W. H. KING versus REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND ANOTHER.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 1 February 1952 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 418 | 1952 INSC 5
Key facts
- Decided
- 1 February 1952
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 8/1951
- Disposal
- Set Aside
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 418
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 5
Text of the judgment
418
1952
Feb. 1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
W. H. KING
v.
REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND ANOTHER.
[PATANJALI
SASTRI
MuKHERJEA, DAs
c. J.,
and
MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN,
CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR
JJ.]
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Rates Control Act (LVII of 1947),
s. 19-Tenant handing over possession to third person receiving
"pugrec"-Whether constitutes urelinquishment"-Difference between assignment and relinquishment-Construction of penal siatutes.
Sub-section (1) of sec. 19 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, LVJI of 1947, provided that "it
shall not be lawful for the tenant or any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the tenant to claim or receive any sum.
or any consideration as a condition for the relinquishment of his
tenancy of any premises"; a.nd sub-sec. (2) provided that" any
tenant or person who in contravention of the provisions of subsec. (1) receives any sum or consideration shall on conviction be
punished with imprisonment and also with fine.
A, who was a tenant of a fiat, handed over vacant possession.
of the fiat to B on receiving "pugree", under a document which
recited that A shall have no claim whatever over the flat and
that B shall pay the rent directly to the landlord. A was convicted of an offence under sec. 19(2). Held, that there was no
"relinquishment" of his tenancy by A, within the n1eaning of
sec. 19(1) and the conviction could not be sustained.
There is a clear distinction bet\veen an assignment of a tenancy
on the one hand and a relinquishment or surrender on the other.
In the case of an assignment, the assignor c~ntinues to be liable
to the landlord for the performance of his obligations under the
tenancy and this liability is contractual, \vhile the assignee becomes liable by reason of privity of estate. The consent of the
landlord to an assignment is not necessary, in the absence of a
contract or local usage to the contrary. But in the case of relinquishment it c<:1nnot be a unilateral transaction; it can only be
in favour of the lessor by mutual agreement between them. Rel~
inquishment of possession must be to the lessor or one who holds
his interest; and surrender or relinquishment terminates the
lessee's rights and lets in the lessor.
As sec. 19 of Bombay Act LVJI of 1947 creates an offence and
imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words ·of the
section must be strictly construed in favour of the subject. The
Court is not concerned so much with what might possibly have
been intended as with what has been actually said in and by the
language employed in the statute.
Judgment of the Bombay High Court reversed.
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S.C.R.
CRIMINAL
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
JURISDICTION :
Criminal
APPELLATE
Appeal No. 8 of 1951.
1952
W. H. King
v.
Appeal from an Order of the High Court of Bombay
Republic of India
(Bavdekar and Chainani JJ.) dated 20th February,
and Another.
1950, in Criminal Appeal No. 106 of i950 arising out
of an order dated 9th January, 1950, of the Presidency
Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay, in Case
No. 10879/P of 1949. The facts are stated m the
judgment.
lswarlal C. Dalal and R. B. Dalal, for the appellant.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General f<>r India (G. N.
Joshi, with him) for the Republic of India (respond-
ent No. 1).
~
Jindra Lal for the respondent No. 2.
1952. February 1. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
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CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-The facts our of
which this Criminal Appeal has arisen are not long.
The appellant, W. H. King, who is carrying on a business in Bombay under the name and style of Associated Commercial Enterprises, was the tenant of a Bat on
the second Boor of a building called "Ganga Vihar",
Marine Drive, Bombay, which belongs to a lady
named Durgeshwari Devi. The tenancy was a monthly
one, the rent being Rs. 215. It is said that the appellant wanted to go to the United Kingdom for treatment
of his failing eye-sight and he gon into touch with the
complainant Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia, who is the
second respondent in this appeal, through one Sayed
for the purpose of making necessary arrangements
about the Bat occupied by him in view of his intended
departure. The prosecution case is that the accused
demanded a sum of Rs. 30,000 which was later on
reduced to Rs. 29,500 as consideration for putting the
complainant in vacant possession of the Bat and an
additional amount of Rs. 2,000 for the furniture, and
that the complainant agreed to pay these sums. The
complainant actually paid the accused two sums of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1952
Rs. 500 each on 7th November, 1948, and 17th November, ·1948. He, however, got into touch with the police
W. H. King
on
1-12-1948, and in conjunction with the latter, a trap
v.
Republic of India was laid for the appellant. It was arranged that the
·and Another.
complainant should bring with him Rs. 1,000, being
the balance due in res.pect of the furniture and tbat
Chandrasekhara
the police would ·give him Rs. 29,500 to be paid to the
Aiyar ].
appellant. The ·complainai'it and· a Sub-Inspector,
posing as the complainant's brother, went to the
appellant on 4-12-1948, and paid him the two sums of
money; and the keys of the flat and the motor garage
were handed ·over to the complainant. As the appellant and his wife were leaving the flar, the man, who
masqueraded as the . complainant's brother; threw off
his disguise· and' disclosed his identity.· The
police
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party, who were down below ready for tht raid, held
up the car of the appellant and recovered the sum of
Rs. 30,500 from the rear seat of the car and also
some papers,· a typed draft of ·a partnership agreement
between the complainant and the appellant · and an
application form for permission to occupy the building as· caretaker. ·"From the · complainant were recovered ·the·bunch of keys and the documents that were
handed over to him by the appellant, namely, ·the
ktter· handing vacant possession ·(Exhibit · D), the
·receipt for "'Rs.' 2,000 for the articles : of furniture
(Exhibit E), a letter to the Bombay Gas Company for
transfer of the gas' connection to. the name cif the complainant (Exhibit• ·F); and the ktter to the Bombay
·Electric Supply' and· Transport Committee for transfer
of · the ' telephone· connections' and the deposit of
·Rs. 27 (Exhibit G). · .
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The appellant was charged under section 18(1) of
the• Bombay Rents;· Hotel i:ind Lodgmg House Rates
'Cbntrol Act, •LVII of 1947, for ·receiving a pugret: of
1Rs. •29,500 :ind'
he ·was · further- ·charged· under
·section· 19(2) of- the" said· Act ·for receiving' the said
·sum ., • as a · condition for · the relinquishment of his
·tenancy. •His· wife; who was· the second accused in the
'case, ·was' char#d .. with . aiding . and ' abetting her
·husband in the:'l:ommission ·of the ·two offencci.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
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421
1952
The defence of the appellant was that he was in
search of a partner to carry on his business during his
W. H. King
intended absence, who was also to act as caretaker of
v.
his flat and that it was in this connection and with Republic of India
and Another.
this object in view that he entered into negotiations
with the complainant. The sum of Rs. 29,500 was not
pugree but represented capital for 0-12-0 share in the Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
business and as the complainant was also to be a
·caretaker of the flat, the sum of Rs. 2,000 was paid
arid received as a guarantee against disposal and
damage of the furniture and it was agreed to be paid
back on the appellant's return to India. The wife of
the appellant denied any aiding and abetting.
The Presidern:y Magistrate, who tried the case, disbelieved the defence on the facts, holding that what
was received by the accused was by way of pugru.
As section 18(1) of the ~ct was not applicable he
·convicted him under section 19(2) of the Act and
sentenced him, in view of his old age and blindness,
·to one day's simple imprisonment and a fine of
Rs. 30,000. The wife was acquitted, the evidence
being insufficient to prove any abetment.
The appellant preferred an appeal to the High
·Court of Bombay but it was summarily dismissed on
20-2-1950. He
asked
for a
certificate
under
:article 134(1) (c) of the Constitution but this was
rejected · on 10-4-1950.
Thereafter he applied for
special: leave to ·appeal to this Court and it was grant•ed on 3-10-1950.
A short legal argument was advanced on behalf of
the appellant based on the language of section 19(1)
of the Act and this is the only point which requires
our cons5deration. The section which consists of two
parts is in these terms :" (l) It shall not be •lawful for the tenant or any
person acting or purporting ·to act on behalf of the
tenant to claim or receive any ., sum 6r any consideration ·as a condition for the relinquishment of his tenancy
of any premises;
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422
1952
W. H. King
v.
Republic of India
and Another.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
(2) Any tenant or person who in contravention of
the provisions of sub-section (1) receives any sum or
consideration shall, on conviction, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6
months and shall also be punished with fine which
shall not be less than the sum or the value of the consideration received by him."
It was urged that the offence arises only on receipt
of any sum or any consideration as a condition of the
relinquishment by a tenant of his tenancy and that in
the present case there was no such relinquishment..
Exhibit D, · which is the most material document,.
under which the appellant handed over vacant possession of the flat to the complainant, constitutes or
evidences an assignment of the tenancy and not a
relinquishment. It says:"I, W. H. King, hereby ha11d over vacant possession of my flat No. 3 situated on 2nd floor and garage
No. 4 on the ground floor of Ganga Vihar Building on·
Plot No. 55 situated on Marine Drive Road to Mr.
Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia from this day onward and'
that I have no claim whatsoever over this flat and Mr.
Mulchand Kodumal Bhatia will pay the rent directly
to the landlord."
The argument raised on behalf of the appellant
appeaIIS to us to be sound and has to be accepted~
The learned Solicitor-General urged that the word·
"relinquishment" was not a term of art and was
used in the section not 111
any strict technicar
sense but in its comprehensive meaning as giving
up of possession of the premises; and he pointed"
out that if it was intended by the legislature that
"relinquishment" should
have 'the
limited meaning sought to be placed upon it on behalf of the
appellant, the word· "surrender" used in , the Transfer
of Property Act would have been more appropriate,
Sections 15 and 18 of the Act were referred to in this
connection but in our opinion they lend no assistance·
to the argument of the learned counsel. Any subletting, assignment or transfer in any other manner of his
interest by
the tenant is made unlawful under
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
section 15. Section 18 deals with the grant, renewal
1952
or continuance of a lease of any premises or the giving
W H K'
of his consent by the landlord to the transfer of a lease
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by sub-lease or otherwise, and it provides that the . Republic~! India
landlord, who receives any fine, premium, or other
and Another.
like sum or deposit, or any consideration for the
grant, renewal or continuance or the accord of consent Chandrast:khara
would be guilty of an offence and liable to the punishAiyar ].
meI\t therein specified. It would thus be seen that an
assignment of the lease or transfer in any other
manner by a tenant is not made an offence; the statute
merely says that it is not a lawful transaction. It is
the landlord's consent to the transfer of a lease by
sub-lease or otherwise on receipt of consideration that
has been made an offence. Then follows section 19
which speaks of the relinquishment of his tenancy of
any premises by a tenant. If, by the expression, an
aSJSignment such as we have in the present case was
meant, appropriate words could have been used, such
as the transfer by a tenant of his interest, which we
find in section 108, sub-clause (j), of the Transfer of
Property Act.
The distinction between an assignment on the one
hand ·and relinquishment or surrender on the other is
too plain to be ignored. In the c~e of an assignment,
the assignor .continues to be liable to the landlord for
the performance of his obligations under the tenancy
and this liability is contractual, while the assignee becomes liable by reason of privity of estate. The consent
of the landlord to an assignment is not necessary, in
the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary.
But in the case of relinquishment, it cannot be a unilateral transaction; it can only be in favour of the
lessor by mutual agreement b_etween them. The relinquishment of possession must be to the lessor or one who
holds his interest. In fact, a surrender or relinquishment terminates the lessee's rights and lets in the
lessor. It is no doubt true that the word "relinquishment" does not occur in the Transfer of Property Act
but it is found in many of the Tenancy Acts in various
provinces were there are sections which deal with the
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SUJ>REME COURT REPORTS
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[1952]
1952
relinquishment of their holdings by tenants in favour
of the landlord by notice given to him in writing. The
W ..H. King
sectiOn' in'' question, it should .be further noted,. does
v.
hot
~peak of relinquishment or giving up of 'possession,
!Republic of India
and Another. • in general terms. The words are "the relinquishment
'of his tenancy of any premises". The relinquishment
·Chandrasekhara 'of a tenancy is -equivalent to surrender by' the lessee
Aiyar /.
·or teriant of his rights as such. Whether abandonment
of a' tenancy would come within the meaning of
relinquishment i~ a question that does not arise in this
appeal, because in the face of Exhibit D, there is no
abandonment' in the sense that 'the tenant dis:ippeafed
from the scene altogether saying 'nothing and making
no arrangements about his interest and 'possession
under the· lease~
As the statute creates an offence and imposes a
penalty of fine and imprisonment, · the words of the
section must be st~ictly construed in favour of the
subject. We' are not concerned so much with what
might possibly have been intended as with what
has been
actually said m and by the langliage
employed.
As in our view, there has been no "relinquishment"
within the meaning of section 19, sub-clause {l),' the
conviction under sub-clause (2) cannot be· sustained.
It is set aside and the fine · of .Rs. 30,000 will be
·refiinded if it has already been paid. The other parts
of the order 'of the learned Presidency Magistrate, · as
'regards the 'disposal of Rs. 1,000 ,Paid ·by the complainant to t;he appellant and the sum of Rs. 29,500.
brought in by the police, will, however, stand.
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Conviction set aside.
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P.
Agent
for
the
appellant:
K.
C
hatteriee.
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Agent for respondent No.. 1: P.A. Mehta.
.
Agent for .,respondent
No. 2: Ganpat Rai.
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