RAM SINGH versus THE STATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 6 April 1951 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 451 | 1951 INSC 23
Key facts
- Decided
- 6 April 1951
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, VIVIAN BOSE
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 21/1951
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 451
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 23
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
451
.RAM SINGH
"·
THE STATE Of DELHI AND ANOTHER
BALRAJ KHANNA
t'.
THE STATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER
RAM NATH KALIA.
• t'.
THE STATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER
c. J.,
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA
PATANJALI SASTRI,
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN
BosE JJ.J
Constitution of lnaia, Arts. 19(1) & (2), 22 (5)-Freedom of
speech-Preventive detention to prevent speeches with a view to maintain public ordei-Omission to state objectionable passages ill
grounds supplied-Legality of detention.
The District Magistrate of Delhi, "being satisfied that with
a view to the maintenance of public order in Delhi it is necessary
to do so" ordered the detention of the petitioners under s. 3 of
the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The grounds of detention
communicated to the petitioners were "that your · speeches
generally in the past and particularly on the 13th and 15th
August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi has been such as to
excite disaffection between Hindus and Mussalmans and thereby
prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in
order to prevent you from making sucft speeches it is necessary
to make the said order." The petitioners contended that under
the Constitution the maintenance of public order was not a purpose for which restriction can be imposed on the freedom of
1951
Jfpil, 6.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
452
1951
11... s•.,.
""' 011wr,
...
TIN Stalt ef
D1lhi and
Another.
[1951]
speech guaranieed by Art. 19 (1) and that the grounds commuI;i.
cated were too vague and inde6nitc to enable them Io make a
representation and the provisions of Art. 22 (5) of the Constiiution were not complied with, and their detention was therefore
ultra virtt and illegal :
Held by the Full Court (KANIA C. J., PATANJ.UI SASTRI, Mm•
CHAND MAHAJAN, S. R. D.u am! VIVIAN Bos. JI.) th.at though
personal liberty is suffi.cicnrly comprehensive to include the
freedoms enumerated in Art. 19 (1) and its deprivation would
result in the extinction of rho~ -freedoms, the Constitution has
treated these civil liberties as disinct fundamental rights an<l
made separate provisions in Arts. 19, 21 and 22 as to Ihe 1imit:>tioos and conditions subject to which alone they could be taken
a\vay or
abridged.
Consequently,
c\'Cn
though a law
which
restricts freedom of speech ::ind cxprc~sion \vhich i.s not <lirected
solely ag:iinst the undermining of the .o;ecurity of the State or its
ovcrthro\\· but is concerned gcncr~lly in the interests of public
order 111ay not fall within the reservation of cl. (2) of Art. 19 and
may therefore be void, :in orJcr of preventive detention cannot
be held to be invali<l merely bc,ause the detention is n1ade with
a view to prevent the making of spe<:ches prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. The decisions in Rrij Bl1ushan and
Anotller v. Tiie Stale of De/Iii ( 1 ) and Romesh Thapparv. TheS111te
Madra1( 1 ) arc not inconsistent with. the decision in A ..1'.. Gopalan
v. Tiie S1111e(1 ). .
Held per KANIA C. J., PATANjAl.I SAsTRI and S. R. DAS JJ.
(Mum CHAND MAHAJAN and BosE JJ. dissenting)-As the time
and place at which the speeches \Vere alleged to haye heen made
and their general nature and effect, namely, that they were such
as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims were also
stated in the grounds communicated, they were not too vague or
indefinite to enable the petitioners to 1nake an effective representation and the detention cannot be held to be illegal on the
ground that Art. 22 ( 5) was not complied with. Per MEuR
CHAND M.<HAJ AN and BoSE JI. (contra )-In the absence of any
indication in the grounds as to the nature of the \.Vords used by
the petitioners in their speeches, fron1 which an inference has
been drawn against them, the petitioners would not be able fully
to exercise their fundamental right of making a representation
and as there were no such indic..1tions in the grounds supplied.
JhcrC \Vas a non~compliancc with the provisions of cl. (5) of,
Art. 22 and the detention was illegal.
The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(') applied.
Oa1c1NAL
JURISDICTION :
Petitions
Nos. 21, 22 and
44 of 1951.
(I) [I950] S.C.R. 6o5.
(3) [ 1950] S.C.R. 88.
(•) (1950] S.C.R. 594.
(4) [1951] S.C.R. 167.
S.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
453
Applications under Art. 32 of the Constitution
praying for the issue of writs in the nature of habeas
Corpus.
Hardaylll Hardy for the petitioners in Petitions
1951
R.,,, SinJ;h
and 01htrs
v.
Tiu S1au of
Delhi and
Anolhtr.
Nos. 21 and 22.
Gopal Singh for the petitioner in Petition No. 44.
• S. M. Sikri for the respondents.
1951. April. 6.
delivered.
The following
judgments
were
PATANJALI SAsTRl J.-These three petitions have
been presented to this Court under article 32 of the
Constitution of India praying for the issue of writs in
the nature of habeas corpus for release of the petitioners who are respectively the President, VicePresident and Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha of
the Delhi State.
The petitioners were arrested on 22nd August, 1950,
by order of the District Magistrate, Delhi, made under
sub.section (2) read with clause (a) sub.clause (i) of
sub.section (1) of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The
order ran as ·follows :
"Whereas I, Rameshwar Dayal, District Magistrate,
Delhi, am satisfied that with a view to the maintenance of public order in Delhi it is necessary to do
so, I, Rameshwar Dayal, District Magistrate, Delhi,
hereby order the detention of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . under sub-section (2) of section 3 (1) (a) (ii) of the Preventive Detention Act. Given under my seal and signature".
The grounds of detention communicated to the
petitioners were in identical terms, save as · to the
-dates on which the speeches were said to have been
made, and read thus :
"In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act you are hereby informed that the grounds on
which the detention order dated 22nd August, 1950,
has been made against you arc that your speeches
generally in the past and particularly on .... August,
Palanjali
Saslri].
454
1951
Ram s;nth
and Others
v.
The State of
Delhi and
Atwth,r.
Pata!Jjali
Sostri J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
1950, at public meetings in Delhi 'has been such as to
excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims and
thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in
Delhi and that in order to prevent you from making
such speeches it is necessary to make the said order".
The petitioners applied to the High Court at Simla
for similar relief under article 226 of the Constitutiop,
but the petitions were dismissed. It appears to have
been contended before the learned Judges (Khosla and
Falshaw JJ.) who heard those petitions that although
this Court held in A. K. Gopalan v. The State of
Madras (') chat the provisions of section 3 of the Act
were constitutional and valid, detention under chat
section was ultra vires and illegal where, as here, it
was based on the ground of making speeches prejudicial to the security of the Seate or the maintenance
of public order. This was said to be the result of the
later pronouncements of this Court in Brij Bhushan
and Another v. The State of Delhi ( 1 ) and Ramesh
Thappar v. The State of Madras (•). This contention
was rejected on the ground that no such proviso could
be read into section 3 on the strength of the later
decisions referred co above which related to a different
point, viz. the scope of authorised restrictions on the
right to freedom of speech conferred by article 19 (1).
Falshaw J. (with whom Khosla J. concurred), proceeded, however, to draw attention to what he conceived
to be an "anomaly"-while a State Government should
not be allowed co interfere with the freedom of the
press by way of stopping the circulation of newspapers
or by pre-censorship of news, the Government shoul<l,
for the same object, be entitled to place a person under
preventive detention which is "even greater restriction
on personal liberty than any restriction on a newspaper ever could be". This distinction appeared to
the learned Judge to be illogical, and he thought that
there was "an apparent conflict" between the decisions
of this Court in Go palan's case ( 1 ) and the other cases,
which could only be resolved by this Court. "k
(1) [1950] S. C.R. 88.
(1) (1950] S. C.R. 605.
(1) (1950] S. C.R. 594·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
455
would be well" the learned Judge concluded "if the
point were raised in this form at an early date in the
Supreme Court".
No wonder that, after this encouragement, the
petitioners have preferred these petitions raising the .
same contention before us. On behalf of the petitioners Mr. Hardy submitted that the provisions of the
Act should not be used to prevent a citizen· from
making speeches though they might be considered to
be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, for
maintenance of public order is not a purpose for
which imposition of a restriction on freedom of speech
is authorised by the Constitution, as held by this
Court in the Cross-Roads( 1 ) and the Organizer(•) cases.
It is true that in those cases this Court decided by a
majority of 5 to 1 that "unless a· law restricting freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against
the undermining of the security of the State or the
overthrow of it such law cannot fall within the reservation of clause (2) of article 19 although the restrictions
which it seeks to impose may have been conceived
generally in the interests of public order". But it will
he noticed that the statutory provisions which were
there declared void and unconstitutional. authorised the
imposition, in the one case, of a ban on the circulation
of a newspaper and, in the other, of pre-censorship on
the publication of a journal. No question arose of
depriving any person of his personal liberty by
detaining him in custody, whereas here, as in
Gopalan's case (' }, the Court is called upon to adjudge
the legality of the detention of the petitioners with a
view to prevent them from making speeches prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Although
personal liberty has a content sufficiently comprehensive to include the freedoms enumerated in article 19
(1), and its deprivation would result in the extinction
of those freedoms, the Constitution has treated these
civil liberties as distinct fundamental rights and made
separate provisions in article 19 and articles 21 and 22
as to the limitations and conditions subject to which
<:l fl950] S.C.R. 594.
(') [1950] S C.R. 88.
( .J [I 950] S. C.R. 605.
1951
Ram Sititlr
altd Othns
v.
TMStat•q/
D•lhi Md
AINl!w.
Palanjali
Sastri ].
•
4%
19!tl
llam Sin1A
and Other1
v.
T/1' Stah ef
Delhi and
.Anothtr.
Patanja/i
.Sostri ].
(l
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
alone they could be taken away or abridged. The
interpretation. of these articles and their correlation
were elaborately dealt wich by the full Court in
Gopalan's case('). The question arose whether section
3 of the Act was a law imposing restrictions on "the
right to. move freely throughout the territory of
India" guaranteed under article 19 (1) (d) and, as
such, was liable to be tested wl1h reference to its ·
reasonableness under clause (5) of that article. It was
decided by a majority of 5 to 1 that a law which authc>rises deprivation of personal liberty did not fall within
the purview of article 19 and its validity was not to
be judged by the criteria indicated in that article but
depended on. its compliance with the requirements of
articles 21 and 22, and as section 3 satifised those
requirements, it was constitutional. If the learned
Judges in the High Court had paid close attention to
the Judgments delivered in this 'Court, they would have
found that there was nothing illogical in that view and
no conflict between the decisions in that case and in
the other cases to which reference has bee~ made. The
observations of the Chief Justice in Gopalan's case( 1 )
make the position quite clear :
"As the preventive detention order results in· the
detention of the applicant in a cell it was contended
on his. behalf that ·the rights specified in article 19
(1) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (g) have been infringed.
It was argued that because of his detention he cannot
have a free right to spe~ch as a!Jd where he desired and
the same argument was urged in respect of the rest of
the rights mentioned in sub-clauses (b), (c), (d), (e) and
(g). Although this argument is advanced in a case
which deals with preventive detention, if correct, it
should be applicable in the case of punitive detention
also, to any one sentenced to a term of imprisonment
under the relevant section of the Indian Penal Code.
So considered, the argument must clearly be rejected.
In spite of the saving clauses (2) to (6), permitting
abridgement of the rights connected with each of
them, punitive detention under several sections of the
Penal Code, e.g., for theft, cheating, forgery and even
(') [1950] S.C.R. Jl!I.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
457
1951
Ram Sirl&/t,
ordinary assault, will be illegal. Unless such conc;lusion
necessarily follows from the article, it is obvious that
such construction should be avoided • - In my opinion
such result is clearly not the outcome of the Constitution. The article has to be read without any preconceived notions. So read, it clearly means that the
legislatio~ to be examined must be directly in respect
of one of the rights mentioned in the sub-clauses. If
there is a legislation directly attempting to control a
citizen's freedom of speech or expression, or his right
to assemble peaceably and without arms, etc., the
question whether that legislation is saved by the relevant saving clause of article 19 will arise. If, however,
the- legislation is not directly in respect of any of these
subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for instance, for punitive or preventive detention, his right under any of these sub-clauses is
abridged, the question of the application of article 19
does not arise. The true approach is only to consider
the directness of the legislation and not what will be
the result of the detention otherwise valid, on the mode
of the <letenu's life. On that short ground, in my
opinion, this argument about the infringement of the
rights mentioned in article - 19 (1) generally must fail.
Any other construction put on the article, it seems to
me, will be unreasonabka" ( 1 )
Similar conclusions expressed by the other learned
Judges will be found at pages 194, 229, 256 arid 305. It
follows that the petitions now before us are governed by
the decision in Gopalan's case ( 1 ), notwithstanding that
the petitioner's right under article 19 (1) (a) is abridged
as a result of their detention under the Act. The
anomaly, if anomaly there be in the resulting position,
is inherent in the structure and language of the relevant articles, whose meaning and effect as expounded
by this Court by an overwhelming majority in the
cases referred to above must now be taken to be settled
law, and courts in this country will be serving no
useful purpose by discovering supposed conflicts and
illogicalities and recommending parties to re-agitate
the points thus settled.
( 1)
[1950] S.C.R. 88, 100-101.
and Otlier1
v.
The Stale of
Delhi and
..4.~ot/rn.
Patanjali
Sastri J~
458
1951
R.m Si11gh
...
.mu! Olhm
The Stal• qf
D•lhi and
.Anolfwr.
Pa1anjali
Sastri J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951}
Mr. Hardy next contended that, in view of the recent
decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. Atma
Ram Sridhar Vaidya (1 ), the grounds of detention communicated to each of the petitioners must be held to be
too vague and indefinite to enable them to make their
"representations" to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi,
and the requirements of clause (5) of article 22 not
having thus been complied with, the petitioners were
entitled to be set at liberty. According to Mr. Hardy
it was not sufficient that the time and place of the
alleged speeches and their general effect were indicated,
but it was also necessary that the offending passages
or at least the gist of them should be commuaicated
in order to enable the petitioners to make effective
representations.
In the case relied on, this Court, no doubt, held by
a majority that, though the first part of article 22 (5),
which casts an obligation on the detaining authority to
communicate the grounds of the order of detention,
would be sufficiently complied with if the "deductions or
conclusions of facts from facts" on which the order was
based were disclosed, the latter part of the clause,
which confers on the person detained the right of making
a "representation" against the order, imposed, by necessary implication, a duty on the · authority to furnish the
person with further particulars to enable him to make
his representation. It was further held that the suffidency of this "second communication" of particulars
was a justiciable issue, the test being whether "it is
sufficient to enable the detained person to make a
representation which, on being considered, may give
relief to the detained person." While the communication of particulars should, subject to a claim of
privilege under clause (6), be "as full and adequate as
·the circumstances permit", it did not, however, follow
from clause ( 6) that ''what is not stated or considered
to be withheld on that ground must be disclosed and
if not disclosed there is a breach of a fundamental
right. A wide latitude is left to the authorities in the
matter of disclosure." Referring to the use of the term
( 1 ) [1951] S.C.R. 167.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
'Vague" in this connection, it · was remarked "If on
reading the ground furnished it is capable of being
intelligently understood and is sufficiently definite to
furnish materials to enable the detained person to
make a representation against the order of detention,
it cannot be called vague".
This decision docs not, in our opinion, support the
broad proposition· contended for by Mr. Hardy that
wherever an order of detention is based upon speeches
made by the person sought to be detained, the detaining
authority should communicate to the person the offendin3 passages or at least the gist of such passages on
pain of having the order quashed if it did not. In the
cases now before us the time and place at which the
speeches were alleged to have been made were specified
and their general nature and effect (being such as to
excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims) was
also stated. It is difficult to see how the communication of particular passages or their substance-one of
the petitioners denied having made any speech on the
day specified-was necessary in addition to the particulars already given, to enable the petitioners to make
their representations. It should be remembered in this
.connection that the Court is not called upon in this
class of cases to judge whether or not the speech or
speeches in question constituted a prejudicial act
falling within the purview of section 3 of the Act as
it is called upon in prosecutions for offences under
section 124A or section 153A of the Indian Penal
· Code to find whether the speech attributed to the
accused person constituted an offence under those
sections. That is a matter for the detaining authority
to be .satisfied about. Nor do these cases belong to the
category where a reference had to be made to the Advisory Board under the Act, so that any attempt by the
petitioners to rebut the inference drawn by the detaining
authority from their speeches had to be. made only rn;.
fore the executive authorities. In such circumstances
the suggestion that without the communication of the
offending passages or . their substance the petitioners
were not in a position to make their representations
1951
Rt1tn Sinp
mu/ Othns
v.
Tl# Stolt of
Dllhi ad
.4notltn.
Pa14rifoli
Saitti J
460
1951
Ram Sin&h
and Others
Y.
The Sta11 of
De/m and
Anot.ln
Potatliali
Sallri].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19511
to the executive authorities sounds unreal and is.
devoid of substance. It may be possible to conceive
of peculiar situations where perhaps the person detained
on ground of prejudicial speeches might be in a better
position to make a representation if he was given the
objectionable passages or the gist of them, but the
p~esent cases are not of such peculiar character. On
the other hand, cases have come before this Coun
where speeches were alleged to have been made after
. midnight at secret gatherings of Kisans and workers
inciting them to violence, crime and disorder. Such
allegations could only be based in most cases on information received by the executive authorities from
confidential sources and it would not be practicable in
all such cases to have a record made of the speeches
delivered. To hold that article 22 (5) requires that,
wherever detention is grounded on alleged prejudicial
speeches, the detaining authority Should indicate to
the person detained the passages which it regards as
objectionable would rob the provisions of the Act of
much of their usefulness in the very class of cases
where those provmons
were doubtless primarily
intended to be used and where their use would be
most legitimate. In the case of these petitioners,
no doubt, the speeches are said to have been made at
public meetings, and it is not suggested on behalf
of the respondents, that no record was made of the
speeches, so that the details asked for could have been
furnished. The omission to do 50, for which no
reason is disclosed in these proeecdings, is regrettable, as it has given rise to avoidable grievance and
complaint. The authorities who feel impelled in discharge of their duty to issue orders of detention will do
well to bear in mind the following remarks of the Chief
Justice in the case referred to above :
"In numerous cases that have been brought to our
notice, we have found that there has been quite an
unnecessary obscurity on the pan of the detaining
authority in stating the grounds for the order. Instead
of giving the information with reasonable details, there
is a deliberate attempt to use the minimum number
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
Of words in the communication conveying the grounds
of detention. In our opinion, this attitude is quite
deplorable".
This, however, does not affect our conclusion in these
cases that the grounds communicated to the 'petitioners
contain sufficient particulars to enable them to make
their representations to the authority concerned, and
that the requirements of article 22 (5) have thus been
complied with.
It is. also urged that the orders of detention were
bad because they did not specify the period during
which the petitioners were to be under detention. Thi1
point is now concluded against the petitioners by the
decision of this Court in Ujager Singh v. The State of
Punjab ( 1 ) and /agjit Singh v. The State of Punjab ( 1 )
where it was pointed out that as section 12 of the Act
itself prescribed a maximum period of one year for
detention thereunder, such orders could not be said to
be of indefinite ·duration and unlawful on that ground.
Lastly, it was said that the petitioners were prominent members of a political organisation which was
opposed to the ideals and policies of the party in
power, and that the orders of detention were made:
"for the collateral purpose of stifling effective political
opposition and legitimate criticism of the policies pursued by the Congress Party and had nothing to do
with the maintenance of public order". Allegations: ·
of ma/a fide conduct arc easy to make but not always.
as easy to prove. The District Magistrate has, in hi&.
affidavit filed in these proceedings, stated that, from
the materials placed before him by persons experienced
in investigating matters of this kind, he was satisfied
that it was necessary to detain the petitioners with a
view to preventing them from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and he haS;
emphatically repudiated the purpose and motive
imputed to him. We have thus allegations on the one
side and denial on the other, and the petitioners made
no attempt to discharge the burden, which undoubtedlv lay upon them, to prove that the District
(r) Petition No r 19 or l950
M5SCI
62 S, C. India/59.
(~) Petition No. r67of1950.
1951
Ram Sint
and Others
'If.
Thi Stale of
D1llii and
AllDlher.
Patanjali.
Sastti J.
462
1951
Ram Sin.fill
and Othm
v.
Thi State OJ ..
Delhi and
Another.
Mahajan],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
Magistrate acted ma/a fidt: in issuing the orders of
detention.
The petitions are dismissed.
MAHAJAN J.-These three petitions under article 32
of the Constitution of India were presented by Prof.
Ram Singh, Bal Raj Khanna and Ram Nath Kalia,
all three of whom were arrested and placed in detention on the 22nd August, 1950, under the orders of the
District Magistrate of Delhi, under the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950. The petitioners are resp~ctively.
the President, Vice-President and the Secretary of the
Delhi State Hindu Mahasabha. The grounds of detention supplied to them are almost identical. Those
furnished to Prof. Ram Singh read as follows :"In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive
Detention Act, you are hereby informed that the
grounds on which the detention order dated August
22, 1950, has been made against you • are that your
speeches generally in the past and particularly on the
13th and 15th August, 1950, at public meetings in
Delhi have been such as to excite disa.ffection between
Hindus and Muslims and thereby prejudice the maintenance of public order in Delhi and that in order to
prevent you from making such speeches it is necessary
to make the said order.
You arc further informed that you are entitled to
make a representation against your detention to the
State Government, that is, the Chief Commissioner,
Delhi."
The grounds supplied to the other two petitioners
were the same except that in the case of Bal Raj
Xhanna only the 15th · August, 1950, is metioned as
·the date on which the public speech was made, and
·in the case of the third petitioner, it is only the 13th
August, 1950.
Mr. Hardy on behalf of the pet1aoners inter alia
-urged that the grounds served on the petitioners as
justifying the orders of detention are quite indefinite
and are not sufficient to enable them to make an effective representation to the State Government against
>
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
their detention and that being so, their detention is
illegal.
An affidavit of the District Magistrate was placed
before us at the hearing of the cases stating that he
was satisfied that the petitioners' speeches generally,
and particularly those made on the 13th and 15th
August, 1950, at public meetings in Delhi had been
such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and
Muslims. No particulars of the oe:ending words or
passages or any indication of the nature of the language
employed by the petitioners was mentioned either in
the grounds or in this affidavit. Reference was made
to two speeches of the 13th and 15th in the case of
the first petitioner and to only one speech delivered on
the Bth and 15th respectively by the other two. So
far as the earlier speeches are concerned, it is not even
stated on what occasions, on what dates and during
what years were those speeches made or delivered.
After a reference to the dates of the two speeches, the
conclusion drawn ·by the District Magistrate has been
mentioned. The question for decision is whether what
is stated in the grounds is sufficient material on the
basis of which the fundamental right conferred on the
petitioners by article 22 (5) of the Constitution can be
adequately exercised and whether without knowing
the substance of the offending passages in the speeches
from which the inference has been drawn by the
District Magistrate it is possible to prove that this
inference is not justified.
After considerable thought I have reached the deci- .
sion that these cases fall within the ambit of the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram,
Shriahar Vaidya ( 1 ). In that case certain general
principles applicable to cases of this nature were stated
by the learned Chief Justice, who delivered the majority judgment, in the following terms :
(1) That ·if the representation has to be intelligible to meet the charges contained in the grounds,
the information conveyed to the detained person must
(1) [195l]S. C.R. 167.
1951
Ram Singh
and Others
v.
The Stauqf
Delhi and
Another.
Mahajan].
464
1951
Ram Singh
and Other.,
v.
Till Sta11 of
Delhi and
Anotht<.
MaJuij.. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
be suflicicnt to attain that object. Without get~ng
information suflicient to make a representation against
the order of detention it is not possible for the man
to make the representation. Indeed, the right will be
only illusory but not a real right at all.
(2) That while there is a connection between thccobligation on the pllrt of the detaining authority to
furnish grounds and the right given to the detained
person to have an earliest opportunity to make thccrepresentation, the test to be applied in respect of the
contents of the grounds for the two purposes is quite
different. For the first, the test is whether it is· sufficient to satisfy the authority. For the second, the test
is, whether it is sufficient to enable the detained person
to make the representation at the earliest opportunity.
On an infringement of either of these two rights the
detained person has a right to approach the court and
to complain that there has been an infringement of a
fundamental right and even if the infringement of the
second part of the right under article 22(5) is established he is bound to be released by the court1
(3) That it cannot be disouted that the representation mentioned in the second part of article 22(5)
must be one which on being considered may give relief
to the detaining person. It was pointed out that in
the numerous cases that had been brought to the notice
of the court it was found that there had been quite
an unnecessary obscurity on the part of the detaining
authority in stating the grounds for the order, and
that instead of giving the information with reasonable
details, there is a deliberate attempt to use the minimum number of words in the communication convevin~
the grounds of detention and that such an attitude
was quite deplorable.
In my opinion, these observations have an apposite
application to the grounds furnished to the petitioners
in the present cases. The speeches alleged to have
been made hy the petitioners were made in public
meetings and could not be described as of a confidential nature and no privilege in respect of them was
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
claimed under article 22 (6) of the Constitution. That
being, so the material on the basis of which the District Magistrate drew the inference that these speeches
. would cause or were likely to ca.use disaffection amongst
Hindus and Muslims should have been communicated
to the petitioners so that they may be able to make a
representation, which on being considered may give
relief to them. For ·that purpose either the words
used by them or the substance of the speeches should
have been ·communicated· to the detenus · so that they
may be able to prove that such words or passages
never formed part of the speeches and have been introduced in them as a result of some error or that no
reasonable person could draw an inference from them
that those were likely . to cause hatred and enmity
between the two communities. The sufficiency of the
material supplied is a justiciable issue, though .the
sufficiency of the grounds on which the detaining
authority made up his mind is not a justiciable issue.
In my opinion, in the absence of any indication in the
grounds as to the nature of the words used by the
detenus in their speeches from which an inference has
been drawn against them they would not be able fully
to exercise their fundamental right of making a representation and would not be able to furnish a proper
defence to the charge made against them.
Envisaging oneself in the position of a person asked
to draw out a '!ritten representation on behalf of the
detenus on the materials supplied to them, the effort
could not proceed beyond a bare denial of the speeches
having been made, or a bald statement that no words
were used which could possibly excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims. Such a representation
would be an idle formality inasmuch as mere denials
without any cogent arguments to support them would
convince nobody. Without a knowledge of the offending words or passages, or their substance, it is not
possible to argue that the inference drawn is not a
legitimate one or to allege that the words Used fall
within the ambit of legitimate criticism permissible in
law and cannot be considered to excite disaffection
1951
Ram Singh
and OtMrs
v•
Thi Stat• of
Delhi and
.Anotlrer.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1951
Ram Singh
arrd Others
v.
The State of
Delhi and
Another.
Mahajan].
[1951]
amongst Hindus and Muslims.
The phraseology employed by the detaining authority in the charge sheet
supplied to the detenus seems to have been borrowed
from the language used in sections 124A and 153A of
the Indian Penal Code. Judicial literature abounds in
cases where words and passages likely to cause disaffection between Hindus and Muslims or which have
that effect have been considered and discussed. If the
words objected to were known, the representation on
behalf of the detenus ~ould easily have been drawn up
with the help of judicial precedents and reasoning considered good in those cases. Again, without knowing
the substance of the offending words from which the
inference has been drawn by the detaining authority
it is not even possible to urge that these words were
merely a quotation from some known author or that
the words used fall within legitimate religious propaganda permitted by article 25 of the Constitution or
concern the propagation of some political creed to
which no objection could be taken. As regards the
two speeches alleged to have been given by the detenus,
if the allegation that they were such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims is correct, the
detenus were guilty of the offence under section 153A
of the Indian Penal Code and could not only have been
punished for the offence under that section but could
also have been kept out of harm's way for the future
by that procedure. A charge sheet under that section
or in a trial under section 124A which uses analogous
language would have been defective if it did not mention the substance of the speeches alleged to have been
made by the person charged. [Vide Chint Ram v.
Emperor ( 1 ) ; Chidambaram Pillai v. Emperor (•) ·
Mylapore Krishnaswami v. Emperor (").] In some of
these cases the charge was in substance similar to the
charge here. If a charge in an open trial for an offence
under these sections is defective without the substance of the words used or the passages being cited
· therein, a fortiori the material supplied in a preventive
(1) A.I.R. 1931 Lah. 186.
(2) I.L.R. 32 Mad. 3.
(3) I.LR. 32 Mad, 384.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
detention case on ·a similar charge should be regarded
as insufficient when a man has not even a right · of being heard in person and has merely to defend himself
by means of a written representation. It has to be
remembered in this connection that the phrase "excite
disaffection amongst Hindus ·and Muslims" ·is of a
very general nature and an inference of this kind may
easily have been drawn on material which would not
warrant such an inference. No reason whatsoever has
been stated in the affidavit of the District Magistrate
for not disclosing the words used by the detenus even
after this length of time and from which he drew the
conclusions on the basis of which he has kept the petitioners under detention for a period well over six
months or more.
For the reasons given above I venture to dissent
from the opinion of the majority of the Court with
great respect and hold that the detention orders above
mentioned are illegal. I accordingly order the release
of the petitioners. On the other points argued in the
case I agree with judgment of Sastri J.
BosE J.-1 agree with my brother Mahajan whose
judgment I have had the advantage of reading, and
with the utmost respect find myself unable to accept
the majority view. I am of opinion that these petitio'lers should all be released on the ground that their
detentions are illegal.
I do not doubt the right of Parliament and of the
executive to place restrictions upon a man's freedom.
I fully agree that the fundamental rights conferred bv
the Constitution are not absolute. They are limited.
In some cases the limitations are imposed by the Constitution itself. In others, Parliament has been given
the power to impose further restrictions and in doing
so to confer authority on the executive to carry its purpose into effect. But in every case it is the right>
which are fundamental, not the limitations ; and it is
the duty of this Court and of all courts in the land to
guard and defend these rights jealously. It is our
duty and privilege to see that rights which were
1951
Ram Singh
arrd Others
"·
The Staie of
Delhi and
AMther.
Mahajan].
468
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19511
1~51
Ram Singh
ana Others
v.
TMStaitf
.Delhi an
Anothn.
1JoseJ.
intended to be fundamental are kept fundamental and
to see that neither Parliament nor the executive exceed
the bounds within which they are confined by the Constitution when given the power to impose a restricted
set of fetters on these freedoms ; and in the case of the
executive, to see further that it does not travel beyond
the powers conferred by Parliament. We are here to
preserve intact for the peoples of India the freedoms
which have now been guaranteed to them and which
they have learned through the years to cherish, to the
very fullest extent of the· guarantee, and to ensure that
they are not whittled away or brought to nought either
by Parliamentary legislation or by executive action•
. It is the right to personal freedom which is affected
here : what the Constitution calls the "right to move
freely throughout the territory of India." Now I do
not for a moment deny the right of Parliament to
place limitations upon that right and to do it by preventive detention. Much as all freedom loving persons
abhor the thought of locking men and women up without trial and keeping them behind bars indefinitely,
the regrettable necessity to do so is to my mind undoubted. The safety of the State, which is paramount, requires it and, in any event, the Constitution allows
it but-and this is important-subject to limitations.
So far as the Constitution is concerned, it has given
Parliament the powers to legislate on this subject by
article 246 read with item 9 of List I of the 7th Schedule and item 3 in List III, and I have no doubt that
the legislation sought to be impugned here is intra
vires. But I am unable to hold that the executive
action . taken in these cases on the strength of that
legislation is within the law. The executive has no
power to detain except within the four corners of the
Constitution and the Act now challenged. In my
opinion, it has not kept itself within those limits.
The provisions of the Constitution relevant to the
present purpose have been examined by this Court in
previous cases and I have neither the right nor the
desire to go behind them. My brother Mahajan has
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
469
set out his view of the law which these cases ltave
settled. I respectfully agree with him and will not
cover the same ground. But I do wish to say this; I
am not prepared to place any narrow or stilted construction either upon the Constitution or upon the
decisions of this Court which have so far interpreted
it. If it were permissible to go behind the Constitution and enquire into the reason for the provisions
dealing with the fundamental rights, one would find
them bound up with t:Jie history of the fight for
personal freedom in this land. But that is not permissible and is irrelevant. What does matter is that
the right to personal freedom has been made fundamental and that the power even of Parliament itself
to hedge it round with fetters is "cribbed, cabined and
confined". I conceive it to be our duty to give the
fullest effect to every syllable in the Articles dealing
with these rights. I do not mean to say that any
impossible or extravagant construction should be employed such as would make the position of Government impossible or intolerable. But I do insist that
they should be interpreted in a broad and liberal sense
so as to bring out in the fullest measure the purpose
which the framers of the Constitution had in mind as
gathered from the language they used and the spirit
their words convey, namely to confer the fullest
possible degree of .personal liberty upon the subject
consistent with the safety and welfare of the State.
My Lord the Chief Justice has pointed out in The
State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya (1) that
the information supplied to the detenu must be
sufficient to enable him to meet the charges contained
in the grounds given to him and that without that the
right would be illusory. Are the present cases covered
by that rule ? I do not think they are. Put at their
highest, the grounds set out the date and place of the
meetings at which the speeches complained of are said
to have been made and they do no more than say that
they were.
(r) (1951) S.C.R. 167.
1951
Ram Singh
and Others
v.
The Stale of
Delhi and
Another.
Bose].
470
1951
Ram Singh
and Others
v.
The State ef
Delhi and
Another.
Bose].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
• "Such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and
Muslims and thereby prejudice the maintenance of
public order in Delhi."
I have no quarrel with the details regarding the
date and place but I do not consider that the portion
relating to the nature of the speeches fulfils the requirements which have been laid down by this Court regarding particulars.
Now I fully agree that each case will have to be
decided on its own facts so far as this is concerned.
But when weighing the circumstances this must be
borne in mind. The detenu has no right of personal
appearance before the Advisory Board or other revising authority, nor can be he represented by counsel.
The Board or other authority can deal with his
representation without hearing him or anyone on his
behalf. Therefore, his only hope of being able to convince the Board lies in the explanation he offers. But
how can anyone give a fair explanation of his conduct
unless he is told with reasonable plainness what he has
done, and in the case of a speech, the words used are
everything. They have been called "verbal acts" in
another connection. Now I take it to be established
that Government is bound to give a detenu reasonable
particulars of the acts complained of when conduct is
in question. Why should a differen5 rule obtain when
the acts complained of are verbal ?
It was contended in the argument that the man whc
make.s the speech is in a position to know what he said
and so is not at a disadvantage. But that, in my
opinion, is not the point. He may know what he said
but he cannot know what the authorities think he said
unless they give him some reasonable inkling of what
is in their minds. It has to be remembered that what
the Advisory Beard has before it is not necessarily the
words employed or even their substance but what the
authorities say the man said.
This has to be viewed from two angles. The first is
whether the reports handled in to the authorities are
correct. Even with the utmost good faith mistakes do
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
471
occur and it is quite easy for a reporter to get his notes
mixed and to attribute to A what was said by B. But
unless A knows that that is what happened, it would
be very difficult for him to envisage such a contingency
and give the necessary explanation of fact in his
representation.
The next point is this. When a man is told that
his speech excited disaffection and so forth, he is being
given the final conclusion reached by some other mind
or minds from a set of facts which are not disclosed to
him. If the premises on which the conclusion is based
are faulty, the conclusion will be wrong. But even if
the premises are correct, the process of reasoning may
be at fault. In either event, no representation of
value can be made without a reasonably adequate
knowledge of the premises.
Envisage for a moment the position of the Board.,
In the ordinary course, it would have before it a speech
wi'th the offending passages in full, or at any rate the
gist of them. From the other side it would have a
bare denial, for that is about all a detenu can say in
answer to the grounds given to him when he is not told
the premises on which the conclusion is based. In
most cases, that sort of representation would have
very little value. Consider this illustration. Let us
assume the detenu had spoken about Hindus and
Muslims but had urged unity and amity and had said
nothing objectionable but that unknown to him thepolice, through a perfectly bona fide mistake, had
imputed to him certain offensive words used by
another speaker. What would be the value of a
detenu saying "I said nothing objectionable" and that
is almost all he can say in such a case. He cannot
envisage the mistake and say, "Oh yes, that was said,
but not by me. It was said by A or B." Consider a
second illustration where the detenu had quoted a well
known living authority. I can conceive of cases where
words in the mouth of A might be considered objectionable by some but would never be .condemned in the
mouth of B. It might make a world of difference to
1951
Ram Singh
and Othm
v.
The State of
Delhi and
Another.
Bose].
472
1951
RamSU.gh
and Othtrs
v.
TM State of
.Delhi and ·
Another.
JioSI].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1951]
the detenu if he could explain the source of the
passages complained of in his speech.
But it might
be very difficult for him to envisage the possibility of
objection being taken to anything commg from the
source from which he quoted.
I am anxious not to be technical and I would be·
averse to an interpretation which would unnecessarily
embarrass Government, but I do conceive it to be our
duty to give a construction which, while falling strictly
within the ambit of the language used, is yet liberal
and reasonable, just to the detenu, fair to the Government. And after all, what does a construction such as
I seek to make import ? It places no great or impossible strain on the machinery of Government. All that
is required is that the authorities should bestow on
the cases of these detenus a very small fraction of. the
thought, time and energy which the law compels in
the case of even the meanest criminal who is arraigned
before the Courts of this country. The fact that there
is absent in the case of these persons all the usual
safeguards, the glare of publicity, the right to know
with precision the charge against him, the right to
speak in his own defence, is all the more reason why
Government should be thoughtful, considerate and
kind and should give them the maximum help. In
any case, that, in my opinion, is what the Constitution requires and I am not prepared to abate one jot or
tittle of its rigours.
My attention has been drawn to two decisions of
this Court which are said to be on all fours with the
present case. One is Vaidya's case ( 1 ) and the other
Lahiri's(' ). In the latter, the point whether the gist
of the speech should be given was not considered. It
seemed to have been assumed that it need not. But I
am unable to accept that as authority for anything
beyond the fact that that was not considered necessarv
on the facts and in the circumstances of that particular case. As my Lord the Chief Justice pointed out
in the earlier decision cited above, the question of
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 167.
(2) Not reported.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
473
what is vague "must vary according to the circumstances of each case." It was also said there that
"the conferment of the. right to make a representation necessarily carries with it the obligation on the
part of the detaining authority to furnish the grounds,
i.e., materials on which the detention order was made."
It was further said"Ordinaril y, the 'grounds' in the sense of conclusions drawn by the aut~orities will indicate the kind
of prejudicial act the detenu is suspected of being
engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to
make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him."
This envisages cases in which that would not be
enough. It is therefore sufficient for me to say that in
a case of this kind, where the matter has to turn on the
facts
and circumstances of each case, no useful
purpose can be served by examining the facts of some
other case for use as an analogy. In my opinion, on
the facts and circumstances of the present cases, the
grounds supplied were insufficient and the gist of the
offending passages should have been supplied. The
omission to do so invalidates the detention and each
of the detenus is entitled to immediate release.
Petitions dismissed.
Agent for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 21 &
22 : Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the petitioner in Petition No. 44 : V. P. K.
Nambiyar.
Agent for the respondents: P. A. Mehta.
1951
Ram Singl
and Others
v.
The State qf
Delhi and
Another.
Bose].
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