N. P. PONNUSWAMI versus RETURNING OFFICER, NAMAKKAL CONSTITUENCY AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 January 1952 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 218 | 1952 INSC 2
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 January 1952
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, SIR SYED FAZL ALI, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 351/1951
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 218
- Neutral citation
- 1952 INSC 2
Text of the judgment
218
1952
Jan. 21.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
N. P. PONNUS\VAMI
,_
ti.
RETURNING OFFICER, NAMAKKAL
CONSTITUENCY and OTHERS
UNION OF INDIA and STATE OF MADHYA
BHARAT-INTERVENERS.
C.J.,
[PATANJALI SAsTRr
FAZL Au, MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAs and
CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR
JJ.J
Constitution of India Arts. 226, 324 to 329-Representation of the
People Act, 1951, ss. 36, 80--Election to Legislatures-Rejection of
nomination paper-Applicati-on to High Court for writ of certiorari
-Maintainability-..furisdiction
of
High
Court-Meaning
of
"election" and "questioning election"-Poli"cy of Legislature with
regard to elections-Special remedies.
Article 329 (b) of the Constitution of India provides that
"no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or
either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority
and in such manner as may be provided for, by or under any law
made by the appropriate Legislature." The Representation of
the People Act, 1951, which made detailed provisions for election
to the various Legislatures of the country also contains a· provi~
sion (sec. 80) that no election shall be called in question except
by an election petition presented in accordance with the provi~
sions of the Act.
The appellant\ who was a candidate for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Madras_ and whose nomination
paper was rejected by the Returning Officer, applied to the High
Court of Madras under article. 226 of the Constitution for a writ
of certiorari' to quash the order of the Returning Officer rejecting
his nomination paper and to direct the Returning Officer to
include his name in the list of valid nominations to be published:
Held by the Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI, C. J., FAZL Au,
MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHAR.A
AiYAR
JJ.)
that in view of the provisions of articles 329 (b) of the Constitution and sec. 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of
the Returning Officer.
The word uelection" has by long usage in connection with
the process of selection of proper representatives in democratic
institutions acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the
'·
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
narrow sense it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate
·1952
which may embrace the. ·result of the poll when there is polling
or a particular candidate being returned unopposed when there is N. P. Ponnuno poll. In the wide sense, the word is used to connote the entire
f.Wam1
process culminating in a candidate being declared elected and it"
.v.
is in this wide sense that the word is used in Part XV of the Returmng Officer,
Constitution in which article 329 (b) occurs.
Namak,k,al
Constituency a1ld
The scheme of Part XV of the Constitution and the RepreOthers.
sentation of the People Act, 1951,' seems to . be that any matter
which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought
up' only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any court. Undl:r the election law, the only
significance which the rejection of a nomination paper has,
consists in the fact that it can be used as a ground to call the
election in question. _Article 329 (b) was apparently enacted to
preS<:ribe the manner in which and the stage at which this
ground, anel other grounds which inay be raised under. the \aw to
call the election in question., could be urged. It follows by necessary implication from the language of this provision that those
grounds cannot be urged in any .other manner, at any other stage
and before any other court. If tl1e grounds oh .which. an election
can be called in question could be raised at an earlier stage and
errors, if any, are rectified, there will be no meaning in enacting
a provision like article 329 (b) and in setting up · a special
tribunal. Any other meaning ascribed to the words used in the
article would lead to anomalies, which the Constitution col,lld
not have contemplated, one of them being that canflicting views
may be expressed by the High Court at the pre-polling stage and
by the election tribunal whicli is to be an independent body, at
the stage when the matter is brought up before it. Therefore,
questioning the rejection of a nomination paper is "questioning.
the election" within the meaning of article 329 (b) of the Constitu\ tion and sec. 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Having regard to the important functions which tlie legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it has always
been recognized to be a matter of first importance tliat elections
should be concluded as early as possible according to
S<:hedule
and all controversial matters and all disputes arising out of elections should be postponed till after tlie elections are over, . so
tliat the election proceedings may not be unduly retarded or
protracted. In conformity with this principle, the sclieme of the
election law in this country as well as in England is that no
significance should be attaclied to anything which does not affect
the "election"; and if any irregularities are committed while, it is
in progress and they belong to the category or class which, under
the law by which elections are governed, would have the effect
of vitiating the "election" and enable the persons . affected · rn
time
8:.....3 S. C. India/71
220
1952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~
[1952]
call it in qu~stion, they should be brought up before a special
tribunal by means of an election petition and not be made the
N. P: Ponnu·
subject of a dispute before any court while the election is in
swami
progress.
Returning Of/k.r,
Th e rig
. ht to vote or stan J as a can d"d
f or e1ection
· ts
· not a
i ate
N, v.kkal
civil right but is a creature of statute or specjal law and n1ust be
Co ::a c an J subject to the limitations imposed by it. Strictly speaking, it
ns ~,:; Y
' is the sole right- of the Legislature to examine and determine all
'S.
matters relating to the election of its own members, and if the
legislature takes it out of its own hands and vests in a special
tribunal an entirely new and unknown jurisdiction, that special
jurisdiction should be exercised in accordance with the law which
creates it.
Where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives
a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that
statute only must be availed of.
Wolverhampton New Water 'Works Co. v. Hawkesford [6 C. B.
-(N. S.) 336], Neville v. London Express Newspaper Limited ([1919]
A. C. 368), Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon
·Grant & Co. ([1935] A. C. 532), Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.
( 44 C. W. N. 709), Hurdutrai v. Official Assignee of Calcutta (52
C. W. N. 343), Theberge v. Laudry (1876, 2 App. Cas. 102)
-
referred to.
Judgment of the l-Iigh Court of Madras affirmed.
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTioN : Case No. 351 of
Appeal under article 132 of the Constitution
from the Judgment and Order of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras (Subba Rao and Venkatarama
Ayyar JJ.) dated 11th December, 1951, in Writ Petition No. 746 of 1951. The facts of the case and arguments of the counsel are set out in detail in the judgment.
N. Rajagopal Iyengar, for the appellant.
R. Ganapathi Iyer, for the 1st respondent.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India ( G. N.
Joshi, with him) for the Union of India.
K. A. Chiklle, Advocate-General of Madhya Bharat.
-(G. N. foshi; with him) for the State of Madhya Bharat.
CIVIL
1951.
1952. January 21. Faz! Ali J. delivered Judgment
as follows. Patanjali Sastri C. J."Mahajan, Mukherjea,
Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. agreed. with Faz!
.Ali J.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
221
FAZL Au J.-This is an appeal from an order of the
Madras High Court dismissing the petition of the
.appellant praying for a writ of certiorari.
1952
district.' On the 28th November, . 1951, .the Returning
Officer for that constituency took ·up ·for scrutiQy the
nomination papers filed by the various candidates and
on the same day he rejected the· appellant's nomination paper on certain groun~s w~ich 1 need' not be set
out as they are .not material to the point raised in this
aweal. . The appellant thereupon moved the High
Court under article 226 of the Constitution praying
for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Returning Officer rejecting his nomination paper and to
dim:t the Returning Officer to include his name in the
list of valid nominations to be published. The High
Court dismissed the appellant's application on the.
ground that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the
order of the Returning Officer by reason of the provisions of article 329(b) of the Constitution. The
:appellant's contention in this appeal is that the view
.expressed by the High Court is not correct, that the
jurisdiction of the High Court is not affected by
article 329 (b) of the Constitution and that he was
entitled to a writ o£ certiorari in the circumstances of
the case.
Broadly speaking, the arguments on whi~h the
judgment of the High Court is assailed are two-fold :(1) that the concl~sion 'arrived at by the High
Court does not follow from the language of article 329
(b) of the Constitution, whether that article is . read
by itself or along with the other articles in Part XV of
the Constitution : anrl
(2) that the anomalies which will arise if the construction put by the High Court on article 329 (b) is
accepted, are so startling that the courts should lean
in favour of the construction put forward on behalf of
the appellant.
·
. Others.
N. P. Ponnu·
swami
v.
The appellant was one of the persons who had filed
-Returning Officer,
nomination papers for election to the Madras Legislative
Namakkfd
Assembly fro111 the Namal<lkal Constituency in Salem Constituency and
29
Fazl Ali f.
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952J
1952
The first argument which turns on the con~truction
of article 329(b) requires serious consideration, but I
N. P. Ponnu- think the secon.d argument can be disposed of briefly
Jtuami
T.
at the outset. It should be stated that what the appelReturning Officer, !ant chooses to call anomaly can be more appropriately
Namakkal
described as hardship or prejudice and what their
Constituency and nature will be has been stated in forceful language by
Otlii:rs.
Wallace J. in Sarvothama Rao v. Chairman, Municipal
Faz/ Ali /. · Council, Saidapet(') in these words :- '
"I am quite clear that any post-election remedy is
wholly inadequate to afford the relief which the petitioner seeks, namely, that. this election, now published
be stayed, until it can be held with himself as ~ candidate. It is no consolation to tell him that he can stand
for some other election. It is no remedy to tell him
that he must let the election go on and then have it set
aside by petition and have a fresh election ordered.
The fresh election may be under altogether different
conditions and may bring forward an array of fresh
candidates. The petitioner can only have his proper
relief if the proposed election without him is stayed
until his rejected nomination is restored, and hence an
injunction staying this election was absolutely necessary, unless the relief asked for was to be denie<l him
altogether in limine. In most cases of this kind no
doubt there will be difficulty for the aggrieved party
to get in his suit in time before the threatened wrong
is committed ; but when he has succeeded in so doing,
the Court cannot stultify itself by allowing the wrong
which it is asked to prevent to be actually consummated while it is engaged in trying the suit."
These observations however represent only one side
of the picture and the same learned Judge presented
the other side of the picture in a subsequent case [Desi
Chettiar v. Chinttasami Chett1ar( 2 )] in the following
passage:"The petitioner is not without his remedy. His
remedy lies in an election. petition which we understand he has already put in. It is argued for him
(1) (1924) IL.R. 47 Mad. 585. at 600.
(2) (1928) A.I.R. Mad. 1271 at 1272.
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223
1952
that that remedy which 'merely allows him to have set
.aside an election once held is not as efficacious as the
N. P. Ponnuone which .would enable him to stop the. election altoswami
gether'; and certain observations at p. 600 of Sar-v.
voihama Rao v. Chairman, Municipal Council, Saida- Returning Officer,
.
pet(1) are quoted. In the first place, we · do not see · Namakkal
and
Constituency
how the mere fact that thi: petitioner cannot get the
Others.
election stopped and has his remedy · only after it is·
-0ver by an election petition, will in itself confer on
Fazl Ali /.
him any right to obtain a writ. In the second place,
these observations were directed to the consideration
Qf the propriety of an injunction in a civil suit, a
matter with which we are not here concerned. And
finally it may be observed that these remarks were
made some years ago when the practice of individuals
coming forward to · stop elections in order that their
own individual interest may be safeguarded was not so
common. It is clear that there is another side of the
question to be considered, namely, the i inconvenience
to the public administration of having elections and
the business of "Local Boards held up while individuals
prosecute their individual grievances. We understan~
the election for the elective seats in this Union has
\
been held up since 31st May because of this petition,
the result being that the electors have been unable
since then to have any representation on the Board,
and .the Board is functioning, if indeed it is functioning, . with a mere nominated fraction of its total
strength; and this state of affairs the petitioner proposes to have continued until his own personal griev;;mce is' satisfied."
These obser¥ations which were made in regard to
e1ections to Local Boards will apply with greater force
to elections to legislat\Jres, because it does not require
much argument to show that in a country with ·a
Aemocratic constitution in which the legislatures have
to play a very important role, 1t will lead to serious
consequences if the elections are unduly protracted or
obstructed .. To this. aspect of the matter I shall have to
.adv~rt later, but , it .is sufficient for the present purpose
(1) ( 1924) I.L.R. 47 Mad. 585 at 600.
/
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
to state firstly that in England the hardship and
inconvenience which rnay be suffered by an individual
N. P. Ponnucandidate has not been regarded as of sufficient
swami
weight to induce Parliament to make provision for
v.
Returnint Of!icet, immediate relief and the aggrieved candidate has tc>
Namakkal
wait_ until after the election to challenge the validity
Constituency and of the rejection of his nomination paper, and secondly,
Others.
that the question of hardship or inconvenience is after
all . only a secondary question, because if the construcFaz/ Ali/.
tion put by the High Court on article 329 (b) of the
Constitution is found to be correct, the fact that such
construction will lead to hardship and inconvenience
becomes irrelevant.
1952
Article 329 is the last article in Part XV of the
Constitution the heading of which is "Elections", and·
it runs as follows :"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution-( a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to
such constituencies made or
purporting to be made
under article 327 or article 328, shall not be called in
question in any court ;
(b) no election to either House of Parliament or
to the House or either House of the Legislature of a
State shall be called in question except by an election
petition presented to such authority and in such
manner as may be provided for, by, or under any law
made by the appropriate Legislature."
In construing this article, reference was made by
both parties in the course of their arguments to the
other articles in the same Part, namely, articles 324,
325, 326, 327 and 328. Article 324 provides for the
constitution and appointment of an Elecetion Commissioner to superintend, direct and control elections to
discrimination
the legislatures ; article 325 prohibits
against electors on the ground of religion, race, ca<te
or sex ; article 326 provides for adult suffrage ; article
327 empowers Parliament to pass laws making provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in
connection with, elections to the legislatures, subject
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
225
1952
to the provisions of the Constitution ; and article 328
is a complementary article giving power to the State
N. P. PonnuLegislature to make provisions with respect to all
swami
matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to
v.
the State Legislature. A notable difference in the Returning Otficn-,
Namakkal
language used in articles 327 and 328 -on the one hand,
and
and · article 329 on the other, is that while the first Constituency
Others.
two articles begin with the words "subject to the pro.
visions of this Constitution", the last article begins
Fnl Ali/.
with -the words "nothwithstanding anything in this
Constitution." It was conceded at the bar that the
effect of this difference in language is that whereas
any law made by Parliament under article 327, or by
the State Legislatures' under article 328, cannot exclude
_ the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of
the Constitution, that jurisdiction is excluded in regard
to matters provi<}ed Jor in article 329.
Now, the main controversy in this appeal centres
round the meaning of the words "no election shall be
called in question except by an election petition'~ in
article 329(b ), and the point to be decided is whet~er
questioning the action of the Returning Officer in rejecting a nomination paper can be said to be comprehended within the words, "no election shall be called
in question." The appellant's case is that questioning
something which has happened before a candidate is
dedared elected is not the same thing as questioning
an election, and the arguments advanced on his bebalf in support of this construction were these :(1) That the word "election" as used in article
329(b) means what it normally · and etymologically
means, namely, the result of polling or ~he final selection of a candidate ;
•
(2) That the fact that an election petition
can be filed only after polling is over or after a
candidate is declared elected, and what is
normally called in question by such petition is the
final result, bears out the contention that the word
· "election" can have no other meaning in article 329
(b) than the result of polling or the final selection of a
candidate ;
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226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1952
(3) That the words "arising out of or in connection
with" which are used in article 324(1) and the words
N. P. Ponnu- "with respect to all matters relating to, or in connecswam1
tion with" which are used in articles 327 and 328,
v.
Returning Officer, show that the framers of the Constitution knew that it
Namakkal
was necessary to use different languages when referring
Constituency and respectively to matters which happen prior to and
Others.
·
after the result of polling, and if they had intended
to include the rejection of a nomination paper within
Fazl Ali /.
the ambit of the prohibition contained in article 329
(b) they would have used similar language in that
article ; and
( 4) That the action of the Returning Officer in rejecting a nomination paper can be questioned before
the High Court under article 226 of . the Constitution
for the following reason :-Scrutiny of nomination
papers and their rejection .are provided for in section 36
of· the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Parliament has made this provision in exercise of the powers
c0nferred on it ·by article 327 of the Constitutio11
which is "subject to the provisions of the Constitution".
Therefore, the action of the Returning Officer is subject
to the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court
under article 226.
These arguments appear .a~ first sight to be quite
impressive, but in my opm1on there are weightier
and basically more important arguments in support of
the view taken by the High Court. As we have seen,
the most important question for determination is the
meaning to be given
to the word "election" in
article 329 (b). That word has by long usage in
<:onnection with the process of selection of proper
representatives in democratic
institutions,
acquired
both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the narrow
sense, it is used to mean the final selection of a
candidate which may embrace the result of the
poll when there is polling or a particular candidate
being returned unopposed when there is no poll. In
the wide sense, the word is used to connote the entire
process culminating in a candidate being declared
:S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT ~EPORTS
227
1952
·elected. In Srinivasalu v. 1;..uppuswami(1), the learned
Judges of the Madras High Court after examining the
N. P. Ponnuquestion, expressed· the opinion that : the term "elecswami
tion" may be taken to· embrace the whole procedure
v.
where by an "elected member" is returned, whether or Returning Officer,
Namakkal
not it · be found necessary to take a poll. With this
Constituency and
·view, my brother, Mahajan J. expressed his agreement
Othe1·s.
.in Sat Narain v. Hanuman Pramd(2) ; and I also find
myself iJ1 agreement with it. It seems to me that the
Faz/ Ali f.
word "election" has been used in Part XV of the
·Constitution in the wide sense, that is to say, to con.note the entire procedure to be gone through to return
.a candidate to the legislature. The use of the expres.. sion "conduct of elections" in article 324 specifically
points to the wide meaning, and that meaning can also
·be read consistently into tile other provisions which
•occur in Part XV including article 329 (b). That the
·word "election" ·bears this wide meaning whenever we
· :talk, of elections in a democratic country, is borne out
by the fact that in most of the books on the subject
:and in several cases dealing .with the matter, one of
the questions mooted is, when the election begins. The
-subject is dealt with quite concisely in Ha1sbury's
Laws of England in the following passage(3) under the
.beading "Commencement of the Election" :"Although the first formal step in every election is
the issue of the writ, the election is considered for some ·
_purposes to begin at an earlier date. It is a question
d fact in each case when an election begins in such a
way as to make the parties concerned responsible for
breaches of election law, the test being whether the
.contest is "reasonably imminent". Neither the issue of
:the writ nor the publication of the notice of election
·can be looked to as fixing the date when an election
begins from this point of view. Nor, again, does the
·nomination day· afford any criterion. The election. will
usually begin at least earlier than the issue of the writ.
'The question when the election begins .must be care( 1) (1928) A.LR. Mad. 253 at 255.
(2) (1945) A.LR. Lah. 85.
(3) See page 237 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd edition,
Volume 12.
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
fully distinguished from that as to when "th~ conduct
and
management of" an election may be said to begin.
N. P. PonnuAgain,
the question as to when a particular person
JWami
commences to be · a candidate is a question to be conv.
Returning Officer, sidered in each case."
Namak._k._al
The discussion in this passage makes it clear that
( onstituency and
the word "election" can be and has been appropriately
Ot,hers.
used with reference to the entire process which consists.
Fazl Ali ].
of several stages and embraces many steps, some of
which may have an important bearing on the result of
the process.
The next important question to be considered 1s
what is meant by the words "no election shall be
A reference to any treatise
called in question".
on elections in England will show that an election proceeding in that country is liable to be assailed on very
limited grounds, one of them being the improper rejection of a nomination paper. The law with which we
are concerned is not materially different, and we find
that in section 100 of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951, one of the grounds for declaring an election
to be void is the improper rejection of a nomination·
paper.
The question now arises whether the law of elections
in this country contemplates that there should be two·
attacks on matters connected with election proceedings,
one while they are going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226
of the Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of the·
courts having been expressly excluded), and another
after they have been completed by means of an elec-·
tion petition. In my opinion, to affirm such a position
would be contrary to the scheme of Part XV of the·
Constitution and the Representation of the People Act,.
which, as I shall point out lateq seems to be that any
matter which has the effect of vitiating an election
should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in
an appropriate manner before a special tribunal and·
should not be brought up at an intermediate stage·
before any court. It seems to me that under the elec-·
tion law, the only significance which the rejection of
1952
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"
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229
a nominatiorl: paper . has consists in the fact that it
1952
can be used as a ground to call the election m
question. Article 329(b) was apparently enacted to
N. ~~::riu··
prescribe the manner in which and the stage at which
v.
this ground, and other. grounds which may be raised Returning Office1',
under the law to call
the electio11 in question,
N~makkal d
could be urged. I think it follows by necessary im- Consigu;ncyan
1
plication from the
language
of this provision
ers.
that those grounds cannot be urged in any other
Faz/ dli /,·
manner, at any other stage and before any other court.If the grounds on which an election can be called .irr
question could be raised at an earlier stage and errors,,
if any, are rectified, there will be no meaning in enact-'
ing a provision like article 329(b) and in setting' up a
special tribunal. Any other meaning ascribed to the
words used' in the article would lead to anomalies,
which the Constitution could not have ·contemplated,,
one of them being that conflicting views may be expressed by the High Court at the pre-polling stage and by
the election tribunal, which is to be an independent
body, at the stage when the matter is brought up
before it.
I think that a brief examination of the scheme of
Part XV of the Constitution and the Representation.
of the People Act, 1951, will show that the construction I have suggested is the correct one. Broadly
speaking, before an election machinery can be brought
into operation, there are three requisites which ,requii;-e
to be attended to, namely, (1) there should be a set of
laws and rules making provisions with respect to all
matters relating . to, or ·in connection with, elections,
and it should be decided as to how these laws and rules
are to be made; (2) there should be an executive
charged with the duty of securing the due conduct of
elections; and (3) there should be a judicial tribunal
to deal with disputes arising out of or in connection
with elections. Articles 327 and 328 deal with the first
of these requisites, article 324 with the second ai1d
article 329 with the third requisite. The other two
articles in Part . XV, viz., articles 325 and 326, deal
with two matters of principle to which the Consti~u
tion-fotmers have attached much importance. They
30
230
·1952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS -
(1952]
are :-( 1) prohibition against discrimination in the
preparation of, or eligibility for inclusion m, the
N. P. Ponnu- electoral rolls, on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex
swatnt
v.
or any of them ; and (2) adult suffrage. Part XV of
Returning Officer, the Constitution is really a code in itself providing
Namakkal
the entire ground-work for enacting appropriate laws
Constituency and and setting up suitable machinery for the conduct of
Others.
elections.
Faz/ Ali f.
The Representation of the· People Act, 1951, which
was passed by Parliament under article 327 of the
Constitution, makes detailed provisions in regard to
all matters and all stages connected with ·elections to
the various legislatures in this country. That Act is
divicjed into 11 parts, and it is interesting to see the
wide variety of subjects they deal with.
Part II
deals with "the qualifications and disqualifications for
membership'', Part III deals with the notification of
General Elections, Part IV provides for the administrative machinery for the conduct of elections, and
Part V makes provisions for the actual conduct of
elections and deals with such matters as presentation
of nomination papers, requirements of a valid nomination, scrutiny of nominations, etc., and procedure for
polling and counting of votes. Part VI deals with
disputes regarding elections and provide~ for the
manner of presentation of election petitions, the constitution of election tribunals and the trial of ekction
petitions. Part VII outlines the various corrupt and
illegal practices which may affect the elections, and
electqral offenc·es. Obviously, the Act is a self-contained enactment so far as elections are concerned,
which means that whenever we have to ascertain the
true position in regard to any matter connected with
elections, we have only to look at the Act and the rules .
made thereunder. The provisions of the Act which are
material to the present discussion are sectioru 80,
100, 105 and 170, and the provisions of Chapter I.I of
Part IV dealing with the form of election petitions,
their contents and the reliefs which may be sought in
them. Section 80, which is drafted in almost the same
language as ·article 329(b), provides that "no election
shall be called m question except by an election
'•
..
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S.C.R.
SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS
231
1952
petition presented in accordance with the provisions of
this Part". Section 100, as we have already seen, proN. P. Ponnuvides for the grounds on which an election may be
swami
,called in question, one of which is the imriroper rejecv.
tion of a nomination paper. Section 10) says that Returning Officer~
N11mak,k,al
"every order 'of the Tribunal made under this Act shall
Constituency and
be final and conclusive". Section 170 provides that
Others.
"no civil court shall have jurisdiction to question
the legaiity of any action taken or of any decision
Fazl Ali/.
given by the Returning Officer or by any other person
appointed under this. Act in ·connection with an election." These are the
provisions regarding election matters being judicially dealt with, and it should
be noted that there is no provision anywhere to the
effect that anything connected with elections can be
· questioned at an intermediate stage.
It is now well-recognized that where a right of liability is created by a statute which gives a special
remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that
statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated
with great clarity by Willes J. in WoltJerhampton
-New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford( 1 ) in the following passage :"There are three dasses of cases in which a liability
may b~ established founded upon statute. One is,
where there was a liability existing at common law,
and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives
a special and , peculiar form of remedy different from
the remedy which existed at common law; 'there,
unless the statute contains words which expressly or
by necessary implication exclude the
co,nimon law
remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue,
either that or the statutory remedy. The second class
of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue
merely, but provides no particular form ·of remedy~
there,_ the party can only proceed by action . at common law. But there is a third class, tJiz,, where a·
liability not existing at common law is created by a
statute which at the same time gives a special and
particular remedy for enforcing it. . . . . . . . . . The remedy
provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not
roam
(l) 6 C.B. (N.S.) 336, 356.
'
232
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1952
competent to the party t~ pursue the course applicable
to cases of the second class. The form given by
N. P. Ponnuthe
statute
must be adopted and adhered to."
stvami
v.
The rule laid down in this passage was approved
/.?.<turning Officer, by the House of Lords in Neville v. London ExNamakkal
press Newspaper Limited(') and has been reaffirmed
l~'(Jnstztuency and
by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of TriOther;.
nidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co.(') and
.Fa~I Ali f.
Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.( 3 ) ; and it has also been
held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights :
see Hurdutrai v. Official Assignee of
Calrntta(•).
That being so, I think it will be a fair inference
from the provisions of the Representation of the
People Act to state that the Act provides for only one
remedy, that remedy being by an election petition to
be presented after the election is over, and there is no
remedy provided at any intermediate stage.
It was argued that since the Representation of the
People Act was enacted subject to the provisions of
the Constitution, it cannot bar the jurisdiction of the
High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the
-Constitution. This argument· however is completely
shut out by reading the Act along with article 329(b).
It will be noticed that the language used in that article
and in section 80 of the Act is almost identical, with
1:his difference only that the article is preceded by the
words "notwithstanding anything in this Constitution". I think that those words are quite apt to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with
any matter which may arise while the elections are in
progress.
It may be stated that section 107(1) of the Representation of People Act, 1949 ( 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 68) in
England is drafted almost in the same language as
article 329(b). That section runs thus:
"No parliamentary election and no return to Parliament shall be questioned except by a petition complaining of <tll undue election or undue return (hereinafter referred to as a parliamentary election petition)
'.Presented in accordance with this Part of this Act."
.
(1) [1919] A.C. 368.
{?) [1935] A.C. 532.
(3) (1940) 44 C.W.N. 709.
( 4) (1948) 52 C.W.N. 343, 349.
,..
+
':S.C.R.-
t •
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
233
.
It appears that similar language was used in the
1$52
·earlier statutes, and it is noteworthy that it has never
N. P. Ponnu-·
been held in England that the improper rejection of a
swami
nomination paper can be the subject of a writ of
v.
certiorari or mandamus. On the other hand, it was Returning Officer,
conceded at the bar that. the question of improper reNamakkal
jection of a.nomination paper has always been brought Constituency and
Others:
up in that country before the appropriate tribunal by
means of· an election petition after the conclusion· of
Fflzl Ali /.
the election. It is true that there is no direct dedsfon
holding ·that the words used in the' relevant provisions
exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue ap_propriate prerogative writs at an intermediate stage of
the election, but the total absence of any such decision
can be accounted for only on the view that the provi::1ions in question have been generally understood'to have
that effect. Our attention .was drawn to rule 13 ot the
rules appended to the Ballot Act of 1872 and a similar
rule in the Parliamentary Elections Rules of _1949,
providing that the decision of the Returning Officer
<lisallowing an objection to a nomination paper· shall
be final, but allowing the same shall be subject to
reversal on a petition questioning the election or return.
These rules however do not affect the main
argument.
I think it can be Iegitim_ately ·stated that
1f words similar to those used in article 329 (b) have
.been consistently treated in England as words apt to
exclude the jurisdiction of the CQJtrts including the
High Court, the same consequence must follow from
the words used in article 329(b) of the Constitution.
fhe words
"notwithstanding anything
in
this
Constitution" give to that article the same wide and
binding effect as a statute passed by a sovereign legislature like the English Parliament.
It may be pointed out that article 329(b) must be
. read as complimentary to clause (a) of that ;µ-tide.
Clause (a) bars the jurisdiction of the courts with
regard to such law as may be made under articles_327
and 328 relating to the delimitation of constituencies
or the allotment of seats to such constituencies. . It
was conceded before us that article 329(b) ousts the
· jurisdiction of the courts with regard to matters
234
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952].
ansmg between the commencement of the polling and
the final selection. The question which has to be asked
N. ~~::.?nu- is what conceivable reason the legislature could have
v.
had to leave only m:itters connected with nominations
Returning Officer, subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Namak/r..ol
article 226 of the Constitution. If Part XV of the
Constituency and Constitution is a code by itself, i.e., it creates rights.
Others.
.
. l.
an d prov1"d es f or t he1r
enfo rcement by a specia
Fazl Ali /.
tribunal to the exclusion of all courts includ:ng the
High Court, there can be no reason for assuming that
the Constitution left one small part of the election process to be made the subject-matter of contest before.
the High Courts and thereby upset the time-schedule
of the elections. The more reasonable view .seems to
be that article 329 covers all "electoral matters".
The conclusions which I have arrived at may be
summed up briefly as follows : ( 1) Having regard to the important functions.
which the legislatures have to perform in democratic
countries, it has always been recognized to be a:
matter of first importance that elections should be
concluded as early as possible according to time
schedule and all controversial matters and all disputes
arising out of elections should be postponed till after
the elections are over, so that the election proceedings
may not be unduly retarded or protracted.
(2) In conformity with this principle, the scheme
of the election law in this country as well as in England is that no significance should be attached to anything which does not affect the "election"; and if any
irregularities are committed while it is in progress and
they belong to the category or class which, under the
law by which elections are governed, would have the
effect of vitiating the "election" and enable· the person
affected to call it in question, they should be brought
up before a special tribunal by means of an election
petition and not be made the subject of a dispute
before any court while the election is in progress.
It will be useful at this stage to refer to the decision
of the Privy Council in Theberge v. Laudry('). The
1952
. (1) (1876) 2 App. Cas. 102.
-
(
-KC.R.
,. .
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
235
1952
petitioner in that case having been declared duly
elected a member to represent an electoral district in
N. P. Ponnuthe Legislative Assembly of the Province of Quebc:c,
swami
his election was afterwards, on petition, declared null
v.
and void by judgment of the Superior Court, under Retur.ning Officer,
Namakkal
the Quebec Controverted Elections Act, 1875, and
himself declared guilty of corrupt practices, both Constituency and
nthers.
personally and by his agents. Thereupon, he applied
for special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council,
Faz! Ali{.
but it was refused on the ground that the fair construction of the Act of 1875 and the Act of 1872
which preceded it providing among other things that
the judgment of the Superior Court "shalf not be susceptible of appeal" was that it was the intention of
the · legislature to create a tribunal for the purpose of
trying election petitions in a manner which should
make its decision final for all purposes, and should
not annex to it the incident of its judgment being
reviewed by the Crown under its prerogative. In
delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, Lord
Cairns observed as' follows :-
"These two Acts of
Parliament,
the
Acts of
character.
They are not Acts constituting
or providing for
the decision of mere ordinary civil rights ; they
are Acts creating an entirely new, and up to that
time unknown, jurisdiction in a particular Court
. . . . .for the purpose of taking out, with i~ own
consent, of the Legislative Assembly, and vesting in
that Court, that very peculiar jurisdiction which, up
to that time, had existed in the Legislative Assembly
of deciding election petitions, and determining the
status of those who claimed to be members of the
Legislative Assembly. A jurisdiction of that kind is
extremely special, and one of the obvious incidents or
consequences of rnch a jurisdiction must be that the
jurisdiction, by whomsoever it is to he exercised,
should be exercised in a way that should as soon
as possible become conclusive; and enable the constitution of the Legislative Assembly to be distinctly and
speedily known."
1872 and 1875, are Acts peculiar in their
· 9-3 S. c. Iuctia/71
236
1952
N. P. Ponnuswami
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
After dealing with certain other matters, the Lord
Chancellor proceeded to make the following further
observations :-
'•
"Now, the subject-matter, as has been said, of the
. v.
R eturmng 0 fficer, l . l ·
.
l
.
I
Namakkal
Constituency and
Others.
Fazl Ali /.
~gts at10n IS • . extreme y pecu1iar.
t concerns the
nghts and prmleges of the electors and of the Legislative Assembly to which they elect members. Those
rights and privileges have always in every colony,
following the example of the mother country, been
jealously maintained and guarded by the Legislative
Assembly. Above all, they have been looked upon as
rights and privileges which pertain to the Legislative
Assembly, in complete independence of the Crown, so
far as they properly exist. And it would be a result
somewhat surprising, and hardly in consonance with
the general scheme of the legislation, if, with regard
to rights and privileges of this kind, it were to be
found that in the last resort the determination of them
no longer belonged to the Legislative Assembly,
no longer belonged to the Superior Court which the
Legislative Assembly haq put in its place,
but
belonged to the Crown in Council, with the
advice of the advi~ers 0£ the Crown at home, to be
determined without reference either to the judgment
of the Legislative Assembly, or of that Court which
the Legislative
Assembly had substituted
in its
place."
y
The points which emerge from this decision may be
stated as follows :(1) The right to vote or stand as a candidate for
election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute
or special law and must be subject to the limitations
imposed, by it.
(2) Strictly speaking, it is the sole right of the
Legislature to examine and determine all matters
relating to the election of its own members, and if the
legislature takes it out of its own hands and vests in a
special tribunal an entirely new and unknown jurisdic. tion, that special jurisdiction should be exercised in
accordance with the law which creates it.
~
t
I
I
!
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
237
It should be mentioned here that the question as to
what the powers of the High Court under articles 226
N. P.· Ponnuand 227 and of this Court under article 136 of the
swami
Constitution may be, is one that will have to be
v.
decided on a proper occasion.
Returning Officer,
Namakkal
It is necessary to refer at thi~ stage to an argument
Constituency
and
advanced before us on behalf of the appellant which
Others.
was based on· the language of article 71 (1) of the
Constitution. That provision runs thus :Faz/ Ali j.
"All doubts and disputes ari$ng out of or in connection with the election of a President or Vice-President shall be inquired into and decided by the
Supreme Court whose decision shall be final."
The argument was as follows. There is a marked
contrast between the language used in article 71 (1)
and that of article 329 (b). The difference in the
phraseology employed in the two provisions suggests
that they could not have been intended to have the
same meaning and scope as regards matters to be
brought up before the tribunals they respectively deal
with. If the framers of the Constitution, who apparently
knew how to express themselves, intended to include
within the ambit of article 329 (b) all possible disputes
connected with elections to legislatures, including
disputes as to nominations, they would have used
similar words as are to be found in article 71 ( 1). It
is true that it is not necessary to use identical language
in every provision, but one can conceive of various
alternative ways of expression which would convey
more clearly and properly what article 329 (b) is said
to convey.
It seems to me that once it is admitted that the
same idea can be expressed in different ways and the
same phraseology need not be employed in every provision, the argument loses much of its force.
But,
however that may be, I think there is a good explanation as to why article 329 (b) was drafted as it stands.
A reference to the election rules made under the
Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 will show
that the provisions in them on the subject were almost in the same language as artVle 329 (b). The
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
corresponding rule made under the Government of
India Act, 1919, was rule 31 of the electoral rules, and
N. P. Ponnu- it runs as follows :swami
v.
"No election shall be called in question, except by
Returning Officer, an election petition presented in accordance with the
N~makkal
provisions of this Part."
Constituency and
.
•
Others.
It should be noted that this rule occurs m Part VII,
the heading of which is "The final decision of doubts
Faz/ Ali/.
and disputes as to the validity of an election". These
words throw .some light on the function which the election tribunal was to perform, and they are the very
words which the learned counsel for the appellant
argued, ought to have been used to make the meaning
clear.
The same scheme was followed in the election rules
framed under , the Government of India Act, 1935,
which are contained in "The Government of India
(Provincial Elections) (Corrupt Practices and Election
1.>etitions) Order, 1936", dated the 3rd July, 1936. In
that Order, the rule corresponding to rule 31 under the
earlier Act, runs thus :- "No election shall be called in question except by
an election petition presented in accordance with the
provisions of this Part of the Order."
This rule is to be found in Part III of the Order, the
heading of which is "Decision of doubts and disputes
as to validity of an election and disqualification for
corrupt practices."
The rules to which I have referred were apparently
framed on the pattern of the corresponding provisions
of the British Acts of 1868 and 1872, and they must
have been iutended to cover the same ground as the
provisions in England have been understood to cover
in that country for so many years. If the language
used in article 329 (b) is considered against this
historical background, it should not be difficult to see
why the framers of the Constitution framed that provision in its present form and chose the language
which had been consistently used in certain earlier
legislative provisions and which had stood the test of
time.
1952
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
239
1952
And now a word as to why negative language was
used in article 329 (b). It seems to me that there is
N. P. Ponnu·
an important difference between article 71 ( 1) and
swami
article 329 (b). Article 71 (1) had to be in an affirv.
mative form, because it confers special jurisdiction on lteturning Officer,
Namakkal
the Supreme Court which that Court could not have
exercised but for this article. Article 329 (b), on the Constituency and
Others.
other hand, was primarily intended to exclude or ousl
the jurisdiction of all courts in regard to electoral
Faz/ Ali f.
matters and to lay down the only mode in which an
election could be challenged. The negative form was
therefore more appropriate, and, that being so, it is
not surprising that it was decided to follow the preexisting pattern in which also the negative language
had been adopted.
Before concluding, I should refer to an argument
which was strenuously pressed by the learned counsel
for the appellant and which has been reproduced by one
of the learned Judges of the High Court in these words:"It was next contended that if nomination is part.
of election, a dispute as to the validity of nomination
is a dispute relating to election and that can be. called
in question only in accordance with the provisions of
article 329 (b) by the presentation of an election petition to the appropriate Tribunal and that the Returning Officer would have no jurisdiction to decide that
matter, and it was further argued that section 36 of
Act XL.III of. 1951 would be utlra vires inasmuch as it
confers on the Returning Officer a jurisdiction which
article 329 (b) confers on a Tribunal to be appointed
in accordance with the article."
This argument displays great dialectical ingenuity,
but it has no bearing on the result of this appeal and
I think it can be very shortly answered. Under section 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
it is the duty of the Returning Officer to scrutinize:
the nomination papers to ensure that they comply with
the requirements of the Act and decide all objections
which be made to any nomination. It is clear that
unless this duty is discharged properly, any number
of candidates may stand for election without complying with the provisions of the Act and a great deal of
240
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1952
confusion may ensue. In . discharging the statutory
duty imposed on him, the Returning Officer does not
N. P. Ponnuswami
call in question any election. Scrutiny of nomination
v.
papers is only a stage, though an important stage, in
Rettirning Of!i«r, the election process. It is one of the essential duties to
Namakkal
be performed before the election can be completed, and
Constituency and · anything done towards the completion of the election
Othtrs.
proceeding can by no stretch of reasoning be described
as questioning the election. The fallacy of the arguFaz/ Ali/.
ment lies in treating a single step taken in furtherance
of an election as equivalent .to election. The decision of
this appeal however turns not on the construction of
the single word "election", but on the construction of
the compendious expression-"no election shall be
called in question" in its context and setting, with due
regard to the scheme of Part XV of the Constitution
and the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Evidently, the argument has no bearing on this method
of approach to the question posed in this appeal,
which appears to me to be the only correct method.
We are informed that besides the Madras High
Court, seven other State High Courts have held that
they have no jurisdiction under article 226 of the Omstitution to entertain petitions regarding improper
rejection of nomination papers. This view is in !PY
opinion wrrect and must be affirmed. The appeal
must therefore fail and is dismissed. In view of the
nature and importance of the points raised m this
appeal, there should be no order to costs.
pATANJ ALI SASTRI c. J,_:I agree.
MEim CHAND MAHAJAN J.-1 agree.
MuKHERJEA f.-1 agree.
DAs J.-1 agree.
CHANDllASEKHARA AIYAR r.-I agree.
Appeal dismitsed.
Agent for the appellant : S. Subt<ahmanyam.
Agent for the 1st respondent : P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the Union of India and the State of
Madhya Bharat : P. A. Mehta.
GIPN-Si-3S.C India/71-6-10·72-7DO
',
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