THE STATE OF BOMBAY versus ATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 January 1951 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 167 | 1951 INSC 4
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 January 1951
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, SIR SYED FAZL ALI, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 22/1950
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 167
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 4
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
167
not communicate it to the first defendant. This statement is supported by the cable of the 26th August and,
if Youngman can be said to have had any leaning at
all, it was certainly in favour of the plaintiff. In these
circumstances, it would be difficult to hold that
Youngman had deliberately misdescribed the plaintiff's
acceptance of the counter-offer as his offer in the
cable which he sent on the 26th August to the first
defendant.
19Sl
Col. D. I.
Mil() Phersott
v.
M. N. APflanM
and ANJtlrer.
Fazl Ali].
It seems to us that the view taken by the Judicial
Commissioner is not correct, and, as there was no
concluded contract, the decree passed by him awarding .
compensation to the plaintiff for breach of contract
cannot be sustained. We therefore allow the appeal,
set aside the judgment and dtcree of the Judicial
Commissioner and dismiss the plaintiff's suit. Having
regard to the circumstances of the case, we make no
order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant : M. S. K. Sastri.
Agent for the respondent: Rajinder Narain.
..
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
1951
v.
Jan. 25.
ATMA RAM SRIDHAR VAIDYA
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,
PATANJALI SAsTRr; MuKHERJEA, DAs and
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
JJ.)
Constitution of fodia, Arts. 21, 22 (5)-Preventive detention
-Duty to communicate grounds and to afford opportunity to make
representation-Whether distinct rights-Ground supplied vague
-Non-supply of particulars or supply of particulars at later st.7ge
-Whether vitiates dttention-furisdiction of court to consider
sufficiency of grounds-Preventive Detention A.ct (IV of 1950), s. 3.
The respondent was arrested on the 21st of April, 195(),
under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
1951
April, 1950, he was mpplied with the ground for his detention
which. was as iollo~·s ; "That you are engaged and are likely to
Stat• qf B0111bay
he cng:iged in pron1oting: acts of sabotage on railway and r:tihvay
v.
property . in Greater Bombay." The respondent filed a habsas
.Atma Ram
corpus petition contending that the ground supplied was vague
Sridhar Vaidya.
as it did not 1ncntion the time, place or nature of the s~botage
or how the respondent promoted it and that as the ground gave
nc particulars, his detention was illegal. Pending the_ disposal
of the petition, the Con1missioner of Police sent a comn1unica<:ion
to the respondent giving these further particulars, viz., that the
activities 1nentioned in the grounds supplied to him ·.vcre being
tarried on by };im in Greater Bombay between January, 19S(J,
and the d.tte of h~s detention and that he will in all probability
continue to do so. The High Court of Bombay held th•t if the,;e
particulars had been furnished at the time when the grounds
were furnished on the 29th of· April, 1950, very likely they would
have come to the conclusion that the grounds were such as
would have led the <letenue to know exactly what he was charged
with and to 1nake a proper representation, but released the respondent holding th:n the only grounds which were furnished in
the purported compliance of Art. 22 (5) were the grounJs furnisO.ed
on the 29th of April, 1950, and as these grounds were not
such as. to enable the dctcnue to make a proper representation,
there was a violation of a fundamental right and a contravention
of the statutory provisions and this violation cannot be set
right by the detaining authority by amplifying or improving the
grounds already given :
the Full Court (KANIA C.J., FAZL Au, PAT.\NJALI
DAs and
CHA!"!'DRASEKHARA
A1YYAR JJ).Under s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government., as
the case may be, that is necessary, and if the grounds on wbich
it is stated that the Central Government or the State Government :ire satisfied have a rational connection with the: ohiccts
which were to be prevented from being attained, the que~tion
of satisf.action cannot be challenged in a court of law except on
the ground of ma/a frdes.
,
Held
SASTRI,
by
MuKHERJEA,
and
and DAS JJ.
dissenting).-Clause (5) of Art. 22 confers two rights on the
detenue, namely, first, ·3 right to be informed of the grounds on
which the order of detention has been made, and secondly, to be
afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation
against the order; 2n<l though these rights are linked together
they arc two distinct rights. If grounds which have a ration01l
connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3 are supplied, the
first condition is complied with. But the right to make a re·
presentation implies that the detenue should have information
so as to enable him to make a representation: and if r.he grounds·
Held
also
CttANDRASEKHARA
per
KANIA
AIYAR
JJ.,
CJ.,
FAzL
ALI,
MuKHERJEA
(PATANJALI . SASTRI
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
169
supplied are not sufficient to enable ·the detenue to make a repmentation, he can rely on the sec0nd. right: He may if he
likes ask. for further particulars which will enable _him to make a
representation. On an infringement of either of these two rights
the detained person has a right to approach the court, and even
if an infringement of the second right under Art. 22 (5) is alone
established he· is cntilcd to be rcleaSed.
Per l>ATANJAU SAsTa! and DAs JJ.-As the power to issue
a detention order depends upon the existence of a state of mind
in the detaining authority, that is,. its satisfaction, which is
purely a · subjective condition and judicial enquiry into the
sufficiency of the grounds to justify ilie detention .is thus excluded, it would be wholly inconsistent with the scheme to hold that
it is open to the· court to examine tho sufficiency of the same
grounds to enable · the person detained to make a representation,
for, the grounds to be communicated to the person detained are
the grounds on which the order has been made. There is further
nothing in Art. 22, cl. (5), to warrant the view that the grounds
on which the order of detention has been made must be such,
that when communicated to the person they are found by a cour:
of law to be sufficient to enable him to make what the court
considers to be an adequate representation, or that the latter
part of cl. ( 5) confers a distinct right on the detenue or an independent obligation on . the detaining authority to furniSh the
detcnue with sufficient particulars and details to enable him to
·
make an effective representation.
Held by the Full Court (KANIA ,C.J., FAzL Au, PATANJAU
SASTRI, MuKHERJEA DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YYAR JJ.)ln any view, on the facts of the case there was no infringement
of any fundamental right of the respondent or contravention of
any constitutional provision as he had been s,upplicd with
sufficient particulars as soon as he raised the objection that the
grounds supplied were vague and the respondent was not, therefore, entitled to be released.
Per (KANIA C.J., FAzL Au, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA
A1YAR JJ.)-The "grounds for making the order which have
to be communicated to the person detained .1s soon as
may be arc conclusions of facts and not a complete recita! of
all the facts. These grounds must be in existence when the order
is made. No part of the grounds can be held back, and after
they have been once conveyed there can be no addition to the
grounds. All facts leading to the conclusion constituting the
ground need not, however, be conveyed at the same time. If a
second communication contains no further conclusion of fact but
only furnishes some of the facts on which the first mentioned
conclusion was founded it does not amount to a fresh ground.
The test th~reforc is whether what is conveyed in the second
communication is a statement of facts or events, which facts or
1951
Stot1 qf Bombay
v.
Atma Ram
SriJAar Vaidya.
170
J95J
Staie qf Bomba7
v.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
events were already taken into consideration in arriving at the
conclusion constituting the ground already supplied.
So long as the later communications do not make out a new
ground, their contents are no infringement of the two procedural
rights of the <letenue 1nentioned in Art. 22, cl. (5). They n1ay consist of a narration of f:icts or particulars relating to the grounds
already supplieJ. But in doing so the timC" factor in respect of
second duty, viz., to give the detained person the earlitc;t oppor~
tunity to make a representation, cannot be overlooked.
If on reading the ground furnished it is capable of being
intellWenrly understood and is sufficiently definite to furnish
materials to enable the detained person to make a representation
against the order it cannot be said to be "vague". The question
whether the vagueness or indefinite nature of the statement
furnished to the detained person is such that he was not given the
earliest opportunity to make a repr;esentation is a matter within
the jurisdiction of the court's inquiry and subject to the court's
decision.
CruMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION: Case
No. 22
of 1950.
Appeal under Art. 132(1) of the. Constitution against
a judgment and order of the Bombay High Court
dated. 1st September, 1950, in Criminal Application
No. 807 of 1950. The facts and arguments of counsel
are set out in the judgment.
M. C. Setalvad, Attarney-General, ( G. N. foshi,
with him) f<;>r the appellant.
A. S. R. Chari and Bava Shiv Charan Singh for
the respondent.
1951. Jan. 25. The judgment of Kania C.J., Faz!
Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. was
delivered by Kania C.J. Patanjali Sastri and Dass JT.
delivered separate judgments.
EaniaC. ].
KANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from.a judgment of
the High Court at Bombay, ordering the release of the
respondent who was detained in custody under a
detention order made under the Preventive Detention
Act (IV of 1950). The respondent was first arrested
on the 18th December, 1948, under the Bombay
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
171
Public Security Measures Act, 1948 (Bombay Act IV
of 1947), but was released on the 11th of November,
1949. He was arrested again on the 21st of April,
1950, under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and
on the 29th of April, 1950, grounds for his detention
were supplied to him. They were in the following
terms : "That you are engaged and are likely to be
engaged in promoting acts of sabotage ori railway and
railway property in Greater Bombay." The respondent. filed a habeas corpus petition on the 31st of July,
1950, in which, after reciting his previous arrest
and release, in paragraphs 6 and 7 he mentioned as
follows:"(6) On his release the applicant left Bombay and
stayed out of Bombay, that is, in Ratlam and in Delhi.
(7) On the 20th April, 1950, he returned to Bombay
and was immediately arrested as stated above."
He contended that the sole aim of the Government
in ordering his detention was not the preservation of
public order or the security of the State, but the locking-up of active trade unionists who belonged to
the All-India Trade Union Congress. He contended
that the ground is "delightfully vague and does not
mention when, where or what kind of sabotage or how
the applicant promoted it." He further urged that the
ground gave no particulars and therefore was not a
ground as required to be furnished under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. He stated that the present
appellant acted mala fide, for a collateral purpose,
- outside the scope of the Act, and that the applicant's
detention in any event was illegal and mala fide.
When this petition was presented to the Court on the
9th of August, 1950, it directed the issue of a notice to
the Commissioner of Police. Pending the disposal of
the Rule, on the 26th August, 1950, the Commissioner
of Police sent a communication .to the respondent as
follows:
"In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), and in continuation
of my communication No. 227 dated the 29th April,
4-1 S. C. India/68
t95J
$tale qf Bom6ay
v.
Atma Ram
SritllitW Vaitfyo.
KanioC. J1
172
1951
Stoi.~ Bom6ay
v.
Abrut Ram
Sridhar Yaidy•.
KaaiaC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
1950, the following further particulars arc hereby
communicated to you in connection with the grounds
on which a detention order has been made against you
under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the said Act:That the activities mentioned in the grounds furnished to .you were being carried on by you in Greater
Bombay between January 1950 and the date of your
detention; and
In all probability you will continue to do so.
2. If, in view of the particulars now supplied, you
wish to make a further representation against the
order under which you are detained, you should
address it to the Government of :SOmbay and forward
it through the Superintendent of Arthur Road Prison,
Bombay."
On the 30th of August, 1950, the Commissioner of
Police filed an affidavit against the petition of the
respondent in which it was stated that the objectionable activities were carried on by the applicant between
the months of January, 1950, and the date of detention. It further stated that in or about the month of
January, 1950, there was a move for a total strike on
the railways in India in the month of March, 1950,
and the applicant was taken prominent part to sec that
the strike was brought about and was successful. As
a means to make the strike successful and bring about
total cessation of work on all railways, the applicant
and his associates were advocating sabotage on railways and railway property in Greater Bombay. He
further stated that reliable materials were put before
him of the respondent being engaged in such activities
by experienced police officers. He added that although
the railway strike in the month of March did not
materialise, the idea of bringing about such strike as
soon as convenient continued to be entertained and
the present respondent was actively engaged in bringing about such- a strike in the near future. He then
stated that the disclosure of further facts relating to
the activities of the dctcnuc was against public
"interest. In para. 6 there was a· specific denial that
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
173
the respondent, after his release· in Novcrnber, 1949,
and till 20th April, 1950, was out of Bombay. It was
stated that he used to go out of Bombay at times but
during the major part of the period he was in the city
of Bombay.
J
When the matter came up before a Bench of the
High Court the respondent's petition was granted. In
the judgment of the Court, Chagla C. J. observed:
"It is clear by reason of the view we have taken in
several cases under section 491 · of the Criminal Procedure Code, that this is not a ground which would
enable the detenue to make a representation to which
he is entitled both under the Act and under the Constitution." After noticing the affidavit of the Commissioner of Police, it was further observed : "We
appreciate the fact that, after our decision was given,
Government decided to place all the materials before
us so that we should be satisfied that what influenced
the detaining authority in making the order was not
any ulterior motive but that ample materials were at
the disposal of the detaining authority which would
justify the applicant's detention. We have looked at
this affidavit and we have also looked at the particulars furnished to us by Mr. Chudasama. ·If these
particulars had been furnished at the time when the
grounds were furnished on the 29th of April, 1950,
very likely we would have come to the conclusion that
the grounds were such as would have led the detenue to
know exactly what he was charged with and to make
a proper representation." The judgment is however
based on the following observation of the Chief
Justice : "A new and important question arises for
our consideration; and that is whether it is permissible to the detaining authority to justify the detention
by amplifying and improving the grounds originally
furnished ........ The only grounds which we have to
consider and which were furnished in the purported
compliance of article 22(5) were the grounds furnished
to the detenue on the 29th of April, 1950; and if these
grounds were not such as to enable the detenue to
make a proper representation, then there was a
1951
Slate ef B11111t•.1
v.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Y 11;,/ya.
Xallill C.].
174
1951
Sttdt ef Bomhay
v.
Atma Ram
Srfr!krzr JlnU!ya.
Kania C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
violation of the fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions. That violation and
that contravention cannot be set right by the detaining
authority by amplifying or improving the grounds
already given. As we said before, the point of time
at which we have to decide whether there was a compliance or not with the provisions of article 22(5)
is the 29th of April, 1950, when the grounds were
furnished, and not when further and better particulars
were given on the 26th of August 1950." The learned
Attorney-General, appearing for the appellant, has
strenuously objected to this line of approach.
As the question of vagueness of grounds for the
order of detention and the question whether supplementary grounds could be furnished after the grounds
were first given to the detenue have arisen in various
High Courts,' we think it right that the general
principles should be properly appreciated. The Constitution of India has given legislative powers to the
States and the Central Government to pass laws
permitting preventive detention. In order that a legislation permitting preventive detention may not be
contended to be an inJlringement of the Fundamental
Rights provided in Part III of the Constitution, article
22 lays down the permissible limits of legislation
empowering preventive detention. Article 22 prescribes
the minimum procedure that must be included in any
law permitting preventive detention and as and when
such requirements are not observed the detention,
even if valid ab initio, ceases to be "in accordance
with procedure established by law" and infringes the
fundamental right of the detenue guaranteed under
articles 21 and 22(5) of the Constitution. In that way
the subject of preventive detention has been brought
into the chapter on Fundamental Rights. In the
present case we are concerned only with clauses (5)
and ( 6) of article 22 which run as follows :22. "(5) When any person is detained in pursuance
of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
175
as soon as may be, communicate to such person the
ground on which the order has lx;en made an~ shall
afford him the earliest opporturuty of making a
representation against the order.
( 6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority
making any such order as is referred to in that clause
to disclose facts which such authority considers to be
against the public interest to disclose."
It has to be borne in mind that the legislation in
question is not an emergency legislation. The powers
of preventive detention under this Act of 1950 are in
addition to those contained in the Criminal Procedure
Code, where preventive detention is followed by an
inquiry or trial. By its very nature, preventive detention is aimed at preventing the commission of an
offence or preventing the detained person from
achieving a certain end. The authority making the
order therefore cannot always be in possession of full
detailed information when it passes the order and the
information in its possession may fall far short of
legal proof of any specific offence, although it may be
indicative of a strong probability of the impending
commission of a prejudicial act. Section 3 of the
Preventive Detention Act therefore requires that the
Central Government or the State Government must be
satisfied with respect to any person that with a view
to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to ( 1) the defence of India, the relations of
India with foreign powers, or the 1 security of India, or
(2) the security of the state or the maintenance of
public order, or (3) the maintenance of supplies of and
services essential to the community .......... it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person
be detained. According to the wording of section 3
therefore before the Government can pass an order of
preventive detention it must be satisfied with respect ·
to the individual person that his activities arc directed
against one or other of the three objects mentioned
in the section, and that the detaining authority was
satisfied that it . was necessary to prevent him from
1951
State qf Bombay
v.
AtmaRawa
Sridhar Yail/ya.
Kania C.J.
176
1951
St"1e qf BDmbay
"·
Atmallam
Sridhar Vaidya.
KaniaC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
acting in such a manner. The wording of the section
thus clearly shows that it is the satisfaction of the
Central Government or the State Government on the
point which alo'ne is necessary to be established. It is
significant that while the objects intended to be
defeated are mentioned, the different methods, acts or
omissions by which that can be done are not mentioned.
as it is not humanly possible to give such a~
exhaustive list. The satisfaction of the Government
however must be based on some grounds. There can
be no satisfaction if there are no grounds for the same.
There may be a divergence of opinion as to whether
certain grounds are sufficient to bring about the satisfaction required by the section. One person may think
one way, another the other way. If, therefore, the
grounds on which it is stated that the Central Government or the State Government was satisfied are such
as a rational human being can consider connected in
some manner with the objects which were to be
prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction except on the ground of mala fides cannot be
challenged in a court. Whether in a particular case
the grounds are sufficient or not, according to the
opinion of any person or body other than the Central
Government or the State Government, is ruled out by
the wording of the section. It is not for the court to
sit in the place of the Central Government or the
State Government and try to determine if it would
have come to the same conclusion as the Central or
the State Government. As has been generally obsen·ed.
this is a matter for the subjective decision of the
Government and that cannot be substituted by an
objective test in a court of law. Such detention orden
are passed on information and materials which may
not be strictly admissible as evidence under the
Evidence Act in a court, but which the law, taking
into consideration the needs and exigencies of
administration, has allowed to be considered sufficient
for the subjective decision of the Government.
An order having been so permitted to ~e made, the
next step to be considered is, has the detamed person
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
17'1
195{
any say in the matter? In the chapter on Fundamental Rights, the Constitution of India, having given State of Bomba.1
v.
every citizen a right of freedom of movement, speech,
Att114 Ra•
etc., with their relative limitations prescribed in the Sridhar Vaidya.
different articles in Part III, has considered the posiKaniaC. J.
tion of a person detained under an order made under
a Preventive Detention A1=t. Three things are expressly considered. In article 22(5) it is first considered that
the man so detained has a right to be given as soon as
may be the grounds on which the order has been made.
He may otherwise remain in custody without having
the least idea as to why his liberty has been taken
away. This is considered an elementary right in a
free democratic State, Having received the grounds for
the order of detention, the next point which is considered is, 'but that is not enough; what is the good
of the man merely knowing grounds for his detention
if he cannot take steps to redress a wrong which I1e
thinks has been committed either in belief in the
grounds or in making the order." The clause therefore
further provides that the detained person should have
the earliest opportunity of making a representation
against the order. The representation has to be
against the order of detention because the grounds
are only steps for the satisfaction of the Government
on which satisfaction the order of detention has
been made. The third thing provided is in clause (6).
It appears to have been thought that in conveying the
information to the detained person there may be facts
which cannot be disclosed in the public interest. The
authorities are therefore left with a discretion in that
connection under clause (6). The grounds which form
the basis of satisfaction when formulated are bound to ·
contain certain facts, but mostly they are themselvea
deductions of facts from facts. That is the general
structure of article 22, clauses (5) and (6), of the Constitution.
The question arising for discussion is what should
be stated in the grounds. It is argued that whatever
may be stated or omitted to be stated, the ground
c.'\Illlot be vague; that the Constitution envisages the
178
195!
Stat< ef Bom••.1
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
EaniaC.j.
SUPRF.ME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
furnishing of the grounds once and therefore there .is no
occasion for furnishing particulars or supplemental
grounds at a later stage;. and that article 22(5) does not
give the detained person a right to ask for particulars,
nor does it give the authorities any right to supplement the grounds, once they have furnished the same.
In our opinion much of the controversy is based on a
somewhat loose appreciation of the meaning of the
words used in the discussion. We think that the position will be clarified if it is appreciated in the first
instance what are the rights given by article 22 (5).
The first pan of article 22, clause (5), gives a right to
the detained person to be furnished with "the grounds
on which the order has been made" and that has to be
done "as soon as may be." The second right given to
such persons is of being afforded "the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." It
is obvious that the grounds for making the order as
mentioned above, are the grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied . that it was necessary to
make the order. These grounds therefore must be ·in
existence when the order is made. By their very nature
the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete
detailed recital of all the facts. The conclusions drawn
from the available facts will show in which of the three
categories of prejudical acts the suspected activity of
the particular person is considered to fall. These conclusions are the "grounds" and they must be supplied.
No part of such "grounds" can be held back nor can
any more "grounds" be added thereto. What must
be supplied are the "grounds on which the order has
been made" and nothing less. The second right of
being afforded the "earliest opponunity of making a
representation against the order" is not confined to
only a physical opportunity by supplying paper and
pen only. In order that a representation can be made
the person detained must first have knowledge of the
grounds on which the authorities conveyed that they
were satisfied about the necessity of making the
detention order. It is therefore clear that if the representation has to be intelligible to meet the charges
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
179
contained in the grounds, the information conveyed to
the detained person must be sufficient to attain that
object.
Ordinarily, the "grounds" in the sense of
conclusions drawn by the authorities will indicate the
kind of prejudicial act the detenue is suspected of
being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable
him to make a representation setting out his innocent
activities to dispel the suspicion against him.
Of
course if the detenue is told about the details of facts
besides the grounds he will certainly be in a better
position to deal with the same. It is significant that
the clause does not say that the "grounds" as well as
details of facts on which they are based must be
furnished or furnished at one time. The law does
not prescribe within what time after the grounds are
furnished the representation could be made. The
time in each case appears deliberately unprovided for
expressly, because circumstances vary in each case
and make it impossible to fix a particular time for the
exercise of each of these two rights.
It thus appears clear that although both these rights
are separate and are to be exercised .at different times,
they are still connected with each other.
Without
getting information sufficient to make a representation
against the order of detention it is not possible for the
man to make the representation. Indeed the right
will be only illusory but not a real right at all. The
right to receive the grounds is independent but it is
thus intentionally bound up and connected with the
right t<> make the representation. Although these
two rights are thus linked up, the contingency of
further communication between the furnishing of the
grounds on which the order is made and the exercise
of the right of representation granted by the second
part of · that clause is not altogether excluded. One
thing is clear from the wording of this clause and
that is that after the grounds are once conveyed to
the detenue there can be no addition to the grounds.
The grounds being the heads, from which the Government was satisfied that it was necessary to pass the
order of detention, there can be no addition to those
1951
State of Bombay
v.
Atma Ram
Sriihar Yaitlya,
Ka11iaC.J.
180
1951
State of Bombay
v.
Atma RIJln
Sridhar Vait(ya.
.Kania C. ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1951 J
grounds because such additional grounds will be either
the grounds which were not elements to bring about
the satisfaction of the Government or if thev were
such grounds there has been a breach of the provision
of the first part of article 22(5), as those grounds for
the · order of detention were not conveyed to the
detained person "as soon as may be."
This however does not mean that all facts leading
to the conclusion mentioned in the grounds must be
conveyed to the detained person at the same time the
grounds are conveyed to him. The facts on which the
conclusion mentioned in the grounds are based must
be available to the Government, but there may be
cases where there is delay or difficulty in collecting
the exact data or it may not be convenient to set out
all the facts in the first communieation. If the second
communication contains no further conclusion of fact
from facts, but only furnishes all or some of the facts
on which the· first mentioned conclusion was founded
it is obvious that no fresh ground for which the order
of detention was
made is being furnished to the
detained person by the second communication which
follows some time after the first communication. As
regards the contents of that communication therefore
the test appears to be whether what is conveyed in the
second communication is a statement
of facts or
events, which facts or events were already taken into
consideration in arriving at the conclusion included
in the ground already supplied. If the later communication contains facts leading to a
conclusion
which is outside the ground first supplied, the same
cannot be looked into as supporting the order of
detention and therefore those grounds arc "new"
grounds. In our opinion that is the more appropriate
expression to be used. The expression "additional
grounds" seems likely to lead to confusion of thought.
The next point to be considered is the time factor.
If a second communication becomes necessary, when
should it be made? Clause 22 (5) lays down two time
factors. The first is that the grounds should be
supplied "as soon as may be" This allows the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1Rt
authorities reasonable time to formulate the grounds
on the materials in their possession. The time element
is necessarily left indeterminate because acti~ities of
individuals tending to bring about a certain result
may be spread over a l<mg or a short period, or a
larcrer or smaller area, or may be in connection with
a f~w or numerous individuals. The time required to
formulate t'he proper grounds of detention, on information received, is bound to vary in individual cases.
There is no doubt that no express words are used to
suggest a second communication from the authority
to the detained person. But having regard to the
structure of the clause dealing with the two rights
connected by the word "and'', and the use of the
words "as soon as may be and "earliest opportunity"
separately, indicating two
distinct
time factors,
one in respect of the furnishing of grounds and the
other in respect of the making of the representation,
the contingency of a second communication after the
grounds are furnished, is not excluded. However, the
second communication should not be liable to be
charged as not being within the measure "as soon as
may ·be". Secondly, it must not create a new ground
on which satisfaction of the Government could be
suggest~d to have been arrived at. In our opinion, if
these two conditions are fulfilled, che objection against
a later communication of details or facts is not sufficient
to cause an infringement of the provision made
in article 22(5). The question has to be approached
from another point of view also. As mentioned above,
the object of furnishing grounds for the order of
detention is to enable the detenue to make a representation, i.e., to give him an opportunity to put forth
his objections against the order of detention. Moreover, "the earliest opportunity" has to be given to
him to do that. While the grounds of detention are
thus the main factors on which the subjective decision
of the Government is based, other materials on which
the conclusions in the grounds are founded could and
should equally be conveyed to the detained person to
enable him to make · out his objections against the
1951
Stat• qf Bombay
v.
AtmaRiim
Sridlun' Y aidya.
EaniaC.J.
182
t95t
Stale qf Bombay
v.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaid,a.
KaniaC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
order. To put it in other words, the dctainirig authority has made its decision and passed its order. The
detained person is then given an opportunity to urge
his objections which in cases of preventive detention
comes always at a later stage. The grounds may
have been considered sufficient by the Government to
pass its judgment. But to enable the detained person
to make his representation against the oraer, further
details may be furnished to him. In our opinion, this
appears to be the true measure of the procedural rights
of the detained person under article 22(5).
It was argued that under article 22(6) the authorities .are permitted to withhold facts which they
consider not desirable to be disclosed in the public
interest. It was argued that therefore all other facts
must be disclosed. In our opinion that is not the
necessary conclusion from the wording of article 22(6).
It gives a right to the 1detaining authority not to
disclose such facts, but from that it does not follow
that what is not stated or considered to be withheld
on that ground must be disclosed and if not disclosed,
there is a breach of a fundamental right. A wide
latitude is left to the authorities in the matter of
disclosure.
They are given a special privilege in respect of facts
which are considered not desirable to be disclosed in
public interest. As regards the rest, their duty is to
disclose facts so as to give the detained person the
earliest opportunity to make a representation against
the order of detention.
On behalf of the respondent, it was argued that if
the grounds of detention are vague or insufficiently
clear there will result a failure to give him the earliest
opportunity to make a representation against the
order of detention and that defect in its turn must
affect the. satisfaction on which the order of detention
was made. It was argued that just as a ground which
is completely irrelevant, and therefore, in law is no
ground at all, could not satisfy any rational person
about the necessity for the order, a vague ground
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
183
which is insufficient to enable the detenue to make a
representation would similarly make the order of
detention based on it, void. In our opinion, this
argument is unsound. Although the ground may be
good there may be a cenain indefiniteness in its
statement. Proceeding on the footing that there is
some connection, i.e., the ground by itself is not so
convincingly irrelevant and incapable of bringing
about satisfaction in any rational person, the question
whether such ground can give rise to the satisfaction
required for making the order is outside the scope of
the inquiry of the court. On the other hand, the
question whether the vagueness or indefinite nature of
the statements furnished to the detained person is
such as to give him the earliest opportunity to make
a representation to the authority is a matter within
the jurisdiction of the court's inquiry and subject to
the coun's decision. The analogy sought to be drawn
between a ground which can have no connection
whatsoever with the order and a ground which on its
face has connection with the order but is not definite
in its statement) is clearly faulty. The extreme
position, on the other hand, that there is no connection
between the ground to be furnished and the representation -to be 'made by the detained person under
anicle 22(5) is equally unsound, when the object in
furnishing the ground is kept in mind. The conferment
of the right to make a representation necessarily
carries with it the obligation on the pan of the
detaining authority to furnish the grounds, i.e.,
materials on which the detention order was made. In
our opinion, it is therefore clear that while there is a
connection between the obligation on the part of the
detaining authority to furnish grounds and the right
given to the detained person to. have an earliest
opportunity to make the representation, the test to be
applied in respect of the contents of the grounds for
the two purposes is quite different. As already pointed
out, for the first, the test is whether it is sufficient
to satisfy the authority. For the second, the test is,
J951
State qf Bombay
v.
Atma Ram
Sritihar Vail/ya.
KaniaC.J.
184
J951
...
StateW BombtfJ
.l!m'lRam
SrUlhor Y aid f a
Jron;aC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
whether it is sufficient to enable the detained person
to make the representation at the earliest opportunity.
The arugument advanced on behalf of the respondent
mixes up the two rights given under article 22(5) and
converts it into one indivisible right. We are unable to
read article 22(5) in that way. As pointed out above,
the two rights are connected by the word "and".
Furthermore, the use of the words, "as soon as may
be" with the obligation to furnish the grounds of the
order of detention, and the fixing of another time
limit, viz., the earliest opportunity, for making the
representation, makes the two rights distinct. The
second right, as it is a right of objection, has to depend
first on the service of the grounds on which the
conclusion, i.e., satisfaction of the Government about
the necessity of making the order, is based. To that
extent, and that extent alone, the two are connected.
But when grounds which have a rational connection
with the ends mentioned in section 3 of the Act are
supplied, the first condition is satisfied. If the grounds
are not sufficient to enable the detenue to make a
representation, the detention can rely on his second
right and if he likes may ask for particulars which
will enable him to make the representation. On an
infringement of either of these two rights the detained
person has a right to approach. the court and complain
that there has been an infringement of his fundamental right and even if the infringement of the second
part of the right under article 22(5) is established he
is bound to be released by the court. To treat the
two rights mentioned in article 22(5) as one is neither
proper according to the language used, nor according
to the purpose for which the rights are given.
The contention that the grounds are vague requires
some clarification. . What is meant by vague? Vague
can be considered as the antonym of 'definite'. 1£ the
ground which is supplied is incapable of being understood or defined with sufficient certainty it can be
called vague. It is not possible to state affirmatively
more on the question of what is vague. It must vary
according to the circumstances of each case. It is
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
185
however improper to· contend that a ground is
necessarily vague if the only answer of. the detained
person can be to deny it. That is a matter of detail
which has to be examined in the light of the circumstances of each case. If on reading the ground
furnished it is capable of being intelligently understood
and is sufficientlv · definite to furnish materials to
enable the detained person to make a representation
against the order of detention it cannot be called
vague. The only argument which could be urged is
that the langu:ige med in specifying the ground is so
general that it does not permit the detained person to
legitimately meet the charge against him because the
only 2nswer which he can make is to say that he did
not aCl as generally suggested. In certain cases that
argument may support the contention that having
regard to the general language used in the ground he
has not been given the earliest opportunity to make a
representation against the order of detention. 1t cannot be disputed that the representation mentioned in
the second part of article 22(5) must be one which on
being considered may give relief to the detained
person.
The argument that supplementary grounds cannot
be given after the grounds are first given to the
detenue, similarly requires a closer examination. The
adjective "supplementary" is capable of covering
cases of adding new grounds to the original grounds,
as also giving particulars of the facts which are already
mentioned, or of giving facts in addition to the fact.s
mentioned in the ground 'to lead to the conclusion of
fact contained in the ground originally furnished. It
is clear that if by supplementary grounds" is meant
addz'tional grounds, i.e., conclusions of fact required
to b1ing about the satisfaction of, the Government, the
furni3hing of any such additional grounds at a later
stage . will amount to an infringement of the first
mentioned right in article 22(5) as the grounds for the
order of detention must be before the Government
before it is satisfied about the necessity for making
the order and all such grounds have to be furnished
1951
StOI• qf Bombay
v.
&mallaa
Sridhar y aitlyc.
Irotli• c. J.
186
1951
Siatt .J' Bombay
v.
AhnaRam
Sridhar Vaidya.
KaniaC.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951]
as soon as may be. The other aspects, viz., the second
communication (described as supplemental grounds)
being only particulars of the facts mentioned or
indicated in the grounds first supplied, or being
additional incidents which taken along with the facts
mentioned or indicated in the ground already conveyed
lead to the same conclusion of fact, (which is the
ground furnished in the first instance) stand on 2
different footing. These are not new grounds within
the meaning of the first part of article 22(5). Thus,
while the first mentioned type of "additional" grounds
cannot be . given after the grounds are furnished in the
first instance, the other types even if furnished after
the grounds arc furnished as soon as may be, but
provided they are furnished so as not to come in
conflict with giving the earliest opportunity to the
detained person to make a representation, will not be
considered an infringement of either of the rights
mentioned in article 22(5) of the Constitution.
This detained examination shows that preventive
detention is not by itself considered an infringement
of any of the fundamental rights mentioned in Part III
of the Constitution. This is, of course, subject to the
limitations prescribed in clause (5) of article 22. That
clallse, ::ts noticed above, requires two things to be
done for the person against whom the order is made.
By reason of the fact that clause (5) forms part of
Part III of the Constitution, its provisions have the
same force and sanctity as any other provision relating
to fundamental rights. As the clause prescribes two
requirem~nts, the time factor in each case is necessarily
left iluid. While there is the duty on the part of the
detaining authority to furnish grounds . and the duty
to give the detained person the earliest opportunity to
make a representation, wlllch obligations, as shown
above, are correlated; there exists no express provision
contemplating a second· communication from the
cetaining authority to the person detained. Tills is
because in several cases a second communication may
not be necessary ar all. The only tlllng which emerges
fiom the discussion is that while the authorities must
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
187
discharge the duty in furnishing grounds for the order
of detention "as soon as may be'.' and also provide
"the earliest opportunity to the detained person to
make the representation", the number of communications from the detaining authority to the detenue may
be one or more and they may be made at intervals, provided the two parts of the aforesaid duty are dischargeed in accordance with the wording of clause C5). So long
as the later communications do not make out a · new
ground, their contents are no infringement of the two
procedural rights of the detenue mentioned in the
clause. They may consist of a narration of facts or
particulars relating to the grounds already supplied.
But in doing so the time factor in respect of the second
duty, viz., to give the detained person the earliest
opportunity to make a representation, cannot be overlooked. That appears to us to be the result of clause
(5) of article 22.
•
In numerous cases that have been brought to our
notice, we have found that there has been quite an
unnecessary obscurity on the part of the detaining
authority in stating the grounds for the order. Instead
of giving the information with reasonable details, there
is a deliberate attempt to use the minimum number
of word~ in the communication conveying the grounds
of detention. In our opinion, this attitude is quite
deplorable. We agree with the High Court of Bombay
in its observation when it says : "I11 all the matters
which have come up before us we have been distressed
to find how vague and unsatisfactory the grounds are
which the detaining authority furnished to the detenue;
and we are compelled to say that in almost every case
we have felt that the grounds could have been ampler
and fuller without any detriment to public interest."
While the Constitution gives the Government the
privilege of not disclosing in public interest facts
which it considers undesirable to disclose, by the words
used in article 22(5) there is a clear obligation to convey to the detained person materials (and the disclosure
of which .is not necessary to be withheld) which will
enable )um to make a representation. It may be
5-1 ~. C. India/68
1951
State of Bombay
v.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
. Kania C.J.
188
1951
Stale qf Bomhay.
v.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
Kania C.J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
m1ticed that the Preventive Detention Act may not
even contain machinery to have the representation
looked into by an independent authority or an advisory
board. Under these circumstances, it is but right to
emphasize that the communication made to the
detained person to enable him to make the representation should, consistently with the privilege not to disclose facts which are not desirable to be disclosed in
public intere;t, be as full and adequate as the circumstances permit and should be made as soon as it can
be done. Any deviation from this rule is a deviation
from the intention underlying article 22(5) of the
Constitution. The result of this attitude of some
detaining authorities has been that, applying the tests
mentioned above, several communications to the
detained persons have been found wanting and the
orders of detention are pronounced to be invalid.
Having regard to the principles mentioned above,
we have to consider whether the judgment of the High
Court is correct. We have already pointed out that
the summary rejection by the High Court of the later
communication solely on the ground that all materials
in all circumstances must be furnished to the detenue
when the grounds are first communicated, is not sound.
We have indicated the circumstances and conditions
under which the later communication may or may not
be considered as falling within the purview of article
22(5) of the Constitution.
In dealing with the position when the grounds were
first communicated, the High Court held as follows :
"This is not a ground which would enable the detenue
to make a representation to which he is entitled both
under the Act and under the Constitution." In ·this
case the later communication of the 26th August, 1950,
was made after the respondent filed his petition and
it appears to have been made to controvert his allegation that he was never in Bombay between January
and ApriL 1950, as alleged in his affidavit. After
takinsr into consideration this communication it was
observed by Chagla C.J. that if these particulars had
been furnished on 29th April, 1950, very likely the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
189
court would have rejected the petition. The court set
the respondent free only because of its view that after
29th April no further communication was permissible.
In our opinion, this view is erroneous. We think that
on the facts of the present case therefore the respondent's petition should have been dismissed. We therefore allow the appeal.
PA1ANJALI SASTRI J.-While I concur in the order
proposed by my Lord that this appeal should be
allowed, I regret I · find myself unable to agree with
him on the true meaning and effect of article 22, clause
(5), which is reproduced in section 7 of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as - "the
Act"). Put shortly, the question that falls to be
decided is : Is it within the competence of the court
to examine the grounds communicated to a person
detained under the Act, with a view to see if they are
sufficient in its opinion to enable pim to make a
representation to the detaining authority against the
order, and if they are not, to direct his release?
It is now settled by the decision of the majority in
Gopalan's case(1) that article 21 is applicable to preventive detention except in so far as the provisions of
article 22(4) to (7) either expressly Qr_ by necessary
implication exclude its application, with the result that
a person canno~ be deprived of this personal liberty,
even for preventive purposes, "except according to
procedure established by law." Part of such procedure
is provided by the Constitution itself in clauses (5) and
(6) of article 22 which read as follows:
"(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of
an order made under any law providing for preventive
detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon
as may be, communicate to such person the grounds
on which the order has been made and shall afford
him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority
making any such order as is referred to in that clause
(1) [1950J S.C.R. 88.
1951
State of Bombay
v.
Atm Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
Patanjali
Sastri ].
190
J95t
Stat1 ef Bomba7.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951]
to disclose facts which such authority considers to be
against the public interest to disclose.
v.
.A:ema Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
Patanj12li
Sastri .].
If this procedure is not complied with, detention
under the Act may well be held to be unlawful, as it
would then be deprivation of personal liberty which is
not in accordance with the procedure established by
law. The question accordingly arises as_ to what are
the requirements of article 22(5) and whether they
have been complied with in the present case?
On behalf of the respondent it is urged that the
clause provides two safeguards for the person ordered
to be detained, namely, that (1) the grounds of his
detention sho11ld be communicated to him as soon as
may be, and (2) he should be given the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
As there is to be no trial in such cases, the right of
making a representation affords, it is said, the only
opportunity to the person detained to repell the accusation brought against him and establish his innocence.
It is the communication of the grounds of detention
that is expected to give him notice of what he is to
meet by making a representation. The grounds must
therefore, it is submitted, give sufficient indication of
the nature and. extent of the information on which
action has been taken against him and must contain
sufficient particulars of the time and place of the acts
charged, so as to enable him to make his representation effective as far as it is in his power to do so. If the
grounds are vague and do not disclose the substance of
the information on which the detention has been based,
there would be no real compliance with the procedure
prescribed by article 22 (5), and the detention must, it
is claimed, be unlawful. In other words, the sufficiency
of the grounds for the purpose of enabling the person
detained to make an effective representation against
the order of detention is, in every case, a justiciable
issue.
It must now be taken as settled by the decision of
this Court in Gopalan's case('), which on this point was
(!) [1950] S.C.R. SS.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
191
unanimous, that section 3 of the Act is constitutional
and valid notwithstanding that it leaves it to the
"satisfaction" of the ·executive government to decide
whether action under the Act is to be taken or not
against any particular person or persons. The learned
Chief Justice pointed out (at p. 121) that action by
way of preventive detention must be based largely
on suspicion, and quoted the remark of Lord Finlay
in Rex v. Halliday(1), that a court is the least appropriate tribunal to investigate the question whether
circumstances of suspicion exist warranting
the
restraint on a person. Dealing with a similarly
worded provision of the Central Provinces and Berar
Public Safety Act, 1948, the Federal Court declared in
another unanimous judgment, that "The language
clearly shows that the responsibility for making a
detention order rests upon the provincial executives as
they alone are entrusted with the duty of maintaining
public peace; and it would be a serious derogation
from that responsibility if the court were to substitute
its judgment for the satisfaction of the executive
authority and, to that end, undertake an investigation
of the sufficiency of the materials on which such
. satisfac.tion was grounded ........ The court can, however, examine the grounds disclosed by the Government to see if they are relevant to the object which
the legislation has in view, namely, the prevention of
acts prejudicial to public safety and tranquility, for
"satisfaction" in this connection must be grounded
on material which is of rationally probative value"Machindar Shivaji Mahar v. The King(2). These
decisions clearly establish, what indeed is plain from
the nature of the measure, that preventive detention is
a form of precautionary police action, to be employed
on the sole responsibility of the executive government
whose discretion is final, no recourse being permitted
to a court of law by way of review or justification
of such action except on allegations of mala fides · or
irration:il conduct.
(1) [1917] A.C. 260. 269.
(2) [1949-50] F.C.R. 827, 831-32.
1951
Sta11 qf Bombay.
"'
Atma Ram
Sridhar Yaiiiya,
Patanjali
Sastri].
192
J95J
SJaJe ef Bombay.
v.
Attna 1"mt
Sritfhar YaUi'Ja.
Pat<mjali
SastTi].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951]
When the power to issue a detention order has thus
been made to depend upon the existence of state of
mind in the detaining authority, that is, its "satisfaction"', which is a purely subjective condition, so as
to exclude a judicial enquiry into the sufficiency of the
grounds to justify the detention, it seems to me to be
wholly inconsistent with that scheme to hold that it is
open to the court to examine the sufficiency of tl;ie
same grounds to enable the person detained to make
a representation, for, be it noted, the grounds to
be communicated to the person detained are the
"grounds on which the order has been made."
Indeed, the logical result of the argument advanced by
the respondent's counsel would be to invalidate section 3 of the Act in so far as it purports to make the
satisfaction of the government the sole condition of a
lawful detention, for, if clause (5) of article 22 were to
be construed as impliedly authorising a judicial review
bf the grounds of detention to see if they contain
sufficient particulars for making a representation,
then, the subjective condition prescribed in section 3
would be inconsistent with that clause and therefore
void. When this was pointed out to counsel he submitted that the decision in Gopalan's case(') as to the
constitutionality of section 3 required reconsideration
in the light of his arguments based on article 22,
clause (5). Although the clause was not then considered from this paint of view, it came in for a good
deal of discussion in connection with section 14 of the
Act, and the present argument must, in my opinion, be
rejected because it runs counter to that decision.
Apart from this aspect of the matter, I am not much
impressed with th~ merits of the argument. While
gqnting, in view of the structure and wording of
clause . (5), that the grounds communicated to the
pe.rson detained are to form the basis of his representation against the order, I am unable to agree with what
· appears to be the. major premise of the argument
namely, that clause · (5) contemplates an inquiry where
the person detained is to be formally charged with
(!) [19~0] S:C.R. 88.
,.
S.C.R.
SUPREME C.OURT REPORTS
193
specific acts. or omissions of a culpable nature and
called upon to (lllswcr them. As pointed out by Lord
Atkinson in Rex v. Halliday(1), preventive detention
being a precautionary measure, "it must necessarily
proceed ·in all cases to some extent on suspicion or
anticipation as distinct from proof", and it must be
capable of being employed by the executive government in sudden emergencies on unverified information
supplied to them by their police or intelligence officers.
If the Government, acting honestly and in good faith
make an order being "satisfied" on such information,
however lacking in particulars, that a person should
be detained in the public interest, as they have
been empowered by Parliament to do, then all that
article 22(5) requires of them is to communicate as
soon as may be the grounds which led to the making
of the order, to the person concerned, and to give him
the earliest opportunity of making any representation
which l1e may wish to make on the basis of what is
communicated to him. If such communication is made
and such opportunity is given the detaining authority
will have complied with the procedure prescribed by
the Constitution, and the person under detention
cannot complain, that he has been deprived of his
personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with the
proce~ure established by law. I can find nothing in
article 22, clause (5), to warrant the view that the
grounds on which the order of detention has been
made must be such that, when communicated to the
person detained they are founded by a court of law to
be sufficient to enable him to make what the co\irt
considers to be an adequate representation; The right
to be produced before a Magistrate and to consult and
be defended by a legal practitioner is expressly denied
by the Constitution itsdf to a person under preventive
detention [vide article 22(1), (2) and (3)] and this
Court held in Gopalan's case( 2 ) that there was nothing
in the Constitution to entitle him to a hearing even
before tht: detaining authority. All this underlines
the executive character of the function exercised by
(1) [1917] A.C. 260, 2i5.
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
1951
Stllli qf Boabay
v.
Atma a,..
Sridllar J'llidya.
Pata,,;ali
Sas1ri ].
194
1951
StBl1 qf Bomba,Y
v.
Atma Ram
Sridka Vaidya,
Patanjali
Sastri J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
the authority which does not in any 'J:ay embark on
a judicial or quasj-judicial inquiry. In such circumstances the representation which the person detained
is allowed to make to the Government, which is constituted the judge in its own cause, cannot be assumed
to be similar in scope or purpose to a defence against
a formulated charge in a court of law. The argument,
therefore, that the right of making a representation
should be made effective in the sense that such person
should be enabled to defend himself successfully if
possible, and, for that purpose, the detaining authority
should communicate to him the necessary particulars
on pain of having the order quashed if such particulars are not furnished, proceeds on a misconception
of the true position.
Perhaps the most cogent reason for rejecting the
argument is to be found in the language and provision
of clause (6) of article 22. "Nothing in clause (5)",
that is to say, neither the right to be informed of the
"grounds" of detention nor the right to make a
"representation" shall "require" the detaining authority to disclose facts which the authority "considers"
should not be disclosed in the public interest. In other
words, clause (5) should not be taken to import an
obligat1011 to provide particulars which the authority
is given an absolute discretion to furnish or withhold.
I cannot understand how it can be claimed, in the
face of clause ( 6), that it is incumbent on the executive
government to communicate particulars which a court
of law considers necessary to enable the the person detained to make a representation. ft cannot be compulsory
to furnish what the authority is given an uncontrolled
power to decide to give or to refuse. The combined
effect of clauses (5) and (6) is, to my mind, to require
the detaining authority, to communicate to the person
affected only such particulars as that authority and
not a court of law, considers sufficient to enable the
said person to make a representation.
It is worthy of note that in the well-known English
case of Liversidge v. Anderson('), the existence of a
(I) [1942] A. C. 206.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
195
similar privilege was regarded as a "very cogent
reason" for holding that the words "H the Secretary
of State has reasonable cause to believe" did not raise
a justiciable issue as to the existence of such cause as
an objective fact. Viscount Maugham observed "It
is beyond dispute that he can decline to disclose the
information on which he has acted on the ground that
to do so wowd be contrary to the public interest, and
that this privilege of the Crown cannot be disputed.
It is not adrem on the question of construction to say
in reply to this argument that there are cases in which
the Secretary of State could answer the attack on the
validity of the order for detention without raising the
point of privilege. It is sufficient to say that there
must be a large number of cases in which the information on which the Secretary of State is likely to act
will be of a very confidential nature. That must have
been plain to those responsible in advising His
Majesty in regard to the Order in Council, and it constitutes, in my opinion, a very cogent reason . for ·
thinking that the words under discussion cannot be
read as meaning that the existence of 'reasonable
cause; is one which may be discussed in a court which
has not the power of eliciting the facts which in the
opinion of the Secretary of State amount to 'reasonble cause'."
There was considerable disc11ssion as to the meaning
of the words "grounds" and "representation" used in
clause (5). These are words of very wide connotation
and, in the view I have expressed, it is unnecessary to
define them. It may, however, be noted that clauses
(5) and (6) are not mutually exqlusive in the sense that,
when clause (6) is invoked, clause (5) ceases to be
applicable. When, therefore, the detaining authority
withholds the material facts under clause (6) and
communicates to the person detained tlie grounds
of detention, · which in that case must be necessarily vague, it would still be communicating to
him the "grounds" on which the order has been
made, and such representation as the person may wish
to make on the basis of that communication would
1951
Sidi efB_.,
v.
AllllDR..
Vridllar Yaillya,
P4talfiali
SastiiJ.
1%
1951
Slale ef Bomba.1
v.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Yai(,a.
Patanjali
SastriJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
still be a "representation'', within the meaning of
clause (5). This shows that no precise connotation
can be attributed to the terms "grounds" and "refresentation" as used in clause (5), for in certain
cases at least, the one can be vague and the other
inadequate from the point of view of the person
detained and on a question of construction they need
not be different in other cases.
It was suggested in the course of the argument that
clause (5) dealt with two distinct and independent
matters, namely, (1) the communication of the grounds
of detention, and (2) the affording of an opportunity
to make a representation against the detention, and
that the grounds communicated need not have any
necessary relation to the representation provided for.
The right to make a representation, it was said,
imported by implication and independent obligation
on the part of the authority to furnish the person
detained with sufficient particulars and details of the
accusation against him apart from and in addition to
the obligation expressly imposed on the authority to
communicate the grounds on which the ~ order has
been made, for the reason that without such particulars
no adequate or effective representation could be made
against the order, and though the sufhciency of the
grounds on which the order was based had Deen held
not to be open to judicial examination, there was no
reason why the sufficiency of the further communication implied in the provision for representation should
not be justiciable. The different time-limits fixed for
the performance of the duties imposed by clause (5)
on the detaining authority are said to support this
argument. The construction suggested is, in my
opinion, strained and artificial and cannot be accepted.
The collocation in the same clause of the right to
be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to
make a representation against it indicate, to my mind,
that the grounds communicated are to 'form the basis of
the representation and, indeed, are intended mainly, if
not solely, for that purpose. To suggest that, apart
from those grounds, and right of making a representa-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
197
tion imports, by necessary implication, a further obligation to give such . details and particulars would
render that right effective is, in my opinion, not to
construe the clause in its natural meaning but to
stretch it by the process of implication, so as to square
with one's preconceived notions of justice and £airplay.
No support for this construction can be derived from
the provision of distinct time limits for the communication of the grounds and the affording of opportunity
for representation, as that can be explained by the
different degrees of urgency required in the two cases.
The grounds are to be communicated "as soon as may
be" which means as soon as possible and imports a
much higher degree of urgency than what is implied in
affording the . "earliest opportunity" which, I take it,
means affording writing and communication facilities
to the person under detention as soon as he is ready
and desires to make the representation.
While clause (5) does not allow the authority, after
making the order of detention and communicating the
grounds of such order, to put forward fresh grounds in
justification of that order, I can find nothing in that
clause to preclude the authority furnishing particulars
or details relating to the grounds originally communicated, or the person under detention availing himself of such particulars and making a better or a
further representation. Nor is there anything to prevent such person from asking for, or the authority
from providing, further and better particulars of those
grounds where it is in a position to do so. But the
attempt in these and similar proceedings has always
been not to secure the necessary particulars hut to
shift the arena of the contest to the court which, as
Lord Finlay remarked in the case already referred to,
is the least appropriate tribunal for investigating what
must largely be matters of suspicion and not proof and
which, for that very reason, might afford the relief
hoped for .without being in possession of all the facts.
Reference was made to the decisions of several High
Courts dealing with the necessity of furnishing particulars of the· grounds of detention. But those decisions
1951
Stale ef Bo111ioy.
v•
..41maRlllll
Sridha'I Yaitlya.
Patanjali
SMrl].
198
1951
Stat1 qf Bo.,6ay.
v.
Atma Ratio
Srii/Jvu l'ali/ya,
Patanjali
SasviJ.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
turned on the provisions of the various Provincial Public Safety Acts which were passed before the commencement of the Constitution and which, in most cases
specifically provided for the communication of particulars. Those decisions are of no assistance to the respondent as neither in article 22 nor in the Act is there
any express provision that particulars of the grounds
of detention should be given to the person detained.
Our attention was called to the decision of this court
in lshwar Das v. The State(') as an instance where
this court considered the grounds of detention to be
vague and directed the release of the petitioner in
that case from detention under the Act. As pointed
out in the brief judgment in that case, no arguments
were addressed on the point and the case was disposed
of on the view prima facie supported by the decisions
already referred to that, if the grounds were too general and vague to enable the person under detention to
make a representation, he was entitled to be released.
No value can therefore be attached to that decision as
a precedent.
In the course of the debate it was repeatedly urged
that this court should be jealous in upholding the
liberty of the subject which the Constitution has
guaranteed as a fundamental right and must not adopt
a construction of article 22(5) which would rob the
safeguards provided therein of all their efficacy. I
am profoundly conscious of the sanctity which the
Constitution attaches to personal liberty and other
fundamental rights and of the duty of this court to
guard against inroads on them by the legislature or
the executive.
But when, as has been stated, the
Constitution itself has authorised preventive detention
and denied to the subject the right of trial before a
court of law and of consulting or being defended by
a legal practitioner of his choice, providing only certain
procedural . safeguards, the court could do no more than
construe the words used in that behalf in their natural
sense consistently with the nature, purpose and scheme
of the measure thus authorised, to ascertain what
(1) Not reported.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
199
powers are still left to the court in the matter. It is
in this light that I have endeavoured to . construe
clause (5) and, for the reasons indicated above, I have
come to the conclusion that it is not the province of
the court to examine the sufficiency of the grounds
for the purpose of making a representation, a matter
left entirely to the discretion of the executive authority. An argument in support of the liberty of the subject has always a powerful appeal but the court should,
in my opinion, resist the temptation of extending its
jurisdiction beyond its legitimate bounds.
DAs J.-This appeal from a decision of the Bombay
High Court raises a very important question as to the
sufficiency of the grounds of an order of detention
under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The question depends, for its answer, on a correct interpretation of clauses (5) and (6) of article 22 of our Constitution which have been reproduced in section 7 of
the Act. A similar question has also been raised in
another appeal filed in this court by one hundred
detenus from the decision of a Bench of the Calcutta
High Court, being Case No. 24 of 1950 (Tarapada and
Others v. The State of West Bengal)(1). As the view I
have taken as to the ·true meaning and effect of the
relevant provisions of the Constitution and of the Act
has not commended itself to the majority of my
colleagues, I express it with a certain amount of
diffidence arising out of the high regard I have for
their opinions.
Under section 3 (1) (a) of the Act the authority
concerned can make an order of detention only if he
is satisfied that, with a view to preventing a person
from acting in a manner prejudicial to one or more of
the matters referred to in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii)
of clause (a), ari order should be made. What materials
will engender in the mind of the authority the requisite
satisfaction under section 3 ( 1) of the Act will depend.
on the training and temperament and the habitual
mental approach of the person who is the authority t()
( l) Reported infra at p. 212.
1951
State qf Boin6ay
• v.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaid.Ya•
Das].
200
1951
Stott ef Bomba7
v .•
A.tma Ram
Srldhar Y aitfya.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
make the detention order. The authority concerned
may be a person who will not derive the requisite
satisfaction except on very precise and full information amounting almost to legal proof or he may be
a person equally honest who will ' be so satisfied on
meagre information which may appear to others to be
very vague or even nebulous. If the authority is a
person on the first mentioned type, then the "grounds"
on which he will make the order will necessarily be
more precise and fuller in particulars than the
"grounds" on which an order may be made by the
authority who is a person of the second mentioned
type. The "grounds" on which the authority who is
a person of the first mentioned type makes an order of
detention create no difficulty for such grounds are
quite precise and ample, and, when communicated to
the detenu, will clearly enable him to appreciate the
reasons for his detention and to make his representation. We are, however, concerned with the "grounds"
on which an order of detention may be made by the
authority who is a person of the second mentioned
type who may derive the requiste satisfaction from
the conclusions which he may draw from the available
information, which may not be precise or ample but.
on which, having regard to his source of information,
the authority may honestly feel safe to rely and to
act. This ·last mentioned type of "grounds" will, in
the following discussion, be referred to as "vague
grounds". The question for our decision is whether
an order of detention made in good faith on such
"vague grounds" is valid when it is made and whether
if valid when made, becomes invalid because these
very grounds, when· communicated to the detenue, arc
found to be insufficient to enable him to make a representation.
The first question urged by the learned counsel for
the detenu is that an order of detention made upon
grounds which are too vague to enable the detenu to
make a representation against the order is bad ab
initio. The argument is thus formulated. Article 22
(5) requires two things, namely first, that the authority
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
201
\
making the order of detention shall, as soon as may be,
communicate to the_ detenu the grounds on which the
order has been made -and, secondly, that the authority
shall afford him the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order. The two requirements
are correlated. The object of the communication of the
grounds, according to the argument, is to enable the
detenu to make a representation against the order of
detention and the combined effect of the two constitutional requirements is that the grounds on which the
order is made must be such as will, when communicated to the detenu, enable him to make a representation.
li the grounds communicated are too vague being devoid of particulars, then no representation can be made
on the basis of them and if no representation can be
made on the basis of these grounds, no order of detention could properly have been made on_ those grounds,
for it is the grounds on which the order had been made
that have to be communicated to the detenu so as to
enable him to make a representation. The argument
shortly put, is that the implied requirement that the
grounds must be such as will enable the detenu to
make a representation also indicates the quality or
attribute of the grounds on which the order of detention may be made. Whether the grounds satisfy the
requirements of article 22(5) is not left to the subjective opinion of the authority which makes the order
of detention but an objective test is indicated, namely,
that the grounds - must be such as will enable the
detenu to make a representation which quite clearly
makes the matter justiciable. If the court finds that
no representation may be made on account of the
vagueness of the grounds, the court must also hold
that the order made on such vague grounds cannot be
sustained. The next step in the argument is that the
provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950
(Act IV of 1950), which was passed after the Constitution came into effect must be read in the light of
article 22(5) as construed above. So read, the satisfaction of the authority referred to in section 3 of
the Act cannot be the subjective satisfaction of the
!95!
Stale of Bomba;·.
v.
Ahlla Ram
Sridhar Vaitf;·o.
Das].
202
!95!
State ef B"""'•:1
v.
Atma ROWJ
Sridhar Y aid70,
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
authority, for the satisfaction must be founded
on grounds which, when communicated later on,
will enable the detenu to make a representation
which postulates an objective test. This involves that
section 3 ( 1) (a) of the Act should be read as if the
words "on grounds which, when communicated to
him, will enable hi11J. to make a representlation such as
is mentioned in section 7 of this Ad" occurred after
the words "if satisfied with respect to any person"
and before the words "that with a view". If such
interpolation of words be not permissible according to
accepted canons of construction, then it must be held
that in so far as section 3 of the Act makes an order
of detention dependent on the subjective satisfaction
of the authority, the section is unconstitutional, being
repugnant to the provisions of article 22 (5) and the
necessary intendment
thereof. The argument
so
formulated is attractive but on closer scrutiny will be
found to be unsound. Before the Constitution came
into force there were laws for the maintenance of public security in almost all the provinces and in those
laws there were provisions similar to the provisions of
section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. It
was held in many cases that in the absence of bad
faith, and provided the grounds on which the authority
founded its satisfaction had a reasonable relation or
relevancy to the object which the legislation in question had in view, the satisfaction of the authority was
purely subjective and could not be questioned in any
court of law. The decision of the Federal Court in
Machindar Shiva# Mahar v. The King<') is one of such
decisions. Vagueness of the grounds on which satisfaction of the authority is founded cannot be treated
as on the same footing as the irrelevancy of the grounds,
unless the vagueness be such as may by itself, be
cogent evidence in proof of bad faitli. If the grounds
are relevant to the objects of the legislation and if there
is no proof of bad faith, then mere vagueness of the
grounds cannot vitiate the satisfaction founded on
them. The satisfaction being. subjective, the court
(I) [1949-50] E.C.R. 827 at p; 831.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
203
cannot arrogate to itself the responsibility M judging
the sufficiency or otherwise of the grounds. It is true
that at the time those. decisions were given the Constitution had not come into force and there were no
fundamental rights, bu,t these well established principles were recognised and adopted by all members of
this court in Gopalan's case(1) which came up for consideration after the Constitution had come into force.
In that case it was held unanimously that under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, . 1950, the
satisfaction of the authority was purely subjective and
could not, in the absence of proof of bad faith, be
questioned at all and that section 3 was not unconstitutional. It is true that the arguments now advanceed were not advanced in exactly the same form on that
occasion but. that fact makes no difference, for the
arguments have no force as they are founded on the
assumption that the grounds on which an order may
be made must be such as will, when communicated,
be sufficiently full and precise so as to enable the
detenu to make a representation.
I find no warrant
for such an assumption. Indeed, the fact that this
court has held that section 3 of the Act which makes
the satisfaction of the authority a purely subjective
matter is not unconstitutional clearly destroys the
cogency of the argument formulated as hereinbefore
stated. The decision in Gopalan's case(1) as to the
validity of section 3 of the Act makes it impossible to
accept this argument.
It is next urged that even if the initial order was
not invalid when made because satisfaction was a
purely · subjective matter for the authority alone and
the court cannot consider or pronounce upon the
sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction
was based, nevertheless, the continuance of the detention becomes unlawful if the same grounds when
communicated, be found to be vague and devoid of
particulars so as to render the making of a representation by the detenu somewhat difficult. The argument
is that although the vagueness of the grounds is not
(1) [1950) S.C.R. 88.
6-1 S. C. India/68
195!
State ef Bombay
v.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya;
Das].
204
195!
Stntr. oj' Rombr:_v
v.
Atma ltu11!
.~1idlw1 Vai4y..1.
D ... j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
justiciable ~t the initial. stage when the order is made
and so the order cannot be said to be invalid ab initio,
the same Y'1gueness of the grqund is nevertheless
justiciable at the later stage when they are communicated, so that if vagueness renders the making of a
representation difficult the continuance of the detention at once becomes illegal. Under article 21 no person
can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
As exaccording to procedure established by law.
plained in Gopalan' s case(') procedure established by
law means procedure enacted by the Legislature, i.e.
State-made procedural law and not any rule of natural
justice. It was pointed out that the implication of
that article was that a person could be deprived of
his life or personal liberty provided such deprivation
was brought about in accordance with procedure
enacted by the appropriate Legislature.
Having so
provided in article 21, the framers of our Constitution
proceeded to lay down certain procedural requirements
which, as a matter of constitutional necessity, must be
adopted and included in any procedure that may be
enactx:d by the Legislature and in accordance with
which a person may be deprived .of his life or personal
liberty. Those requirements are set forth in article 22
of the Constitution. A. perusal of the several clauses
of that article will show that the constitutional requirements of procedure which must be incorporated
in any law for preventive detention relate ·to a stage
after the order of detention is made under section 3
of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The order of
detention being thus in accordance with procedure
enacted by law which is not inconsistent with any of
the provisions of Part III of the Constitution applicable to that stage, the order of detention cannot be
questioned unless there is proof of bad faith, either
direct or indirect. We have, therefore, to consider
whether the detention validly brought about becomes
unlawful by reason of subsequent non-compliance with
the procedural requirements laid down in clause (5)
of article 22, for if there is such non-compliance, the
(I)° [ 1950) S.C.R. 88.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
205
detenu from that moment must be held to be deprived
of his liberty otherwise . than in accordance with
proc~dure established by law and will, therefore. be
entitled to be released.
I am preparoo to concede that there is some correlation between the two parts of article 22 (5), namely,
the communication of the grounds on which the order
has been made and the making of the representation
by the detained person. The Constitution insists on the
communication of the grounds on which the detention
order . ha~ been made for some puqiose. That purpose
obviously is to appraise the detenu of the reasons for the
order of his detention. The communication of the
grounds will necessarily enable him, first, to sec
whether the grounds are at all relevant to the object
sought to be secured by the Act. If they are not, then
they were no grounds at all and no satisfaction could be
founded on them. The very irrelevancy of the grounds
will be a cogent proof of bad faith on the part of the
authority so as to make the order itself invalid. In the
next place, the disclosure of the grounds will tell the
detenu in which chss his suspected activities have been
placed and whether he is entitled to the benefit of
having his case scrutinised by the Advisory Board.
Finally, the communication of the grounds on which
the order has been made will tell him generally the
reasons for his detention,
and will, therefore, be
helpful to the detained person in making his representation which is also provided for in the latter
part of clause (5). The fact that there is correlation
between the two parts of clause (5) does not, however,
carry us any further. There is no warrant for assuming that the grounds to be communicated to the detenu
are to be a formal indictment or a formal pleading
setting forth a charge or a case with meticulous particularity nor is there any warrant. for the assumption
that the representation has to be in the nature of a
defence or written statement specifically dealing with
the charge or the case. Indeed, the idea of a trial is
foreign to the law of preventive detention. The very
fact that the provisions of clauses (1) and (2) of article
1951
Stc.fe qf 1'oni6ay
v•.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
Das].
206
(951
SlaJ1 ef Bombay
v•
.Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
Das j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
22 do not apply to preventive detention clearly excludes
the idea of a trial before a tribunal. As I have said, the
grounds will generally indicate the conclusions drawn
by the appropriate authority with respect to the
suspected activities of any particular person and those
grounds, when communicated, will enable the detenu
to make a representation, for he can easily r~fer to and
set forth his real activities and represent that all his
activities are innocent and cannot possibly give rise to
the suspicion indicated in the grounds. To say that
clause (5) itself indicates that the grounds must be
such as well enable the detenu to make a representation
is to read into clause (5) something which is not there.
It is a re-statement of the first argument in a new form
and is fallacious. In the first place clause (5) does not
in terms say that the authorities shall communicate
such grounds as will enable the detenu to make a
representation. In the second place, the decision in
Gopalan's case(') militates against this argument, for
if the sufficiency of the grounds is not justiciable at the
initial stage when the order is made, as held in that
case, it is wholly illogical to say that the intention of
the Constitution is to make the sufficiency of the same
grounds justiciable as soon as they are communicated
to the detenu. As already stated, in order made upon
satisfaction founded on a vague grounds is quite valid,
if the vagueness is not proof of bad faitll. Under clause
(5) the authority is to communicate the grounds on
which the order has been made. This will let the
detenu know what operated on the mind of the authority when it made the order. If the grounds were vague
it is the vague grounds that must be communicated,
for it was upon thost vague grounds that the order
had been made. That is the express provision of
the first part of clause (5). This being the express
requirement, the implication that the grounds communicated must be sufficient to enable the detenu to
make a representation cannot be read iii.to the clause,
for that will militate against the express requirement.
If the order had hee11 made on vague grounds but
(I) [1950] S.C.R. 88.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
207
the authority 1s to
communicate precise and
well formulated grounds which will be sufficient for
the detenu to make a representation, then the communication will not be of grounds on which the order
was made but of something more than what is
expressly required.
The express provision must
exclude such an inconsistent implied provision. Again,
clause (6) of article 22 gives the authority the right
to daim privilege against disclosure of facts in public
interest.
Non-disclosure of facts
will
necessarily
make the grounds, as communicated, extremely vague
and devoid of particulars.
If the construction of
clause (5) which is contended for by the detenu's
. counsel were correct, then the vagueness of the grounds
resulting from. the non-disclosure of facts under clause
(6) will entitle the detenu to be released, for that
vagueness also will render the making of a representation impossible or difficult. That will mean that the
claim of privilege given to the authority by clause (6)
of article 22 is wholly meaningless and ineffective, and
will defeat its very purpose, for the privilege cannot
be claimed except at the peril of releasing the detenu.
Obviously that cannot be the intention. It must,
therefore, be held that the vagueness of grounds resulting from non-disclosure of facts under clause (6) will
not invalidate the order of detention, which was
initially valid, on the ground that · no representation
can be made on the basis of such vague grounds. In
that case by claiming privilege under clause ( 6) the
authority can frustrate the claim of justiciability "f
the sufficiency of grounds. Further, why should
the vagueness of grounds otherwise brought about
stand on a different footing ? Clause (5) cannot mean
one thing when the privilege is claimed and mean
quite the opposite thing when no such privilege is
claimed under clause (6). The initial order is not
justiciable. The claim of privilege is not justiciable.
Why should it be assumed that the sufficiency of
grounds for the purpose of making a representation
was intended to be justiciable ? I see no logical reason
!951
Stale qf Bombay
••
Atma Rom
Sridhar Vaidya.
Dasj.
208
1951
StaUqfBombay
""
AW«llmn
Sri4har Yaid;•a.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[195IJ
for making an assumption which will introduce an
objective test in a matter which is prima facie
intended to be purely subjective.
The argument is then re-stated in the following
further modified form. Clause (5) of article 22 imposes
two obligations on the authority making an order of
detention, namely (i) that the authority shall, as. soon
as may be, communicate the grounds on which the
order has been made, and (ii) that the authority shall
afford the earliest opportunity to the detenu to make
a representation against the order. If the order was
made as a result of satisfaction derived in good faith
but upon grounds which may be vague, the order will
be perfectly good and cannot be challenged in any
court.
Communication of such grounds, even if they
are vague, will satisfy the first obligation imposed
upon the authority. Under the latter part of clause
(5) the authority is also under the obligation to afford
the earliest opportunity to the detenu to make a
representation. If the grounds on which the order
has been made were vague, then the second part of
clause (5), independently and without reference to the
first part of clause (5), impliedly imposes on the
authority an obligation to rectify the defect of
vagueness by supplying particulars so as to enable the
detenu to make a representation. Supplying of particulars, the argument concludes, is implicit in the
second part of clause (5), for without such particulars
the detenu is not afforded the opportunity to make a
representation. I am unable to accept this line of
argument. Under the first part of clause (5) the
grounds on which the order has been made have to be
supplied 'as soon as may be.' The measure of time
indicated by the words 'as soon as may be' must
obviously run from the date of detention. Likewise,
the latter part of clause (5) requires affording the
detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation. From what terminus a quo is the period indicated
by the phrase "earliest opportunity" to begin to run ?
If that is also to run from the date of the detention,
then the two periods under the two parts of clause (5),
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
must nece54arily coincide and, therefore, the question
of supplying further particulars after the grounds are
supplied cannot arise. On the other hand, the natural
meaning of the words of the latter part of clause (5)
to my mind, is that the period connoted by the phrase
the "earliest opportunity" . begins to run from the
time the detenu expresses his desire or intention to
make a representation. The making of a representation is the right of the detenu. To make or not to
make a representation is his choice. Therefore, it is
only when he decides to make a representation and
expresses his desire or ·intention to make a representation that the earliest opportunity is to be afforded
to him to make the desired or intended representation. Now, if the time is to run after the expression
of desire or intention on the part of the detenu
to make a representation, t!1en the earliest opportunity to be afforded to the detenu can only mean
affording him all physical facilities
to carry · out
his desire or intention, for the detenu has decided to
make his representation without any further particulars. According to the language used in the latter
part of clause (5), there is no express provision for
supplying particulars. Suppose the grounds on which
the order was made and which were communicated to
the detenu under the first part were quite precise and
sufficient to enable the detcnu to make a representation, then affording him the earliest opportunity to
make the representation can only mean giving him all
physical facilities to do so, e.g., by supplying him
with paper, pen· and ink and when the representation
has been drown up by him, by forwarding the same
with due despatch. In such a case there is no question
of supplying further and better particulars. Suppose,
again, that the grounds on which the ord<:r has ·been
made and which have been communicated to the:
detenu are regarded by the authority to be quite
precise and sufficient for making a representation, is
the authority to anticipate that the detenu may find
these grounds insufficient or that being moved in that
behalf the Court may consider them insufficient and
J951
State ef Bomba'
••
Atma Ram
Srir!har Vaid)la
Das].
210
195!
Statt qf Bombay
v.
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
then, as soon as the detenu expresses his desire or
inteI1tion to make a representation, is the authority to
keep quiet and take the risk of the court releasing
the detenu for the vaguenes~ of the grounds or is he to
tell the detenu "just wait a little; I think the grounds
which I have communicated to you are quite precise
and sufficient ; lest you or the court find the grounds
insufficient for making a representation, I shall supply
you with further and better particulars so as to enable
you to make the representation ?" The position thus
stated is unreal on the face of it. In my opinion, on
a plain reading of clause (5) there is no justification for
assuming that a second communic;;nion of particulars
is contemplated either under the first part or under
the second part of clause (5). This does not, however,
mean that the authority may not suppfy particulars
either suo motu or on the application of the detenu.
All that I say is that clause (5) imposes no constitutional obligation on the authority to supply
particulars so as to remove the vagueness of the
grounds or to enable the detenu to make a representation, and non-supply of further particulars does
not
constitute an infraction of any fundamental
right.
It is said that clause (5) of article 22 construed in
the way suggested above, would render that clause
nugatory for it will then really guarantee no fundamental right at all. I respectfully differ from this view
for the criticism does not appear to me to be wdl
founded. Communication of the grounds, even if
vague, will none the less be helpful to the detenu in
the several ways I have already mentioned and, therefore the right to have the grounds on which the order
has been made communicated to him is a valuable
right which has been recognised as a fundamental
right. Likewise, the right to make a representation
is a valuable right which is guaranteed by the Constitution. These rights remain unaffected.
If the
the provisions of clause (5) of article 22 of our Constitution on a correct interpretation ·thereof are found
to be inadequate for the protection of the liberty of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
211
the detenus it is their misfortune. The: Constitution
which the people have given unto themselves is the
supreme law and must be .upheld and obeyed whether
or not one lilaes its provisions, inhibitions afld necessary implications. The · court can only draw the
attention of the Parliament to the lacuna or defect, if
any, in the Constitution and in the Act so that the
lacuna may be supplied or ·the defect reroedied in the
constitutional way.
Our attention has been drawn to a number of cases
where under various provincial laws and before the
Constitution the different High Courts have directed
the .release of the detcnu on th,e basis of the vagueness
of the grounds. Those decisions arc, however, distinguishable because they were based . on legislation
which required the communication not only of grounds
but also of particulars. The . omission from our Constitution of the provision for communicating the
particulars in addition . to the grounds which were to
be found in those laws is significant, for it may be
deliberate. Apart from this, however, those decisions
do not appt;ar to me to have any bearing on the
correct interpretation of our Constitution or of the
Preventive Detention Act. It. lswar Das v. The State(1)
the question was not raised or argued as it was made
clear in the judgment itself.
In view of what I have stated above, I am of the
opinion that as the grounds originally communicated
to the detenu were relevant to the objects whi"h the
Act had in view and as there is no proof of mala /ides
the obligations cast
upon the authorities under
article 22(5) which have been reproduced in section 7
of the Preventive Detention Act have been fully
complied with. Even according to the views expressed by the majority of my colleagues I would be
prepared to hold that . the particulars subsequently
supplied · along with the grounds originally supplied
fully enable the detenu to make his representation.
In my opinion there has been no contravention of the
fu~damental rights .of the detenu. I would, therefore,
{I) Not reported.
J95J
State qfBomhy
v•
.dtma Ram
Sri dhar Vaidya.
Dai].
212
J95J
Stall of Bombay
v.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
allow this appeal and reverse
Bombay High Court.
[1951]
the . decision of the
Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant : P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the respondent: V. P. K. Nambiyar.
1951
Jan. 25.
TARAPADA DE AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL Au,
PATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and
CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR
JJ.l
Constitution of lndia, 1950, Art. 22 (5)-Preventive detentionDuty to contmunicate grounds of detention as soon as n1ay beDuty to gii1e earliest opportunity to make t-cpresentation-Grounds
fttrnished after 15 days-"Supplementary
grounds 11 furnished
after 4 months-Ugality of detentt'on-Vague grounds and irrele-
vant grounds distinguished-Supply of grounds first and details
later-Legality-Serving printed orders on same date on several
persons-Bona fides of detention.
A large number of persons were detained under the Bengal
Criminal Law An1endrnent Act, 1930~ The validity of this ~.\ct
was being c.hallenged in the High Court. Meanwhile, the Prcven·
tive Detention Act of 1950 was passed on 26th February, 1950,
and on the same date ·detention orders under this J\-:t \Vere
served on them. The grounds of detention were served on them
on the 14th of l\farch, and on the 16th of July the Government
served on them "'Supplementary grounds" in continuation of the
grounds already furnished on the 14th of March. A sec~nd
set of grounds were communicated to the appellants on the
22nd or 23rd of July. They applied to the High Court of Calcutta
for writs of habeas corpus contending that the orders of detention
were invalid on various ground~. The High Court rejected these
applications and they appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held per KANIA C.J., FAzI. ALI, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRA·
SEKHARA AIYAR ·JJ.-(i) that-in the particular circumstances of
the case, cSpccial!y in view of the fact that a large nnn1ber _of
cases had to be dealt with on the passing of the Preventive
Detention Act in February, 1950, it cannot be said that the
grounds \Vt.re not communicated to the appellants "as soon as
may be" within the meaning of Art. 22 (5);
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