STATE OF SERAIKELLA versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 6 April 1951 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 474 | 1951 INSC 24
Key facts
- Decided
- 6 April 1951
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- ORIGINAL SUIT No. 1/1950
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 474
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 24
Text of the judgment
474
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1951
[1951]
STATE OF SERAIKELLA
.April 6.
fl.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
(Suit No. 1 of 1950)
STATE OF DHENKANAL
fl.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
(Suit No. 2 of 1950)
STATE OF BAUDH
fl.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
(Suit No. 3 of 1950)
STATE OF TIGIRIA
fl.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
(Suit No. 4 of 1950)
STATE OF ATHGARH
fl.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
(Suit No. 5 of 1950)
STATE OF BARAMBA
fl.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
(Suit No. 6 of 1950)
STATE OF NARSINGPUR
"·
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
(Suit No. 7 of 1950)
t SHRI HAluLAL KANIA C. J., PA"rANJ ALI
CHAND
MAHAJAN,
SASTRI, MEH1l
S. R. DAS and VIVIAN BosE JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts. 363 (! ), 374 (2)-Indian StatesAccession to India under Instruments of Accession-Orders treatjng States as having merged in lnd~a-Suit to declare orders ultra
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
vires and enforce rights under Instrument of Accession-Suits filed
in Federal Court before 26th /anuary 1950-/urisdiction of
Supreme Court to try such suits-Scope of Arts. 363 (1) and 374 (2).
Article 374 (2) of the Constitution of India provides that all
suits, appeals and proceedings pending in the Federal Court at
the commencement of this Constitution shall stand removed to
the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same. Article 363 ( l) provides
that notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, neither the
Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in any
dispute arising out of any provision· of a treaty, agreement or
similar instrument entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State.
Certain States had acceded to the Dominion of India under
Instruments of Accession in August 1947. They were treated as
having merged in the Province of Bihar and were administered
as a part of that Province under Orders issued under the Extra
Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, and · s. 290-A of the
Government of India _Act, 1935 (as amended by the Constituent
Assembly Act of 1949). The States instituted suits in the
Federal Court of India before the 26th January, 1950, for a declaration that the various Orders under which the States came to be
administered as a part of Bihar and the laws under which those
Orders were ·made were ultra vires and void and the Province
of Bihar had accordingly no authority to carry on the administ Tation of the States. The suits stood transferred to the Supreme
Court of India under Art. 374 (2) of the new Constitution:
Held, per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI J. and BosE J.
(MAHAJAN ). dissenting).-That even though the suits were
instituted before the new Constitution came into force and under
Art. 374 (2) they stood removed to the Supreme Court, nevertheless the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 374 (2) was
controlled by Art. 363 ( l) of the Constitution in view of the .
opening words of the latter namely, "notwithstanding anything
in this Constitution". As the suits were really to enforce the
plaintiffs rights under their Instruments of Accession and the
dispute between the parties really arose out of those instruments,
under Art. 363 (1) the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to
hear the suits. This view did not involve giving any retrospective effect to Art. 361 (3). MAHAJAN J. (contra.)-Art. 363
takes away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on the subjects
mentioned therein if suits about them were instituted after the
26th January, 1950, or disputes concerning them arise after
that date, while Art. 374 { 12) empowers the Supreme Court to
hear and determine suits which were pending in the Federal
Court on the 26th January, 1950, and which that court was
competent to hear and determine. There is no confilct between
1951
State of
Seraikel/a
and Others.
v.
Union of India
and Another.
476
1951
Sl!Jleef
&raikella
and 01/urs
v.
l!nion qf India
""" Malltlr.
Ka11iaC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[I951J
these articles, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear
the suit.
DAs J.-As the plaintiff States, by virtue of the States Merger
(Governor's Provinces) Order, 1949, were immediately before the
commencement of the new Constitution being administered as if
they formed part of the Provinces of Bihar or Orissa the
territories of Bihar and Orissa included the territories of the
plaintiff States under Art. I of the Constitution read with the
third paragraph of Part A of the First Schedule. These States
consequently ceased to be States so far as the new Constitution
is concerned, they had no legal existence as acceding States, and
could not therefore be recognised as such States by Courts, as
Courts arc bound by the Constitution and cannot question the
validity of any of its provisions. The suits must therefore be
regarded as .having. abated.
0IUGJNAL JuIUSDICTION. Suits Nos. 1 to 7 of 1950.
The facts are stated in detail in the judgment of
KANIA c J.
N. C. Chatterjee (A. N. Roy Choudhry, with him) for
the plaintiffs in suits Nos. 1, 3, and 6.
Dr. N. C. Sen Gupta (A. N. Roy Choudhry, with him)
for the plaintiffs in suits Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 7.
M. C. Setalvad Attorney-General for India (G, N. /oshi
with him) for the defendants in all the suits.
1951. April 6. The following judgments were delivered:KANIA C J.-This is a suit filed on the 15th of
January, 1950, under the Original Jurisdiction of the
Federal Court as it was functioning before the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January,
1950. The State of Seraikella was a State in Orissa
and its Ruler was Raja Aditya Pratap Singh Dea. On
the 16th August, 1947, the plaintiff State acceded to
the Dominion of India by virtue of an Instrument of
Accession executed by its Ruler and accepted by the
Governor-General of India under section 6 of the
Government of India Act, 1935. After reciting that
under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Dominion of India was set up and that under the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted, it provided that
an Indian State may accede to the Dominion of India
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
by an Instrument of Accession, the Instrument stated
that the Raja acceded to the Dominion of India and
that he accepted that the · matters specified in the
Schedule to the Instrument were the matters with
respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make
laws for the State. The three principal heads mentioned in the Schedule to that Instrument were
Defence, External Affairs and Communications, with
particulars detailed under each of those heads. The
Instrument expressly provides that by executing the
same the Ruler shall not be deemed to be committed
to the acceptance of any future Constitution of India
or to fetter his discretion to enter into arrangements
with the Government of India under any such future
,Constitution. It further expressly provides that nothing in the Instrument affects the continuance of the
sovereignty in and over the State, or save as provided
by or under the Instrument, the exercise of any
powers, authority and rights so far enjoyed by him as
Ruler of the State or the validity of any law then in
force in the State. It also provides that the terms of
the Instrument of Accession are not to be varied by
any amendment of the Government of India Act or of
the Indian Independence Act, · 1947 unless such
amendment is accepted by the Ruler or by an Instrument supplementary to the said Instrument. It was
denied in the plaint that any such supplementary
instrument was executed by the Ruler and ·no amendment of the aforesaid Acts has been accepted by him
or the plaintiff State. A Standstill Agreement was also
executed by the Ruler under which it was agreed that
matters of common concern and specified in the
Schedule to the Agreement would continue between
the Dominion of India and the said State until new
agreements were made in that behalf.
On the 15th December, 1947, an agreement is alleged
to have been entered into between the GovernorGeneral of India and the Ruler of the plaintiff State.
'By that document the Raja ceded to the Dominion
Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction
and powers for and in relation to the governance of
4-62 s. a. India/59.
1951
Stale of
Ser~l111
llllli Ot/reri
Y.
Union of lndi11
and A.not/rer.
EaniaC.].
478
1951
Stat• of
S1rafk,lla
and Others
v.
Union of l•di4
*1ld Anolillr.
KaniaC.].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
the State and agreed to transfer the administration of
the State to the Dominion Government on the 1st of
January, 1948, Article 2 contained a provision for the
Privy Purse of the Raja and it is contended by the
plaintiff that when the Raja signed the document the
figure in this clause had been left -blank. Under
article 3 of that agreement, it was provided that the
Raja would be entitled to the full ownership, use and
enjoyment of all private properties belonging to him
on the date of the agreement and that by the 1st of
Janliaty, 1948, the Raja will furnish to the Dominion
Government an inventory of all immovable propertieS;
securities and cash held by him as such private property. Under article 4, the personal privileges enjoyed
by the Raja and the members of his family mentioned .
therein had to continue.
On the 24th of December, 1947, an Act to provide
for the exercise of certain extra-provincial Jurisdiction
of the Central Government (Act XLVII of 1947) was
passed. Under section 3 of that Act it was provided
that it shall be lawful for the Central Government to
exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction in such manner
as it thinks fit and the Central Government may delegate any such jurisdiction as aforesaid to any officer
or authority in such manner and to such extent as it
thinks fit. Under section 4 it was provided that the
Central Government may by notification in the official
Gazette make such orders as may seem to it expedient
for the effective exercise of any extra-provincial jurisdiction of the Central Government. A notification
under' section 4 of that Act was thereafter issued by the
Central Government delegating, under section 3, the
power£ contained in that Act to the Province of Orissa.
On the 18th of May, 1948, that notification was cancelled and the powers in respect of the two specified
States including the plaintiff State were delegated to
the Province of Bihar. On the same day the Government of Bihar passed an order called "The Seraikella
and Kharaswan States Order" providing for the
administration of the two States. On the 5th of
January, l!m, the Legislative Assembly of India,
s.c.l\.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
which was also functioning as the Constituent Assembly, passed the Constituent
Assembly Act I of 1949
and added section 290-A to the Government of India
Act, 1935. That section runs as follows :"Administration of certain Acceding States as a
Chief Commissioner's Province or as part of a Governor's or Chief Commissioner's Province(1) Where full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the Government
of any Indian State or of any group of such States are
for the time being exercisable by the Dominion Government, the Governor-General may be Order direct
(a) that the State or the group of States shall be
administered in all respects as if the State or the group
of States were a Chief Commissioner's Province; or
(b) that the State or the group of. States shall ·be
administered in all respects as if the State or the group
of States formed part of a Governor's or a Chief Commissioner's Province specified in the Order :
Provided that if any Order made under clause (b) of
this sub-section affects a Governor's Province, the
Governor-General shall before making such Order,
ascertain the views of the Government of that Province
both with respect to the proposal to make the Order
and with respect to the provisions to be inserted
therein.
(2) Upon the issue of an Order under clause (a)
of sub-section ( 1) of this section, all the provisions of
this Act applicable to the Chief Commissioner's Province of Delhi shall apply to the State or the group of
States in respect of which the Order is made.
(3) The Governor-General may in making an
Order under sub-section (1) of this section give such
supplemental, incidental and consequential directions
(including directions as to representation in the Legislature) as he may deem necessary.
( 4) In this section, reference to a State shall
include reference to a part of a State."
On the 27th of July, 1949, the Governor-General of
India promulgated an Order called the States Merger
1951
Stat1 of
Seraikella
and Others
y,
Uuion of India
anti Anoth#.
Kania C. J•
480
1951
State of
Seraikella
...
a.1d Oiht1J
Union oj"lndia
and AMlh.,,
Kania C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951}
(Governors' Provinces) Order of 1949. The result of
that was that the plaintiff State is claimed to have
merged in the Province of Bihar.
The plaintiff State contends that the Government of
Orissa wrongfully and illegally purp9rted to administer
the plaintiff State by virtue of the .Notification of the
23rd of December, 1947, under Act XLVII of 1947. It
is claimed that the Act was and is ultra vires and ot no
effect and not binding on the plaintiff State. The
alleged agreement of the 15th of December, 1947, is
contended to be void for want of consideration and is
inoperative. Indeed it is contended that as the figure
was left blank there was no agreement at all. It is
contended that on the 18th May, 1948, without the
consent and approval of the plaintiff State or its .Ruler,
the Province of Bihar wrongfully and illegally took
over the administration of the State and passed the
Seraikella and Kharsawan Administration Order, 1948.
In paragraph 10 of the plaint it is contended that the
Dominion of India had no authority to go beyond the
Instrument of Accession, had no authority to delegate
powers to the Province of Bihar to administer the
plaintiff State and the said Order, in any event, is
illegal and inoperative as it went beyond the ambit of
. the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947. As regards
the Order issued by the Governor-General on the 27th
of July, 1949, it is contended that he had no authoritii
or power to promulgate the Order and the State
Merger Order of 1949 purporting to be passed under
section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, is
also void. The enactment of the Constituent Assembly
Act I of 1949 is contended to be ultra vires and illegal.
That Act is further challenged on the ground that it
was enacted without the assent of the GovernorGeneral of India. It is contended in the plaint that
the defendants, viz., the Union of India and the State
of Bihar, deny and are interested in denying the existence or entity of the plaintiff State and in disputing
the rights, privileges, powers and prerogatives of its
Ruler as well as the right to the private properties as
set out in the annexure. The States Merger Order of
s.e.R.
SlJPREME COU.RT REPORTS
481
l949 is .contended to be an abuse -of power and autho..
rity and a fraud on the Government of India. Act,
1935, and the Indian Independence Act, 1947, It is
contended that the Government. of India or the Constituent Assembly had no ~uthprity to pass any legisla.tion on ·a matter not specified in the Schedule to the
Instrument of Accession. In paragraph 19 of the plaint
it is contended that the dispute between the parties
comprised and involyed questions on which the existence or extent of legal rights depends and the plaintiff
State is a party to the same. These disputes concern
the intc;rpretation of the Government of India Act,
1935, and/or of an order made thereunder J.nd/or the
interpretation of the Indian Independence · Act and/or
an order made thereunder and/or the .extent of. authority vested in the Dominion by virtue of the Instrument of Accession of the plaintiff .State. The prayers
are: (a) Interpretation of the relevant provisions of
the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and the States Merger Order, 1949.
(b) For a declaration that the Dominion Government
had no authority to assume any power or jurisdiction
beyond the matters specified in the Instrument of
Accession and had no authority to delegate · any · power
in relation to the plaintiff . State to the Provincial
Government of Bihara ( c) For a declaration tha~ Act
XLVII of 1947, the Constituent Assembly Act I .of 1949,
section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935,
as adapted, and the States Merger Order, 1949, are
ultra vires, illegal and .inoperative in so far as they are
made applicable to the plaintiff ~tate and Orders
made thereunder as also actions taken or purported to
be taken thereunder; (d) For a declaration that the
Province of. Bihar had no authority or jurisdiction to
carry on tlie administration ·of the plaintiff State and
tMt. the alleged merger was illegal and unauthorized :
( e) For a declaration as to the rights of th.e parties and
as to the extent of the authority of the Domini9n of
India over and in respect of the plaintiff State; (f) For
a declaration that· the. plaintiff State retained its entitv
and territ6ri:il . integrify; that its administration' should
1951
State of ~
Seraike/la
and Others
v.
Union of India
mrd Another.
Kania C.J.
482
1951
State of
Seraiktlla
muJ Others
v.
Union of India
and Another.
KaniaC.].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951}
in any event be carried on in the name of its Ruler and
that his rights and privileges as set out in annexure
'C' and his private properties as set out in annexure
'D' remain unaffected ; and (g) For a declaration that
the Province of Bihar had no authority or jurisdiction
over the plaintiff State and that it should not interfere
in any way with the State or the sovereignty of its
Ruler.
Six other suits by other States of the former Eastern
Agency were filed also before the Constitution of India
came into force on the 26th of January, 1950, on the
same lines, except that in four of them the agreement
similar to the agreement of the 15th December, 1947,
is admitted to have been executed by the Ruler and is
admitted to be binding on the plaintiff.
The material part of section 6 of the Government of
India Act, 1935, which provides for the accession of
Indian States, runs as follows :6. Accession of Indian States.-(1) An Indian State
shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion .if
the Governor-General has signified his acceptance of
an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler
thereof whereby the Ruler on behalf of the State :(a) declares that he accedes to the Dominion with
the intent that the Governor-General, the Dominion
Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion
authority established for the purposes of the Dominion
shall, by virtue of his Instrument of Accession, but,
subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the
State such functions as may be vested in them by
order under this Act; and
(b) assumes the obligation of ensuring that due
effect is given within the State to the provisions of
this Act so far as they are applicable therein by virtue
of the Instrument of Accession.
(!) An Instrument of Accession shall specify the
matters which the Ruler accepts as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws
for the State, and the limitations, if any, to which the
sm.
481
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
i95t
power of the Dom.inion Legislature to ~e laws for
the State, and the exercise of the cxecuttve authority
of the :Dominion in the State, are respectively to be
subject.
(3) A Ruler may, by a ,supplementary Instrument
eYl"CUted by him and accepted by the Governor-General,
vary the Instrument of Accession of his State by
extending the functions which by virtue of that Instru•
ment are exercisable by any Dom.inion authority in
:relation to his State.
•
•
•
S1a1; ef.
Seraiklili&
tiild Olhits
v.
Union of IlliiilJ
iJlltl Anolfltf.
KaniaC.j.
•
(5) In this Act a State which has acceded to the
Dominion is referred to as an Acceding State and the
Instrument by virtue of which a State has so acceded
construed together with any supplementary Instrument executed under this section, is referred to as the
Instrument of Accession of that State .... "
A supplementary · Instrument executed under subsection (3) by the Ruler and accepted by the GovernorGeneral is, by virtue of sub-section (5), therefore to be
considered a part of the Instrument of Accession of
that State. The supplementary Instruments signed by
the four States only bring within the scope of discussion those supplementary Instruments on the. footing
that they were a part of the Instrument of Accession.
Written statements have been filed on behalf of the
defendants contesting the contentions raised in the
, plaint. There are several contentions in respect of the
jurisdiction of the Court. Several contentions cover
pure issues of law and some raise issues of fact in respect of the document of 15th December, 1947. The
parties agreed on the issues and they have been filed
in Court. It was further agreed between the parties
that issues 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 may be tried as preliminary issues and we have heard counsel on those issues
fully. The-first issue is in these terms:
"Whether, having regard to the subject-matter of
the suit and the provisions contained in article 363 (1)
of the Constitution of India, this Hon'ble Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit."
1
484
1951
Sime of
Seraikella
...i 011im
v.
U~n oflndi•
aad AnotM?..
.K4~UJ ~~.3.
'
StlJP.llEME COURT REOORTS
[1'951]
In the view I take of this issue I do not think it
necessary to discuss the other preliminary issues raised
on the question of jurisdiction. For determining this
issue, it may be noted that the Federal Court, prior to
the 26th of January, 1950, had original jurisdiction
in respect of matters covered· by section 204 of the
Gove.rnment of India Act. Under that section, that
Court had jurisdiction in any dispute between a State
and the Dominion if and in so far as the dispute involved any question (whether of law or fact) on which
existence or extent of a legal right depended, provided
.that the said jurisdiction did not extend to a dispute
to which a ·State was a party unless the dispute was
covered by clause (a) (i) of the Proviso, which runs as
follows:"Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to- ·
(a) a dispute to which a State is a party, unless the
dispute(i) concerns th<" "interp.retation of this Act or of an
Order in Council made thereunder before the date of
the establishment of the Dominion, or of an order made
thereunder on or after that date, or the interpretation
of ·the Indian Indepepdence Act, 1947, or of any order
made thereunder, or the extent of the legislative or
executive authority vested in the Dominion by virtue
of the Instrument of Accession of that State ; or .. "
The rest of the section is not material. Section 204
(2) provided that the Federal Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction shall not pronounce any judgment other than a declaratory judgment. The suit
having been filed prior to the 26th of January, 1950,
the suit stOOd transferred to this Court under article
374 (2) of the Constitution of India. That article. runs
as follows i "374. (2) All suits, appeals, and .proceedings, civil
or criminal, pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of this Constitution shall stand removed to
the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court shall have
jurisdiction to. hear and determine· the same, and the
S.G.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
485
judgments and orders of the Federal Court delivered or
made before the. commencement of this Constitution
shall have the .same force and effect as if they had been
·d( livered or made by the Supreme Court."
Article 131 of the Constitution deals with the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and its material
portion runs as follows :"Subject to the provisions of ·this Constitution, the
Supreme Court shall .... have original jurisdiction in
:any dispute ....
(b) between the Government of India :ind any State
Qr States on one side arid one or more other States on
the other ....
if and in so far as the dispute involves any question
(whether of law or fact) on which the existence of a
1egal right depends : ·
Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend
to (i) a dispute to which a State specified in Part B of
the First Schedule is a party if the dispute arises out ·
-of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant,
engagement, sanad or other similar instrumel).t which
was entered into or executed before the ·commencement
-of·· this Constitution and has or has been continued in
<Operation after such commencement."
The, States specified in Part B of the First Schedule
<lo not mention any ,of the plaintiff States. ..Article 363
of the Constjtution of India runs as follows :"363. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143
neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall
have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any
provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement,
sanad or other similar instrument which was entered
of this
into or executed before the commencement
Constitution by any :Ruler of an Indian State and to
which the Government of· the Dominion of India or
any. of its predecessor Governments was a party and
which has or has been continued in operation after
such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of
any right w:ruing under or any liability or obligation
1951
State of
Seraikel/a
and Others
v.
Union of India
and Another.
Kania C.J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1951
State ef
Seraiktlla
and OtlurJ
v,
Uniot• of India
and Anot/rn.
Kania C.J.
[1951J
arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, convenant,
engagement, sanad or other similar instrument.
(2) In this article( a) 'Indian State' means any territory recognised
before the commencement of this Constitution. by His
Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India
as being such a State ; and
(b) 'Ruler' includes the Prince, Chief or other person.
recognised before· such commencement by His Majesty
or the Government of the Dominion of India as theRuler of any Indian State."
The first question arising for consideration is the.
true interpretation of article 374 (2) of the Constitution of India. It was argued that the Federal Court
had jurisdiction to try the suit as framed before the
Constitution of India came into operation. Under
article 347 (2) that suit stood removed to the Supreme·
Court and the question of jurisdiction to try this suit
at the present stage has to be determined only having
regard to- the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, because
the trial of the suit was transferred to the Supreme
Court under this article. It was argued that if there
was any limitation on the jurisdiction of the SQpreme
Court to hear such a suit, (if instituted in it under its
original jurisdiction), such limitation is not relevant to
be considered in respect of suits which stood transferred to. the Supreme Court under article 374 (2). In
other words, in respect of such suits the Supreme
Court had a wider jurisdiction as compared with thejurisdiction of the Federal Coutt, if its jurisdiction is
construed as limited by virtue of the different article.~
of the Constitution. In this connection, some reliance
was placed on the use of the word 'jurisdiction' .as;
· connected with the Supreme Colll't in article 374 (2).
In my opinion, this argument is unsound. Article 374
is in the Part dealing with temporary and transitional
provmons. In article 374 (1) it is provided that the
Judges of the Federal Court holding office ~ore tht!
commencement of the . Constitution, unless they have
S.C.R.
SuPREMl!: COURT REPORTS
487
. elected otherwise, become Judges of the Supreme Court.
Article 374 (2), in my opinion, similarly provides,
firstly, for the removal .of all suits, appeals and proceedings, civil or criminal, pending in the Federal
Court to the Supreme Court and, secondly, provides
that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear
and determine these matters. 'lt may be noticed that
in this clause provision is made not only in respect of
suits but of civil and criminal appeals and also of other
pending procee-Oings. By providing only for the
removal of these matters to the Supreme Court, there
will remain a lacuna, if it was not furth~r stated that
after such removal the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to try the matters. It is from that point of
view only that, in my opinion, the Constitution
states that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction
to hear and determine the same. I think it is not
correct to read those words as giving to the Supreme
Court an extended jurisdiction in these matters. Two
stages have therefore to be considered in determining the operation of this clause : (1) whether the suits,
· appeals or proceedings, which were pending before the
Federal Court, were within the jurisdiction of the Fede-.
ral Court ; and (2) whether on removal the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the same
having regard to all the provisions of the Constitution
relating to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It
must be n,,oticed that the Supreme Court was a new
Court established by the Constitution of India. It had
no existence before that. The jurisdiction of that Court
has therefore to be ascertained by considering all the
relevant articles of the Constitution of India. It is in
that light that the provisions of article 363 have to be
read and interpreted.
Before doing so I think it is essential to bear in mind
the political ba~kground. Prior to August, 1947, British
India, as it was then described, was governed under
the Government of India Act, 1935'
Indian States, as
they were then described, were independent States not
governed by the Government of India. They were
under the suzerainty of His Majesty the · King and their
1951
State of
Straikel/a
and Others
·V.
Union °of India.
and Another.
Kania C.J.
488
1951
Statt of
Straik11lla
and Olhers
v
Onion of India
and Anothtr.
.KaniaC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
administration was controlled under the advice of. the
Political Department of the Government of India, on
the footing that the King .was the Sovereign and had
the right to exercise suzerain powers over those States.
On the passing of the Indian Independence Act, 1947,
from the 15th August, 1947, the British Parliament
and the King ceased to have power to make any laws
for India or rnake any changes in its Constitution.
These were left to India. As regards the Indian States,
while provision continued in the Governm.ent of India
Act for the Rulers signing instruments of accession,
no suzerain rights were given to the Dominion of India
by the Indian Independence Act. If, therefore, the
Dominion of India or any of these States committed
acts of aggression or territorial trespass, there was no
law, the enforcement of which could give either party
a relief and there was no court also which could give
such a relief; Section 204 of the Government of India
Act also did not provide any relief to any of these
Indian States unless they signed an Instrument of
Accession.
With the passing of the Constitution of
India, India became a Sovereign Independent Republic.
If that Dominion or Republic committed any .acts of
aggression towards a neighbouring Indian State (as it
is convenient to. describe under the circumstances) the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to give relief to the
Indian . State. A.s noticed above, its jurisdiction under
article 131 is limited and even in respect of a State
specified in Part B of the First Schedule · if a dispute
arises out of any provision of a treaty, agreement,
covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument, it w.ill not ·be .entertained by this Court if the
conditions of the proviso apply to the same. It is with
this background that we have to read article 363 of
the Constitution.
The opening words of that article in terms override
all provisions of the· Constitution, but are made subject
only to the provisiQO.s of article 143 which enabks the
President to consult · the Supreme Court on matters
referred to it. These all embracing opening words of
article .363 thcrefo~ clearly override the operation of
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
489
article 374 (2) also. The result is that article 363 is the
controlling .article over article ·374(2) also. The jurisdiction of the' Supreme Court having been stated in
articles 131-136, article 363 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in . those articles and
other articles of the Constitution, neither the Supreme
Court nor any other court will have jurisdiction in
any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty,
agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other
similar instrument which was entered into or executed
before the commencement of this Constitution and
which has or has been continued in operation after
such commencement. If .therefore the dispute arises
in respect of a document of that description and if such
document had been executed Qefore the Constitution
by a Ruler and which was or had continued in operation after such commencement, this Court has no
jurisdiction to determine such issue. It was argued
that as the agreement had to be in operation after
the commencement of the Constitution, no dispute
can arise in respect of ·such document before the commencemenr of the Constitution and therefore as the
dispute in the present case had arisen before the commencement . of the Constitution, article 363 had no
operat~on. In my opinion, this is not a correct reading
of article 363 (1). The time factor is related only to
the document in question and not the dispute. It is
provided that such. document should have been executed
before the Constitution came into force and has to be
in operation after the Constitution, but the dispute,
which is the subject-matter of the litigation, may arise
before or. after.
It was argued that the article is prospective and
not retrospective. Therefore it onlv covers the cases
which are filed in the Supreme cOurt after the Constitution comes into force and does not affect suits filed in
the Federal Court before the Constitution of India came
into operation. In my opinion this argument is based
on a mistaken meaning given to the words "prospective" and "retrospective". It is· not disputed that the
Constitution is prospective. The question however
1951
Stale of
Seraikella
and Othns
v.
u..ion of l1zdit&
and Another.
KaniaC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1951
'Stal< ef
Setail¢Ua
and Others
v.
Onion ef India
and .Another.
.KaniaC.J.
[1951]
is that the Supreme Court having been created by the
Constitution itself, on the day the Court proceeds to
determine the matter, what according to the Constitution of India, is the jurisdiction of this Court. This
approach doc~ not make the provision retrospective.
In this connection, the similarity in language of articles 363 (1) and 131 proviso (i) may be noted. Considered in that way, the only question which remains
for decision is whether on the structure of the plaint,
the dispute raised by the suit arises out of the provision
of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad
or any other similar instrument. I have already noticed
above that the dispute in respect of the agreement of
the 15th December, 1947, is immaterial for the present
discussion. If the plaintiff repudiates that agreement
he is seeking to enforce his rights after ignoring the
same. If the plaintiff (as noticed in four of the suits)
relies on this agreement, it becomes a part of the
Instrument of. Accession under section 6 (5) of the
Government of India Act, 1935. and the dispute will
still have to be considered having regard to the terms
of the two documents, viz., the original Instrument of
Accession and the supplementary Instrument. The
question thus resolves itself into an analysis of the
plaint and to find out what the plaintiff seeks . to get
by his suit. Apart from the fact that in prayers (f) and
(g) of his plaint he seeks to enforce his rights under the
Agreement of the 15th December, 1947, it appears clear
that the whole ambit of the suit is to enforce his Instrument of Accession. The plaintiff contends firstly that
it had signed the Instrument of Accession through its
Ruler. The State next complains that, acting beyond
the powers given over under the Instrument of Accession, the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are
trespassing wrongfully on its legislative ;md executive
functions, that the Dominion of India and the State of
Bihar are making laws which they have no power to
make having regard to the Instrument of Accession,
and arc wrongfully interfering with the administration
of the State beyond the rights given to them under
the Instrument of Accession. The whole plaint i$
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
491
nothing else except the claim to enforce the plaintiff's
.right uhder the Instrument of Accession. The dispute
therefore in my opinion clearly is in respect of this
Instrument of Accession and is covered by article
363 (1) of the Constitution of India. The question of
the validity of the different enactments and orders is
also based on the rights claimed under the Instrument
of Accession so far as the plaintiff is concerned. On
the side of the defendants, the position is that they
admit the Instrument of Accession and they do not
daim that they are exercising the disputed rights
under that Instrument. Their contention is that the
Agreement of the 15th of December, 1947, was validly
signed and is binding and enforceable against the plaintiff. The defendants contend that their action in
passing the disputed, legislation and orders and the
action in taking over the administration are all based
on that Agreement of 15th December, 1947. If the
plaintiff contends that that Agreement is not binding
on it, it cannot enforce its rights under the original
jurisdiction of the Court. If the plaintiff has a grievance and a right to a relief which the defendants
contend it has not, the forum to seek redress is not the
Supreme Court exercising its original jurisdiction on
the transfer of the suit from the Federal Court. According to the defendants, the situation in those circumstances will be of a Sovereign Independent State
trespassing on the territories, powers and privileges
of another neighbouring independent State. To redress
a grievance arising out of such action on the part of
the defendants, the Supreme Court is not the forum to
give relief. The issue is answered in the negative
. the cause.
'
·costs costs m
1951
State of
Seraikella
and Others
v,
Union of India
and Anot"'r.
KaniaC. J.
VMAN BosE J.-1 agree.
PATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is a batch of suits
brought by plaintiffs claiming to be Acceding States
for certain declaratory reliefs in regard to the allep;ed
wrongful merger of their respective territories in the
territories of the adjoining Provinces of Bihar and
Orissa. The Dominion of India was impleaded as the
Pattm,iali
Saslri J.
492
1951
State of
Straiktlla
anti Others
v.
Union of India
and Another.
Patarefali
Sastri].
SUPR£ME COURT REPORTS
[1951}
first · defendant, and the Province of Bihar or the
Province of Orissa, as the case may be, as ·the second
defendant.
The suits were instituted in the Federal Court of
India under section 204 of the Government of India
Act, 1935, shortly before the comm~ncement of the new
Constitution. Apart from certain minor variations,
the substance of the plaintiff's case in each suit, shorn
of verbiage, is that the merger and the taking over of
the adminiscration of the territory concerned; carried
out in purported exercise of powl:rs conferred by the
State Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949,
made by the Governor-General of India under section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, was
a breach of the terms of the Instrument of Accession
executed by the Ruler and accepted by -the GovernorGeneral in August, 1947, which continued the sovereignty of the Ruler in .and over the State, and that all
notifications, orders or enactments issued or made in
violation of the rights and obligations flowing out of
that Instrument were ultra vires, void and inoperative.
In the plaints in Suits Nos. 1, 2 and 3 reference · was
made to an agree1I1ent entered into between the
Governor-General and the Ruler concerned· in. December, 1947, and it was alleged· that it was inoperative
and void because it was not a concluded agreement
and, in any case, not supported by ·consideration. In
the other Suits Nos. 4, 5; 6 and 7 that agreement was
fully admitted, but "in spite of the agreement aforesaid" it was contended that "the actions taken by the
defendants including the promulgation of the orders,
notifications and legislation mentioned herein are
wrongful, illegal and. ultra vird' The crucial prayer
in all the suits was "a declaration that the Dominion
of India has no authority vested in it to assume any
power or jurisdiction beyond the matters specified in
the Instrument of Accession and had no authority to
delegate any power or powers in relation to the plaintiff
State to the Provincial · Government" of Bihar or of
Orissa, as the case may be. The other reliefs asked for
were merely ancillary a:nd consequeritiaf.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
493
The defence, in the main, was based on the aforesaid
agreement of December, 1947, under which, it was
alleged, the plaintiff in each case "ceded full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in
relation to the governance of the plaintiff to the Government of India with effect from 1st January, 1948". It
was claimed that, from that date and particularly
from January 26, 1950, when the Constitution of India
came into force and made the territory of the plaintiff
an integral part of the territory of the State of Bihar
(or of Orissa, as the case may be), the plaintiff ceased
to be a distinct legal unit and had no capacity to
maintain the suit. The said agreement was a political
agreement and not a civil contract requiring consideration for its effectiveness and, in any case, was a concluded agreement supported by consideration. In view
of that agreement, all the actions, notifications and
orders referred to in the plaint proceeded "on the basis
of the supersession of the said Instrument of Accession
by the consent of the parties" and they were legal,
valid and operative to bind the plaintiff. In a supplementary written statement the defendants raised the
plea that "this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain
the suit having regard to the subject-matter of the suit
and the provisions contained in article 363 (1) of the
Constitution of Indja".
On the 9th December, 1950, by consent of both
sides, it was ordered by the Judge in Chambers that
the suit should be heard on the preliminary issue,
namely, "whether having regard to the subject matter
of the suit and the provisions contained in article
363 (1) of the Constitution of India, this Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit". When the matter
was taken up for hearing on 5th March, 1951, it was
considered desirable that 'issues should be settled on·
all matters in controversy in the suits, and all the
issues relating to the maintainability of the suits,
including the issue of jurisdiction, should be tried as
preliminary issues, and the suits were adjourned tothe 7th March for that purpose. The parties then
filed seventeen agreed issues as arising out of the,
5-62 S. C. India/59
1951
State of
Seraikellti
and Others
v.
Union of India
and Another.
Patanjali
&istri ].
494
1951
State ef
Seraikella
and Others
v.
Union of India
and Another.
Patarefol_i
Sastn J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
pleading;, and they further agreed that issues 1, 3,
4, 5, 6 and 7 might be tried first. These issues are as
follows:
1. Wh~ther having regard to the subject matter of
the suit and t_he provisions contained in article 363 ( 1)
of the Constitution of India, this Hon'ble Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?
3. Whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to
entertain the suit under section 204 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and particularly in regard to
the questions as to the existence and validity of the
agreement of merger ?
4. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain
the suit ?
5. Whether the suit is maintainable in view of the
absence of the requisite notice to the defendants under
section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code ?
6. Whether having regard to the provisions of the
Constitution, the plaintiff has a legal capacity and is
entitled to maintain the suit ?
7. Whether this Court is competent to examine the
validity of section 290-A of the Government of India
Act, 1935, enacted by the Constituent Assembly ?
As I am of opinion that issue No. 1 should be found for
the defendants and the suits must fail on that ground,
I do not propose to consider the other issues, although
arguments have been addressed to us on all of them.
The determination of issue No. 1 turns on the proper
construction of articles 363 (1) and 374 (2) which read
thus:
"363. (1) Notwithstanding anything in tl1is Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143, neither
the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have
jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision
of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad
or other similar instrument which was entered into or
executed before the commencement of this Constitution
by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the
Government of the Dominion of India or any of its
predecessor Governments was a party and which has
:S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
495
-0r has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right
:accruing under or any liability or obligation ansmg
-0ut of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating
to any such treaty,· agreement, covenant, engagement,
~anad or other similar instrument."
"374. (2) All suits, appeals and proceedings, civil or
·criminal, pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of this Constitution shall stand removed
to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court shall
have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and
the judgments and orders of the Federal Court delivered
-0r made before the commencement of this Constitution
shall have the same force and effect as if they had
been delivered or made by the Supreme Court."
As already pointed out, the sheet anchor of the
plaintiffs' case is the Instrument of Accession, which,
according to them, continues to operate in full force.
They contend that "the Dominion of India or the Constituent Assembly of India has no authority or power
under the Indian Independence Act or otherwise to enact
section 6 of the Constituent Assembly Act I of 1949 or
to introduce section 290-A into the Government of
India Act, 1935, or to legislate for the plaintiff State in
any manner except with reference to the matters specified in the Schedule to the said Instrument of Accession"
(paragraph 18 of the plaint in Suit No. 1 of 1950).
They proceed to state that "the disputes between the
parties comprise and involve questions on which the
extent or ·existence of a legal right depends and such
disputes, to which the said Acceding State is a party,
concern (among other things) the extent of authority
vested in the Dominion bv virtue of the Instrument
Accession of the plaintiff ·State." And prayer (b), to
which reference has been made already, is for "a declaration· that the Dominion Government has no authoritv
vested in it to assume any power or jurisdiction beyonri
the matters specified in the Instmment of Accession"
(paragraph 21). These passages are reproduced in all
the plaints. On the other hand, the mainstay of the
of
1951
State of
Seraikella
and Others
v.
Union oflndia
and Another.
Patanjali.
Sastri J.
4%
1951
State ef
Straiktlla
and Others
v.
Union of India
and Anot'Mr.
Palmifali
Saslri ...1.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951J
defence is the subsequent agreement of December 1947.
and it is claimed that the States Merger (Governors'
Provinces) Order, 1949, under which the impugned
merger was effected, was made "on the basis of the
supcrsession of the said Instrument of Accession by
the consent of parties". (Vide paragraph 21 of the
written statement of the first defendant which was
adopted by the second defendant). And, although the
defendants proceeded to state, on the aforesaid basis.
that there was no dispute regarding the Instrument of
Accession, inasmuch as that basis is repudiated in the
piaints, such repudiation obviously raises the
dispute
whether the Instruments of Accession are still in force
or have been superseded. That dispute "arising'', as
it does, "out of" the. Instrument of Accession in each
case falls within the purview of article 363 (1).
It was said that ·the suits involved also certain other
disputes not falling within article 363 (1) such as, for
instance, those relating to the agreement of Decem b~r,
1947, and the validity of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, of section 290-A of the Government
of India Act, 1935, and of the States Merger (Governors'
Provinces) Order, 1949, etc. The· controversies regarding these matters are but contentions whereby the
parties seek fo establish, on the one hand, that the
Instrument of Accession still governs their mutual
rights and obligations and, on the other, that that Instrument stands superseded and is no longer in force.
Issues have no doubt been framed in regard to these
matters but they cannot in my opinion, be considered
to be disputes for the purposes of article 131 or article 363 (1). These articles deal with the jurisdiction
of courts and they envisage disputed claims to substantive legal rights. The claims in these suits arc
undoubtedly based on the respective Instruments of
Accession and they are repudiated because those
Instrument of Accession are said to have been
superseded by reason of the alleged agreement of
lJecember, 1947. These claims are disputes to which
article 363 (1) clearly applies. The other s<><alled
disputes are only incidental and ancillary controversies
/
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
raised with a view to support or overthrow the claims
and cannot, in my opinion, affect the operation of
the bar under that Article any more than, for instance
issue No. 5 relating to the necessity for notice to the
defendants under section 80 of the CiYil ·Procedure
Code.
Nevertheless, it is contended, the article has no
:application here and it cannot operate retrospectively
and applies only to disputes arising after the Commencement of the Constitution. I am unable to accept
this restrktcd interpretation of article 363 ( 1). While
the Article undoubtedly postulates
the continued
operation of the treaties, agreements, etc., entered into
or executed before the commencement of the Constitution and giving rise to the disputes, it does not require,
as a condition of its appliCation, that such Disputes
should arise after the commencement of the Constitution. I sec no ·reason for importing a restriction which
a plain grammatical construction of the language employed does not warrant. It is not correct to say that
the wider constmction would make the operation of the
article retrospective, for the bar to interference by the
court operates only after the Constitution came into
force irrespective of the disputes concerned having
:arisen before or after the commencement of the Constitution. It was said that the article should not be
construed so as .to bar the trial of pending suits or
proceedings. But this is not a case of a pending .action
in a court which continues to function. The Federal
Court, in which the suits were pending, and which had
exclusive jurisdiction to deal with them, was abolished and a new court, the Supreme Court of India, was
created with original jurisdiction strictly limited to
disputes relating to
legal
rights between
States
recognised as such under the Constitution. But as the
. States specified in Part B of the First Schedule had a
semi-sov~reign status before the
Constitution, agreements with them were in · the nature of international
treaties and covenants, and disputes arising out of
them would not lie in municipal courts. That principles is given effect to, so far as the Supreme Court's
1951
State of
Seraikel/a
and Others
v.
Union of India
and Anothtr.
Patanja/i
Sostri ].
498
1951
StaJe of
SeraikeUa
and Others
v.
UnWn of India
and Another.
Patanjali
Sastri J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19511
original jurisdicuon is concerned, by the proviso . ~o
article 131 which defines such jurisdiction and, m
regard to all courts and in respect of all proceedings,.
by article 363 (1). The reason for applying that
principle is greater, not less, in regard to such disputes
arising before the Constitution when these States, then
known as Indian States, enjoyed a• higher degree of
political freedom. Furthermore, the construction contended for by the plaintiffs as applied to article 131
would mean that the Court would, notwithstanding
the proviso, have jurisdiction in respect . of such
disputes, provided they arose before the commencement of the Constitution. If that had been intended,
one would expect that such jurisdiction would have
heen conferred by positive enactment, instead of being
left to be derived by implication from a .proviso
intended to delimit the jurisdiction conferred by that
article. It seems to me, therefore, that the proviso to
article 131 must be construed as applicable to disputes
of the kind mentioned arising both before and after
the commencement
of the Constitution. If so,
article 363 ( 1) must receive the same construction, the
language employed heing essentially the same.
Even so, it is next contended, article 363, which
enacts a general rule of non-interference by courts in
certain classes of disputes, cannot control the operation
of article 374 (2), which is a special provision providing that suits, appeals and proceedings pending in
the Federal Court at the commencement of the Constitution shall stand removed to the Supreme · Court
and that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to
hear and determine the same. There would he considerable force in this argument but for the opening
words of article 363 (1), namely, "notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution." These words clearly
indicate that the bar to the exercise of jurisdiction
enacted in article 363 controls the operation of
article 374 (2) and excludes the rule of construction
invoked by the plaintiffs.
I ·find issue No. 1 for the defendants~
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
499
MAHAJAN J.-On the 16th January, 1950, ten days
before the inauguration of the Constitution of India,
the State of Serailtella (an Orissa State attached to
the Eastern States Agency) brought .a suit in the
Federal Court of India against the Dominion of India
and the Province ot Bihar for the following reliefs :
"(a) Interpretation of the relevant provisions of
the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian
Independence Act, 1947, and of. the States Merger
(Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949;
(b) Declaration that the Dominion Government
has no authority vested in it to assume any power or
jurisdiction beyond the matters specified in .the
Instrument of Accession and had no authority to
delegate any power or powers in relatioh to the plaintiff
State on the Provincial Government of Bihar or Orissa ;
( c) Declaration that the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, XLVII of 1947, the Constituent Assembly
Act, I of 1949, section 290-A of the Government of
India Act, 1935, and the States Merger (Governors'
Provinces) Order, 1949, are ultra vires, illegal and
inoperative in so far as they are made applicable to
the· plaintiff State and that all orders made or
purported to .be made and/or all actions taken or purported to be taken thereunder are also illegal and
inoperative ;
( d) Declaration that the Province of Bihar has
no authority or jurisdiction to carry on the administration of the plaintiff State and that the alleged· merger
of the said State in the Province of Bihar is illegal and
unauthorized and is not binding on the said · State and
its Ruler;
( e) Declaration as to the rights of the parties and
as to the extent of authority of the defendant
Dominion of India over and in respect of the plaintiff
States ;
(f) Declaration that the plaintiff State retains its
entity arid territorial integrity that its administration
should in any event be carried on in the name of its
Ruler and that his rights and privileges as set out in
1951
State of
Seraikella
and Others
v.
Union of India
and Another.
Mahajan].
500
1951
State of
Seraiktlla
and Others
v.
Union of India
and Another,
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
annexure "C" and his private properties as set out in
aµnexure "D" remain ·unaffected ;
(g) Declaration that the Province of Bihar has no
authority or jurisdiction over the plaintiff State and
that it should not interfere in any way with the said
State or the sovereignty '?f its Ruler."
All the different reliefs set out .above in substance
converge on the reliefs stated in clause ( f). The plaintiff
wants a declaration from this court to the effect that
the State of Seraikella retains its entity ;rnd territorial
integrity and has not integrated itself with the
territories of the Indian Dominion. ·
This suit was pending in the Federal Court on the
26th January,
1950, and under the provisions of
article 374 (2) of the Constitution it has to be heard
and determined by this Court. The plaintiff claims
the above reliefs on the following allegations :
(1) That on the 16th August, 1947, the plaintiff
State acceded to the Dominion of
India under
the terms of an Instnunent of Accession (Exhibit A)
executed by its Ruler and
accepted
by
the
Governor-General of
India, that
the said instrument could not be added to or amended unless suc 11
addition or amendment was accepted by the Ruler
by a
supplementary
Instrument ;
that no such
supplementary Instrument was ever executed or accepted by the Ruler ;
(2) That from 31st August, 1947, the Government
of
Orissa wrongfully and illegally purported to
administer the plaintiff State by virtue of an alleged
delegation of authority by the Dominion Government
by a notification dated 23rd December, 1947, issued
under an Act called the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction
Act, XLVII of 1947, that the said Act is ultra vires
and of no effect and does not bind tne plaintiff and
that the Act was not authorised by the Tnstrument of
Accession;
(3) That the defendant claims to rely for the validity of its wrongful acts on an \llleged agreement
of 15th December, 1947, but the same is void and
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
.inoperative and that it never became a concluded
-contract between the parties ;
(4) That on the 18th May, 1948, the Province of
13ihar wrongfully and illegally took over the administration of the State and issued an administrative order
-under Act XL VII of 1947, that the Dominion of India
had no authority beyond the Instrument of Accession
to delegate its power to the Province of Bihar to
:administer the plaintiff State ;
(5) That on the 26th July, 1949, the GovernorGeneral wrongfully and illegally promulgated an order.
<:ailed the States Merger Order of 1949, unqer which
the State was illegally merged in the Province of Bihar,
that this order was made under section 290-A of the
Government of India Act which section was introduced
in that Act by section 6 of the Constituent Assembly
Act, I of 1949, which was ultra vires and illegal, that
the Dominion of India had no authority to bring the
plaintiff State within the provisions of section 290-A
<>f the Government of India Act, that the Constituent
Assembly Act, I of 1949, was inoperative as it was
enacted without the consent of the Governor-General
that the Merger Order prejudicially affects the existence and entity of the State, its position and status
:and goes beyond the ambit of section 290-A. Shorn
of all its verbiage, the plaint in substance denies the
agreement of the 15th December, 1947, on the foot of
which the plaintiff State was integrated with· the territories of the Indian Dominion and on the basis of
which Act XL VII of 1947 was made applicable to it, ·
and the notifications mentioned in the plaint were
issued. On the basis of the same agreement section
290-A of the Government of India Act was also made ·
applicable to the plaintiff State. By reason of the denial
<>f the agreement of the 15th December it is asserted
by the plaintiff that the actions of the Dominion
Government in first merging the plaintiff State with
the Province of Orissa and subsequently meming it
with the Stat.'! of · Bihar is unlawful and ille;al ; in
other words; the plaintiff alleges that in the absence
of any supplementary agreement as contemplate.cl by
1951
State of
Seraikella
and Otht.rs
v.
Union of India
and Another.
Mahajan].
502
1951
State of
SeraikeUa
and Otlv.rs
v.
Union of India
and Another.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
section 6, sub-section (3), of the Government of India
Act, 1935, the Dominion of India had no authority
whatsoeyer to bring the plaintiff State within the
ambit of the different statutes mentioned above and
that all its acts in depriving the State of its legal
entity are acts in excess of the terms of the Instmment of Accession and amount to usurpation of the·
sovereignty of the plaintiff State which was retained·
by it under that Instrument and that being so, the·
plaintiff is entitled to a declaration from this Court to·
the effect that the plaintiff State still retains its entity
and territorial integrity and · that the various orders
and laws under which it has been integrated with the
State of Bihar are void and ultra vires and are acts of
encroachment on the sovereignty of the State• Shortly
stated, the plaintiff seeks by this suit to specifically
enforce the terms of the Instrument of Accession by·
denying the existence of the agreement of. 15th December, 1947, or by pleading its invalidity.
The suit brought against the Dominion of India and
the. Province of Bihar has now to be continued and
determined against the Government of the Union of
India and the State of Bihar in view of the provisions
of article 300 of the Constitution. Both the defendants
contested the suit on similar grounds. The followingagreed issues between the parties bring out the points'
in dispute that arise out of the pleadings :
1. Whether having regard to the subject matter·
of the suit and the provisions contained in article 36J
( 1) of the Constitution of India, this Hon'ble Court
has jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?
2. Whether the plaintiff had ceased to be an
acceding State· and a distinct legal entity at the date·
of the institution of the suit ?
3. \Vhether the Federal Court had jurisdiction toentertain the suit under section 204 of the Government·
of India Act, 1935, and particularly in regard to thc
questions as to the existence and validity of the agreement of merger ?
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
4. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain
the suit?
5. Whether the suit is maintainable in view of
the absence of the requisite notice to the defendants
under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code ?
6. Whether having regard to the provisions of the
Constit1ftion, the plaintiff has a legal capacity and · is
entitled to maintain the sµit ?
7. Whether this Court is competent to examine
the validity of section 290-A of the Government of
India Act, 1935, enacted by the Constituent Assembly ?
8. Whether the States Merger (Governor's Provinces) Order dated the 27th July, 1948, made by the
Governor-General under section 290-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, is valid and competent ? ·
9. Whether the Ex:tra Provincial Jurisdiction Act,
1947, was ultra vires and invalid ?
10. Whether the delegation · of authority by the
Government of India to the Government of Orissa was
ultra vires and illegal ?
11. Whether the Constituent Assembly was competent to enact the Constituent Assembly Act I of 1949
under the provisions of the Indian Independence Act ?
12. Whether the Seraikella and Kharsawan States
(Amendment Act) Order, 1948, is ultra vires and goes
beyond the ambit of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction
Acr. 1947?
13. Whether the plaint discloses any cause of
action ?
14. Whether the agreement dated 15th December,
1947, is a concluded agreement between the parties ?
15. Whether the agreement dated 15th December,
1947, is void and inoperative for want of consideration ?
16. Whether the agreement dated 15th December,
1947, is a political agreement and not a civil contract ?
17. Whether the administration of the plaintiff
was handed over to the Government of Bihar under
1951
State of
Seraikella
and OtMrs
v.
Union of lrul/o:
and Another.
Mahajan
504
1951
State of
Seraikella
and Others
v•
.Vnion of India
and Anoth~.
Mahaja11].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
Notification No. 217-P dated 18th May, 1948, m consultation with the Ruler of the plaintiff State ?
With the consent of parties it was decided to hear
arguments on issues I, 3, 5, 6 and 7 as they could be
decided without taking any evidence.
Issue I : As regards this issue, it was contended by
the learned Attorney-General that this Court has no
jurisdiction "to determine any dispute arising out of
any provisio11 of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engage-
ment, sanad or other similar instrument which was
entered into or executed before the commencement of
this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and
to which .the Government of the Dominion of India ..
. . was a party and· \vhich· has or has been continued in
operation after such commencement .... ," and that the
present suit relates to a dispute of this nature and
though the suit is removed to the records oi the Court
from ~he Federal Court, this Court must decline to
hear it. Article 363 on the basis of which this contcrotion is raised provides thus :
"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but
subject to the provisions of article 143, neither the
Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of
a treaty, agreement ...... which was entered into or
executed before the commencement of this Constitution
by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the
Govem;nent of the Dominion of India ot anv of its
predecessor Governments was a party and whi~h has
or has been continued in ·operation after such commencement ... . "
The learned Attorney-General pointed out that
particular subjects were removed from the jurisd.iction of this Court and it had no power or authority
to adjudicate on them nqtwithstancling any other
provision in the Constitution to the contrary. The
learned counsel for the plaintiff tontroverted this
contention and urged that article 363 of the Constitution had no retrospective effect and could not affect
suits that were pending · in the Federal Court and
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
which uncle( the provisions of article 374 (2) · were
removed to the Supreme Court and regarding which
jurisdiction was conferred on it under the provisions
of that article. It was said that article 363 could only
have application to suits or disputes brought or raised
'after the 26th January, 1950, and not to suits that had
aircady .been brought before that date. It was further
contended that the plaintiff's suit did not arise out of
any treaty or agreement inasmuch . as it denied the very
existence of such a treaty or agreement. It was further
pointed out that the suit did not relate to any of the
subjects that were within the scope of this article. In
order to appreciate these contentions it is necessary to
refer to article 374 (2), which provides as follows :"All suits, appeals and proceedings, civil or criminal,
pending in the Federal Court at the commencement of
this Constitution shall stand removed to the Supreme
O>Urt, and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction
to hear and determine the same .. "
The question for decision under this issue concerns
the true scope of the provisions of articles 363 and
374 (2) of the Constitution. It is easy to frame difficult
conundrums on the material offered by the. two articles
in question but when one considers them without a
desire for controversy, they soon open to a clear and
simple meaning. Article 363 takes away the jurisdiction of this Court on certain subjects if suits about
them are instituted ~fter the 26th January, 1950, or
disputes concerning them arise after that date, while
article 374 (2) empowers this Court to hear and to
determine suits which were pending in the Federal
Court of India on the 26th January, 1950, and which
that court was competent to try and determine. There
is, in my opinion, no conflict between these two articles.
They operate on two different fields. The Feder11l
Court of India had jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of section 204 of the Government
of India Act,.
.
1935, to· determine certain suits between acceding
States and the Government of India with respect to
certain subject matters and that jurisdiction was continued for the time being and was conferred on this
'
1951
Stale of
Seraik•lla
and Others
v.
Union of Indiaand Another.
Mahqjan J.
506
1951
Siok ef
SnaikeUa
-end Othtrs
v.
.(JnWn of India
and Another.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
Court. The original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
is conferred by article 131 in respect of similar suits bur
it does not embrace all the subjects that were covered
by section 204 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
In Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay ( 1 ) it was held by this Court that the Constitution
of India has no retrospective operation. This proposition was not disputed by the learned Attorney-General.
Article 363 of the Constitution has therefore to be
given a prospective operation and as such it cannot
affect suits pending before the 26th January, 1950. It
was contended by the learned Atton1ey-General that
though the article has no retrospective operation, yet
the language employed in it affects the jurisdiction of
this court in respect of suits that were pending in the
Federal Court if they relate to subjects stated therein.
Emphasis was laid on the opening words of the article.
In my opinion, this contention is without force. The
opening words of the article do not make the article
retrospective. Once it is held that the whole article
operates prospectively on suits that are brought after
the 26th January, 1950, or on disputes that arise after
that date, then the opening words of the article cannot
affect cases transferred to this Court from the Federal
Court under the provisions of article 374 (2) of the
Constitution. It is a well known rule of construction
of statutes that no statute unless it be a statute dealing
with procedure only should be construed as having
retrospective effect, unless the statute expressly makes
its provisions retrospective or
retrospective effect
must be given to it by necessary implicatioµ or intendment. The law leans against giving retrospective effect
to statutes. Reference in this connection may be made
to the decision of the Court of Exchequer in Moon v.
Burden(•). Ther~ the learned Barons of the Exchequer
had to consider whether section 18 of the Gaming Act,
~ and 9 Viet., Chapter 109, was retrospective. The
words of that section Were as follows :"And be it enacted, that all contracts or agreements,
whether by oral or in writing by way o~ gaming or,
(r) [1951] S. C.R. 228.
(2) [1884] 2 Ex. 22.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
wagering, shall be null and void ; and that no suit sh~ll
he brought or maintained in any court of law or equity
for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing
.alleged to be won upon any wager, or which shall have
been deposited in Mie hands of any person to decide
the event on which ~ny wager shall have' been made."
Although the section provided that no suit should
be brought or maintained in any court for the recovery
of any such sum, nevertheless the Court of Exchequer
held that that section did not apply to suits which
had been instituted though not decided before .the Act
came into force. It was observed by Baron Parke that
the enactment "that all contracts or agreements, by
way of gaming or wagering shall be null and void", if
it stood by itself, ought most clearly to be construed
:as applicable to future contracts and agreements· only,
and that if the next part stood alone, it would, though
not so clearly, be construed to apply to future actions
only and it should be construed to mean, not that an
action already brought should not be maintained but
that no action should afterwards be brought,
or, if
brought, maintained. In Beadling v. Coll( 1), the Court
of Appeal in England held that the Gaming Act, 1922,
which provided that no action under section 2 of the
Gaming Act, 1855, to recover back money paid in
respect of gaming debts "shall be entertained in any
court", did not apply to actions which had been commenced before the Gaming Act of 1922 came into force.
In Henshall v. Porter ( 2 ), McCardie J., went further
and held that the Gaming Act, 1922, which prohibited
. all courts from entertaining such suits, did not apply
to cases Where the cause of action had arisen before
the passing of the Act though no suit had been instituted
until the Act had been passed. The rule laid down in
these cases was expressly approved by the Federal
Court of India in The United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa
Begum( 8 ) and the learned Attorney-General frankly
conceded that the rule laid down therein was not contested. It seems to me that this rule of construction
(1) P922]39 T. L. R. 128.
(~)
[1923] 2 K. B. 193.
(3) [1940] F. C.R. 110.
1951
State of
Seraiktlla
and Others
v.
Union ofIndia
and Another.
Mll/i4ian ].
508
1951
;)'fate of
Seraiktlla
and Others
v.
Union of India
and Another.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
has apposite application to the construction of article
363 of the Constitution and the article has no retrospective operation and only affects disputes that would
arise after the 26th January, 1950. As pointed out in
Willis in his Constitutional Law, the same principle~
govern the construction of constitutions and the construction of statutes, but that the dominant force in
the construction of constitution is to construe one part
in the light of the provisions in the other part, as the.
constitution is a logical whole, each provision of which
is an integral part of itself. In the majority judgment
of this Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State
of Bombay(') it was observed that the idea of the preservation of past inchoate rights or liabilities and
pending ·proceedings to enforce the same is not foreign
or abhorrent to the Constitution of India and
that idea can be given effect to if article 363 ( 1) is
construed as above. Any other interpretation of article
363 would make the provisions of article 374 (2) partially nugatory inasmuch as certain suits pending in
the Federal Court under section 204 of the Government of India Act, though removed to this Court with
a direction that they have to be determined by us,
could not be heard by this Court. Such a result is
avoided if article 363 is construed as suggested by me.
The contention raised by the learned counsel for
the plaintiff that this suit does not arise out of any
agreement as it questions its very existence does not
seem sound because the dispute in this case clearly
arises out of the provisions of the Instrument of
Accession.
The next contention raised that the suit in so far as
it questions the validity of certain statutes by .interpreting the provisions of the Government of India Act
and the Independence Act has force as these subjects
fall outside the scope of article 363. The question of
jurisdiction has to. be determined on the allegations
made in the plaint and cannot be decided by considering the written statement and the validity of the
grounds alleged in the plaint.
(1) [1951] S. C.R. 228.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
500
For the reasons given above I respectfully beg to
differ from the view of the majority of the Court on
this issue and hold that issue l should be decided in
favour of the plaintiff.
Issue 3: Section 204 of the Government ·of India
Act provides as follows :- ·
"(l) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Federal Court shall, to the exclusion of any other
court, have an original jurisdiction in any disp?te
between any two or more of the foliowing parties,
that is to say, the Dominion, any of the Provinces or
any of the Acceding States, if and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on
which the existence or extent of a legal right depends :
Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend
to-
(a) a dispute to which a State is a party, unless the
dispute(i) concerns the interpretation of this Act or of an
Order in Council made thereunder 'before the date of
the establishment of the Dominion, or of an order
made thereunder on or after that date, or the interpretation of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, or of any
order made thereunder, or the extent of the legislative
or .executive authority vested in the Dominion by virtue of the Instrument of Accession of that State ;
or .... ''.
Under this section the Federal Court was· conferred
exclusive jurisdiction on disputes between the Dominion, any of the Provinces or the Acceding States,
provided that in the case of the Acceding· States the
conditions laid down in clause (a) cited above were
fulfilled. It was contended by the learned AttomeyGeneral that the basic relief claimed in the plaint is
that the Instrument of Accession subsists and that in
substance the suit is to enforce the terms of the Instrument of Accession on the allegation that these have
been contravened, but that the fact is that the Instrument of Accession was superseded by the agreement of
the 15th December, 1949, and is no longer subsisting,
M5SCI
6-62 S. C. India/59
1951
State 'ef
Seraiketla
'and Others
v.
Union of India
and Another._
Mahqjan J
510
1951
Stale of
&raiklUa
and Otklr}
v.
Unioa qf India
and Anotlrlr.
Malrqjon J.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'.fS
[1951]
and that beillg so, the subject matter of this dispute is
outside the scope of: the section. It was also argued
that unlawful. acts by one sovereign State over the
sovereignty of another State would be in the natw;'e of
politi~al acts (acts of State) and that
the municipal
courts could have no jurisdiction to give relief concerning them. It was not disputed that in those suits in
which the execution of the supplementary agreement of
the 15th December, 1949, was not derlied the controversy raised in the plaint would be within the ambit
of the section. In reply to these contentions the following submissions were made on behalf of the plaintiffs
in this and in the connected suits :
( 1) That the subject matter of the suit concerned
the construction of sections 6 and 101 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the point to be decided
was whether on the correct construction of these sections the Dominion of India was competent to pass the
Extra Territorial Jurisdiction Act, XLVII of 1947, so
as to affect the plaintiff's rights, and could promulgate
the various orders concerning the merger of the plaintiff State;
(2) That on the allegations in the plaint, that on a
true construction of the provisions of stction 6( 3) of.
the Government of India Act, 1935, the alleged or
admitted supplementary instrUlllent did not fall within
iis purview was a matter within section 204 of: that Act ;
(3) That it having been alleged in the plaint tha~
the merger order in pursuance of. which pbintiff Stare
was merged with the Province of Bihar was not within
the ambit of section 290-A, brought the suit within
the provisions of section 204 inasmuch as it was a
question concerning the interpretation of section roA
of that Act ;
.
(4) That on the allegations in the plaint that on
a proper construction of: the Indian Independence Act,
section 290-A was not a valid piece. of legislation the
suit came again within the ambit of the section ;
(5) That the defendant not having raised the ple:i
of act of: State ·to defend its various ~Ctions taken qua
S:C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
the plaintiff · State, the point could not be raised at
this stage, and that in any case when the defendant
had pleaded that its acts were done under the agreement of 15th ·December, 1949, it was not open to it to
take that plea.
·
As already observed, the question of jurisdiction has
to be decided purely on the allegations made in the
plaint and it seems clear that on those allegations the
suit is within the ambit of section 204. It is, however,
quite a different matter ·that those allegations may
not on further inquiry be substantiated. Questions
regarding the interpretation both of the Government
of India Act and of the Indian Independence Act have
been canvassed in the plaint and it has also been contended that on a true construction of the scope of the
Instrument of Accession which subsists none of the
acts of the defendant can be justified. ·The merger
order, it has been said, is in excess of the provisions
of section 290-A of the Government of India Act and
this raises the question of the true scope and intent of
that section. The issue therefore is decided in favour
of (he plaintiff.
Issue 6 : The decision of the question raised by
this issue depends on the ·determination of the question
whether the plaintiff State has been validly integrated
with the Province of Bihar. If section 290-A of the
Government of . India Act is not a valid piece of legislation or if the merger order issued under that section is
void, 'then it cannot be said that the plaintiff State no
longer exists and .has been merged in the . .Province of
Bihar. The learned ~ttorney-General made reference
to article 1 of. the Constitution, which defines the territories -of India and also referred to the schedule in
which .. it has been· noted that the territory of the State
of Bihar includes those territories which under the
provisions of section 290-A have been integrated with
it. This statement in the schedule has to be read
subject to
con~ntion raised above. It cannot be
denied that ;m Instrument of Accession was executed
by the plaintiff State in favour of the Dominion of
the
1951
Stall of
Seraiiulla
and Othm
v.
Union of India
and Anot/ter.
Mahajan J.
512
1951
Stau of
&..WU a
and Oilurs
v.
Union of lnt!ia
and Another.
Mahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'J;'S
[1951]
India and the plaintiff by this suit alleges that on the
true construction of that instrument the plaintiff State
retains its integrity. The plaintiff State denies the
execution of the supplementary instrument and also
denies that its merger is valid under its terms. Without determining the correctness of these allegations it
is difficult to hold that mere non-recognition of the
State in the Constitution wipes out its existence and
that the situation is analogous to the case of death of
a party in a suit. It may be pointed out that under
the terms of the Instrument of Accession the plaintiff
was not bound either to accept the future Constitution
of India or to subscribe to its terms and that being so,
it would not be correct to find that by the coming into
force of the Constitution the plaintiffs suit has abated.
This Court has to decide the case in the situation in
which it was instituted in the Federal Court of India
and on the merits of the controversy it .has to be
determined whether the State has been integrated
validly with the territories of the Dominion of India
or not; In these circumstances, in my opinion, the
plea of abatement raised has no validity. It was argued th~t this Court must accept the Constitution and
cannot go behind it. This is unquestionably so, but in
this case no question arises of going behind the Constitution, when the court is only exercising jurisdiction
conferred on it by article 374 (2) of the Constitution
and deciding suits filed by Acce<ling States before the
Constitution came into force.
Issue 5 : In my judgment, the plea raised under
section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no validity. The Code of ·civil Procedure has not been made
applicable as in the case of High Courts by section 117
to the Federal Court of Indi~ By section 204 of the
Government of India Act, exclusive original jurisdiction was conferred on the Federal Court in respect of
suits between States and States which were outside
the ken of the Code of Civil Procedure. By section 214
of the Government of India Act, the F edcral Court was
authorised. to make its own rules of procedure. The
Code in section 4 has enacted that it does not affect
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
513
any special jurisdiction or special forms of procedure.
Rule 5 of the Federal Court Rules framed under Section 214 of the Government of India Act lays down in
.clear and unambiguous language that none. of the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply
to any proceedings in the Federal Court unless specifically incorporated in these rules. The provisions of
section 80 have not been incorporated in the rules and
that being so, section 80 cannot affect suits instituted '
in the Federal Court under section. 204 of the Government of India Act,· 1935. It was contended by the
learned Attorney-General that the condition precedent
for instituting a suit laid down in section 80 was not
a qiatter of procedure falling within the ambit of
section 214 of the Government of India Act and that
the Federal Court could not make rules eliminating
the condition precedent laid down in section 80 before
a suit could be instituted against the Government.
In my judgment, this contention is not sound. Section
214 lays down that the Federal Court may from time
to time with the approval of the Governor-General
make rules of court for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the wurt. "Practice" in its
larger sense like procedure, denotes the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is
enforced, as
distinguished from the law that gives and defines
as
defined in
Wharthe right. "Procedure"
ton means the mode in which successive steps in litigation . are taken. It seems to me that what is enacted in
section 80 is the first step in litigation between the
parties when the cause of. action is complete. Section 80 in effect provides ·that an · advance copy of the
plaint should be served on the defendant and no suit
should be instituted in court until the expiry of two
months after such service. Section 80 does not define
the rights of parties or confer any. rights. on the parties.
It. only provides a mode of . procedure .for getting the
relief in respect of a cause of .action. .It is a part of
the machinery for obtaining legal rights, i.e., machinery
as distinguished from its products [Vide Boyser v.
Minors(').]
(') 50 L. J. F..x. 555.
·
1951
State of
S.raike11a
and Others
v.
Union of India
and 1lnoth1r.
Mahajan J.
514
1951
S1au of
Ser.WI/a
111111 Othm
...
u.;•• ofIndia
nd Anot/rlr,
Mahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
Reference was made by the learned AttorneyGeneral to the decision in Bhagchand Dagadusa v.
St:crt:tary of State for lndia ( 1). At page 357 their
· Lordships of the Privy Council examined the view
that had been taken in some of the . High Courts in
India on the applicability of section 80 to suits for
injunction and it was held that these had been decided
on an erroneous assumption that a statutory provision
as to procedure was subject to an exception in cases
of hardship or in <;ases where irremediable harm might
be caused, if it was strictly applied. It was pointed
out that the Procedure Code must be read in accordance with the natural meaning of its words and that
section 80 being explicit and mandatory, it admitted
of no implications or exceptions. Their · Lordships then
made these observations :"To argue as the appellants did, that the plaintiffs
had a right urgently calling for a remedy, while section 80 is mere procedure, is fallacious, for section 80
imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon
the Court.''
The learned Attorney:.Gcneral relying on those
observations contended that section 80 did not lay
down any role of procedure hut was a provision affecting substantive rights. I .am unable ~o accede to this
contention. Their Lordships did not decide, and it is
not possible to think that they would make any such
decision, that section 80 did not lay down a rule of
procedure but was a piece .of. legislation defining substantive rights. All that they said was that section 80 ·
was not mere procedure but was of a mandatory
character and more than this they did not say.
Further, ·it seems to me that suits between States
and States in respect of their political or public rights
and which were wholly outside the ambit of the Code
of Civil Procedure could not be governed by a rule like
this which aptly applies to cases of private persons
seeking to enforce private rights against Government.
Parliament while conferring original jurisdiction on
( 1)
L. R. 54 I. A. 338.
S.C.lt•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
515
. the Federal Court of . India concerning these political
rights could not be intended, to clog the enforcement
of those rights by · the provisions of section 80 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The only conditions precedent
for the maintainability of the suit arc those laid. down
in section 204 and the hearing of these suits has to be
accordance with the rules of procedure prescribed
by the Federal Court of India under the provisions of
s¢ction 214 of the Gqvernmcnt of India Act.
m
19;;1
·s""'
of
Seraikell4
and Otlilrs
v.
Union of India
tlllll A.not/aw.
Mahajan].
Issue 7 : This issue was not very seriously argued
by the learned counsel for · the plaintiff. The validity
· of section 290-A of the Government of India Act was
disputed on the ground that the assent of the GovernorGencral was not obtained to the addition· of this section in the Act. ·The section was added to the Government of India Act by the Constituent Assembly in its
sovereign capacity and was assented to by. the
President of the Assembly. The Government of India
Act, 1935, was the Constitution Act of· the Dominion
of India and the Constituent As5cmbly
authorized
by · the Independence Act to amend or alter it till that
Assembly framed a permanent Constitution for India.
The provisions of sections 6 and 8 of the Independence
Act fully bear this out. In my opinion, there is no
validity in the contention raised on behalf of the
plaintiff State that section 290-A was not a valid
piece of legislation and that it could not become law
till the assent of the Governor-General was obtained in
respect of it. This Court has no jurisdiction to examine
the legislation passed by a sovereign body.
was
The result is that these suits, in my opinion, cannot
be disposed of ·on the preliminary issues and must
proceed to trial on the other issues. This order will also be treated as an order in all the other connected suits.
DAs J.-1 prefer to base my decision on issue No. 6.
and I express no opinion on the . other preliminary
issues argued -before us.
The seven suits ·which have been posted before us ·
for• hearing on several ·preliminary issues came to be
instituted in the following circumstances :
Das J.
516
1951
State of
Seraiktlla
6114 Othm
'"
Onion of India
nnd Another.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[195J]
On different dates hereinafter mentioned caeh .of the
plaintiff States ·acceded to the Dominion of India by
virtue of Instruments of Accession executed by their
respective Rulers and accepted by the GovernorGeneral of India. Each of the said States also entered
into standstill agreements with the Dominion of India.
Later on, each of the plaintiff State,s entered into
separate Articles of Agreement with the GovernorGeneral of India. Instruments of Accession and standstill agreements entered into by the State of Seraikella
(plaintiff
Suit No. 1 of 1950), the State of Dhenkanal
(plaintiff in Suit No. 2 of 1950), and the State of Baudh
(plaintiff in Suit No. 3 of 1950) were executed on or
about August 16, 1947, by the State of Tigiria (plaintiff
in Suit No. 4 of. 1950) and the State of Athgarh
(plaintiff in Suit No. 5 of 1950) on August 15, 1947,
and by the State of Baramba (plaintiff in Suit No; 6
of 1950) and the State of Narsinghpur (plaintiff in
Suit No. 7 of 1950) on July 18, 1947, and November 11,
1947, respectively. Article& of Agreemenr were executed by the States of Seraikella, Dhenkanal and
Baudh on December 15, 1947, and by the States of
Tigiria, · Athgarh,
Baramba and N arsinghpur on
December 14, 1947.
By the Instruments of Accession, which were in the
same terms in all the cases, the respective Rulers of
the plaintiff States acceded to the Dominion of India
with the intent that the Governor-General of India,
the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any
other administrative authority should, by virtue of
the said Instruments but subject to the terms thereof
and for the purposes pnly of the Dominion, exercise in
relation to the ·State concerned such. functions as might
be vested in them by or under the Government of
India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India
on the 15th of August, 1947. By article 3 of the said
Instrument of Accession, the respective Rulers accepted the matters specified in the Schedule as matters
with respect to which the Dominion Legislature: might
make: laws for · the respective States. The matters
specified in the Schedule comprised, broadly speaking,
m
S.C.R.
SUP.REME COURT ~R.TS
517
Defence,
External
Affairs and Communications.
Article 5 provided that the terms of the Instrument of
Accession ·should not be varied by any amendment of
the Government of India Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment was
accepted by the
Ruler by an Instrument supplementary to the Instrument ·Of Accession. Article 7
provided that nothing in the Instrument of .Accession
should be deemed to commit the Ruler of the State
~concerned
in any way to acceptance of any future
Constitution of India or to fetter his discretion to enter
into arrangements with the Governme.nt of India
under any such future Constitution. Article 8 preserved the continuance of the Ruler's sovereignty in and
over his State, and, save as provided by or under the
Instrument of Accession, the exercise of all powers,
authority and rights then enjoyed by him as Ruler of
the State.
By the standstill agreements, which were also in
similar terms, all agreements and
administrative
arrangements as to matters of common concern then
existing between the Crown and any Indian State
continued as between the Dominion of India and the
State.
By article 1 of the Agreements, the respective
Rulers ceded to the Dominion Government full and
exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and
in relation to the governance of the . State and agreed
to transfer the administration of the State to .the
Dominion. Government on the first day of January,
1948, and the Dominion Government, as from the. last
mentioned date, became competent to exercise the
ceded powers, authority :].nd jurisdiction in such
manner and through such agency as it might think fit.
Article 2 secured to· the respective Rulers theii: respective privy purse. It may here be mentioned
that the
amount of the privy purse payable to the Rulers of
the States of Seraikella, Dhenkanal and Baudh not
having been agreed upon at the date of the signing of
the Art~cles of Agreements the space meant for .inserting the amount of privy purse was left blank in the
19Sl
Sl4t1 •f
Slftlikell•
And Others
v.
Uni•n of Indio
""4 .Another.
Das].
518
1951
Sidi< of
Stmik<l/a
aM Others
v.
Union "! llltiit1
mid Another.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951}
Agreements signed by the said Rulers. Article J.
preserved the Rulers full ownership, use and enjoyment of all his private properties as distinct from State
properties. Article 4 saved all personal privileges.
enjoyed by the Rulers whether within or outside the ·
territories of the States immediately before the 15th
day of August, 1947. Article 5 guaranteed ·the succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi _of the
State and to the Ruler's personal rights, privileges,
dignities and titles.
On December 24, 1947, the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (Act XLVII of 1947) received the
assent of the Governor-General and came into force.
The preamble of the Act and the definition, in section 2
of 'extra-provincial jurisdiction' made it quite clear
that the Central Government could, under this Act,
exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction over a · State only
if it had by treaty, agreement etc. acquired · full and
exclusive ·authority, jurisdiction and powers for and
in relation to the governance of the State. In the case
of these seven States the Central Government could
exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction over them only on
the strength of the Articles of Agtcement of ~mbcr,
1947. It could not exercise extra-provincial jurisdiction by reason of the Instrument of Accession.
On December 23, 1947, the Central Government
issued a notification purporting to delegate its cxtraprovincial jurisdiction with respect to the plaintiff
States under the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act,
1947 (No. XLVII of 1947) to the · Government of
Orissa which at once began to exercise extraprovincial jurisdiction over the seven States. It
is not quite clear ·how there could be a delegation
of jurisdiction before the Act came into force;
Be that as it may, on May· 18, 1948, another
notification was issued by the Central Government
under sections 3 and 4 of the Extra-Provincial· Juris:diction Act, 1947, cancelling the previous notification
with respect only to the State of Scraikella ·and · the
State of Kharsawan and delegating its jurisdiction iii
or in relation to those two States to the Goverrurient of
S.C..R.
SUPRE~ COURT REPORTS
519
Bihar and on the same date the Government of Bihar
after promulgating
the. . Scraikclla and . Kharsawan
States Ord~r asslimcd jurisdiction over them. The
other States continued to · be administered by the
Government of Orissa. The Constituent Assembly by
the Government of India (Amendment) Ac~ 1949 (No. I
of 1949) which received the assent of the President of
the
Constituent Assembly on January 10, 1)149,
amended the Government of India Act, 1935, by, inter
alia inserting the following section as section 290-A :. "Administration of certain acceding States as a
Cliief Commissioner's Province or as part of a Governor's
· or Chief Commissioner's Province.-(1) Where full and
exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and
in relation to the governance of any Indian State or of
any group of such States arc for the time being .exercisable by the Dominion of India, the Governor-General
may by order direct( a) that the State or the group of States shall be
administered in all respects as if the State or the group
of States were a Chief Commissioner's Province ; or·
(b) that the State or the group of States shall be
administered in all respects as if the States or the group
of States form part of a Governor's or a Chief Commissioner's Province specified in the order :
Provided that if any order made under . <:lausc (b) of
this sub-section affects a Governor's
PrQVincc, the
Governor-General shall before making such order
ascertain the views ·of the Government of that Province
both with respect to the proposal to make. the order
and with respect · to the provisions to be inserted
therein".
It will be noticed that the Governor-General could
act under the new
only where full and · exclusive
authority, jurisdiction and .. powers for and. in relation
tO the govcrnan~ of any .Indian State were for the·
time J>cing . cxCic:isablc by the P.omioion of India.. It
follows that . the Governor..GcQeral could, under this
new section, make an. or.der of !llergcr. with respect to
tbC5C seven States only on the strength of the .Articles
scctiOn
1951
StllU •f
&nrikeU.
Oflll 01Mr$
v.
Uniorc qf lrulils
_, Anollrer.
Das].
520
1951
S..Uqf
&raikella
""" r,o,,,,,.,
lfltMn of-lttdia
-anti .Anot/Nr.
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
of Agreements of December 1947. He could not make
any such order by reason of the Instrument of Accession.
In exercise of the powers conferred on him by the
new section 290-A, the Governor-General, on July 27,
1949, promulgated an Order called the States' Merger
(Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949. Section 3 of this
Order provided as· follows :"A.s from the appointed day, the States specified in
each of the Schedules shall be administered in all
respects as if they formed part of the Province specified
in the heading of that Schedule : and accordingly, any
reference to an acceding State in the Government of
India Act, 1935, or in any Act or Ordinance made on
or after the appointed day shall be construed as not
including a reference to any of the merged States, and
any reference in any such Act or Ordinance as aforesaid to a Province specified in a Schedule to this Order
shall be construed as including the territories of all
the States specified in chat Schedule."
Schedule III of the Order showed that the State of
Seraikella was one of .the two States merged in the
Province of Bihar and Schedule IV showed that the
other Orissa States including the plaintiffs in Suits
Nos. 2 to 7 of 1950 were merged in the Province of
Orissa.
Being aggrieved by the enactments, orders and
notifications resulting in their merger with Bihar or
Orissa the plaintiff States filed the present suits in the
Federal Coun of India in its Original Jurisdiction.
Suit No. 1 of 1950 was filed on or about January 15,
1950, and the other six suits were fikd on January 23,
1950. The defendants in the suits are two in number.
The first defendant in all the suits is the Dominion of
India and the second defendant in Suit No. l .is the
State of Bihar while the second defendant in all the
other stiits is. the State of Orissa. The main written
statements in all the suits arc filed on behalf of the first
defendant and the second defendant; the State of Bihar
or the State of. Orissa, as the case may be, has adopted
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
521
the contentions set forth in the written statements of
the first defendant. An additional written statement
was filed by the first defendant raising another preliminary issue of law ~hich has also been adopted by
the second defendant.
The Constitution of India having come into force on
January 26, 1950, all these suits, by virtue of article
374 (2), .stood removed to this Court which was created
by the Constitution. The learned Chamber Judge
directed that the issue of law raised in the additional
written statement be tried as a preliminary issue.
When the suits were called on for hearing on that
preliminary· issue, learned Attorney-General handed in
a list of 17 issues and it was agreed by counsel on both
sides that the following issues only should be determined first as preliminary issues :. L Whether having regard to the subject-matter
of thr suit and the provisions contained in article 363(1)
of the Constitution of India. this Hon'ble Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit ?
3. Whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to
entertain the suit under section 204 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and particularly in regard to
the questions as to the existence and validity of
the agreement of merger ?
4. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain
the suit ?
5. Whether the suit is maintainable in view of the
absence of the requisite notice to the defendants under
se.ction 80 of the Civil Procedure Code ?
6. Whether having regard to the provisions of the
Constitution the plaintiff has a legal capacity and is
entitled to maintain the suit ?
·
7. Whether this Court is competent to examine the
validity of section 290-A of the Government of IndiaAct, 1935, enacted by the Constituent assembly ?
Re-Issue No. 6.-I take up issue No. 6 which appears
to me to be decisive. Article 1 of the Constitution says
that India shall be a Union of States and that the
States and territories thereof shall be the States and
1951
State qf
Siraik•Ila
and Others
v.
Union of lndU.
and Another.
Das].
522
1951
Siok of
Snoik#l/o
.,,, 011...,
v.
u,.;,,. ef r.m.
and .11..1111 ••
D.,].
SUPREME COURT·REPORTS
[1951]
their territories specified in Parts A, B and C of the
First Schedule. The First Schedule to the Constitution
in Parts A, B and C sets out the names of the States
and indicates what the territories of the States shall
be comprised of. The third paragraph in Part A provides as follows :·
"The territory of each of the other States in this
Part shall comprise the territories which immediately
before the commencement of this Constitution were
comprised in the co~rcsponding Province and tl'ic
territories which, by virtue of an order made under
section 29Q.A of the Government of India Act, 1935,
were immediately before such commencement . being
administered as if they formed part of that Province."
The argument is that as the territories of the plaintiff
States, by virtue of the States' Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949, made under section 29Q.A of the
Government of India Act, 1935, were immediately
before the commencement
of the
Constitution
being administered as if they formed part of the
Provinces of Bihar or Orissa, the territories of
the States of Bihar and Orissa therefore now
comprise the territories of the plaintiff States.
The subjects of the plaintiff States have now become
the citizens of India, their territories have been .merged
in the State of Bihar or Orissa, as the case may be.
These States arc no longer recognised as States in
Parts A, B or C of the First Schedule to die Constitution. In short, they have ceased . to be States so far
as our Constitution is concerned and consequently
they have no legal existence .as acceding States which
thi:s Court ~hich is bound by the Constitution may
recognise. These States, in the circumstances, cannot
come to this Court to enforce their political rights and
arc no longer entitled to maintain the suits. Learned
counsel for the plaintiffs, howeve~, contend that the
order made under section 290-A of the Government of
India Act, bejng ultra vires and illegal, the territories
of the States were never lawfully administered as part
of the Provinces of Bihar or Orissa and, therefore, the
territories of the State of Bihar or Orissa cannot be
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
523
said to comprise the territories of the plaintiff States.
It seems to me that the contention of the learned
counsel for the plaintiffs is misconceived, for the part
of the sentence beginning with the words "which
immediately before the commencement" and ending
with the words "formed part of that Province" are
but description of the territories which the Constitution states are to be comprised in the territories of the
States of Bihar or Orissa. The validity or otherwise
of the order made under section 290-A of the Government of India Ac~ has no relevancy. The question is
whether the territories of the plaintiff States were in
fact being administered as if they formed part of the
Provinces of Bihar or Orissa and whether such territories were being so administered by virtue of an order
made under section 290-A of the Government of India
Act. There can be no doubt that the answer must be
in the affifD)ative. This Court is bound by the Constitution and cannot question the validity of any of its
provisions. The Constitution says that the territories
of Bihar and Orissa shall comprise the territories
specified in Part A and this Court must accept that
position. None of these States is included amongst
the States named in Parts A, B and C. Our Constitution docs not recognise any of these States . as an
acceding State. The Government of India Act which
recognised them as acceding States has been repealed.
Therefore, the plaintiff States have no existence in the
eye of the Constitution and cannot come to this Court
to enforce their political rights. It is not necessary to
consider whether in international law there may be a
State without any territory or .·. without any subject
such as many of the States, which during the last war
had been overrun by the invaders and which functioned
in foreign countries, claimed to be. The problem
before us is quite different. The States which are
plaintiffs in suits Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 ceased to be
acceding States by reason of the Merger agreement of
December 1947 admittedly concluded by their respective Rulers. In any event, our Constitution has quite
clearly eliminated these States as such by absorbing
1951
Stau.t
.,
Straih/la
ad Others
um.n of 11111ia
on4 .fulhn.
Das].
524
1951
The Si.te of
SeraikeUa
and OtMrs
v.
Union Qf India
and ..fnotf!Lr.
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
their territories with the States of Bihar or Orissa. As our
Constitution does not recognise these States as acceding States or even as States, this Court cannot recognise
these States or their political rights. These cases may
have been within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court
_when they were instituted, but since then the Government of India Act has been repealed and the new
Constitution has come into force. Under the Constitution, these States do not exist at all. Assuming that
these States are still in existence notionally, they have,
at any rate, ceased to be States of the kind which could
maintain a suit under section 204 of the Government
of India Act. After the repeal of the Government of
India Act and the commencement of the Constitution
none of these States is an acceding State which may
continue a suit filed under section 204. The suits
as having abated by
must, therefore, be regarded
reason of the elimination of the plaintiff States as
States or acceding States just as an ordinary suit
would abate on the death of a plaintiff. In my judgment, these suits can no longer be continued in this
Court.
In view of my decision on issue No. 6, the other
preliminary issues need not be considered.
Suits dismissed.
Agent for
R. R. Biswas.
the
plaintiffs in Suits Nos. 1, 3 & 4 :
Agent for the plaintiffs in Suits Nos. 2 & 5 :
P. K. Chatterjee.
Agent for the
S. C. Bannerjee.
plaintiffs in Suits Nos. 6 & 7 :
Agent for the defendants : P. A. Mehta.
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