respondents Nos .
1 and 2 from taking any proceeding in the matter and
the respondent No. 2 from making any award.
Upon this petition, notice was issued to the respondents, and an injunction was issued directing them
not to file any award till the date of the next hearing,
which was fixed for 31st January, 1950. On the 4th
February, 1950, the first respondent wrote to the
second respondent (the arbitrator) that since no
arbitrator had been appointed by the company and
since the company had refused to appoint any arbitraator, he (Mr. Chopra) was to act as the sole arbitrator.
On the 6th February, 1950, Mr. Chopra wrote to inform
the insurance company that he had been appointed
sole arbitrator and asked the company to send the
• statement of its case and to produce all the evidence
·!>ll the 14th February, 1950. On the 10th February,
1950, the insurance company filed a petition before the
Subordinate Judge, Delhi, praying that the responden~
be stopped from proceeding further in the matter so
.that its application under section 33 may not become
infructuous. On the 11th February, the Subordinate
Judge issued notice to the respondents fixing the 17th
}'ebruary as the date of hearing and passed the fol'lowing order:
"Moreover (till) the decision of this application
·the arbitrator should not give or pronounce his award
·bur should continue the proceedings."
On. the 14th February, 1950, the second respondent
pronounced his award after making a note to the
following effect:"Mr. G. R. Chopra, the counsel of the defendants,
,sent a telephonic message at 12 A.M. requesting exten~on till ;! P.M.
I agreed and accordingly I waited for
•
'
.. .
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
Ruby Gent:ral
lnsuranct:
Co. Lttl.
He made a further note at the end of the award to
this effect:"As after the giving of the award a notice was
1erved upon me not to give the award, I have not sent
any formal letter to the parties informing them of the
award and its costs."
Pal Ali /.
On the 24th March, 1950, the Subordinate Judge
pa$sed an order on the company's application under
section 33, dismissing it and holding that the terms.
of clause 7 of the agreement "were comprehensive
enough to include the points of disputes between the
parties now and as such are triable by the arbitrator
and not by the court". The Subordinate Judge concluded his order by observing:
"I, therefore, hold that the reference to the arbitration of the differences is perfectly valid and the
points raised by the parties to this application with
regard to the abandonment of claim . and its becoming
irrecoverable are to be decided by the arbitrator."
...
19)2
him and the plaintiff with his counsel also waited up
to 1 P.M. Nobody turned up on behalf of the defendants. I commenced the proceedings and took the
statement of the plaintiff and the documents that he
had produced."
The judgment of the Subordinate Judge was upheld
in revision by the Punjab High Court and the company has now preferred an .appeal to this court by
special le~ve.
The points that were . urged on behalf of the appellant in this appeal are these:(1) that the arbitration clause had ceased to be
operative and the question as to the existence and
validity of the arbitration agreement was triable by
the court under section 33 of the Arbiration Act and
not by the arbitrator; and
(2) that the award was invalid and not binding
on the appellant, because it was pronounced in spite of
the order of the court dated the 11th February, 1950,
directing the arbitrator not to pronounce his award.
T.
Pe11rt:y lAl
Kumar
ani A.notht:r.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Clause 7 of the policy of insurance runs
follows:-
as
506
1952
Ruby Genn-111
Insurance
Co. Ltd.
v.
Pearey Ltil
Kumar
11nd A nothnF11zl Ali J.
"All differences arising out of this policy shall
be . rderred to the decision of an arbitrator to be·
appointed in writing by the parties
in difference
or if they cannot agree upon a single arbitrator to the·
decision of two arbitrators one to be appointed in
writing by each of the parties within one calendar
month after having been required in writing so to dO'
by either of the parties or in case the arbitrators do
not agree of an umpire appointed in writing by the
arbitrators before entering upon the reference. The·
umpire shall sit with the arbitrators and preside at
their meeting and the making of an award shall
be a condition precedent to any right of action against
the company. If the company shall disclaim liability
to the insured for any claim hereunder and such claim
shall not within twelve calender months from the date
of such disclaimer have been referred to arbitration
under the provisions herein contained then the claim
shall for all purposes be deemed to have been aban. cloned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder."
It will be noticed that this clause provides among·
other things that if the company disclaimed liability
to the insured for any claim under the policy and such·
claim was not within twelve calendar months from the
date of such disclaimer . referred to arbitration, then
the claim should be deemed to have been abandoned
and was not recoverable. The case of the company is
that it disclaimed liability for the loss of the car on
three successive occasions,
namely, on the 26th May,
1948, the 3rd July, 1948, and the 1st August, 1948.
The first respondent however did not take any action
in regard to the appointroent of an arbitrator until the
21st November, 1949, i.e., until more than 12 months
after even the last disclairoer by the company. For this
reason, the claim put forward by the first respondent
must be deemed to have been abandoned and he
cannot recover anything from the company. On
the other hand, the case of the first respondent, which
--
-
...
.
S.C.R.
507
is set out m 'his affidavit dated the 17th February,
1950, is that there was never any valid disclaimer by
the company of its liability. The position that he took
up was that the Branch Manager of the company had
no authority to disclaim the liability, and it could have
been disclaimed only by a resolution of the company.
Now these being the respective contentions of the
parties, the question is whether the point in dispute fell
to be decided by the arbitrator or by the court under
section 33 of the Arbitration Act. Section 33 is to the
following effect:"Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an
award or to have the effect of either determined shall
apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the
question on affidavits :
- Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on
other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for
discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit."
}.
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
-
"
The question to be decided is whether the point ori
which the parties are in dispute is a difference "arising
out of the policy" in terms of clause 7 of the policy.
The test for determining such a question has been laid
down in a series of cases and is a simple one. The
test is whether recourse to the contract by which the
parties are bound is necessary for the purpose of determining the matter in dispute between them. If such
recourse to the contract is necessary, then the matter
must come within the scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction. In the present case; both thP. p;iries admit the
contract and state that they are bound by it. Indeed,
the appellant-company, in order to mak-ie good its contention, is obliged to rely and does rely on that part of
clause 7 of the policy which states that if the company
should disclaim liability and the
claim be not
refered to arbitration within 12 months of such
disclaimer, the claim shall be deemed to have been
abandoned.
Evidently,
the
company
cannot
succeed without calling m aid this clause and
3-6 S. C. India/71
1952
Ruby General
Insurance
Co. Ltd.
v •.
Pearcy Lal
Kumar
and- Another.
Fazl - Ali. J.
508
1952
Ruby General
Insurance
Co. Ltd.
v.
Peuey Lal
Kumar
•ntl Another.
F•d Ali f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
rely.ing on it. Agajn, the first respondent does not say
that he is not bound by the clause but states that the
matter was referred to arbitration before any valid
disclaimer was made. The position therefore is that
one party relying upon the arbitration clause says that
there has been a breach of its terms and the other
party, also relying on that cla11Se, says that there has
been no breach but on the other hand the requirements .
of that clause have been fulfilled. Thus, the point in
dispute between the parties is one for the decision of
which the appellant is compelled to invoke to his aid
one of the terms of the insurance agreement. it is thus
clear that the difference between the parties is a
difference arising out of the policy and the arbitrator
had jurisdiction to decide it, the parties having made
him the sole judge of all differences arising out of the
policy. ,
-
A large number of cases were cited before us on
behalf of the parties, but it is unnecessary to refer to
them, since the question which arises in this appeal is
a simple one and is covered by the statement of law
which is to be found in the decision of this Court in
A. M. Mair & Co. v. Gordhandas; Sagarmull('), and
in a series of English authorities, some of which only
may be referred to. In Heyman v. Darwin;, Ltd. (t)
the law on the subject has been very clearly stated in
the following passage :«An arbitration clause is a written submission,
agreed to by the parties to the contract, and, like otha
written submissions to arbitration, must be construed
according to its language and in the light of the circumstances in which it is made. If the dispute is :u
to whether the contract which contains the clause has
(!ver been entered into at all, that issue cannot go to
arbitration under the clause, for the party who denies
that he has ever entered into the contract is thereby
denying that he has ever joined in the submission.
Similarly, if one party to the alleged contract is contending that it is void ab initi"o (because, for example,
the making of such a contract is illegal) the arbitration
(I} [19SOJ S.C.R. 792.
(2) [1941) I A. E. R. 337,343.
-
'
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
509
dause cannot operate, for on this view the clause itself
is also void.
....
-
If, however, the parties are at one in asserting that
they entered into a binding contract, but a difference
has arisen between them as to whether there has been
a breach by one side or the other, or as to whether
-circumstances have arisen which have discharged one
o0r both parties from further performance, such differ~nces should be regarded as differences which have
arisen 'in respect of', or 'with regard to,' or 'under'
the contract, and an arbitration clause which uses
these, or similar expressions, should be construed
.accordingly.''
In Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co.(1), the
:41ppellant had insured a large quantity of timber
against fire and the greater part of the timber having
been destroyed by fire, he sued the insurance company
to recover the loss but the action was stayed and the
matter was referred to arbitration in pursuance of the
conditions contained in the policy. The arbitrator
held that the claimant had no insurable interest in the
-goods insured and disallowed .the claim. One of the
points raised in the case was that the arbitrator had
no jurisdiction to decide the matter, but that contention was rejected by Lord Sumner in these words :"The defendants do not repudiate the policy or
dispute its validity as a contract; on the contrary,
they rely on it and say that according to its terms,
-express and implied, they are relieved from liability :
!CC Stebbing's case(2}, Woodall v. Pearl Assurance c~.e>
.... It is a fallacy to say that they assert the policy
to be null and void."
In Stebbing v. Liverpool. and London and Globe Insurance Company Limited(2), to which reference was
made by Lord Sumner, the policy of insurance contained a clause referring to the decision of an arbitrator
"all differences arising out of this policy". It also
(I) (1925] A.C. 619.
(2) [1917] 2 K. B. 433.
(3) [1919] l K.B. 593.
1952
Ruby General
Insurance
Co. Ltd.
v.
Pearey Lal
Kumar
ond Another.
Fazl Ali f.
510
Ruby General
lnsuranc~
Co. Ltd.
.v.
Pearey Lal
Kumar
and Another.
Fazl Ali f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
contained· a recital that the assured had made a proposal and declaration as the basis of the contract, and
a clause to the effect that compliance with the conditions indorsed upon the policy should be a condition
precedent to any liability on the part of the insurers •
One of the conditions provided that if any false
declaration should be made or used in support of a
claim all benefit under the policy should be forfeited.
In answer to a claim by the assured, the insurers
alleged that statements in the proposal and declaration
were false.
When the matter came before the
arbitrator, the assured objected that this was not a
difference in ·the arbitration· and that the arbitrator
had no power to determine whether the answers were
true or not, or to determine any matters which called
in question the validity of the policy. In holding that
the arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide the matter,
Viscount Reading C. J. observed as follows : -
-
"If the company were seeking to avoid the contract
in the true sense they would have to rely upon some
matter outside the contract, such as a misrepresentation of some material fact inducing the contract, of
which the force and effect are not declared by the
contract itself. In that case the materiality of the fact
and its effect in inducing the contract would have to
be tried. In the present case the company are claiming the benefit of a clause in the contract when they .
say that the parties have agreed that the statements
in question are material and that they 'induced the
contract. If they succeed in escaping liability that is
by reason of one of the clauses in the policy. In
resisting the claim they are not avoiding the policy
·but relying on its terms. In my opinion, therefore, the
question whether or not the statement is true is a
question arising out of the policy."
The main. contention put forward on behalf of the
appellant is that the points in dispute fall outside the
jurisdiction: of the artibitrator, firstly because the existence of the arbitration agreement is challenged, and
seconaly, because the sole object of the application
under section 33 of the Arbitration Act is to have the
-
...
.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
1952
effect of the arbitration agreement determined. In our
opinion, neither of these objections is sound. How can Ruby General
it be held that the existence of the arbitration agreeInsurance
ment is challenged, when both parties admit that the
Co. Lti.
clause in the policy which contains that agreement
v.
Pearey Lill
binds them. It is neither party's case that there is no
arbitration agreement in the policy. On the other antiKumar
Another.
hand, both parties admit that such agreement exists,
and each of them relies on it to support its case. It is
Fazl ·Ali /.
true that the appellant contends that the arbitration
agreement has ceased to be applicable, but that contention. cannot be sustained without having recourse to
the arbitration agreement. It is said that the agreement no longer subsists, but that is very different from
saying that the agreement never existed or was void
ab initio and therefore is to be treated <!-' non-existent.
Again, no question of determining the effect of the
arbitration agreement arises, because there is no dispute between the parties as to what it means. The
language of the arbitration clause is quite clear, and
both parties construe it in the s:ame way. The real
question between them is whether the first respondent
has or has not compli'ed with the conditions of the
agreement. But this question does not turn on the
effect of the agreement. This is the view which has
1ubstantially been taken by the High Court, and in
our opinion it is correct.
The second point urged before us is that the award
is invalid, since it was made in spite of the court's
injuction directing the arbitrator not to pronounce
any award.
This point however does not, in our
opinion fall within the scope of this appeal. The
application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act,
which is the subject of this appeal, was filed before the
award was pronounced. In that application, there is
no reference to the award; nor is there any reference to
the circumstances which are now stated to invalidate
the award and which happened after the application
was filed. The learned counsel for the appellant made
an application before us praying for the amendment
of the petition under section 33 by introducing certain
512
1952
Ruby General
Insurance
Co. Ltd.
v.
Pearey Lal
Kumar
and Another.
Fazl Ali /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
additional facts and addiD;g a prayer for declaring the
award to be invalid, but it was rejected by us. It
should be stated that as early as the 24th March, 1950.
the Subordinate Judge in dismissing the appellant's
petition under section 33, made the following observations :"During the pendency 0£ the arbitration proceedings the arbitrator pronounced the
award .... The
award has now been filed in the court of S. Mohinder
Singh, Sub Judge, 1st class, Delhi. Any objection
against the award can be filed there. In this application in which there is no prayer for setting aside the
award, which exists, I do not think it proper to decide
the question of the validity of the award.''
In OUf opinion, the Subordinate Judge correctly
indicated the course which it was open to the appellant in law to adopt for the purpose of questioning the
validity of the award, but not having taken that
course and not having made any application in
the courts below for amending the petition under
section 33, the company cannot ask this court to go
into the validity of the award by widening the scope of
the original petition. This court is always in favour
of shortening litigation, but it would be a very
unusual step to allow the petition under section 33. to
be amended now and to decide a question involving
investigation of facts without having the benefit of the
judgments of .the courts. below.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissecl.
Agent for the appellant
G.inpat Rai.
Agent for respondent No. 1 : S. D. Sekhri.
,.
.
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