SRINIVAS RAM KUMAR versus MAHABIR PRASAD AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 February 1951 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 277 | 1951 INSC 9
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 February 1951
- Bench
- M. PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 82/1949
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 277
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 9
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
SRINIVAS RAM KUMAR
1%1
"·
MAHABIR PRASAD AND OTHERS.
Fcb.9
[PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and
MuKHERJEA
JJ.]
Pleadings-Inconsistent
pleas-Plaintiff
suing for
specific
performance alleging that money was paid as price-Defendant
pleading th.at money was received as loan-Plaintiff's case not
proved-Jl/fhether decree can be given for recovery of money as
/oflt* on defendant's plea.
Though the court would not grant relief to the plaintiff on a
call¢ for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which
the other side was not called upon or had no opportunity to meet,
yet, when the alternative· case which the plaintiff could have made
was not only admitt~ by the defendant in his written statement
but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim ·which
the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in
giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant
himself makes. In such circumstances, when no injusti'ce can
possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to . drive
the plaintiff to a separate suit.
The plaintiff brought a suit for specific performance of
an agreement to sell a house alleging that he had paid Rs. 30,000
towards the price and ha,d been put in possession in part performance of the contract, but the defendant pleaded that the amount
of Rs. 30,000 was received as a loan and the plaintiff was put in
possession only to facilitate payment of interest, and the court
found that the defendant's plea was true : Held, that a decree
could be passed in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of the sum
of Rs. 30,000 and interest remaining due under the agreement of
loan pleaded by the defendant, even though the plaintiff had not:
set up such a case and it was even inconsistent with the allega·
tions in the plaint.
Babu Raja Mohan Manucha
referred to.
v.
Babu
Manzoor
(70 I.A. 1)
C1v1L APPELLATE JuRismcnoN : Appeal from a
judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature
at Patna dated '29th August, 1947, in First Appeal No.
13 of 1945, modifying a decree · of the Subordinate
Omrt of Gaya in O.S. No. 59 of 1943 : Civil Appeal
No. 82 of 1949.
278
1951
SritainaJ
Ramkumar
v.
Mahabir. Prasad
11na Othtrs.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
S. P. Sinha (C. R. Pattabhi Raman and B. K. Saran
with him) for the appellant.
Udai Bhan Chaudhry for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
Haris Chandra (N. C. Sen, with him)
dents Nos. 3 to 7.
1951. February 9.
delivered by
Mukherj1:r1. J-
[19511
for respon-
The judgment of the Court was
MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is on behalf of the plaintiff and it arises out oV a suit for specific performance
of a contract to sell a house in the town of Gaya, belonging to the defendants second party who, it is alleged, agreed tc sell the house to the plaintiff but subsequently resiled from the agreement and sold the same
to the defendants first party who purchased it with
notice of the contract.
The plaintiff's case, in substance, is that in September, 1941, the defendants second party, who owned a
house at Gaya, entered into a negotiations for sale of the
same, with one Jadu Ram, and the title deeds of the
property were actually handed over to the latter. These
negotiations failed and the second party defendants
thereupon approached the plaintiff firm and a contract
was entered into by and between them sometime te>wards the end of October, 1945, under which the former
agreed to sell to the latter their house at Gaya for a
consideration of Rs. 34,000. Out of this consideration,
a sum of Rs. 30,000 was paid by ~he plaintiff firm on
behalf of the vendors to a creditor of the latter on 28th
October, 1941. The vendors ~n their turn put the
plaintiff in possession of the house agreed to be sold in
part performance of the contract and promised to execute a conveyance as soon as the title deeds were returned to them by Jadu Ram and the balance of consideration money amounting to Rs. 4,000 was paid by
the plaintiff. The second party defendants, however,
went back on their promise and did not execute the
conveyance in favour of the plaintiff even after they
got back their title deeds from Jadu Ram; and on the
other hand, they sold the house to the defendants fint
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
279
party on August 13, 1943. The plaintiff was thus
obliged .to bring this suit, Claiming specific performance
of the contract of sale.
The suit wap contested by both sets 0£ defendants.
The second party. defendants contended inter alia that
they never agreed to sell their house at Gaya to the
plaintiff, and the story of a contract of sale as set up
by the plaintiff was entirely false. They admitted
that they were in need of money and hence approached
the plaintiff for a loan and the plaintiff did advance to
them a sum of Rs. 30,000 carrying interest at 6% per
annum. It was entirely for facilitating payment of interest due on this loan and not in part performance of
the contract of sale that the plaintiff was put in possession of the same.
This defence was reiterated by the first party
defendants who. further pleaded that they were bona
fide purchasers for value having no notice of any contract of sale with the plaintiff.
The Subordinate Judge, who heard the suit, came to
the conclusion, on the evidence adduced by the parties,
that the story of a contract of sale, as alleged by the
plaintiff, was not established and it was not in pursuance of any such contract that the plaintiff was put' in
possession of the house. It was held that the defendants' story was true and that the plaintiff did
advance a sum of Rs. 30,000 to the defendants second
party, but this was by way of a loan and not as part
payment of the consideration money. So far as the
first party defendants were concerned, it was held that
they were bona fide purchasers for value without
notice. In view of these findings, the Subordinate Judge
.dismissed the plaintiff's claim . for specific perform- .
.ance but as the second party defendants admitted
that they had taken an advance 0£ Rs. 30,000 from the
plamtiff, a money decree was given to the plaintiff for
this sum against these defendants with interest at 6%
per annum from the date of the suit till realisation.
Against this _decision, the plain~ff took an appeal
to the High Court at Patna, and the second party
1951
Stinivas
Ramkumar
v.
Mahabir frasad
and Others.
Mukh•rj•a J.
280
1951
Srinictu
Ramkumat
v.
MahabiT Prasad
. and Others.
MakherjtaJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
defendants also filed cross-objections challenging the
propriety of the money decree that was passed against
them. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the
Patna High Court who, by their judgment dated August 29, 1947, dismissed the appeal of the plaintiff and
allowed the cross-objections preferred by the second
party defendants. The learned Judges held, concurring
with the trial court, that no case of concluded contract
between the parties was established by the evidence
adduced in the case, and the fact of the plaintiff being
put in possession of the house could not be regarded
as an act of part performance of any such con~ract.
The High Court agreed with the trial judge in holding
that the sum of Rs. 30,000 was advanced as a loan by
the plaintiff to the second party defendants, though the
evidence was not very clear regarding payment of
interest upon it, and that the first party defendants
were purchasers for value without notice. The High
Court held further that even if there was a contract, its·
terms were vague and indefinite, and as one of the
vendors was a minor, no relief in equity by way of
specific performance of the contract should be
given in this case as it would substantially prejudice
the interest of the minor. In the opinion of the H'igh
Court, the money decree granted against the second
party defendants was not warranted in law as no case
of a loan was made by the plaintiff in the plaint and
no relief was claimed on that basis. The result was
that the suit was dismissed 'm its entirety and the
decree for recovery of money that was made in favour
of the plaintiff by the trial court was set aside. It is
against this judgment that the plaintiff has come up
on appeal to this court.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contends before us that the findings upon wh'1ch the courts
below disbelieved the story of the plaintiff and dismissed the claim for specific performance are not proper
findings of fact which could be legitimately .inferred
from the evidence adduced in tHis case.· In the alternative it is argued that the High .Court was wrong in
· setting aside the decrc:c for money which was given
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
against the
judge.
second
party
defendants
bv
281
the trial
The first contention put foward by the learned
counsel appears to us to be plainly unsustainable.
When the courts below have g'1ven concurrent findings
on pure questions of fact, this court would not ordinanly interfere with these findings and review the evidence for the third time unless there are exceptional
circumstances justifying departure from this normal
practfce. The position may undoubtedly be different
if the inference is one of law from facts admitted and
proved or where the finding of fact is materially affected by violation of any rule of law or procedure. The
practice adopted by this court is similar to what has
always been acted upon by the Judicial ·Committee.
To quote the words of Lord Thankerton in Bibhabati
v. Ramendra Narayan(1), "it is not by any means a
cast
iron practice";
there
may
occur cases
of unusual
nature which might constrain us
to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact
to avoid miscarr'iage of justice. The case before us
however, has nothing unusual in it and involves a
pure question of fact. There is no document in writing in proof of the agreement upon which the plaintiff's
case is based and the decision hinges primarily upon
appreciation of the oral evidence that has been adduced
by the parties. The trial judge, who had the witnesses before him, was the best person to weigh and
appraise their credibility and the conclusions which
he art1ved at, have been affirmed in their entirety by
the High Court on appeaL In these circumstances,
we see no reason whatsoever to go beyond the facts
which have been found against the appellant by both
the courts below.
As regards the other point, however, we are of the
opinion that the decision of the trial court was right
and that the High Court took an undoubtedly rigid
md technical view in reversing this part of the decree
of the Subordinate Judge. It is true that it was no
tart of the plaintiff's case as made in the plaint that
(I) 51 C. W. N. 98.
1951
Srinitiiu
R.,,,,,._
v.
Maha6ir PrlWill
tlfld Othns.
MuV..-j•a J.
282
t9!il
Srini»01
Ramkumm
v.
Maha/Jir Prasad
·""1'0thm.
Mukktrjta J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
the sum of Rs. 30,000 Was advanced by way of loan
to the defendants second party. But it was certainly
open to the plaintiff to make an alternative case to that
effect and make a prayer in the alternative for a decree
for money even if the allegations of the money being
paid in pursuance of a contract of sale could not be
established by evidence. The fact that such a prayer
would have been inconsistent with the other prayer is
not really material.
A plaintiff may rely upon
different rights alternatively and there is nothing in
the Civil Procedure Code to prevent a party from
making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations
and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. The
question, however, arises whether, in the absence
of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to
the court to give him relief on that basis. The rule
undoubtedly is that the court cannot grant relief to
the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not
called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But
when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could
have made, was not only admitted by the defendant
in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff
made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in
giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the
defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff
based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be
regarded with surprise by the latter and no question
of adducing evidence on these facts would arise wheh
they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his
pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice
can possibly result to the defendant, ~t may not be
proper to drive the plaintiff to a separate suit. As an
illustration of this principle, reference may be made to
the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Bab14
Raia Mohan Manucha v. Babu Manzoor (1). This
appeal arose out of a suit commenced by the plaint\ff
appellant to enforce, a mortgage security. The plea of
the defendant was that the mortgage was void. This
(7) (70) I. A. 1.
,
r
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
283
plea was given effect to by both the lower courts as
well as by the Privy Council. But the Privy Council
held that it was open in such circumstances to the
plaintiff to repudiate the transaction altogether and
claim a relief outside it in the form of rest-itution under
section 65 of the Indian Contract Act. Although no
such alternative claim was made in the plaint, the
Privy Council allowed it to be advanced and gave a
decree on the ground that the respondent could not be
prejudiced by such a claim at all and the matter ought
not to be left to a separate suit. It may be noted that
this relief was allowed to the appellant even though
the appeal was heard ex parte in the absence of the
respondent.
·
Mr. Barish Chan~ra appearing for the second party
defendants raised the question of interest in connection with the plaintiff's claim for a money decree. His
contention is that the plaintiff could not claim any
interest so long as he was in possession of the house
and he could not also claim any interest after that, as
his clients made a tender of the sum of Rs. 30,000
by sending a hundi for that amount to ·the plaintiff by
registered post on July 12, 1943, which the plaintiff
refused to accept. The first part of the contention is
undoubtedly correct and is not disputed on behalf of
the plaintiff. We feel difficulty, nowever, in accepting the second part of the contention raised by Mr.
Harish Chandra. The receipt of this hundi was totally
denied by the plaintiff both in the plaint as well as in
the evidence and it is doubtful whether even if the story
was true, it could constitute a valid tender mlaw. The
defendants undoubtedly had the use of this money all
this time and in our opinion the plaintiff is entitled to
some interest. The learned counsel appearing for both
the parties, at the close of their arguments, left this
question· of interest to be determined by us ·and we
think that it would be quite fair if we allow interest
on the sum of Rs. 30,000 at the rate of 4% per annum
from the beginning of September, 1943. It is admitted
that the plaintiff's possession of the house ceased by
the end pf August, 1943.
ll7
19!>1
StiniiJas.
Ramkumar
v.
M ahahir Praiad
and Others.
Mukherjea j.
284
1951
Srirtiotu
11am1;,,.,,,
v.
Mahabir Prasad
dlld Otlurs.
Muk/urfa• ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
The result is that we allow the appeal in part; th?
decree made by the High Court is affirmed in so far
as it dismissed the claim for specific performance. The
plaintiff, however, will be entitled to a money decree
for the sum of Rs. 30,000 against the defendants
second party w'1th interest at 4% per annum from the
1st of September, 1943, to the date of realisation. Each
party to this appeal will bear his own costs.
Appeal allowed in part.
Agent for the appellant : R. C. Prasad.
Agent for respondents : Tarachand Brii Mohan Lal.
D. STEPHENS
1951
"·
NOSIBOLLA.
(SAIYID FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
Munn:RJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAR JJ.]
Marcb2
Criminlll Prot:edure Code, 1898, ss. 417, 439-Revision againll
order of ocq11ittal-lnterf<rmce-Guiding principles-Indian Merchant Shipping Act, XX! of 1923, ss. 25, 26-Supply of seamenConstitution of Board by owners of ships and seamen for recruii.
ment of seamen-Levy of one rupee from each seaman towanls
expenses of B011rd-Whether contrDvenes ss. 25, 26-Giving .of
muster card permitting appearance at muster-Whether amounts·
to
11
engaging 01' supplying" seamen.
The rcvisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court
under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly
exercised when it is invoked by a private complainant against
an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of
appeal under s. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional
cases where the interests of public justice require intcrfcn:ncc
for ):he correction of a manikst illegality or the prevention of a
gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinari!J
invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a
wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on t1ie
l'CCDrd.
Shipowners had an organisation in Cakntta called the c.1cutta Liners' Confrcncc and the seamen had an organisaliaa
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