COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY versus MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 October 1951 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 43 | 1951 INSC 46
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 October 1951
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA, M. PATANJALI SASTRI, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 44/1950
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 43
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 46
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
43
COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY
v.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY
OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS .
. [HARILAL KANIA
C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI, DAS,
CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR
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and VIVIAN. BosE JJ.]
Bombay City Land Revenue Act (II of 1876), s. 8-Resolution of
Government gr1inting land to Corporation free of rent-Statutory
formalities not complied with-Corporation in possession for over
70 years and erecting costly structures-Assessment to land revenue
-Legality-Equitable estoppel~Part-performance-Acquisition
of
right to exemption from assessment-Prerogative of Crown.
In 1865, the Government of Bombay called upon the predecessor
in title of the Corporation of Bombay to remove some markets
from a certain site and vacat~ it, and on the application of the
then Municipal Commissioner the Government passed a resolution
approving and· authorising the grant of another site to the
Municipality. The resolution stated further that "the Gover1iment do not consider that any rent should be charged to the
Municipality as the markets will be, likq other public buildings,
for the benefit of the whole community." The Corporation gave
:io the sites on which the old markets were situated and spent a
sum of over 17 lacs in erecting and maintaining markets on the
new site. In 1940 the Collector of Bombay, overruling the objection of the Corporation, assessed the new site under s. 8 of the
Bombay City Land Revenue Act to !'and revenue rising from
Rs. 7,500 to Rs. 30,000 in 50 years. The Corporation sued for a
declaration that the order of assessment was ultra vires and that
it was entitled to hold the land for ever without payment of any
assessment. The High Court of Bombay held applying
the
principle of Ramsden v. Dyson( 1 ) that the Government had lost its
right to assess the land in question by reason of the equity
arising on the facts of the case in favour of the Corporation and
there was thus a limitation on the right of the Government to
assess under s. 8 of the said Act :
Held per KANIA C. J., DAs, CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR and
BosE JJ. (PATANJALI SAsTRr J. dissenting)-that the Government
was, not under the circumstances of the case\ entitled to assess
land revenue on the land in question.
Per KANIA C. J.; DAs and BosE JJ.-Though there was no
effectual grant by the Government passing title in the land to
the Corporation by reason of non-compliance with the statutory
formalities, yet, inasmucli as the Corporation had never-the-less
taken possession of the land in terms of the Government resolution and continued in such possession open!~, uninterruptedly and
as of right for over 70 years, the Corporation had acquired the
(1) (1866) L.R. I H.L. 129.
1951
October 5.
44
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
1951
limited title it had been prescribing for during the period, that
is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent,
Collector of
but only for the purposes of a market and for no other purposes.
Bombay
The right acquired included as part of it an immunity from payv.
ment of rent which constituted a right in limitation of the
Municipal Cor- Government's r.ight to assess in excess of the specific limit estaporation of the blished and preserved by the Government Resolution within the
City of Bombay meaning of s. 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act (II of
and Others.
1876) there being for the purposes of ·this case no distinction betweea rent and revenue. Per CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-If the
Resolution of 1865 can be read as meaning that the grant was of
rent-free land the case would come strictly \vithin the doctrine
- of estoppel enunciated in s. 115 of the Indian Evidence Act. Even
otherwise, if there was merely the holding out of a promise that
no rent will be charged in the future the Government must be
deemed to have bound themselves to fulfil it. The right to levy
assessment is a prerogative right of the Government and it is
hard to conceive of a case where it could be said to be lost by
adverse possession. A court of equity must prevent the per·
petration of a legal fraud.
PATANJALI
SASTRI J. (contra)-The principle of Ramsden v.
Dyson cannot prevail against statutory requirements regarding
disposition of property or making of contracts by Government.
No question of estoppel by representation arises, as the Govern·
I
\
mcnt made no representation of fact which it now seeks to deny.
Nor can any case of estoppel by acquiescence be founded on the
facts of the case as there was no lying by and letting another
run into ~ trap. No right of exemption has been established
either on the basis of oxpress or implied contract or on the
basis of equitable principles of part·performance or estoppel by
.acquiescence. The right to lev"y land revenue is no part of the
Government's right to property but a prerogative of the Crown
.and adverse possession of the land could not destroy the Crown's
prerogative to impose assessment on the land.
CML APPELLATE JUR1sorcTioN : Civil Appeal No.
44 of 1950. Appeal from a judgment and decree of
the High Court of Bombay (Sen and Dixit JJ.) dated
21st February, 1947, in First Appeal No. 64 of 1943.
'C.
K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General (S. B. /athar,
with him) for the appellant.
N. C. Chatterjee (N.K. Gamadia,· with him) for
the respondents.
1951. October 5. The Judgment of Kania C.J., Das
and Bose JJ. was read by Das J. Patanjali Sastri and
Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. delivered separate Judgrnents.
I
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
45
DAs J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of a
Bench of the Bombay High Court (Sen and Dixit JJ.)
delivered on February 2, 1947, in an appeal filed under
section 18 .of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act II
of 1876 against the judgment of the Revenue Judge at
Bombay delivered on October 27, 1942, in a suit filed
by the respondents, the Municipal Corporation of the
City of Bombay, and Madusudan Damodar Bhat, the
then Muni_cipal Commissioner for the city of Bombay
against the Collector 0£ Bombay.
1951
Collector oJ
Bombay
·V.
Municipal Corporation 'of the
City of Bombay
and Others.
There is no substantial dispute as to the facts leading up to this litigation and they may be shortly
stated. In 1865, the Government of Bombay, having
decided to construct an Eastern Boulevard, called upon
the Corporation of Justices of the Peace for the City of
Bombay, the predecessor in title of the respondent
Corporation, to remove 'its then existing fish and
vegetable markets from the site required for the construction of the Boulevard. The then Municipal Commission Mr. Arthur Crawford, after whom the present
municipal market was named, applied for the site set
aside for the exhibition buildings on the Esplanade for
the purpose of constructing new ·markets as the disting markets could not be removed until new markets
had been provided. On December 5, 1865, the Architectural Improvement Committee informed tlie Government that it had no objection to the proposed site ·
measuring about 7 acres being "rented to the Municipal
Commissioner" and suggested that "the annual charge
of one pie per square yard. be levied in consideration
of the expense of filling in the ground." Computed at
this rate, the annual rental would have amounted to
about Rs. 176. On December 19, 1865, the Government passed the following resolution:" ( 1) Government approve of the site and authG- •
· rise its grant..
(2). The plans should be submitted for approval;
but Government do not consid~r any rent should be
charged to the Municipality' as the markets will be
like other ,public build'ings, for the benefit \of the
whole community."
Das/.
46
1951
Collector of
Bombay
v.
Municipal Corporation of the
'
City of Bombay
and Others.
Das/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, possession of
the site was made over to the then Municipal Commissioner, but no formal grant was executed as required
by the Statute 22 & 23 Vic. C. 41. It has nowhere been
contended that even if the statutory formalities had
been complied with the grant upon the terms mentioned
in the Resolution would nevertheless have been invalid
being in excess of the powers of the Government. The
Municipal Commissioner had the site filled up and
levelled at the expense of the Corporation. The plans
were approved by the Government and the market
buildings were erected by the Corporation at considerable expense. The respondent Corporation wa. incorportated in 1888 as the successor of the Corporation of
the Justices of the Peace for the City of Bombay and
it continued in possession of the land and the buildings
without paying any rent to the Government according
to the Government Resolution of 1865. Indeed, it is
pleaded in paragraph 7 of the plant and it is not
denied in the written statement that acting upon the
said grant contained in the Resolution and the terms
contained therein the respondent Corporation and its
predecessor spent considerable sums of money in building and improving the market and have been in possession of the land and the buildings thereon for over 70
years in accordance with the terms of the Resolution
and that no land revenue or rent had been paid to the
Government ever since the grant was made. It is in
evidence that besides giving up the sites on which the
old markets had been situate, a total sum of
Rs. 17,65,980-12-1 has been spent by the Corporation
upto March 31, 1940, in filling up and levelling the
site and erecting and maintaining the new market
buildings on this site. In 1911, a portion of the market
site was acquired by the Government for the widening
of the Palton Road. Upon the Collector of Bombay
being called upon to put in his claim, 'if any, to any
part of the compensation money awarded by the Land
Acquisition Officer, the Superintendent, City Survey,
on behalf of the Collector, replied that Government had
no claim in respect of the said land. The respondent
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
47
19Si
Corporation, therefore, received the whole of the
compensation money and it continued in possession of
Collector of
the rest of the land and the buildings thereon without
Bombay
v.
payment of any rent. On March 18, 1938, · the appellant Collector of Bombay informed the respondent Municipal Corporation of the
Municipal Commissioner that it was proposed to assess City of Bombay
the land occupied by the Crowford Market under sec11nd Others.
tion 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act II of
Dorf.
1876 and asked for certain information to enable him
to do so. In his reply, the Municipal Commissioner
wrote to say that the site of the market had been given
to the Municipality as a gift for the construction of the
market and that, therefore, the question of assessment
did not arise. The appellant Collector of Bombay
having insisted that in spite of the Government Resolution of 1865 the Government had the right to assess
the site, the Mayor of Bombay an March 23, 1939, wrote
a letter to the Government stating, inter alia, as
follows i-
)·
.
,~
"The Corporation have been advised that there
can be no doubt that it was 'the intention of Government to make \a permanent grant oif the :land to the
Municipality, and, further, that it was also the intention that permanent grant should be free from rent and
from assessment to land revenue. I am to point out
that the word 'rent' was used in official documents
with the greatest frequency with reference to the land
revenue lev!able by the East India Company and later
by Government in the City of Bombay and in the·
Presidency. It is, therefore, clear that it was the intention of Government in 1865 that this grant should be
free from any form of rent or assessment. The Corporation were put into possession for a period of over 70
years, during which period the land has without interruption been devoted to the purpose for which the
grant was made. Throughout this long period there
has been no suggestion from Government that the
grant was other than- a permanent one, free of revenue,
or that the terms of the grant were in any way subject
to revision."
4_;.2 S.C. India/71
48
1951
Collector <>f
Bombay
v.
Municipal Cor~
poration of the
City of Bombay
and Others.
Das f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
The above contentions were repudiated by the
Government in its letter of January l, 1940, rn the
following terms :"As regards the contention that the land has been
held by the Municipality uninterruptedly for over 70
years without any suggestion from Government that
it was liable to assessment, I am to state the right to
levv the assessment is the prerogative of the Crown
and a mere non-user of this prerogative cannot destroy
it. Besides, conditions have considerably altered since
the land was originally allotted to the Municipality
without charging any ground rent or assessment: the
Municipality has been recovering substantial rents by
letting out stalls in the market and should now be in
a position to pay the assessment. Under the circumstances, the levy of as;cJ>ment in this case can no
longer be foregone or postponed."
On January 31, 1940, the appellant Collector assessed
the land under section 8 of the Bombay Act II of 1876
with a guarantee of SO years as under :"Assessment Rs. 7,500 per annum for
the first
10 years from 1st April, 1940.
Assessment Rs. 15,000 per annum for the next
10 years.
Assessment Rs. 30,000 per annum for the remaining 30 years."
The assessment was to begin to run from 1st April,
1940, and the first payment of the assessment was to
become due on 1st April, 1941. The present suit was
thereupon filed in the Court of the Revenue Judge in
accordance with the provisions of the Bombay City
Land Revenue Act, 1876, for the following reliefs,
inter alzia :" (a) that it may be declared that there is a right
on the part of the plaintiff Corporation in limitation
of the right of Government to assess the said land and
that the plaintiff Corporation is· entitled to hold the
said land for ever without payment of any assessment
and that the Government has no right to assess the
said premises.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
49
1951
(b) That the said assessment may be declared ultra
vires, invalid and may be ordered to be set aside."
cbllecior of
By his judgment dated October 27, 1942, the learned
Bombay
Revenue Judge dismissed the suit with costs. The
.v ..
Corporation appealed to the High Court. Before the Municipal CorHigh Court, as before us, two of the learned Revenue poration of the
Judge's conclusions were not challenged, namely, (1) City of Bombay
and Others.
that the Government Resolution of 1865 was bad in
law either as a grant or even: as a contract and could
Das f;
not by itself operate to give any interest in the land to
the respondent Corporation because of the non-com~
pliance with the formalities required to be observed
by Statute 22 & 23 Vic. C. 41. in the matter of disposition of all real and personal estate vested in the Crown
ur.1der Statute 21 & 22 Vic. C. 106, and (2) that the
Crown's right to levy assessment on property was a
prerogative right to which the ordinary presumption
that rights to property which had not been asserted or
exercised for a long period of years had been granted
away did not apply. What was urged before and
accepted by the High Court was that the right of the
Government to levy any assessment on the land in
question had been lost and could not be asserted or
exercised by die Government by reason of· the equity •
arising on the facts and circumstances of the case in
faNour of the respondent Corporation on the principal
established by the decision in Ramsden v. Dyson(?-)
which was adopted by Jenkins C.J. in The Municipal.
Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of.
State (') and which equity was, on the authorities,
biRding on the Crown. After dealing with the cases of
Dadoba /anardhan v. The Collector of Bombay(3) and
Jethabhoy Ruttonsey v. The Collector of Bombay( 4 ) the
High Court observed :"We think, on a reading of the language of the'
Government Resolution dated the 19th December,
1865, that we should be justified in holding (within the
meaning of the rule in Ramsden v. Dyson) that an·
expectation was created or encouraged by the landlord
'
.
(1) (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129.
(3) (1901) I.L.R. 25 Born. 714.
(2) (1905) I.L.R. 29 Born. 580. (4) (1901) I.L.lt 25 Born. 752.
.....
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1951
Collector of
Bombay
Vo•r
Municip~I Corporation of the
City of Bombay
and Others.
Das f.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1952 J
that the Municipality was to get possession of the land
rent-free and that the latter took possession of the land
with the consent of the landlord, and upon such expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord and without
objection by him, laid out money upon the land."
According to the High Court the rule of equity
enunciated in Ramsden v. Dyson (supra) was not, as
pointed out by Jenkins C.J. in Municipal Corporation
of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of State (supra),
dependent of the validity of the disposition and could
be asserted even where the statutory formalities relating to the disposition of the property had not been
observed and performed, and that this equity constituted a right on the part of the respondent Corporation
in limitation of the right of the Government in consequence of a specific limit to ascessment having beea
established and preserved w'ithin the meaning of
section 8 of the Act II of 1876 so as to disentitle the
Government from assessing the land in question. The
High Court relied on the decision in Kamalavahooji
Maharaj v. The Collector of Bombay(') in support of
their view that section 8 of the Bombay Act II of 1876
would apply even where the specific limit was nil. In
the result, the High Court reversed the decision of the
learned Revenue Judge, allowed the appeal and passed
a deci·ee declaring the rights of the respondent Corporation and awarding to it the costs in both Conrts.
The Collector of Bombay appealed to the Federal
Court and the appeal has now come up for hearing
before us.
There has been considerable discussion before us
as to the precise scope and effect of . the principle of
equity enunciated in Ramsden v. Dyson (supra), as 'to
whether such principle should be extended to the facto
of the present case, w he th er the facts of this case
attract the application of the equity established in
Ramsden v. Dyson (supra) or attract the equity established in Maddison v. Alderson(') and Walsh v. Lonsdale(") and finally as to whether, in view of the decision
(1) (1937) 39 Born. LR. 1046
(3) (1882) LR, 21 Ch. D. 9.
(2) (1883) LR. 8 App. Cas. 417.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
51
of the Privy Council in Ariff v. Jadunath(1), the equity
in Ramsden v. Dyson (supra) can prevail against the
requirement of formalities laid down in the Victorian
Statute referred t10 above any more than. the equity in
Maddison v. Alderson (supra) can do against the
reqmrements of the Transfer of Property Act and
whether the decision in The Municipril Corporation of
the City 8f Bombay v. The Secretary of State(2) requires
reconsideration in the light of the decision in Ariff's
c,ase (Supra). Irt the view we have taken, it is not
necessary to go into, and to express any opinion on, any
of these questions, for this appeal can, in our opinion,
be disposed of on a narrower and shorter ground.
)
The Government claims to asses~ .the lands in terms
of :;ection 8 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 wh'ich runs
thus:-"8. It shall be the duty of the Collector, subject
to the orders of the Provincial Government, to fix and
to levy the assessment for land revenue.
Where there is no right on the part of the superior
hc>lder in limitation of the right of the. Provincial
Government to assess, the assessment shall be fixed at
the discretion of the Collector subject to the control
of the Provincial Government.
When there is a right on the part of the superior
holder in limitation of· the right of the Provincial
Government, in consequence of a specific limit to
ass'essmen1~ having \:Aeen established 1and preserved,
the assessment shall not exceed such ~ecific limit."
The sole question for our consideration is whether,
on the facts of this case, the m!Pondent Corporation has
succeeded in establishing in itself a right in limitation
of the right of 1the Government to assess the fand in
consequence of a specific limit to assessment having
been established and preserved. There is no dispute
that by reason of the non-compliance with the statu-.
tory formalities the Government Resolution of 1865 is
not an effectual grant passing title in the land to the
respondent Corporation and is not also an enforceable
. (l) (1931) LR, 58 I.A: 91.
(2) (1905) I.L.R. 29 Bom. 580.
1951
Collector of
Bombay
V; .
Municipal Corporation of the
City of Bombay
and 0th er.~.
Da1 ].
52
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19521
contract. On the other hand, there is no doubt as to the
existence
of an intention on the part of the GovernCollector of
ment
to
make and on the part of the Corporation
Bombay
to take a grant of the land in terms of the Resolution
v.
Municipal Cor- of 1865 including an undertaking by the Government
poration of the
not to charge any rent. Both parties acted on the
City of Bombay
basis of that Resolution and the predecessor in title
and Others.
of the respondent Corporation went into possession
Das/.
of the land in question pursuant to the Government
Resolution of 1865 and, acting upon the said Resolution and the terms contained therein, the respondent
Corporation and its predecessor in title spent considerable sums of money in levelling .the site and erecting
and maintaining the market buildings and have been
in possession of the land for over 70 years.. What, m
the circumstances was the legal position of the respondent Corporation and its predecessor in title in relatiott
to the land in question? They were in possession of
the land to which they had no legal title at all.
Therefore, the position of the respondent Corporation
and its predecessor, in title was that of a person having
no legal title but nevertheless holding possession of the
land under colour of an invalid grant of the land m
perpetuity and free from rent for the purpose of a
market. Such possession not being referable to any
legal title it was prima facie adverse to the legal title
of the Government as owner of the land from the very
moment the predecessor in title of the respondent
Corporation took possession of the land under the
invalid grant. This possession has continued open Iy,
as of right and uninterruptedly for over 70 years and
the respondent Corroration has acquired the limited
title it and its predecessor in tide had been prescribing for during all this period, that is to say, the right
to hold the land in perpetuity free from rent but only
for the purposes of a market in terms of the Government Resolution of 1865. The immunity from the
liability to pay rent is just as much an integral part
or an inseverable incident of the title so acquired as is
the obligation to hold the land for the purposes of a
market and for no other purpose. There is no queotion
1951
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1951
.of acquisition .by ·adverse ,possession of the Government's prerogative right to levy assessment. What the
Collector of
respondent Corporation has acquired is the legal right
Bombay
to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent for the specific
v.
·purpose of erecting and maintaining a market upon the Municipal Corterms of the Government Resolution as if a legal grant poration of the
of Bombay
had been made to it. The right thus acquired includes, Gty
and Others.
as part of it, an immunity from payment of rent which
must necessarily constitute a right in limitation of the
Das].
Government's right to assess in excess of the specific
limit established and preserved by the Government
RescJution within the meaning of section 8 of the
Bombay Act II of 1876. It is true, a~ pointed out by
the Privy Council in Kamalavahooji Maharaj v.
Collector of Bombay (supra) that the words of the
section would appear to apply rather to the case of . a
limitation on the right to assess than to the case of a
complete exemption from assessment but such a
construction would not protect the cases of total
exemption which, as conceded in that very case did
in fact exist and were recognised and protected by
vitue of the words of section 8 of the Bombay Act II
of 1876. It has not been suggested before us that there
are no cases of total exemption or that those cases are
protected by any provision of law other than that of
this very section. There is, therefore, no escape from
the conclusion arrived at by the High Court, with
which we concur, that the words of section 8 would
apply to a case where total exemption from assessment
was granted. In other words, specific limit may be
nil for the purposes of section 8 of the Act.
It was sought to be iirgued that even if the Government be precluded from enhanCing the "rent" in view
of the terms of the Government Resolution, it cannot be
held to have disentitled itself from its prerogative right
to assess "land revenue". This contention is sought to
be founded on a distinction between "rent" and "land
revenue". This contention, however, was not raised
in the written statement and was not made the subjectmatter of any issue on which the parties went to trial
anll was never put forward before either of the Courts
54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
119521
1951
below. Indeed, in the letter of the Mayor of Bombay
dated March 22, 1939, to wl11ch reference has been
Collector of .
made, it was clearly alleged that the word '"rent" was
Bombay
used in official documents with the greatest frequency
v.
Municipal Cor- with reference to the land revenue leviable by the
poration of the
East India Company and later by the Government in
City of Bombay
the Citi of Bombay and in the Presidency." In the
and Others.
Government's reply dated January 24, 1940, also
quoted aboye this assertion was never repudiated or
J.
denied. In the premises, the appellant cannot be
permitted at this stage to raise this contention founded
on the supposed distinction, if any, ~tween "rent"
and "land revenue" and for the purpose of this , case
we must proceed on the basis that the word "rent" in
the Government Resolution of 1865 was synonymous
with or included "land revenue."
v.,
In our opinion, for reasons stated above, the actual
decision of the High Court was correct and this appeal
should be dismissed with costs, and we order aceordingly.
P.HANJALI SASTRI J.-I am of opinion that this
appeal should be allowed and I will briefly iRdicate my
reasons w~thout recapitulating the facts which have
been fully •tated in the judgment of my learned
brother Das which I have had the adva!ltage of
reading.
The appeal wncerns a claim by the ProviRcial Government of Bombay to charge land revenue on a plot of
land on which the predecessors of the respondent
Municipality erected the buildings known as the
Crawford Market in the City of Bombay. It is common
ground that the land in question would be assessable
to land revenue under section 8 of the Bombay City
Land Revenue Act (No. II of 1876) unless th@ responddent established "a right in limitation of the right of
the Provincial Government in consequence of' a specific
limit to assessment having been established and
preserved", in which case, the assessement must not
exceed such specific limit. It has been held, and it is
not now disputed, that the words quoted above CO\'tr
S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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a right · of total exemption
from assessment, the
"specific limit" in such a case being nil (see Goswamini
Shri Kamalavahooji v. Colfrctor of Bombay () ). The
only question, therefore, is whether the respondent has
established a right to such. exemption.
The resolution of the Government
dated 19th
December, 1865, authorising the grant of the land without "any rent being charged to the Municipality as
the market will be like other buildings for the benefit
of the whole community" did not by 'itself purport ro
pass title to the land in question or to confer on the
Municipality a right to exemption from land revenue.
Admittedly no formal instrument was executed either
granting the land or exempting it from assessment.
Nor could the resolution be regarded as .a valid dis, position of property or an enforceable contract not to
charge revenue on the land, as it did not comply with
the . requirements of the statute 22 & 23 Vic. C. 41
which prescribed certain formalities to be observed
for such transactions. As pointed out by Jenkins C.J.
in Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The
Secretary of State( 2 ) all land in British India having
been vested in the Crown bv 21 & 22 Vic. C. 106,
the Government-in-Council in . Bombay could not dispose
of property o.f enter into a contract· on behalf of the
Crown except in exercise of the power bestowed on
them for the purpose under 22 & 23 Vic. C. 41 and
that power could be exercised only by observing the
formalities prescribed by that statute. The learned
Judges of the High Court, while recognising . this
difficulty in the way of the respondent establishing a
legal right to exemption from assessment, held that
the conduct of the Provincial Government in allowing
and, indeed, encouraging the respondent to erect the
buildings at great cost on the faith of the promise not
to charge ·land revenue contained in the Resolution of
19th .December, 1865, precluded the respondent on the
equitable principle recognised in Ramsden v. Dyson(3)
from assessing the land in question, and that this
(1) L.R. 64 I.A; 334.
(3) (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129.
{2) (1905) I.L.R. 29 Born. 580.
1~51
Collector of
·Bombay
v.
Municipal Corporation of the
City of Bombay
and Others.
Patanjali
.S•stri /.
56
1951
Collector of
Bombay
v.
Municipal Corporation of the
City of Bombay
and Others.
Patanjali
Sastri /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
equity was a· "right" in limitation of
of the Provincial Government to assess.
(1952J
the
right
I am unable to share that view. There is, in my
opinion, no room here for the application of the principle of Ramsden v. Dyson('). That decision has been
explained by the Privy Council in Arifj v. fadunath(')
as based on the equitable doctrine of part performance
which, their Lordships held, could not be applied so
as to nullify the express provisions of the Transfer
of Property Act relating to the creation of leases.
They observed:"Whether an English equitable doctrine should, m
any case, be applied so as to modify the effect of an
Indian statute may well be doubted; but that an
English equitable doctrine, affecting the provisions of
an English statute relating to .ihe right to sue upon a
contact, should be applied. by analogy to such a
statute as the Transfer of Property Act and with
such a result as to create without any wntmg an
interest which the statute says can only be creaited by
means of a registered instrument, appears to their
Lordships, in the absence of some binding authority
to that effect, to be impossible."
After quoting the well-known passage in the judgment of Lord Kingsdown, their Lordships commented
thus.:"It will be noticed that .Lord Kingsdown is dealing
with the case of express verbal contract or something
'which amounts to the same thing.' He nowhere puts
the case of estoppel; the word is not mentioned. He
would appear to be dealing simply with the equitable
doctrine of part performance. His reference to Gregory
v. Mighall r(811) 18 Ves. 328J confirms this view,
for that case was simply an earlier instance of the application of the doctrine. Even if Lord Kingsdown's
language was intended to cover something beyond the
equitable doctrine of part performance in relation to
the Statute of Frauds, and was intended to refer to
circumstances in which a court of equity will enforce
(l) (1866) L.R. I H.L. 129.
(2) (1931) 58 I.A. 91.
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
57
a title to land against the person who at law is the
owner thereof, the title must, nevertheless, in their
Lordships' view, be based either upon contract express
or implied, or upon some statement of fact grounding
an estoppel.'
In the later decision in Mian Pir Bux v. Sardar
Mahomed(') their Lordships reiterated the same view
. and held that English equitable · doctrines did not
afford in India a valid defence to an action in ejectment based on title.
'' '
'
1
After these decisions of the Privy Council elucidating the principles underlying Ram~den v. Dyson( 2 )
and Maddison v. Alderson(3), it. seems to me clear that
they have no applic:~tion to the facts of the present
case. They can no. more prevail against the statutory
provisions regarding .the disposition of property or the
making of contracts by Government than against the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act requiring
registered instruments for effecting certain classes of
transiactions. No quest~on of estoppel by representation arises, for the .Government made no representation
of fact which it now seeks to. deny. Nor can any case
of estoppel by acquiscence be founded on the facts
of the case. Both parties knew the facts and neither
was misled. There was no lying by and letting another
run into a trap [per Cot.ton L.J. in Russell v. Watts( 4 ) ].
The conduct of the parties was referable to the express
agreement evidenced by the Government Resolution
of 19th December, 1865, to . make a grant of the land
free of rent (whrch, in such context, means and includes revenue). No question, therefore, of any implied
contract could arise. Unfortunately for the respondent,
the express
agreement was unenforceable owing to
non-observance of the prescribed statutory formalities,
though it wJs acted upon by both sides. No question
arises here as to the respondent's title to the land
which apparently has been perfected by lapse of time,
but it is clear that no right of exemption has been
established either on the basis of .express or implied
(1) (1878) 6 I.A. 388.
'(2) (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129.
(3) (1883) 8 App. Cas. 467.
(4) (1884) 25 Ch. D. 559.
1951
Collector of
Bombay
v.
Municipal Corporation of the
City of Bombay
and Others .
Patanjali
· Sastri ].
58
1951
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11952]
or on the basis of equitable principles
of part performance or estoppel by acquiescence.
contract
C o/lcctor of
Bombay
v.
Municipal Cor·
poration of the
.City of Bombay
and Others.
Patanja/i
Sastri f.
•
It was next contended that, on the analogy of the
line of cases holding that a limited interest in land
could be acquired .by adverse possession for over the
statutory period, the respondent's possession of the
land in dispute without payment of any quit rent or
revenue for over 70 years to the knowledge of the
Government perfected its title to hold the land free
from liability to pay land revenue. It is difficult to
appreciate the argument so far as the claim to exemption is concerned. There is no question here of acquisition of limited interest- in land by adverse poS<ession. The respondent was asserting full ownership
and a right of exemption from assessment and the
Government agreed with that view as shown by their
letter dated 26th June, 1921, to the Land Acquisition
Officer for the City of Bombay wherein they stated
that "no Government claim in respect of the land
under acquisition (a portion of the land here in question) in the above mentioned case is made as the land
vests in the Municipality." Be it noted that the
Government made no claim even ro a portion of the
compensation on the basis of any right of resumption
reserved to them, the Resolution of 1865 having made
no such reservation. The position. then was that
throughout the period of adverse possession, the n::.pondent Municipality regarded itself and was regarde<l
bv the Government as absolute owner of the la:id with
tl;e additional right of exemption from assessment to
land revenue with the result that the Government's
"right to such property" (the subject of adverse possession) was "extinguished". under section 28 of the
Limitation Act. But the right to levy land revenue
was no part of the Government's right to the property.
It is a prerogative right of the Crown which was placed
on a statutory basis under the Bombay City Land
Revenue Act of 1876, and could be exercised in respect of a land only on the footing that it belonged to
another, the "superior holder", for, the · claim to levy
assessment itself implies a recognition of ownership in
,
f,
S.C:R.
l'
,,..,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
59
1951
another. It is, therefore, difficult to see how adverse
possession of . the land could entitle the respondent to
Collector of
exemption from assessment of land revenue.
Bombay
v.
It was . said that the Government having intended
Municipal
Corto grant the land on the terms that it was to be held
poration of the
free of quit rent or revenue and the respondent hav- City of Bombay
ing held the land on such terms claim'ing i~ to be
Rnd Others.
exempt from assessment, a title to hold it on those
Patanjali
terms Wa5 perfected by the adverse possession, the
Sastri /.
covenant for exemption from assessment forming part
and parcel of the title. In other words, the respondent
should be placed in the same position as if the
Government had made a valid revenue free grant.
If the
The arguement is, to my mind, fallacious.
Government had given effect to their expressed intention by executing an instrument in writing observing
the due formalities, the respondent would, no doubt,
have secured a valid title to the property with a contract binding the Government not to charge revenue,
supported as it was by consideration. But, as already
stated, the Government's promise not to charge land
revenue was unenforceable from the inception, and the
respondent's adverse possession of the land, though
accompanied by a claim to exemption from revenue,
could not destroy the Crown's prerogative right to
impose assessment on the land. A somewhat analogous
question arose in Goswamini Shri Kamala Vahooji v.
Collector of Bombay('). The Government admitted
that no land revenue had ever been charged in respect
of the land which was enjoyed by the holders for more
than a century without paymen~ of revenue and it
was urged that in virtue of such a long enjoyment a
lost grant of the land on the terms that it should be
held free from liability to pay revenue must be presumed. Rejecting that contention, their Lordships
observed:"The appellant submits that in the circumstances
a lost grant should be presumed, and that this lost grant
should be presumed to have contained an exemption
from land revenue or a 'right in limitation of the right
(1) (1937) 64 I.A. 334.
60
1951
Collector of
Bombay
v.
Municipal Cor_poration of the
City of Bombay
and Others.
Pato.njali
Sastri ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19521
of Government' to assess t!ze property.
The law may
presume the existence of a grant which has been lost
where it is sought to disturb a person in the enjoyment
of right which he and his predecessors have immemorially enjoyed, but it is a different thing to seek to presume that the Crown has by some lost grant deprived
itself of the prerogative power to tax the property of
its subjects, and their Lordships are of opinion that
this plea is untenable." (Italics mine).
The decision shows that exemption from land
revenue does not form part and parcel of the title to
land but is collateral to it. If a presumed lost grant
could not cover it neither could title by adverse possession.
I would allow the appeal but make no order as to
costs.
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J :-I had the advantage
of reading the judgment prepared by my learned
brother Mr. Justice Das, and I agree in the conclusion
he has reached; but I wish to add a few words of my
own on some of the points that have been discu~sed
during the course of the hearing.
In the first place, there can be little doubt that the
word "rent" in paragraph 2 of the Government
Resolution of the 19th December, 1865, means
"assessment". It is true that this word is used
generally in cases of landlord and tenant, but when it
is remembered that here the Government was parting
with the land vested in the Crown in favour of the
Municipal Corporation of Bombay, it can safely be
assumed or presumed 'that they were th.inking not
merely of their rights as landlord but also of their
prerogative right as well. That the land was going to
be used for the building of markets for the benefit of
the whole. community and, therefore, should not be
charged with rent is a comideration more relevant and
appropriate to the prerogative right to assess than to a
right to collect rent in respect of a transaction of lease.
Moreover, it is well-known that whenever we speak of
I;
S.C.R.·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
61
a rent-free grant of an inam by the Government, what
is meant is land revenue or assessment.
\
1951
Collector of
Born bay
The Resolution in questi-0n authorized the grant of
v.·
the site.
There is apparently no grant in writing, Municipal Corconforming to the formalities prescribed by the law pora_tion of the
thell' in force. Part of the site was wanted for the City o/Bombay
and Others.
erection of stables and the question of title to that
portion. was considered and decided in The Municipal Chandrasekhara
Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of
Aiyar f.
State for India in Council('), where the Government
gave the Municipality notice to quit and brought a suit
for rent on the alleged determination of the tenancy.
It is part of the' same transaction with which we are
concerned now, and it seems to me that there was no
valid grant. The grant having been authorized, the
Corporation went into possession and it is not denied
that they have built the Crawford Market at enormous
cost. Though the grant was invalid, the Corporation
has now acquired a title by adverse possession to the
site; this, however, is not the case with reference to
aforesaid Bombay
the stable site covered by the
decision. There the question was brought before the
Court, well within the 60 years' period.
The Crawford Market site has been in the possession
of the Municipal Corporation for over 60 years under
an invalid grant, a term of which was that no rent
should be charged. We are not concerned now with
any question of ejectment or determination of tenancy.
Could it be said that the right to levy assessment on
the land, enjoyed without any payment of any kind so
far, was lost by adverse possession? I find it difficult·
to give an affirmative answer. Before a right could be
said to be acquired or lost by adverse possession, it
must have been the subject of possession by a man
without title as against the· person with the rightflil
title. Right to levy assessment is a prerogative right
of the Government and it is hard to conceive of a case
where it could be said to be lost by· adverse possession.
True, there can be adverse possession of a limited
(1) (1904) I.L.R. 29 Born. 580.
\
62
1951
Collector of
Bombay
v.
Municipal Cor~
poration of the
City of Bomh11y
and Others.
Chandmsekhar•
Aiyar /.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
right like that of a mortgagee or a lessee or e»en a
permanent tenant, but still a right must have been
enjoyed by the possessor adversely to the claim of
the true owner. It is unnece~sary to go into the wider
question whether the denial of the right to levy assessment and possession of property coupled with tbis
denial for over a period of 60 years will negative that
right; it is mfficient to say that no right to levy
assessment was exercised in the case before us before
March, 1938, and the denial was only afterwards.
This, however, does not determine the case in
favour of the appellant, as there is a question of equity
to consider and on which the appellant failed in the
court below. In fact, it is the crucial point for determination. When
the
Architectural
Improvement
Committee proposed to levy a nominal rent, the
Government stated that no rent need be charged, as
the markets to be built were for the benefit of the
whole community. This was a representation made
by the Government when the site was given and
possession was taken.
How far tb'is representation
was taken into consideration when the Corporation of
Bombay took possession· of the site under the grant is
not necessary to be considered at any great length. It
is just possible that they would have taken the site .
even with the nominal rent, but it is equally possible"
that had ·they known that the rent was in the nature
of assessment and liable to enhancement from time to
time or periodically. they would have insisted on getting a site free from assessment in consideration of the
sites they gave up for forming the eastern Boulevard.
The allegation in paragraph 7 of the plaint that the
Corporation acted on the faith of the terms contained
in the grant has not been denied by the Government.
The accident that the grant was invalid does not
wipe out the existence of the representation of the fact
that it was acted upon by the Corporation. Even if
the suit had been brought within 60 years for ejectment and the Corporation had no answer to such a
claim, the right to levy assessment might have conceivably stood on a different footing. In any event
'!'
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
63
there can be no doubt that it would have been
competent for a Court of equity to give compensation
for the expenditure and protect the possession in the
meantime. Lord Kingsdown refers to this aspect of t.he
matter in Ramsden v. Dyson(1). In the present case,
the Corporation stands on much firmer ground. They
have acquired a title to the land which the Government
cannot upset or challenge. This acquisition of title is
as a result of the law of limitation. It has nothing to
do with any conduct on the part of the Corporation
which can be said to have rendered tl\e representation
about IJOn-libility to assessment of no legal effect or
consequence. The invalidity of the grant does not lead
to the obliteration of the representation.
..
, Can the Government be now allowed to .go back on
the representation, and, if we do so, would it not amount
to our countenancing the perpetration of what can be
compendiously described as legal fraud which a court
of equi,ty must prevent being committ;ed? If the
resolution can be read as meaning that the grant was
of rent-free land, the case . would come s~rictly within
the doctrine of estoppel enunciated in section 115 of
the Indian Evidence Act. But even otherwise, that is,
if there was. merely the holding out of a promise that
no rent will be charged in the future, the Government
must be deemed in the circumstances of this case to
have bound themselves to fulfil it. Whether it is the
equity recognised in Ramsden's case (1), or it is some
other form of equity, is not of much importance. Courts
must do justice by the promotion of honesty and good
faith, as far as it lies in their power. As pointed out
by Jenkins C. J. in Dadoha /anardhan's case (2), a
different conclusion would be "opposed to what is
reasonable, to what is probable, and to what is fair." .
I am of the ·opinion that the decision of the Privy
Council in Ariff v. Jadunath(3) is not applicable to
the facts before us, as the doctrine of part performance
~
I
(1) (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129.
(2) Dadoba fanardan v. The Collector of Bombay (1901) I.L.R.
25 Bom. 714.
·
(3) {1931) 58 I.A. 91.
5-2 s c. India/71
1951
Collector of
Bombay
v.
Municipal Corporation of the
City of Bombay
and Others.
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar /.
64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
is not being invoked here as in that case, to clothe a
person with title which he cannot acquire except by
Collector of
the pursuit of or in conformity with certain legal forms.
Bombay
Here, as pointed out already, the Corporation became
v.
Municipal Corthe full and absolute owner of the site on the lapse of
poration of the 60 years from the date of the grant.
City of Bombay
Appeal dismissed.
and Others.
Agent for the appellant: P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the respondent : R. A. Govind.
1951
Oct. 26.
THAKUR RUDRESWARI PRASAD SINHA
v.
SRIMATI RANI PROBHABHATI AND OTHERS
[PATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs and
VIVIAN BosE JJ. J
Ghatwali tenures-Nature and incidents-Alienability of Ze1nindari Ghatwalis-Taluka Kakwara whether alienable.
Taluk Kakwara was in its origin a Zemindari Ghatwali tenure
and continued to be so, and was in fact treated as such ever
since. Even if by virtue of Captain Browne's Sanad it became
a Government Ghatwali tenure, then under the Sanad of Raja
Kadir Ali or after the Permanent Settlement at any rate, it became a Zemindari Ghatwali and as ·such alienable with the
consent of the Zamindar according to the custom of Kharakpur
judicially recognised.
[Nature and incidents of Ghatwali tenures discussed] .
. CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Civil Appeal
No. 75 of 1950.
Appeal from Judgment of the High Court of
Judicature at Patna dated 22nd November, 1944, in
Appeal No. 238 of 1940 arising out of order dated
13th July, 1940, of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur
in Mis. Case No. 174 of 1939. The facts of the case
appear from the judgment. The appeal was originally
preferred to the Privy Council and was subsequently
tranferred and heard by the Supreme Court.
N. C. Chatteriee (B. Sen, with him), for the
appellant.
B.
C. De (Ragunath ]ha, with him) for the
respondents.
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