SHRIMANT SARDAR BHUJANGARAO DAULATRAO GHORPADE versus SHRIMANT MALOJIRAO DAULATRAO GHORPADE AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 30 January 1952 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 402 | 1952 INSC 4
Key facts
- Decided
- 30 January 1952
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 11/1950
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 402
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 4
Text of the judgment
402
1952
Naranjan Singh
Nathawan
v.
The State of
Punjab.
Patanjali
Sastri C. /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
not made bona fide on being satisfied that the petitioner's detention was still necessary but it was
"obviously to defeat the present petition". The question of bad faith, if raised would certainly have to be
decided with reference to the circumstances of each
case, but the observations in one case cannot be
regarded as a precedent in dealing with other cases.
••
We accordingly remit the case for further hearing.
This order will govern the other petitions where the
same question was raised.
-
Petitions remitted.
Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.
1952
Jan. 30.
SHRIMANT SARDAR BHUJANGARAO
DAULATRAO GHORPADE
v.
SHRIMANT MALOJIRAO DAULATRAO
GHORPADE AND OTHERS.
[PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J.,
DAs and VIVIAN
BosE JJ.]
Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), s. 4(a)-Saranjam-Dispute between branches of grantee's •family-Government
Resolution regulating succession-Suit to declare Resolution ultra
-
vires, for declaration of sole right as saranjamdar, and for injunc·
tion against
other branches-Governtnent impleaded
as party-
Maintainability of suit.
The position of the Gajendrcigad estate which had been recog·
nised by the British Government as a saranjam and which had
been declared by the Bombay High Court in 1868 to be partible,
was re-examined in 1891 and Government passed a Resolution in
1891 that "the whole of the Gajendragad estate was a saranjam
continuable as hereditary in the fullest sense of the word. It ls
continuable to all made legitimate descendants of the holder at
the time of the British conquest." In 1932 by another Resolution Government formally resumed the grant and re-granted it
to the plaintiff who belonged to the first branch of the family of
the original grantee with a direction that it should be entered in
his sole name in the accounts of the Collector. The other two
branches felt aggrieved and in 1936 Government passed another
Resolution which confirmed the Resolution of 1891 and modified
the Resolution of 19321, by declaring that the portions of the
~
.
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
estate held by the branches shall be entered as de facto shares
and that each share shall be continuable hereditarily as if it
were a separate saranjam estate. The plaintiff instituted a suit
impleading the representatives of the other two branches as
defendants 1 and 2, and the Province of Bombay as the 3rd
defendant, alleging that the Resolution of 1936 was tdtra vires
and praying (A) for a declaration (i) that the defendants 1 and 2
had no right to go behind the Resolution of 1932 under which
the plaintiff was recognised as the. sole saranjamdar and that the
assignments held by defendants were held by them as mere
potgi holders, (ii) that the plaintiff had the sole right to all
privileges appertaining to the post of saranjamdar, and (iii) that
the Government had no right to change the Resolution of 1932,
and (B) for restraining the defendants I and 2 from doing anyacts in contravention of the aforesaid right of the plaintiff.
Held, (i) that the suit was a suit "against the Crown" and
also a suit "relating to lands held as saranjam" within the
meaning of sec. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876,
and the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit;
(ii) that the plaintiff could not be given even the reliefs
claimed against defendants 1 and 2 alone, as the rights claimed
against these defendants could not be divorced from the claim
' against the Government and considered separately;
(iii) in any event if the claim against the Government was
to be ignored it can only be on the basis that its orders could
not be challenged and if the orders stood, the plaintiff could not
succeed because both sides held their respective properties on
the basis of those orders.
Basalingappagowda v. Secretary of State (48 Born. L.R. 651)
and Basangauda v. Secretary of State (32 Born. L.R. 1370)
approved. Province of Bombay v. Hormusji Maneklal (74 I.A.
103) distinguished.
ll eld also, that sec. 4 of the said Act would apply even if the
only relief claimed in the suit against the Government was a
declaration.
Dattatreya Viswanath v. Secretary of State for India (I. L.R. 1948
Born. 809) disapproved. Daulatrao v. Government of Bombay (47
Born. L.R. 214) approved.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 11 of 1950.
JURISDICTION
Civil
Appeal
Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High
Court of Bombay (Bhagwati and Dixit JJ.) dated 16th
December, 1948, in Second Appeal No. 1226 of 1945
confirming a judgment and decree of the District Judge
of Dharwar in Appeal No. 123 of 1943. The facts of
1952
Bhunjangrao
Daulatrao
v.
Malojirao
Daulatrao
and Others.
404•
1952
8h#njangrao
Da11/atrao
v.
M•lojirao
Da14/a1rao
and Others.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
the case and the arguments of the counsel appear iil
the judgm_ent.
B. Somayya and Sanjiva Rao Naidu (N. C. Shaw,
with them) for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (V. N.
· Lokur, with him) for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-Genaal for India, ( G. N.
Joshi, with him) for respondent No. 3 (the State of
Bombay.)
1952. January 30. Judgment was delivered bv
BosE J.. PATANJALI SAsTRI C. J. and DAs J. agreed
with BQse J.
BosE J.-The plaintiff appeals.
The suit relates to a Saranjam estate in the State of
Bombay. The plaintiff claims to' be the sole Saranjamdar and seeks certain declarations and other reliefs
appropriate to such a claim.
The first and second defendants are members of the
plaintiff's family while the third defendant is the State
of Bombay (Province of Bombay at the date of the
suit) •
. The only question is whether the suit is barred by
section 4(a) of Bombay Act X of 1876 (Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act).
The following genealogical tree will show the relationship between the parties :
Bhujangrao Appasaheb
(British Grantee)
I
Daulatrao I
(died 24-7-1864)
r---------
1
I
Bhujangfao 1
(died 1881)
Mal.ojirao
(widow) Krishnabai
Daulatrao II
(died 8-5-1931)
Daulatrao III
(Def. 1)
I
.
I
Bhl\langrao III
(Plaintiff)
I
·----.
I
Yeshwantrao alias
Annasaheb
. I
Bhuiangrao II
(Def. 2)
-
:S.C.R.
. :::..
-J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
The facts are as follows. A common ancestor of the
_present parties was given the Gajendragad estate as a
Saranjam .some time before the advent of the British.
When they arrived on the scene they decided, as far as
possible, to continue such Sararijams, jagirs and inams
as had been granted by the earlier rulers, and accordingly they framed rules under Schedule B, Rule 10
of ·Bombay Act XI of 1852 (The Bombay Rent Free
Estates AGt of 1852) to regulate the mode of recognition
:and the succession and conditions of tenure to Saranjams, which are analogous to jagirs. In compliance
with this, the common ancestor shown at the head of
the genealogical tree set out above was recognised by
the British Government as the Saranjamdar of the
·Gajendragad estate. He may for convenience be termed the British Grantee. The Register Ex. P-53
shows that the estate consisted of 26 villages. We do
not know the date of the British recognition but the
nature of the tenure is described as follows :"Continuable to all male legitimate descendants of
the holder at the time of British conquest, viz.,
'Bhujangrao Appasaheb, the first British Grantee,
son of Bahirojirao Ghorpade."
On the death of the British Grantee (Bhujangrao
Appasaheb) he was succeeded by his son Daulatrao I
who died on the 24th of July, 1864. This Daulatrao I
left three sons, Bhujangrao I, Yeshwantrao and
Malojirao.
'
In the year 1866 Bhujangrao I and his brother Yeshwantrao alia1 Annasaheb sued Malojirao for possession
-0£ this Saranjam. A question of impartibility was
raised but the Bombay High Court declared that the
property in British India was partible. They further
declared that Bhujangrao I was the head of the familv
and as such was entitled to a special assignment which
was not to exceed a quarter share, for the expenses
and duties which might devolve on him by virtue of
his position, and that after this had been set aside each
of the three brothers was entitled to an equal one-third
share in the landed property in India. This judgment
1951
Bhunjangrao
Daulatrao.
v.
Malojirao
Daulatrao
and Others.
Bose/.
406
1952
Bhunjangrao
Daulatrao
v.
Maloiirao
Daulatrao
and Others.
Bose/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
is reported in 5 Born. H.C.R. 161. The duties enumerated at page 170 included the "keeping up of armed
retainers for the fort of Gajendragad, and for the im·
provement of that village, which was the chief seat of
this branch of the Ghorpade family, and also to enable
him to distribute on ceremonial occasions the custom·
ary presents to the junior members of the family."
The judgment is dated the 12th of October, 1868.
As a consequence a division of the property wa!>
effected. Malojirao separated himself from his brothers
and was allotted seven villages. The other two
brothers continued joint and took the remainder.
But this was only with respect to property situate in
British India. .The parties also had property in the
State of Kolhapur. That was left undivided.
Bhujangrao I died in 1881 and his younger brother
Yeshwantrao (alias Annasaheb) claimed to succeed as
the sole heir. The Political Department of the Government of India refused to recognise this claim and permitted Bhujangrao I's widow Krishnabai to . adopt a
a boy from the family and recognised him as the heir
in respect of that portion of the estate which lay within
the Principality of Kolhapur. This was on the 3rd of
February, 1882.
The Bombay Government followed a similar course
regarding the property in British India. On the 26th
of April, 1882, they passed a Resolution embodying
the following decision :
( 1) The adoption was to be recognised and the
adopted son was to occupy the same position as his
adoptive father, that is to ·say, he was to get one-third
of tl~e property plus the assignment given · to him as
head of the family.
(2) Malojirao who had already taken his share of
the estate was to continue in possession.
(3) Yeshwantrao (alias Annasaheb) was given
the option of remaining joint with the adopted boy or
separating.
Finally, the Resolution concluded-
....
....
-
S.C.R.
..
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
"The two brothers will hold their respective shares
as their private property in virtue of the decree of the
High Court and the Jahagir will henceforth be restricted to the portion awarded by the High Court to
Bhujangrao which the adopted son will now inherit.
It should however be clearly understood that the decision of the High Court is not to be held as a precedent
and that no partition of the Jahagir Estate to be continued to the adopted son will ever be allowed."
This position was emphasised by Government in the
same year on the 22nd August, 1882. Krishnabai, who
had been allowed by Government to adopt Daulatrao
II, asked that her husband's one-third share in the
estate be also treated as private property in the same
way as the shares of the other two brothers. This
prayer was refused and Government stated :
_.
•
•
,. .
"It should be plainly understood that Government
allow the adoption to be made by her only in consideration of Bhujangrao's one-third share as well as the
portion assigned to him as head of the family being
continued to the adopted son as indivisible Jahagir
Estate descending in the line of male heirs in the order
of primogeniture and subject to no terms whatsoever
as to the enjoyment of the same by Krishnabai during
her lifetime."
The position was re-examined by Government in
1891 and its decision was embodied in the following
resolution dated the 17th of March, 1891 :
"It appears to
Government that the whole
Gajendragad Estate is a Saranjam continuable as hereditary in the fullest sense of the word as interpreted
by the Court of Directors in paragraph 9 of their
Despatch No. 27 dated 12th' December, 1855. It is
continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the
holder at the time of the British conquest; and should
Government ever sanction an adoption the terms of
sanction would be those applicable to Saranjamdars.
The property should be dealt with like other Saranjams
in the Political Department."
53
1952
Bhuniangrao.
Daulatrao
v.
Malo;irao
Daulatrao
and 0 th~rt.
Bos~/.
408
1952
Bhunjangrao
D11Hl111rao
Y.
J4R/ojirll0
DRHlatrao
"'ml Others.
Bos•],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
In the year 1901 the adopted son Daulatrao II sued
Yeshwantrao's son Bhujangrao II for partition. It
will be remembered that in the litigation of 1866, which
ended in the Bombay High Court's judgment reported
in 5 Born. H.C.R. 161, Malojirao alone separated
and the other two brothers continued joint. The
litigation of 1901 put an end to that position. The
High Court's judgment dated the 12th of March, 1908,
makes it clear · that as Government was not a party to
that litigation its rights against either or both of the
parties were not affected. But as between the parties
inter se they were bound by the previous decisiol'I and
so the adopted son was entitled to partition and separate possession of ~uch properties as might fall to his
share. After this decision was given the two partitioned
the property between themselves amicably.
In or about the year 1930 a Record of Rights
was introduced in fourteen of the villages in the
Gajendragad Jahagir and a dispute arose again between
the three branches of the family. The District Deputy
C,ollector, after inspecting the records, found that
"the name of the Khatedar Saranjamdar alone
has found place in the village Inam register, in the
Saranjam list and the land alienation register,"
while in the other village records the various members
of the family were entered according to the "actual
wahivat or enjoyment."
After due consideration he thought that the interest
of Government and the Saranjamdar would be
sufficiently safeguarded by allowing the same position
to con6nue. He ordered the entries to be made
accordingly. The order also discloses that the matter
had been referred to the Legal Remembrancer to the
Bombay Government.
In the meanwhile, on the 5th of May, 1898, a set of
Rules framed under Schedule B, Rule 10, of the Bombay
Rent Free Estates Act of 1852 were drawn up and
published in the Bombay Gazette. These Rules were
republished, probably with some modification, in the
Gazette of 8th July, 1901. The portions applicable
here were as follows :-
'.
....
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
. .:..,
-
"I. Saraniams shall ordinarily be continued in
accordance
with the decision
already passed by
Government in each case.
II. A Saranjam which has been decided to be
hereditarily continuable shall ordinarily descend to
the eldest male representative, in the order of primogeniture, of the senior branch of the family descended
from the first British Grantee or any of his brothers who
were undivided in interest. But Government reserve to
themselves their rights for sufficient reason to direct the
continuance of the Saranjam to any. other member of
the $aid family, or as an act of grace, to a person
adopted into the same family with the sanction of
Government.
*
>·
.~
409
*
V. Every Saranjam shall be held as a life estate. It
shall be formally resumed on the death of the holder and
in cases in which it is capable of further continuance
it shall be made over to the next holder as a· fresh grant
from Government, unencumbered by. any debts, or
charges, 5ave such as may be specially imposed by
Government itself.
VI. No Saranjam shall be capable of sub-division ..
VII. Every
Saranjamdar
shall
be responsible
for making a suitable provision for the maintenance
of .... " (certain members of the family enumerated m
the Rule).
IX. 'If an order passed by Government under
Rule VII is not carried out, Government may, what-_
ever the reason may be, direct the Saranjam, or a
portion of it, to be resumed .... Provision for the
members of the Saranjamdar's family entitled to maintenance shall then be made by Government out of the
revenues of the Saranjam so resumed."
After the District Deputy Collector's orders were passed on the 20th of May, 1930, Daulatrao II died on the
8t11 of May, 1931, and the matter was again taken up
by Government. This time it passed ilie following
1952
Bhuniangrao
Daulatrao
v.
Malo;irao
Daulatrao
and Others.
Bo;e / .
•
410
1952
Bhunjangrao
Dau/atrao
v.
Malojirao
Daulatrao
and Others.
Bose /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Resolution on the 7th of June, 1932. The Resolution
was headed, "Resumption and regrant of the Gajendragad Saranjam standing at No. 91 of the Saranjam
List." It reads"Resolution :-The Governor-in-Council 1s pleased
to direct that the Gajendragad Saranjam should be
formally resumed and
regranted to Bhujangrao
Daulatrao Ghorpade eldest son of the deceased
Saranjamdar Sardar Daulatrao Bhujangrao Ghorpade
and that it should be entered in his sole name in the
accounts of the Collector of Dharwar with effect from
the date of the death of the last holder. The Collector
should take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages of the Saranjam estate which were
in possession of the deceased Saranjamdar.
...: .
-
2. The Governor-in-Council
agrees
with the
Commissioner, Southern Division, that the assignments
held by the Bhaubands as potgi holders should be
continued to them as at present."
The Bhujangrao mentioned in the Resolution is the 1
plaintiff who is shown as Bhujangrao III in the
genealogical tree.
The defendants were evidently aggrieved by this, (or
they filed Suit No. 23 of 1934 against the present
plaintiff and the Secretary of State for India in Council
praying inter alia "that the properties in that suit,
viz., the villages allotted to their shares, were their
independent and private properties and in case they
were held to be . Saranjam properties, they be declared
as independent Saranjams, separate and distinct from
the one held by the present plaintiff."
This suit was withdrawn with liberty to bring a
fresh suit on the same cause of action against the
present plaintiff but not against the Secretary of State
for India in Council. According to defendants 1 and
2, this was pursuant to an arrangement between the
Government and themselves that Government would
issue a fresh Resolution in terms of the earlier Resolution dated the 17th of March, 1891.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
This was done. On the 25th of February,
Government passed the following Resolution:-
-
...
411
1936,
"Resolution:-After
careful
consideration
the
Governor-in-Council 1s pleased to confirm the decision
in Government Resolution
(Political Department)
No. 1769 dated the 17th of March, 1891, and to declare
that the whole of the Gajendragad Estate shall be
continuable as
an
inalienable
and
impartible
Saranjam on the conditions stated in the said
Resolution.· Having regard, however, to the manner
in which different portions of the estate have been held
by different branches of the family, the Governor-inCouncil, in modification of the orders contained in
Government Resolution No. 8%9 dated the 7th June,
1932, is ?leased to direct that the portions of the said
estate held by Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade,
Daulatrao
Malojirao
Ghorpade and
Bhujangrao
Yeshwantrao Ghorpade, respectively, shall henceforth
be entered in the Revenue Records as de facto shares
in the said estate held by the said persons as repreof three branches of the
sentatives, respectively
Ghorpade family. Each of the said de facto shares
shall be continuable hereditarily as such as if it were
~ separate Saranjam estate in
accordance with the
rules made for the continuance of Saranjams by the
Governor-in-Council in exercise of the powers referred
to in the rules framed under the Bombay Rent Free
Estates Act, 1852, and section 2(3) of the Bombay
Summary Settlement Act (VII of 1863) and such
special orders as the Governor-in-Council may make
in regard to the Gajendragad Estate as a whole or in
regard to the said share. The recognition of the aforesaid shares and their entry in the Revenue Records
~ separate shares shall not be deemed to amoua.t to a
recognition of the estate of Gajendragad as in any
manner partible or alienable and shall not in any way
affect the right of_ Government to treat the said estate
as an entire impartible and inalienable Saranjam
estate.
2. The Governor-in-Council further directs that
the aforesaid shares shall in no case be capable of
1952
Bhunjangrao
Daulatrao
v.
Malojirao
Daulatrao
and Others.
Bose/.
412
1952
Bhuniangrao
Daulatrao
v.
Ma/o;irao
Daulatrao
and bthers.
Bose f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
sub-division and shall not in any way be alienated or
encumbered except m accordance with the rules and
orders referred to above ..."
The present suit 1s an attack on the action of
Government in passing this Resolution. The first and
second defendants are the present representatives of
the other branches of the family and the third defendant is the Province of Bombay (now the State of
Bombay). The plaint states"9. Government
can
have no . jurisdiction to.
deprive the plaintiff at any rate during his lifetime of
the full benefit of all the rights and privileges apertaining to the holder of a Sarani am. The Order of
Government of the 8th February, 1936 is, therefore,
ultr.a vires and in no way binding on the present
plaintiff ..... .
10. Defendants 1 and 2, therefore, are not entitled
to any rights or privileges claimable by the holder of
a Saranjam which according to the G. R. is continuable 'as an inalienable and . impartible Saranjam', such
as for example in the matter of appointment of the
village officers m any of the 27 villages appertaining
to the Gajendragad Saranjam.
11. The cause of action a~ose in April 1938 and the
resolution and the entry being ultra "titres is not binding...
12. As this is a suit claiming for relief primarily
against defendants I and 2, defendant 3 is made a
party to the suit in order to enable Government (defendant 3) to give proper effect to the decision of Government of the 17th March, 1891, and of 7th June, 1932,
as against defendants I and 2 who have no right to the
position which they claim ..."
The reliefs prayed for are" (a) That is be declared that defendants I and 2
have no right to go behind the order of the Government
as per Resolution No. 8969 of 7th June, 1932, under
which plaintiff ·is entitled to be recognised as the sole
Saranjamdar in the Revenue Records, and that the
assignments held by defendants 1 and 2 are held by
them as mere potgi holders.
••
....
....
.•.
..
./
.
$.C.R.
-
........
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
(b) That in consequence of his position of a sole
Saranjamdar, the plaintiff alone at any rate during his
lifetime has the sole right to the rights and privileges
appertaining to the post of a sole Saranjamdar, to wit,
to be consulted in the appointment of the village
officers in all the villages appertaining to the Saranjam
estate, but assigned to defendants 1 and 2 for potgi ..•
( c) Defendants 1 and 2 be restrained from doing
any acts or taking any steps in contravention of the
aforesaid right of the plaintiff.
(d) That it be declared that defendant 3 (Government) have no right to change the Resolution No. 8969
of 7th June, 1932, and at any rate during the lifetime
of the plaintiff."
The first Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the
merits holding that Government had the right to amend
its Resolution in the way it did.
The lower appellate Court also dismissed the suit on
three grounds: (1) that the two previous decisions of
1868 and 1908 operate as res iudicata, (2) .that the impugned Resolution 1s intra vires and (3) that section 4
(a) and (d) of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act bars the
jurisdiction of the Court.
In second appeal the High Court only considered the
question of jurisdiction and, agreemg with the lower
appellate Court on the point, dismissed the appeal but ·
it granted the plaintiff leave to appeal to this Court.
The only question we have to consider is the one of
jurisdiction. Section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (Bombay Act X of 1876), runs~
Subject to the exceptions hereinafter appearing, no
Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to(a) . . . claims against the Crown relating to lands ...
held as Saranjam ... "
It was strenuously contended that this is not a claim
against the Crown but one against the first and second
defendants. That, m my opinion, is an idle contention in view of paragraphs 9 and 12 of the plaint and
reliefs (a) and (d). In any event, Mr. Somayya was
asked whether he would strike out the third defendant
4-'--5 S.C. India/71
1952
Bhuiangr111:1
Daulatrao
v.
Malojirao
Daulatrao
and Other$
Bose /.
414
1952
~
Bhujangrao
Daulatrao
v.
Malo;irao
Daulatrao
and Others.
Bose/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
and those portions of the plaint which sought relief
against it. He said he was not prepared to do so. I
cannot see how a plaintiff can insist on retaining a
person against whom he claims no relief as a party. I
am clear that this is a suit against the "Crown" within
the meaning of section 4(a).
The next question is whether, assuming that to be
the case, it ts also one "relating to lands held as
Saranjam." So far as the reliefs sought against
Government are concerned, that . is clearly the case.
Paragraph 9 of the plaint challenges Government's
jurisdiction to deprive the plaintiff of the full benefit
of all rights and privileges appertaining to the
holder of a Saranjam. These rights cannot exist
apart from the lands which form part of the
Saranjam estate and the implication of the prayer
is that Government has, for example, no right to
resume the Saranjam either under Rule V on the death
of the last Saranjamdar or under Rule IX during his
lifetime. It 1s to be observed that a resumption under
Rule IX can only be of the land because the rule
directs that when the Saranjam is resumed Government itself shall make provisions for the maintenance
of those entitled to it "out of the revenues of the
Saranjam so resumed." These revenues can only come
out of the land.
Relief ( d) in the prayer clause seeks a declaration
that Government has no right to change Resolution
No. 8969 dated the 7th of June, 1932. That Resolution
directly relates to the land because it directs that the
Gajendragad Saranjam be resumed and the Collector is
directed to take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages· of the Saranjam estate etc.
It is impossible to contend that this is not a claim
relating to lands held as Saranjam.
It was next argued that if that be tlte case the claim
against Government can be dismissed and the plaintiff
can at least be given the reliefs claimed against the
other two defendants. These, it was contended, do
not relate to land and in any event are not claims
against the "Crown".
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S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
In my opinion, this is not a suit in which the rights
claimed against the other defendants can be divorced from the claim against Government and considered
separately. That is evident enough from paragraph 10
of the plaint. In paragraph 9 the power of Government to deprive the plaintiff of the rights he claims is
challenged and in paragraph 10 of the plaintiff explains
that "therefore" the first and second defendants are not
entitled to any of the rights and privileges of the
Saranjamdar. One of those rights, as we · have seen
from Rules VII and IX, is to take the revenues of the
entire estate in order that he might fulfil his obligation
regarding the payment of maintenance to certain
members of the family; and if the d~fendants claim to
hold their lands under the orders of Government and
the plaintiff insists on retaining Government as a party
in order that it may be bound by the decree he wants
against the other defendants it 1s obvious that his
claim against these defendants cannot . be separated
from his claim against the Government.
•
In any event, if the claim against Government is to
be ignored it can only be on the basis that its orders
cannot be challenged and if the orders stand it 1s
evident that the plaintiff can have no hope of success
because both sides hold their respective properties on
the basis of those orders.
There are two decisions of the Bombay High Court
which have taken this view. Basalingappagouda v.
The Secretary of State for India(1) was a Watan case.
Government had recognised the second defendant as
the W atandar. Plaintiff sued Government and the
second defendant and sought a declaration and injunction. On being faced with the dilemma that the
suit against Government did not lie because of section 4
(a) (3) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876,
he asked the Court, as here, to leave the Government
out of consideration and decree his claim against the
second defendant alone. The learned Judges held that
that would amount to striking out the main relief
sought against both the defendants and would entirely
. (I) 28 Born. L.R. 651.
1952
Bhujangrao
Daulatrao
v.
Malojirao
Daulatrao
and Others.
Bose/.
,.
.
416
1952
Bhujangrao
Daulatrao
v.
Malojirao
Daulatrao
and Others.
Bos< /.
i
.
.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
change the character of the suit and added that "as
lo1,1g as the Secretary of State is a party to the suit,
such a declarat:ton could not be granted."
In the other case, Basangauda v. The Secretary of
State('), Beaumont C. J. and Baker J. took the same
view. They said"Mr. Gumaste, who appears for the appellant, says
that his claim is not a claim against the Government
but in that case he ought to strike out the Government.
He is not prepared to strike out the Government,
because if he does they will not be bound by these proceedings and will follow the decision of their revenue tribunals. Therefore, he wants to make the Government
a party in order tliat they may be bound. But, if they
remain a party, it seems to me tha~ there is a claim
against them relating to property appertaining to the
office of an hereditary officer, although no doubt it is
quite true that the appellant does not desire to get any
order against the Government as to the way in which
the pl'bperty should be dealt with or anything of the
sort, and he only wants a declaration as to his title
which will bind Government."
They held that the jurisdiction of the courts was
ousted.
It was next contended, on the strength of a decision
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reported in Province of Bombay v. Hormusji Manekji( 2 ),
that the courts have jurisdiction to decide whether
Government acted· in excess of its powers and that
that question must be decided first. In my opinion,
this decision does not apply here.
Their Lordships were dealing with a case falling
under section 4(b) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876. That provides that". . . no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as
to ..... .
*
(b) objections to the amount o~ incidence of any
assessment of land revenue authorised by the Provincial Government."
(!) 32 Born. L.R. 1370.
(2) 74 I.A. 103.
. "'lo..
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:S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
'
1
'
•
F
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417
As ·pointed out by Strangman K. C., on behalf of the
plaintiff respondent, "authorised" must mean "duly
authorised," and in that particular case the impugned
.assessment would not be duly authorised if the Government Resolution of 11-4-1930 purporting to treat the
.agreement relied on by the respondent as cancelled and
authorising the levy of the full assessment was ultra
vires under section 211 of the Land Revenue Code.
Thus, before the exclusion of the Civil Court's jurisdiction under section 4(b) could come into play, the Court
had to determine the issue of ultra vires. Consequently,
their Lordships held that that question was outside the
scope of the bar. But the position here is different.
We are concerned here with section 4(a) and under
that no question about an authorised act of Government arise5. The section is general and bars all "claims
.against the Crown relating to lands.... held as
Saranjam." That is to say, even if the Government's
act in relation to such lands was ultra vires, a claim
impugning the validity of such an act would fall within
the scope of the exclusion in clause (a) provided it
relates to such land.
There is a difference of opinion in the Bombay High
·Court as to whether section 4 is attracted if the only
relief sought against Government is a declaration.
One set of decisions holds that that does not amount
"to a "claim
against Government." Dattatraya Vishwanath v. The Secretary of State for lndia(1) is typical
·Of that view. On the other hand, Daulatrao v. Government of Bombay(2), a case relating to the Gajendragad
·estate, took the ot~er view. In my opinion, the latter
·view is correct.
In my opinion, the decision of the High Court was
:right and I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
PATANJALI SASTRI ·C. · J.--:J agree .
.S. R. DAs J.-I agree.
Appeal dismissed
Agent for the appellant : Ganpat Rai.
Agent for respondents Nos. 1 & 2 : M. S. K. Sastri.
Agent for respondent No. 3 : P. A. Mehta.
(I) I.L.R. 1948 B°.m. 809 at 820.
(2) 47 Born. L.R. 214.
1952
Bhujangrao
Daulatrao
v.
Malojirao
Daulatrao
and Others.
Bose/.
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