TIKAIT HARGOBIND PRASAD SINGH versus SRIMATYA PHALDANI KUMARI
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 November 1951 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 153 | 1951 INSC 55
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 November 1951
- Bench
- MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SIR SYED FAZL ALI, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 87/1950
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 153
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 55
Text of the judgment
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
153
TIKAIT HARGOBIND PRASAD SINGH
1951
ti.
Nov. 29.
SRIMATYA PHALDANI KUMARI.
[SAIYID FAZL Au, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, and
VIVIAN BosE
JJ.]
..
Gkatwali tenures-Birbhum ghatwals--Succession-Widouls right
to succeed in preference to nearest male agnate when family is joint
-Custom-Hindu law-Regulation XXIX of 1814.
'
Held by the Full Court-Amongst the Birbhum ghatwals,
when the holder of a ghatwali dies leaving a widow but no direct
lineal descendants;, the widow succeeds in preference to the
,nearest male agnate, even though the family may be a joint
family.
Per MAHAJAN and BosE JJ.-The Mitakshara rule that the
property inherited by a person from his immediate paternal
ancestors becomes ancestral in his hands, and his sons, grandsons
and great-grandsons acquired a right in it at the moment of their
birth has no application to Birbhum ghatwali tenures.
The word "descendents" is used in Regulation XXIX of 1814
loosely in the sense of "heirs" and does not mean lineal
descendants.
_...,.,....,
FAzL ALt (-Custom and usage are important factors governing
succession to ghatwali property, and while in some cases custom
may develop on the lines of Hindu law 'relating to succession
owing to 'repeated instances of tacit and unquestioned application of the law, in other cases succession to ghatwali property
may be governed not entirely by Hindu Jaw but by such law as
modified in ,certain respects by usage and custom.
Eulbati Kumari v. Maheswari Prasad (A.I.R. 1923 Pat. 453)
distinguished.
..
CML
APPELLATE
JmusmCTioN : Civil Appeal
No. 87 of 1950. Appeal from the Judgment and Decree
dated 8th February, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Manohar Lall and Mahabir Prasad JJ.)
in Appeal ~o. 38 of 1946 arising out of decree dated
the 18th December, 1945, of the Subordinate Judge of
Deoghar in Title Suit No. 1 of 1939.
B. C. Dey (S. C. Ghose, with him) for the appellant.
M. C. Sctal.vad (Kanhaiyaji, with him) for the re,s..
pond~nt.
154
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
1951
1951. November 29. The Judgment of Mehr Chand
Mahajan
and Vivian Bose JJ. was delivered by
Tik_ait Hargobind
Mahajan J. Fazl Ali J. delivered a separate judgment.
Prasad Singh
v.
MAHAJAN J.-The question involved in the appeal ,
relates to the right of succession to six Birbhum ghatwalis governed by Regulation XXIX of 1814, annexed
to Gaddi Pathrol and lying within Tapasarath in the
Santhal Parganas. The genealogy of the contestants
appears from the following pedigree table :-
Sri1natya
Phaldani
Ku'nlari.
Mahajan f.
Digbijoy Singh
I
.-----~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--...
i. .
1.s.
I
G uro h an Smgh
(Ghatwal)
. I .
I
Kanha1 1ngh
I
Bhairo Singh
.
i Ba 1ramI Singh
Pratar Singh
I
I ·s·mgh Pitambar
. I
I Singe
.
Banwart
Katku
Bharat Singh
(Died
(Ghatwal)
issueless)
I
Kharagdhari Singh
(Ghatwal)
I
.
Ram Chandra Smgh
(Ghatwal)
r-
I
---..
1
Brijbehari Singh
(Ghatwal)
· I Prasad s·1ngh
.
K nshna
(Ghatwal)
I
I
Sarju Prasad Singh
(Original plaintill)
Hargobind Prasad Singh
(Substituted plaintifl)
,.~.~~~~~~~~
I
Kali Prasad Singh
(Ghatwal)
I
Pha ldani Kumari
(Defendant)
I
Durga Prasad
(Died issueless)
I
Tikait Kali Prasad Singh, the last gaddidar of
Pathrol, died in the year 1935. He belonged to the
Baisj..Chaurasi clan. On the 29th November, 1935, the
...
S.C.R.
•'
..
..
'
~.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
155
1951
Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division recognized· Smt.
Phaldani Kumari as the next ghatwal and entitled to Tik.ait Hargobind ·
be maintained in poosession of the ghatwali estate. On
Prasad Singh
the 30th November\ 1936, Sarju. Prasad Singh brought
v.
Sn'matya
the suit out of which this appeal arises in forma pauPhaldani
peris in the court of · the Subordinate Judge of
Kumari.
Deoghar for possession of the ghatwalis. In paragraphs
7, 8 and 10 of the plaint it was alleged that the ghatMahajan /.
walis in suit were joint family property and were im. partible by custom ; that succession to them was
governed by the law of lineal primogeniture ; that the
females and persons claiming through them were
altogether excluded from inheritance. It was claimed
that the late Tikait Kali Prasad Singh and the plaintiff were members of a joint Mitakshara family and
that he alone as the eldest member of the eldest surviving line of the descendants of the common ancestor
was entitled to succeed to them.
The defendant in her written statement denied this
claim and contended that Birbhum ghatwalis governed
by Regulation XXIX of 1814 are not and cannot be
in the nature of joint family property but that the
perso'n who succeeds and holds the tenure as ghatwal
is the sole proprietor and owner thereof. It was
pleaded that the properties being the exclusive and
separate properties of the ghatwal for the time being,
the defendant, his widow, was entitled to succeed to
them in preference to the plaintiff under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law which admittedly governed
the family of the parties. The pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues :I. Whether succession to the ghatwalis in question is governed by the customs alleged m para 7 of
the plaint?
2. Did the ghatwalis in question form joint family
property of Kali Prasad Singh, his ancestors in the
'direct line and of Sarju Prasad Singh and the plaintiff ?
3. Did Kali Prasad die in a state of jointness
with Sarju Prasad Singh?
4-3 S.C India·/71
156
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
[1952]
1951
4. Are the ghatwals the sole proprietors of the
ghatwalis
for the time being as alleged by the
Tikait Hsrgobind
Prasad Singh defendant?
v.
5. Whether the plaintiff or the defendant 1s enSrimatya
titled to succeed to the properties in suit ?
Phaldani
Issues 2, 3 and 4 were found by the trial Judge m
Kum11ri.
favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. It
Mahajan /.
was held that Kali Prasad Singh died in a state of
jointness with Sarju Prasad Singh and that ·the ghatwalis in question were their joint family property and
that the plaintiff the eldest surviving coparcener in
the eldest line of Digbijoy Singh's descendants was entitled to succeed to them in preference to the widow.
It was common ground between the parties tl1at in
case the properties were held to be the separate properties of Kali Prasad Singh, the widow was entitled
to succeed to them. As a result of these findings the
plaintiff's suit was decreed with costs. On appeal by
the widow to the High Court, this decree was reversed
and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed with costs. It
was held that the character of the ghatwali tenures in
question was such that they could not be regarded as
joint property of the plaintiff and the last ghatwal and
that being w, the defendant was entitled to succeed
to them.
The learned counsel for the appellant based his
arguments on the thesis that the ghatwali estates in
question were of the same nature and character as
joint family impartible estates governed by the Mitakshara law and that the rule of survivorship applicable
to such estates: was also applicable to them. It ~as
contended that the High Court was in error in holding
thar the suit properties exdusively belonged to Kali
Prasad Singh or that there was anying peculiar in
these tenures which differentiated them from other
ghatwalis in the Santhal Parganas or from oilier impartible estates known to Hindu law and which peculiarity incapacitated them from being included within
the definition of coparcenary property.
The plea that females were by custom excluded
from inheriting ghatwali tenures in Birbhum was
..
•
.0-
'
SUP'.REME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
,.
>
;
"
157
1951
dropped in the two courts below and was not raised
before us ; so also the point of custom set out in para. 7
TiftaitHargo~intl
of the plaim and covered by issue I was not seriously
Prasatl Sinzh
urged.
v.
Srimatya
The learned Attorney-General, while conceding that
Phalrlani
succession to these tenures was governed by the MitakKumari.
shara law, contended that in no sense could they be
regarded as joint family property and that their pecuMahajan /.
liar characteristics precluded the acquisition of any
right by birth by members of a joint Hindu family
in them. He also urged in the alternative that the
widow was entitled to succeed to them, assuming
them to be joint family property under custom.
. The courts below have given elaborate judgments
in the case and reference has been made to a large
number of decided cases. In our opinion, the main
point that needs decision is whether the suit ghatwalis
were to be regarded as joint family or separate properties of the deceased. For a solution of this problem it is necessary to refer first to the nature and main
incidents of a ghatwali tenure. Its origin is now well
known. In Moghul times grants of land were made
to selected persons who were appointed guardians of
the mountain passes for protecting the countryside
against hill invaders and the office held by these persons bore the designation "ghatwal". These grants
were made in some cases directly by· the ruling power
and in other cases by the zamindar ·responsible by
custom for . the maintenance of security and order
within the estate as consideration for the performance
of the duties. By efflux of time these grants assumed
the form of an actual estate in land, heritable and
perpetual, but conditional upon services certain or
services to be demanded.
Reference to some of the decided cases rdating to
Birbhum ghatwali tenures will sufficiently indicate
·
their nature and character.
In Har/al Singh v. /orat{an. Singh(1), it was held
that a ghatwali estate in Birbhum was not divisible
(I) 6 Select. Rep. 20,..
21
158
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
on the death of a ghatwal, amongst his heirs but
should devolve entirely on the eldest son or the next
Tikait Hargobind
ghatwal.
It was said that ghatwali lands are grants
Prasad Singh
for particular purposes, especially of police, and to
v.
Srimatya
divide them into small portions amongst the heirs of
Phaldani
the ghatwals would defeat the very ends for which
Kumari.
the grants were made.
.. Mahajan /.
In Satrukchunder Dey v. Bhagat Bharutchunder
Singh('), a decision of the year 1853, it was stated
that the ghatwali tenures in Birbhum were not private
property of the ghatwals but lands assigned by the
State in remuneration for specific police services and·
were not alienable or attachable for personal debts.
..
Mst. Kustooree Koomaree v. Monohar Deo(2), Loch J.
took the view that succession to ghatwalis is regulated
by no rule of kulachar or family custom, nor by the
Mitakshara law, but solely by the nature of the
ghatwalis tenure, which descends undivided to the
party who succeeds to and holds the tenure as ghatwal
and that a female is not incapable of holding a ghatwali tenure. It was said that-
"the party who succeeds to and holds the tenure
as ghatwal must be, and has always been, looked
upon as sole proprietor thereof, and, therefore, the
other members of the family cannot claim to be
coparceners and entitled to share in the profits of the
property, though they may, by the permission and
goodwill of the incumbent, derive their support, either
from some portion of the property which he may have
assigned to them, or directly from himself."
In Binode Ram Sein v. Deputy Commissioner of
Santhal Parganas('), (on review 7 W. R. 178) it
was held that the rents of a ghatwali tenure are not
liable for the debts of the former deceased holder of
the tenure. The reason for the decision was that the
tenure was held for the purpose of public ~ervices
and those who perform the services are entitled to the
whole of the remuneration.
(1) 9. S.D.R. 900.
(3) 6 W.R. 129.
(2) 1864 W.R. (Gap Nos.) 39.
..
.
~
,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
1951
In Tikait Durga Prasad Singh v. Teketnee D_urga
Kuari(1), it was urged that female's right to inherit
Tikait Hargobiml
was inconsistent with a ghatwali estate. This conPmsad Singh
tention was negatived and reference was made to the
v.
fact that many ghatwali estates were held by females
Srimatya
Phaldani
and it was observed that it was difficult to hold that
Kumari.
a ghatwali estate must necessarily be held by male
heirs. This case further suggests that in a case where
Mahajan /.
it is held proved that the family was joint, succession
to Birbhum ghatwali may be regulated by the same
rule of Hindu law as is, applicable to the ·devolution
of impartible estates.
•
In Ram Narain Singh v. Ramoon Paurey(2), another
Birbhum ghatwali case, it was held that the ghatwal
for the time being was only entitled to interest on the
compensation money obtained for compulsory acquisition of a part of the ghatwali interest but that he
could not spend the corpus of it which had to devolve
on the next heir -intact.
So far as Birbhum ghatwalis are concerned, it is
only the above mentioned cases to which our attention
was drawn.
'" "'
I
Reference in. this connection is also necessary to the
terms of Regulation XXIX of 1814. Sections I and
II of the Regulation which are material 'to this enquiry
are in these terms:I. Whereas the lands held by the · class of persons
denominated Ghautwauls, in the district of Beerbhoom,
form a peculiar tenure to which the provisions of the
existing Regulations are not expressly applicable ;
and whereas every ground exists to believe that,
according to the former usages and constitution of the
country, this class of persons are entitled to hold their
lands, generation after generation, in perpetuity, subject nevertheless to the payment of a fixed and
established rent to the zemindar of Beerbhoom, and to
the performance of certain duties for the maintenance
of the public peace and support of the police; and
whereas the rents payable by those tenants have been
(1) 20 W.R. 154.
(2) 23 W.R. 376.
160
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
recently adjusted, after a full and minute inquiry
made
by the proper officers in the revenue department;
Tikait Hargobind
and
whereas
it is essential to give stability to the
Prasad Singh
arrangements
now
established among the Ghautwauls,
v.
Srimatya
the following rules have been adoP,ted, to be in force
Phaldani
from the period of their promulgation in the district of
Kumari.
Beerbhoom.
Mahajan /.
IL A settlement having lately been made on the
part of the Government with the Ghautwauls in the
district of Beerbhoom, it is hereby declare~ that they
and their descendants in perpetuity shall be maintained in possession of the lands, so long as they shall
respectively pay the revenue at present assessed upon
them, ...... "
The result of the decided cases and of the provisions
of the regulation is that the grantee of the tenure and
his descendants have to be maintained in possession
of the land fo?m generation to generation conditional
upon services to · be rendered. The tenure is however
liable to forfeiture for
misconduct or misbehaviour
of the ghatwal for the time being. The succession to
it is determined by the rule of lineal primogeniture. It
is neither partible nor alienable (except in exceptional
cases with the consent of the government or the
zamindar, as the case may be). These two characteristics are inherent in its very nature and have not been
annexed to it by any rule of custom. The estate in the
hands of the last holder is not liable either to attachment or sale in execution of a decree against him ; nor
is it liable in the hands of his successor for payment
of his debts. When the succession opens out, the heir
determined according to law has to execute a muchilika
in favour of the grantor guaranteeing the performance
of the duties annexed to the office and stipulating that
in case of misconduct or misbehaviour or non-fulfilment · of the obligations attaching to the office, as to
which the tenure is in the nature of a remuneration,
government will have the right to resume it.
In view of these peculiar characteristics of a ghatwali tenure in Birbhum which are so different from
other inheritances, we find it difficult to apply to it the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
161
1951
law of Mitakshara to the full extent. The essence of a
, coparcenary under the Mitakshara law is unity of
Hargobinrl
ownership. As observed in K'atama Natchiar v. The Tikait
Prasad Singh
Raja of Sivaganga(1), there has to be community of inv.
Srimatya
terest and unity of posses.sion between all the members
Phaldani
of the family, and upon the death of any one of them the
Kumari.
others may well take by survivorship tliat in which
they had during the deceased's lifetime a common interest
Mahajan ],
and a common possession. The incidents attaching to ,
a Birbhum ghatwali tenure rule out the existence of
any notion of community of interest and unjty of possession of the members of the family with the holder for
the time being. He is entitled to be maintained in
exclusive possession of the ghatwali lands and the
devolution of the property is to him in the status of a
sole heir. This view finds support from the observations of Lord Fitzgerald in Kali Pershad v. Anand
Roy(2), though made in respect of a zamindari ghatwali, yet also appositely applicable to a government
ghatwali. His Lordship observed as follows:"Where, however, the Mitakshara governs, each
son immediately on his birth takes a share equal to
his father in the ancestral immoveable estate. Having
regard to the origin and nature of ghatwali tenures and
their purposes and incidents as established by decided
cases. most of which have been referred to in the
course of the argument, it is admitted that such a
. tenure is in some particulars distinct from, and cannot be governed by, either the general objects of Hindu
inheritance as above stated, or by the before-quoted
rule of the Mitakshara.
It is admitted that a ghatwali estate is impartible
-that is to say, not subject to partition ; that the
eldest son succeeds to the whole to the exclusion of his
brothers. These are propositions that seem to exclude
the application of the Mitakshara rule that the sons
on birth each take an equal estate with the father and
are entitled to partition."
Similar opinion was expressed m Chhatradhari
Singh v. Saraswati Kumari('), by a Bench of the
(!) (1861-3) 9 M.I.A. 543.
(3) (1895) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 156.
(2) (1888) I.L.R. 15 Cal. 471.
162
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952)
1951
Calcutta High Court. The following passage from that
decision
may be quoted with advantage :Tikait Hargobind
Prasad Singh
"The learned pleader for the appellant has howv.
ever
contended before us that, although this ghatwali
Srimatya
tenure is impartible, yet according to the decision of
Phaldani
their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chintaman
Kuniari.
Singh v. Nowlukho Koonwari('), it is not necessarily
Mahajan /.
separate property, and that as their Lordships observe
'whether the general status of a Hindu family be joint
or undivided, property which is joint will follow
one a rid property which is separate will follow
another course of succession.' The decision referred to
is no doubt an authority for the proposition that there
may be impartible joint family property, such as a
raj or other estate similar to a raj, but whether such
property is to be regarded as joint or separate would
appear to depend generally upon the character of the
property at its inception, such as the nature of the
grant, etc. creating ·it. Having regard however to the
view we have already expressed as to the status of the
family in the present case, and as to the ghatwali
tenure having been the exclusive property of Ananta
Narain, we think it is unnecessary to determine what
was originally the character of this tenure, although,
if we were called upon to decide the question, tl!e
should be disposed to say, with reference to t./ie peculiar
character of these tenures as described in Regiilation
XX!X of 1814, that they were intended to be the exclusive property of the ghatwal for the time being, and
not joint family property in the proper sense of the
term.n
In Raja Durga Prashad Singh v. Tribeni Singh('),
again it was said as follows :"It was certainly an advantage to the
whole
family that one of their members should hold the office
and the tenure. He could put other members of the
family into minor offices and grant them snbordinate interests commonly called jotes, and he could and
would generally provide for the family in the manner
(1) 13 W.R. 21.
(2) (1918) 45 I.A. 251.
,1" A
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
163
···-··----
1951
expected of its head. But i:his is a long way off making him a trustee for the family or treating the gha~ Tikait Hargobind
wali estate as possessed by the family and reducing the
Prasa4 Singh
ghatwali to the position of karta ;or managing head of
v.
Srimatya
the• family. Their Lordships do not find that the
incidents of ghatwali tenure are such as to give the family , Phaldani
Kumari.
any rights over the property while it is in t he hands
of the ghatwal, and they find themselves upon this
Mahajan ].
point in full agreement with the courts in India."
>'
In Narayan Singh v. Niranjan Chakravarti(1), Lord
Sumner made an exhaustive review of the decided
cases and examined the whole position of ghatwali
lienures generally and observed that where the tenure
is hereditary, a recognized right to be appointed ghatwal takes the place of a formal appointment and
a recognized right in the superior to dismiss, the ghatwal if he is no longer able and willing to render the
service required by his tenure, and to appoint another
to the office and the tenure of the lands, then readily
suffices to maintain in perpetuity the incidents of the
tenure.
'
In these circumstances 1t 1s not possible to hold
that the Mitakshara rule that when a· person inherits
property from any one of his three immediate paternal
ancestors, his sons, grandsons and great-grandsons
acquire an interest in it by birth can have any application to the case of these grants which are in the
nature of a remuneration for the performance of certain
services by the holder of that office. A ghatwali has
to be regarded as something connected with an office
and as observed by Lord Sumner in the above mentioned case, the office cannot except by special custom,
grant or other arrangement, either run with lands or
be served from them. In other words, just as primogeniture and impprtibility are handmai'ds, similarly
the ghatwal's office and the ghatwali tenure are two
inseparables and cannot be lodged in separate compartments. If the office cannot be in the nature of
coparcenary property, the tenure must follow the same
way. Thus it is not easy to conceive that an interest
(1) (1924) 51 I.A. 37.
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
can be acquired at the birth of a member of a joint
family
m a tenure which is annexed to an office, even
Tikait Hargobind
if
it
has
descended from three immediate paternal
Prasad Singh
ancestors.
In certain eventualities the selecoion of
v.
Srim.atya
the next heir depends on the choice of the rnling
Phaldani
authority and in case of misconduct or misbehaviour
Kum'ari.
of the holder for the time being the rnling power
cannot only dismiss the ghatwal but even resume the
Mahajan /.
tenure. This is a feature which places this heritable
property in a class by itself as distinguished. from
other inheritances governed by the Mitakshara law.
The view that in Birbhum, ghatwali tenures are in
the nature of separate property or the exclusive property of the ghatwal finds support from the fact that
in many instances, whenever succession has opened
out in respect of them, it has been determined according to the Mitakshara rnle applicable to the devolution
of separate property irrespective of the circumstance
whether the dec~ased dred in joint or .separate
status with the other members of the family.
Thirteen instances of such practice in the past amongst
members of the Baisi-Chaurasi clan were proved in the
case, in all of which the widow succeeded in preference
to a male heir. The learned trial Judge held that in
some of these instances the female succeeded because
the agnate nearest in line was separate from her husband; as regards the others though he reached the conclusion that tl1e evidence of separation was weak, he
thought that these did not establish a custom superseding in cases of joint family property the rnle of
survivorship. . The High Court was of a different
opinion. It· rightly remarked that while numerous
instances of female succession to the estates held by
Baisi-Chaurasi gaddidars had been proved, not a single
instance of a female having been excluded from the appointment of a ghatwal on the ground of an agnate
being entitled to come in as a coparcener of the last
holder by survivorship had been proved, and that in
these circumstances there was force in the contention that even if the tenures in question were
ancestral . joint family property, succession thereto was
.
.
-
!
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
165
1951
governed by the Mitakshara rule applicable to separate
property.
Tikait Hargobind
~·
For the reasons given above we held that the MitakPrasad Singh·
v.
shara rule that the property inherited by a person
Srimatya
from his immediate paternal ancestors becomes ancesPhaldani
tral in his hands -and in it his sons, grandsons and
Kumari.
great-grandsons_ acquire a right at the moment of the
birth has no apposite application to Birbhum ghatwali
Mahaian ~·
tenures.
The learned counsel for the appellant in support ·of
his contention placed reliance on a number of decisions
of their Lordships of the Privy Council concerning
impartible estates governed ·by the Mitakshara law,
wherein it was held that the succession to an impartible estate which is the ancestral property of a joint
Hindu Family governed by the Mitakshara law is
governed by the rule of survivorship subject to the
custom of impartibility ; the eldest member of the
senior branch of the family succeeding in preference
to the direct lineal senior descendants of the common
ancestor, if the latter is more remote in degree. Particular reference was made to the remarks of Turner L. J.
in the Sivaganga case('), and to the observations in
Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh(2) and in the
case .ot Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kumari
Debi(3). Therein it was said that in the case of ordinary joint family property the members of the family
have (1) the right of partition, (2) the right to restrain
alienations by the head, (3) the right of maintenance,
•
and ( 4) the right of survivorship. The first of these
rights cannot exist in the case of an impartible estate,
though ancestral, from the very nature of the estate.
~ The second and third are incompatible with the custom of impartibility. To. this extent the general law
of the Mitakshara has been superseded by custom and
the impartible estate, though ancestral, is clothed
with the incidents of self-acquired and separate property. But the right of survivorship is not inconsistent with the custom of impartibility. This right
(I) (1861-3) 9 M.I.A. 543.
(2) (1921) I.L.R. 43 All. 228.
22
(3) A.T.R. 1932 P.C. 216
)
166
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
therefore still remains and to this extent the estate
still
retains its character of joint family property and •
Tikaii'Hargobind
its devolution is governed by the general Mitakshara law
Prasad Singh
applicable to such property and that though the other
v.
Srimatya
rights which a coparcener acquires by birth in JOint
Phaldani
family property no longer exist, the birthright of the
Kumari.
senior member to take by survivorship still remains.
Mahajan f.
In our view, these observations have no application
to the tenures in suit: As already indicated, it is not
possible to concede in their case that a member of a
joint family governed by the Mitakshara law acquires
any right by birth in them. The general law of
Mitakshara creating that right seems to have been
superseded in their case not only by peculiarities inherent in the nature o.f these tenures but by encroachments of custom on it.
Moreover, it appears that the
remarks relied upon were made in cases where the impartihle estates were admittedly joint family property
or the grants ·were of such _a character that they are
intended for the benefit of the family as such. The
ratio of these decisions was that even though certain
incidents attaching to joint family property may
cease to exist by custom, some others which are not
affected by custom may survive; This reasoning can
have no application to property which at no stage
whatever could be clothed or was clothed with any of
the incidents of cciparcenary property.
·
The Jearned counsel for. the appellant placed considerable reliance on the observations of Sir Dawson
Miller C. J. in Fulbati Kumari v. Maheshwari
Prasad('). The learned Chief Justice therein dissented
from the view urged before him that all ghatwali property is the exclusive separate property of the holder
for the time being and that it devolves according to
the rules affecting separate property subject again
to the circumstance of impartibility. He observed
that the fact that a raj is impartible does not in a
case governed by the Mitakshara law make it separate
or self-acquired property, that it may be self-acquired
(I) A.LR. 1923 Pat. 453.
.
.
.
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
167
1951
property or it may be the property of a joint undivided family and that in the latter case succession will
Tikait Hargobind
be regulated according to the rule \Of survivorship. In Prasad Singh
our opinion, these observations have no application to
v.
the case of Birbhum ghatwalis because in
express
Srimatya
Phaldani
terms these were excluded from consideration in that
Kumari.
case. In the judgment it was said :"In our opinion, the estate In the present case 1s m
Mahaian /.
no way comparable to the Birbhum ghatwali tenures
.~
. and Regulation XXIX of 1814 does not apply to it."
The decision in the case proceeded on the assumption
that Birblrnm ghatwalis stood apart from other ghatwalis which stood on the same footing as impartible
estates governed by Mitakshara law.
The learned Attorney-General challenged the correcthess of these decisions and contended that the
decisions of the Privy Council on this subject were not
uniform. He drew our attention to the observations
made in Sartaj Kuari's case(1), in the Second Pittapur
caseC), and in Tipperah ca.Se( 3 ). There may be a
seeming conflict between the view expressed in those
decisions and the view expressed in Baijnath Prasad
Sing/1 v. Tej Bali Singh( 4 ), and in Shiba Prasad Singh
'.
v. Rani Prayag Kumari Debi("). It seems to us however that these latter cases have settled the law applicable to joint family impartible estates governed by
Mitakshara law and it is rather late in the day to
reopen a controversy settled by a series of decisions
of the Privy Council.
The contention that on the death of the last holder
-. a ghatwali
tenure in Birbhum reverts to the grantor
and that notionally there is a resump6on of it in
favour of government and a re-grant to the next heir
does not impress us. On the express terms of the
regulation these tenures are heritable from generation
to generation and the theory of resumption and regrant is inconsistent with their heritable character.
Inheritance can never remain in abeyance and on the
-
-~
(1) (1887-8) 15 I.A. 51.
(2) (1918) 45 I.A. 148
(3) (1867-9) 12 M.I.A. 523.
( 4) (1921) I.LR. 43 All. 228.
(5) A.LR. 1932 P.C. 216.
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
death of the last holder the estate immediately vests
in
the next heir. The circumstance that the governTil(ait Hargobind
ment
may in certain events have the power to dismiss
Prasad Singh
a
ghatwal
or to forfeit the tenure cannot lead to the
v.
Srimatya
inference that it terminates and is re-granted at every
Phaldani
death
Kumari.
Mahajan f.
The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that a widow not being a descendant of the
grantee under the terms of Regulation XXIX of 1814,
is not entitled to inherit to Birbhum ghatwali tenures
also does not impress us. The regulation does not enact
any rule of succession to these tenures, and the devolution with respect to them is admittedly determined by
personal law or custom. The expression "descendants"
used in the regulation cannot deprive females, like a
widow or a mother, from taking the inheritance wh$re
they are legal heirs under Mitakshara law or under custom. Females have invariably been allowed to succeed
to these tenures in the past. The appellant's counsel
conceded that if the property was the separate property of Kali Prasad Singh, the defendant was entitled
to inherit to it. We think that the expression "descendants" has been loosely employed in the regulation
for the word "heirs". On this point we are in agreement with the observations made by a Bench of the
Calcutta High Court in Chhatradhari Singh v.
Saraswati Kumarz"(').
It may further be pointed out that even if the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is to
be accepted, by no process could the trial court have
passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff in respect of
items 4, 5 and 6 of the schedule. Admittedly these
were acquired by Krishna Prasad Singh, father of
Kali Prasad Singh by a decree of court passed in his
favour against his collateral Katku Singh who also
claimed these properties as· an heir to the last male
owner Banwari Singh (vide Exhibit 4); These properties having devolved upon Krishna Prasad Singh
by obstructed heritage, were in the nature of separate
property in his hands and could not fall within the
(1) (1895) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 156.
J. .....
S.C.R.
..
..,,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
169
definition of ancestral property given in Mitakshara.
1951 .
Sarju Prasad Singh, uncle .of Kri&hna Prasad Singh, TikaitH8rgo~ntl
could acquire no right or interest in these properties by
Prasad Singll
birth enabling him to claim them by survivorship.
v.,
Kali Prasad Singh who inherited them on the death of
Srimatya
his father got them as his separate property as he
Ph.altiani
had no son who- could acquire any interest in them by
Kumari.
birth. With regard to this property the widow was
Mahajan /.
certainly an heir after the death of her husband and
plaintiff could have no claim whatsoever in respect of
these items of the schedule. This aspect of the case
seems to have been lost sight of in the two courts
below.
The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is
dismissed with costs.
FAZL Au J.-While
agreeing generally with ·my
learned brother Mahajan J., I wish to say a few
words to indicate the main ground on which I would
dismiss this appeal.
There are a number of authoritative decisions dealing with the special features of ghatwali property, one
of which is said to be that if the ghatwal is a member
of a joint family, the family has no right over the
property while it is in his hands. [See Durga Prasad
Singh v. Tribcni Singh(1)]. The logical corollary from
this characteristic of ghatwali property would seem to
be that it is more in the nature of exclusive property
of the ghatwal than of joint family property. Nevertheless, in some cases, succession to such property has
been determined with reference to the rules of Hindu
law regarding joint property, where the ghatwal was
found to be a member of the joint family. As at
present advised l am not prepared to say that those
cases were wrongly decided, but I think .it. will not be
incorrect to say that cus.tom and usage are also
important factors governing succession . tq ghatwali
property, and it is conceivable. that while in some
cases custom may develop on the lines of Hindu la"'
relat:ing to succession owing to repeated instances of
(1) (1918) 45 I.A. 251.
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
tacit and unquestioned appliqtion of the law, in other
cas,es succession to ghatwali property may be governed
Tikait Hargobind
not
entirely by Hindu law but by such law as modified
Prasad Singh
in certain respects by usage and custom.
v.
Srimatya
Phaldani
Kumari.
Fazl Ali/.
The question with which we are concerned in this
case is whether the widow of a deceased ghatwal, who
was a member of a joint family and died leaving no
issue or direct male descendants, can succeed to the
ghatwali property in preference to the nearest male
agnate.
On a reference to the plaint, it would appear that
what the plaintiff contended was that the clan to
which the parties belong was governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law "subject to their clan
custom'', one of which was said to be that females,
viz., widow, daughter or mother, and persons claiming
through females could not and did not succeed on the
death of the ghatwal. This allegation was controverted in the written statement, and it was claimed that
the family was governed by the Mitakshara system of
law and "there was no clan custom governing the
estate in suit." Upon these pleadings, one of the
issues framed by the trial court was "whether succe'•ion to the ghatwali is governed by custom, as alleged
in paragraph 7 of the plaint." In the course of the
trial, the plaintiff tried to prove that females were
always excluded as alleged by him. In this, he did
not succeed. The courts below however found that
the question which directly affected the present case
was a much narrower one, namely, whether females
could succeed even when the family was joint. So far
as this question is concerned, both the courts below are
agreed that females cannot be excluded if the property
is the separate property of the ghatwal. But the
question which still remains to be decided is what the
true legal position would be if the property is deemed
to be joint property. It appears that evidence was
adduced at the trial to show that in 13 instances
affecting the Baisi-Chaurasi clan to whom the Birbhum
ghatwals admittedly belong, the widow of the last
ghatwal succeeded in preference to a male agnate
'
'
'~-
•
S.C.R.
,,.-- '-.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'.171
The trial judge however found that in four of these
1951
instances the nearest agnate who claimed the property . .
was separate from the ghatwal
or his widow, but , in T•k••tHargobind
Pra Md Singh
the other instances, there was no evidence of separation, or\'~the evidence was weak", which, I take·it, is
s~;:,,y•
another way of saying that it could not be safely rePhatdani
lied on. It seems to me that these instances lend some
Kumari.
support to the view that Hindu law haS-been modified
by custom, so far as the Birbhum ghatwalis are con- Fail Ali J.
cerned, and · that among the ghatwals belonging to
this class, where the last ghatwal dies leaving a widow
but no issue,. then she succeeds in preference to the
nearest male agnate, even though the family 'may be
joint. The Birbhum ghatwals form .a class by them- ·
selves, and they are also subject to a special Regulation-Regulation XXIX of 1814. That Regulation.
states among other things that this class of ghatwals.
shall be entitled to hold the ghatwali property generation after generation and that they and their descendants in perpetuity shall be maintained in possession
of such property. Strictly speaking, neither a widow
nor a distant agnate will come within the terms of the
Regulation, not being a descendant of the last ghatwal, and therefore custom and usage cannot be ruled ·
out in determining succession in such cases. The
strongest case which was relied upon by the appellant
is Fillbati Kmnari v. fl.faheshwari Prasad(') where it
was laid down that on the death of a ghatwal, who
was a member of a joint family, the ghatwali property
• would devolve according to the rules of Hindu law
affecting joint property, that is to say, by the rule of
survivorship. But, in this case, Dawson Miller C.J.
who delivered the judgment, took care to observe that
·the ghatwali estate which was the subject of litigation
was not comparable to the Birbhum ghatwali tenures,
which means that the rule laid down in that case may
not apply to Birbhum ghatwals.
In the present case, the Commissioner, who repre 7
seated the Government and who had special means of
knowing the usages affecting the Birbhum ghatwals,
(!) A.I.~. 1923 Pat. 453.
172
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l952J
1951
appointed the respondent as the ghatwal, stating
preTikait Hargobind that he was· "following a well-established
cedent
in
the
case
of
these
ghatwals
by
recognizing
Prasad Singh
y,
the widow m the absence of a direct heir." In my
Srimatya
opinion, whatever evidence there is in this case supPhaldani
ports the Commissioner's view. and their is hardly
Kuma>·i.
any cogent evidence to rebut it: In the circumstances,
I agree that this appeal ought to be dismissed wtih
i::ost.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: P. K. Chatterjee.
Agent for the re.~Jxmdent : S. P. Varma.
1951
ADAMJI UMAR DALAL
Nt>t1. 26.
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
[SA!YID FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN
and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]
Criminal trial-Sentence-Imposition .Pf fine-Guiding ,n~
ciples-Circumstances of' accused-Proportion between offence anti
penalty-Very heavy fines with iniprisonment condetnned-Blackfnarketihg-Punishment-Supreme Court-Pt'actice-Criminal appeals
-Interference tuith sentence.
The determination of the right measure of punishment
is
often a point of great difficulty and no hard and fast rule can he
ti.id down; it being a matter of discretion which is to be guided
bj a variety of considerations, but the Court has always to bear
in mind the necessity of proportion between an offence and the
penalty.
In im?>Sing a fine it is necessary to have as much regard to
the pecuniary circu~nstanccs of the accused persons as to the
character and magnitude of the offence and where a substantial
term of imprisonment is inflicted, an excessive fiile should not
accompany it, except in exceptional cases.
Though the offence of black-marketing is very generally pre'Vclant in this country at the pr~t moment and when ii: is
brought home against a person no leniency in the matter of
sentence should be shown 3;0d a certain amount of S'!Verity may
be Yety appropriate and even called for, yeti, when a •ubstantial
. '!' .
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org