THE STATE OF MADRAS versus SRIMATHL CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 April 1951 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 525 | 1951 INSC 26
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 April 1951
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, SIR SYED FAZL ALI, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 270/1951
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 525
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 26
Text of the judgment
...
525
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
THE STATE OF MADRAS
.April 9·
"·
SRIMATHl CHAMPAKAM DORAIRAJAN
and
THE STATE OF MADRAS
ti.
C. R. SRINIVASAN
J.
[Sm1 HAlllLAL KANIA C. FAZL Au,
PATANJALI SASTU, M&Hll. CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHUJEA, S. R. DAS and VMAN BosE
JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts. 13, 16 (4), 29 (2), 46-Admission to
educational institution1-E:cecuti11e Order fi:cint number of seius for
particular communities-Invalidity-Fundamental ritht
aiainst
discrimination on the iround of reli1ion only-Directive principles
of State policy-Value of.
With regard to admission of students tO the Engineering and •
Medical Colleges of the State, the Province of Madras had issued
an order (known as the Communal G. 0.) that seats should be
filled in by the selection committee strictly on the following basis,
i.e., out of every 14 scats, 6 were to be allotted to Non-Brahmin
(Hindus), 2 to Backward Hindus, 2 to Brahmins, 2 to Harijans,
1 to Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians and 1 to Muslims :
Held by the Full Court (Kania C. /., Fazl Ali, Pataniali Sastri,
Mehr Chand Mahaian, Mukher;ea, S. R. Das and .Vivian
Bose 1/.)-that the Communal G. 0. constituted a violation of
the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens of India by
Art. 29 (2) of the Constitution, namely, that "no citizen shall be
denied admission to any educational institution maintained by
the State or receiving aid out of the State funds on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, language or any of them," and was therefore void under Art. 13.
The directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV
of the Constitution cannot in any way override or abridge the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Part UI. On the other hand
they have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights laid down in Part tu .
Judgment of the Madras High Court affirmed.
C1v1L
APPELLATE
and 271 of 1951.
JuRisDICTION.-Case
Nos. 270
526
1951
v.
Srimothi
Ch4mMam
Dorasrajon
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
Appeals under Art. 132 ( 1) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated 27th July,
1950, of the Madras High Court in certain applications
under Art. 226 of the Constitution for protection of the
fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 15 ( 1)
and Art. 29 (2) of the Constitution and praying for the
issue of a writ of mandamus or other suitable prerogative writ restraining the State of Madras and all
officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following the order of the Government known as the Communal G. 0. which laid down
rules to be observed· by the selection committee in the
matter of admission of students to the Medical and
Engineering Colleges of the State.
V. K. T. Chari, Atl11ocatt:-General, Madras (R. Ganapat/1y lyt:r, with him) for the appellant.
Das].
Al/adj Krjshnasw11mj Aiyar (Al/adj
Ajyar, with him) for the respondents.
Kupuswamj
1951, April 9. The Judgment of the
delivered by
Court was
DAs J.-This judgment covers both Case No. 270 of
1951 (State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairaian) and Case No. 271 of 1951 (State of Madras v.
C. R. Srini11asan) which are appeals from the judgment passed by the Higl) Court of Judicature at
Madras on July 27, 1950, on two separate applications
under article 226 of the Constitution complaining of
breach of the petitioners' fundamental right to get
admission into educational institutiQns maintained by
the State.
·
The State of Madras maintains four Medical
Colleges and only 330. seats aie available for students
in those four Colleges. Out of these 330 scats, 17
seats are reserved for students coming from outside
the State and 12 seats are .reserved for discretionary
allotment by the · State and the balance of the scats
available are apportioned between four distinct groups
of districts in the State.
S.C.R.
527
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Likewise, the State of Madras maintains four
Engineering Colleges and the total number of seats
available for students in those Colleges are only 395.
Out of these, 21 seats are reserved for students coming
from outside the State, 12 seats are reserved for
discretionary allotment by the State and the balance
of the seats available are apportioned between the
same four distinct groups of districts.
For many years before the commencement of the
Constitution, the seats in both the Medical Colleges
and the Engineering Colleges so apportioned between
the four distinct groups of districts used · to be filled
up according to certain proportions set forth in what
used to be called the Communal G.O. Thus, for
- every 14 seats to be filled by the sdection committee,
candidates used to be selected strictly on the following
basis:-
'
Non-Brahmin (Hindus)
Backward Hindus
Brahmins
Harijans
Anglo-Indians and Indian
Christians
6
Muslims
I
2
2
2
Subject to the aforesaid regional and what have
been claimed to be prottct1vc prov1S1ons selection
from among the applicants from a particular community from one of the groups of districts used to be
made on certain principles based on academic qualifications and marks obtained by the candidates. In
the case of the Medical Colleges, not less than 20 per
cent. of the total number of seats available for
students of the State were filled by women candiates
separately for each region, it being open to the selection committee to admit a larger number of woman
candidates in any region if qualified candidates were
available in that region and if they were eligible for
selection on merits vis a vis the men candidates in
accordance with the general principles governing such
1951
The State of
Madras
v.
Srimathi
Champakam
Dorairajan
Das].
528
1951
Th< Stal< of
Madras
v.
Srimathi
Chompakam
Dorairajan
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
admissions as laid , down in those rules. It appears that
the proportion fixed in the old Communal G. 0. has
been adhered to even after the commencement of the
Constitution on January 26, 1950. Indeed, G. 0.
No. 2208, dated June 16, 1950, laying down rules for
the selection of candidates for admission into the
Medical Colleges substantially repi;oduces the communal
proportion fixed in the old Commu111l G. 0.
On June 7, 1950, Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan
made an application to the High Court of Judicature
at Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for
protection of her fundamental rights under article 15
(1) and article 29 (2) of the Consiitution and prayed
for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other suitable
prerogative writ restraining the State of Madras and
all officers and subordinates thereof from enforcing,
observing, maintaining or following or requiring the
enforcement, observance, maintenance 9r following by
the authorities concerned of the notification or order
generally referred to as the Communal G. 0. in and by
which admissions into the Madras Medical Colleges
were sought or purported to be regulated in such
manner as to infringe and involve the violation of her
fundamental rights. From the affidavit filed in support of her petition, it does not appear that the
petitioner had actually applied for admission in the
Medical College. She states that on inquiry she came
to know that she would not be admitted to the College
she belonged to the Brahmin community. No
objection, however, was taken to the maintainability
of her petition on the ground of absence of any actual
application for admission made by her. On the contrary, we have been told that the State had agreed
to reserve a seat for her, should her application before
the High Court succeed. In the peculiar circumstances,
we do not consider it necessary to pursue this matter
any further. But we desire to guard ourselves against
being understood as holding that we approve of a
person who has not actually applied for admission
into an cduca;ional institution coming to Court complaining of infringement of any fundamental right
as
f
,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
529
under article 29 (2). The High Court by its judgment
delivered on July ll, 1950, allowed this application of
Srimathi Champakam
Dorairajan.
The State ,of
Madras has now come up before us on appeal which has
been numbered Case No. 270 of 1951.
Sri Srinivasan who had actually applied for admission into the Government Engineering College at
Guindy, filed a petition praying for a writ of mandamus
or any other writ restraining the State of Madras .and
all officers thereof from enforcing, observing, maintaining or following the Communal G.O. in and by which
admission into the Engineering College was sought to
be regulated in such manner as to infringe and
involve the violation of the fundamental right of the
petitioner under article 15 (1) and artide 29 (2) of the
Constitution. In the affidavit filed in support of his
petition, the petitioner has stated that he had passed
the Intermediate Examination held in March, 1950, in
Group 1, passing the said examination in the first class
and obtaining marks set out in paragraph 1 of his
affidavit. It will appear that in the optionals which
are taken into consideration in determining the
academic test for admission in the Engineering College
the petitioner Srinivasan secured 369 marks out of a
maximum of 450 marks. The High Court has by the
same judgment allowed this application also and the
State has filed an appeal which has been numbered
271 of 1951. The learned counsel appearing for the
State of Madras conceded that these two applicants
would have been admitted to the educational institutions they intended to join and they. would not have
been denied admission if selections had been made on
merits alone.
Article 29 which occurs in Part III of the Constitution under the head "Cultural and Educational Rights"
runs as follows :
"(1) Any section of the citizens residing in the
territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct
language, script or culture of its own shall have the
right to conserve the same.
1951
The State of
Madras·
v.
Srimathi
Champakam
Dorairqjan
Das].
530
1951
The Stau ef
Madras
...
Srimathi
Champakam
Dorairflian
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any
educational institution maintained by the State or
receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
It will be noticed that while clause ( 1) protects the
language, script or culture of a section of the citizens,
clause (2) guarantees the fundamental right of an individual citizen. The right to get admission into any
educational institution of the kind mentioned in clause
(2) •is a right which an indivjdual citizen has as a
citizen and not as a member of any community or class
of citizens. This right is not to be denied to the citizen
on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or
any of them. If a citizen who seeks admission into
any such educational institution has not the requisite
academic qualifications and is 'denied admission on
that ground, he certainly cannot be heard to complain
of an infraction of his fundamental right under this
article. But, on the other hand, if he has the academic
qualifications but is refused admission on! y on grounds
of religion, race, caste, language or any of them, then
there is a clear breaclt of his fundamental right.
The learned Advocate-General appearing for the
State contends that the provisions of this article have
to be read along with other articles in the Constitution. He urges that article "6 charges the State with
promoting with special care the educational and
economic interests of the weaker sections of the people,
and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes, and with protecting them from social
injustice and all forms of exploitation. It is pointed
out that although this article finds a place in Part IV
of the Constitution which lays down certain directive
principles of State policy and though the provisions
contained in that Part are not enforceable by any
Court, the principles therein laid down are nevertheless
fundamental for the governance of the country and
article 37 makes it obligatory on the part of the State
to apply those principles in making laws. The argu·
ment is that having regard to the provisions of article
"6, the State is entitled to maintain the Communal
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
531
G. 0. fixing proportionate seats for different communities and if because of that Order, which is thus contended to be valid in law and not in violation of the
Constitution, the petitioners are unable to get admissions into the educational institutions, there is no
infringement of their fundamental rights. · Indeed, the
learned Advocate-General of ·Madras even contends
that the provisions of article 46 override the provisions
of article 29(2). We reject the above noted contentions
completely. The directive principles of the State policy,
which by article 37 are expressly made unenforceable
by a Court, cannot -override the provisions found in
Part III which, notwithstanding other provisions, are
expressly made enforceable by appropriate Writs,
Orders or directions under article 32. The chapter of
Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be
abridged by any Legislative or Executive Act or
order, except to the extent provided in the appropriate
article in Part III. The directive principles of State
policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the
Chapter of Fundamental Rights. In our opinion, that
is the correct way in which the provisions found in
Parts III and IV have to be understood. However, so
long as there is no infringement of any Fundamental
Right, to the extent conferred by the provisions in
Part III, there can be no objection to the State acting
in accordance with the directive principles set out in
Part IV, but subject again to the Legislative and
Executive powers and limitations . conferred on the
State under different provisions of the Constitution.
In the next place, it will be noticed that article 16
which guarantees the fundamental right of equality of
opportunity in matters of public employment and provides that .no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion,
race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or
any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against
in respect of any employment or office under the State
also_ includes a specific clause iii the following terms :" ( 4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State
from ma!cing any provision for the reservation of
appointments of posts in favour of any backward class
1951
Tke State of
Madras
v.
Srimathi
Champa/cam
Dorairajan
Das].
532
1951
The State of
Madras
...
Srimathi
Ckampakam
Dorairojan
Das]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
of citizens which, in the opinion of the .State, is not
adequately represented in the services under the
State."
If the arguments founded on article 416 were sound
then clause ( 4) of article 16 would have been wholly
unnecessary and redundant. Seeing, however, that clause
( 4) was inserted in artick 16, the omission of such an
express provision from article 29 cannot but be regarded as significant. It may well be that the intention
of the Constitution was not to introduce at all communal considerations in matters _of admission into any
educational institution maintained by the State or
receiving aid out of State funds. The protection of
backward classes of citizens may require appointment
of members of backward classes in State services and
the reason why power has been given to the State to
provide for reservation of such appointments for backward classes. may under those circumstances be understood, That consideration, however, was not obviously
considered pccessary in the case of admission into an
educational institution and that may well be the reason
for the omission from article 29 of a clause similar to
clause ( 4) of article 16.
Take the case of the petitioner Srinivasan. It is not
disputed that he secured a much larger number of
marks than the marks secured by many of the NonBrahmin candidates and yet the Non-Brahmin candidates who secured less number of marks will be
admitted into six out of every 14 seats but the petitioner
Srinivasan will not be admitted into any of them.
What is the reason for this denial of admission except
that he is a Brahmin and not a Non-Brahmin. He may
have secured higher marks than the Anglo-Indian and
Indian Christians or Muslim candidates but, nevertheless, he cannot get any of the scats reserved for the
last mentioned communities for no fault of his except
that he is a Brahmin and not a member of the aforesaid communities.
Such denial of admission cannot
but be regarded as made on ground only of his caste.
It is argued that the petitioners arc ·not denied
admission only because they arc Brahmins but for a
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
533
variety of reasons, e.g., (a) they are Brahmins, (ho)
8rahmins have an allotment of only · two scats out of
l4 and ( c) the two scats have already been filled up
by more meritorious Brahmin candidates. This may
be true so far as these two seats reserved for the
·8rahmins arc concerned but this line of argument can
have no force when we come to consider .the scats
reserved for candidates of other communities, for, so
far as those seats are concerned, the petitioners are
denied admission into any of them not on any ground
other than the sole ground of their being Brahmins
and not being members of the community for whom
those reservations have been made. The classification
in the Communal G. 0. proceeds on the basis of religion, race and caste. In our view, the classification
made in the Communal G. 0. is opposed to the Constitution and constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizen under article
29 (2). In this view of the matter, we do not find it
necessary to consider the effect of articles 14 or 15 on
the specific articles discussed above.
For the reasons stated above, we arc of opinion that
the Communal G. 0. being inconsistent with the provisions of article 29 (2) in Part III of the Constitution
is void under article 13. The result, therefore, is that
these appeals stand dismissed with costs.
Appeals dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: P. A; MehttZ.
Agent for the respondents : M. S. K. StZStri.
19.51
Th4 Stale of
MadrtU
.Y.
Srimathl
Champakam
Dorairajan
D'"J
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