BATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY versus THE STATE OF MADRAS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 14 February 1952 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 425 | 1952 INSC 6
Key facts
- Decided
- 14 February 1952
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 13/1951
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 425
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 6
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
BATHINA RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
1952
v.
Feb. 14.
THE STATE OF MADRAS.
[PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
Muui:ERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR· JJ.]
Contempt of Courts Act (XII of 1926), s. 2(3)-lndian Penal
Code (XLV of 1860), s. 499-Contempt of subordinate Court-/urisdiction of High Court to take cognisance-Contempt punishable as
defamation under Penal Code-Whether iurisdiction ousted-Scope
and object of Contempt of Courts Act.
Sub-sec. (3) of section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926,
excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognisance of
a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court
subordinate to it only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt are punishable as contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but not ·where these acts merely
amount to offences of other description for which punishment
has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code.
-
The fact that defamation of a judge of a subordinate Court
constitutes an offence under sec. 499 of the Indian Penal Code
does 11ot, therefore, oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to
take cognisance of the act as a contempt of court.
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Defamatory statements about the conduct of a judge even in
respect of his judicial duties do not necessarily constitute contempt of Court. It is only when the defamation is calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper
administration of justice that it amounts to contempt.
Kisan Krishna /i v. Nagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent
de Paul (A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 334) disapproved. V. M. Bason v.
A. H. Skone (LL.R. 53 Cal. 401) explained. Subordinate fudge, First
Class Hoshangabad v. /awaharlal (A.LR. 1940 Nag. 407)> Narayan
Chandra v. Panchu Pramanick (A.LR. 1935 Cal. 684), Naresh Kumar
v. Umaromal (A.LR. 1951 Cal. 489), Kaulashia v. Emperor (I.L.R.
12 Pat. 1), State v. Brahma Prakash (A.I.R. 1950 All. 556),
Emperor v. /agannath (A.LR. 1938 All. 358), Bennet Colman v.
C. S. Monga (I.L.R. 1937 Lah. 34) approved.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JurusDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 13 of 1951. Appeal by special leave from
the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras
(Rajamannar C. J. and and Balakrishna Ayyar J.) dated
10th April, 1950, in Contempt Application No. IO of
1949.
426
1952
Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy
v.
The State of
Madras.
Mukheriea /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
S. P. Sinha ( S. S. Prakasam, with him), for the
appellant.
R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondent.
1952. February 14. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
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MuKIIERJEA J.-This appeal has come up before
us on special leave granted by this court on May 23,
1950, and it is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated April 1(},
1950, by which the learned Judges found the appellant
guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to serve
simple imprisonment .for three months.
The appellant is the publisher and managing editor
of a Telugu Weekly known as "Praja. Rajyam" which
is edited and published at Nellore in the State of
Madras. In the issue of the said paper dated 10th
February, 1949, an article appeared under the caption
"Is the Sub-Magistrate, Kovvur, corrupt?" The purport of the article was that Surya Narayan Murthi,
the stationary Sub-Magistrate of Kovvur, was known
to the people of the locality to be a bribe taker and to
be in the habit of harassing litigants in various ways.
He was said to have a broker, through whom negotiations in connection with these corrupt practices were
carried on. Several specific instances were cited of
cases tried by that officer, where it was rumoured that
he had either taken bribes or had put the parties to
undue harassment, because they were obdurate enough
to refuse the demands of his broker. The article,
which is a short one, concludes with the foHowing
paragraph:"There are party factions in many villages in Kovvur
Taluk. Taking advantage of those parties many
wealthy persons make attempt to get the opposite
party punished either by giving bribes or ma:king
recommendations. To appoint Magistrates who run
after parties for a Taluk like this .... is to betray the
public. It is tantamount to failure of justice. Will the
Collector enquire into the matter and allay the public
of their fears?"
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
1952
The attention of the State Government being drawn
to this article, an application was filed by the Advocate. Bathina RamaGeneral of Madras before the High Court on November krishna Reddy
14, 1949, under section 2 of the Omtempt of Courts
v.
The State af
Act (Act XII of 1926) praying that suitable action
Madras.
might be taken against the appellant as well as three
other person~ of whom two were respectively the editor
Mukherjea /.
and sub-editor of the paper, while the third was the
owner of the Press where the paper was printed.
On receiving notice, the appellant appeared before
the High Court and filed an affidavit taking sole responsibility for the article objected to and asserting
that the article was published be~ause of his anxiety
to uphold the highest traditions of the judiciary
in the land and to create popular .confidence
in courts, the duty of which was to dispense
justice without fear or favour and without any discrimination of caste, creed or community. It was said
that before the article was published, numerous complaints had reached him from various quarters imputing corruption and disreputable conduct to this Magistrate and the only desire of the appellant was to draw
the attention of the higher authorities to the state of
public opinion in the matter and to invite an enquiry
into the truth or otherwise of the allegations which
were not asserted as facts but were based only on
hearsay.
The High Court after hearing the parties came to the
conclusion that the publication in question did amount
to contempt of court, as it was calculated to lower the
prestige and dignity of courts and bring into disrepute
the administration of justice. As the appellant was not
prepare8 to substantiate the allegations which he made
and which he admitted to be based on hearsay and did
not think it proper even to express any regret for what
he had done, the court sentenced him :to simple imprisonment for three months.
The other three respondents, through their counsel,
tendered unqualified apology to the courr and the learned Judges considered that no further action against
them was necessary.
428
1952
Bathina Ram~
krishna Reddy
v.
The Staie of
Madras.
Muk herjea /.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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[19521
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The propriety of the decision of the High Coun. so
far as it relates to the appellant has been challenged
before us in this appeal and Mr. Sinha, who appeared
in support of the same, raised before us a two.fold
contention; his first and main contention is that as the.
contempt in this case was said to have been comml.tted
in respect of a court subordinate to the High Court and
the allegations made in the article in question constitute an offence under section 499 of the Indian Penal
Code, the jurisdiction of the High Court to take
cognizance of such a case is expressly barred under
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The other
contention advanced by the learned counsel relates to·
the merits of the case and it is urged that in publishing the article objected to, the appellant acted in perfect good faith, and as the article amounted to nothing
else but a demand for enquiry into the conduct of a
particular person who was believed to be guilty of
corrupt practices in the discharge of his judicial duties,.
there was no contempt of court either intended or
committed by the appellant.
So far as the first point is concerned, the determination of the question raised by the appellant would
depend upon the proper interpretation to be put upon
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act which runs
as follows :-
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••
"No High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a
court subordinate to it where s_uch contempt is an
offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code."
According .to Mr.. Sinha, what the sub-section ·means
is that if the act by which a , party is alleged to have
committep contempt of a subordinate court constitutes
offence of any description whatsoever punisbable under
the Indian Penal Code, the High Court is precluded
from taking cognizance of it. It is said that in the
present case the allegations made in t~e article in question amount to an offence of defamation as defined by
section 499 of the Indian Pelial Code . and consequently
the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred. Reliance
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
19.52
is placed in support of this proposition upon the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kz'san Krifhna Ji v. Batlzioa Ram11Nagpur Conference of Society of St. Vincent de Paul( 1 ). krishna Reddy
This contention, though somewhat plausible at first
v.
The State of
sight, does not appear to us to be sound. In our
Madras.
opinion, the sub-section referred to above excludes the
jurisdiction of High Court only in cases; where the
acts alleged to constitute contempt of a subordinate
court are punishable as contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not where these
acts merely amount to offences of other description for
which punishment has been provided for in the Indian
Penal Code. This would be clear from the language of
the sub-section which uses the words "where such
contempt is an offence" and does not say "where the
act alleged to constitute such contempt is an offence".
It is argued that if such was the intention of the Legislature, it could have expressly said that the High
Court's jurisdiction will be ousted only when the contempt is punishable as such under the Indian Penal
Code. Jt seems to us that the reason for not using
such language in the sub-section may be that the expression "contempt of court" has not been used as description of any offence in the Indian Penal Code,
though certain acts, which would be punishable as
contempt of court in England, are made offences under
it.
It may be pointed out in this connection that
although the powers of the High Courts in India esta·
blished under the Letters Patent to exercise jurisdiction as Superior Courts of Record in punishing contempt of their authority or processes have never been
doubted, it was a controversial point prior to the
passing of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, as to
whether the High Court could, like the Court of King's
Bench in England, punish contempt of courts subordinate to it in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
The doubt has been removed by Act XII of 1926
which expressly declares the right of the High Court
to protect subordinate courtq against contempt, but
(l) (1943) A.LR. 1943 Nag. 334.
5- S C. lndia/71
430
1952
Bathina RatnaJtrishna Reddy
v.
The State of
Madras.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
subject to this restriction, that cases of contempt which
have already been provided for in the Indian Penal
Code should not be taken cognizance of by the High
Court. This seems to be the principle underlying
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act. What
these cases are need not be exhaustively determined
for purposes of the present case, but some light is undoubtedly thrown upon this matter by the provision
of section 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which
empowers any civil, criminal or revenue court to
punish summarily a person who is found guilty of
committing any offence under sections 176, 178, 179,
180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code in the
view or presence of the court. We are not prepared
to say, as has been said by the Patna High Court in
/nanendra Pro1ad v. Gopal('), that the only section of
the Indian Penal Code which deals with contempt
committed against a court of justice or judicial officer
is section 228. Offences under sections 175, 178, 179
and 180 may also, as section 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code shows, amount to contempt of court if the
"public servant" referred to in these sections happen&
to be a judicial officer in a particular case. It is well
known that the aim of the contempt proceeding is "to
deter men from offering any indignities to a court of
justice" and an essential feature of the proceeding is
the exercise of a summary power by the court itself
in regard to the delinquent. In the cases mentioned
in section 480 of the Indian Penal Code, the court has
been expressly given summary powers to punish a
person who is guilty of offending its dignity in the
manner indicated in the section. The court is competent also under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code to forward any case of this description to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try it, if it considers that
the offender deserves a higher punishment than what
can be inflicted under section 480. Again, the court
is entitled under section 484 to discharge the offender
on his submitting an apology, although it has already adjudged him to punishment under acction 480
(I) J.L.R. 12 Pat. l?l.
S.C.R.
SUJ>REME COURT REPORTS
431
1952
or forwarded his case for trial under section 482.
The mode of purging contempt by tendering apology
Bathina Rama·
is a further characteristic of a contempt proceeding. krishna Reddy
It seems, therefore, that there are offences which are
v.
punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code
1'he State of
Madras.
and as subordinate courts can sufficiently vindicate
their dignity under the provisions of criminal law in
mch cases the legislature deemed it proper to exclude Mukheriea /.
them from the jurisdiction of the High Court under
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act; but it
would not be correct to say that the High Court's
jurisdiction is excluded even in cases where the act
complained of, which is alleged to constitute contempt,
is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal Code.
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This view has been taken and, in our opinion quite
rightly, in a number of decisions by the Calcutta,(1)
Patna,(2) Allahabad( 3 ) and Lahore(') High Courts. The
only authority which Mr. Sinha could cite in support
of his contention is the decision of the Nagpur High
Court in Ki.ran Krishna Ii v. Nagpur Conference of
Society of St. Vincent de Pau/(6). The authority is
undoubtedly in his favour as it proceed5 upon the
assumption that the idea underlying the provision of
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act is that if
a person can be punished by some other tribunal, then
the High Court should not entertain any proceeding
for contempt. It is to be noticed that the learned
Judge, who decided this case, himself took the opposite
view in the case of Subordinate fudge, First Class,
Hoshangabad v. fawaharla/( 8 ) and definitely held that
the prohibition contained in section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act refers to offences punishable as
contempt of court by the Indian Penal Code and not
to offences punishable otherwise than as contempt.
This decision was neither noticed nor dissented from
in the subsequent case, and it is quite possible that
(1) Narayan Chandra v. Panchu Pramanik (A.LR. 1935 Cal. 684);
N,msh Kumar v. Umaromal (A.LR. 1951 Cal. 489).
(2) Kaulashia v. Emperor (12 Pat. 1).
(3) State v. Brahma Prakash (A.I.R. 1950 All. 556); Emperor v.
fagannatll (A.I.R. 1938 All. 358).
(4) Bennett Coleman v. G. S. Monga (I.L.R. 1937 Lah. 34),
(5) A.LR. 1943 Nag. 334.
( 6) A.LR. 1940 Nag. 407.
432
1952
Bathina Ramakrishna R<ddy
v.
Th• Stat• of
Madras.
Mukh.rj•a /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
the attention of the learned judge was not drawn to
this earlier pronouncement of his, in which case the
matter would certain! y have been more fully discussed. We think further that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in V. M. Bason v. A.H. Skone,(')
which was the basis of the decision of the learned
Judge in the subsequent case does not really support
the view taken in it. In the Calcutta case what happened was, that a clerk of the Attorney, who appeared
for the respondent decreeholder, went to serve a notice
under Order 21, Rule 37 ( 1), of the Civil Procedure Code
upon the appellant judgment-debtor. The judgmentdebtor refused to take the notice and abused and
assaulted the Attorney's clerk. Upon that, contempt
proceedings were started against him and ,Mr. Justice
C. C. Ghosh, sitting on the Original Side of the High
Court of Calcutta, held the appellant guilty of contempt and fined him Rs. 200. On appeal, this judgement was affirmed by the appellate Bench and there
was a general observation made by Chief Justice
Sanderson at the close of his judgment that it is not
desirable to invoke the special inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court by way of proceeding for contempt if
ordinary proceedings in a Magistrate's court are sufficient to meet the requirements of a case. This was
not a case under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts
Act at all and no question either arose or was decided
as to whether if an act is otherwise punishable as an
offence under the Indian Penal Code the jurisdiction
of the High Court' under that section would be ousted.
Undoubtedly the High Court had jurisdiction in that
· case and whether such jurisdiction, which is certainly
of a special character and is exercised summarily,
should be called in to aid in the circumstances of a
particular case would depend upon the discretion · of
the court. This has, however, no bearing on the point
that has arisen for consideration before us. We would
hold, therefore, that the right view was taken by the
learned Judge of the Nagpur High Court in the earlier
case and not in the later one.
. ( 1) 1.L.R. 53 Cal. 40 l.
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SUPRE!-.~E
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433
It is next urged by Mr. Sinha that even assuming
1952
that this view is correct, the language of section 499
of the Indian Penal Code is wide enough to cover a Bathina Ramacase of contempt of court. What is said is, that if a krishna v.Reddy
libel is published against a judge in respect of his
The State of
judicial functions, that also is defamation within the
Madras.
meaning of section 499 of the In~ian Penal Code and
as such libel constitutes a contempt of court, it may Mukherjea /.
be said with perfect propriety that libel on a judge is
punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code.
We do not think that this contention can be accepted
as sound. A libellous reflection upon the conduct of
a judge in respect of his judicial duties may certainly
come under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and
it may be open to the judge to take steps against the
libeller in
the ordinary \Vay for vindication of his
character and personal dignity as a judge; but such
libel may or may not amount to contempt of court.
As the Privy Council observed in Surendra Nath
Benerjee v. Tlze Chief Justice and Judges of the High
Court(1) "although contempt may include defamation, yet an offence of contempt is something more
than mere defamation and is of a different character."
When the act of defaming a judge is calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or
proper administration of law, it would certainly
amount to contempt. The offence of contemp~ is
really a wrong done to the' public by weakening the
authority and influence of courts of law which exist
for their good. As was said by Willmot, C.J.( 2 )
"attacks upon the judges excite in the minJs of the
people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations ...... and whenever man's allegiance to the
laws is so fundamentally shaken it is the most fatal
and dangc;:rous obstruction of justice and in my opinion calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress
than any other obstruction whatsover; not for the
sake of the judges as private indi1•iduals but because
they are the channels by which the King's justice is
conveyed to the people".
(1) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 109 at 131.
(2) Willmot's Opinions page 256: Ro: v. Davies 30 at p. 40-41.
434
1952
Bathina Ram•·
fc.rishna Reddy
v.
The State of
Madras.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1952}
What is made punishable in the Indian l'enal Code
is the offence of defamation as defamation and not as
contempt of court. If the defamation of a subordinate
court amounts to contempt of court, proceedings can
certainly be taken under section 2 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, quite apart from the fact that other
remedy may be open to the aggrieved officer under
section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. But a libd
attacking the integrity of a judge may not in the cir:
cumstances of a particular case amount to a contempt
at all, although it may be the subject-matter of a
libel proceeding. This is clear from the observation
of the Judicial Committee in the case of The Matter
of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands(').
The first contention of Mr. Sinha, therefore, fails.
The second point raised by the learned counsel does
not appear to us to have any real substance. The
article in question is a scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty of a judicial officer. Specific instances have been given where the officer is alleged to
have ~aken. bribes or behaved with 'impropriety to the
litigants who did not satisfy his clishonest demands.
If the allegations were true, obviously it would be to
the benefit of the public to bring these matters into
light. But if they were false, they cannot but undermine the confidence of the public in the administration of justice and bring judiciary into disrepute.
The appelhnt, though he took sole responsibility
regarding the publication of the article, was not in
a position to substantiate by evidence any of the
allegations made therein. He admitted that the statement was based on hearsay. Rumours may have
reached him from various sources, but before hr
published the article it was incumbent upon him as a
reasonable man to attempt to verify the informations
he received and ascertain, as far as he could, whether
the facts were true or mere concocted lies. He does
not appear to have made any endeavour in this direction. As the appellant did not act with reasonabk
care and caution, he cannot be said to have act:erl
Cl) fl 8931 A.C. 138.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
435
1952
bona fide, even if good faith can be held to be a defence
at all in a proceeding for contempt. What is more, Bathina Ramtt·
he did not express any regret for what he had done krishna Reddy
either in the High Court or before us and his behaviour
v.
The State of
Joes not show the least trace of contrition. In these
Madras:.
circumstances, we think that the appeal cannot succeed and must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appelliant : S. Subrahmanyam.
Agent for the respondent : P. A. Mehta.
KATHI RANING RAWAT
ti.
THE STATE OF
[PATANJALI SASTRI
c. J.,
SAURASHTRA
FAZL ALI, MEHAR CHAND
~1h.IHJAN, MuKERJEA, DAs, CHANDRASEKH.,RA
A1YAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]
Saurasiitra State Public Safety (Third Amendment) Orditzanu
(LXVI of 1949), ss. 9, 10, 11-Law empowering State to constitute
Special Court,· to try special classe..- of ofjences-Constittttional
11alidity-Contraventio11 of fundamental rig/it to equal protection of
laws-Ess~ntiais
of valid clas.<ifimtion-I>c:legation of legislative
powers--r:omritutio11 of lndia, .1rts. 13, 14.
The Saurashtra State Public Safety .Measnrcs Ordinance,
19-18, was p~5'ed "to provide for pul1lic safety, maintenance of
public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the
State of Saurashtra." As crimes involving violence such as
dacoity and murder were increasing, this Ordinance was amended by the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, which, by secs. 9, JO and 11, empowered the State Government hy notification in the official gazette
to constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such
,1rea as may he specified in the notification, to appoint Special
fudges to prc,ide over such Conrts and to invest them with
jurisdiction to try such offences or classes of offences or such
cases or classes of cases as the Government may, by general or
special order in writing, direct. The procedure laid down by
1952
p,,,. 27.
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