THE UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. versus THEIR WORKMEN
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 April 1951 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 380 | 1951 INSC 25
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 April 1951
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, SIR SYED FAZL ALI, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 35/1951
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 380
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 25
Text of the judgment
380
1051
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
of the village, their rights under the custom should
Ram Doon LU r.ev~ve as soon as. the rive~ come~ .down within the
amt other. limits of mouza S1kha. This position certainly has
v.
got to be admitted but as we are concerned with the
Radh' Sham
and Other•.
J1.ukherjea J,
state of affair£ existing at the date of the institution of
the suit and there is no evidence on the record as to
the position of the river at the present moment, the
plaintiff will be entitled to a decree in the form as it
was given by the trial judge, it being clearly understood that the rights declared in this suit would be
subject to the custom of Dhrtr Dhura which the defendants may invoke if and when the proper occasion arises.
Subject to this observation, we allow the appeal and
restore the judgment of the trial judge. The plaintiff
No. I wiJI be entitled to his costs.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellants: R. S. Narula.
Agent for the respondents : Tarachand Brijmohan
Lal.
1951
THE UNITED COMMERCIAL BANK LTD.
AJ>Til 9.
v.
THEIR WORKMEN
(and other cases)
UNION OF INDIA-Intervener.
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J ., SA!YID FAZL Au,
PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MUKHERJEA: S.R. DAS and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.J
Industrial Disputes Act (XTV of 1947), ss. 7, 8, 12, 16-Rules
under the Act, R. 5-Constitution of Tribunal of three membcrsAbsence of one of three members on other duty-Absent member
rejoining after some time-Validity of awards made during his
absence by the two remaining members, and by all of them after
he rejoined-Construction and effect of ss. 7, 8, 12 and Rule ~.
The Central Government constituted an Industrial Tribunal
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, consisting of A, B, and C
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
381
for deciding certain disputes and the Tribunal commenced its
19111
sittings in September, 1949. On the 23rd Novem\)er, 1949, the
services of C were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Thi United
External Affairs as a member of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Commercial
Disputes Triounal, and the two remaining members, after an ob- Banlc Ltd.
jection raised by one side, continued to sit and hear the disputes.
v.
On the 20th February, 1950, C returned from the Boundary Their Workm<in.
Disputes Tribunal and began to sit again with the other
two members and hear the further proceedings in the case
of disputes which were part heard and not finally decided
on that date. On the 20th May, 1950, the Government issued a
notification that C had " resumed charge of his duties as a member of the All India Indu!itrial Tribunal". Some awards were
made by A and B before the 20th February, 1950, and some
awards were made after that date by A, Band C together.
Held, per KANIA, C. J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and
BOSE JJ. (FAZL ALI and PATANJALI SASTRI JJ. dissenting):(i) when C was appointed as a member of the Boundary
Disputes Tribunal, his services "ceased to be available" and
there arose " a vacancy " within the meaning of Sec. 8 of the
Industrial Disputes Act ;
(ii) under the said section read with Rule 5 of the Industrial
Disputes Rules, when a vacancy occurred· it was obligatory on
the Government to notify its decision as to whether it intended
to fill up the vacancy or not, and if the Government decided
not to fill up the vacancy, a notification under Sec. 7 of the
Act was essential to constitute the remaining members a
Tribunal inasmuch as a Tribunal of three members is a different
Tribunal altogether from a Tribunal consisting of two of them
only;
(iii) neither the fact that C began to sit again along with the
two other members from the 20th February, 1950, nor the notification of the 20th May, 1950, stating that Chad "resumed charge
of his duties as a member" of that Tribunal could be treated as
an appointment to the vacancy created on C's appointment as a
member of the Boundary Disputes Tribunal;
(iv) awards made by A and B after the services of C ceased
to be available, and awards made after the 20th February, 1950,
by A, B and C were not made by a Tribunal duly constituted
under the Act and were void ;
(v) since the two remaining members were not a duly con·
stituted Tribunal and the duty to work and decide was the joint
respomibility of all the three members who originally constituted
the Tribunal, the matter was one of absence of jurisdiction and
not a mere_irregularity in the conduct of proceedings, and the
defect could not be cured by acquiescence or estoppel.
382
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
1951
PerFAzLALiandPATANJALI SASTRI}J. (contra)-There was
a ' vacancy ' within the meaning of Sec. 8 of the Act when the
The Unittd services of C were placed at the disposal of the Boundary Disput.es
Commercial
Tribunal, \Vhich provided an occasion for the Government to
Bank Ltd.
exercise the discretion vested in it under Sec. 8 of the Act to fill
v,
up the vacancy or not. The fact that the Government decided not
Their Workmen. to fill up the vacancy, could not render the Tribunal an imperfectly constituted Tribunal, and the proceedings could validly be
continued before the Tribunal in spite of the vacancy. Fnrther,
since the vacancy was a temporary one and was not filled np, C
did not cease to be a member of the Tribunal and could therefore
rejoin it as soon as he was free from the duties of his new office.
Even if it be assnmed that it was necessary for the Government
to make an appaintment under Sec. 8 (1), the requirements of
that section were complied with, when C joined under the orders
of the Government and that fact was also notified by the Government on the 20th May, 1950. Rnle 5 of the Industrial Disputes
Rules applies only when a Tnbunal is initially constituted. It
does not apply to appointments to fill vacancies.
Per MuKHERJliA J .-An Industrial Tribunal can be constituted only in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act and unless a Tribunal is properly constituted,
it cannot be invested with jurisdiction to adjudicate on industrial
disputes. Under snb-sec. (2) of Sec. 7, the number of members
constituting the Tribunal has to be determined by the appropriate
Government and a change in the number of members could be
made therefore only in pursuance of the provision contained in
that sub-section. As Sec. 8 does not lay down that, in case
the services of a member of the Tribunal cease to be available
and the Government does not choose to make a new appointment in his place, the remaining members should continue to
form the Tribunal, the constitution or reconstitution of the
remaining members as a Tribunal could be made only under Sec. 7
of the Act and as there was no notification by the appropriate
Government under Sec. 7 constituting the two remaining members
a Tribunal under the Act during the absence of C, the proceedings
before these two members and the awards made and signed by
them ouly during C's absence were void. But, there was no
necessity for a fresh notification and a fresh constitution of the
Tribunal when the absent member returned as the original notification was still there unaltered and unamended, and by virtue of
this notification alone, the three members would be competent to
sit as a Tribunal and discharge its duties. The Tribunal was
thefore, properly constituted from the 20th February; 1950, and
the awards made by all the three members after that date were
not void for want of jurisdiction in the Tribunal.
by
special leave against an Award dated 31st July, 1950,
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Appeals
S.C.R ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
1901
of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) :
Civil Appeals Nos. 35 to 50of1951. The facts of the TM Unit«I
case and the arguments of Counsel appear in the commercial
judgment.
Bank Ltd.
C. K. Daphtary ·(R. ]. Kolah, with him) for the Th . .;·0 k
' :mon.
appellanti in Civil Appeals Nos. 35, 36 and 37.
eir
]amshedji Kanga (R.]. Kolah, with him) for the
appellant in Civil Appeal No. 38.
S. Chaudhuri (G. C. Mathur, with him) for the
appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 41, 43, 44, 45, 46
and 49.·
S:Chaudhuri (S.N. Mukherjee, with him) for the
appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 48 and 50.
R. ]. Kolah, for the appellants in Civil Appeals
Nos. 39, 40 and 42.
Ram Lal Anand (Charan Das Pu_ri, with him) for
the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 47.
A.C. Gupta (M.M. Sen and R.K. Banerji, with him)
for the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 35, 36, 40,
41, 42, 43 and 44.
M.M. Sen for the respondents in Civil Appeals
Nos. 37, 39, 45 and 46.
Niren be (B.K. Chaudhury, with him) for the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos. 38 and 50.
T. R. Bhasin for the respondents in Civil Appeals
Nos. 48 and 49.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (S. M.
Sikri, with him) for the Intervener (Union of India)
in Civil Appeal No. 35.
1951. April 9. The judgment of Kania C.J, Mehr
Chand Mahajan, S. R. Das and Vivian Buse J]. was
delivered by Kania C.J.,. Fazl Ali. Patanjali Sastri
and Mukherjea JJ. delivered separate judgments.
KANIA C.J.-In these appeals the question whether Kanu. o. J.
the Industrial Tribunal (Bank Dispute~) had jurisdiction to make the awards has been directed by
the Court to be tried as a preliminary issue. The
decision depends on the true construction of sections
7, 8, 15 and 16 of the Industrial Disputes Act. On
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
this question, the agreed statement of facts shows that
by a notification of the Government of India dated
~::::;:;;:: the 13th June, 1949, the Central Government constitutBtmkLtd.
ed an Industrial Tribunal for the adjudication· of
v.
industrial disputes in banking companies consisting of
Their Workmen.Mr. K.C. Sen, chairman, Mr. S. P. Varma and Mr.
J. N. Mazumdar. A second notification dated the
0
Kania · J. 24th August, 1949, was thereafter issued as follows:"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1)
of section 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Central
Government was pleased to appoint Mr. N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar as a member of the Industrial Tribunal
constituted by the notifications of the Government of
India in the Ministry of Labour dated the 13th June,
1949, in the place of '.Vlr. S. P. Varma whose services
have ceased to be available." The Tribunal commenced its regular sittings at Bombay from the 12th to the
16th of September, 1949. It thereafter sat at Delhi and
Patna between the 19th September, 1949, and 3rd April,
1950. Further sittings were held, at some of which
Mr. Mazumdar was absent on various dates and Mr.
Chandrasekhara Aiyar was absent from the 23rd
November, 1949, to the 20th of February, 1950, as his
services were placed at the disposal of the Ministry of
External Affairs as a member of the lndo-Pakistan
Boundary Disputes Tribunal. Between the 23rd
November, 1949, and 20th February 1950, Mr. Sen and
Mr. Mazumdar together sat at several places and made
certain awards. Those awards have been accepted by
the Government under section 15 of the Act and
published in the Gazette as the awards of the Tribunal. The Tribunal held its sittings in Bombay to hear
general issues from the 16th January, 1950, and concluded them on the 3rd April, 1950. In the agreed
statement of facts. it is stated that the services of Mr.
Chandrasekhara AiyaJ' were not available to the Tribunal from the afternoon of 23rd November, 1949, to the
forenoon of 20th February, 1950. From the 16th
January, 1950, up to 20th February, 1950, several
matters, particularly including 15 items covering,
inter alia, Issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 15, 23, 27, 28, 33, 34, 37
1951
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
385
and dealing with the question of the jurisdiction of
19111
the Tribunal in respect of officers regarding banks The United
having branches in more than one Province and banks Oommercial
in liquidation; question of retrospective effect to be Bank Ltd.
given to the award, question relating to provident and
v.
guarantee fund and allowances to special categories of Their Workmen.
workmen, were dealt with by the Tribunal. From the K ~ J
notes of the proceedings of the Tribunal it appears an.a . ·
that as numerous banks anB workmen were parties to
the proceedings, some workmen who had not found it
convenient to attend throughout appeared and put
forth their views in respect of the aforesaid issues and
questions after Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar started his
work from the afternoon of the 20th February, 1950,
again by sitting with Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal of the aforesaid three
persons to make the award is disputed on two grounds:
(1) That when Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar's services
ceased to be available, as mentioned in the agreed
statement of facts, the remaining two members had to
be re-appointed to constitute a Tribunal. (2) That
when Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar beg;m to sit again
with Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar from the forenoon of
20th February, 1950, it was imperative to issue a notification constituting a Tribunal under section 7 of the
Industrial Disputes Act. The argument is that in the
absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar the two members had no jurisdiction to hear anything at all without the appropriate notification and that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar's services having ceased to be available
on the 23rd of November, 1949, he cannot sit again
with the other two members to form the Tribunal in
the absence of a notification under section 7.
In order to appreciate the correct position, it is
necessary to consider the scheme of the Industrial
Disputes Act. It envisages the establishment of a Conciliation Board, a Court of Inquiry and a Tribunal for
adjudication. Relevant portions of sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
15 and 16 of the Act which only are material for the
present discussion run as follows: 110
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[195
5. (1) "The appropriate Government may as
occasion arises by notification in the official Gazette
~=~~;:.~ constitute a Board of Conciliation for promoting the
Bank Ltd.
settlement of an industrial dispute·.
v.
• (2) A Board shall consist of a chairman and two or
Their Workmen. four other members, as the appropriate Government
thinks fit.
Kania 0. J.
.
(3) The chairman shal~ be an independent . pers~n
and the other members shall be persons appomted m
equal numbers to represent the parties to the dispute
and any person appointed to represent a party shall be
appointed on the recommendation of that party :
1961
*
*
*
(4) A Board, having the prescribed quorum, may
act notwithstanding the absence of the chairman
or any of its members or any vacancy in its number.
Provided that if the appropriate Government notifies
the Board that the services of the chairman or any
other member have ceased to be available, the Board
shall not act until a new chairman or member, as the
case may be, has been appointed."
6. (1) "The appropriate Government may as
occasion arises by notification in the official Gazette
constitute a Court of Inquiry for inquiring into any
matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to
an industrial dispute.
(2) A Court may consist of one independent person
or of such number of independent persons as the
appropriate Government may think fit and where a
Court consists of two or more members, one of them
shall be appointed as the chairman.
(3) A Court, having the prescribed quorum, may
act notwithstanding the absence of the chairman or any
of its members or any vacancy in its number.
Provided that, if the appropriate Government
notifies the Court that the services of the chairman
have ceased to be available, the Court shall not act
until a new chairman has been appointed."
7. (1) "The appropriate Government may constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR! REPORTS
387
adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with
19ol
the provisions of this Act.
The United
(2)A Tribunal shall consist of such number of Oomm<1'Cial
members as the appropriate Govemm1ent thinks fit. Bank Ltti.
Where the Tribunal consists of two or more members,
v.
one of the~ shall be appointed as the chairman. .
Their Workmen.
(3) Every member of the Tribunal shall be an , Kania o. J.
independent person,
(a) who is or has been ,a Judge of a High Court
or a District Judge, or
(b) is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a
High Court:
Provided that the appointment to a Tribunal of any
person not qualified under part (a) shall be made hi
consultation with the High Court of the Province in
which the Tribunal has, or is intended to have, its
usu<!-1 place of sitting."
8. (1) "If the services of the chairman of a Board
or the chairman or other member of a Court or Tribunal cease to be available at any time, the appro~
priate Government shall in the case of a chairman,
and may in the case of any other member, appoint
another independent person to fill the vacancy,
and the proceedings shall be continued before the
Board, Court or Tribunal so reconstituted.
(2) Where a Court or Tribunal consists of one
person only and his services cease to be available the
appropriate Government shall appoint another independent person in his place, and the proceedings shall
be continued before the person so appointed.
(3) Where the services of any member of a Board
other than the chairman have ceased to be available,
the appropriate Government shaff appoint in the
manner specified in sub-section (3) of section 5 another
person to take his place, and the proceedings shall be
continued before the Board so reconstituted."
15.. (1) "Where an industrial dispute has been
referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold
its proceedings expeditiously and shall, as soon as
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951)
practicable on the conclusion thereof, submit its award
to the appropriate Government.
umnmercial
(2) On receipt of such award, the appropriate
bank Ltd.
Government shall by order in writing declare the
v.
award to be binding :
Their W QTkmen.
*
*·
*
Kania o. J.
(4) Save as provided in the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 19, an award declared to be binding
under this section shall not be called in question in
any manner."
16. "The report of a Board or Court and the
award of.a Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be
signed by all the members of the Board, Court or Tribunal, as the case may be :
Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed
to prevent any member of the Board, Court or Tribunal from recording a minute of dissent from a
report or award from any recommendation made
therein."
Confining our attention to the aspect of absence of
members at the sittings of the different bodies and
what results follow therefrom, it is clear that under
section 5 (4) when a member of a Board of Conciliation
is absent or there is a vacancy, the Board is permitted
to act, notwithstanding such absence, provided there
is the prescribed quorum. Such quorum is fixed by
the rules framed under the Act. According to the
proviso to this sub-section however, if the appropriate
Government notifies the Board that the services of the
chairman or any other member have ceased to be
available, the Board shall not act until a new chairman or a member, as the case may be, has been
appointed. Reading these two parts together, it is
therefore clear that a distinction is drawn between the
situation arising from the absence of the chairman or
any of its members and a vacancy in the Board, and
the position when the Government has intimated that
the services of a chairman or member have ceased to
be available. The words "having the prescribed
quorum" put a further limitation on the right of the
1951
Th• United
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
rn51
remaining members of the Board to act, when all of
them are not acting together. The proviso thus makes
it clear that when the serviees of a chairman or member ~=:~;r~;~
have ceased to be available and that fact has been Bank Ltd.
notified to the Board by the appropriate Government,
v.
the remaining members have no jurisdiction to act in Their Workmen.
the name of the Board. Thus all the contingencies of K ~
temporary or casual absence. as well as permanent ania · J.
vacancy, and the contingency of the chairman or a
member's services having ceased to be available
·are contemplated and provided for. In the same way
and in the same terms, provision is made in respect
of the Court of Inquiry in section 6 (3). The prov·isions as regards the Tribunal are found in section 7. No other section deals with the establishment
of the Tribunal. The first clause empowers the
appropriate Government to constitute one or more
industrial tribunals having the functions allotted
to it under the Ad. Sub clause (2) provides that
a Tribunal shall consist of such number of members
as the appropriate Government thinks fit. This
clause therefore authorizes the appropriate Govern
ment to fix the number of members which will
constitute the Tribunal. Sub-clause (3) and the proviso
deal with the qualifications of individuals to be
members with which we are not concerned. Although
in this section there is no provision like sections 5 (I)
and 6 (1) requiring a notification of the constitution of
the Tribunal in the official Gazette, the deficiency is
made up by rule 5 of the Industrial Disputes Rules,
1949, framed by the Government under section 38 of
the Act. The rule provides that the appointment of a
Board, Court or Tribunal "together with the names of
the persons constituting the Board, Court or Tribunal"
shall be notified in the official Gazette. It is therefore
obligatory on the appropriate Government to notify
the composition of the Tribunal and also the names
of the persons constituting the same. In respect of a
TriOunal which is entrusted with the work of adjudicating upon disputes between employers and employees
whi.ch have not been settled otherwise, this provision
390
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
is absolutely essential. It cannot be left in doubt to
the employers or the employees as to who are the perCo•M»ercial
sons authorized to adjudicate upon their disputes.
Bank Ltd.
This is also in accordance with notifications of appointv.
ments of public servants discharging judicial or quasiTheir Workmen. judicial functions.
The important thing therefore to
-.- J
note
is
that
the
number
forming the Tribunal and the
0
Kania · · names of the members have both to be notified in the
official Gazette for the proper and valid constitution
of the Tribunal.
It is significant that there is no provision correspond- •
ing to section 5 (4) or 6 (3) in section 7. Section 15
of the Act provides that when an industrial dispute
has been referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, it
shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and as soon as
practicable and at the conclusion thereof submit its
award to the appropriate Government. It is thus
clear and indeed it is not disputed that the tribunal as
a body should sit together and the award has to be
the result of the joint deliberations of all members of
the Tribunal acting in a joint capacity. Section 16
requires that all members of the Tribunal shall sign
the award. This again emphasizes that the function
of the Tribunal is joint and it is not open to any
member to refrain from signing the award. If the
award is not signed by all members it will be invalid
as it will not be the award of the Tribunal.
In the light of the provisions of section 7 the question arising for consideration is, what was the duty of
the Government when the services of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be available. The two telegrams
exchanged between Mr. Sen and the Government show
that the Government fook the view that a vacancy
had occurred and they did not think of filling it up at
the time. In the first place, on the true construction
of the Act, was it not obligatory on the Government
to notify to the contesting parties that it had decided
not to fill up the vacancy? Is it open to them to leave
the parties in doubt in respect of a Tribunal entrusted
with the work of adjudicating upon very important
disputes between parties? In our opinion, the whole
rns1
The United
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
scheme of the Act leads to the conclusion that the
1951
Government must notify its decision as to what it The United
desired to do, i.e., whether it intended to fill· up the Cammercial
vacancy or not and thereupon notify what members Bank Ltd.
were going to constitute the Tribunal. We are led to
v.
that conclusion because a Tribunal of three consisting Their Workmen.
of Mr. Sen, Mr. Mazumdar and Mr. Chandrasekhara
Aiyar is a different tribunal from one consisting of Kania 0 · J.
two, viz., of Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdaronly.
In this setting, it is next necessary to consider the
words of section 8 on which strong reliance is placed
on behalf of the respondents. The marginal note of
that section is "filling of vacancies ". The section
deals with the Board, the Court and the Tribunal in
its clauses. Under sub-section {l), the Legislature
clearly contemplates that when the services of a member
cease to be available at any time there will arise a
vacancy. This sub-section deals with the situation in
three stages. The first question is, have the services
of a member {and this includes, for the present discussion, a chairman) ceased to be available? If so, the
vacancy having thus arisen, the next question is, what
can be done by the appropriate Government ? If the
vacancy is filled up by making the appointment, the
final question is, how the proceedings shall go on before the Board, Court or Tribunal so reconstituted ? It
was argued on behalf of the respondents that it was
for the appropriate Government alone to pronounce
whether the services of a member had ceased to be
available at any time and that was not a matter for
the decision of the Court. In our opinion, what is
left to the option of the Government is, in case of the
services of a member ceasing to be available, to appoint
or not to appoint. Those stages having passed, the
appropriate Government, under the section, is obliged
to appoint another person to fill the vacancy, if the
vacancy is c.reated in respect of a chairman. In respect
of the vacancy of a member's p9st, the Government is
given the option to appoint or not to appoint another
person. The concluding words of the sub-section "so
reconstituted" clearly relate only to tpe contingency of
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
the Government making the appointment of another
independent person •in the vacancy.
The concluding
The United
.
Commercial
part of that sub-section provides for the continuance of
Bank Ltd.
the proceedings before the body so reconstituted. Subv,
section (2) also provides that where a i:ourt or tribuTheir Woekmen. nal consists only of one person and his services have
ceased to be available, on the appointment of another
0
Kmiia · J. independent person the proceedings shall be continued
before the person so appointed and it will not be
necessary to start the proceedings from the beginning
before that person. Section 8 (3) provides for the
contingency of the services of a member of a Board
not being available. It requires the appropriate
Government to make the appointment as provided in
section 5 (3) and further provides that notwithstanding
the inclusion of a totally new man in that vacancy, the
proceedings shall be continued before the Board so
reconstituted. Reading the three clauses together,
therefore, it is quite clear that the object of section 8 is
to make specific provisions in respect of situations when
the Government must or does fill up vacancies in the
event of the services of a member or chairman not being available and the consequences of a totally new man
filling up the vacancy. As we read the Act, that is
the total object and intention of this section. It does
not contemplate the consequences of the Government
not making an appointment where it has the option
not to do so. The emphasis on the words "so reconstituted " in sub-sections (1) and (3) and the
concluding words of each of those clauses clearly bear
out this intention of the legislature.
It was argued that although no provision is made in
section 8 (1) about what is to happen if the Government did not fill up the vacancy, it is implied that in
that event the remaining members can continue the
work. We are unable to accept that argument. In the
first place, as pointed out above, the object of section 8
is to provide in what cases vacancies must be filled up
and how the proceedings should continue on the
vacancy being filled up. It does not deal at all with
the situation arising from the not filling up of the
1951
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
vacancy by the Government. In this connection the
1951
provisions of sections 5 (4) and 6 (3) have been already The United
noted. When the legislature wanted to provide that commercial
in spite of the temporary absence or permanent vacancy Bank Ltd.
.the remainip.g members should be authorised to proceed
v.
with the work they have made express provision to Their Workmen.
that effect. If in the case of a Board or Court of Inquiry, neither of which is adjudicating any disputes, Kania 0 · J.
such a provision was considered necessary to enable
the remaining members to act as a body, we think
that the absence of such provision in respect of the
Tribunal, which adjudicates on the disputes and
whose quasi· judicial work is admittedly of a joint
character and responsibility leads to the irresistible
conclusion that in the absence of one or more members
the rest are not competent to act as a Tribunal at all.
Again the provisos to sections 5 (4) artd 6 (3) are important. Under those provisos when the Government
intimates to the remaining members that the services
of one "have ceased to be available" the rest have no
right to act as the Board or Court. It appears under
the circumstances proper to hold that in respect of a
Tribunal when the services of a member have ceased
to be available, the rest by themselves have no right
to act as the Tribunal.
Th'e question which we have got to consider can be
divided in two stages. On the_ appointment of Mr.
Chandrasekhara Aiyar as a member of the Boundary
Tribunal, did his services cease to be available within
the meaning of section 8, and thereby was a vacancy
created? The parties have put before us only two
telegrams exchanged between the chairman and Mr.
Mazumdar on the one hand and the Central Government on the other, to reach our conclusion about the
situation arising from Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar
joining the Boundary Tribunal. Certain Government
notifications published in May and June, 1950, i.e.,
over three or four months after Mr. Chandrasekhara
Aiyar finished his work on the Boundary Tribunal,
have been put before us, but in our opinion these ~
61
394
1961
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
lH>51]
ex post facto notifications cannot help us in deciding the
Th• Unittd
important question under section 8. It is obvious that,
commercial on the date the appointment of Mr. Chandrasekhara
Bank Ltd.
Aiyar as a member of the Boundary Tribunal was
•·
made, it could not have been known how long that
Their Workmen. Tribunal would take to complete its work.
In any
event, the evidence put. before us as of that date does
Kania O. J.
not show that the appomtment was for a short time.
The Boundary Tribunal's work may have lasted for a
month or a year. Having regard to the urgency and
the necessity of quick disposal of industrial disputes
recognised in section 15, the deputation of a member of
such a Tribunal to another Tribunal. whose work may
be of an indefinite duration, obviously makes the
services of the member cease to be available to the
Industrial Tribunal within the meaning of section 8 so
as to bring about a vacancy. The later statement in the
Government notification of May, 1950, that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar's services were lent to the External
Affairs Ministry "from the 23rd of November, 1949,
to the 20th of February, 1950, " appears to be more a
notification for the purpose of the Accountant-General
and the Audit departments of the Government than a
disclosure of the mind of the Government when the
appointment was made on the 23rd of November.
When Mr. Sen, as chairman, and Mr. Mazumdar held
their first sitting in the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara
Aiyar, an objection was raised about the constitution
of the Tribunal. Thereupon Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar conveyed to the Government what had happened
at the meeting. The Government was therefore clearly
faced with the problem as to what it wanted to do.
The reply telegram from the Government asked Mr. Sen
and Mr. Mazumdar to go on with the proceedings. It
further stated that the Government might fill up the
vacancy later on. The question for consideration is,
what is the effect of this telegram of the Government ?
In the light of the provisions of section 8 that telegram
can only mean that the Government had decided not to
fill up the vacancy. If a vacancy had occurred they
had to make the appointment or state that they will
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
395
1951
not do so. They cannot defer their decision on the.
question of filling up the vacancy and in the interval Th• United
direct the remaining members to go on with the commercial
reference. That seems to us to be the correct position Bank Ltd.
because the fundamental basis on which the Tribunal
v.
has to do its work is that all members must sit and Their Workmen.
take part in its proceedings jointly. If a member was
·
casually or temporan"ly ab sent ·. owmg
to 1·11ness, t h e Kania C. J.,
remaining members cannot have the power to proceed
with the reference in the name of the Tribunal, having
regard to the absence of any provision like section 5 (4)
or 6 (3) in respect of the tribunal. The Government
had notified the constitution of this Tribunal by
the two notifications summarized in the earlier
part of the judgment and thereby had constituted
the Tribunal to consist of three members and those
three were Mr. Sen, Chairman, Mr. Mazumdar and
Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar. · Proceeding with the
adjudication in the absence of pne, undermines the
basic principle of the joiQt work and responsibility of
the Tribunal and of all its members to make the award.
Moreover, in their telegram the Government had not
suggested that no vacancy had occurred. Indeed, they
recognised the fact of a vacancy having occurred but
stated that they might make the appointment later on.
If those words are properly construed, without any
outside considerations, it is clear that the Government
intended that the remaining two members of the
Tribunal should proceed with the adjudication as a
Tribunal. This direction in fact was accepted and the
two members proceeded with the reference and made
certain awards. Those awards were sent to the Government under section 15 (2) and the Government by
its order declared the awards to be binding, and
published them in the official Gazette. Those awards
are signed only by Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar. Reading those awards with the notifications and the provisions of sections .15 and 16 it is therefore clear that
between 23rd November, 1949, and 20th February,
1950, the Government "intended" the tribunal to .consist only of Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar. It was rlot and
396
1
9~1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
cannot be seriously disputed that in the event of the
Government deciding to fill up the vacancy, a notification had to be issued. The question is, why and under
Bank Ltd.
what rule? The answer clearly is that they had to do
v.
it because of rule 5. The reason why intimation of a
Their Workmen. new man forming a member of the Tribunal has to be
publicly given, in our opinion, applies with equal force
Kania a. J.
'b
1 ..
when a tn una m1tially constituted of three persons,
viz., Mr. Sen, Mr. Mazumdar and Mr. Chandrasekhara
Aiyar, is, by the Government decision,as from a certain
date, to be a tribunal of Mr.Sen and Mr. Mazumdaronly.
The word " reconstituted " is properly used in section 8
because when a new member is introduced in the panel
so far performing its duties, it is a reconstitution, but
the words of section 8 do not exclude the obligation on
the Government to issue a notification under rule 5
when there is not a reconstitution, but a new constitution of the Tribunai. The Government, however, did
not give effect to its intention by issuing a fresh
notification under section 7. Therefore, when the
services of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be
available and they decided that another independent
person was not to be appointed to fill the vacancy,
there arose the situation when only two members
constituted the Tribunal.and for the constitution of such
Tribunal no notification under section 7 of the Act was
issued. To enable such a Tribunal of two persons to
function, under the provisions of the Act, a notification
under section 7 of the Act, in our opinion, was absolutely essential. The work of the two members in the
absence of such a notification cannot be treated as the
work of a Tribunal established under the Act and all
their actions are without jurisdiction.
It was argued on behalf of the respondents that
when Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar left for the Boundary
Tribunal, there arose a temporary abs('lnce which it was
not necessary to fill up and the remaining two members
had jurisdiction under the Act to proceed with the
adjudication. In our opinion, this contention cannot
be acc~pted. In the first place, in the agreed statement
of facts, it is not stated that there was any temporary
The United
Oommercial
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
_ 397
1951
absence. Again, as we have pointed out the Government by its telegram of the 29th of November accepted The Unite.d
the position that a vacancy had occurred and. no commercial
question of temporary absence therefore arises for our Bank Ltd.
consideration. An analogy sought to be drawn between
v.
the temporary absence on leave or on deputation of a Their Workmen.
Judge is misleading having regard to the fact that
under section 7 the Government has to decide at the Kania 0 • J.
initial stage how many members and who will constitute the Tribunal and have to notify the same. That
step having been taken, it is not within the power or
competence of the Government to direct a few members
only of such Tribunal to proceed with the adjudication
for however short or long time it be. In our opinion,
section 8 has no application to that situation. In this
connection, it may be useful to notice that under rule
12 it was provided that " when a Tribunal:;consists of
two or more members, the tribunal may, with the
consent of the parties, act notwithstanding any casual
vacancy in its number ...... " This rule clearly shows
that even when there was a casual vacancy and the
remaining members desired to proceed with the work
they could do so only with the consent of the parties.
This rule framed under section 38 of the Act strongly
supports the cont~ntion that if the Act impliedly
gave power under section 8 to the remaining two
members of the Tribunal to act, as contended on
behalf of the respondents, there was no necessity at all
for making this rule. Although this rule was repealed
on the 3rd of December, it was in operation when the
services of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be
available to the Tribunal as from the 23rd of November.
If in the case of temporary absence, the consent of the
parties was essential to enable the remaining members
to act, it certainly follows that the objection to their
working as a Tribunal when there is no consent and
the 1-bsence is not casual, but is due to the services of
one of the members having ceased to be available, is
fatal. It follows therefore that all awards made by
Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar, after the services of
Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be available, were
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
not made by a tribunal duly constituted under section
7 and those a wards are therefore void.
The United
Gomm•rcial
l1; was contended that by directing Mr. ChandraBank Ltd.
sekhara Aiyar to work again as a member of the Banks
v.
Tribunal in February, 1950, the Government had filled
Th•ir Workm•n. up the vacancy under section 8. In our.opinion this
- 0
position cannot be supported on the admitted facts.
Kania • J. As regards filling up of a vacancy under section 8, we
have already noticed that by directing the remaining
two members to proceed with the work and by notifying their awards as the awards of the Tribunal the
Government must be considered to have intended not
to fill up the vacancy. Again, the later notification
published in June, 1950, does not even state that Mr.
Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a member of the
fribunal " in any vacancy." The word used there is
" resumed," suggesting thereby that he had gone out
for the time being but had started the work again.
Under the circumstances and in the absence of any
other evidence, we are unable to consider the fact of
Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar sitting along with the two
members from and after the 20th February, 1950, as
an appointment by the Government in the vacancy
created by his appointment to the .Boundary Tribunal
in November, 1949.
At one stage it was suggested that the members of
the Tribunal could delegate their work to a few members only and the award can be supported in that way.
Apart from the question what work could be so delegated, it was ascertained that the Rule permitting
delegation was first published on 3rd December, 1949,
and as Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar had gone to his
work on the Boundary Tribunal on 23rd November, no
delegation in that manner was possible. Moreover, the
statement of facts nor the award of the three persons
suggests that there was any delegation of work by the
Tribunal in the matter of the general issues to some
members only. Nor was any report made to or considered by the full Tribunal as required by the rule.
The next question to be considered is the effect
of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar sitting with the two
1951
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
399
1951
members of the Tribunal after 20th February, 1950.
The record· shows that the two members considered The United
most of the general issues raiSed in respect of the banks oommercial
at many meetings. The nature and volume of the work Bank Ltd.
done by them during this interval has been summarizv.
ed in the earlier part of the judgment. It is not contend- Their Workmen.
ed that on Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar commencing to
sit again_ with the other two members on and from the Kania 0 • J.
20th February what had happened in his absence was
re-done or re-heard. Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar along
with the other two members continued to work from
the point work had proceeded up to 19th February,
1950, and the award which is put before us is signed by
all the three of them, i.e., on the footing that all the
three of them were members of the Tribunal. It was
suggested that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar should be
treated as having remained throughout a member of
the Tribunal of three and that he resumed workaftera
temporary absence between November, 1949, and February, 1950. In our opinion, this position is quite
unsupportable. When the services of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be available to the Tribunal
in November; 1949, and the Government accepted the
position that a vacancy had occurred, Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar ceased to be a member of the Tribunal
of three as constituted under the Government notification ofJune, 1949. Thereafter Mr .. Chandrasekhara
Aiyar never became a member of the Tribunal as he
was never appointed a member before he signed the
award. No notification making such an appointment
under section 7 read with section 8 of the Act has been
even suggested to exist. In the circumstances, the
position in law was that Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar
ceased to be a member of the Tribunal of three as originally constituted, that no new Tribunal of two was
legally constituted and that, having ceased to be a
member of the tribunal of three, Mr. Chandrasekhara
Aiyar could not resume duties as a member of the Tribunal of three without a fresh constitution of a Tribunal of three. The result is that all the interim awards
purported to be made by Mr. Sen and Mr. Mazumdar as
400
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
well as the final awards made by the three must all be
held to have been made without 1"urisdiction. It seems
The United
Commercial to us that the only way in which the Government
Bank Led.
could have put matters right was by a notification
"·
issued in February, 1950, constituting the tribunal
Their Workmen. as a fresh Tribunal of three members (and not by pro-.ceeding as if a vacancy had been filled up on 20th
0
Kania · J. February, 1950, undersection8) and the three members
proceeding with the adjudication de novo. Even if the
contention of the respondents that Mr. Chandrasekhara
Aiyar continued throughout a member of the tribunal
were accepted, in our opinion, the appellants' objection
to the jurisdiction of the three persons to sign the
award must be upheld. Section 16 which authorizes
them to sign is preceded by section 15. Unless they
have complied with the provisions of section 15, i.e ,
unless all the three have heard the matter together,
they have no jurisdiction to make the award in terms
of section 15 and have therefore also no jurisdiction
to sign the award under section 16. In any view of
the matter the awards are therefore without jurisdiction:
It was suggested that .his signature on the award
could be treated as surplus. In our opinion, this argument requires only to be stated to be rejected. It is
not and cannot be disputed that Mr. Chandrasekhara
Aiyar took active part in the deliberations and in the
proceedings after 20th February, 1950, and naturally
discussed and influenced the decision of the other two
members of the Tribunal by such discussions. This is
not a case where an outsider was consulted by the
members of a Tribunal and thereafter the members
came to their own independent decision. It is ob~i
ous that> for making the award all the three persons
worked together and were jointly responsible for the
resultant award. The argument of surplusage therefore must fail. In this view of the matter, the .final
award put before the Court is clearly without jurisdiction and the appellants' contention must be upheld.
The final contention that the sittings in the interval
constituted only an irre~larity in the proceedings
1951
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
401
•
cannot again be accepted because, in the first place, an
ioin
objection was raised about the sitting of the two mem- The Unit«!
bers as the Tribunal. That objection, whether it was oommercial
raised by the appellants or the other party, is im- Bank Ltd.
material. The objection having been overruled, no . v.
question of acquiescence or estoppel arises Nor can Th••r Workmen.
consent
give a court jm:isdiction if a condition which Kania 0. J.
·
goes to the root of the jurisdiction has not been performed, or fulfilled. No acquiescence or consent can give
a jurisdiction to a court of limited jurisdiction which
it does not possess. In our opinion, the position here
clearly is that the responsibility to work and decide
being the joint responsibility of all the three members,
if proceedings are conducted and discussions on several
general issues took place in the presence of only two,
followed by an award made by three, the question goes
to the root of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and is
not a matter of irregularity in the conduct of those proceedings. The absence of a condition necessary to
found the jurisdiction to make the award or give a
decision deprives the award or decision of any conclusive effect. .The distincti(Jn clearly is between the
jurisdiction to decide matters and the ambit of the
matters to be.heard b)' a Tribunal having jurisdiction
to deal with the same. In the second case, the question
of acquiescence or irregularity may be considered and
overlooked. When however the question is of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to make the award under the
circumstances summarized above, no question of
acquiescence or consent can affect the decision.
It was contended that under section 8 the contingency of the Government not filling up a vacancy is
clearly visualized. It is also provided in the section
that in the event of a vacancy the Government may
fill it up by appointing a new man and in such a case
the proceedings need not start afresh. It was argued
that nothing more had happened in the present case
and therefore no question of invalidity of the awards
ari$CS We are unable to accept these contentions. In
the first place, when Government decides not to fill up
62
402
1951
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1!)51]
a vacancy its decision has to be notified. It is not a
matter of the Government's internal administration
The United
commercial where the officers can work under departmental orders.
Bank Ltd.
Moreover it should be noticed that when the services
v.
of a member cease to be available and that fact is conTheir Workmen. veyed to the rest of the members under sections 5 (4)
Kania a. J. and 6 (3), the rest have no right· to act as a Body at
all. The wording of section 7 or 8, in our opinion, does
not permit the remaining members of a Tribunal to ·
have a higher right in the absence of a proper new
notification issued under section 7 of the Act. As
regards the second contention, it should be noticed.
that the Government is given the option to make an
appointment when a vacancy occurs, and section 8 provides that if a new man is appointed in the vacancy
the proceedings need not start de novo. That however
does notrnean 'that the Government must appoint a
man in every case of vacancy and the proceedings
must go on without commencing the same afresh. It
appears that the option is left to Government having
regard to the stage to which the proceedings may have
reached. Suppose only after some preliminary work
of a data finding nature is done a vacancy occurs, the
Government may well think of appointing a new
man as it may not be considered necessary to start
the proceedings afresh. On the other hand, if the
work has progressed considerably the Government
may not think it just and proper to fill up a
vacancy by bringing in a new man, as by doing
so they will in effect permit the work of the
Body being done in two parts, viz., the first with two
men and the second with three men. These considerations emphasize the importance of the Government
making up its mind to fill up or not to fill up a vacancy
when it occurs. It cannot keep its decision in abeyance and at one stage intend to proceed on the footing that the vacancy is not filled up and later on after
considerable work is done by the remaining members
change its mind and proceed to act on the footing that
a vacancy has continued and fill up the same after
some months.
·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
19 5 1
On the admitted principle that the work of ~he Tribunal, which is of a quasi-judicial nature, is one of 7-'ke United
joint resp~nsibility of all its members, section 8 pro- aomrnercial
vides exceptions .. The Legislature having thus fixed Bank Ltd.
in that section the limits of the exceptions, the limits
v.
have .to be strictly observed and it is not within the Their Workmon.
competence either of the Tribunal or the Government
to extend the limits of those exceptions. In our opinion, Kania 0 · J.
the incidents in respect of the sittings and work of this
Banking Tribunal, as mentioned above, do not fall
within the limits of the exceptions and therefore the
awards must be considered as made without jurisdiction.
In our opinion, therefore, the awards made and
signed by Messrs. Sen and Mazumdar and by all the
three persons are without jurisdiction and the contention of the appellaJ.lts on this issue must be accepted.
FAZL Au J.-The questions which this Bench is
called upon to decide arise upon the following facts.
By a Notification dated- the 13th June, 1949, the
Government of India constituted a Tribunal for the
adjudication of industrial disputes in Banking Companies, consisting of Mr. K. C. Sen (Chairman), Mr.
S. P. Varma and Mr. Majumdar (Members). Subsequently, Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a
member of the Tribunal in the place· of Mr. Varma,
whose services had ceased to be available. On the 13th
June, 1949, the Government referred to the Tribunal
the disputes between a number of Banking Companies
and their employees, and the Tribunal consisting of
the chairman and 2 members commenced hearing
them on the 12th September, 1949. In November,
1949, the services of Mr. Aiyar were placed at the
disposal of the Department of External-Affairs of the
Government of India, and he was appointed a member
of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal,
with the result that during his absence which covered
a period of nearly 3 moJ!ths beginning from the 23rd
FazlAZiJ.
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
November, 1949, and ending on the 20th February,
1950, the proceedings were continued before the chair~:;;;:;;.": man and theremaining member, and certain interim
Bank Ltd.
awards were also made during this period. · Mr. Aiyar
v.
rejoined the Tribunal on the 20th February, 1950, and
1'/wir Work•nen. ultimately all the 3 members made and signed an
-.
award on the 31st July, 1950, which was published in
Faz! Al• 1• the Gazette of India on the 12th August, 1950. The
main point raised in these appeals is that this award is
without jurisdiction. In some of the appeals, it is also
contended that some of the interim awards, namely
those given by the chairman of the Tribunal and Mr.
Majumdar on the 5th January, 25th January, 20th
February and.22nd February, 1950, in the case of the
Imperial Bank of India, the Lloyds Bank and the
Punjab National Bank, were also without jurisdiction.
Briefly, the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants is that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, did
not permit either of the following courses, firstly, that
2 members of the Tribunal, which originally consisted
of 3 members, should deal with any of the controversies between the parties in connection with the disputes referred to the Tribunal, and secondly, that a
member who had left the Tribunal in the midst of the
hearing should rejoin and influence the decision of the
other members in regard to the matters which he ~ad
not heard.
These contentions, however plausible they may- appear at the first sight, especially when ·we consider
them in the light of our notions of judicial procedure
to be followed in courts of law, will, in my opinion, be
found to be without much substance, on close examination, once we realize that the Industrial Tribunal,
though it has all the trappings of a court of law, is not
such a court and has to follow its own procedure which
has to be determined by the provisions of the Indusrial Disputes Act and the rules framed by the Government thereunder. The determination of the questions
raised before us will depend mainly upon the proper
construction of section 8 ( 1) of the Act, which runs as
follows:1951
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
"8 (1) If the services of the chairman of a Board or
rns1
of the chairman or other member of a Court or. Tribu- The United
nal cease to be availab1e at any time, t he appropriate Commercial
Government shall, in the case of a chairman, and may Bank Ltd.
in the case of any other memher, appoint another
v.
independent person to fill the vacancy, and the pro- 1.'heir Workrnw.
ceedings shall be continued before the Board, Court or
F'azl Ali J.
Tribunal so reconstituted."
One of the questions to be decided in construing this
section is, as to the exact meaning of the words " services cease to be available." Ordinarily, the word
" cease" conveys a sense of permanency, and therefore
the expression would certainly cover cases where the
services of a person have ceased to be available permanently or for all time. But that word is also sometimes applied to" intermission of a state or condition
of being, doing or suffering" (see Oxford Dictionary),
and, among several instances of its being used in this
narrower sense, we were referred to The Queen v.
Evans(1) which is a case dealing with an English statute
in which the expression " cease to reside " was used
so as to include a case where the person concerned was
away .from England for a period and then returned
there. It seems to me that the words '' services cease to
be available" include cases where the services are not
available for a defined or undefined period, provided
that during that period they are completely unavailable. These words should, I think, be read with the
marginal note of section 8, which indicates that
they were intended to cover every situation necessitating the filling of a vacancy. As we are aware, a
·vacancy may . be permanent or temporary, and
therefore if the services of a member of a Tribunal
are temporarily placed at the disposal of another
department of the Government for performing specia.
work, such a case will be covered by the section. This
must necessarily be so, if the nature of the duties
which the member is called upori to discharge is such
as to necessitate that particular member severing
himself completely from the Tribunal during the
(t • [ l 896] 1 Q.B. 228.
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
period in which he holds bis new office. I find it
Ti.. United
difficult to hold that the section was meant to ap>ply
oommerciol only to a permanent vacancy, and that no provision
Bank Ltd.
whatsoever was made for a temporary vacancy, which
v..
is by no means a matter of uncommon occurrence. It
Their Workmen. should be noted that in sections 5 and 6 of the Act
'
Fa::l AU J. the Legislature has been careful to use the words
"vacancy in number" which are wide enough to include cases where, though there is a vacancy, the
membership does not cease .
•
It is common ground that in the present case, the
services of Mr. Aiyar were not available to the Tribunal, while be was employed as a member of the
Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal. It is
also not disputed that at the time his ser.vices were
transferred, it was not known for what period his new
duties would keep him away from the work of the
Industrial Tribunal. There can be no doubt therefore that there was a vacancy, which provided an
occasion for the Government to exercise the discretion vested in it under section 8 of the Act.
At this stage it will be relevant to quote certain
correspondence which passed between the chairman of
the Tribunal and the Government soon after ·Mr. Aiyar
left the Tribunal. We find that on the 28th November, 1949, the chairman sent an express telegram to
the Labour Ministry stating that in the absence of Mr.
Aiyar objections had been raised to the remaining two
members of the Tribunal continuing the proceedings
and urging the Ministry either to appoint a substitute
or to intimate that the Tribunal could proceed with
two members during Mr. Aiyar's absence. To this, the
Government sent the following reply:"Reference your telegram twentyeighth stop
Government advised that rule twelve is inconsistent
with section eight stop rule twelve being deleted
through notification stop Government ad1•ised Tribunal
can continue proceedings with remaining two members
stop no formal order or notificati'on. necessary stop
Government may fill vacancy tater date."
1961
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
These two telegrams indicate that both the chair1951
man of the Tribunal and the Government took the
view that in the circumstances of the case, there was a ~::;,~;::;:i
vacancy within the terms of section 8, that under that Bank Ltd.
section it was open to the Government either to make an
v.
appointment to fill the vacancy or not to make an ap- Their Worl·men.
pointment, and that the proceedings before the Tribunal
could continue even if the vacancy was not filled. This is Fazl Ali J.
quite clear from the concluding words (which I have
underlined) of the telegram sent by the Government
to th~ chairman of the Tribunal. In my judgm,ent,
the view taken by the .chairman of the Tribunal and
the Government was perfectly correct. The question
involved here is twofold, namely, (1) whether section
8 applies to a temporary vacancy; and (2) whether, in
case the Government decides not to fill such a vacancy,
the proceedings can continue before the chairman and
the remaining member. I have already dealt with the
first point, and the second point may also be now dealt
with briefly. In substance, what section 8 provides is
that if the chairman goes out, the vacancy must be
filled, bat, if a meml?er goes out, the Government may
or may not fill the vacancy. It seems to me to follow
from this by necessary implication, that if there is a
member's vacancy and the Government decide not to
fill it, the Tribunal will not become an imperfectly
constituted Tribunal. In other words, the proceedings
can be continued before the Tribunal in spite of the
vacancy. The argument put forward before us on behalf on the appellants was that in the event of a member's vacancy, either the Government should make
an appointment at once or the work of the Tribunal should be suspended until an appojntment is
made. These inferences however do not appear
to me to be warranted by the words of the section, firstly because if the section says that the
Government may or may not appoint a new member,
how can we say that the Government must appoint
him, and secondly because there is nothing in the section to show that the work of the Tribunal should
remain suspended indefinitely in the situation with
408
1951
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951)
which we have to deal. A reference to the correspond-
The unma
ing Acts in England and America will show that susOommercial
pension of work is generally ruled out in cases of
Bank Ltd.
industrial disputes since they need expeditious settlev.
ment. (See section 3 (b)' of the National Labour RelaThei" Workmen. tions Act of America and section 3 of the Industrial
Fazl Ali J.
Courts Act, 1919, of England). The scheme of our Industrial Disputes Act appears to me to be the same,
and I think that it will be entirely foreign to that
scheme to suggest that the proceedings of the Tribunal should remain suspended indefinitely. The principle that the proceedings may continue in spite of there
being a vacani;y in number, is expressly laid down in
sections 5 and 6 of the Act which govern Boards of Conciliation and Courts of Enquiry, and is in my opinion
recognized by necessary implication in section 8 with
reference to proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal. It was strenuously argued before us that if the
intention of the Legislature had been that the proceedings before the Tribunal should continue in spite of a
vacancy, an express provision would have been made
in section 8 in the same terms as it has been made in
sections 5 and 6. This argument however will not bear
close examination. Sections 5 and 6 have been reproduced from the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, without
any verbal change whatsoever, and it is quite understandable that a provision dealing with the subject of
a prescribed quorum should expressly state what
would be the effect of the absence of the chairman or
a member when the quorum is complete. Section 8,
on the other hand, has not been borrowed from the
old Act, but is a completely new section in which its
draftsman has used his own language and proceeded
on the footing that if it was possible to convey the
meaning intended to be conveyed in fewer words, there
was no necessity for reproducing the entire phraseology used in sections 5 and 6. Besides, in the context
in which the provision occurs, there is no room for
surmising that the intention of the framer of the section might have been to suspend the work of the Tribunal. The words "the proceedings shall be continued
S.C.R.
~'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
409
before the Board, Court or Tribunal so reconstituted",
1961
obviously• refer to a situation which arises
when
a
new
•
The United
chairman or a new member is appotnted, but they Oommercial
also show that the framer of the section must Bank Ltd.
have assumed that the proceedings before the Tribuv.
nal shall continue when there is a vacancy in number Tlte.:r IVorkm•••·
and the Government decides not to fill it.
Fa.Z Ali J. '
The position we have now arrived at is this. There
was a vacancy of an indefinite duration and the Government decided, as itwas<:ompetent for ittodecide,
not to fill it for the time being but to let the Tribunal
continue the work. In my J'udgment, in such circumstances, the proceedings be ore the chairman and the
remaining member cannot be said to have been without jurisdiction.
The further question which now arises is, "what
would be the legal effect of Mr. Aiyar rejoining the
Tribunal on the 20th February, 1950?" It is contended
on behalf of the appellants that the whole award is
vitiated by Mr. Aiyar being brou~ht into the Tribunal
at a late stage, and the argument is put in the following way." The Government had originally appointed a
Tribunal· consisting of 3 members. Granting that a
Tribunal of 3 members can, under section Sof the Act,
become a Tribunal of 2, how can it again become a
Tribunal of 3, without the Government acting in strict
compliance with the procedure laid down in the section
and without making a fresh appointment." The same
argument was put a little more rhetorically by likening the proceedings before the Tribunal to a running
train and enquiring whether it was permissible for one
to "jump into and jump off" the train as one chose.
I must confess that though I have very carefully considered this argument I have not been able to appreciate its force. In answering the argument, we have to
bear in mind that the Legislature has conferred very
large powers on the Government, and the entire constitution of the Tribunal as well as the appointment of
its members have been left to its discretion. Section
7 (2) provides that the Tribunal shall consist of such
63
410
1931
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
number of members as the appropriate Government
Th• United
thinks fit. Again, section 8 (1) provides that the
comm•rcial Government may or may not appoint a member to fill
Bank Ltd.
a vacancy. Under sectiop 9, no order of the appropriv.
ate Government appointing any person as a member
Their Workm•n. of a Tribunal shall be called in question in any man-
Fazl.Ali .J.
ner. Under section 38, for the purpose of giving effect
to the provisions of the Act, the Government may
make rules, and, as far as I can see, there is nothing to
prevent the Government from making a rule fixing the
minimum strength of the Tribunal for hearing any of
the matters before it. Thus, in a way, the Governi:nent
is empowered to constitute as well as reconstitute the
Tribunal, and though it is not expected to use the
power arbitrarily, or unfairly the power is there. Therefore look~ng at the substance of the matter, as opposed
to mere technicalities and legal refinements, it appears
to me to be a sufficient answer to the question posed on
behalf of the appellants to say that, if the going out and
coming in of Mr. Aiyar was under the orders of the
Government, the proceedings cannot be held to be
invalid.
Apart from this general answer, I shall now try to
deal with the question a little more closely. As I have
already pointed out, under section 8, the Government
is empowered not to fill a member's vacancy at all.
Now, there appear to me at least two obvious reasons,
which may induce the Government not to fill the
vacancy, namely, (1) because it considers that the
chairman and the remaining member or members are
sufficient to carry on the work of the Tribunal, and
(2) because the vacancy being a temporary 011e, it considers it unnecessary to introduce a new member and
prefers to await the return of the old member. It
seems to me that it was the latter alternative that
commended itself to the Government in ihe present
case. Here, the vacancy being a temporary one,
Mr. Aiyar had not ceased to be a member of the Tribunal, and could therefore rejoin it as soon as he was
free from the duties of his new office. In such an
event, it was not necessary for the Government to
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
make any order reappointing him to the Tribunal. He
1951.
was still a member of the Tribunal and resumed ·his
duties as such under the orders of the Government. It Commercial
The Unitid
will, therefore, be entirely wrong to describe him as an Bank Ltd
intermeddler and to argue that the proceeding was
v.
·
vitiated by his return to the Tribunal. There is indeed Their Workine11.
no difficulty in the present case in holding that Mr.
Aiyar joined the Tribunal under the orders of the Gov- :b'azl AU J.
ernment, and we find that the Government ultimately
declared the award, to which he was a party, to be
binding under section 15 of the Act. He was allowed
to resume his duties as member of the Tribunal, and
drew his salary as such from the 20th February,
1950, till the termination of the proceedings. Such
being the facts, it would be far too abrupt a
conclusion to hold that the entire proceedings are
void and the award is bad. One of the arguments
which has been advanced before us against the
validity of the award is that Mr. Aiyar, though he did
not participate in the proceedings which took place
in his absence, was at least theoretically able to
influence the decision of the remaining members who
had participated in them. But I do not see any basis
for this argument in law, unless we allow our minds to
be influenced by any preconceived notions of strict
judicial procedure followed in a regular court of law.
A perusal of section 8 (2) will show that the Act does
not contemplate a de novo hearing. in those cases
where a new member is appointed by the Government
iri the place of a member whose services had ceased to
be available. The new member may join at any
stage of the proceedings, and no party will be heard
to say that a member who has not taken part in 'the
earlier proceedings is able to influence the views of
those who had participated in them. How then can
such an objection be raised in the case of Mr. Aiyar,
who was familiar with the proceedings and had taken
part in them in the earlier stages.
When we therefore examine the facts closely, we
:find that in substance nothing has happened in this
case which could not have legitimately happened
412
1961
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
under section 8 of the Act. Even if we assume that
T,,. UniUd it was necessary for the Government to make an
oommncial appointment under sub-section (1) of section 8, the
Bank Lid.
requirements of the provision appear to me to have
v.
been substantially fulfilled in this case, because Mr.
2•i..;. Workm<n.Aiyar could not have joined the Tribunal without
Fad AU J.
giving notice to the Government and without obtaining its orders. There can be no doubt that the
Government permitted Mr. Aiyar to join the Tribunal,
and I do not find any substantial difference between
its directing a. person to participate in the w9rk of :the
Tribunal and appointing him as a member of that
Tribunal.
Once therefore it is dearly understood that under
the Act, the Government has been empowered not only
to constitute the Tribunal but also to reconstitute it
under certain circumstances, the problem which is
supposed to arise from the numerical changes in the
composition of the Tribunal in question should not
present any difficulty.· I think that the answer to
that problem is to be found within the four corners of
section 8. If there is a vacancy within the terms of
that section and the Government does not fill it the
Tribunal of 3 members will evidently become a Tribunal of 2 members. But the power of filling the
vacancy being vested in the Government, the Tribunal
may again become a Tribunal of 3 members, as soon as
the vacancy is filled. I think that the Government can
take its own time in filling the vacancy and may allow
the work of the Tribunal to go on in the meantime.
Sometimes, the filling of the vacancy may be delayed,
because a suitable person is not at once available, and
it may also be delayed for other conceivable reasons.
I do not see anything in the Act or in section 8 to
restrict the powers of the Government in such a
manner as to compel it either to fill the vacancy at
once or to Jet the vacancy remain unfilled for ever. To
import such a condition would be placing an undue
restriction on the power of the Government, which
neither the provisions nor the scheme of the Act justify.
The section, as it stands, will also in my opinion cover
S.C.R.
·.f
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
1951
a case where the vacancy being a temporary one, the
Government chooses not to fill it but awaits the return Th~ United
of the old incumbent.
Commercial
It was contended that there was no formal notifica- . Bank Ltd.
tion made at the proper time to furnish evidence of the TM· ;
decision arrived at by the Government. .Jn fact, how- 'r ~kmen.
ever, a Notification was issued by the Government on Fazl ..tz• J.
the 20th May, 1950, to the following effect:"After relinquishing charge of membership of the
Indo-Pakistan Boundary Dispute Tribunal, Sri N.
Chandrasekhara Aiyar resumed charge of his duties
as Member of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank
Disputes) on the 20th February 1950 (forenoon)."
It is argued that this ex post facto notification
cannot legalize an illegality which had already been
committed. I do not however appreciate this argument. In the first place, there was no illegality committed; secondly, the section does not require any
notification ; and thirdly, it is not correct to say that
the Notification was issued ex post facto, as the proceedings had not terminated but were still going on.
The Government can take its. own time for issuing a
Notification, and I am unable to hold that the Government did not act bona fide in making the Notification
to which I have referred.· As I have already stated, the
fact that Mr. Aiyar joined the Tribunal with the concurrence of the Government and the Government
wanted him to continue to participate in the work of
the Tribunal and paid him his salary on that basis,
is sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
Act. How the absence of a formal order or delay in the
Notification can have such a far-reaching effect on the
proceedings before the Tribunal as to make the whole
award void as having been piade without jurisdiction,
is a matter which I find considerable difficulty in
appreciating. It seems to me that the .objections
. raised on behalf of the appellants are of the most unsubstantial <:haracter, and in the absence of any cogent
if not compelling reason to do so, I cannot pursuade
myself to hold that the work which has been
414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
accomplished by the Tribunal after nearly a year's
deliberations and peregrinations all over the country
commero>al
at considerable cost to the public exchequer is so much
Bank Ltd.
money and labour thrown away.
·
. v.
In the course of the arguments, we were asked to
Thflr Workmen.read section 8 with sections 7 and 16. I do not find
Pazl Ali J.
anything in either of these sections which militates
against the view which I have ventured to express, and
I do not think that the provision contained in section 16 that the report of the Tribunal shall be signed
by all the members of the Tribunal, means that it
should be signed even by those members who had not
taken part in the proceedings. It really means that
the award shall be signed by such members as have
taken part in the proceedings and could have taken
part in them under the Act. It should be remembered
that the provision is general and applies to the awards
made by the Tribunals as well as the Boards and
Courts, and it should be read with the provisions contained in sections 5 and 6 which state that a Board or
Court having the prescribed quorum may act notwithstanding the absence of the chairman or any of its
members or any vacancy in its number. It may be
that the Tribunal and the Government could have
acted in this case with more care so as to avoid the
criticisms directed against the proceedings of the Tribunal, but I find no sufficient ground for holding that
the proceedings were without jurisdiction.
Reference was made in the course of the arguments
to rules Nos. 5 and 12 framed by the Government
under section 38 of the Act, which run as follows:"5. The ap~intment of a Board, Court or Tribunal together wlth the names of persons constituting
the Board, Court or Tribunal shall be notified in the
official Gazette.
12. Where a Tribunal consists of two or more
members, the Tribunal may, with the consent of the
parties, act notwithstanding any casual vacancy in its
number and no act, proceeding or determination of the
Tribunal shall be called in question or invalidated by
reason of any such vacancy."
1961
The Unit.a
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
These rules however have in my opinion no bearing
1951
on the point in dispute. Rule 5, dealing as it does
• the appointment of a B oard , Court or Tribunal Ormimerciat
The United
with
together with the names of persons constituting them, Bank Ltd.
refers to a Notification which the Government has to
v.
make when a Board, Court or Tribunal is initially con- Their Workmen.
stituted under the Act. This was done in this case, as
will appear from the award itself. The rule has no F'a•l Ali 1 ·
reference to the appointments made under section 8
of the Act to fill vacancies. I take it that the Govern. ment will, as a matter of practice, issue a notification
in regard to the appointments made under section 8,
but the notification will not be under rule 5, and section 8 itself does not expressly provide for issuing
any notification. Nor is a notification necessary under
sections in cases where the Government decides not to
fill a vacancy. The mere fact that the word 'reconstituted' occurs in section 8, is not in my opinion
enough to attract rule 5. Rule 12 which was in force
till the 5th December, 1950, dealt with a casual
vacancy, and provided that on the occurrence of such
a vacancy, the Tribunal may act with the consent of
the parties. This rule had nothing to do with the
vacancy caused by the services of a chairman or a
member ceasing to be available, which is dealt with
in section 8. At the first sight, it may appear that if
the consent of parties was necessary in the case
of a casual vacancy for continuing .the proceedings,
it may also be necessary for continuing the proceedings
under section 8 of the Act when no appointment is
made. In my opinion, however, no such inference
can be drawn from rule 12. Under that rule, the proceedings could go on without the Government being
informed, but as to vacancies which occur under section 8, the matter passes into the hands of the Government and its action alone, one way or the other,
legalizes the proceedings, and no question of consent
of parties arises. On the other hand, rule 12 lends
support to the respondents' contentions in two ways.
Firstly, it shows that a" vacancy" for the purposes of
the proceedings before the Tribunal can be casual and
416
rns1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
need not always be a permanent one, as suggested on
The Uni"4
behalf of the appellants; and secondly, what is more
commercial important, that a "vacancy " does not affect the
Bank Ltd.
jurisdiction of the remaining members to continue the
v.
proceedings, for it is settled law that consent cannot
Their Workmen. give jurisdiction in respect of a subject-matter though
F
Al'
1
1
"' · ' •
Patanjali
Saatri·J,
Mukherjta J.
it might cure a mere irregularity. It was said that rule
12 was ultra vires, but it appears to me to be unneces.
sary to inquire into this side issue.
For the reasons I have set out, I respectfully differ
from the conclusion arrived at by my Lord the Chief
Justice and the majority of my colleagues, and hold
that the objections raised on behalf of the appellants
should be overruled.
PATANJALI SASTRI J.-1 agree with the reasoning
and conclusion of my learned brother Fazl Ali whose
judgment I have had the advantage of reading. He
has said all I wished to say and has said it so well that
I have nothing to add.
MUKHERJEA, J.-1 concur in the decision of my
learned brother Faz! Ali, J. that the award of the All
India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) dated the
31st July, 1950, could not be held to be illegal and
inoperative by reason of any lack of jurisdiction in the
Tribunal which made it. However, as the line of reasoning by which I have reached my conclusion is not
the same as that adopted by my learned brother and
as I have not been able to agree with him as regards
the validity of certain earlier awards which the Tribunal purported to make in the months of January and
February 1950, I deem it necessary and proper to
express my own views on the subject matter of controversy in these appeals as succinctly as possible in a
separate judgment.
The only point that has been canvassed before us at
this stage of the hearing of the appeals relates to the
question of jurisdiction, and the substantial ground
upon which the legality of the awards has been assailed by the learned Counsel appearing for the several
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
'
Banks is that the awards were not made by a Tribunal
19111
properly constituted and competent to adjudicate upon The United
industrial disputes under the terms of the Industrial oommercial
Disputes Act. To appreciate the arguments that have Bank Ltd.
been raised by the respective parties on this point, it
v.
would be necessary to state a few facts.
Their Workmen.
By a notification dated the 13th of June, 1949, the Mukherjoo J.
Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred
upon it by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, constituted an Industrial Tribunal consisting
of three members to wit: (1) Mr. K. C. Sen, (who was
appointed chairman of the Tribunal), (2) Mr. S. P.
Verma and (3) Mr. J. N. Mazumdar. By a further
Notification dated August 24, 1949, Mr. N ..Chandrasekhara Aiyar was appointed a member of the Tribunal
in place of Mr. S. P. Verma whose services ceased to
he available and the Tribunal so reconstituted was
designated "The All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank
Disputes)." The Tribunal consisting of the chairman
and the two members mentioned aforesaid commenced
their sittings at Bombay on September 12, 1949, and
continued to sit as so constituted at Bombay and
various other places since then. From the afternoon
of 23rd September, 1949, the services of Mr. N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar were placed temporarily at the disposal
of the Ministry of External Affairs, he being appointed
a member of the lndo-Pakistali Boundary Tribunal.
Mr. Aiyar's work in connection withthelndo-Pakistan
Boundary Tribunal ended on 27thof January, 1950, and
a Government Notification shows that he was absent
on leave from 28th January, 1950, uptil the 19th of
February following and it is on the 20th February,
1950 that he actually resumed his duties as a member
of the Industrial Tribunal. During the entire period
of his absence there were various sittings of the Industrial Tribunal in which the two remaining members
took part and a number of a wards were also made and
signed by these two members adjudicating upon
several items of dispute concerning certain Banks. It
may be mentioned here that in exercise of the powers
r,4
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
conferred by section 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
certain rules were framed by the C.entral Government
The United
Commercial which came into force on 3rd December, 1949, and under
Bank Ltd.
which the Tribunal, as constituted by the Notification
v.
of 13th June, 1949, was authorised to entrust such
Their Workmen. cases or matters referred to it, as it deemed fit, to one
or more members for enquiry and report. In case of
Mukherjea J.
such entrustment, the report of the enquiring member
was to be placed before the chairman of the Tribunal
and the Tribunal after considering the report and
making such further enquiry as it deemed proper
could deliver the award. Purporting to act in pursuance of these rules, a large number of matters pending
before the 1'ribunal were divided amongst the members for enquiry and report and the members of the
Tribunal did sit separately at different places from the
3rd of December, 1949.
After Mr. Aiyar joined the Tribunal, the proceedings
continued as before. The hearing of the general issues,
which began at Bombay, was concluded on 3rd April,
1950. The Tribunal made and signed the, main award
on 31st July, 1950, which was published in the Gazette
of India (Extraordinary) on August 12, 1950.
The point that has been pressed for our consideration on behalf of the appellants Banks is that on the
services of Mr. Aiyar having ceased to be available by
reason of his being appointed a member of the IndoPakistan Boundary Tribunal, the remaining two members could not, in law, constitute an Industrial Tribunal without its being reconstituted as such in the
manner contemplated by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, The proceedings after the 23rd
of November, 1949, became, therefore, void and inoperative and the subsequent rejoining of the Tribunal by
Mr. Aiyar was of no avail, as a vacancy having once
occurred, a fresh appointment of a member and a fresh
constitution of the Tribunal were imperative in law.
We have been asked to declare the award made on
31st of July, 1950, as well as the earlier awards void
and inoperative on these grounds.
1951
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
These contentions have been sought to be repelled
1951
on behalf of the respondents employees as well as by TM- Unilel
the learned Attorney-General who appeared for the oommerotai
Central Government as intervener, on a variety of Bank Ltil.
grounds and though the grounds are not quite uniform
v.
or consistent, they have all been invoked in support of Their Workmen.
the position that even in the absence of Mr. Aiyar it Mukherjea J.
was quite competent to the two other members to continue to function legally as a Tribunal under the provisions and the general scheme of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. There was nothing irregular, it is said, in
Mr. Aiyar's subsequently taking part in the Tribunal
and signing the award on 31st July, 1949. I will notice
these arguments in detail as I proceed with my judgment.
It will be convenient first of all to advert to such of
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
have a bearing on the questions raised in this case.
The object of the Industrial Disputes Act, as set out
in the preamble is " to make provisions for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for
certain other purposes hereinafter appearing." There
are three classes of authorities provided for by the Act
which are entrusted with the powers and duties of
investigation and settlement of industrial disputes.
First of all, there are Conciliation Officers or Boards
of Conciliation, whose duties mainly are to induce the
parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of
the disputes amongst themselves. Secondly, there are
Courts of Enquiry and though they are described as
courts, their duties end with investigation into tl}.e
matters referred to them and submitting reports thereon to the appropriate Government. Lastly, there are
Industrial Tribunals composed of independent persons
who either are or had been Judges of the High Court
or District Judges, or are qualified for appointment as
High Court Judges.
Sub-section (2) of section 5 provides for the constitution of a Board of Conciliation. A Board of Conciliation shall consist of a chairman and two or four
other members as the appropriate Government thinks
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
fit, and sub-section (3) provides that the chairman
shall be an independent person, while the members
oom,,..roial
shall be persons appointed in equal numbers by the
Bank Ltd,
parties to the dispute. Sub-section (4) makes an im·
v.
portant provision, namely, that a Board can function
1'heir Workm.,.. despite the absence of the chairman or any of the
Mukherjeo J. members if it has the prescribed quorum as laid down
in the rules, provided however that if the Government
notifies the Board that the services of the chairman
or of any other member have ceased to be available,
the Board shall not act unless a new chairman or
member, as the case may be, has been appointed.
Section 6 of the Act relates to Courts of Enquiry
and such court may consist of one independent person
or such number of independent persons as the appropriate Government may think fit. Where a Court of
Enquiry consists of two or more members, one of them
has got to be appointed as a chairman. The Court
like the Board of Conciliation can function in the absence of the chairman or any of its members or in the
case of any vacancy in its.number, provided it has
the prescribed quorum; bnt it cannot function if the
appropriate Government notifies it that the services of
the chairman have ceased to be available, so long as
a new chairman is not appointed. There is no provision in section 6 relating to notification by Government
in case the services of a member of a Court cease to
be available as there is in the case of a member of the
Conciliation Board under se~tion 5.
Section 7 deals with Industrial Tribunals. Sub-sectjon (1) lays down that tbe appropriate 'Government
may constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for
the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance
with _the provisions of this Act. Sub-section (2) provides that a Tribunal shall consist of such number of
members as the appropriate Government thinks fit.
Where the Tribunal consists of two or more members,
one of them shall be appointed a chairman. There is
no provision in section 7 similar 1o that appearing in sections 5 and 6 empowering a Tribunal to
continue its proceedings in the absence of the chair man
1951
The Uniwi
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
or any of its members, provided there is a requirni;1
site quorum; in fact, no quorum has
been
prescribed
in
•
The United
the rules in regard to an Industrial Tribunal at all. It commercwl
is clear, therefore, from the provisions of section 7 of Bank Ltd.
the Industrial Disputes Act referred to above- and
v.
this position has not been disputed by Mr. De who Their Workmen.
appeared for the employees of some of the Banks- that
-.
if a Tribunal has eeen constituted as consisting of three Mukher;ea J.
members as in the present case, then subject to any ·
exception that may be created by any other provision
of the Act all the three members of the Tribunal must
act together.
On behalf of the respondents very great stress has
been laid upon section 8 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, and it is contended that in the circumstances
which have happened in the present case, the provision
of section 8 would furnish a clear authority to the two
remaining members to continue as a legally constituted Tribunal during the period that the service~ of Mr.
Aiyar ceased to be available, even though there was
neither a fresh appointment in his place nor a fresh
constitution of the Tribunal Section 8 is in the following terms:"(!) If the services of the chairman of a Board or
of the chairman or other member of a Court or Tribunal cease to be available at any time, the appropriate
Government shall, in the case of a chairman, and may
in the case of any other member, appoint another independent person to fill the vacancy, and the proceedings shall be continued before the Board, Court or
Tribunal so reconstituted.
(2) Where a Court or Tribunal consists of one per.
son only and his services cease to be available, the
appropriate Government shall appoint another independent person in his place, and the proceedings
shall be continued before the person so appointed.
(3) Where the services of any member of a Board
other than the chairman have ceased to be available,
the appropriate Government shall appoint in the manner specified in sub-section (3) of section 5 another
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
person to take his place, and the proceedings shall be
continued before the Board so reconstituted."
The United
oom""'rcial
The section purports to provide for filling up vacanBank Ltd.
cies. Sub-section (2) is not material for our present
v.
purpose. Taking sub-sections (1) and (3) together we
Th<ir Workmen. find that if the services of the chairman of a Board a
'
Muklwrjea J. Court or a Tribunal cease to be available at any time,
it is incumbent upon the appropriate Government in
each case to fill the vacancy by the appointment of
another independent person as chairman and the proceedings shall be continued before the authorities so
reconstituted and they would not have to be commenced de novo. In case the services of a member of either
a Court or a Tribunal cease to be available, it is discretionary with the appropriate Government to fill
the vacancy or not as it chooses. If it chooses to ap·
point a new member in place of the old, the same provision will apply as in the case of appointment of a
new chairman. The section does not say, a·t least in
express terms, as to what would happen if the Government does not think it proper to appoint a new member. So far as a Board of Conciliation is concerned, a
different provision is made even when the services of
a member cease to be available. ln such a case, re-appointment has got to be made as provided for in subsection (3) of section 5 and the reasons are obvious;
because the essential thing in a Board of Conciliation
is the equal representation of both parties to the dispute and the parties would be unequally represented
if the vacancy of a member is not filled up.
In the present case one of the membP.rs of the Tribunal namely, Mr. Aiyar, was admittedly absent
for a period of above three months and as he was
appointed to do duties in another capacity, his services could not possibly be available during the period
that he was engaged elsewhere. This fact, it appears,
was brought to the rrotice of the appropriate Government by the other two members, but the Government
decided not to make any new appointment in his place.
The question is, what exactly became the legal position of the other two members? Could ·they function
1951
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
as a Tribunal in the absence of the third member and
111111
without the Government reconstituting the Tribunal as The United
a Tribunal of two? The contention of the respondents Oommercial
is that as section 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act Bank Lid.
gives an option to the appropriate Government to fill
v.
the vacancy or not, as it chooses, when the services of a Their Workmen.
member cease to be available and as it provides for reconstitution only when a new member is appointed by Mukherjta J.
the Government, it is implicit in the provision of the
section itself that in case the Government does not
decide to appoint a new member, the rell}aining
members would automatically constitute the Trihunal and would proceed as such. It is said that the
Industrial Tribunals are really administrative bodies
and as the very object of establishing such Tribunals
is to settle industrial disputes as quickly and as expeditiously as possible with a view to secure industrial
. peace, certain amount of laxity m the procedure cannot
but be allowed to these Tribunals as appears from the
various provisions of the Act and it would defeat the
very object of the enactment if the normal rules of
law and procedure are made applicable to them. It
is suggested further that what section 7 (I) contemplates is the constitution of a Tribunal irrespective of its
members for adjudication of industrial disputes. What
number of persons the Tribunal shall consist of can be
determined by the Government at different times and
in different manner and no question of fresh constitution of a Tribunal would arise in case the number is
subsequently altered.
So far as an Industrial Tribunal is concerned, section 8 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act comes into
operation when the services of the chairman of the
Tribunal or of any member thereof cease to be avail. able at any time. This non-availability of services may
be permanent or temporary and may be occasioned by
any cause or circumstance. When the services of a
member cease to be available, the appropriate Government has got to make up its mind whether it would
fill the vacancy or not ; and in case it chooses to
appoint a new member, the Tribunal must be ~eemed
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
to be reconstituted within the meaning of section 8,
the primary object of which is to provide that the proceedings shall be continued before such reconstituted
Tribunal·from the stage at whick they were left and
v.
they would not have to be started afresh. Thus it
Their Work,,..n. follows from the language of section 8 that the reconstitution spoken of or contemplated by the section is
M ukh"i"' J.
reconstitution by reason of the appointment of a new
member in place of the old. There is no question so
far as section 8 is concerned of reconstitution of the
Tribunal when the Government chooses not to fill the
vacancy.
The point that is stressed on behalf of the respondents is that as section 8 dties not provide for
reconstitution of the Tribunal when no new appointment of a member is made, the implication must
necessarily be that the remaining members would
continue to act as a Tribunal and no further order or
notification by the Government is necessary. The argument seems plausible at first sight but an examination
of the material provisions of the Act reveals the
difficulties, and those of a formidable character, in the
way of accepting this contention as sound.
As has been pointed out already, there is a marked
distinction between the provisions of sections 5 and 6
of the Industrial Disputes Act on the one hand and
those of section 7 on the other. Sections 5 and 6
expressly empower a Board of Conciliation and a Court
of Enquiry to exercise their functions in the absence of
aqy of the members, provided the prescribed quorum
is present ; but such provision has been deliberately
omitted from section 7 and nothing has been prescribed
either in the Act or in the rules in regard to any
quorum for the members of the Tribunal. It cannot be
argued that no quorum has been laid down in the case
of a Tribunal, as it can consist of one member only.
The position of a Court of Enquiry, it seems, is
precisely the same so far as this point is concerned and
yet there is a rule prescribing a quorum for members
of a Court. Having regard to the language of section
7 which admittedly contemplates that the members of
1un
The United
Oommucial
Bank Lid.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S.C.R.
425
a Tribunal must act all together, it would, in my
1951
opinion, be a perfectly legitimate view to take that if The United
the legislature did intend to make an exception to this Commercial
rule, it would have done so in clear terms instead of Bank Ltd.
leaving it to be gathered inferentially from the
v.
provision of another section which itself is not couched Their workmen.
in unambiguous language.
M kh . J
An Industrial Tribunal can be constituted only in " l!f'jea •
accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the
Industrial Disputes Act and unless a Tribunal is
properly constituted, it cannot be invested with.
jurisdiction to. adjudicate o~ industrial disputes
Under sub-section (2) of section 7, the number of
members constituting the Tribunal has got to be
determined by appropriate Government and that is an
integral part of the Tribunal itself. A change in the
number of members of a Tribunal could be made
therefore only in pursuance of the provision contained
in sub-section (2) of section 7. As section 8 does not
lay down that in case the services of a member of the
Tribunal cease to be available and the Government
does not choose to make a new appointment in his
place, the remaining members should continue to form
the Tribunal, the constitution or reconstitution of the
remaining members as a Tribunal should, in my
opinion, be made only under section 7 of the Act.
I am not impressed by the argument of Mr. De that
a Tribunal is to be conceived of as an entity different
from the members o~ which it is composed and
whatever changes might occur in the composition of
the Tribunal, the identity of the Tribunal remains
intact. A distinction undoubtedly exists between the
court and the judge who presides over it, but if the
constitution of the court requires that it is to be
composed of a certain number of judges, obviously a
lesser number could not perform the functions of the
court.
Mr. De also argued that the very object of the
Industrial Disputes Act is to ensure a speedy and
quick determination of industrial disputes and section
55
426
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951]
15 of the Act expressly lays down that the Tribunal
shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, as
soon as practicable, on the conclusion thereof, submit
its award to the appropriate Government. This object,
"·
it is said, would be frustrated if the strict rules of
Their Workmen. ordinary law are extended to the proceedings of an
Mu!:herjea ,J, Industrial Tribunal.
It is quite true that a quasi-judicial tribunal enjoys
greater flexibility and freedom from the strict rules of
law and procedure than an ordinary court of law, but
however much informality and celerity might be considered to be desirable in regard to the proceedings of
an Industrial Tribunal, it is absolutely necessary that
the Tribunal must be properly constituted in accordance with requirements of law before it is allowed to
function at all. I fail to see further how the issuing of
a formal notification under section 7 of the Act could
delay the proceedings of the Tribunal or hamper
expeditious settlement of the disputes. Section 16 of
the Industrial Disputes Act makes the imperative
provision that the a ward of a Tribunal shall be in
writing and shall be signed by all the members. So
long as there is no change or alteration in the original
notification which constituted the Tribunal, the
expression " all the members" must mean and refer to
all the members whose names appear in this notification and, unless all of them sign the award, it would
not be a valid or operative award in law.
Our attention was drawn in course of the arguments. to rule 12 ofthe rules framed by the C'entral
Government in exercise of its powers under section 38
of the Industrial Disputes Act. This rule, it is to be
noted, was deleted with effect from 6th of December
1949. As it stood originally, it was worded as
follows:" Where a Tribunal consists of two or more members the Tribunal may with the consent of the parties
act notwithstanding any casual vacancy in its
number and no act, proceeding or determination of the
Tribunal shall be called in question or invalidated by
reason of any such vacancy."
!951
The United
oom1ne1'Cial
Bank Ltd.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that
this rule was ultra vires of the authority which passed
it. It is not necessary for us for purposes of the
rn.;i
The Unite!/
commercial
Eank Ltd.
present case to discuss this matter. Assuming the rule
to be valid, it certainly does not assist the respondv: ,
ents in any way, as there is no suggestion in this Their Workmen.
case that during the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara JfuklteiJca .1.
Aiyar the proceedings continued before the remaining two members with the consent of both parties. On
the other hand, the provision in the rule certainly goes
against the broad contention that the respondents
wanted to raise upon the langua~e of section 8. In my
opinion, as there was no notification by the appropriate Government under section 7 of the Industrial
Disputes Act constituting the two members a Tribunal
under the Act during the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, the proceedings before these two members were void and inoperative and the award made
and signed by them only during this period must be
held to be void.
I do not think however that it should be held that
the Tribunal was not a properly constituted authority or
lacked jurisdiction to exercise its function when
Mr. Aiyar resumed his duties on 20th of February,
1950. As I have said already, what is necessary for
due constitution of an Industrial Tribunal is a notification or order by the appropriate Government under
section 7 of the lndustrial Disputes Act and the
number and names of the members as given in the
notification form an essential or integral part of the
Tribunal thus constituted. If the services of one of the
members cease to be available at any time as is
contemplated by section 8 and the appropriate Government does not choose to appoint another member in his
place, one or other of two consequences may follow.
The Government may, by a fresh notification under
section 7, constitute a Tribunal with the remaining
members or in any other way it likes or it may not
take. any steps at all and allow the original notification to remain. It can certainly be assumed that the
Government will choose the latter alternative only
...
428
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951]
when it thinks that the vacancy is only for a short
period and is not likely to continue long. In such
~:=.~=~ circumstances, as I have already indicated, the true
Bank Ltd.
position is that the remaining members cannot
v.
function as a Tribunal and all the proceedings must be
'l'J..ir Warkm<11. held to remain in abeyance till the absent member
rejoins his duties. But I do not see any reason why
MukherJea J. there should be a fresh notification and.a fresh constitution of the Tribunal when the absent member
returns. The original notification is still there unaltered
and unamended and not affected in any way by any
subsequent notification; and by virtue of this notification alone, the three members would be competent to sit
as a Tribunal and discharge its duties. The fact that
the services of one of them were not available at a time
would not make the original notification null and void.
The only effect of the absence of a member would be
that the remaining members would not be competent
to continue the proceedings ; but this disability would
cease as soon as the services of the absent member
become available and a Tribunal as constituted by the
notification is ready and able to function.
The appellant's contention seems to be that once a
vacancy has. occurred, the Tribunal becomes imperfectly constituted and a fresh constitution is necessary.
I do not think that this position is sound. As I have
said already, the non-availability of the services of a
member may be permanent or purely temporary and
may be due to various causes. The word " vacancy "
has no technical meaning.
As will appear
from a reference to the Oxford Dictionary, the
word ' vacancy " is ordinarily used in the sense
of a " temporary freedom or cessation from
a business or occupation" If the absence of a member was merely temporary, the vacancy would mean
nothing else but an interval or period during which a
particular office remained unoccupied. The question
of a fresh appointment might arise if the vacancy
was actually filled up; but, as has happened in the
present case, if the vacancy is not filled up but is allowed to remain, it would automatically come to an erd
1961
S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
1951
as soon as the member whose absence caused the
vacancy comes back and rejoins the office. It may be Th• United
desirable in the interests of the public t6 issue a notice 00111111erciat
or make some announcement in regard to the resump- Banic Ltd.
tion of duties by the absent member, but in· my opinion . v.
no reconstitution of the Tribunal with the self same Th..r Workmen.
members is called for or necessary under the provi- Mukherjea 1 .
sions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is pointed out
that cases may be conceived of where the non-availability of the services of a member is due to death,
lunacy or some such circumstance; but in such cases
there could be no question of the man's coming back
and joining his office, and as I have said already
under section 16 of the Industrial Disputes Act no
award would be valid unless all the members whose
names appeared in the notification signed it. This
would be impossible in the case of death, lunacy or
some other disablement of that character.
It will be seen that in the Government Notification .
No. LR 60 (47) dated 20th March, 1950, it was expressly stated that the services ofShri N. Chandrasekhara
Aiyar, Member.of the All India Industrial Tribunal
(Bank Disputes), were temporarily placed at the disposal of the Ministry of External· Affairs with effect
from 23rd November, 1949, (afternoon). Mr. Aiyar's
new duties continued till 27th J atmary, 1950. As soon
as this work was over, he was regarded as coming
back to bis office as a member of the All India Industrial
Tribunal and he was allowed leave in that capacity by
the Ministry of Labour from 28th January, 1950, to
19th February, HJSO, (vide Notification No. LR 60 (73)
dated 16th September, 1950.) By another Government
notification (being Notification No. LR 60 (47) dated
29th May, 1950), it was declared that Shri Cbandrasekhara Aiyar resumed charge of his duties as member
of the All India Industrial Tribunal on the 20th February, 1950, (forenoon).
It is true that these notifications were issued much
after the time when Mr. Aiyar actually resumed his
duties, but as they are not notifications under section 7
of the Industrial Disputes Act, and cannot constitute
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
a condition precedent to investing the Tribunal with
jurisdiction under the law, the delay in the actual
7
,,.,,.,"'ial
publication of the notices is really immaterial. They
00
Dank Ltd.
are relevant only for the purpose of showing what the
v.
state of affairs really was. In my opinion, therefore,
Their w...t ...... the Tribunal was a properly constituted authority on
and from the 20th February, 1950, and as the award
Mukherjea.J. dated 31st July, 1950, was signed by all the three members appointed under the notification dated 24th
August, 1949, no objection is legally sustainable that
the award was made without any jurisdiction.
A question may be raised that as the hearing of the
general issues before the Tribunal commenced at a
time when Mr. Aiyar was absent and he had not the
opportunity of being present all through the proceedings
when arguments of both sides were advanced, there
has been an irregularity or illegality in the procedure
which vitiates the whole award. A decision on this
point would require investigation of various matters
which have not been placed before us at the present
stage by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants Banks; and I would refrain from expressing any
opinion upon it. My conclusion is that the award
dated the 31st of July is not void by reason of any
Jack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal which made it. I
am, however, of the opinion that the other awards
which were made during the absence of Mr. Chandrasekhara Aiyar or which were not signed by him must
be held to be without jurisdiction.
Awards declared void.
1us1
,h• Unu<d
Agent for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 & 49:
Rajender Narain.
Agent for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 48
and 50; Ranbir Sawhney.
Agent for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 47:
Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the respondents: Naunit Lal.
Agent for the Intervener: P. A. Mehta.
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•
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