THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER versus F. N. BALSARA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 May 1951 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 682 | 1951 INSC 39
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 May 1951
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, SIR SYED FAZL ALI, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 182/1951
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 682
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 39
Text of the judgment
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
!951
THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER
May 25.
v.
F. N. BALSARA
F. N. BALSARA
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND ANOTHER
[SA1Ym FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SAsTRI, MUKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs and V1v1AN BosE lf.]
Bombay Prohibition Act (XXV of 1949)-Constitutional validity
-Applicability of Act to foreign liquors-To medicinal and toilet
preparations containing alcohal-Validity of ss. 2(24) (a), 12, 13,
23, 24, 39, 40(1) (b), 46, 52, 53, 139 (c)-Law of Province prohibiting possession and sale of foreign liquor within Province-W heth er
encroaches on power of Dominion to make laws as to "ituport and
export" -Doctrine of original pack.age -Applicability to India Construction of Lists-Restriction on fundamental right uto acquire,
hold and dispose of property" and to "equal protection of the laws"
Government of India Act, 1935, s. 297 (4), Seventh Sched., List
I entry 19--List 11 entry 31-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1),
19 (2).
Under entry 31 of List 11 of
the
Seventh Schedule
to the
Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial .Legislatures had
the power to make laws in respect of "intoxicating liquors, that
is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport,
purchase and sale of intoxiqting liquors" and under entry 19 of
List I, the Dominion Legislature had the power to make laws
with respect to "import and export across customs frontiers".
The constitutional validity of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949,
in so far as it rcstrict.ed the possession and sale of foreign liquors
was impugned on the ground that it was an encroachment on
the field assigned to the Dominion Legislature under entry 19 of
List I :
H eltl~ ( i) that the words "possession and sale" occurring in entry
31 of List II must be read without aJiy qualification, ahd the
word "import" In ~ntry 19 of List 1 standing by itself will not
include either sale or possession of the article imported into the
country. There was thus no conflict between entry 31 of List II
and entry 19 of List I and the Bombay Prohibition Act, in so
far as it purported to restrict the possession and sale of foreign
liquors, did not encroach upon the field of the Dominion Legis-
lature; (ii) even assuming that the prohibition of purchase, u~e,
possession, transport and sale of liquor will affect its import, the
Bombay Prohibition Act was in pith and substance an Act fall-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT Rm>ORTS
683
ing within entry 31 of List . II and. the fact th~t. the law. incid·
cntally encroached upon the powers i:lf the Domm1on Legislature
under entry 19 of List I would not effect its validity.
The American doctrine of "original package" which laid down
the importation was not over so long as the goods were still in
that original package, has no application in India having regard to
the scheme of legislation that has been outlined in the Govern·
roent of India Act, 1935, and in the present Constitution in which
the various entries in the Legislative Lists have been expressed
in clear and precise language.
BhQla Prasad v. The King Emperor [1942] F.C.R. 17 and Miss
IGshor, Sethi v. The King [ 1949] F.C.R. 650 relied on. In re the
Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1838 [1939) F.C.R., 18,
The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum [1940] F.C.R. 110, Governor
General in Council v. Province of Madras [1945] F.C.R. 179, Prafulla Kumar Mul(k_erjea and others v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna
[1947] F.C.R. 28, Subramanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan
[1948) F.C.R. 207 referred to: Brown v. Maryland (25 U.S. 419)
and Leisy v. Hardin (135 U.S. 100) distinguished.
The Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, does not in any way contravene the ptovisions of s. 297 ( 1) (a) of the Government of India
Act, 1935, inasmuch as it is not a law made by virtue of the
entry relating to "Trade and commerce within the Province"
(entry 2 of List II) or the entry relating to "the production,
supply and distribution of commodities" (entry 29 of List II).
Bhola Prasad v. King Emperor [1942] F.C.R. 17 followed.
The word "liquor" as understood in India lit the time of the
Government of India kt, 1935, covered not only those
alcoholic liquids which arc generally used as beverages and
produce intoxication, but also all liquids containing alcohol;
the definition of "liquor" eontained in s. 2 (24) of the Bombay
Prohibition Act, 1949, is not therefore ultra 111'rei.
Section 39 of the Act which empowers the Provincial Government to permit the use or tonsumption of foreign liquor on cargo
boats, warships and troopships and in military and naval messes
and canteens does not contravene Att. 14 of the Constitution
(which provides that the State shall not deny to any person
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws) inasmuch as the relaxation · of the general law In respect of the
persons contemplated by the section is not arbitrary or capti·
dous but is based on a reasonable classification.
Ru\e 67 of. the Bombay Foreign Liquor Rules which authorises
the granting of a permit to "any foreigner on a tour of India
who enters the! S~te of . Bombay and de!sircs to possess, use and
c~nsume foreign liquor" is not void on the ground of discrimina·
t1on, firstly because,· thought it provides for the case of a foreign
1951
The Staltqf
Bombily
find Anol/ler
. v.
F. N. Balsara.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
684
1951
The Stat• ef
Bombay
and Anotlur
v.
F. N. Balsara.
visitor, tl:Q:rc is no prohibition against .any other
S.C.R.
outsider
being
granted a permit, .and secondly, because the policy underlying
the rule is quite consistent with the policy underlying s. 40 of
the Act which enables permits to be granted to foreigners under
certain c(Kl.ditions.
Section 52, 53 and 139 ( c) of the act do not constitute delegation of legislative power, and delegation of the character which
these sections involve cannot in any view be held to be invalid.
In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912 etc.( 1 ) relied on.
The restrictions impose by ss. 12 and 13 of the Act on the
possession, sale, use and consumption of liquor are not reason-
able restrictions on the fondamcntal right guaranteed by
Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution "to acquire, hold and dispose
of property", so far as medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol are concerned and the said sections arc invalid so far
as they prohibit the possession, sale, use and consumption of
these articles, but the sections arc not wholly void on this
around as the earlier categories mentioned in the d~finition of.
liquor, namely, spirits of wine, methylated spirit, \Vine, beer and
toddy are distinctly separable items which are easily severable
from the last category, namCly, all liquors containing alcoho~
and the restrictions on the possession, sale, use arid consumption
of these earlier categories are not unreasonable restrictions.
Romesh Thappar v. Tie Stue. of Madras (1950] S.CR. 594 anti
Chintaman Rab v. ]he Su~ of Madhya Pradesh [1950] S.C.R. 759
distinguished ..
Sections 23 (a) and 24 (1) (a) of the act in so far as they refer
to "commending" any intoxicant, conflict with the fundamental
right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by
Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution and- none of the conditions
mentioned in ·cl. (2) of Art. 19 applies to the case and therefore
these provisions arc void. Section 23 {b) is also void, because
the words 0 incite" and 0 -enc:ouragc''· Uc wide enough tO include
incitement and
encouragement by
words and speeches and also
by acts artd ·the wotds used in the section are so wide and vague
that the clause .must be held to. be void .in its entirety.
There is nothing unreuonab!c in a law relating to prohibition
between . Indian citizens against whom it is
primarily to be tnforccd and. foreigners who ha•!c ·n<> intention
of permanently residing in India. A provisinn enabling a certain
class of pessons holding permits to offer drink to persons holding similar permits is also not unreasonable. Notilications
No. 10484/45C and 2843/49(a) arc not therefore invalid.
discriminating
The requirement that an applicant .for a permit on .the ground
of health undct '· 40(1) (b) must get a medical certificate declaring that he is 1111 "addict'' is n<>t warranted by the provisions of
1
( )
Repc>rkd infra.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
the Act. The word "addict" in the form of the medical certificate should therefore be replaced by the words used in s. 40 ( 1)
(b) of the Act or words corresponding to them.
The provisions of the Act which have been held to be invalid
are not so inextricably bound up with the remaining provisions
of the Act as to render the whck Act void.
1951
Th~ State of
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
[The decision of the High Court that ss. 136 (1), 136 (2) (b),
136 (2) (c) 136 (2) (e) and 136 (2) (f) were void inasmuch as they
offended against Art. 19 of the Constitution was not assailed
before the Supreme Court.}
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd August, 1950, of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Miscellaneous
Application No. 139 of 1950.
M. C. Setalvad and C. K. Daphtary (M. M. Desai
and H. M. Seervai. with them) for the appellants in·
Case No. 182 and respondents in Case No. 183.
N. P. Engineer (G. N. Joshi, R. ]. Kolah and
.N. A. Palkhiwala, with him) for the respondent in
Case No. 182 and appellant in Case No. 183.
195. May 25. The judgment of the court was delivered by
,'
FAzL Au J.-These appeals arise from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay upon the application of one F. N. Balsara
(hereinafter referred to as the petitioner), assailing the
validity of certain specific provisions o~ the Bombay
Prohibition Act, 1949 (Bombay Act No. XXV of
1949), as well as of the Act as whole. The petitioner,
claiming to be an Indian citizen, prayed to the High
Court inter alia for a writ of mandamus ·against the
State of Bombay and the ProhibitiQn Commissioner
ordering .them to forbear from enforcing against him
the provisions of the Prohibition Act and for the issue
of a writ of mandamus ordering them (1) to allow him
to exercise his right to possess, consume and use certain articles, namely, whisky, brandy, wine, beer,
medicated wine, eau-de-cologne, etc., and to import
and export across the Customs frontier . and to purchase, possess consume and use any stock of foreign
3-4 S. C. India/68
Far.I Ali J.
686
1951
Tbt State qf
Bombay
and Anotbtr
v.
F. }{. Bahara.
Far.I Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
liquor, eau-de..:ologne, lavender water, medicated
wines and medicinal preparations containing alcohol,
and (2) to forbear from interfering with his right to
possess these articles and to take no steps or proceedings
against him, penal or otherwise, under the Act. The
petitioner also prayed for a similar order under section
_45 of the Specific Relief Act against. the respondents.
The High Court, agreeing with some of the petitioner's
contentions and disagreeing with others, declared some
of the provisions of the. Act to be invalid and the rest
to be valid. Both the State of Bombay and the
petitioner, being dissatisfied with the judgment of the
High Court, have appealed to this Court after obtaining
a certificate frpm the High Court under article 132 ( 1)
of the Constitution.
The Act in question was passed by the Legislature
of the Province of Bombay as it was constituted in
1949, and was published in the Bombay Government
Gazette on the 20th May, 1949, and came · into force
on the 16th June 1949. The Act consis~ of 148 sections with 2 schedules and is divided into 11 chapters.
It is both an amending and consolidating Act and
incorporates the provisions of the Bombay Abkari Act
which it repeals and also those of the Bombay Opium
and Molasses Acts and containS new provisions for
putting into force the policy of prohibition which is
one of the objects mentioned in the preamble of the
Act. The most important provision in Chapter I his
the definition of "Liquor" which has been vigorously
assailed as being too wide and therefore beyond the
powers of the Provincial Legislature. Chapter II
relates to establishment and is not relevant to the
present appeal. Chapter III, which contains a ntimber
of prohibitions in regard to liquor as defined in the
Act, is said to enact sweeping provisions which are
liable to be assailed. Sections 12 a:nd 13 and the relevant provisions of sections 23 :ind 24 in this Chapter
may be quoted :12. No person shall(a) manufacture liquor;
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
(b) construct or work any distilfery or brewery;
(c) import, export, transport or possess liquor; or
(d) sell or buy liquor.
13. No person shall( a) bottle any liquor for sale;
(b) consume or use liquor; or .
( c) use, keep or have in his possession any materials, still, utensils; implements or apparatus whatsoever for the manufacture of any liquor.
23. No person shall( a) commend, solicit the use of, offer any intoxicant or hemp, or
(b) incite or encourage any member of the public
or any class of individuals of the pufilic generally to
commit any act, which frustrates or defeats the provisions of this Act, or any rule, regulation or order made
thereunder, or. .....
24 (1). No person shall print or publish in any newspaper news-sheet, book leaflet, booklet or any other
single or periodical publication . or otherwise display
or distribute any advertisement or other matter( a) which commends, Solicits the use of, or offers
any intoxicant or hemp,
(b) which is calculated to encourage. pr mc1te any
individuals or the public generally to coll).mit an offence
under this Act, or to commit a breach of or to evade
the provisions of any rule, regulation or order made
thereunder or the conditions of any licence, permit,
pass or authorisation granted thereunder.
Chapter IV relates to "control, regulation and
exemptions", and contains inter alia sections 30 to
38 and section 44 which provide for cases in which,
licenses for the manufacture, export, import, transport,
sale or possession of liquor may be granted; section
39, which authorises the Government to permit the use
or consumption of foreign liquor on cargo boats, warships, troopships and in military and naval messes and
canteens; section 40, which provides for the grant of
1951
Th•State of
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Faz! Ali J.
688
!95!
ThtStaie of
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fad Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951J
permits fot the use or consumption of foreign liquor
to persons whose health would be seriously and permanently affected if they were not permitted to use or
·consume such liquor and to foreigners who do not
intend to stay permanently in India; section 41, whicJ:i
enables special permits to be granted to diplomats and
foreign sovereigns; section 45, which authorises use of
liquor for sacramental purposes; section 52, which empowers an authorised officer to grant licenses, permits,
etc., in cases not specifically provided for; section 53,
which deals with the form in which and the conditions
under which licenses, etc., may be granted; and section
54 which provides for the cancellation or suspension of
licenses and permits. The other material chapters of the
Act are Chapter VII, which provides for offences and
penalties, and Chapter IX which deals with "powers and
duties of officers and procedure." Sections 118 and 119
of the Act declare the offences under the Act to be
cognisable and some of them to be non-bailable. Under
section 121, any authorised prohibition officer or any
police officer may open any package and examine any
goods and may stop any vessel, vehicle, or other means
of conveyance and search for any intoxicant. Section 136(1) provides that if any of the officers mentioned therein is satisfied that any person is acting or is
likely to act in a manner which amounts to preparation, attempt, abetment or commission of any of the
offences punishable under section 65 or 68 of the Act,
he may arrest such person without a warrant and
direct that such person shall be committed to such
custody aS such officer may deem lit for a period not
exceeding 15 days. By section 136(2), the State Government is given the extraordinary power of imposing
restrictions on the right of free movement of any person
if it is satisfied that such person is acting or is likely
to act in the manner aforesaid. Chapter XI contains
certain miscellaneous prmtlsions and the only sections
of this Chapter which need be referred to are section
139 ( c), which statj:s that the State Government may
by general or special order exempt any person or class
of persons or institution or class of institutions from the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ,
689
observance of all or any of the provisions of the Act or
any rule, regulation or order made thereunder, and
section 147, which declares that nothing in the Act
shall be deemed to apply to any intoxicant or other
article in respect of its import or export across the
customs frontier as defined by the Central Government.
The High Court accepted the contention of the
petitioner that the definition of "liquor" in the Act was
too wide and went beyond the power vested in the
legislature to legislate with regard to intoxicating
liquors under item 31 of List II. It also held the following section to be invalid :Sections 23 (a) and 24 (1) (a) so far as they refer to
"commending"; section 23 (b); 24 (1) (b) so far· as it.
refers to "evasion"; section 39; section 52; section 53 ·in
part; section 136 (1); section 136 (2) (b), (c), (e), (f); and
section 139 (c). The High Coun also held Rule 67 of the
Bombay Foreign Liquor Rules and Notifications Nos.
10484/45 (c) and 2843/49 (a), dated the 30th March,
1950, invalid. It further held that the word "addict"
in the medical certificate was not warranted by the
provisions of the Act.
The two important questions which this Court is
called upon to decide in these appeals are :( l) whether there are sufficient grounds for declaring the whole Act to be invalid; and
(2) to ~hat extent the judgmerit of the High ·court
can be upheld with regard to · the specific provisions
of the Aot which have been declared by it to be void.
It seems to me that it will be convenient to deal in
the first instance with the argument assailing the
validity of the Act as a whole, which is based ·on
three grounds, these being :( 1) that the law is an encroachment on the field
which has been assigned exclusively to the Central
Legislature under entry 19 of List I;
(2) that some of the material provisions of the Act
interfere with or are calculated to interfere with interState trade and commerce and as such transgress the
1951
Tiu Stale of
Bom/Jay
dlll/ 4.Mther
"·
F. N. Balsara.
Fazl Ali].
690
1951
Th< State qf
Bombay
and Anothtr
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fazl Ali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951}
provmons of section 2'J7 of the Government of India
Act, 1935; and
(3) that the High Court having held a number of
material provisions to be void, should have declared
the Act as a whole to be invalid, especially as the provisions found by the High Court to be void are not
severable from the rest of the Act and it cannot be
said that the legislature would have passed the Act in
the truncated form in which it is left after the decision
of the High Court.
It is obvious that the proper occasion to deal with
the third ground will be after examining the specific
provisions which have been declared by the High Court
to be void, but the first two grounds may be dealt with
at once.
·
The first question is whether the impugned law can
be said to have made any encroachment upon the field
of legislation . assigned to the centre. In order to decide this point, it will be necessary to refer to entry
No. 31 in List II,· under which ·the law purports to have
been made, and entry No. 19 of List I, which is
said to have been transgressed. These entires run as
follows:~
Entry 31, List 11 :. Intoxicating liquors and narcotic
drugs, that is to i!ay, the production, manufacture
possession, transport,· purchase and sale of· intoxicating
liquors, opium and other narcotic drugs, but subject
as respects opium, to the provisions of List I and, as
respects poisons and dangerous drugs, to the provisions
of List III.
Entry 19, List I : Import and export across customs
frontiers as defined by the Dominion Government.
Prima facie, it would seem that there is no real conflict between these two entries, because entry 31 of List
II has no reference to import or export but merely
deals with production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale. Dealing with t1iis entry,
Gwyer C. J. observed as follows in the case of Bhola
Prasad v. The King Emperor(') :(')[1942] F.C.R. 17 at 25.
$.C.R•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
. "A power to legislate 'with respect to intoxicating
liquors' ·could not well be expressed in wider terms,
and would, in our opinion, unless the meaning of the
words used is restricted or controlled by . the context
or by other provisions in the Act, undoubtedly include
the _power to prohibit intoxicating liquors throughout
the. Province or in any specified part of the Province."
Thus, under entry 31, the Provincial Legislature can
pass any law regarding production, manufacture,
transport, purchase, possession and sale of intoxicating liquor. But the point that is pressed for our consideration is that "import" does not end with mere
landing of the goods on the shore or their arrival in
the customs house, but it implies that . the imported
goods must reach the hands of the importer and he
should be able to possess ·theµi. On !ltls basis, it is
contended that there is no difference in effect between
a power to prohibit the possession and sale of an article and a power to prohibit ~ts import or introductiqn
into the country, since the one would be a necessary
consequence of the other. This contention is based
upon some American cases to which I shall refer l~ter,
but it may be stated at once that the point which is
raised in this case is precisely the point which was
raised and negatived in Miss Kishori Shetty v. The
King(1). In that case, the appellant had been convicted under section 14-B of the Bombay Abkari
Act, 1878, as amended by the Bombay Abkari (Amendment) Act, 1947, for having in possession a· certain
quantity of foreign liquor in excess of the limit prescribed by a notification issued under the following
provision of the Act :"14-B (2) ...... the Provincial Government may by
notification in the Official Gazette prohibit the possession by any individual or a class or a body of
individuals or the public generally, either throughout
the whole Presidency 9r in any . local area, of any
intoxicant, either absolutely or subject to such conditions as it may prescribe."
(1) [1949] F.C.R. 650.
1951
The State qf
Bombay
anti AnotMt
v.
F. /(. Balsara.
Fa.i;l Ali J.
692
!951
TheStatt ef
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
The main argument advanced in that case was reproduced in the judgment in these words :"But counsel for the appellant. drew attention to
item 19 of List I which covers "Import and export
across customs frontiers as defined by the Dominion
if "intoxicating
Government", and argued that
liquors" in item 31 of List JI were held to include also
liquors imported from abroad, then the Provincial
Legislature, by prohibiting possession of such liquors
by all persons, whether private consumers, common
carriers or warehousemen, could defeat the power of
the Federal Legislature to regulate imports of foreign
liquors across the sea or land frontiers of British India
which are customs frontiers as defined by the Central
Government and thus seriously jeopardise an important
source of central customs revenue. As under section 100 of the Constitution Act the Provincial legislative powers under List JI were subject to the exclusive
powers of the Federal Legislature in List I, the Bombay
Act to the extent to which it trenched upon the subject
of item 19 of the latter List must, it was submitted,
be regarded as a nullity."
It will be seen that the rationale of the argument
there is the same as that of the argument advanced in
the present case, but it was rejected for reasons which
are clearly set out in the following passage_:"There is, in our view, no irreconcilable conflict here such as would
necessitate
recourse
of
Federal
supremacy
laid
to the principle
down in section 100 of the Constitution Act. Section 14-B does not purport to restrict or prohibit
dealings in liquor in respect of its importation or
exportation across the sea or land frontiers of British
India. It purports to deal with the possession of
intoxicating liquors which, in the absence of limiting
words, must include foreign liquors. It is far-fetched,
in our opinion, to suggest that, in so far as the provision covers foreign liquors, it is legislation with
respect to import of liquors into British India by sea
or land".
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
Since the enactment of the Government of India Act,
1935, there have been several cases in which the
principles which govern the interpretation of the Legislative Lists have been laid down. One of these principles is that none of the items in each List is to be read
in a narrow or restricted sense(1). The second principle
is that where there is a seeming conflict between an
entry in List II and an entry in List I, an attempt
should be made to see whether the two entries cannot
be reconciled so as to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction.
This principle has been stressed in a number of cases
by the Federal Court as well as by the Privy Council.
In re The Central PrOtlinces and Berar Act No. XIV
-0/ 1938(2), the question arose as to whether a tax on
the sale of motor spirits was a tax on the sale of goods
within entry 48 of the Provincial List or a duty of
excise within entry 45 of the Federal list. Dealing
with the difficulty which arose in that case, Gwyer C. J.
observed as follows :"Only in the Indian Constitution Act can the particular problem arise which is now under consideration;
and an endeavour must be made to solve it, as the
Judicial Committee have said, by having recourse to
the context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation
attempted between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and by
interpreting, and, where neceessary, 'modifying, the
language of the one by that of the other. If indeed
such a reconciliation should prove impossible, then,
and only then, will the non-obstante clause operate and
the federal power prevail; for the clause ought to be
regarded as a last · resource, a witness to the imperfections of human expression and the fallibility of legal
craftsmanship."
To the same effect are the following observations
made by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras(3),
( 1) Vide United Provinces v. Atiqa
Begum, [1940) F. C. R. 110
at 134.
( 2} [1939) F.C.R. 18.
(3) fl935] F.C.R. 179 at H!l.
1951
The State qf
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Ea.ti Alj J.
694
1951
Thi Stale qf
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fazl Ali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
after referring to section 100 of the Government
India Act, 1935 :-
of
"Their Lordships do not doubt that the effect of
these words is that, if the legislative powers of. the
Federal and Provincial Legislatures, which are enumerated in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule,
cannot fairly be reconciled, the latter must givJ: way
to the former. But it appears to them that it is right
first to consider whether a fair reconciliation cannot be
effected by giving to the language of the Federal
Legislative List a meaning which, if less wide than it
might in another context bear; is yet one that can properly be given to it, and equally giving to the language
of the provincial Legislative List a meaning which it
can properly bear." In the present case, as already
pointed out, the words "possession and sale" occurring in entry 31 of List II are to be read without any
qualification whatsover, and it will not be doing any
violence to the construction of that entry to hold that
the Provincial Legislature has the power to prohibit
the possession, use and sale of intoxicating liquor
absolutely. If we forget for the time being the. principles which have been laid down in some of the
American cases, it would be difficult to hold that the
word 'import' standing by itself will include either
sale or possession of the article imported into the
country by a person residing in the territory in which
it is "imported. There is thus no real conflict between
entry 31 of List II and entry 19 of List I, and I find
it difficult to hold that the Bombay Prohibition Act in
so far as it purports to restrict possession, use and sale
of foreign liquor, is an encroachment on the field
assigned to the Federal Legislature under entry 19 of
List I.
There is also another way of dealing with the contention raised before us. It is well settled that the
validity of an Act is not affected if it incidentally
trenches· on matters outside the authorised field, and
therefore, it is necessary to inquire in each case what is
the pith and substance of the Act impugned. If the
Act, when so viewed, substantially falls within the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
powers expressly conferred upon the Legislature which
enacted it, then it cannot be held to be invalid, merely
because it incidentally encroaches on matters which
have been assigned to another l~gislature. This was
emphasised very clearly in Gallagher v. Lynn(1) in these
words:"It is well established that you are to look at the
"true nature and character of the legislation : Russell
v. the Queen(2) 'the. pith and substance of the legislation'. If, on the view of the statute as a whole, you
find that the substance of the legislation is within the
express powers, then it is not invalidated if incidentally
it affects matters which are outside the authorised
field".
In Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee and Others v. Bank
of Commerce, Ltd., Khulna(8) the question arose before
the Privy Council whether the Bengal Money-lenders
Act, 1940, which provided that no borrower shall be
liable to pay after the commencement of the Act more
than a limited sum in respect of 'principal and interest,
WM intra vires the Provincial Legislature as dealing in
pith and substance with money-lending and moneylenders, a subject-matter within the competence of the
Provincial Legislature under entry 27 of List II, or
whether it trenched on "promissory notes" and
"banking'', which were subjects reserved for the
Federal Legislature under entries 28 and 38 respectively
of List I. The Privy Council, notwithstanding the
fact that loans. on promissory notes would also have
been subject to the provisions of the impugned Act,
held that the Act was valid, and while rejecting the
argument . that it was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature which had enacted
it, their Lordships observed as follows :-
"As Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. said in the Subrahmanyam Chettiar case: "It must inevitably happen
from time to time that legislation, though purporting
to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a
( 1)
( 2)
[1937] A.e. 863 at 870.
7A.C. 829.
(a) [1947] F.C.R. 28.
,
1951
The State qf'
Bombay
and &iolhn
v.
F. N. BalstZl'a•.
Fa(l AU J.
696
195!
Th•Statt of
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fa:! Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
subject in another list, and the different provisions of
the enactment may be so closely inter-twined that blind
observance to a strictly verbal interpretation would
result in a large number of statutes being declared
invalid because the legislature enacting them may
appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence
the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial
Committee, whereby the impugned statute is examined
to ascertain its 'pith and substance', or its 'true
nature and character', for the purpose of determining
whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this
list or in that". Their Lordships agree that this
passage correctly describes the grounds on which the
rule is founded, and that it applies to Indian as well
as to Dominion legislation"(').
The same principle was reiterated by the Federal
Court in Ralla Ram v. The Province of East Punjab(2)
and was also referred to in Miss Kishori Shetty v. The
King( 3 ) in the following passage :"It may be that a general adoption of the policy
of prohibition by the Provinces will lead to a fall in
the import of foreign liquors and to a consequential
diminution of the Central customs revenue, but where
the Constitution Act has given to the Provinces legislative power with respect to a certain matter in clear
and unambiguous terms, the Court should not deny it
to them or impose limitations on its exercise, on such
extraneous consideration. It is now well settled that
if an enactment according to its true nature, its pith
and substance, clearly falls within one of. the matters
assigned to the Provincial Legislature, it is valid notwithstanding its incidental encroachment on a Federal
subject."
The short question therefore to be asked is whether
the inipugned Act is in pith and substance a law
relating to possession and sale etc. of intoxicating
liquors or whether it relates to impon and export of
intoxicating liquors. If the true nature and character
(') [1947] F.C.R. at p. 51.
(3 ) [1949] F.C.R. 650 at 655.
(•) [1948] F.R.C. 207 at 225.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
of the legislation or its pith and substance is not
import and export of intoxicating liquor but its s:ile
and possession etc., then it is very difficult to dechre
the Act to be invalid. It is said that the prohibition
of purchase, use, possession, transport and sale of
liquor will affect its import. Even assuming that such
a result may follow; the encroachment, if any, is only
incidental and cannot affect the competence of the
Provincial Legislature to enact the law in question.
On these considerations, there is really nothing else to
be said on the question befoo:: us, but in view of the
very great stress laid upon the American doctrine of
"original package", it seems necessary to deal with what
that doctrine means and under what conditions it was
evolved. The wide meaning of 'import' on which reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner was
adopted for the first time by Marshall C. J. in BrQwn
v. Maryland(1), in which the facts were these. The
State of Maryland had passed an Act prohibiting
importers of foreign goods from selling their goods
without .taking a license for which a certain amount
had to be paid. The question which was raised in that
case was that the Act was repugnant to the provisions
of the Constitution which provided that "no State
shall without the consent of Congress allow any imposts
or duties on imports or exports except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."
In the course of his judgment, Marshall C. J. observed
inter alia as follows :"There is no difference, in effect, between a power
to prohibit the sale of an article and .a power to prohibit its introduction into the country. The one would
be a necessary consequence of the other. No goods
would be imported if none could be sold. No object
of any description can be accomplished by laying a
duty on importation, which may not be accomplished
with equal certainty by laying a duty on the thing
·imported in the hands of the importer." (2)
The learned Chief-Justice further observed :(1) (1827) 25 U.S. 419.
(2) (1827) 25 U.S. at p. 439·
1951
The State qf
Bombay
antf Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
F;:lll Ali J.
698
1951
'The Stat• qf
Bombay
and Anotlt1r
v•
..F. N. Balsara.
.Fazl Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
"Sale is the object of importation, and is an
essential ingredient of that intercourse, of which importation constitutes a part. It is as essential an
ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of the
entire thing, then as importation itself. It must be
considered as a component part of the power to regulate
commerce. Congress has a right, not only to authorise
importation, but to authorise the importer to sell."(')
Upon principles so stated, what is known as the
"original package" doctrine was evolved in America,
which was applied not only to commodities imp0rted
from foreign countries but also to commodities ,which
were the subject of inter-state commerce. This doctrine
laid down that importation was not over so long as
the goods were in the original package and hence a
State. had no power to tax imports until the original
package was broken or there was one sale while the
goods were still in the original package. The principle
upon which this doctrine was founded is explained by
Marshall C. J. in the case referred to in these words :"There must be a point of time when the prohibition ceases, and the power of the State to tax commences; we cannot admit that this point of time is
the instant that the articles enter the country .... It is
sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when
the importer has so acted upon the th:ing imported that
it has become incorporated and mixed up with the
mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost
its distinctive character as an import, and has become
.imbject to the taxing power of the State ; but while
remaining the property of the importer, in his ware.house, in the original form of package in which it was
imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports
to escape the prohibition in the Constitution."( 2 )
The doctrine was reiterated in a number of cases,
=d in Leisy v. Hardin( 8 ), it was laid down that "the
importers had the right to sell in the original packages
unopened and unbroken, articles brought into the
(') (1827) 25 U.S. at p. 447.
{') (1827) 25 U.S. at p. 441.
( 8)
135 U.S. 100.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
6'»
State from another State or territory notwithstanding
a starute of the State prohibiting the sale of such
articles except for purposes mentioned therein and
under a license from the State". The American writers
have however pointed out the difficulty which arose
from time to· time in apply_ing the "original package" doctrine, since sometimes very intricate questions arose
before the courts, such as whether the d9Ctrine applied
to the larger cases only or to _the smaller packages contained therein, or whether it applied to SJ:!laller paper
packages of cigarettes taken from loose piles of packages at the factory and transported in baskets. The
difficulty in applying the doctrine was particularly
experienced in working prohibition schemes, :md to
combat its mischief and uncertainty, new legislative
measures had to be passed by the Congress like the
Wilson Act, Webb-Kenyon Act, etc. I do not wish to
pursue the matter, but wish only to point out that the
doctrine has no plac~ in this country, having regard to
the scheme of legislation that has been outlined in the
· Government of India Act, 1935, and in the present
Constirution, in which the various entries in the Legislative Lists have been expressed in cleat and precise
language. In The Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons(1), Gwyer C.J., while expressing hjs
profound respect for the views expressed by Marshall C.J. in Brown v. Maryland( 2 ), mildly hinted that
it was easier to follow the line of reasoning of Thompson J. in his dissenting judgment in that case and
concluded with the following remarks :"Next, it is to be observed that the American
Constitution also provides that Congress alone has
power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States and with the Indian tribes",
and it was held that the Maryland tax was no less
repugnant to this provision also. Marshal C. J. asked:
"To what purposes should the power to allow importation be given, unaccompanied with the power to
authorise the sale of the thing importtd? Congress
has a right, pot only to authorise importation, but to
( 1) [1942] F.C.R. 90.
( 1)
(1827) 25 U.S. 419.
1951
T/al Stt111 ef
Bomba,
and Ar11111ttr
v.
F. N. BabaTo.
Fa~l Ali].
700
!95(
The State ef
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fat/AU].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1951 J
authorize the importer to sell. . . . )\'hat does the importer
purchase, if he does not purchase the privilege to sell?"
On this view of the Commerce Clause, it would indeed
be difficult to recognize the right of the State to impose
a tax upon the first sale of the commodity, at any rate
so long as it remained. in tl)e importer's hands. In the
Indian Constitu~ion Act no such question arises; and
the right of the Provincial Legislature to· levy a tax
on sales can be considered without any reference to so
formidable a power vested in the Central Government.
Lastly, the prohibition in the American Constitution
is against the laying of "any imposts or duties on
imports _or exports" the prohibition is not merely
against the laying of du.ties of customs, but is expressed
in what we conceive to be far wider terms; and it does
not appear to us that it would necessarily follow from
the principle of the Maryland decision that in India
the payment of customs duty on goods imported from
abroad or the payment of an excise duty on goods
manufactured or produced in India can be regarded
as conferring some kind of license or title on the
importer or manufacturer to sell his goods to any purchaser without incurring a further liability to tax.
That was the view which commended itself to the
Court in the Maryland Case(') and it was a view adopted
and argued before us. The analogy with the American
case is an attractive one, but for the reasons which
we have given we are wholly unable to accept it."(2)
I find considerable force in the opinion thus expressed
by Gwyer C.J. and agree that the "original package"
doctrine has no application to this country. In the
United States, the widest meaning could be given to
the Commerce Clause, for there Was not question of
reconciling that Clause with another Clause containing
the legislative povu:r of the State. Under the provisions
of the Government of India Act, a limited meaning
must be given to the word "import" in entry 19 of
List I in order to . give effect to the very general words;
used in entry 31 of List II.
(') (1827) 25 u. s. 419.
(') [1942] F.C.R. 90 at 106-7.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
701
The second attack on the Act is founded upon the
provision contained in section 297 (1) (a) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and it is contended that the
prohibitions contained in the impugned Act in regard
to the use, consumption, purchase, transport, possession and sale of intoxicating liquor will necessarily
amount to prohibiting and restricting inter-provincial
commerce, and inasmuch as they tend to stop and
restrict entry into or export from the Province of
Bombay of goods of a particular class or description,
the Act contravenes section 297 (1) (a). This section
runs as follows :"No
shall-
Provincial
Legislature
or
Government
(a) by virtue of the entry in the Provincial Legislative List relating to trade and commerce within the
Province, or the entry in that List relating to the production, supply and distribution of commodities, have
power to pass any law or take any executive action
prohibiting or restricting the entry into, or export
from the Province of goods of any class or . description .... "
It should be noticed that tliis provlSton refers to
"trade and commerce within the Province", which is
the subject of entry 27 of List II and to "production,
supply and distribution of commodities", which is
the subject of entry 29 of List II. The provision
virtually means that import into or export from a
Province of goods of any class or description cannot
be prohibited or restricted on the ground that it will
affect, trade and commerce within the Province or
the production, supply and distribution of commodities. If therefore by any law framed by a Provincial
Legislature relating to or based on the subjects of
entry 27 or entry 29 of List II, the entry into or export
from the Province of any goods is prohibited or restricted, such a law will be invalid. But, here, we are
concerned not with a law which purports to be made
and was made by virtue of entry 27 or entty 29 of
List II, but a law which is claimed to have been made
4-4 S.C. lndia/68
1951
The State qf
Bombll!
and Anotlur
v.
F. N. Balsara,
Fad Ali J.
702
1951
TMS1ate of
Bomba,
a1ld Anoth"
v.
F. N. Bal•ara.
Fad Ali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
and was made by virtue of entry 31 of that List and
certain other entries therein. Section 297(1) (a) therefore has no application to the present case. This was
clearly pointed out in the case of Bhola Prasad v. King
Emperor('). In that case, the Bihar Excise (Amendment) Act, 1940, which amended the Bihar and Orissa
Excise Act, 1915, was challenged as contravening
section 297 (1) (a), but it was held to be a valid Act
on grounds already stated, as will appear from · the
following observations of Gwyer C. J. :"The second point raised on behalf of the appelh,nt was that s. 19 ( 4) of the Act. of 1915, as amended
by the Act .of 1940, is invalid because repugnant to
s. 297 (1) (a) of the Constitution Act. We confess that
we have difficulty in appreciating thjs argument.
Section 297 (1) (a) enacts that .... It is plain beyond
words that this provision only refers to legislation
with respect to entry No. 27 and entry NQ. 29 in the
Provincial Legislative I..ist ; it has no application · to
legislation with respect to anything in entry No. 31.
A Provincial Legislaure, if it desires to pass a law
prohibiting export from, or import into, the Province,
must therefore seek for legislative authority to do so
in entries other than entry No. 27 or entry No. 29. If
it can point to legislative pmvers for· the purpose
derived from any other entry in the Provincial Legislative List, then its legislation cannot be challenged
under section 297 (1) (a). There is no substance at all
in the appellant's arguments on this point"(").
Having dealt with and negatived the first two contentiOJll upon which the validity of the entire Act was
assailed, I now proceed to.., deal with certain sections of
the Act, the validity of which also was brooght into
question. The provision which was most vigorously
assailed and in regard to which the attack was successful in the High C<iurt, is the definition of the: word
'liquor' _in section 2 (24) of the Act. The definition
runs thus:"Liquor" includet(1) [1942] F.C.R. 17 at 21.
{ 1) [1942] F.C.R.. 17 at 27. 28.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
703
(a) spirits of wine, methylated spmts, wine, beer,
toddy and all liquids consisting of or containing
alcohol; and
(b) any other intoxicating substance which the
Provincial Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, declare to be liquor for the purposes of
this Act.
The High Court has held that the word "liquor" ordinarily means 'a strong drink as opposed to soft drink"
but .it must in any event be a beverage which is ordinarily drunk. Proceeding upon this view, the High
Cou'rt has held that although the legislature may while
legislating under entry 31 prevent the consumption of
non-intoxicating beverages and also prevent the use
as drinks of alcoholic liquids which are not normally
consumed as drinks, it cannot prevent the legitimate
use of alcoholic preparations which are not beverages
nor the use of medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. This view of the High Court was very
strongly supported on the one hand and equally
strongly challenged on the other before us, and I ther~
fore proceed to deal with the question at some length.
In the Oxford English Dictionary, edited by James
Murry, several meanings are given to the word
"liquor", of which the following may be quoted :LIQUOR .... 1. A liquid; matter in a liquid state; in
wider sense a fluid.
2. A liquid or a prepared solution used as a wash
or bath, and in niany processes in the industrial arts.
3. Liquid for drinking; beverage, drink. Now
almost exclusively a drink produced by fermentation
or distillation. Malt liquor, liquor brewed from malt;
ale, beer, porter etc.
4. The water in which meat has been boiled;
broth, sauce; the fat in which bacon, fish or the like
has been fried; the liquid contained in oysters.
5. The liquid produced by infusion (in testing the
quality of a tea). In liquor, in the state of an infusion.
195!
The State qf
Bombay
and Anothlr
v.
F. N. Bals~ra.
Faz/ Ali J.
704
195!
The Stale ef
Bombay.
anti Another
v.
F. N. Balsa.a.
Fazl Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951J
Thus, according to th: Dictionary, the word 'liquor'
may have a general meaning in the sense of a liquid,
or it may have a special meaning, which is the third
meaning assigned to it in the extract quoted above,
viz., a drink or beverage produced by fermentation or
distillation. The latter is undoubtedly the popular and
most widely accepted meaning, and the basic idea of
beverage seems rather prominently to run through the
main provisions of the various Acts of this country as
well as of America and England relating to intoxicating liquor, to which our attention was drawn- But
at the same time, on a reference to these very Acts, it
is difliculty to hold that they deal exclusively .... with
beverages and are not applicable to certain articles
which are strictly speaking not beverages. A few instances will make the point clear. In the National
Prohibition Act, 1919, of America (also known as the
Volstead Act), the words, liquor and intoxicating
liquor, are used as having the same meaning and the
definition states that these words shall be construed to
"include alcohol, brandy, whisky, rum, gin, beer, ale,
porter and wine, and in addition thereto any spirituous,
vinous malt, or fermented liquor, liquids, and compounds, whether medicated, proprietary, patented or
not, and by whatever name called, containing one-half
of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume which
are fit for use for beverage purposes." Having defined
'liquor' and 'intoxicating liquor' rather widely, the
Volstead Act excepted denatured alcohol, medicinal
preparations,
toilet
and
antiseptic
preparations,
flavoring extracts and sirups, vinegar and preserved
sweet cider (s. 4) which suggest that they were included in the definition. In some of these items, we
have the qualifying words "unfit for use for beverage
purposes'', but the heading of section 4 of the Volstead
Act, under which these exceptions are enumerated, is
exempted liquors."
The Licensing (Consolidating) Act, 1910, of England
was an Act relating to licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquor, etc. · The definition of "intoxicating
liquor" ·in this Act was as follows :-
t
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
" 'Intoxicating liquor' mean& (unless inconsistent
with the context) spirits, wine, bear, porter, cider,
perry and sweets, and any fermented, distilled, or
spirituous liquor which cannot, according to any law
for the time being in force, be legally sold without an
excise licence."
The word "spirits" has been defined in the Spirits
Act, 1880, as meaning spirits of any . description, and
includes all liquors mixed with spirits, and all mixtures, compounds, or preparations made with spirits."
It was contended before us that the definition of the
word "spirits" in the Spirits Act should not be imported in the Act of 1910, but in our view for the purpose of understanding the definition of 'intoxicating
liquor', the two Acts should be read together. I do
not suggest that the definition of "liquor" in the present Act was borrowed from those Acts, but I am only
trying to show that the word 'liquor' is capable of being
used in a wide sense.
Coming now to the various definitions given in the
Indian Acts, I may refer in the first instance to the
Bombay Abkari A!_:t of 1878 as amended by subsequent Acts, where the definition is substantially the
same as in the Act with which we are concerned. In the
Bengal Excise Act, 1909, "liquor" is said to mean
'liquid consisting of or con~aining alcohol' and includes
spirits of wine, spirit, wine, tari pachwai, beer, and
any substance which the Provincial Government may
.... declare to be liquor for the purposes of the Act."
In several other Provincial Acts, e.g., the Punjab
Excise Act, 1914, the U.P. Excise Act, 1910, "liquor"
is used as meaning intoxicating liquor and as including
all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol. The
definition of "liquor" in the Madras Abkari Act, 1886,
is the same as in the Bombay Act of 1878. Even if
we exclude the American and English Acts from our
consideration, we ·find that all the Provincial Acts of
this country have consistently included liquids containing alcohol ·in the definition of 'liquor' and
'intoxicating liquor'. The framers of the Government
of India Act, 1935, could not have been entirely
1951
The State qf
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Faz:./ Ali J.
706
1951
The Stalt of
Bom&q,
an4 Anotht1
v.
P. N. Bals.,a.
Pa:l Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951}
ignorant of the accepted sense in which the word
'liquor' has been used in the various excise Acts of this
country an.d, accordingly I consider the appropri~.te
conclusion to be that the word "liquor" covers
not only those
alcoholic
liquids
which
are
generally used for beverage purposes and produce
intoxication, but also all liquids containing alce>hol. It may be that the latter meaning is not the
meaning which is attributed to the word "liquor" in
common parlance especially when that word is prefixed
by the qualifying word "intoxicating", but in my
opinion having regard to the numerous staturory definitions of that word, such a meaning could not have
been intended to be excluded from the scope of the
term "intoxicating liquor" as used in entry 31 of
List II.
There is in my opinion another method of approaching the question which also deserves consideration. Remembering that the object of the Prohibition Act was
not merely to levy excise duties but also to prohibit
use, consumption, possession and sale of intoxicating
liquor, the legislature had the power to legislate upon
the subjects included in the Act not .only under
entry 31 of Lilt II, but also under entry 14, which
refers inter alia to public health. Article 47 of the
Constitution, which contains one of the directive principles of State policy, provides that "the State shall
regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the
standard of living of its people and the improvement
of public health as among its primary duties and, in
particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about
prohibition of the consumption, except for medicinal
purposes, of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which
are injurious to health". This article has no direct
bearing on the Act which was passed in 1949, but a
reference to it supports to some extent the conclusion
that the idea of prohibition is connected with public
health, and to enforce prohibition effectively the wider
definition of the word "liquor" would have to be
adopted so as to include all alcoholic liquids which
may be used as substitutes for intoxicating drinks, to
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
707
the detriment of health. On the whole, I am unable
to agree with the High 0urt's finding, and hold that
the definition of "liquor" in the Bombay Prohibition
Act is not ultra vires.
The learned Attorney-General also relied upon entry
1 of List II which relates among other items to "public
order", and though .at first. sight it may appear to be
far-fetched to bring the subject of intoxicating liquor
under "public order", yet it should be noted that there
has been a tendency in Europe and America to regard
alcoholism as a menace to public order. In Russel v.
The Queen(1), Sir Montague Smith held that the Canada
Temperance Act, 1878, the object and scope of which
was to promote temperance by means of a uniform law
throughout the Dominion, was a law relating to the
"peace, order, and good government" of Canada, and
in so deciding said as follows :"Laws of this nature designed for the promotion of
public order, safety, or morals and which subject those
who contravene them to criminal procedure and punishment, belong to the subject of public wrongs rather
than to that of civil rights. They are of a nature which
falls within the general authority · of Parliament to
make laws for the order and good government of
Canada .... "(2)
Again, referring to liquor laws and liquor control, a.
learned British author(3) says as follows :"The dominant motive everywhere, however, has
been a social one, to combat a menace to public order
and the increasing evils of alcoholism in the interests
of health and social welfare. The evils vary greatly
from one country to another according to differences· in
climate, diet, economic conditions and even within the
same countr}" according to differences in habits, social
customs and standards of public morality. A new factor
of growing importance since the middle of the 19th
( 1)
7 A. C. 829.
(2) 7 A. C. 829 at p. 839.
3
( )
The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th Edition, Volume 14,
page 191.
1951
The State qf
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Faz/ Ali j.
708
!951
The State ef
Bombay
and Another
v.
F.iJI. Balsata.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
century has been the rapid urbanisation, industrialization and mechanization of our modern every day life
in the leading nations of the world, and the consequent
wider recognition of the advantages of sobriety in
safeguarding public order and physical efficiency."
Fa.ti Ali J.
These passages may lend some support to the contention of the learned Attorney-General that tile Act
comes also within the subject of "public order'', but I
prefer to leave out of account th~ entry, which has a
remote bearing, if any, on the object and scope of the
present Act.
1 now come to section 39 of the Act which has been
impugned on the ground that it offends against article
14 of the Constitution which states that "the State shall
not deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India". The meaning and scope of this article has been
fully discussed in the case of Chiraniit Lal Chowdhury
v. The Uhion of India and others('), and the principles
laid down in that case may be summarized as follows :
(1) The presumption is always in favour of the
constitutionality of an enactment, since it must be
assumed that the legislature understands and correctly
appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws
are directed to problems ' made manifest by experience
and its discriminations are based on adequate grollnds.
(2) The presumption i;nay be rebutted in certain
cases by showing that on the face of the statute, there
is no classification ~t all and no difference peculiar to
any individual or class and not applicable to any other
individual or class, af\d yet the law hits only a particular individual or class.
(3) The principle of equality does not mean that
every law must have universal application for all i>ersons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, and the varying needs of
different classes of persons often require separate
treatment.
(') [t950J s.a.R. 869.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
7!'E
( 4) The principle does not take away from the State
the power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes.
(5) Every classification is in some degree likely to
produce some inequality, and mere production of
inequality is not enough.
(6) If a law de~ls equally with ~embers of a welldefined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to
the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground
that it has no application to other persons.
(7) While reasonable classification is permissible,
such classification must be based upon some real and
substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just
relation to the object sought to be attained, and the
classification cannot be made arbitrarily and without
any substantial basis.
Similarly, Professor Willis, dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, which guarantees equal protection of the laws,
sums up. the law ·as prevailing in that country in these
words :
"The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
means the protection of equal laws. It forbids class
legislation, but does not forbid classification which
rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction. It does
not prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. 'It. merely requires that all
persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated
alike under like circumstances and conditions both iu
the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed'.
'The inhibition of the amendment .... was designed to
prevent any person or class of persons from being
singled out as a special subject for discriminating and
hostile legislation.' It doc:; not take from the states
the power to classify either in the adoption of police
laws or tax laws, or eminent domain laws, but permits to them the exercise of a wide scope of discretion,
and nullifies what they do only when it is without any
perfect
reasonable ba,sis. Mathematical nicety and
equality are not required. Similarity, not identity of
1951
The State of
Bombay
and Another
y.
F. N. Balsara.
Faz/ Ali J.
710
1951
The State ef
Bomf>ay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fa<I All J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951}
treatment, is enough. If any state. of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain a classification, the existence of that state of facts must be assumed. One who·
assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis."('}
With these principles in view, I have to decide
whether article 14 of the Constitution has been violated
by the provisions contained in section 39 of the A~t
before us. That sectiofl runs as follows :"The Provincial Government may, on such conditions as may be specified in the notification published
in the Official Gazette, permit the use or consumption
of foreign liquor on cargo boats, warships and troopships and in military and naval messes and canteens."
What is contended is that the concession shown ta
the warships, troopship, and military and naval messes
and canteens is a violation of the principle• of equality
and the legislature has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in selecting certain bodies or 'groups of people
for favoured treatment, while subjecting the petitioner
m~d other citizens to the general provisions of the Act.
It is said that the law should have been enforced alike
against the civil population and military personnel,
between whom no distinction can be made at all on
any rational ground in the enforcement of the policy
of prohibition.
The scheme of Chapter IV of the Prohibition Act, in
which the impugned provision finds a place, seems
inter alia to relax the law in favour of certain persons
or groups of persons or institutions by introducing the
system of passes, licences, permits and authorizations.
A few examples will show that the legislature did not
proceed without making any classification.
For
instance, section 35 deals with licences to hotels, section 37 with licences to dining cars and coastal steamers,
section 38 with liceaces to shipping companies, section 40 with permits to foreigners and · persons who·
need liquor on grounds of health, section 41 with
permits to foreign sovereigns and diplomats, section 44
( ') Constitutional Law; by Prof. Willis, (1st Edition) p. 578.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
with licences to clubs, section 45 with authorisations for
sacramental purposes, section 46 with visitors' permits,
and so on,. These sections were not challenged before
us, and it may be assumed that the classification made
by the legislature has been accepted so far as they are
concerned. The question is whether in relaxing the
rule in favour of warships, troopships, and military
and naval messes and canteens, the legislature has
acted arbitrarily and capriciously or it has proceeded
here also on the basis of reasonable classification. The
learned Attorney-General referred
us to
several
statutes, army regulations and certain prov151ons of
the Constitution, in order to show that the military
force has been regarded in this country as a class by
itself, and there are many special provisions with
regard to it. But it is contended that this is not
enough and that no classification can be held to be
valid unless it is shown to bear a just and reasonable
relation to the objects of the particular legislation
before us. The argument, in other words, is this :
Assuming that the armed forces may be treated as a
class for certain purposes, can it be treated as a class
for the purpose of enforcing prohibition? This argument found favour with the High Court, and section 39 was declared to be void. In my opinion, the
judgment of the High Court cannot be supported
because I think that ,there is an understandable basis
for the exemptions granted to the military canteens,
etc. by the Act. The armed forces have their own
traditions and mode of life, conditioned and regulated
by rules and regulations which are the product of long
experience and which aim at maintaining at a high
level their morale and those qualities which enable
them to face dangers and perform unusual tasks of
endurance and hardship when called l!pon to do soqualitie~ such as dash and courage,
unbreakable
tenacity and energy ready for any sacrifice which
should .be unfaltering for long days together. By these
rules and regulations, drinking among the forces is not
prohibited, but it is properly and carefully regulated.
1951
The state ef
Bomb~
Gnd Anof/ur
v;
F.N. Balstll'll.
Fail Ali J.
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
195]
It is easy to understand that the legislature chose not
.Tht State ef
to interfere with the mode of life to which the forces
have been accustomed, lest such interference should
affect their morale and lead to subterfuges which
may prove unwholesome for their discipline and good
behaviour. Besides, when drinking is regulated among
a class of persons by specific rules and regulations and
drunkenness is made an offence, the relaxation of the
law of prohibition in their case is not likely to produce
the same evil results as it may produce under other
circumstances. I find therefore nothing wrong prima
facie in the legislature according special treatment to
persons who form a class by themselves in many respects and who have been treated as such in various
enactments and statutory provisions. In my opinion,
therefore, section 39, in so far as it affects the military
and naval messes and canteens, warships and troopships, cannot be held to be invalid. So far as the
cargoboats are concerned, it was contended on behalf
of the petitioner that no rational differentiation could
be made between them and the passenger boats, and
there was no conceivable ground for granting exemption or concession of any kind to the former. Here
again, we cannot assume that the legislature has proceeded arbitrarily. The cargoboats being slower
boats have to be on the sea for long periods, the
number of persons affected by the exemption is comparatively small, and they are mostly sojourners who
stay at the port for a short time and then go away.
These cos:iderations may well have induced the legislature to show some concession to them, and we
cannot say that these are irrelevant considerations.
The provision relating to exemption of cargoboats
should therefore be held to be valid.
Bombay
anJ .Another
v.
11. N. Balsaro.
Fazl .Ali].
I have already referred to section 46 which deals
with visitors' permits. That section provides that the
Provincial Government may authorize an officer to
grant visitors' permits to consume, use and buy foreign
liquor to persons who visit the Province for a period of
not more than a week. The High Court held this pr<>vision to be valid, but it considered rule 67 of the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
Bombay Foreign Liquor Rules, framed under section 143 of the Act, to be invalid. That rule provides
that any foreigner on a tour of India who enters the
State of Bombay and desires to possess, use and consume foreign liquoF shall apply to certain officers for
obtaining a permit, which may be granted for a period
not exceeding one month subject to subsequent renewal. The High Court declared this rule to be invalid
on th<1 ground that it discriminated between foreign
visitors and Indian visit<m who visit Bombay from
neighbouring Provinces. It seems to me that this is
hardly a matter which should have been gone into on
the petitioner's application, since he claims to be
neither a foreigner nor an Indian visitor from another
Province. But in any event, the rule cannot be
assailed on the ground of discrimination, firstly
because though it provides for the case of a foreign
visitor there is no prohibition against any other outsider being granted a permit, and secondly, because
the policy underlying the rule is quite consistent with
the policy underlying section 40 of the Act which
enables permits to be granted to foreigners under
certain conditions.
The High Court has also declared sections 52, 53
and 139(c) of the Act invalid on the ground that they
constitute "delegation of legislative power". The
reasons given by the High Court for arriving at this.
conclusion are stated in its judgment as follows :"Under section 52 power is given to the Government to grant licences in cases other than those
specifically provided under any of the provisions of
the Act. Under section 53 Government is inter a/,ia
empowered to vary or substitute any of the conditions
of the licence laid down in the Act, and under section 139 ( c) power is given to Government to exempt
any person or institution of any class of persons or
institutions from the observance of all or any of the
provisions of the Act or any rule or regulation or order
made thereunder. The policy of legislation has been
clearly laid down by the legislature in the Act itself.
As pointed out bv us before. the legislature intended
!95I
The State qf
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fazl Ali J.
714
J95J
·The Slate ef
Bombay
and A.noth1r
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fa:! Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951]
to grant permits ordinarily only on grounds of health
and certain exceptions were made in the case of certain
classes. It is always open to the legislature to leave
it to the Government to work out the policy in details.
It would be impossible for the legislature to provide
for all circumstances and all eventualities that may
arise in the actual working of the Act. But it is not
open to the legislature to permit Government to alter
In our opinion, in leaving it to
the policy itself.
Government to issue permits in cases other than those
provided for by the Act, . in permitting Government to
vary or substitute conditions of the licence, and in
permitting Government to exempt persons or classes
from the provisions of the Act, the legislature was
-clearly delegating to Government its own power of
legislation. This it can clearly not do."
This Court had to consider quite recently the
9uestion as to how far "delega~ed legislation"
JS
permissible, and a reference to 1ts final conclusion will show that delegation of the character
which these sections involve cannot on any view be
held to be invalid. (See Special Reference No. 1 of
1951 : In re The Delfti Laws Act, 1912, etc. (') ). A legislature while legislating cannot foresee and provide for
all future contingencies, and section 52 does no more
than enable the duly authorized officer to meet, contingencies and deal with various situations as they
arise. The same considerations will apply to sections 53 and 139 ( c). The matter however need not
be pursued further, as it has already been dealt with
elaborately in the case referred to.
I now proceed to deal with a group of sections in
l'egard to which I find myself in agreement up to a
point with the views expressed by the High Court.
Section 12 of the Act provides inter alia that no person
shall possess or sell or buy liquor and section 13 provides inter alia that no person shall consume or use
liquor. Substituting for the word "liquor" occurring
in these two sections the definition . of that word as
given in clause (a) of section 2 (24) of the Act, the
effect of these two sections is that no person shall
(') Reported infra.
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
715
possess, or sell or buy or consume or use "s,pirits of
wine, methylated spirit, wine, beer, toddy and all
liquids consisting of or containing alcohol." I have
already held that under · entry 51 of List II, the Bombay Legislature was quite competent to make a law
with respect to "liquor" even as broadly defined. It
is however contende<l that the power of making laws
has to be exercised subject to the other provisions of
the Constitution and in particular to those relating to
the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of
the Constitution.. The provisions to which I have
referred have been assailed on the ground that they
are in conflict with article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution
-which guarantees that all the citizens shall have the
right "to acquire, hold and dispose of property". This
clause is wide enough to include movable as well as
immovable property. The provisions in question un.doubtedly prevent a citizen from possessing, selling,
buying, consuming or using "liquor" as defined, and
therefore they prima facie infringe the fundamental
right of the Indian citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of a kind of property, namely, "liquor" as defined
in section 2 (24) of the Act, and as such would be void
under article 13. The question_ to be considered is
whether they can be saved by clause (5) of article 19,
which runs as follows :"Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said
-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in
so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making
any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said subclauses either in the interests of the general public or
for the protection of the interests of any scheduled
tribe."
The question boils down to ascertaining whether the
restrictions imposed by the provisions to which reference has been made are reasonable. In judging the
reasonableness of the restrictions · imposed by the Act,
one has to bear in mind the directive principles of
State policy set forth in article 47 of the Constitution,
"The State is charged with the duty of bringing about
1951
Th1Stat1 qf
BombIf!
and.41111thn
v.
F. N. Baltar1J,
Fat.I Ali J.
716
1951
TheState qf
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fatl Ali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
prohibition of the consumption, except for medical purposes, of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are
injurious to health." That the restrictions imposed by
the sections on the right of a citizen to possess, or sell
or buy or consume or use spirits of wine, methylated
spirits, wine, beer, toddy are in view of the aforesaid
directive principles of State policy quite reasonable,
has not been disputed before us. The controversy has
centred round the words "and all liquids consisting
of or containing alcohol." It is said that those words
include "all liquids, toilet or medicinal preparations
containing alcohol" and the restrictions imposed upon
the ordinary use of such toilet or medicinal preparations are unreasonable and therefore void. So far as
these preparations are concerned, the High Court has
dealt with the matter as follows :-
"To put it in a simple form, the question to
which we have to address ourselves is whether the
legislature can prohibit the legitimate use of an article which ordinarily is not drunk, merely because its
use may be perverted for the possible purpose of defeating or frustrating the objects and purposes of the
Prohibition Act. Let us take the concrete case of
eau-de-<:ologne or lavender water. Their legitimate use
is only for the purpose of toilet. They contain spirit
and it may be that an addict deprived of his drink
may drink it in order to satisfy his thirst. Is it permissible to the legislature under such circumstances
to deprive the general public of the legitimate use of
eau-de-cologne or lavender water as articles of toilet?
The legislature may prevent the abuse of these
articles, but can it prevent their legitimate use? It is
difficult to understand how any restriction on the
legitimate use of these articles can be in the interests
of the general public so as to make these restrictions
reasonable within the meaning of article 19(5). If a
citizen uses eau-de-cologne or lavender water for the
purpose of toilet, he is not doing anything against
public interest. It is only when he is preverting their
use· that it may be said that he is acting against public
interest. Therefore, in our opinion, while it was open
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
to the legislature to provide against the abuse of these
articles, it was not open to it to prevent its legitimate
use. But the legislature has totally prohibited the
use of possession of all liquids containing alcohol
except under permits to be granted by Government.
It is contended by the Advocate-General that a citizen
may possess eau-de-cologne or lavender water under ·a
permit. But that is a restriction upon the right of the
citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and,
in our opinion, that restriction is not reasonable. The
same argument applies to medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. Therefore we hold that to
the extent to which the Prohibition Act prevents the
possession, use and consumption of non-beverages and
medicinal and toilet preparations containing .alcohol
for legitimate purposes the provisions are void as
offending against article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution
even if they may be within the legislative competence
. of the Provincial Legislature."
The next step in the argument is that as the law
· purports to authorise the imposition of a restriction on
a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover
restrictions both within and without the limits of ~on
stitutionally permissible legislative action affecting
such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far
as it may be applied W!ithin the constitutional limits,
as it is not severable. This line of reasoning, no doubt,
seeks to find suppon from the observations made in
the majority decisions of this Court in Romesh T happar
v. The State of Madras(1) and in Chintaman Rao v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh(2), but in my opinion
those observations do not apply to the case before us.
It will be noticed that the legislature · has defined the
term "liquor" as including several distinct categories
of things followed by a general category. There can
be no doubt whatever· that the earlier categories of
liquor, namely, spirits of wine, methylated spirit, wine,
beer, toddy are _distinctly separable items which are
easily severable from the last category, namely, all
liquids consisting . of or containing alcohol. These
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 594.
5-4 S. C. India/68
( 2)
[1950J s.c.R. 759.
J 951
The State of
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fa{/ Ali J.
718
1951
The State of
Bombay
and Anotter
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fad Ali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1951 J
items being thus treated separately by the legislature
itself and being severable, and it not being contended,
in view of the directive principles of State policy
regarding prohibition, that the restrictions imposed
upon the right to possess or sell or buy or consume or
use those categories of properties are unreasonable, the
impugned sections must be held valid so far as these
categories are concerned. The next question is whether
those sections are void in so far as they purport to
impose restrictions on the 'citizens' right to acquire,
hold or dispose of all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol. It is said that this is one general item
and it cannot be split up into different sub-categories
and therefore the sections in so far as they relate to
this general item must be held to be void. This argument at first appears to have some force but a close
scrutiny will reveal that it is not in the circumstances
of this case sound. Section 139 of the Act authorises
the Provincial Government, by general or special order,
to exempt any intoxicants or class of intoxicants from
all or any of the provisions of the Act. An order made
by the Provincial Government in exercise of the power
conferred by this section owes its legal efficacy to this
section and therefore in the eye of the law the notification has the force of law as if made by the legislature itself. In exercise of powers vested in it by section 139(d) the Provincial Government issued an order
No. 10484/45(e) exempting intoxicants specified in
column 1 of the Schedule thereto annexed from the
provisions of the Act specified against them in column 2
of that Schedule. Turning to the Schedule, we find
that in item ( 1) duty-paid prefumed spirits (except
eau-de-cologne), in item (3) duty-paid spirituous toilet
preparations (except lavender water) and in item ( 4)
duty-paid spirituous medicinal preparaticns other than
123 specified liquids, are exempted from the operation
of sections 12(c) and (d) and 13(b) to the extent specified therein. This notification was superseded on the
1st April, 1950, by another notification which is more
liberal in certain respects, and these notifications, being
made in exercise of the power given by the Act itself
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
have undoubtedly the force of law and must be read
along with the Act. So read, it is quite clear that "all
liquids consisting of or containing alcohol" are capable
of being split up into and have in fact been split
up into several distinctly separate sub-items including
liquid toilet and medicinal preparations containing
alcohol. The legislature itself contemplated this
sub-division, for by section 139 it authorised the Provincial Government to exempt any intoxicant or class
of intoxicants from the operation of the Act. This circumstance takes the case out of the principles laid
down in the two cases mentioned above and the item
being thus severable I am free to consider whether the
restrictions imposed on a sub-itJem, namely, !liquid
· toilet and medicinal preparations containing alcohol,
are reasonable or not. I am substantially in agreement with the line of reasoning adopted by the High
Court and I consider that the Act is ·not a law impoing reasonable restrictions so far as medicinal and toilet
preparations containing alcohol are concerned. The
National Prohibition Act or the Volstead Act of
America, to which I have referred, was also an Act
relating to prohibition; but toilet and medicinal preparations containing alcohol were expressly excluded
from the scope of that Act. I refer to that Act simply
to show that a complete scheme of prohibition can be
worked without including such articles among those
prohibited. Again, article 47 of the Constitution also
takes note of the fact that medicinal preparations
should be excluded in the enforcement of prohibitio~.
I do not consider that it is reasonable that the possession, sale, purchase, consumption or use of medicinal
and toilet preparations should be prohibited merely
because there is a mere possibility of their being
misused by some perverted addicts.
It was contended that there was no meaning in
declaring the provisions relatbg to purchase, sale,
possession, use and consumption of medicinal and toilet
preparations containing alcohol to be invalid, since in
the Notification No. 10484/45, issued by the Provincial
1951
The State qf
Bombay
ant! Another
v.
F. N. Balsaro.
Fazl Ali J.
720
1951
ThtStatt of
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
Government on the lst April, which is no part of the
Act, the Government have exempted duty-paid perfumed spirits (including eau-de-cologne), duty-paid
spirituous toilet preparations and certain classes of
duty-paid spirituous medicinal preparations from the
following . provisions of the Act :-·
(i) Section 12 (c);
(ii) Section 12 (d), in so for as it relates to buying of such preparations;
(iii) Section 13 (b), in so far as it relates to use
of such preparations.
But it is to be noted that the sale of these articles is
not covered by the above notification, but is regulated
by two other notifications, namely, Notification
No. 2843/49, dated the 6th April, 1950, and Notification
No. 2843/49, dated the 11th April, 1950. In these two
Notifications, there are provisions imposing limits on
sales. For example, in the first notificaµon issued on
the 6th April, rule 10( l) provides as follows :"The licensee shall not sell to any person on any one
day any. kind of · perfumed spirits, .spirituous toilet
preparations or .essences in excess of such quantity· as
may be prescribed by the COmmissioner under the
Act."
.
Similarly, in the second notification of the 11th
April, rules 9 and 10 run as follows :"9. The licensee shall not sell medicated tonics 0r
medicated wines containing more than 10 per cent. of
alcohol (or containing alcohol in strength more than
17.5 per cent. of proof spirit) except those which are
classified as spirituous medicinal preparations and
regulated as such under the Drugs Act, 1940.
l 0. Subject to the provisions of rule 9 the licensee
shall not sell the following spirituous medicinal preparations to any person unless he produces a medical
prescription in that behalf, namely :(a) medicated tonics and medicated wines;
( b) asaves and arishtas specified in the schedule
hereto annexed;
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
( c) any other spirituous medicinal preparations containing more than 10 per cent of alcohol (or containing
alcohol in strength more than 175 per cent . of proof
spirit) which are intended for internal use :
Provided that . the following spirituous ·medicinal
preparations may be sold to any person without the
production by such person of any medical prescription;
namely .... "
In view of the restrictions imposed on the sale of
these preparations, it is pertinent to enquire whether
those restrictions will not also affect their purchase
possession, use and consumption, and whether the socalled exemptions contained in the notification of the
1st April really go as far as they purport to -go: (vide
in this connection conditions in col. 7 of Notification
No. 10484/45 (a) of the 1st April, 1950). Again, in the
Notification No. 10484/45 of the 1st April, only 8 medicinal preparations arc totally exempted as regards their
purchase, possession, and use, and so far as medicinal
preparations for internal consumption are concerned,
only those containing not more than 10% of alcohol or
17.5% of proof spirit are exempted. This notification
has to be read along with another notification No.
10484/45(a). of the same date, which was to remain in
force till 31st March, 1951, only; In the latter notification, for the purpose of possession, purchase, consumption and use, the quantity of medicinal preparations
containing not more than 100/o of alcohol, etc., is restricted to such quantity as may be prescribed by a
registered medical practitioner. Even these notifications may be withdrawn, superseded or amended at
any moment bJ the Provincial Government, as was
done in the case of the notifications issued on the 16th
June, 1949, which have been referred to. An ordinary
citizen may find it a pe~plexing task to attempt to
extract information out of the long series of complicated regulations, as to the true nature and extent of
the right which the law i::onfers upon him. Indeed it
was only with the help of the learned counsel appearing for the parties that we were able to know what
the position was up to the 31st March, 1950, and
1951
The State of
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. Jv. Balsara.
Fazl Ali J.
722
195!
Tiii State qf
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fad Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
what changes were made on the 1st April, 1950.
But in the bundle of notifications which have been
placed before us, there is no notification stating
what step has been taken after the 31st March, 1951,
and none was brought to our notice in the course of
the arguments. Having given my careful consideration
to the matter, I am of the opinion, that the restrictions
imposed by the Act even when read with the above
notifications are not reasonable, and I would affirm the
conclusion arrived at by the High Court.
The next group of sections which the High Court
has held to be invalid, are sections 23(a) and 24(l)(a)
in so far as they refer to "commending" any intoxicant, section 23(b) in its entirety, and section 24(1) (b)
in so far as it refers to "inciting or encouraging" any
individual or class of individuals or the public generally "to evade the provisions of any rule, regulation or
order made thereunder or the conditions of any licence,
etc." These provisions run as follows :23. No person shall-
( a) commend, solicit the use of, or offer any intoxicant or hemp, or
(b) mc1te or encourage any member of the public
or any class of individuals or the public generally to
commit any act which frustrates or defeats the provisions of this Act, or any rule, regulation or order made
thereunder, or ....
24. (1) No person shall print or publish in any news
paper, news-sheet, book, leaflet, booklet or any other
single or periodical publication or otherwise display
or distribute any advertisement or other matter,(a) which commends, solicits the use of or offers
any intoxicant or hemp, or
(b) which is calculated to encourage or incite any
individual or class of individuals or the public generally
to commit an offence under this Act, or to commit a
breach of or to evade the provisions of any rule, regulation or order made thereunder or the conditions of
any licence, permit, pass or authorization granted
thereunder."
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
Sections 23(a) and 24(1)(a) in so far as they refer to
"commending" any intoxicant are. said to conflict with
the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(l)(a),
namely, the right to freedom of speech and expression,
and there can be no doubt that the prohibition against .
"commending" a.ny intpxicant is a curtailment of the
right guaranteed and it can be supported only if it is
saved by clause (2) of article 19 which, as it stands
at present, provides that "nothing in sub-clause (a) of
clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law
in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from
making any law relating to libel, slander, defamation,
contempt of court or any matter which offends against
decency or morality or which undermines the securit~
of, or tends to overthrow, the State." It seems to me
that none of the conditions mentioned in clause (2)
applies to the present case, and therefore the provisions in question must be held to be void. Section 23
(b) must also be held to be void, because the words
"incite" and "encourage" are wide enough to include
incitement or encouragement by words and speeches
and also by acts. The words "which frustrates
or defeats the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation . or order made thereunder" are so wide and
vague that it is difficult to define or limit th~ir scope.
I am therefore in agreement with the view of the High
Court that this provision is invalid in its entirety.
So far as article 24(1)(b) is concerned the judgment of
the High Court in regard to it cannot be upheld. The
learned counsel for the petitioner also conceded before
us chat he was not going to assail this provision.
The High Court has also declared sections 136(1),
136(2)(b), 136(2)(c), 136(2)(e), 136(2)(£) to be void
as offending against various provisions of article 19 of
the Constitution, but no argument was addressed to
us on behalf of the Government of Bombay assailing
the judgment of the High Court with regard to these
provisions. The judgment of the High Court in regard
to them will therefore stand.
I will now deal with two Notifications Nos. 10484/45
(c) and 2843/49(a), dated the 30th March, 1950, which
1951
The State ef
Bombay
and Another
v.
I<'. N. Balsam
Fazl Ali J.
724
!951
Tht State ef
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fa,I Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1951]
the High Court has held to be invalid. As regards the
first notification, the High Coun has stated that section
139 ( c) having been held to be ultra vires the legislatute, this notification, which was issued under that
section is ultra vires the Bombay Government. But,
since this Court has taken a different view in regard to
the validity of section 139 ( c), the decision of the High
Court as regards the above notification cannot stand.
It appears from certain observations in the judgment
under appeal, firstly that the High Court upheld section 40(1) (c) (i) and (ii), which deals with the grant
of permits to foreigners who do not intend to stay permanently in India, merely because the Explanation to
that section provided that "a person shall be deemed
to be residing or intending to reside in India temporarily, if the period of his residence does not exceed six
months"; and secondly, that the High Court would
have found it difficult to uphold the classification on
which section 40(1) (c) is based if the restriction
regarding six months' residence was not there, as would
be the result of reading the section subject to the
above notification. I am however unable to see how
the notification will tum a classification which is
otherwise a good classification into a bad one. There
is nothing unreasonable in a law relating to prohibition discriminating between Indian citizens against
whom it is primarily to be enforced, and foreigners
who have no intention of permanently residing in this
country. The condition of six months' residence which
is laid down in the Explanation to ~ection 40 is somewhat arbitrary, and the mere fact that the Government
by notification withdrew this condition cannot in
principle alter the basis of the classification.
The High Court has declared the other notification
issued by the Government on the 30th March, 1950, to
be invalid on grounds which are stated in these
words:"That notification exempts persons holding permits under clause (c) of wb-section (1) of section 40,
special permits under section 41, or interim permits
under section 47, from the provisions of section 23 (a)
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
in so far as it relates to the offering of foreign liquor
to persons holding similar permits. This is clearly not
justified. Having created a class, having given to that
class the right of obtaining a permit on grounds other
than those of health, it will be totally wrong to permit
that class not to abide by the same provisions with
regard to permits as others to whom permits have
been given. The restrictions placed by the 'legislature
itself on a permit-holder regar'ding the use and consumption of hi~ stock of liquor is to be found in section
43 under which the permit-holder shall not allow the
'use and consumption by any person who is not a permit-holder. That restriction must apply equally to
permits issued under section 40 to Indian citizens as
well as foreigners, and in our opinion it is improper to
allow a foreigner permit-holder to stand drinks to
other permit-holders and to deny that privilege to
Indian permit-holders. The guarantee of equality
before the law extends under our Constitution not only
to legislation but also to rules and notifications made
under statutory authority and even to ex~cutive orders
and as the notification offends against the principle of
equality it is, therefore, void."
In order to under.stand these remarks, it will be
necessary to state that persons holding permits under
clause ( c) of sub-section ( 1) of section 40 are foreigners
as described in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (c), that
persons holding special permits under section 41 are
foreign sovereigns, ambassadors, etc., and that persons
holding interim permits under section 47 are persons
applying for permits under either section 40, or section 41. The last class will include not only foreigners
but also Indian citizens applying for permits on the
ground that their health will be seriously and permanently affected if they are not permitted to use or
consume liquor. Thus, the assumption on which the
conclusion of the High Court is based, does not appear
to be correct. Besides, I do not find anything in this
notification which violates the principle of equality. It
simply enables a certain dass of pers&'is holding per-'
mits to offer drinks to persons holding similar permits.
1951
The State ef
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fa;.l Ali J.
726
1951
The State ef
Bombay
am/ Anoth<r
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Faz! Ali j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
This is in accord with the principle underlying the
provisions of section 43 which has not been assailed
before us and which provides that "no holder of a
permit granted under section 40 or 41 shall allow the
use or consumption of any part of the stock held by
him under the permit to any person who is not the
holder of such a permit". In my opinion, there is no
substantial ground for holding the notification to be
invalid. The points relating to the notifications . are
extremely small, and the subtle distinctions upon
which they are based, are hardly worth the attention
which the High Court has bestowed on them.
There is another point which arises on the judgment
of the High Court which may also be noticed. The
point is set out in that judgment in these words :"When a person applies for a perm.it on the
ground of health, he has to forward with it a certificate
from the medical board and when we turn to the form
of this certificate, it requires the medical board to
declare the applicant an addict. Therefore the position
is that it is only on the applicant being found an
addict bv the medical board that he would be entitled
to a permit if his health would be seriously and permanently affected if he was not permitted to use or
consume liquor· It is not only in the case of addicts
that such a contingency would arise. Even persons
who are not addicts may have been accustomed to
drink for a long period of time and a sudden discontinuance of drink may seriously and permanently affect
their health. It may also happen that without being
accustomed to drink at all a person may contract an
illness which may require the use by him of alcoholic
drink under medical opinion. To be an addict, in our
opinion, means something more than being merely
accustomed to drink. We must give to it its plain
natural meaning. It is certainly not a term of art, and
giving to it its plain natural meaning, the expression
"addict" does carry with it a sense of moral obloquy.
The intention of the Government seems to be that only
persons who ~mess that they are deviating from
standards of morality should be given permits. Now
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
insistence upon a medical certificate in this form is not
at all warranted by the provisions of the Act."
The point is a small one but it seems to me that
there is some substance in it. In my opinion, the word
"addict" in the medical certificate should be replaced
by the words used in section 40 (1) (b) of the Act or
'
words corresponding to them.
The only other point which remains to be decided
is whether as a result of some of the sections of the
Act having been ·declared to be invalid, what is left of
the Act should survive or whether the whole Act should
be declared to be invalid. This argument was raised
before the High Court also. but it was rejected and it
was held that it was not possible on a fair review of
the whole matter to assume that the legislature would
not have enacted the part which remained without
enacting the part that was held to be bad. It is to be·
noted that upon the findings of the High Court, the·
question should have assumed a more serious aspect
than it presents now, because the High Court has
declared several important sections of the Act including
the definition of "liquor" to be ultra vires the legislature. I have now examined those sections and have·
held many of them to be valid. The provisions which
are in my view invalid cannot affect the validity of
the Act as a whole. The test to be applied when an
argument like the one addressed in this case is raised,
has been very correctly summed up by the Privy
Council in Attorney-General for Alberta v. AttorneyGeneral for Canada(1) in these words :"The real question is whether what remains is so
inextricably bound up with the part declared invalid
that what remains cannot independently survive or,
as it has sometimes been put, whether on a fair review
of the whole matter it can be assumed that the legislature would have enacted what survives without
enacting the part that is ultra vires at all."
It is quite clear that the provisions held by me to
be invalid are not ~nextricably bound up with the
( 1)
[1947] A.C. 505 ·.t 518.
1951
TM State ef
Bombay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
Fa;:.l Ali J.
728
195!
·rhe State qf
Bombay
and Anotlat'.
v.
F. N. Balsata.
Faz/ Ali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
remaining pn;ivisions of the Act, and it is difficult to
hold that the legislature would not have enacted the
Act at all without including that part which is found
to be ultra vires. The Act still remains substantially
the Act as it was passed, i.e., an Act amending and
consolidating the law relating to the promotion and
enforcement of the policy of prohibition and also the
Abkari law in the Province of Bombay.
In the result, I declare the following provisions of
the Act only to be invalid :(1) Clause (c) of section 12. so far as it affects the
possession of liquid medicinal and toilet preparations
ccontaining alcohol.
(2) Clause (d) of section 12, so far as it affects
the selling or buying of such medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol.
(3) Clause (b) of section 13, so far as it affects the
consumption or use of such medicinal and toilet
preparations containing alcohol.
( 4) Clause (a) of section 23, so far as it prohibits
the commendation of any intoxicant or hemp.
(5) Clause (b) of section 23, in entirety.
(6) Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 24, so
far as it prohibits commendation of any intoxicant or
hemp.
(7) Sub-section (1) of section 36, in entirety.
(8) Clauses (b), (c), (e), and (f) of sub-section (2)
of section 136, in their entirety.
I hold that the rest of the provisions of the Act are
valid, and I also hold that my decision declaring some
of the provisions of the Act to be invalid does not
affect the validity of the Act as it remains. Appeal
No. 182, preferred by the State of Bombay, is there·
fore substantially allowed and Appeal No. 183 pre.
£erred by the petitioner is dismissed.
On the question of costs I am disposed to make the
same order as the High Court has made, not only
because some of the provisions of the Act are still
found to be invalid, but also because the present case
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
appears to have been instituted to test the validity of
a controversial measure and to secure a final decision
on it to set at rest the doubts and uncertainties which
may have clouded the minds of a section of the public
as to how far the provisions of the Act conform to law
and to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights in the present Constitution.
1951
The State qf
Bol1'bay
and Another
v.
F. N. Balsara.
PATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-1 agree and have nothing
more to add.
Patanjali
Sastri :J.
MuKHERJEA J.-1 have read the judgment of my
learned brother Mr. Justice Fazl Ali and I am in
entire agreement with his conclusions and reasons.
There is nothing further which I can usefully add.
Muklurjea :J.
S. R. DAs J.-1 agree and I have nothing
to add.
S. It. Das].
further
V1VIAN BosE J.-I also agree.
Vivian Bose J.
Appeal No. 182 allowed.
Appeal No. 183 dismissed.
Agent for the appellants in Case No. 182 and respondents in Case No. 183 : P. A. Mehta~ .
Agent for the respondent in Case No. 182 and
appellant in Case No. 183 : Rajinder Narain for
R. A. Gagrat.
TARA SINGH
1951
v.
June 1
THE STATE.
[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,
S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]
Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), ss. 173 (1), 190 (1) (b),
340 (1), 342, 288-Evidence Act (1 of 1872), s. 145-Filing of
second challan-Whether vitiates first report-Examination of
accused-Imp<>rtance of-Statements made in Committal CourtW hen admissible.
Where the report made by a police officer to · the Magistrate
complies with the requirements of s. 173 ( 1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code the Magistrate can take cognisance. of the case
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