COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY versus FINLAY MILLS LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 1 October 1951 | [1952] 1 S.C.R. 11 | 1951 INSC 43
Key facts
- Decided
- 1 October 1951
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 103/1950
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1952] 1 S.C.R. 11
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 43
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11
1951
We are therefore of the opinion that it was a pan of
-·the normal activtties of the assessee's business to earn
Commissioner of
money by making use of its machinery by either em- Excess Profits
ploying it in its own manufacturing concern or temTax, Bombay
. City
porarily letting it to others for making profit for that
v.
business when for the time being it could not itself run
Sri Lakshmi
it. The High Court therefore was in error in holding Silk
Mills Ltd.
that the dyeing plant had ceased to be a commercial
asset of the assessee and the income earned by it and
Mahajan /.
received from the lessee, Messrs Parakh & Co., was not
·chargeable to excess profits tax. The result therefore
is that we hold that the answer returned by the High
Court to the question referred to it by the Tribunal
was wrong ;:ind that the correct answer to the question
would be in the affirmative and not in the nagative.
The appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances of
the case we make no order as to costs. We have not
thought it necessary to refer to all the cases cited as
the Bar as none of them really is in point on the short
question that we were called upon to decide and analogies drawn from them would not be helpful in arriving
at our decision.
Appeal, a/,lowed.
Agent for the appelant : P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the respondent : P. K. Chatterjee.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY
1951
v.
Oct. I.
FINLAY MILLS LTD.
[HARILAL KANIA
c. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN AND
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
JJ.]
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 10(2) (xv)-Expenditure
incurred for registration of trade mark-Whether business expenditure-Effect of registration.
The expenditure incurred by a company carrying on the manufacture and sale of textile goods in registering for the first time
its trade. marks which were not in use prior to the 25th January,,
12
1951
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1952]
1937, is revenue expenditure and an allowable deduction under
Sec. 10 (2) (xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The fact that a
.Commissioner of trade mark after registration could be separately assigned and not
Income Tax,
Bombay
v•
.Finlay Mills
Ltd.
as a part of the goodwill of the business only, does not n1ake the
expenditure for registration capital expenditure. It is only an
additional and incidental facility given to the owner of the trade
mark; it adds nothing to the trade mark itself.
Judgment of the Bombay High Court affirmed.
Commissioner of lncome~tax, Bonibay v. The Century Spinning
and Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. ([1947] 15 l.T.R. 105)
approved. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. v. Atherton
([1926] A. C. 205), Southern v. Borax Consolidated Ltd. ([1942] 10
l.T.R. Supp. 1), Henriksen v. Grafton Hotel Ltd. ([1942] 2 K. B.
184) referred to.
'
'
Civ1L
APPELLATE
JuR1smcTioN : Civil Appeal
No. 103 of 1950.
Appeal from a Judgment of the Bombay High Court
(Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J.) dated 25th March,
1949, in Income Tax Reference No. 31 of 1948.
M.
C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India
( G. N. Joshi, with him) for the appellant.
R. /. Kolah, for the respondent.
1951. Oct. 1. The
delivered by
Judgment
of
the
Court was
KANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of
the High Court at Bombay and it arises out of the
opinion expressed by the High Court in respect of a
question submitted to it by the Income-tax Tribunal.
The material facts are these. The respondent is a textile mills company carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling textile goods. . For the assessment
years 1943-44 and 1944-45, covering the accounting
periods ending with the calendar years 1941, 1942 and
1943, the respondent claimed the expenditure incurred
by it in registering for the first time its trade marks
which were not in use prior tp the 25th February, 1937,
as revenue expenditure and an allowable deduction out
of its income for the said periods, under section 10(2)
(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Following the
decision of the Bombay H'igh Court in Commis$ioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. The Century Spinning
'
t
t
$.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
13
1951
,and Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.(1), the Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee. At the desire
Commissioner of
:of the appellant, the Tribunal submitted the following I ncorne Tax,
;.question for the opinion of the High Court :Bombay
v.
"Whether, on the facts of the case, the expendiFinluy Mills
ture incurred by the assessee company in Jegistering
Ltd.
for the first time its trade marks which were not in
Kania.C. f.
use prior to the 25th February, 1937, is revenue expen;diture and an allowable deduction under section 10(2)
,{xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act?"
The High Court, following its previous decision and
finding that the fact of the trade marks having come
into use after the 25th of February, 1937, made no
...d'ifference in the result, answered the question in the
affirmative. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bom-·bay, has come on appeal to us.
· It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the
_question whether a certain disbursement was of a
• capital or revenue nature, has to be decided according
-to the principle laid down in British Insulated and
Helsby Cables Ltd. v. Atherton(2). In that case the com"' : pany which carried on the business of manufacturers of
·1nsulated cables established a pension fund for its clerical
and technical salaries staff. The fund was constituted
· by a trust deed which provided that members should
_,contribute a percentage of their salaries to the fond
and that the company should contribute an amount
~equal to half the contributions of the members; and
further that the company should contribute a sum of
·,£31,784 to form the nucleus of the fund and to prov~de
the amount necessary in order that past years of service
-+ _.of the then existing staff should rank for pension. That
. sum was arrived at by an actuarial calculation on the
···basis that the sum would ultimately be exhausted
. when the object for which it was paid was attained.
· The House of Lords held that this payment was in the
nature of capital expenditure and was therefore not an
, .admissible deduction. Although in the opinions ex1;Pressed by the different members of the House of Lords
J
~.·. , .
.;1-
.
(1) [1?47] 15 I.T.R. 105.
(2) [1926] A.C. 205.
14
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952t
1951
the line of approach is not completely the same, the
principle stated by Lord Cave in his speech has been
Commissioner of
accepted
as a safe test to distinguish capital expendiIncome· Tax,
ture from revenue expenditure. It was recognised that
Bombay
v.
a sum of money expended, not of necessity and with a
Finlay Mills
view to a direct and immediate benefit to the trade,
Ltd.
but voluntarily and on the grounds of commercial expediency, and \n order indirectly to facilitate the carryKania C. /.
ing on of business, may yet be expended wholly and
exclusively for the purposes of the trade. The Lord
Chancellor observed that the question appeared to be
a question of fact which was proper to be decided by
the Commissioners upon the evidence brought before
them in each case. The test that capital expenditure
is a thing that is going to be spent once and for all and
income expendiure 1s a thing that is going to recur
every year was considered an useful element in arriving
at the decision but was not certainly the decisive fact.
The Lord Chancellor observed as follows :-"But when
an expenditure is made, not only once and for all, but
with a view to bringing into existence an asset or an
advantage for the enduring benefit of the trade, I think
that there is very good reason for treating such an expenditure as properly attributable not to revenue but
to capital."
In order to appreciate the true position here correctly
it is next necessary to notice the relevant provisions of
the Indian Trade Marks Act, 1940. It may be noted
that before this Act there was no Trade Marks Act
in India b'ut it was recognised that .an action lay for
infringement of a trade mark independently of an action
for passing off goods. The Act opens with the preamble "whereas it is expedient to provide for the registration and more effective protection of trade marks
...... " Section 2(1) of the Act defines a trade mark as
meaning "a mark used or proposed to be. used in
relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so as
to .indicate a connection in the course of trade between
the goods and some person having the right to use the
mark, whether with or without any indication of the
identity of that · person." Section 14 permits the
'
'
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
15
1951
proprietor of a trade mark to ·have the trade mark registered. The Attorney-General, on behalf of the appel- Commissioner of
lant, relied on sections 20, 21, 28 and 29 in support of
Income Tax,
Bombay
his contention. He argued that before the Trade Marks
v.
Act, although the proprietor of a trade mark could
Finlay Mills
maintain an action for infringement of his trade mark
Ltd.
and the cause of action in such a case was quite differKania C. f.
ent from the cause of action in an action for passing off
goods, by the Trade Marks Act the right oif the owner
of the trade mark is increased by section 21, and it is
made assignable independently of the goodwill under
sections 28 and 29 of the Trade Marks Act. The question thus resolves itself into whether by reason of these
two incidents· the case falls within the principle laid
down by Lord Chancellor Cave, as mentioned above.
••
,/
In our opinion, the contention urged on behalf of the
appellant must fail. It is not contended that by the
Trade Marks Act a new assets has come into existence.
It was contended that an advantage of an enduring
nature had come into existence. It was argued that
just as machinery may attain a higher value by an implementation causing greater productive · capacity, in
the present case the trade mark which existed before
the Trade Marks Act acquired an advantage of an
enduring nature by reason of the Trade Marks Act and
·the fees paid for registration thereunder were in the
nature of capital expenditure. In our opinion, this
analogy is fallacious. The machinery which aquires
a greater productive capacity by reason of its improvement by the inclusion of some new invention naturally
becomes a new and altered asset by that process. So
long as the machinery lasts, the improvement continue~
to the advantage of the owner of the machinery. The
replacement of a dilapidated roof by a more substantial
roof stands on the same footing. The result however
of the Trade Marks Act is only two-fold. By registration, the owner is absolved from the obligation to
prove his ownership of the trade mark. It is treated
as prim a facie proved on production of the registration certificate. It thus merely saves him the trouble
of leading evidence, in the ·e\rent of a· suit~ · in a court
2-2 S. C. india/71
16
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
of law, to prove his title to the trade mark. It has
been said that registration is in the nature of collateral
C-ommissioner of
security furnishing the trader with a cheaper and more
Income Tax,
direct remedy against infringers. Cancel the registraBombay
v.
tion and he has still his right enforceable at common
Finlay Mills
law to restrain the p'iracy of his trade mark. In our
Ltd.
opinion, this is neither such an asset nor an advantage
as to make payment for its registration a capital
Kania C. J.
expenditure. In this connection it may be useful to
notice that expenditure incurred by a company in
defending title to property is not considered expense
of a capital nature. In Southern (H. M. Inspector of
Taxes) v. Borax Consolidated Limited('), it is there
stated that where a sum of money is laid out for the
~cquisition or the improvemer.t of a fixed capital asset
1t 1s attributable to capital, but 'if no alteration is
made in the fixed capital asset by the payment, then
it is properly attributable to revenue, being in substance a matter of maintenance, the maintenance of
the capital structure or the capital asset of the company. In our opinion, the advantage derived by the
owner of the trade mark by registration falls within
this class of expenditure. The fact that a trade mark
after registration could be separately assigned, and not
as a pan of the goodwill of the business only, does not
also make the expenditure for registration a capital
expenditure. That is only an additional and incidental
facility given to the owner of the trade mark. It adds
nothing to the trade mark itself.
In the judgment of the High Court some emphasis
is laid on the fact that by reason of registration the
duration of the tra<le mark is only for seven years, and
it does not thus possess that permanency which is
ordinarily required of an expenditure to make it a
capital expenditure and in order to prove the existence
of a benefit of an enduring character. The learned
Attorney-General contended that the view that as the
benefit of registration lasted for seven year., i.e., for
a limited period, it prevented the expenses of registration being treated as capital expenditure, is unsound
(1) [1942] 10 I.T.R. Suppl. 1.
i
,.
S.C.R.
)
:SUP:RE,ME cou1rr REPORTS
17
.and for that contention he relied on He?Jriksei:z (Inspector of Taxes) v. Grafton Hotel Ltd.(1). In that case
ten.ants .of licensing premises by agreement with the
landlord paid by instalment the monopoly value fo:;ed
by the licensing j'ustices when gran11ling ':the licence
under section 14 of of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act,
1910. These were sought to be deducted as revenue
expenditure but were disall0wed by the Court. Lord
Greene M. R. first considered that the payment foll
into the same class as the payment of a premium on
the grant of a lease or the expenditure on improvements to the property which justices may require to
be made as a conditiqn of granting a licence. Having
reached that conclusion he rejected the argument that
the payment not being made in one lump sum but -by
instalments made a difference in the character of the
payment. H~ observed as fofilows:-"Whenever a
licence is granted for a term, the payment is made as
on a purchase of a monopoly for that term. When a
licence is granted for a subsequent term, the monopoly
value must be paid in respect of that term and so on.
The payments are recurrent if the licence is renewed,
they are not periodical so as to give them the quality
of payments which ought to be debited to revenue
account. The thing that is paid for is of a permanent
quality although its permanence, being conditioned by
the length of the term, is shortlived. A payment of
this character appears to me to fall into the same
class as the payment of a premium on the grant of a
lease, which is admittedly not deductible." The
Attorney-General relied on these observations to point
out tha~ the permanence of the advantage was thus
not dependent · on the number of years for which it was
to enure for the benefi~ of the proprietor of the trade
mark. In our opinion, these observations have to be
read in the context in which they have been made.
The learned Master of the Rolls was discussing only
the quest.Ion of payment .being made by instalments
as not making any d,i,ffere1~ce in ,the nature of the
(I) [1942] 2 K. B. 184.
1951
Comtp/~sion.er .qf
l11cpme T.ax,
/)o,11J.b.ay
.y.
Finlay Mills
Lt,d.
~m;i_a C. /.
18
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
1951
expenditure. It was first held by him that the payCommi'ssWner of ment in question was of a capital nature and of the
same character as premium paid on the grant of a, lease
Income Tax,
Bombay
and was therefore necessarily of a capital nature.
v.
Having come to that conclusion, he only rejected the
Finlay Mills
contention that because the premium was paid in more
Ltd.
instalments than one it lost its character of a capital
expenditure. In our opinion, this is an entirely difKania.C. /.
ferent thing from stating that the 'fact of the advantage being for a limited time altered the character of
the payment in any way. As observed by Viscount
Cave L. C. the question is always one of fact depending on the circumstances of e~h case 'individually.
•
In our opinion, the decision of the High Court reported in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. The
Century Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing
Co. Ltd.(') is correct and in the present case also the
contention of the appellant must fail. The appeal
therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant : P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the respondent : R. A. Govind.
(1) [1947] 15 I.T.R. 105.
1951
BHIM SEN for R. S. MALIK MATHRA DAS
Oct. 4
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
UNION OF INDIA-Intervener.
PREM NATH for CH. HARBANS LAL
fl.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
BHIM SEN for RATTAN CHAND
fl.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
..
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org