S. KRISHNAN AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF MADRAS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 7 May 1951 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 621 | 1951 INSC 33
Key facts
- Decided
- 7 May 1951
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 303/1950
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 621
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 33
Text of the judgment
[1951]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
S. KRISHNAN AND OTHERS
1951
May 7
"·
THE STATE OF MADRAS
(AND OTHER PETITIONS)
UNION OF INDIA-Intervener
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.
J., PATANJALI SAsTRI,
MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN,
VIVIAN BosE
s. R. DAS ~d
JJ.]
Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, ss. 9, 10, 11, 12Indian Constitution, 1950, Arts. 22( 4) (a) & (b), 22(7)-Dctentions
under eariicr Act treated as detentions under new Act and continued
for more than one year-Omission to fix maximum period-Infringement of fundamental rights-Contravention of ConstitutionValidity of amending Act-Temporary Stateites-Order of detentions
-Validity after expiry of Statute.
The Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act of 1951 which
extended the operation of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950
for a period of one more year, that is, up to 1st April, 1952,
effected two material alterations by providing (i) that a reference
to an Advisory Board shall be made in all cases within six weeks
(s. 9) ; (ii) that every detention order in force at the commencement of the new Act shall continue in force and shall have effect
as if had been made under the Act as amended (s. I:!). The
petitioners, who were on the date of the commencement of the
amending Act in detention in pursuance of orders made under
s. 3(1) (a) (ii) of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, and who
but for the amending Act would have been entitled to be released under the eai"lier Act on the expiry of one year from the date
of the order of detention, applied for habeas corpus contending
that ss. 9 and 12 of the amending Act which enacted the above
mentioned provisions contravened the provisions of Art. 22( 4) (a)
of the Constitution and were consequently void under Art. 13(a)
inasmuch as the combined effect of these sections was to keep
the petitioners in detention for a period longer than three months
without reference to an Advisory Board, and also to keep them
in detention for a period of more than one year. The Act was
also attacked on the ground that it did not fix any maximum
period for detention :
Held, per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MAHAJAN, S. R. DAS
and BosE JJ. :-that ss. 9 and 12 of the Preventive Detention
(Amendment) Act, 1951, and not contravene Art. 22 (4) of the
Constitution and were not void.
622
1951
s. Krbhnan
and Others
v.
The State of
MadraJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
Per KANIA C.].1 and PATANJALI SAsTRI J.-The amending Act
could be regarded as a law made substantially in accordance
with sub-clauses (a) and (b) of cl. (7) of Art. 22, and as such it
satisfied the requirements of Art. 22(4) (b) and cannot be held to
be unconstinttional or void.
Per MAHAJAN and DAs JJ.-The law enacted by the amending
statute is not the same law as was declared by the original
statute and to that extent the amended statute was in the nature
of a new and independent statute; the effect of s. 12 was to make
the detention of the petitioners a fresh detention under the r.cw
la\v ; and there was nothing in the new law standing by itself
\vhich authorised detention of a person for more than three months
without ref~rence to an Advisory Board or for more than one
year and there was thus no contravention of any of the provi~
sions of Art. 22 ( 4).
Held also per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SAsTR1, MAHAJAN and
DAs Tl. (BosE J. dissenting).-The Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, was not invalid on the ground that it did
not fix a maximum period for detention, inasmuch as the Act
itself \Vas to be in force only for a period of one year and no detention under the Act could be continued after the expiry of
the Act. Born J.-Sub-scction (!) of s. II of the impugned
Act contravened Art. 22 ( 4) of the Constirution inasmuch as it
did not fix any maximum period of detention, but on the other
hand empowered the government in express terms to order that
a detention shall continue "for such period as it thinks fit". The
view that a detention which has been ordered under an Act
would come to an end with the expiry of the Act is not
sound.
ORIGINAL Jm1sn1CT10N.-Petitions Nos. 303, 617 to
619, 621 to 631, 561 to 571, 592, 594, 596 and 600
of 1950. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution
for writs in the nature of habeas corpus. The petitioners . were detained in pursuance of orders for detention made under s. 3 (1) (a) (ii) of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950. On the 22nd February, 1951
while they were under detention the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, came into force and this
Act by substituting the figures "1952" for "1951" in
sub-sec. (3) of s. 1 of the Preventive Detention Act of
1950 continued the operation of the Act until 31st
March, 1952. Since the maximum period of detention
fixed by the Act of 1950 was one year the petitioners
applied for writs in the nature of habeas ·corpus for
their release. The material facts, the points raised by
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
1951
the petitioners and the arguments of the counsel appear
in the Judgment.
s. Krishnan
M. 1<.. Nambiyar (V. G. Raw, with him) for the Petitioner in Petition No. 303 of 1950.
The State of
Madras.
and Others
v.
Bawa Shiv Charan Singh for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 618, 619, 621, 622, 624, 626, 627, 628, 629,
630 and 631 of 1950.
Basant Chandra Chose (amicus curiae) for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 592,
594, 596, and 600 of 1950.
V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General, Madras, and
G. S. Swaminathan (R. Ganapathy Iyer with them) for
the Respondents in Nos. 618, 619, 621, 622, 624, 626,
627, 628, 629, 630 and 631 of 1950.
Fakhruddin Ahmed (Numddin Ahmed with him) for
the Respondents in Petitions Nos. 567, 568, 569, 570,
571 592, 594, 596 and 600 of 1950.
Petitioner in person in Petition No. 617 of 1950.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (R. Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the Union of India, Intervener.
1951 May 7. The following Judgments were deliveredKANIA C. J.-:-1 agree with the Judgment prepared by
· Sastri J. and have nothing more to add.
KANIA C. J.
PATANJALI SASTRI J.-The common question which
arises for consideration in these petitions is whether
certain provisions of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, purporting to amend the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950, so as to authorise detention of
the petitioners to be continued beyond the expiry of
one year are ultra vires and inoperative.
PatanjaliSastriJ.
The amending Act (hereinafter referred to as the
new Act) came into force on 22nd February, 1951, and
by substituting the figures "1952" for "1951" in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Preventive Detention
Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the old Act), it
624
1951
s. Kri5/rllan
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
continues the operation of the old Act till 31st March,
1952.
and Others
v.
the State of
MadraJ.
Patanfalt
Sa>trl J.
The petitioners in all these cases were, at the commencement of the new Act, under detention in pursuance of orders made under section 3(1) (a) (ii) of the
old Act and, save in a few cases where the detention was
also attacked on some special grounds which have no
~ubstance, the legality of that detention was not open
to question. But such detention having commenced
more than a year before the date of hearing of these
petitions the petitioners would have been entitled to be
rele;>.sed had it not been for the provisions of the new
Act which purport to authorise the continuance of
their detention.
Mr. Nambiyar, on behalf of the petitioners, urged
that these provisions contravened article 22(4) (a) of
the Constitution and were, therefore, .void under
article 13(2). Article 22(4) (a) provides:
"No law providing for preventive detention shall
authorise the detention of a person for a longer period
than three months unless(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who
are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as
Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there
is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention :
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall
authorise the detention of any person beyond the
maximum period prescribed by any law made by
Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7).''
It will be seen that two conditions have to be fulfilled in order that a person can be detained for a
longer period than three months; ( i) his case must be
referred to an Advisory Board constituted in the
manner specified and (ii) that Board must make a
report before the expiration of three months that there
is sufficient cause for such detention. Section 12 of the
old Act having provided that there was to be no review
by an Advisory Board in cases
falling within
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
section 3 (l)(a)(ii), the petitioners' detention in pursuance of orders made under the latter section fell under
article 22 ( 4) (b), and there was no question, therefore,
of such detention contravening article 22 (4) (a). The
scheme of the new Act, however, was to extend the
benefit of a review by an Advisory Board to all cases
and to bind the detaining authorities to act conformably to the report of the Board. The method
adopted to give effect to this scheme was to delete
some of the provisions of the old Act and to substitute
in their place new provisions.
The material provisions of the new Act are sections 9, 10, 11 and 12. Section 9 provides for a reference
to an Advisory Board within six weeks from the date
specified in sub-section (2) which says "The date
referred to in sub-section (1) shall be-(a) in every
case where at the commencement of the Preventive
Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, the person is under
detention in pursuance of a detention order made
under sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of
sub-section (1) of section 3, the date of commencement of the said Act ; and (b) in every other case the
date of detention under the order". By section 10 the
Advisory Board is required to submit its report within
ten weeks from the date specified in sub.section (2) of
section 9. Section 11 ( 1) authorises the appropriate
Government to continue the period of detention for such
period as it thinks fit in case the Advisory Board
reports that there are sufficient grounds for the detention, while sub-section (2) provides tliat the Government shall revoke the detention order and release the
person concerned if the Advisory Board reports the
other way. Sub-section (1) of section 12 declares for
the "avoidance of doubt" that every detention order
in force at the commencement of the new Act "shall
continue in force and shall have effect as if. it· ~ad been
made under this Act as amended" by the "'new Act, and
sub-section (2) provides that nothing contained in subsection (3) of section 1 or in sub-section (1) of section
12 of the old Act shall affect the validity or duration
of any such order.
1951
$.Krishnan
and Othera
v.
The State of
Madraa.
Patanja/i
Sa>tri J.
626
1951
S· Kri.shan
and Other:1
v.
The State of
Madras
Patan}ali
Sa-stri J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1951]
It will be seen that although the object of the new
Act was to liberalise the provisions of the old Act in
the manner indicated above, section 12 had the effect
of enlarging .·he period of detention of the petitioners
who were under detention at the commencement of the
new Act by enacting the legal fiction that detention in
such cases shall have effect as if it had been made
under the new Act. On that basis, the new Act seeks
to bring detention orders in force at its commencement
and more than three months old into conformity with
article 22( 4) (a) by prescribing a period of six weeks
in section 9 for referring such cases to the Advisory
Bo~.rd and ten weeks in section 10( l) for the submission by the Board of its report, the period in each case
being calculated from the commencement of the new
Act. But this fiction cannot obscure the fact that in
the case of the petitioners more than three months had
elapsed from the date of their arrest without any
Advisory Board making a report on their detention
and it is, of course, not possible for the Advisory Board
now provided for in such cases to submit its report
before the expiration of that period, with the result
that their detention contravened article 22(4) (a).
No doubt the detention up to the commencement of
the new Act was lawful under section 12 of the old
Act, as it was in accordance with sub-clause (b) of
clause ( 4) of article 22, but that could not make the
petitioners' continued detention any _the less a violation of article 22(4) (a) after the deletion of old section 12. It is a fallacy to treat what was a lawful
detention under sub-clause (b) as being no detention
at all for purposes of sub-clause (a). Detention is a
hard physical fact, and the total period of detention of
the petitioners having far exceeded three months without an Advisory Board having reported within three
months that there were sufficient grounds therefore, it
could not lawfully be continued under article 22(4) (a).
Constitutional provisions regarding fundamental rights
cannot be circumvented by resorting to legal fictions.
It was said that if the petitioners had been released
on 22nd February, 1951, and re-arresteC. 1nd detained
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
6tl
immediately thereafter under the new Act such detention would have been valid. But, for proceeding in
that manner the enactment of section 9(2) (a) and
section 12(1) would be unnecessary. Parliament has,
however, adopted a different mode of proceeding by
providing for the continuance of detention orders in
force at the commencement of the new Act on the
basis that they should have effect as if they had been
made under the new Act. The resulting position must,
therefore, be dealt witn only on that basis and not on
any other hypothetical footing.
•
The Attorney-General, however, contended in the
alternative that the constitutional validity of section
9 (2) (a) and section 12 (1) of the new Act could be
sustained under article 22(4) (b) which has been held
by a majority of the Judges in A. K. Gopalan v. The
State of Madras (1) to be a distinct and independent
provision authorisil).g preventive detention for a period
longer than three months in · accordance with a law
made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of
clause (7) of article 22. The Attorney-General claimed
that the aforesaid provisions were such a law, none the
less because Parliament may have intended to make a
law within article 22 (4) (a) by providing for a review
by an Advisory Board in all cases or preventive detention. On a question of vires, the intention of the
Legislature is immaterial, and I agree that a provision
for an Advisory Board is not a hall-mark which stamps
a preventive detention law as one necessarily falling
within sub-clause (a) of clause (4), so as to make its
constitutional validity determinable exclusively with
reference to the requirements of that sub-clause. The
law could still be upheld if it fulfilled the conditions
laid down in sub-clause (b) of clause (4). Mr. Nambiyar,
however, submitted that the new Act did not fulfil
those conditions, for it is not a law made under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7). The word "and" should
be understood in its ordinary conjunctive sense, and
the new Act neither prescribes the circumstances
and classes referred to in sub-clause (a) nor thr
co
[t950J s.c.R. 88.
7-10 S.C. India/67
1951
s. Krishnan
and Others.
v.
The State of
Madras.
Patan}ali
Sastri J,
628
19SI
s. KriJhnan
and Others.
v.
The State of
Madra&.
Patan]a//
Sastri J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951)
maxim um period of detention required to be prescribed
under sub-clause (b) of clause (7). The contention is
devoid of substance. The new Act can, in my opinion,
be regmx:led as a law made substantially in accordance
with sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7), According
to the majority view in Go pa/an's case, sub-clause (a)
of clause (7) being an enabling provision, the word
"and" should be understood in a disjunctive sense.
The combined effect of sections 9(2) (a) and 12(1) is to
provide, in a certain class of cases, namely, where detention orders were in force at the commencement of the
new Act, that the persons concerned could be detained
for a period longer than three months if an Advisory
Board reports that there are sufficient grounds for
detention within ten weeks from the commencement of
the new Act, that is to say, without obtaining the
opinion of an Advisory Board before the expiration of
the three months from the commencement of the detention as provided in sub-clause (a) of clause (4). And,
although the new Act does not in express terms prescribe in a separate provision any maximum period as
such for which any person may in any class or classes
of cases be detained, it fixes, by extending the duration
of the old Act till the 1st April, 1952, an over-all timelimit beyond which preventive detention under the
Act cannot be continued. The general rule in regard
to a temporary statute is that, in the absence of special
provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being
taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate
as soon as the statute expires (Craies on Statutes, 4th
Edition, p. 347). Preventive detention which would,
but for the Act authorising it, be a continuing wrong,
cannot, therefore, be continued beyond the expiry of
the Act itself. The new Act thus in substance prescribes a maximum period of detention under it by
providing that it shall cease to have effect on a specified date. It seems to me, therefore, that section 9(2) (a)
and section 12(1) of the new •Act substantially satisfy
the requirements of sub-clause (b) of clause ( 4) of article 22, and cannot be declared unconstitutional and
void.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
The objection to the validity of section 11(1) can be
disposed of in a few words. The argument is that the
discretionary powc:r given to the appropriate Government under that sub-section to , continue the detention
''for such period as it thinks fit" authorises preventive
detention for an indefinite period, which is contrary to
the provisions of article 22(4). But, if as already
observed, the new Act is to be in force only up to 1st
April, 1952, and no detention under the Act can continue
thereafter, the discretionary power could be exercised
only subject to that over-all limit. The objection therefore fails.
1951
s. Krishan
and Other&.
v.
The State of
Madra&.
Patanjali
Sa&t&il.
In the result the petitions are dismissed.
MAHAJAN J.-The question to be decided in these
petitions is whether the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, or any part thereof is invalid and
whether the petitioners who have been detained are
entitled to a writ in the nature of habeas corpus on
the ground that their detention is illegal.
The Act was enacted by Parliament on the 27th
February, 1951, and according to its express terms will
cease to have effect on the 1st April, 1952, save as
regards things done or omitted to be done before that
date.
The point that has been canvassed before us is that
sections 9(2) {a) and 12 of the Act are invalid as these
infringe the fundamental rights conferred under articles 21 and 22 of Part III of the Constitution.
Section
9 of the Act as amended reads as follows :" (1) In every case where a detention order has
been made under this Act, the appropriate Government
shall, within six weeks from the date specified in subsection (2) place before an advisory board constituted
by it under section 8 the grounds on which the order
has been made and the representation, if any, made
by the person affected by the order, and in case where
the order has been made by an officer, also the report
made by such officer under sub-section (3) of section 3.
Mahajan J.
630
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1951
s. Kr/Jhnan
and Others.
v.
The State of
MadrOJ.
Mahajan J.
be-
[1951]
(2) The date referred to in sub-section (1) shall
(a) in every case where at the commencement
of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951,
a person is under detention in pursuance of a detention order made under sub-clause ( i) or (ii) of clause (a)
of sub-section ( 1) of section 3, the date of commencement of the said Act ; and
(b) in every other case the date of the detention
order."
Section 12 is in these terms :"For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared( a) every detention order in force at the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act,
1951, shall continue in force and shall have effect as
if it had been made under this Act as amended by
the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951 ; and
(b) nothing contained in sub-section ( 3) of section
1, or sub-section ( l) of section 12 of this Act as origi·
nally enlcted shall be deemed to affect the validity or
duration \>f any such order."
Mr. Nambiar for the detenus challenged the vires of
these sections on ~he following grounds : ( l) That
article 22(4) of the Constitution limits the legislative
power of Parliament and State legislatures in respect
of preventive detention laws in the matter of duration of
the period of detention and provides that no law of preventive detention can authorise the detention of a person
for a longer period than three months without the intervention of an advisory board and without obtaining its
opinion with.in three months. The amending Act, 1951,
by section 9 authorizes detention for a period longer
than three months without the opinion of the advisory
board having been obtained within the said period of
three months from the date of the actual detention
in respect of persons detained under Act IV of 1950 as
it or~nally stood and it thus infringes the fundamental right conferred by article 22( 4). (2) That
Parliament in exercise of powers conferred on it under
artide 22(7) having prescribed in section 12 of Act IV
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631
of 19'0 a maximuttl period of one year for detention
in certain classes of cases without obtaining the opinion
of the advisory board, that period of one year became
a part of the content of the fundamental right conferred
under article 22(4) of the Constitution. Sections 9 and
12 of the amended Act contravene this fundamental
right inasmuch as they authorize detention of persons
yvho were detained under orders passed under section
3 (1) (i) and (ii) of Act IV of 1950 beyond the period
of one year prescribed therein, and are therefore void.
(3) That Parliament has no authority to alter the
period of one year prescribed by it by virtue of authority given to it under article 22 (7) (b) of the Constitution so as to affect the cases of persons detained
under Act IV of 1950. (4) That the Constitution does
not envisage detention for an indefinite period and that
inasmuch as the amended Act has failed to provide a
maximum period for the detention of a person, it is
repugnant to the Constitution and is void ; that it was
obligatory on Parliament while making the law providing for preventive detention to fix the maximum
period for such detention. (5) That the provisions ot
these sections infringe article 21 of the Constitution
inasmuch as they authorize detention contrary to
procedure established by law (Act IV of 1950) in r~s
pect of detentions under that Act, because under established procedure detention beyond a period of one year
was void. For the reasons given above it was contended that as in the case of the petitioners the maximum period of one year under section 12 of Act IV of
1950 had expired on 27th February, 1951, they were
entitled to their release.
For a proper appreciation of the points urged by the
learned counsel and the manner in which they were
combated by the learned Attorney-General, it is necl!ssary to shortly state the nature of the relevant amendments introduced by the amending Act iii. the Preventive Detention Act, IV of 1950. In section 8 of Act IV
of 1950, which concerns tl1e constitution of advisory
boards, the new Act has provided that the board shall
consist of three persons instead of two except in cases
s -10 S.C. In dia/67.
1951
s. Kri$hnan
and Others
v.
The State of
Madra!
Mahajan J.
632
1951
s. Krl,hna11
and Others
v.
Th• Stale of
Madras
Mahajan}•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951]
where before the commencement of the amended Act
reference had already been made to an advisory board.
Section 9 of Act IV of 1950 has been substituted by
section 9 'of the amending Act and it gives the benefit of
the advisory board to all classes and cases of persons,
who under Act IV of 1950 were not entitled to that benefit. It makes it .obligatory on government to place all
these cases, like all other cases, within six weeks from
a prescribed date before an advisory board.
In
section 10 the amended Act makes it obligatory on
the adviso_ry board to submit its report to the government within ten weeks of the date specified under
section 9 and it also authorizes the advisory board
to call for such information as it deems necessary from
government and from the person concerned and it empowers it to give a hearing to the detenu if in any particular case it considers it essential. Section 11 makes the
opinion of the ad~isory board binding on government.
It also authorizes government to continue the detention of persons for such period as it thinks fit in cases
where the opinion of the board is in favour of the
Section 12 provides that
continuance of detention.
orders of detention in force at the commencement of
the amended Act will be deemed to have been made
under this Act. A new section, 14, has been introduced
in Act IV of 1950 and it authorizes temporary release
of persons detained.
The provisions of the amended Act are thus a great
improvement on the original Act inasmuch as they
provide a greater opportunity to the detenus of proving their innocence than they had under the original
Act. The detention of a person without the case being
referred to the opinion of an advisory board constituted of independent persons has been completely done
away with, except for a period of three months provided for in article 22(4) of the Constitution. What
the amended Act has in substance done is that instead
of the cases of persons preventively detained being
considered by ordinary courts of law, a special tribunal
designated as an advisory board and consisting of men
of high judicial experience has been given authority
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
to examine their cases within a prescribed period and
the decision of that authority has been made binding
on government. This tribunal is obviously no substitute for a court of law but a provision like this is in
the nature of a substantial solatium in cases of preventive detention wherein ordinarily the detaining
authority is the judging authority as well.
Shortly stated, Mr. Nambiar's attack on these beneficial provisions and concerning their vires is based
principally on the method adopted by the draftsmen
of the Act for switching over the detentions which
were being continued under section 12 of Act IV of
1950 and which were valid by virtue of the constitutional provisions contained in article 22(4) (b) of the
Constitution to the constitutional provisions contained
in article 22( 4) (a) so that they may be given the
benefit of an advisory board's opinion. His grievance
is that in doing so the amended statute has enlarged
the period of three months provided under article 22(4)
for a report of the advisory board and has extended
the period of one year mentioned in section 12 of Act
IV of 1950. This argument is based on the assumption
that the period of one year mentioned in section 12 of
Act IV of 1950 was an Immutable and unalterable orie
and that Parliament could not amend section 12 of tl1e
Act in any manner whatsoever once having enacted it.
I am unable to accept this contention. It seems to me,
that it was open to Parliament to amend section 12
and substitute another maximum for the period of one
year mentioned therein. If Parliament had recourse
to that alternative, t11en in my opinion, the petitioners
could have no possible grievance as regards the vires
of the new legislation. As regards the period of three
months, it was essential to fix some date from which
that period had to be calculated in respect of cases
which were previously governed by section 12 of Act
IV of 1950. Under that section they did not have the
benefit of the advisory board and when the new law
gave them that benefit, a t(rminus quo had to be fixed
for the period of three months during which the advisory
board had to submit its report. The amended Act
1951
S· Krishnan
and Other&
v.
The State of
Madra1
Maha} an/.
634
1951
s. Krishnan
and OtherJ
v.
The State of
MadraJ
Mahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951]
achieved this by prescribing in these specified classes
of cases the date of the commencement of the amended
Act as the date from which this period was to begin
and by section 12 it provided that all detentions continuing at the date of the commencement of the
amended Act shall be deemed to be detentions under
the amended Act.
After a careful consideration of the argument of
Mr. Nambiar I have reached the conclusion that there
is considerable force in the reply made to it by the
learned Attorney-General. He contended that article
22(4) provides that no law providing for preventive
detention shall authorize detention of a person for a
longer period than three months and that the amended
Act has not in any manner infringed this provision ;
on the other hand, it provides that the advisory board
must make its report to the government within ten
weeks. It was urged that in order to judge the vires of
the amended Act it was not relevant to take into consideration detention of persons validly detained under
a different statute and that its vires must be adjudged
on its own provisions and not with reference to what
has actually happened under another law. It was
frankly conceded that if Parliament or a State legislature passed legislation in a manner which amounted
to a fraud on the Constitution inasmuch as those
enactments were passed with the purpose of defeating
the constitutional provisions, then those laws could be
attacked on that ground but not on the ground of
their vires, that in the present case no such argument
had been taken or could be taken and that being so,
the contention of Mr. Nambiar was not justified.
In my opinion, the statute as framed docs not in
any way contravene or abridge either the provisions
of article 21 or of article 22. It was open to Parlia.
ment, as already observed, to alter the maximum
period of detention mentioned in section 12 of Act IV
of 1950 and to enhance it. It was also open to government to release these detenus after the expiry of one
year and to serve fresh orders of detention on them
after their revise under the amended Act. If that
1
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
had been done, no question could possibly be raised
that the period of three months provided for in article
22(4) of the Constitution had in any way been affected.
Instead of going through that form of ceremony,
Parliament by section 12 of the amended Act provided that all detention orders in force under Act IV
of 1950 be treated as detention orders under the
amended Act. · By the effect of this section the detention of all such persons becomes a fresh detention,
under the new law, with the result that nothing in the
amended statute can · be said to abridge the fundamental right conferred by article 22 ( 4) of the Constitution. It was argued that the amended statute is
not a new and an independent statute and that in
spite of the amendments it remains the same statute
as was passed in 1950, and that the detention of the
petitioners is under the same law of preventive detention and it therefore offends against article 22( 4) of
the Constitution and that it virtually amounts to
tacking of the period of detention under one Act to
the period of detention under another Act and as such
amounts indirectly and substantially to an infringement of the fundamental right. In my opinion, this
contention, though attractive, is without force. Technically speaking, an amended statute remains the same
statute as originally enacted but from that proposition
it does not follow that the law contained in the amended
statute is the same law as was contained in the original
one. Section 9 of the original Act has been substituted
by section 9 of the amcI).ded Act and declares a new
law and it is not a re-enactment of the law as was
contained in the earlier statute. Section 12 of the
original statute has been completely repealed and no
longer exists. The law declared by that section has
been abrogated. The law declared by section 12 of the
amended Act is in the nature of a substituted provision. It seems to me that the law declared by the
amended statute is not the same law as was declared
by the original statute and to that extent the amended
statute is in the nature of a new and independent
statute. The petitioners are being detained today by
1951
s. Krishnan
and Other~
v.
The State of
Madras
Mahajan J.
636
19Sl
S. Krishnan
and Others
v.
The State of
Madras
Ma/lajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
force of the provisions contained in sections 9 and 12
of the amen<led Act and not under the law that was
passed in 1950, as by repeal of section 12 of that Act
their detention Wlder it technically terminated.
The
new law admittedly standing by itself does not authorize detention of any person beyond a period of three
months except in the manner provided by article
22(4) of the Constitution. No question whatever arises
of tacking of the period of detention under one law to
the period of detention under another law, inasmuch
as the detention under the earlier law automatically
terminates with the repeal of section 12 of Act IV of
1950. For the. reasons given above, the first contention
of Mr. Nambiar fails.
In view of the above decision it is unnecessary to
consider the alternative argument of the learned
Attorney-General to the effect that in case it is held
that section 9 contravenes article 22(4) (a) of the Constitution, it is a valid law under article 22(4) (b) of
the Constitution and hence the order of detention is
legal. Mr. Nambiar's contention to the effect that in
case the petitioners' detention is regarded as a fresh
detention under the amended Act, then it is necessary
to serve them with fresh grounds of detention does not
appear to me to be well founded. The point was not
raised in the petitions and no argument was addressed
to us that any right under article 22(5) had been
infringed. Moreover, as at present advised, I think
the contention has not got much force because of the
clear provisions of section 12 of the amended Act
which treats every detention order having force at the
commencement of the amended Act as being deemed to
continue unde_r it. When detention is not on any fresh
grounds but on grounds already served, any default in
observing the formality of again serving those very
grounds on the detenu cannot be said to be an infringement of the fundamental right under article 22(5) of
the Constitution.
The next contention of Mr; Nambiar that Parliament
having fixed the maximum period of detention in
section 12 of Act IV of 1950 under its powers contained
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
63"/
in article 22(7) of the Constitution, that maximum
became a part of the content of fundamental right and
sections 9 and 12 of the amended Act contravene this
fundamental right inasmuch as these authorize detention of the petitioners for a period beyond one year
again, in my opinion, is not sound. In other words,
the argument of the learned counsel amounts to this ;
that as soon as Parliament by law under article 22(7)
prescribed a maximum period for which any person
may be detained under any law providing for preventive detention, then that period becomes a part of the
fundamental right conferred on a person under
Part III of the Constitution. The only method of
adding to or subtracting from those rights is by an
amendment of the Constitution in the manner provided therein. By clause (7) of article 22 Parliament
has not been authorized to add to the fundamental
rights. The contention of the learned counsel is based
on an erroneous assumption that article 22 in clause (7)
confers a fundamental right on a person ; in its true
concept it restricts to a certain degree the measure of
the fundamental right contained in clause 4 (a) of the
article.
The argument that Parliament has no authority to
alter the period of one year prescribed by it under
article 22(7) (b) of the Constitution is again founded
on an erroneous assumption that the clause confers
legislative power on Parliament. The ambit of the
legislative powers of Parliament is contained in article
245 of the Constitution read with the entries in the
Seventh Schedule. Article 22 of the Constitution restricts those powers to a certain extent. It does not
enlarge them. Clause (7), however, cuts down these
restrictions to a certain extent. Parliament having
power to make the law has also the power to alter or
amend it, if it so chooses. It is difficult to assent to
the proposition of the learned counsel that if a person
is detained according to a law that existed at the time
of his detention, then in regard to him it is that and
that law alone which matters and any change in the
l!»Sl
s.. Krishn•11
and Othert
v.
Tht State of
Madras
Mahajan J.
638
19Sl
Si,, Krishnan
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
law, even if it has retrospective effect, cannot affect
him in any manner whatever.
and Others
"~
Thi Stale of
Madra3
Mallajan J.
The next point canvassed before us was that the
Constitution does not envisage detention for an indefinite period and that it is obligatory on Parliament to
provide a maximum period for detention of a person
under a law of preventive detention. In my opinion,
this argument again is not sound. Emphasis was
laid on the proviso to article 22(4) (a) which enacts
that nothing in the . sub-clause shall authorize the
detention of any person beyond the maximum period
prescribed by any law made by Parliament under
sub-clause (b) of clause (7), and it was urged that the
word "may" in article 22(7) must be read in the sense
of "must" and as having a compulsory force inasmuch
as the enactment authorizes Parliament to prescribe
by law a maximum period for detention, for the
advancement of justice and for public good, or for the
benefit of persons subjected to preventive detention.
Reference was made to Maxwell on "Interpretation of
Statutes" (9th Edn., page 246) and to the well-known
case of Julius v. Bishop of Oxford('). Lord Cairns in
that case observed as follows :"Where a power is deposited with a public officer
for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons
that power ought to be exercised."
In my opinion, clause (7) of article 22, as already
pointed out, in its true concept to a certain degree
restricts the measure of the fundamental right contained in clause ( 4) (a) and in this context the rule
referred to by Maxwell has no application whatever.
Moreover, the provision in the · Constitution is merely
an enabling one and it is well settled that in an enabling Act words of a permissive nature cannot be
given a compulsory meaning. ( Vide Craies on Statute
law, p. 254). Be that as it may, the point is no· longer
open as it has been concluded by the majority decision
in Gopalan's case( 2 ). The learned Chief Justice at
p. 119 of the report observed as follows :(I) 5 App. ca•. 214.
(2) '19S0] 8CR 18<
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
639
"Sub-clause (b) is permissive. It is not obligatory
on the Patliament to prescribe any maximum period.
It was argued that this gives the Parliament a right to
If that
allow a person to be detained indefinitely.
construction is correct, it springs out of the words of
sub-clause (7) itself and the court cannot help in the
matter."
Nothing said by Mr. Nambiar is sufficient to persuade me to take a different view ·of the matter than
was taken in Gopalan's case(1). It may be pointed out
that Parliament may well have thought that it was
unnecessary to fix any maximum period of detention
in the new statute which was of a temporary nature
and whose own tenure of ~ife was limited to on_e year.
Such temporary statutes cease to have ahy effect after
they expire, they automatically come to an end at the
expiry of the period for which they have been enacted
and nothing further can be done under them. The ·
detention of the petitioners therefore is bound to
come to an end automaticaUy with the life of the
statute and in these circumstances Parliament may
well have thought that it would be wholly unnecessary
to legislate and provide a maximum period of· deten·
tion for those detained under this law. The fast point urged by Mr. Nambiar that the provisions of the amended Act contravene the provisions
of article 21 of the Constitution does not impress me.
The expression "procedure established by law" was
considered by the majority in Gopalan's case(1) as
meaning procedure prescribed by law. The petitionen
have been detained in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the amended statute and their detention
therefore is in accordance with procedure prescribed
by law. The contention of Mr. Nambiar that they are
:JOVerned by the procedure contained in section 12 of
Act IV of 1950 as that was the procedure at the time
when initially they were detained is, in my opinion,
unsound. It is open to Parliament to change the procedure by enacting a law and that procedure becomes
the procedure established by law within the meaning
c1 > [19SOJ s.c.1..11s.
1951
s' Kwitnatt
mtd Ot ltera
v.
17.e State of
Mtt/lrtn.
'Mahai11n J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[~951]
l~l
of that expression in article 21 of the Constitµtion.
Further,
the present detention of the petitioners being
S-lVWuual
ot/Ot~'
by virtue of section 12 of the amended Act a new
detention under the amended Act, the procedure pres'17,. 3••tt •I
JI.....
- cribcd by the amended Act is the procedure established
by law within the meaning of article 21.
"·
For the reasons given above, in my opinion the
Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, is a valid
statute and the provisions impugned by Mr. Nambiar
do not contravene the Constitution and the pctitionen
arc not entitled to their release merely on the ground
that the period of one year mentioned in section 12 of.
Act IV of 1950 has expired.
On the merits of the petitions it was urged (1) that
the grounds supplied to then were vague and insufficient to enable them to make a, proper representation,
and (2) that their detention was mala fide and on poli·
tical and party considerations. There is no force what•
ever in ~hese contentions.
The result is that all these pet1t1ons arc dism!_ssed
and the rules are discharged. This order will have
force in the case of petitioners who have so far not
been released by Government.
S. I.. D•• J.
S. R. DAs J.-1 agree that the petitions should be
dismissed and I do so substantially on the grounds
itatcd by my learned brother Mahajan.
BosE J.-With the utmost respect I am unable to
accept the majority view. fo my judgment, section 11
(1) of the amcndip.g Act is ultra virei. The ground on
which I hold it to be so was suggested by me in the
course of the arguments. It was, however, not very
fully dealt with possibly because I expressed my view
at a late stage and possibly because I did so somewhat
akctchily. But as I am ploughing a lonely furrow
.that, fortunately, will not much matter.
'
Articles 21 and 22 confer the fundamental right of.
personal liberty. The first is general, and as the meaning of the words "procedure established- hf law" ha&
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
641
been thoroughly discussed in Gopalan's casc:(1), I do not
intend to cover that ground. But so ·far as article 22
( 4) is concerned, my opinion is that it confers a fundamental right not to be kept under preventive detenThe extent of ·that
tion beyond a certain period.
pcriqd can vary but it can only be extended beyond
three months within certain fixed liniits and subject
to specified conditions.
Article 246 read with item 9 in List I and item 3 in
List III of the Seventh Schedule confcrs jurisdiction
upon the Union Parliament and ·the State Legislatures
to make laws for preventive detention, but article 22
(4) imposes restrictions. It says that•
"No law providing for preventive detention shall
authorise the detention of a person for a longer period
than three months,"
unless certain conditions arc fulfilled.
The conditions arc set out in sub-clause (a) and subclausc (b). Under the former, a law can provide for
preventive detention over three months provided (1)
there is an advisory board of a certain character, (2)
the board is of opinion that there is sufficient cause
for longer detention, and (3) the board reports before
the expiration of the three months. Then follows a
further restriction which is contained in the proviso to
5ub-clause (4). This states that"nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the
dc.~ention of any person beyond the maximum period
prescribed by any law made by Parliament under
sub-clause (b) of clause (7) ."
Sub-clause (b) of clause (7) reads as follows :" (7) Parliament may by law prescribe(b) the maximum period for which any person
may in any class or classes of cases be detained under
any law providing for preventive detention.''
The second set of conditions is given in sub-dause (b)
Gf clause (4). This sets out that a person can also be
detained beyond three months providcd'1). (19SOJ s.c.R.118.
19SJ.
s. Kmhn1J11
·alld Othera ·
••
The State of
Madra1.
Bose/.
642
1951
s, Krl..~nd'n
and Otlt<n
v.
The Srate of
Madras.
Bose J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951}
"such person is detained in accordance with the
provisions of any law :inade by Patliament under subclauses (a)~ Cb) of claus.e (7).''
I venture to underline the "and" becausei in my
opinion, a lot turn~ on it. But I shall deal with that
later.
·Sub-clause (a) of clause (7) empowers Parliament to
prescribe.
"the circumstances under which, and the cla~ or
classes of cases in which, a person may. be detained fot
a period longer than three months under any law
providing for preventive detention without obtaining
the opinion ·or an advisory board in accordance with
the provision of sub-clause (a) of clause (4)."
In my opinion, these provision~ confer a fundamental
right not to be detained beyond a certain period. The
extent of that period can vary but the maximum
period of detention cannot exceed tertain fixed limits.
Those limits are (a) in the first instance, three months :
if not, (b) the · maximum prescribed - by Parliament
under sub-clause (7) (b ). In my opinion, no law can be
made authorising detention either under sub-clause (4)
(a) or ( 4) (b) unless maximum period of detention 1' ·
prescribed by Parliament under sub-clause (7) (b).
I do hot agree with the contention that tlie word
"may" in clause (7) means "must". I am not prepared
to depart from the usual meaning of worti& unlt:sa
compelled to do so for overwhelming reasons. In my .
opinion, Parliament is free to prescribe or not to
prescribe a .maximum peried under clause (7) (b).
It cannot be compelled to do so. But equally neither
Parliament nor a State Legislature is compelled to
authorise preventive. detcniiOll beyond three months.
If, howevc:r, either wishes ltl do so, then it il bound to
conform to the provision$ -of either sub<!awe (a) er
sub-clause (b) of clause ( 4) or both ; and in the case of
sub-clause (a) the proviso Is as much .:t part of the sub.
clause a& its main provision. ll no maximum .llinit &
fixed under clause (7) (b}, then the proviso o.nn11 t
operate and if it cannot operate, no legnlatl~ action
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
643
can, in my opinion, be taken under clause (4) (a). If A
is told hy B that he may go to a bank and withdraw
a sum of money not exceeding such limit as may be
med by c, it is evident that until c fixes the limit no
money can be withdrawn. C cannot be compelled to fix
a limit but if he chooses not to do so, ·the money cannot be withdrawn. Equally, if A is told that he may
withdraw money not exceeding a limit which he
himself may fix, there can, in my O.{>inion, be no right
of withdfawal until .he fixes the limit.
Look at it another way.
A British General is told
by the Indian Government that he may travel from
India to Burma quickly and easily by plane. He is
also told that he may in addition drive by car over the
hills and through the jungles provided he does not go
beyond the confines of any road made ·hy the Burmese
Government ; and the Burmese Government is told ,
that it may, if it so chooses, put in a. road at India's
expense. It is fairly obvious that the Burmese Govern~
ment is not bound to make the road and it is equally
obvious that under these conditions the General will
not be able to go by car· unless the road is made.
I realise that analogies are often iqaccurate and' may
be misleading. But these examples serve to illustrate
the line of my reasoning. In my opinion, the Constitution (a) tells the State Legislatures that they may
legislate for preventive detention beyond three months
but not beyond a limit which Parliament may fix and
(b) tells Parliament that Parliament itself may do the
same thing provided the detention does not exceed a
maximum which it may itself fix. There is no need ·to
fix a maximum in either event but if that is not done,
then there can be no legislation under clause (4) (a),
Until tl\e road is built there is no right of way.
The same limitation attaches to clause (4) (b ). Legislative action cannot be taken under this unless, first,
the law is made by Parliament and, second, it is madtt
"µrlEler sub-clauses (;i.) and (b) of claus¢ (7)". l again
"enturc to underline the "and" becaqse, in my opinion,
"'-andl' means and &liould mean "and" unless there is
1!)~1
$. Kru/llfan
qn4 O11.er.J
v.
TM State of
Mad.raJ.
Bo~J.
644
1951
S. XriJhnan
and Oth"er!
v.
The State of
MadraJ.
Ban!.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
compelling reason to make it mean "or". To my mind,
not only is there no compelling reason here but, on the
contrary, there are powerful reasons why it should be
construed in its usual and normal sense. The reasons
are these.
Articles 21 and 22 confer a fundamental right and
give a fundamental guarantee. It is therefore the duty
of the Court to sec that the right is kept fundamental
and that the fullest scope is given to the guar.antee.
It is our duty to ensure that the right and the guarantee
are not rendered illusory and meaningless. Therefore,
wherever there is scope for difference of opinion on a
matter of interpretation in this behalf, the interpretation which favours the subject must always be used
because the right has been conferred upon him and it
is the right which has been made fundamental, not the
, fetters and limitations with which it may be circumscribed by legislative action. It is true the full scope
and content of the right cannot be determined without
examining the boundaries within which it is to be
confined, and I agree that in interpreting these provisions equal weight must be given to all the clauses;
also that no one part can be treated with greater
sanctity than the rest. But if, when all that is done,
doubt still remains, then the doubt must, in my judgment, be resolved in favour of the subject and not of
the State.
Brush aside for a moment the pettifogging of the law
and forget for the nonce all the learned disputations
about this and that, and "and" "or", or "m4yu
and "m:ust". Look past the mere verbiage of the
words and penetrate deep into the heart and spirit of
the Constitution. What sort of State are we intended
to be? Have we not here been given a way of life, the
right to individual freedom, the utmost the State can
confer in that respect consistent with its own safety?
Is not the sanctity of the individual recognised :and
emphasised again and again? Is not our Constitution
in violent contrast to those of States where the State is
everything and the individual but a slave or a serf to
serve the will of those who for the time being wield
almost absolute power ? I have no doubts on this score.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I hold it therefore to be our duty, wh.en there is
ambiguity or doubt about the construction of any
clause in this chapter on Fundamental Rights, to
resolve it in favour of the freedoms which have been so
solemnly . stressed. Read the magnificent sweep of the
preamble:"We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved
to constitute India into a · Sovereign Democratic ·Republic and to secure to all its citizens : Justice, Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity."
Read the provisions of the chapter on Fundamental
Rights:-"All citizens shall have the right etc."
•
•
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
to procedure csablished
liberty except according
by law."
"No person who , is arrested . shall be detained in
custody without etc."
'No law providing for preventive detention ·shall
authorise etc. unless-"
Read the provisions which circumscribe the powers
of Parliament and prevent it from being supreme. What
does. it all add up to ? How can it be doubted that the
stress throughout is on the freedom conferred and that
the limitations placed on them are but regrettable
necessities ?
I do not doubt that in construing the f'..onstitutior:i
we must do. so according to all the usual well recognised canons of construction. I· do not doubt that
when the language i.s plain, full effect must be giftn
to it whatever the implications. All I insist on is that
when there is ambiguity or doubt and it is poMible to
take either this view or that, then we must come down
on the side of liberty and freedom; and I err in good
company in so holding. Lord Romer said as much in
LiversiJge's case (1) though he made an exception in the
(J) (t9'J2J A.c. 206 at 2so.
1951
S. L-isfitt'111
tmd C)tller3
v.
Tfle Sta!e of
Mcirtu.
llt11e 1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1951
S. K,;, hnan
anA Ot,~ers
v.
The State sf
Madra!.
~~.. J.
[1951)
case of war legislation. How can it be said that in this
case there is no ambiguity and that there is no room
for doubt ? When I am asked to hold that "and"
means "or,, and that "may" means "must", how can
it be said that there is no room for difference of opinion?
When I am old that"no law providing for preventive detention shall
authorise the detention of a person for a longer period
than three months"
unless there is an Advisory Board etc., and even
then not beyond
"the maximum period prescribed by
any law
made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7)"
how can it be said that there is no doubt about the
intention and that this clearly and unambiguously
means that the detention can be for an. indefinite period
even under a State law if Parliament does not choose
to act under clause (7) (b)? To my mind, there is ambiguity and there is room for doubt.
I feel that the people of India chose for themselves
the free way of life and that they entrusted to Parliament, which represents their will, the duty of satisfying itself that any limitations hereafter to be placed on
the freedoms conferred. are necessary and essential and
that these limitations will not exceed such limits as
Parliament itself shall determine solemnly and deliberately, after anxious scrutiny and dutiful care. I
cannot bring myself to believe that the framers of our
Constitution intended that the
liberties guaranteed
should be illusory and meaningless or that they could
be toyed with by this person or that. They did not
bestow on the people of India a cold, lifeless, inert
mass of malleable clay but created a living organism,
breathed life into it and endowed it with purpose and
vigour so that it should grow healthily and sturdily
in the democratic way of life, which is the free way.
In the circumstances, I prefer to decide in favour of
the freedom of the subject.
I am not hampered here by considerations of war .
necessity or emergency legislation where some authorities hold that the canons of constructions are different
S~C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
647
and that allowance must be made in favour of the
State for the imperfections of language used in legislation which had to be drafted and enacted in a desperate hurry with the State in dire and immediate peril.
I am construing a Constitution which was hammered
out solemnly and deliberately after the most mature
consideration and with the most anxious care. I feel
bound, therefore, when there is ambiguity or doubt,
to resolve it in favour of what I conceive to be the free
way of a Sovereign Demo~atic Republic. After all,
who framed the Constitution and for whose benefit
was it made ?-not just for those in brief authority,
not only for lawyers and dialecticians bqt for the common people of India. It should therefore be construed,
when that can be done without doing violence to the
language employed, in a simple straightforward way
so that it makes sense to the man in the street, so that
the common people of .the land can follow and understand its meaning, To my mind, the whole concept of
the Constitution is that after years of bitter struggle
the citizens of India are assured that certain liberties
shall be guaranteed to them and that these liberties
shall not be curtailed beyond limits which they and
all the world can know and which can only be fixed by
the highest authority in the land, Parliament itself,
directly and specifically after affording
opportunity
for due deliberation in that august body. I would
struggle hard against any interpretation which permitted evasion of those important limitations and which
permitted those hardwon liberties to be curtailed by
some accidental side wind which allows virtual delegation of the responsibility for fixing the maximum
limits which Parliament is empowered to fix to some
lesser authority, and worse, for' fixing them ad hoc in
each individual case, for that, in my opinion, is what
actually happens, whatever the technical name, when
Parliament fixes no maximum and lesser authorities
are left free to decide in each case how long the
individual should be detained. I am clear that these
are not matters which should be viewed technically or
narrowly but in the broad and liberal spirit in which
they were · conceived. Bearing this in mind, I will
1951
S. Kri.shnan
and Others
v.
Tise State of
Madra1.
Boie· I.
648
19SI
S. IriJhnan
111111 Othm
v.
Th• Stat1 •I
Madr.aJ.
B11Jt J.
SUPREME
COURT
proceed to examine the
amending Act.
REPORTS
[1951)
impugned provisions of the
In my judgment, section 9 is good because it confers
a benefit and a privilege.
It takes away nothing. It
gives all detenus the right to ga before an Advisory
Board for review of their cases. It confers this right
not only on those who may be detained In the future
hut also on those already under detention. And further,
it confers this right on those who had no such right
before. This is not an infringement of any fundamental
right nor does it contravene any article of the Constitution; therefore Parliament was free to legislate as. it
pleased regarding that. It was free artificially to alttr
the starting point of the order of detention which i&
what it has done in sub-section (2)(a). That section,·
in my judgment, is intra vires.
So also is new section 12 which continues in force
existing detentions despite the expiry of the old Act
and states that the passing of the new Act shall not
affect either the validity or Jurlllion of orders passed
under the old Act. It will be remembered that the
detentions we are considering in these cases were good
under the old Act. That Act prescribed a maxim,um
limit, namely one year, for this class of detention. In
my opinion, Parliament had the right to say in this
particular manner, for the purpose of removing doubts,
that detentions already in force under that Act should
continue in force for the maximum period already
prescribed. That, to my mind, is the force of the
words "continue," "validity" and "durlltion."
That
would have been the result in any event but section ll
is there to remove possible doubts.
Section 11 (2) is alS<? good because here again a benefit is conferred. Detenus who had no right to rclcaM:
on the .idvicc of an Advisory Board arc here giv~ this
privilege. Therefore, this also ·intra I/ires.
But
&uh-section (1) is, to my mind, 11ltr11 oires. It is ~e
that we find an infringement of article 22(4).. It reads:"ln any case where the Advisory Board has report•
ed that there is in its opinion suflicicnt cause for the detention of a peison, the appropriate Government may
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
649
confirm the detention order and continue the detention
of the person concerned for such period as'it think.~ fit".
This is word for word the same as section 11 of the
old Act. It does not prescribe a maximum limit.
Now section 11 replaces sections 11 and 12 of the old
Act. The amending A~t directs that new section 11
be substituted for old sections 11 and 12. Old sccci_on 12 had prescribed a maximum limit of one year
in certain classes of cases. That is done away with in
the new Act As regards the rest, neither the old Act
nor the new prescribes any limit for other classes of
detention. That, in my opinion, not only contravenes
article 22(4) but in effect shifts the responsibility for
prescribing ·a maximum to the executive authorities
of each State and allows them to do it ad hoc in each
case. I am not speaking technkally at the moment.
I am viewing it broadly as the man in the street would.
I am placing myself in the position of the dctenu
and looking at it· through his eyes. The niceties of the
law do not matter to him. He docs not care about
grammar. All that matters to him is that he is behind
the bars and that Parliament has not fixed any limit
in his · kind of case and that local authorities tell him
that they have the right to say how long he shall remain under detention. I cannot bring myself to think
that. this was intended by the Constitution.
The
powers given to Parliament arc ample.. The Safeguards
for the safety of the State are all there. In the last
resort, immediate action can be taken under the emergency provisions. Therefore, when Parliament and the·
State Legislatures arc told that they cannot authorise
preventive detention beyond three months unless Parliament docs tMs and that, I am of opinion that the
responsibility to do these things is on Parliament · itself
and · that in this particular matter there can be no delegation of authority. The Constituent Assembly has entrusted this particular matter to the care of Parliament
itself and has m~dc this Parliament's
special responsibility. The country is therefore entitled to receive
the benefit of . the mature judgment, wisdom and
patriotism of that august body.
19SI
s. KriJ1t1111n
•M OtlierJ
v.
The $tote 11f
ltlurl!IJ.
a111e ·J.
650
1951
s. Kris/Jnan
WJd Others
v.
The State of
Mathas.
81)3,I J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
I am not doubting Parliament's . general powers
of delegatlon. But, in my opinion, . these powers
are circumscribed and each case must be judged
upon its own circumstances.
As this matter is
under consideration in another case and as mine
is a dissenting voice here, all I need say in this case is
that in my judgment this Is not one of the matters
which can be delegated.
It was said that all this is irrelevant because a
maximum limit has in fact been fixed in the present ,
instance. It was argued that the life of this Act has
only been fixed for one year and that the life of the
old Act was also only one year and that th'is in effect
fixes a maximum.
I am aware that there is high
authority for this view and I venture to dissent with
the utmost reluctance, but with the greatest respect
I find myself unable to agree.
In the first place, I cannot agree that the maximum
limit which Parliament is authorised to fix can be
fixed in this indirect way. What Parliament is empowered to do under article 22(7) (b) is to prescribe"the maximum period for which any person may
in any class or classes of cases be detained."
It cannot do this by saying that no person shall be
detained beyond the 26th of February, 1952, because
that means that persons arrested on the 27th of February, 1951, can be kept under detention for a year while
those arrested on the 25th of February, 1952, can only
be detained for one day. That, in my judgment, is
not what is meant by prescribing a maximum period.
In the next place, when Parliament is authorised
to do this, it is expected to do so consciously and
deliberately after giving the matter due and mature
consideratlon. It is not possible to say that Parliament
had this provision in mind and intended to act under
it when ft merely fixe-0 the duration of the Act. Had
the matter been properly discussed and placed lx1fore
Parliament in the way it should have been, it is conceivable that it might have considered that the maximum period o~ detention should not exceed, say, six
months though the duration of the Act should be· OB!!
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
651
year. In other words, that person could continue to
be arrested so long as the Act was in force but they
could not be kept under detention for more than six
months. With the utmost respect, I cannot agree that
functions so solemnly entrusted to the care of Parliament under these fundamental clauses can be discharged unconsciously.
In the third place, I cannot agree that these deten- tions would come to an end with the expiry of the Act.
The rule in the case of temporary Acts is that"as a general rule, and . unless it contains some
special provision to the contrary, after a temporary
Act has expired no proceedings can be taken . upon it,
and it ceases to have any further effect. Therefore,
offences committed against temporary Acts must be
prosectded and punished before the
Act expires."
(Craies on Statute Law, 4th edition, page 347)·
But transactions wh'ich are concluded and complete
before the Act expires continue in being despite the
expiry. See Craies on Statute Law, page 348, and 31
Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edition), page
513. I take this to mean that if a man is tried £or an
offence created by a temporary Act and is found guilty
and sentenced to, say, five years' imprisonment, he
would have to serve his term even if the Act Were to
expire the next day. In my opinion, the position is
the same in the case of detentions.
A man, who is
arrested under a temporary detention Act and validly
ordered to be detained for a particular period, would
not be entitled to claim release before his time juSt
because the Act expired earlier.
Then again. The Act we are considering has special
provision to the contrary. Section 11(1) empowers
either a State or the Union Goverrunent to order the
detention of a person "for such period as it thinks fit;,.
If this provision is not altra vires, then the Act in
express terms permits the appropriate Government to
order a detention which shall endure beyond the life
of the Act itself, and unless the fundamental provisions of the Constituti()n can be called in aid, there
is nothing to prevent Parliament from enacting such a
19Sl
S. ICHi1iltdt
ttndOthers
. . v.
The State
Madras.
Bose I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
s. XriJlinan
andOi/,.n
.....
Th• St•I• •f
M,,.,,.,,, .
.... 1.
[1951).
law. Therefore, the mere fact that the Act under
consideration is to expire on the 26th of February;
1952, docs not, in my opinion, mean that detentions
under it must necessarily come to an end on that date.
That in turn means that no maximum period has been
prescribed even indirectly•
Vioked straight in the face, what docs the decision
of the majority uphofding the validity of section 11 (1)
impon if it is pushed to its logical conclusion ? To me
it spells just this. The Constitution tells all persons
resident in the land"Hcre is the full extent of your liberty so far as
the length of detention is concerned. W c guarantee
That you will not be detained beyond three months
unless Parliament otherwise directs, either generally
or in your particular class of case; but we empower
Parliament to smash the guarantee absolutely if it so
chooses without let or hindrance, without restriction.
Though we authorise Parliament to prescribe a maxi·
mum limit of detention if it so chooses, we place no
compulsion on it to do so and we authorise it to pass
legislation which will empower any person or authority
Parliament chooses to name, right down to a police
ronstablc, to arrest you and detain you as long as he
pleases, for the duration of your life if he wants, so
that you may linger and rot in jail till you die, as did
men in the Bastille."
In the absence of restrictions Parliament undoubtedly has these powers, for it can legislate about
preventive detention. But if you remove the restrictions, what is left of the fundamental right ? My
concept of a fundamental right is something which
Parliament cannot touch save by an amendment of
the Constitution. The full content of the right can be
as small or as narrow as yo1f please, but unless there i$
a residue which can answer that test, there is to my
mind nothing fundamental. Now, I have no doubt
that a fundamental right regarding the length of deteqtion was intended to be conferred, It would be poin~
lcss to make the provision about three .months and
place it in the chapter on Fundamental Rights if that
were. not so ; so also there would be no point in tht:
.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
653
elaborate provisions regarding this in clauses (4) and
(7). A simple clause saying that no detention shall exceed three months "unless Parliament otherwise directs"
would have met the case. It is therefore clear to my
mind that something fundamental regarding the length
ol. detention which Parliament could not touch save
by amendment of the Constitution was intended to be
conferred. But if section 11 (1) is upheld, what is there
left which is beyond the reach of Parliament ? Parliament has here in effect said that there need be no
general limit to the duration of detentions and that
lesser authorities can fix the duration in each individual
case and arc free to detain for as long as they please.
If that is so, then what is there left of anything fundamental regarding the maximum length of detention ?
To my mind, the whole object of the elaborate provisions in clauses ( 4) and (7) is to place restraints on
powers regarding the length of indefinite and arbitrary
detentions which would otherwise be absolute.
For these reasons, I am of opinion that section 11 (1)
is ttltra vires. My only hesitation has been on the
score of Gopalarl1 case (1). I have searched long and
anxiously to see whether this question is concluded
there and whether my hands are tied. After con51derablc study of the decisiol\, I have reached the
conclusion that I am not pound.
There were six Judges there. The present Act, the
amending Act of 1951, was not under consideration
but section 11 of the old Act, which corresponds t~
section 11(1) of the new, was considered. But only two
Judges, namely, my Lord the Chief Justice and my
brot~cr . Mahajan, ~icalt with this section directly.
Their views arc directly counter to mine. They expressly hold that section 11 of the old Act is intra vires.
That means that section 11 ( 1) of the present Act
would also have to be upheld on their view. But the
other four Judges did not discuss the vires of section 11 at all. They concentrated their attention on
sections 12 and 14 of the old Act. . It is true my
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 8!.
1951
S. Krishnan
and Other8
v.
The State of
Madras.
Bose J.
654
1951
s. Kri•hnan
and Other>
v.
The Stale of
Madt&•·
Bo3e J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
brother Das made a general observation at the end of.
his judgment that in his view "the impugned Act is
valid law except as to section 14" but he did not
expressly consider section 11. In the circumstances,
I do not think Gopalan's case concludes the matter.
It is perhaps ironical that I should struggle to uphold these freedoms in favour of a class of persons who,
if rumour is to be accredited and if the list of their
activitirs furnished to us is a true guide, would be the
first to destroy them if they but had the power. But
I cannot allow personal predilections to sway my
judgment of
the Constitution. As Lord Justice
Scrutton remarked in Rex. v. Home Secretary ( 1 ) : "It is, indeed, one test of belief in principles if
you apply them to cases with which you have ot>
sympathy at all."
and as Mr. Justice Holmes of the United States
Supreme Court said, speaking of the American
Constitution,
"If there is any principle of the Constitution that
more imperatively- calls for attachment than ahy other
it is the principle of free thought-not free thought
for th<>se who agree with us but freedom for the
thought that wt hate."
I respectfully dissent from the majority view and
consider that section 11 (1) is ultra vires. It follows,
in my view, that the present detentions are bad. I
am of opinion that the petitioners in these cases arc
~ntitlcd to immediate rdeasc.
l'e'litions dismissed.
Agent for the petitioner in Petition No. 303 : S11brali-
manyt1m.
Agent for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 618, 619,
021, 622 and 624 to 631 : V. P. K. Nambiyar.
Agent for the State of. Madras: P. A. Melita.
Agent for the State of. Assam : N aimit Ltd.
Agent for the Union of India: P. A. Mehta.
(I) (1923) L.J.K.B. 797
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org