TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 January 1951 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 212 | 1951 INSC 5
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 January 1951
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, SIR SYED FAZL ALI, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 24/1950
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 212
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 5
Text of the judgment
212
J95J
Stall of Bombay
v.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
allow this appeal and reverse
Bombay High Court.
[1951]
the . decision of the
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant : P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the respondent: V. P. K. Nambiyar.
1951
Jan. 25.
TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL Au,
PATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and
CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR
JJ.l
Constitution of lndia, 1950, Art. 22 (5)-Preventive detentionDuty to contmunicate grounds of detention as soon as n1ay beDuty to gii1e earliest opportunity to make t-cpresentation-Grounds
fttrnished after 15 days-"Supplementary
grounds 11 furnished
after 4 months-Ugality of detentt'on-Vague grounds and irrele-
vant grounds distinguished-Supply of grounds first and details
later-Legality-Serving printed orders on same date on several
persons-Bona fides of detention.
A large number of persons were detained under the Bengal
Criminal Law An1endrnent Act, 1930~ The validity of this ~.\ct
was being c.hallenged in the High Court. Meanwhile, the Prcven·
tive Detention Act of 1950 was passed on 26th February, 1950,
and on the same date ·detention orders under this J\-:t \Vere
served on them. The grounds of detention were served on them
on the 14th of l\farch, and on the 16th of July the Government
served on them "'Supplementary grounds" in continuation of the
grounds already furnished on the 14th of March. A sec~nd
set of grounds were communicated to the appellants on the
22nd or 23rd of July. They applied to the High Court of Calcutta
for writs of habeas corpus contending that the orders of detention
were invalid on various ground~. The High Court rejected these
applications and they appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held per KANIA C.J., FAzI. ALI, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRA·
SEKHARA AIYAR ·JJ.-(i) that-in the particular circumstances of
the case, cSpccial!y in view of the fact that a large nnn1ber _of
cases had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preventive
Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that the
grounds \Vt.re not communicated to the appellants "as soon as
may be" within the meaning of Art. 22 (5);
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
213
(ii) it cannot be held that the appellants were not given
the "earliest opportunity" to make a representation, as required
by Art. 22(5), merely because further details and facts were communicated to the appellants on the 16th July and 22nd July as
these later communications did not contain any new or addition,!
grounds
(though they
were described as "supplementary
grounds") but only furnished details of the heads of grounds
furnished on the 14th March;
(iii) merely because a ground is vague it cannot be considered that it is no ground at all and therefore cannot
be
sufficient to 'satisfy' the authorities; a 'vague' ground does not
stand on the same footing as an irrelevant ground, which can
have no connectioil at all with the satisfaction of the Government;
(iv) the sufficiency of the grounds for the purposes of
satisfaction . of the Government is not a matter for examination
by the court; their suflidency to give the detained person the
earliest opportunity to make a representation can be examined
by the court, but only from that point of view.
Held also, per DAs J.-The fact that a large number of fresh
orders of detention were made overnight did not necessarily
indicate bad fait.\ on the part of the authorities in the circumstances of these cases as the authorities had already applied their
minds to the susp~cted activities .of each of the detenues and were
satisfied that with a view to prevent them from doing some
prejudicial :;ct, it was· necessary to detain them.
The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya supra
p. 167 followed.
)951
Tarapatfti DI.
artd Otlwr1
v
The State qf
West Bengill.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: (Case No. 24
of 1950). Appeal under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution of India, against the judgment and order of the
High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Criminal
Miscellaneous Case No. 361 of 1950.
A. C. Gupta and Sudhansu Sekhar Mukherjee
(Arun Kumar Dutta and S. N. Mukherjee, with them)
for the appellants.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General, (B. Sen, with
him) for the respondent.
1951. Jan. 25. The Judgment of Kania C. J., Fazl
Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.J., was
delivered by Kania C. J. Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ.
delivered separate judgments.
KANIA C. J.-This is an appeal under article 132
of the Constitution of India from the judgment of the
Kania C. ].
214
195!
Tarapat!a De
O'lld Others
v.
Thi State ef
Wist Bengal.
KaniaC.].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
High Court at Calcutta, which rejected the hebea:
corpus petitions of the appellants.
The detention
orders under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, in
all cases were served on the appellants on the 26th
February, 1950, and the grounds for the detention were
served on the 14th March, 1950. By way of specimen
we quote one of them :
"You are being detained in pursuance of a detention order made under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of
sub-section ( 1) of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, (Act IV of 1950), on the following
grounds:( 1) That you have been assisting .the operations of
the Communist Party of India, which along with its
volunteer organisations has been declared unlawful by
Government under section 16 of the Indian Criminal
Law Amendment Act (Act XIV of 1908), and which
has for its object commission of rioting with deadly
weapons, robbery, dacoity, arson and murder and
.possession and use of arms and ammunitions and explosives and thus acting in a manner prejudidal to the
maintenance of public order and tbat it is necessary to
prevent you from acting in such manner.
(2) That as a member of the C.P.I. on its Kishan
front, you have fomented trouble amongst the peasants
of Howrah District and incited them to acts of lawlessness and violence :
and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order :
That as a worker of the C.P.I. you have tried to
foment trouble amongst the tramways men and other
workers at Calcutta and in speeches which you delivered at the University Hall and other places you
actually incited them to resort to acts of violence and
lawlessness ; and have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order."
On the 16th of July, 1950, the Government of West
Bengal served on the appellants "in continuation of
the grounds already furnished on the 14th of March,
1950, supplementary grounds" for their detention a
specimen of which is in the following terms :-
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
215
"In continuation of the grounds already furnished
under order No. 6163 H. S. dated 14th March, 1950,
you are being informed of the supplementary grounds
for your detention which are as follows :you as the Secretary of the Bengal Chatkar Mazdoor Union, as a member of the Executive Committee
of the Federation of Mercantile Empolyees' Union, as
the honorary reporter of the 'Khabar' newspaper
(C. P. I. organ) carried on the disruptive programme
of the C. P. I. On the 29th July, 1948, · you along
with others led a procession at Howrah. preaching discontent against Government and have been thus acting
in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order."
As in the case of the first grounds, these "supplementary grounds" were also served on each appellant
separately. The appellants applied for a Rule of habeas
corpus separately wider section 491 of the" Criminal
Procedure Code and on the 21st July, 1950, the High
Court issued a Rule in each case on the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal. A second set
of grounds were communicated to the appellants on
the 22nd or 23rd of July, 1950. A specimer of one is
in the following terms :"In continuation of the grounds alreadv furnished
under order No. 12820 dated 14th July, 1950, you are
being informed of the supplementary grounds for your
detention which are as follows :-
1. That in a meeting held at the University Institute
on the 19th March, 1947, under the auspices of the
Calcutta Tramway Workers' Union, you held out the
threat that any attempt to take out tram cars on the
20th March, 1947, would be inviting disaster and you
further said that if the authorities tried to resume the
tram service you and your friends would not hesitate
to remove the tram lines and cut the wires.
2. Tha:t on the 13th fune, 1948, you presided over
a meeting under the auspices of the Students' Federation (C. P. I. controlled) aad delivered speech
!951
Tarapadtl De
anti Otlters
v.
The Stale ef
ISi B•ftgal.
w
Kania C.J.
216
1951
TarapodaDe
and Others
v.
The SlaJ1 qf
W 1st Bengal.
Koni.tJC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
advocating withdrawal of ban on the Communist
Party of India and its. organ Swadhinta."
The High Court after considering the whole matter
rejected the petitions of the appellants and the appellants have thereupon come in appeal before us.
In the High Court, it was first contended on behalf
of the . appellants that the communication of the
grounds dated the 14th March was not a compliance
with article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, as those
grounds were not communicated "as soon as may be."
The High Court rejected this contention. Under the
circumstances of the case, we agree with the High
Court and are unable to hold that in furnishing the
grounds dated the 14th March, 1950, the authorities
had failed to act in accordar\ce with the procedure laid
down in article 22 (5) of the Constitution. Under the
Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, a very
large number of persons were detained. The validity
of that Act was being challenged in the High Court
and the judgment was expected to be delivered towards
the end of February, 1950. The Preventive Detention
Act, 1950, was passed by the Parliament of India in
the last week of February, 1950, and these orders on
all those· detenus were served ou the 26th of February,
1950.
Having regard to the fact that Provincial
Government had thus sudden Iy to deal with a large
number of cases on one day, we are unable to accept
this contention of the appellants.
On behalf of the appellants it was next urged that
there has been a non-compliance with the procedure
laid down in article 22 (5) of the Constitution and
section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act in the manner. of supplying grounds to the appellants resulting in
not providing to the appellants the earliest opportunity
to make a representation, which they had a right to
make. In the judgment delivered today in Case No. 22
of 1950(') we have discussed in detail the nature of the
two rights conferred under article 22(5). We have to
apply those principles to the facts of this appeal for
its decision.
(I) Supra, p 167,
S.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
217
When the authorities sent their second communication dated 16th July, 1950, to the appel~ants they
described it as "in continuation of the grounds
already
furnished"
and
as
the "supplementary
grounds for your detention". Relying on the wording
of this communication it was argued that these were
additional grounds which were furnished · to the detenu and therefore the procedure prescribed under
article 22(5) had not been followed. It was argued that
the obligation to communicate grounds "as soon as may
be" was absolute. The grounds for detention must be
before the Provincial Government before they could
be satisfied about the necessity for malCing the detention order. If the grounds before the detaining authorities on the 26th of February, 1950, were only those
which they communicated on the 14th of March, they
cannot support the detention on additional grounds
which were not before them on that day and which
the;• ~et out in the second communication four months
later. It was also contended that the fact of this communication showed that the authorities were not satisfied on the original grounds and had therefore put
forth these supplementary grounds as an afterthought.
In our opinion these arguments cannot be accepted.
A description of the contents of the second communication as "supplementary grounds" does not neces.sarily make them additional or new grounds. One has
to Jook at the contents to find out whether they are
new grounds as explained in our judgment in Case
No. 22 of 1950(1). Examining the contents of the later
communicat.ion in that way we find that they only
furnished details of the second heads of the groW1ds
furnished to the appropriate appellant on 14th March,
1950, in respect of his activities. We are unable to
treat them as new grounds and we agree with the
High Court in its conclusion that these are not fresh
or new grounds. We dp not think it proper to consider the true effect of the communication only by
reading its opening words. The whole of it must be
read and considered together.
The contention that
the authorities were not satisfied on the original
0) Supr'a. p. 167
TaraplJl/a D•
and Others
v.
TlzeState qf
West Beng«l.
JrniaC.j.
218
[95[
T arafHJt/a De
and Others
v.
The State ef
West Bengal.
KaniaC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[I95J]
grounds and therefore put forth this communication
as the supplemental grounds is again unsound. The
fact that these details were communicated later does
not necessarily show that they were not within the
knowledge of the authorities when they sent the communication dated the 14th of March. The contention
that this communication of the 16th July, 1950, was
not "as soon as may be", has to be rejected having
regard to the principles set out in our judgment in
Case No. 22 of 1950. The facts in each case have to
be taken into consideration and if the detained
person contends that this part of the procedure prescribed in article 22(5) was not complied with, the
authorities will have to place materials before the
court t~ refute that contention. In the present case
the High Court has considered that there has been no
infringement of this procedural law and we see no
reason to come to a different conclusion.
It was next argued that the grounds being vague,
they could not be considered as grounds at all and
therefore they could not be sufficient "to satisfy" the
authorities. On this point we have nothing to add
to what we have stated in our juagment in Case No. 22
of 1950. We are unable to accept the contention that
"vague grounds" stand on the same footing as "irrelevarit grounds". An irrelevant ground has no connection at all with the satisfaction of the Provincial
Government which makes the erder of detention.
For the reasons stated in that judgment we are also
unable to accept the contention that if the grounds are
vague and no representation is possible there can be no
satisfaction of the authority as required under section
3 of the Preventive Detention Act. This argument
mixes up two objects. The sufficiency of the grounds,
which gives rise to the satisfaction of the Provincial
Government, is not a matter for examination by the
court. The sufficiency of the grounds to give the detained person the' earliest opportunity to make a representation can be examined by the court, but only from
that point of view. We are therefore unable to accept
the contention that the quality and characteristic of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
219
the grounds should be the same for both tests. On the
question of satisfaction, as has been often stated, one
person may be, but another may not be, satisfied on
the same grounds. That aspect however is not for the
determination of the court, having regard to the words
used in the Act. .The second part of the enquiry is
clearly open to the court under article 22(5). We are
therefore unable to accept the argument that if the
grounds are not sufficient or adequate for making the
representation the grounds canriot be sufficient for the
subjective satisfaction of the authority.
As regards the grounds furnished · by the Government in each case in its hrst communication, it is
sufficient to notice that while the first ground is common to all the appellants, the second ground is different in most cases. The High Court has considered
the case of each appellant in respect of the communication dated the 14th of March, 1950, sent to him. In
their opinion those grounds are not vague. They have
held that the procedural requirement to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to make a representation has not beeen infringed by the communication of the grounds of the 14th of March and by
the subsequent communication made to the appellants
in July. This point was not seriously pressed before
us. After hearing counsel for the appellant we sec no
reason to· differ from the conclusion of the High Court
on this point. The result is that the appeal fails and
is dismissed.
1951
TarapaJaDe
and Other1
v.
The State qf
Wen Ben.ta/,
Kania C.J.
PATANJAU SASm J.-This appeal was heard along
with Ca5¢ No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v.
Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya) (1). as the main question
involved was the same. In the view I have expressed on
that question in my judgment delivered today in that
case, this appeal cannot succeed and I agree that it
should be dismissed.
Patanj11li
Sastrial J.
DAS J.-The same important questions have been
raised in this appeal by 100 detenus against an order
of a Bench of the Calcutta High· Court as were raised
D111J.
(I) Supra, p. 167.
7-1 S.O laclia/68
220
1951
T 41'opado DI
and Othm
v.
TA•Slot• ef
West Bt111ol.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
by the detenu in the appeal of the State of Bombay in
which judgment has just been delivered. One additional point raised in this appeal was that the fact
that a large n!Jlllber of fresh orders of detention were
made "overnight" indicates bad faith on the part of
the authorities, for the authorities could not have
applied their minds to each individual case. 1 am
unable to accept this contention as correct. The authorities had already applied their minds to the suspected activities of each of .the dctcnus and were satisfied
that with a view to prevent them from doing some
prejudicial act of a p;rticular kind it was necessary
to m;ike an order of detention against them under the
local Acts. There being doubt as to the validity of the
local Acts and the Preventiv·: Detention Act having
been passed in the meantime the question was to
make a fresh order under the new Act. The minds of
the authorities having already been made up as to the
expediency of making an order of detention against
them, an elaborate application of mind, such as is now
suggested, does not appear to me to be necessary at
all. I do not think there was any failure of duty on the
part of the authorities which will establish bad faith
on their part. In my view, for reasons stated in my
judgment in the other appeal, there being no proof of
any mala {ides on the part of the authorities, no fundamental rights of the petitioners have been infringed.
In the case of each of the detenus, apart from the common ground, there were one or more specilic grounds
of detention which arc quite sufficient to enable the
detenu Concerned to make his representation. Therefore, the question of supplementary particulars does
not arise at all. In my opinion the conclusions arrived
at by Roxburgh J. were correct and well-founded, and,
therefore, this appeal should be dismissed.
Appettl dismisseil.
Agent for the appellant : P. K. Chatterjee.
Agent for the respondent : P. K. Bose.
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