P. D. SHAMDASANI versus CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 December 1951 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 391 | 1951 INSC 64
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 December 1951
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 328/1951
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 391
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 64
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
...
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
P. D. SHAMDASANI
v.
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA LTD.
fP.\TANJALI SAS'I'RI C. J., MEHR CHAh"'D MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA
A1YAR JJ.J
Co11stiiut1o11 of India, Arts. 19(1) (f), 31(1), 32-lnfringement of
rights by private individttals-Application ttnder An. 32
-Maintainability--Scopc of Arts. 19(1) (f) and 31(1).
j~roperty
Article 19(1) (£) of the Constitution is clearly intended to.
protect the freedom to acquire, hold and dispose of property
against State action other than in the legitimate exercise of its
power to regulntc private rights in the public interest. Similarly,
article 31(1) provides a safeguard against dcpriYation of property
by the State except by procedure established by law. Violation
o{ rights of property by private individuals is not within the
purview of those articles.
A person whose rights of property are infringed by a private
individual must therefore seek his remedy under the ordinary
law and not by way of an application under article 32.
ORIGINAL JuRISDicTION : Petition No. 328 of 1951.
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution for issue
of wr.its in the nature of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. The facts appear in the judgment.
The. petitioner in person.
,
C. K. Daplitary, Solicitor-General of India, (J. B.
Dadachanji. with him) for the respondent.
1951. December
was delivered by
21.
The
Judgment of the Court
PAT.\NJALI SAsTRI C. J.-Thi,
i5 a
petition under
article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of
the petitioner's fundamental rights under article 19(1)
(f) and article 31 ( l) alleged to h;ive been violated by
the Central Bank of India Ltd., a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1882, and having
its registered office at Bombay, (hereinafter referred to
as "the Bank").
It appears that the petitioner held five shares in the
share capital of the Bank which sold those shares to a
195)
D!!c. 21.
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
third party in purported exercise of its right of lien for
recovery
of a debt due to it from the petitioner, and
P. D. Shamthe
transfer
was registered in the books of the Bank in
dasani
the
year
1937.
The petitioner thereupon instituted a
v.
Central Bank of series of proceedings in the High Court at Bombay on.
India Ltd.
its original and appellate jurisdiction challenging the
validity of the said sale and transfer. The latest of
Patanjali
these proceedings was a suit filed against the Bank in
Sastri C. }.
1951 wherein the plaint was rejected on 2nd March,
1951, under Order 7, Rule 11 (d), of the Code of Civil
Procedure as barred by limitation. The petitioner now
prays that all the adverse orders made in the previous
proceedings be quashed and the said High Court be
directed to have "the above suit set down to be heard
as undefended and pronounce judgment against the respondent or to make such orders as it thinks fit in
relation to the said suit". It may be mentioned here
that though the aforesaid order rejecting the petitioner's
plaint was appealable, the petitioner did not prefer an
appeal on the somewhat extraordinary ground that
"the appeal if filed could not be heard by the Judges
of the said Court as all of them were disqualified from
hearing such appeal" either because of their interest
in the Bank or because of their prejudice against him.
vre are of opinion that the petitioner has misconceived his remedy and the petition must fail on a
preliminary ground. Neither article 19 (1) (f) nor
article 31 (1) on its true construction was intended to
prevent wrongful individual acts or to provicle protection against merely private conduct. Article 19 deals
with the "right to freedom" and by clause (1) assures
to the citizen certain fundamental freedoms including
the freedom "to acquire, hold and dispose of property"
subject to the power of the State to impose restrictions
on the exercise of such rights to the extent and on the
grounds mentioned in clauses (2) to ( 6). The language
and structure of article 19 and ir.. setting in Part III
of the Constitution clearly show that the article was
intended-to protect those freedoms against State action
other than in the legitimate exercise of its power
to regulate private rights in the public interest.
".
-
S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Violation of rights of property by
within the purview of the article.
'>
I~
,/
~
Y'
393
individuals ts not
1951
P. D. Sltam-
dasani
The position is no better under article 31(1). The
v.
petitioner has urged that clause (1) should be construed
Central Bank of
apart from and independently of the rest of the article
India Ltd.
and, if so construed, its language is wide enough to
Patanjali
cover infringements of rights of property by private
Sastri 9. !~
individuals. He laid emphasis on the omission of the
word "State" in clause ( 1) while it was used in clause
(2) of the same article as well as in many other articles
in Part III. Referring to entry No. 33 of the Union
List, entry No. 36 of the State List and entry
No. 42 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution, he also argued that, while these
entries read with article 246 empowered Parliament
and the State Legislatures to make laws regarding
acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of the Union or the State as the case may be, no
power was conferred to make laws regarding "deprivation of property" by the State, so that the "deprivation" contemplated in clause (1) could only be deprivation by individuals. Sub-section (1) of section 299 of
the Government of India Act, 1935, corresponding to
clause (1) of article 31 was, it was pointed out, omitted
in the draft article 19 (later numbered as article 31)
which retained in a modified form only the provision
contained in sub-section (2) of that section relating to
compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes.
But, clause (1) was subsequently restored and article
31 was enacted in its present form as recommended in
Drafting Committee's Report and this, it was claimed,
showed that clause (1) was intended to operate as a
distinct provision apart from clause (2). We see no
force in any of these arguments.
In support of the argument that clause (1) should be
construed in isolation from the rest of the article, the
petitioner relied on certain observations of our learned
brother Das in Chiranjit Lal v. The Union of India(1),
where the view w~s expressed that clause (1) enunciated
the general principle that no person should be deprived
C') [19SOJ s:c.R. 869.
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
of his property except by authority of law and laid
down
no condition for payment of compensation, while
P. D. Shamclause (2) dealt with deprivation of property brought
dasani
.about by acquisition or taking possession of it and
v.
-Central Bank of required payment of compensation. In other words,
India Ltd.
must be
deprivation referred to in clause (1)
taken
to
cover
deprivation
otherwise
than by
Patanjali
acqu1S1t1on
or
requisitioning
of
property
dealt
with
Sastri C. f.
in
clause
(2).
We
consider it
unnecessary
for the purpose of the · p~esent petition to go into
that question. Even assummg that clause (l) has
to be read and construed apart from clause (2), it is
clear that it is a declaration of the fundamental right
of private property in the same negative form in which
article 21 decli'.res the fundamental right to life and
liberty. There is no express reference to the State in
article 21. But could it be suggested on that account
that that article was intended to afford protection to
life and personal liberty against violation by private
individuals? The words "except by procedure established by law" plainly exclude such a suggestion.
Similarly, the words "save by authority of law" in
clause (1) of article 31 show that it is a prohibition of
unauthorised governmental action against private property, as there can be no question of one private individual being authorised by law to deprive another
of his property.
.
The argument based on the entries in the Lists is
fallacious. It is not correct to suggest that, merely
because there is no entry in the Lists of the Seventh
Schedule relating to "deprivation of property" as such,
it is not within the competence of the legislatures in
the country to enact a law authorising deprivation of
property. Such a law could be made,
for instance,
under entry No. 1 of List II, entry No. 1 of List II or
entry No. 1 of List III. Article 31(1) itself contemplates a law being passed authorising deprivation of
the properties, and it is futile to deny the existence of
the requisite legislative power.
.
.
Nor does the legislative history of the article lend
any support to the petitioner's contention. Section 299
4'
S.C.R.
'
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
395
(I) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was never
interpreted as prohibiting deprivation of property by
private individuals. Its restoration, therefore, in the
same form in article 31, after omission in the original
draft article 19, could lead to no inference in support
of the petitioner's contention, which indeed proceeds
on the fundamental misconception that article 19(1) (£)
and article 31(1), which are great constitutional safe.
guards Vagainst State aggression on private property,
are directed against infringements by private individuals for which remedies should be sought in the
ordinary law.
· In this view 1t 1s unnecessary to deal with certain
other objections to the maintainability of the petition
raised by the Solicitor-General on . behalf of the Bank.
The petition is dismissed. We make no order as to costs.
1951
P. D. Sham·
dasani
v.
Central Bank of
India Ltd.
Patanjali
Sastri C. /.
Petition dismissed.
Agent for the respondent : Rajinder Narain,
NARANJAN SINGH NATHAWAN
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(and 13 other petitions).
lPATANJALI
SAsTRr
C.
J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
JJ.]
MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR
Preventive Detention-Ordt;r of detention challenged as illegalFresh order superseding previous order-Validity-Question of bad
faith-Habeas corpus proceeding-Legality of detention must be
determined as at date of return.
In the absence of bad faith the detaining authority can super-_
sedc an earlier order of detention which has been challenged as
defective on merely formal grounds and make a fresh order
wherever possible which is free from defects and duly complies
with the . requirements of the law in that behalf. The question
of bad faith, if raised, must be decided with reference to the
circumstances of each case.
In habeas corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard to
the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the
return and not with reference to the date of the institution of
the proceedings.
1952
Jan. 25.
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