KESHAVAN MADHAVA MENON versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 22 January 1951 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 228 | 1951 INSC 3
Key facts
- Decided
- 22 January 1951
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, SIR SYED FAZL ALI, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 9/1950
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 228
- Neutral citation
- 1951 INSC 3
Text of the judgment
228
[1951]
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
KESHAVAN MADHAVA MENON
1951
J ... 22
"·
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
[Smu HAru1.AL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL
Au,
PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHEJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 13 (!)-Whether retrospective
Prosecution for contravention of lndi'an Press (Emergency
Powers) Act, 1931, ss. 15,
IS-Constitution passed during
pendency of prosecution-Laws inconsistent with fundamental
rights declared void-Whether prosecution can be continuedA.bsence of provision saving pending proceedi1lgs-Effect a/Expiry of temporary laws or repeal of laws, and laws becoming
void
by
statutory
declaration.-Difference-InterpretationSpirit of the Constitution.
Held by the Court (KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MElD.
CHAND MAHAJAN, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.-FAzL
Au and MuKHERJEA fl., dissenting) .. .Article 13(1) of the Indian
Constitution docs not make existing laws which are inconsistent
with fundamental rights void ab inito, but only renders such
laws ineffectual and Void with respect to the exercise of fundamental rights on and after the date of the commencement of the
Constitution. It has no retrospective effect, and if therefore an
act was done before the commencement of the new Constitution
in contravention of the provisions of any la\\'· which was a valid
law at the - time of the commission of the act, a prosecution for
such an act, which was commenced before the Constitution can1e
into force can be proceeded with and the accused punished
according to that law, even after the commencement of the new
Constitution.
On the expiry of a temporary statute no further proceedings
can be taken under it unless the statute itself saved pending
proceedings and if an offence had been committed under a tern~
porary statute and proceedings were initiated but the offender
had not been prosecuted and punished before the expiry of the
statute, then in the absence of a saving clause the pending prose~
cution -cannot be proceeded- with after the expiiy of the statute
by effiux of time. The effect of Art. 13(1) is quite different from
that of the expiry of a temporary statute or the repeal of a statute
by a subsequent statute.
A court of law has to gather the spirit of the Constitution
from the language of the Constitution. What one may believe
or wish to be the spirit of the Constitution cannot prevail if the
language of. the Co.nstitution OOe. not support that view.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
229
Per FAzL ALI and MuKHERJEA JJ. (contra)-Though Art. 13(1)
has no retrospective
operation, and transacclons which arc past
and closed and rights which have already vested will · remain
unt0uchcd, with regard to· inchoate matters which were still not
determined when. the. Constitution came into force, and as
regar.ds proceedings which were pending at the time of the
enforcement of the Constitution and not yet prosecuted to a
final judgment, a law which has become void under Art 13( 1) of
the Constitution cannot be applied. What has to be looked at is
the ~tate of the law at the time when the question arises as to
whether a person has committed an offence, and if it is found that
the law which made the act an offence has become completely
ineffectual and nugatory, then neither can a charne be framed nor
can the accused person be convicted.
1951
Eiiluzuan
Madha~aM-·
••
Thl~tateqf
BOfllba,
Judgment of the Bombay High Court affirmed.
APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Appeal under Art. 132(1)
of the Constitution from a judgment and order dated
12th April, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature _at
Bombay (Chagla C.J., Bavdekar and Shah JJ.)
Case no. IX of 1950.
A. S. R .. Chari, for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad. Attorney General for India (G.
N. Joshi, with him) for the respondent.
1951. Jan. 22. The judgment of Kania C.J., Patanjali Sastri J. Das J. and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. was
delivered by Das J. Mahajan J. and Fazl Ali J.
delivered separate judgments. Mukherjea J. agreed
with Fazl Ali J.
DAs J.-At all material times the petitioner, who · is
the appellant before us, was the Secretary of People's
Publishing House, Ltd., a company incorporated
under the Indian Companies Act with its registered
office at 190-B, Khedwadi Main Road in Bombay. In
September, 1949, a pamphlet entitled "Railway
Mazdovron ke khilaf Nai Zazish" is alleged to have
been published in Bombay by the petitioner as the
secretary of that company. Learned counsel for the
petitioner states that the pamphlet was published as
a "book" within the meaning of section 1 of the Press
and Registration of Books Act (XXV of 1867) and that
the provisions of that Act had been duly complied
Du J
230
1951
X•ihautJtJ
MadlulvaMIM#
'"
Thi Slat.• of
&mbay.
Das J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19511
with.
The Bombay Government authorities, however, took the view that the pamphlet was a "news
sheet" within the meaning of section 2(6) of the
Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and that
as it had been published without authority reqwreed by section 15(1) of that Act, the petitioner had
committed an offence punishable under section 18(1)
of the same Act. A prosecution under that Act w:u
accordingly started against the petitioner in the
Court decided that question of law. This was followed
and was registered as Case No. 1102/P of 1949.
During the pendency of the proceedings the Constitution of India came into force on · January 26, 1950.
On March 3, 1950, the petitioner filed a written statement submitting, inter alia, that the definition of
"news sheet" as given in section 2(6) of the Indian
Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, and sections 15
and 18 thereof were ultra vires and void in view of
article 19(1) (a) read with article 13 and that the
hearing of the case should be stayed till the High
Court dtcided that question of law. This was followed
up by a petition filed in the High Court on March 7,
1950, under article 228 of the Constitution, praying
that the record of Case No. 1102/P of 1949 be sent
for, that it be declared that sections 15 and 18 read
with section 2(6) and (10), in so far as they create
liability for restrictive measure for a citizen, are ultra
vires of article 19(1) (a) and are, therefore, void and
inoperative and that the petitioner be ordered to be
acquitted. During the pendency of this petition the
Chief Presidency Magistrate on March 23, 1950,
framed a charge against the petitioner under section
18 of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931.
The petition under article 228 was heard on April
12, 1950, by a Bench of the Bombay High Court
consisting of Chagla C.J. and Bavdekar and Shah JJ.
Two questions were raised before the Bench, namely(1) Whether sections 15(1) and 18(1) read with
the definitions contained in section 2(6) and 2(10) of
the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, were
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
231
inconsistent with article 19(1) (a) read with clause (2)
ot that article? and
(2>' Assuming that they were inconsistent, whether
the proceedings commenced under section 18(1) of
that Act before the commencement of the Constitution
could nevertheless be proceeded with?
The High Court considered it unnecessary to deal
with rr decide the first question and disposed of the.
application only on the second question. The High
Court took the view that the word "void" was used
in article 13(1) in the sense of "repealed" and that
conseqn<"ntly it attracted section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, which Act by article 367 was made
applicable for the interpretation of the Constitution.
The High Court, therefore, reached the conclusion that
proceedings under the Indian Press (Emergency
Powers) Act, 1931, which were pending at the date of
the commencement of the Constitution were not affected, even if the Act were inconsistent with the fundamental rights conferred by article 19(1) (a) and as
such became void under article 13(1) of the Constitution after January 26, 1950. The High Court accordir.gly answered the second question in the affirmative
and dismissed
the petitioner's application.
The
petitio:-ier has now come up on appeal before us on the
strength of a certificate granted by the High Court
under article 132(1) of the Constitution.
Learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal
urged that the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act,
1931, was one of the many repressive laws enacted by
an alien Government with a view to stifle the liberty
of the Indian subjects and particularly of the Indian
Press; that with the advent of independence the
people of India began to breathe freely and bv the
Constitution which they gave unto themselves. they
took care to guarantee to themselves the fundamental
rights d free citizens of a democratic republic and
that article 13(1) of that Constitution brushed aside
all vestiges of subordination which the tyranny of the
alien rulers had imposed upon them and declared all
1951
Eeshavan
Madhava Minon
v.
Th1Stal1 ef
B0111ba;1.
Das].
. \
232
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
,11951]
1~51
laws inconsistent with the fundamental rights to· be .
void as if they had never been passed and had never .
Kukavan
Madllava Mcwm existed. It was, therefore; against the spirit of the
v.
· Constitution, argued the learned counsel, that a free
TlwSlal• of
Bombay.
citizen of India should still continue to be persecuted
])(u J. "
under such a retrograde law which, being inconsistent.
with the fundamental rights, must be declared to be
void. Learned counsel urged that it 'Yas not necessary
'- ·
·for him to contend that such inconsistent laws became
void ab inito or that all past and closed transactions
could be reopened but he contended that on and from · ~
January 26, 1950, when· the Constitution cam!l into
. force such inconsistent laws which became void could
. not be lC?Oked at for any purpose" and far less-could
they be utilised for the purpose of framing a charge or
punishing a free citizen.. As the void law cannot be · · •
i:tilised any longer' the pending prosecutions, accord:.
mg to learned counsel, must fall tp the ground. T<;i
permit pending ,proceedings under a law which, after
the co=encement of the Constitution had become .•
void, to proceed further,· after the Constitution has
'taken clffect, is to prolong the efficacy .of the law notwithstanding that it has become void on and from the
•date the · Constitution came into force and that is
•
against th~ spirit of the Constitution .
An argument founded on what is claimed to be the. ..,
. spirit of the Constitution is always attractive, for it
has a powerful appeal to sentiment and. emotion; but
.. a court of law has to gather the.spirit of the Constitu- .ft.ion from the language of the ConstitutioJ.l. . What one
may believe or think to_ be.'the spirit of the Con§titution cannot prevail if the langmtge of the Constitution
does not ·support that view. Article 372 (2) gives ·
power to the,President to adapt and modify existing
laws by way of repealor amendment. There is noth-.
ing to prevent the President, in exercise of the powers
conferred on. him by that article, ·from repealing say_
the whole or any part of the Indian Press (Emergency "'
Powers) Act, 1931. If the President does so, then such
repeal will at once attract .section 6 of the General '.Clauses Act. In such a situation all prosecutions under
f
S.C.R.:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
233
the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, which
were 1Jending at the date of its repeal by the President
would be saved and must be proceeded with notwithstanding the repeal of that Act unless an express
provision was otherwise made in the repealing Act. It
is therefore clear that the idea of the preservation of
past inchoate rights or liabilities and pending proceedings to enforce the same is not foreign or abhorrent
to the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, unable
to accept the contention about the spirit of the Constitution as invoked by the learned counsel in aid of his
plea that pending proceedings under a law which has
become void cannot be proceeded with. Further, if it
is against the spirit of the Constitution to continue
the pending prosecutions under such a void law, surely
it should be equally repugnant to that spirit that men
who have already been convicted under such repressive law before the Constitution of India came into
force should continue to rot in jail. It is, therefore,
quite clear· that the court should construe the language
or article 13(1) according to the established rules of
interpretation and arrive at its true meaning uninfluenced by an assumed spirit of the Constitution.
Article 13(1) with which we are concerned for the
purposes of this application is in these terms :"All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution,
in so far as they are inconsistent with~the provisions of
this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency
be void."
It will be noticed that all that this clause declares
all existing laws, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III shall, to the extent
of such inconsistency, be void. Every statute is prima
ftzcic r-rospective unless it is expressly or by necessary
implicatiom made to have retrospective operation.
There is no reason why this rule of interpretation
s~oukl not be applied for the purpose of interpreting
our Constitution. We find nothing in the language of
article 13(1) which. may be read as indicating an.
i.:; that
195l
Ii'eslt{utltll
Ma4/llllia·M~t11JJ.
'l'f
TheStal'ef
Bom/loJ•
--
DuJ.
234
1951
Jli~
~MelltR
v.
T lrl Slat. qf
&m6q.
-
I J4'j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
p951]
intention to give it retrospective operation. On the
contrary, the language clearly points the other way.
The provisions of Part III guarantee what are called
fundamental rights. Indeed, the heading of Part III
is "Fundamental Rights". These rights are given,
for the first time. by and under our Constitution. Before the constitution cam~ into force there was no
such thing as fundamental right. What article 13(1)
provides i> that all existing laws which clash with the
exercise of the fundamental rights (which are for the
first time created by the Constitution) shall to that
extent be void. As the fundamental rights became
operative only on and from the date of the Constitution
the que>tion of the inconsistency of the existing laws
with those rights must · necessarily arise on and from
the date those rights came into being. It must follow,
therdore, that article 13(1) can have no retrospective
effect but is wholly prospective in its operation. After
this first point is noted, it should further be seen that
article B ( 1) does not in terms make the existing laws
which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights
void ab initio or for all purposes. On the contrary, it
provides that all existing laws, in so far as they are
inconsi.ient with the fundamental rights, shall be
void to the extent of their inconsistency. They are not
void for all purposes but they are void only to the
.:xtcnt they come into conflict with the fundamental
rights. In other words, on and after the commencement of the Constitution no existing law will be permitted to stand in the way of the exercise of any of
the fundamental rights. Therefore, the vcridness of the
existing law is limited to the future exercise of the
fundamental rights. Article 13(1) cannot be read as
obliterating the entire operation of the inconsistent
laws, c.r to wipe them out altogether from the statute
book, for to do so will be to give them retrospective
effect which, we have said, they do not possess. Such
laws exist for all past transactions and for enforcing
all rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the
Constitution. Learned counsel for the appellant has
drawn our attention to articles 249(3), 250, 357, 358
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
235
19!il
and 369 where express provision has been made for
l{Aslrtuum
"lo-aving things done under the laws which expired. It Mailhava
MNton
will be noticed that each of those articles was conv.
r&.'<itautf
cerned with expiry of temporary statutes. It is well
Boriiba,,.
known that on the expiry of a temporary statute no
Das].
further proceedings can be taken under it, unless the
statute itsdf saved pending proceedings. If, therefore,
an offence had been committed under a temporary
statute and the proceedings were initiated but the
offender had not been prosecuted and punished before
t11e expiry of the statute, then, in the absence· of any
saving clause, the pending prosecution could not be
proceeded with after the expiry of the statute by efflux of time. · It was on this principle that express
provision was made in the several articles noted
abovel for saving things done or omitted to be done
uriJer the expiring laws referred to therein. As explained above, article 13(1) is entirely prospective in
its· operation and as it was not intended to have any
retrospective effect there was no necessity at all for
inserting in that article any such saving clause. The
effect of article 13 ( 1) is quite different from the effect
of the expiry of a temporary statute or the repeal of a
statute by a subsequent statute. As already explained;
article 13(1) only has the effect of nullifying or
rendering all inconsistent existing laws ineffectual or
nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding
effect only with respect to the exercise of fundamenta1 rights on and after the date of the commencement
of the Constitution. It has no retrospectjv.e effect and
if, therefore, an act was done before the commencement of the Constitution in contravention of the provisions of any law which, after the Constitution, becomes void with respect to the exercise of any of the
fundamental rights, the inconsistent law is not wiped
out so far as the past act is concerned for, to say that it
is, will be to give the law retrospective effect. There is
n;> fundamental right that a person shall not be prosecuted a.nd punished for an offence committed before the
Constitution came into force. So far as the past acts
236
1951
'"'h,...ara
Mad,,,,,,,,nMThtSJott I/
B11169.
Fazl Ali. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
are concerned the law exists, notwithstanding that it
:does not exist with respect to the future exercise of fundamenal rights. We, therefore, agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court on the second
question, although on different grounds. In view of that
conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to examine
the reasons of the High Court for its conclusion. In our
opinion, therefore, this appeal fails, and is dismissed.
FAZL Au J.-I regret that I cannot agree with the
view which the majority of my colleagues arc inclined
to take in this case.
The. facts of the case are simple and will bring out
the point to be decided. On the 9th December, 1949,
the appellant was arrested and a prosecutioh.t was
started against him under section 18(1) of the ·Indian
Press (Emergency Powers) Act (XXIII of 1931) in the
Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay
for publishing a pamphlet in Urdu entitled "Railway
Mazdoorun Ke Khilaf Nai Sazish". The prosecution
case was that the pamphlet was a news-sheet within
the meaning of section 2(6) of the Act and that since
it had been published without the authority required
by section 15(1) of the Act, the appellant had committed an offence punishable under section 18(1) of the
Act. While the prosecution was pending, the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January.
1950, and thereafter the appellant raised the contention that sections 2(6), 15 and 18 of the Act were void,
being inconsistent with article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution al)d therefore the case against him could not
proceed. Having raised this contention, the appellant
filed a petition in the High Court at Bombay under
article 228 of the Constitution asking the High Court
to ·send for the record of the case .and declare that
sections 15 and 18 of the Indtan Press (Emergency
Powers) Act read with section 2(6) and (10) thereof
-were void and inoperative and the petitioner should
be ordered to be acquitted. The petition, was
heard by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Courr.
and the learned Judges constituting the Bench, in
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT .REPORTS
237
deciding the point raised, assumed that the provmons
of the Act impugned by the appellant were inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, and held that
article 13(1) had virtually the effect of repealing such
provisions of existing laws as were inconsistent with
any of the fundamental rights and that consequently
under section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which is
made applicable for the interpretation of the Constitution by article 367, pending proceedings were not
affected. The appellant's petition to the High Court
having been dismissed, he preferred this appeal in the
Supreme Court.
One of the points discussed elaborately by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties in the course
of their arguments was as to what was the effect upon
pending proceedings when an Act was repealed ·or
when a temporary Act expired. In Craies on Statute
Law, the effect of the expiry of a temporary Act is
stated to be as follows :"As a general rule, and unless it contains some
special provision to the contrary, after a temporary
Act has expired no proceedings can be taken upon it,
and it ceases to have any further effect. Therefore,
offences committed against temporary Acts must be
prosecuted and punished before the Act expires, and
as soon as the Act expires any proceedings which are
being taken against a person will ipso facto terrr.inate." (4th Ed., pp. 347-348).
This statement of law by Craies was referred to
with approval and adopted by the Federal Court in
J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., (Rampur) Ltd.,
and Others v. King Emperor(1) As to the effect of the
repeal of an Act, the following passage from Craies'
book seems to sum up the legal position as it obtained
in England before the enactment of the Interpretation
Act of 1889 :-
"When an Act of Parliament is repealed," said
Lord Tenterden in Surtees v. Ellison(2) "it must be
(I) [1947] F·C.R. 141 at 166
(2) (1829) 9 JJ, & C. 152.
1951
Keshal/011
Modhava M.,...
'"
TIY Slatt ef
Bomba;1.
Fad .A.Ii],
238
1951
.K'eshavan
Madhavan Mmon
v.
The State ef
Bombay.
Fa,l Ali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
(1951)
considered (except as to transactions past and closed)
as if it had never existed. That is the general rule."
TinJal C.J. states the exception more widely. He
says (in Kay v. Goodwin)(') : "The effect of repealing
a statute is to obliterate it as completely from the
records of the Parliament as if lt had never been
passed; and it. must be considered as a law that never
existed except for the purpose of those actions which
were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it
was an existing law." (P. 350).
Again, Crawford in his book on, "Statutory Construction" dealing with the general effect of the repeal
of an Act states the law in America to be as follows :"A repeal will generally, therefore, divest all inchoate
rights which have arisen under the repealed statute,
and destroy all accrued causes of action based thereon.
As a result, such a repeal, without a saving clause, will
destroy any proceedings whether not yet begun, or
whether pending at the time of the enactment of the
repealing Act, and not already prosecuted to a final
judgment so as to create a vested right." (Pp. 599-600).
In a footnote rela~ng to the cases which the !craned
author cites in support of the above proposition, he
adds:"See Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Mumford (Ind.) (2)
where the repeal of a statute during the trial prevented
a judgment from being rendered. Similarly, there can
be no legal conviction for an offence, unless the act
be contrary to law at the time it is committed; nor can
there be a judgment, unless the law is in force at the
time of the indictment and judgment. If the law
ceases to operate, by its own limitation or by a repeal
at any time before judgment, no judgment can be
given. Hence, it is usual in every repealing law to
make it operate prospectively only, and to insert a
saving clause, preventing the retroactive
operation
of the repeal and continuing the repealed law in force
as to all pending prosecutions, and often as to all
TI.olations of the existing law already committed."
(I) (1830) 6 Bing. 576.
(2) 197 N.E.826.
S.CR.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
239
The author then proceeds to quote the following
passage from Wall v.. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., Com-
pany(1) :"It is well settled that if a statute giving a special
remedy is repealed without a saving clause in favour
of penJing suits all suits must stop where the repeal
finds ·rhem. If final relief has not been granted before •
the rept"al went into effect, it cannot be after. If a
case: is appealed, and pending the appeal the law is
changed, the appellate court must dispose of the case
under the law in force when its decision was rendered.
The effect of the repeal is to obliterate the statute:
repealed a~ completely as if it had never been passed,
and it must be considered as a law which never
existed, except for the purposes of those actions or
suits which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded
while it was an existing law. Pending judicial proceedings based upon a statute cannot proceed after it.s
repeal. This rule holds true until the proceedings
have reached a final judgment in the court of latt
resort, for that court, when it cotnes to announce iu
decision, conforms it to the law when existing, and
may therefore reverse a judgment which w.a~ correct
when pronounced in the subordinate tribtinal from
whence the appeal was taken, if it appears that pending the appeal a statute which was necessary to
support the judgment of the lower court has been
withdrawn by an absolute repeal." (P. 601).-"~
. It is well known that formerly the practice in
England used to be to insert in most of·the repealing
statutes a clause saving anything duly done or suffered
under the repealed statutes and any pending legal
proceeding or investigations. · Ultimately, to dispense
with the necessity of having to insert a saving clause
in almost every repealing Act, section 38(2) was
inserted in the Interpretation Act, 1889, which
provides that a repeal, ·unless the contrary intention
appears, does not affect the previous operation of the
repcale~ enactment or anything duly done or suffered
under it, and any investigations, legal proceedings or
(I} 125 N. B. 20.
2-2 S. C. India/68
1951
Kesltilo•n
Marlhaoa Mtnrto
y,
Thi Slate of
Bombay.
Faz.al Ali J.
240
1951
K'tslaavart
Madhaoa Mtnnn
v.
Tiii Stott ef
Bombay.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
remedies ma)' be instituted, continued or enforced in
respect of rights, liabilities and penalties under the
repealed Act, as if the repealing Act had not been
passed.
Crawford in his book to which I have referred
adverts in these words to a similar. difficulty which
1wa~ experienced in America and to the manner in which
it has been met>"Due to the numerous troublesome problems
which constantly arose with the repeal of statutes, as
well as to the numerous cases where hardship was
caused, statutes have been enacted in several States
expressly providing that the repeal of a statute shall
not affect any rights, causes of action, penalties, forfeitures, and pending suits, accrued or instituted under
the repealed statute."
In India, the earliest attempt that was made to
guard against the normal legal effect of a · repeal is to
be found in sectioh 6 of Act I of 1868. This provision was further elaborated by section 6 of the General
Clauses Act of 1897 which is on the same lines as
section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act of England.
1he position therefore now in India as well as in
England is that a repeal has not the drastic effect
which it used to have before the enactment of the
Interpretation Act in England or the General Clauses
Act in this country. But this is due entirely to the
fact that an express provision has been made in those
enactments to counteract that effect. Hence, in those
cases which are not covered by the language of the
General Clauses Act, the principle already enunciated
will continue to operate. The learned AttomeyGeneral had to concede that it was doubtful whether
section 6 of the Act is applicable where there is a
repeal by implication, and there can be no doubt that
the law as to the effect of the expiry of a temporary
statute still remains as stated in the books, because
section 6 of the General Clauses Act and section 38(2)
of the Interpretation Act have no application except
where an Act is repealed. It should be remembered
,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
241
that the soundness of the law which has been consistently applied to cases governed by statutes which have
ceased to be in force, by reason of having been repealed
or having expired; has never been questioned, and it
cannot be brushed aside as if it embodied some archaic
or obsolete rule peculiar only to the common law of
England. It is the law which has been enunciated
by eminent Judges both in England and in America
and is based on good sense and reason.
I shall now proceed to consider what would be the
correct legal position, when a provision of an existing
law is held to be void under article 13(1) of the Constitution. From the earlier proceedings before the
Constituent Assembly, it appears that in the original
draft of the Constitution, the words "shall stand
abrogated" were used instead of "shall be void,"
in article 13(1), and one of the questions directly before the Assembly was what would be the effect of the
use of those words upon pending proceedings and anything duly done or suffered under the existing law.
Ultimately, the article emcrged in the form rin which
it stands at present, and the words "shall stand abrogated" were replaced by the words "shall be void."
If the words "stand abrogated" had been there, it
would have been possible to argue, that those words
would have the same effect as repeal and would attract
section 6 of the General Clauses A.ct, bµt those words
~ave been ab~doned and a Vf!J' strong expression
mdeed the: strongest expression which could be used,
has been used ·in their place. The meaning of the
word "void" is stated in Black's Law Dictionary
(3rd Edn.) to be as follows:"null and void; ineffectual; nugatory; having no legal
force or binding effect; unable in law to support the
purpose for which it was intended; nugatory and ineffectual so that nothing can cure it; not valid."
A reference to the Constitution will show that the framers thereof have used the word "repeal" wherever
ncceswy (see articles 252, 254, 357, 372 and 395)
They have also used such words as "invalid" (sec
1951
Ktshaz•an
Madhava MenM
v.
The S1a11qf
Bombay.
Fazal AliJ.
2'42
19il
1:11.U..u
ld•i4aa• Jt1u11
v.
T/,. Slal1 .!
B1m•ay.
/1'0<•1 Ali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
articles 245, 255 and 276), "cease to have effect" (see
articles 358 and 372), "shall be inoperative", etc. They
have used the word "void" only in two articles, these
being article 13(1) and article 154, and both these articles deal with cases where a certain law is repugnant
to another law to which greater sanctity is attached.
It further appears that where they wanted to save
things done or omitted to be done under the existing
law, they have used apt language for the purpose; r,ce
for example articles 249, 250, 357, 358 and 369. The
thoroughness and precision which the framers of the
Constitution have observed in the matters to which referc;nce has been made, disinclines me to read into
artide 13(1) a saving provision of the kind which we
are asked to read into it. Nor can I be persuaded to
hold that treating an Act as void under article 13(1)
should have a milder effect upon transactions not past
and closed than the repeal of an Act or its expiry in
due course of time. In my opinion, the strong sense in
which the word "void" is normally used and the context in which it has been used are not to be completely
ignored. Evidently; the framers of the Constitution
did not approve of the laws w.hich are in conflict with
.the fundamental rights, and, in my judgment, it would
not be giving full effect to their intention to hold that
even after the Constitution has come into force, the
laws which are inconsistent with the fundamental
rights will continue to be treated as good and effectual
laws in regard to certain matters, as if the Constitution had never been passed. How such a meaning can
be read into the words used in article 13 ( 1), it is difficult
for me to understand. There can be no doubt that article 13(1) will have no retrospective operation, and
transactions which are past and closed, and rights
which have already vested, will remain untouched.
But with regard to inchoate matters which were still
not determined when the Constitution came into force,
and as regards proceedings whether not yet begun, or
pending at the time of enforcement of the Constitotion and not yet prosecilted to a final judgtPent, the
YCI"'\' serious question arises as to whether a law which
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
243
has been declared by the Constitution to be completely
ineffectual can yet be applied. On principle and on
good authority, the answer to this question would -appear to me to be that the law having ceased to be effectual can no longer be applied. In R. v. Mawgan
(Inhabitants) (1) a presentment as to the non-repair of a
highway had been made under 13 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 24,
but before the case came on to be tried, the Act was
repealed. In that case, Lord Denman C.J. said: "li
the question had related merely to the presentment,
that no doubt is complete. But dum loquimur, we have
lost the power of . giving effect to anything that takes
place under that proceeding." And Littledale J.
added : "I do not say that what is already done has
become bad, but that no more can be done." In my
opinion, this is precisely the way in which we should
deal with the present case.
It was argued at the Bar that the logical outcome
of such a view would be to hold that all the convictions already recorded and all the transactions which
are closed, should be reopened, but, in my opinion, to
argue on these lines is to overlook what has been the
accc:pted law for centuries, namely, that when a law
is· treated as dead, transactions which are past and
closed cannot be revived and actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst the law was
operative cannot be reopened.
In the course of the arguments, a doubt was also
raised as to what would be the effect in the case of an
appeal pending when the Constitution came into force,
from a conviction already recorded before the 26th
January, 1950. The law applicable to such a situation
is well-known and has been correctly summed up by
Crawford in these words : ·
"Pending judicial proceedings based upon a statute
cannot proceed after its repeal. The. rule holds true
until the proceedin~ have reached a final judgment in
the coun of last resort, for that court; when it comes to
announce its decision, conforms it to the law then existing, and may therefore reverse a judgment which was
(I} (1888) 8 A. & E. 496.
1951
1(11/ra.aa
Madhavatt Me•••
v.
T Iii Stoll q/
BO#lbay.
/fa.cal Ali].
244
1951
Keshaoiia
Madhaoa Menon
••
The Stale qf
Bomba7.
Fazal Ali].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19511
correct when pronounced 'in the subordinate tribunal
frorri whence the appeal was taken, if it appears that
pending the .appeal a statute which was necessary to
support the judgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal."
I think I should at this stage deal briefly with two
points which were raised in the course of the arguments
in support of the opposite view. It was urged in the
first place that without there being a saving clause to
govern article 13(1), it can be so construed as to permit offences committed prior to the 26th January, 1950,
to be punished. The argument has been put forward
more or less in the following form. The law which is
said to be in conflict with the fundamental rights was
a good law until the 25th January, and, since
article 13(1) is to be construed prospectively,
and not retr<>&pectivcly, every la.ct constituting
an offence under the old law remains an · offence
and can be punished even after the 26th January. It
seems to me that the same argument could . be urged
with reference to matters which constituted offences
under a repealed Act or a temporary Act which has ex·
pired. But such an argument has nc;ver succeeded.
The real question is whether a person who has not been
convicted before the Act has ceased to exist or ceased
to be effectual can still be prosecuted under such an
Ar.t. The answer to this question has always been in
the negative, and I do not see why a different answer
should be given in the case of an Act which has become void, i.e., which has become so ineffectual that it
cannot be cured.
The second argument which also has failed to im. press me is that if section 6 of the General Clauses Act
does not in terms apply, the principle underlying that
section should be applied. The answer to this argument is that the Legislature in its wisdom has confined
that section to a very definite siruation, and, though it
was open to it to make the section more comprehen-.
sive and general, it has not done so. It is well-known
that situations similar to those which arise by reason
of the repeal of an Act have arisen in regard to Acts
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
245
which have expire.cl or Acts which have been declared
to be void, and, though such situations must have been
well-known to the Legislature, they have · not been
provided for. In these circumstances, I do not sec how
the very clear and definite provision can be enlarged in
the manner in which it is attempted to be enlarged.
Besides, I have not come across any c.ase in which the
principle underlying section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act or section 6 of the General Clauses Act has
been invoked or applied.
1951
Keshavan
Madhatia Menon
v.
The State of
Bombay.
Faziil Ali :J
In the present case, we have to look at the state of
the law at the time when the question arises as to
whether a person has committed any offence. If we find
that the law which made the act an offence has become
completely ineffectual and nugatory, then neither can
a charge be framed nor can the accused person be convicted. In my opinion, if the assumption on which the
High Court has proceeded is correct, the appellant is
entitled to a declaration that he cannot be convicted
for the offence of which he is accused.
MAHAJAN J.-The appellant is the secretary of the
People's Publishing House, Ltd., Bombay. In September, 1949, he published, a pamphlet entitled "Railway
Mazdoorum Ke Khilaf Nai Sazish." On the 9th December, 1949, he was arrested and a prosecution was
launched against him under section 18 ( 1) of the Indian
Press (Emergency Powers) Act (XXIII of 1931) in the
Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay
in respect of this pamphlet, as it had been published
without any authority as required under section 16 of
the said Act. On the 8th March, 1950, an application
was made on his behalf in the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay under article 228 of the Constitution of
India for quashing the proceedings started against him
and it was contended that sections 16 and 18 of Act
XXIII of 1931 were ultra vire; of Part III of the Constitution of India and were thus void and had· no effect
whatsoever and no prosecution launched under these
sections could be· proceeded with after the conling into
force of the Constitution. The High Court refused this
Maiit1Ja11J
246
1951
EesAavt111
Matiha•a MetW11
v.
The State ef
Bom/Jaj.
M•hai••J·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19Sl}
application and held that the proceedings instirutcd
against the appellant before the commencement of the
Constitution could not be affected by the provisiom
of the Constitution that came into force on the 26th
January, 1950. Dissatisfied with this decision, the
appellant has preferred the present appeal to this
court.
The sole pi>int to decide in the appeal is whether
proceedings instiruted under section 18(1) of the
Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, XXIII of 1931,
before the commencement of the Constitution of India
are affected by its provisions. The High Court has
answered this question in the negative and, in my
opinion, rightly.
I am in respectful agreemenr with the observations
of the learned Chief Justice of Bombay that it is di.Iiicult to believe that the Constituent Assembly contemplated that with regard to the laws which it Wal
declaring to be void under article 13 all vested rights
and all proceedings taken should be disturbed and
affected by particular laws ceasing to be in force as a
result of inconsistencies with the fundamental rights
guaranteed to the citizens. It is not arguable and was
not argued that Part III of the Constitution has any
retrospective operation. The appellant was not possessed of any fundamental rights in September, 1949,
when he published the pamphlet in question and his
act clearly came within the mischief of the provisions
of section 18 of Act XXIII of 1931 and he thus
became liable to the penalties prescribed therein.
It was, however, contended by Mr. Chari, the
learned counsel for the appellant, that the effect of the
language employed in article 13( 1) of the Constitution
was that the proceedings commenced before the coming
into force of the Constirution could not be continued
after its commencement under the laws that became inconsistent with its provisions. For this proposition he placed reliance on the rule of construction
stated in Maxwell on "Interpretation of Statutes",
p. 404, which is to the following effect :-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
247
"Where an Act expired or was repealed, it was
formerly regarded, in the absence of provision to the
contrary, as having never existed, except as to matters
and transactions passed and closed. Where, therefore,
a penal law was broken, the offender could not be
punished under it if it expired before he was convicted,
although the prosecution was began while the Act was
still in force." This rule seems to be based on a statement of Tindal C.J. in Kay v. Goodwin(1). The learned Chief Justice made the following observations :-
"I take the effect of repealing a statute to be, to
obliterate it as completely from the records of Parliament as if it had never been passed; and it must be
considered as a law that never existed except for the
purpose of those actions which were commenced,
prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an ·existing
law".
This was the rule of · the English common law
which was applied in cases of statutes which were repealed and under this rule all pending actions and prosecutions could not be proceeded with after the repeal of
the law under which they were started. This rule was
however changed by the Interpretation Act of 1889,
section 38. Therein it was enacted that unless the cont·
rary intention appears, no repeal is to affect any investigation, legal proceeding, including the initiation of
eFiminal proceedings, or remedy in respect of any such
right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment and any such investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy may be ins~tuted, continued or
enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not
been passed. A similar provision exists in India in
section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1868 and 1897.
The High Court held that the provisions of article 13(1)
were analogous to the repeal of a. statute and therefore
3ection 6 of the General Clauses Act had applica·
tion to the construction of these provisions and that
being so, the coming into force of the Constitution. did
;(I) ISO E.R. 1403; (1830) 6 Bing. 576.
1:151
Kuluzoaa
M~liaH.M1u11
v.
TluStaH 41"
<fJay.
Ma/ilfi1111 ].
248
1951
Kesha111•n
MadhtJ•a Menon
v.
TM State tf
Bomba7.
Mahajan].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fl.9511
not in any way affect the continuance of the proceedings that had been commenced against the appellant
under the law thar was in force at the time of the
publication of the pamphlet. Mr. Chari contended that
the High Court was in error in applying the provisions
of wction 6 of the General Clauses Act to the interpreta,tion of article 13( 1) of the Constitution inasmuch
as the provisions of this article were not analogous to
repeal and did not amount to a repeal of the existing
law. He contended that a repeal of the law could
only be by the legislature but that under article 13
power had been given to the court to declare any law
inconsistent with the Constitution to be void; in other
words, the power given was larger in scope and effect
than the power of repeal and the effect of the declaration that a certain statute was void as it was repugnant
to the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution was to
wipe out the statute altogether from the date of the
coming into force _of the Constitution and that nothing
could be done under that statute with effect from the
26th January, 1950, and therefore the court could not
frame a charge under the law that was declared void,
or pass a judgment of conviction against a person
under a law that had been declared void, Mr. Chari
went to the length of saying that a statute which was
inconsistent with the Constitution became dead on the
coming into force of the Constitution and under a dead
statute no action could be taken whatsoever. He
emphasised his contention by stressing the fact that
freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution
could not be tainted by keeping alive prosecutions and
actions under laws framed by a foreign government
which were inconsistent with those freedoms. It was
said that some of the laws which the Constitution
intended to be declared void by the court because of
their repugnancy to the fundamental rights guaranteed
to the citizen by the Constitution were those which a
foreign government had enacted to keep the people of
this country under its domination and that to continue
prosecutions under these laws after the coming into
force of the Constitution would be wholly contrary and
-S.C.R;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
249
repugnant not only to the letter of the Constitution
but also to its spirit. It was conceded that_ transactions finally dosed under such laws could not be
reopened but that prosecutions and actions ·which were
still continuing should be stopped and further action
concerning them would become illegal and would be
coµtrary to the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Reference was made to articles 249, 250, 357,
358, and 369 to show that the scheme of the Constitution was that wherever it intended that the · proceedings commenced under existing laws which became inoperative o,n the 26th January, 1950, were to continue
after that date, apt phraseology had been used to
indicate that intention but that in article 13 no such
saving words were used and therefore it must be
presumed that the Constituent Assembly did not
intend that proceedings taken under such laws were to
be continued after the 26th January, 1950.
,
Arti,cle 13(1) of the Constitution is in these
terms:"All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in · so
far· as they are inconsistent with the provisions of
this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be
void."
The freedom guaranteed to the citizen which has
application to the ·case of the appellant is in article 19
(1) (a) and this article is in these t~ms :"All citizens shall have the right to freedom
speech and expression."
-,
of
It is admitted that after the 26th January, 1950,
there has been no infringement of the appellant's right
of freedom of speech or expression. In September, J949,
he did not enjoy either complete freedom of speech or
full freedom of exvression. It is in .relation to the
freedom guaranteed in article 19(1) of the Constitution
to the citizen that ~he provisions of article 13(1) come
into play. This article does not declare any law void
independently of the existence of the freedoms
guaranteed by Part III. A citizen must be possessed
1951
Keslis•<1n
Madhaaa Menon
v.
The State qf
hay,
s....
!tlaAai<1n.J.
250
1951
Ktshaiu
Madhat1a Menon
v.
Tfu Stat• of
Bombay.
Mahajanj.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
of a fundamental right before he can ask the court to
declare a law which is inconsistent with it void; but if
a citizen is not possessed of the right, he cannot claim
this relief. The appellant in the present case was not
possessed of any fundamental right on the day that he
published the pamphlet and in these circumstances th~
question is whether he can claim protection under the
rights guaranteed to him on 26th January, 1950, . for
escaping the consequence of his act on any principles
of construction of statutes. According to the conten
tion of the learned counsel, the principles applicable to
repealed statutes are not in terms applicable · to such a
case, whether they are to be found in the rules of the
common law of England or whether they are contained
in the Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act.
Those rules are applicable to cases either of repeal or
to cases of a statute dying a natural death by effiux
of time. None of those however have any application
to the construction of statutes framed in languages like
the one contained in article 13(1) of the Constitution,
Besides the rule of construction which applies to
repealed statutes or to temporary statutes our attention was not drawn to any other rule of construction
under which a person who commits an offence against
an Act during its existence as a law becomes unpunishable on its termination. Both on considerations of convenience and also on grounds of justice and reason I
am inclined to think that penalties incurred under a
law in force at the time when the act was committed
would survive its extinction so that persons who violate
its provisions might afterwards be punished. Persons
who during the continuance of a statute have obtained
rights under it cannot be affected by a declaration
that the statute with effect from a certain date will be.
come an inoperative statute. When in the case of repeal of a statute, which according to Tindal C.J. obliterates it completely from .the records of Parliament as
if it had never been passed, the common law rule hat
been abrogated by statute, it is difficult to apply th:it
rule on any sentimental grounds at this date to the case
qf statutes which are declared void or declared to han
'
&.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
251
no effect whatsoever after. a certain date only. The cxpre&rion "void" has no larger effect on the statute so declared than the word "repea1" The expression "repeal" according to common law rule obliterates .a starute completely as if. it had never been passed and thus
operates retrospectively on past transactions in the ab5ence of a saving clause or in the absence of provisions
such as are contained in the Interpretation Act, 1889,
or in the General Clauses Act, 1897, while a provision
in a statute that with effect from a partlcular date an
existing law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy has . no such retrospective operation and. cannot
affect pending prosecutions or actions taken under such
laws. There is in such a· situation no necessity of introducing a saving clause ·and it does not need the aid of
a legislative provision of the nature contained · in the
Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act. To hold
that a prospective declaration that a· statalte is void
affects pending cases is to give it indirectly retrospective operation and that result is repugnant to the clear
phraseology employed in the various articles in
Part III of the Constitution.
The contention of the learned Attorney-General that
the phraseology employed in article 13( 1) of the Constitution clearly indicates that there was no intention
to give any retrospective operation to the provisions _of
Part III of the Constitution and that the declaration
that laws repugnant to Part III of the Constitution are
void only operates from 26th January, 1950, has, in my
opinion, force. ·It seems clear that an existing statute
in spite of a declaration by court that it is void remains
in force till the 25th January, 1950, and continues to
remain on the statute book even after the 26th Janu.ary, 1950, except that nq effect can be given to any of
its provisions which are repugnant to the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The ·effect of
articles 13(1) is only prospective and it operates in
respect to the freedoms which are infringed by the
State subsequent to the coming into force of the Constitution but the past acts of a person which came within the mischief of the law then in force are not affected
1951
}/l11hao4n
MaShava Mtv.
TlllStatuf
Bottillay.
Mouj•11].
252
1951
K1shavan
Madhava Mttwn
v.
1~hiStatt of
Bombay.
Mahajan).
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
by Part III of the Constitution. The reference rnade
by Mr. Chari to different articles of the Constitution
where saving clauses have been inserted to save pending
proceedings or acts· is not very helpful inasmuch as
where a certain provision has a. retrospective effect,
then it is necessary to introduce a saving clause if
things done in the past have to be saved from the
retrospective . effect of the statute; but where the provision is clearly not intended to be retrospective, then
the necessity of saving clause does not arise. The provisions of the Constitution to which Mr. Chari made
reference were of the nature that but for the saving
clause the effect of them would be retrospective in
character under the accepted canons of construction of
statutes.
Mr. Chari's argument that it could not have been
intended by the· Constitution makers that prosecutions
started under laws passed by a foreign power and
which affect the freedoms guaranteed to the dtiun
under the Constitution in Part III were to be continued
after the dawn of independence and after India had
become a democratic republic to a certain extent
seems to me to be plausible; but on further thought I
have come to the conclusion that this argument
appeals more to the heart than to the head and is not
based on any sound principle of construction of statutes. Under the accepted canons of construction of
statutes, if a law has no retrospective operation of any
kind whatsoever, then such a law cannot affect pending
prosecutions or actions and the Constitution not being
retrospective in its operation could not therefore in
any way affect prosecutions started for offences that
were complete under the law in force at the time they
were committed. The cure for such an incongruous
state of affairs and the relief for such situation lies with
the Government and the legislature and not with the
cou.rts. If a case of sedition against an alien government
is continued after the coming into force of the Constitution, the court cannot decline to ·proceed with it and
to pass some sentence howsoever lenient, against an
accused by pl.acing a construction on the Constitution
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
253
which gives it retrospective operation, but the government of the republic or its legislature can always by
executive or legislative action bring to a close all such
distasteful proceedings and not only can it do so in the
case of pending prosecutions but it can give relief also
to persons who have suffered under laws of sedition
against an alien government and are suffering terms of
imprisonment in the jails of the Republic. If punis~<
ment ror contravention of such laws cannot be given to
offenders because decision in their case has been delayed beyond the 26th January, 1950, it will be highly
unreasonable not to give relief and to let punishments
continue in case of persons, the sentence against whom
have already been passed under laws which were
solely enacted to maintain the alien rule. Both cases,
in my opinion, stand on the same footing and relief in
those cases lies not with courts but with the executive
government of the Republic. If Mr. Chari's argument
that on the commencement of the Constitution on 26th
January, 1950, all proceedings started under laws that
became repugnant and inconsistent with the Constitution were to be stopped was accepted, it would lead to
very strange results, and Mr.- Chari had to concede
that it would be so. Suppose a person was convicted
of the offence of sedition or of an offence under one of
the safety Acts, the provisions of which are repugnant
to the Constitution, but his appeal was pending in the
High Court against his conviction, then, according to
the contention of Mr. Chari, the court has no power to
hear the appeal because the law being void, no further
action could be taken in the matter. The result would
be that the Court would not be able to hear an appeal
and to give relief to the accused if he had been erroneously convicted. If a court cannot frame a charge or
convict a person under a law that is repugnant to the
Constitution equally it would not be entitled to continue any proceeding for the benefit of the accused under
cover of such a law.
Great deal of emphasis was laid during the course of
the argument on the meaning to be given to the word
"void" and it \_'Vas said that this word in its widest
1951
Eeshavan
Maahava Menon
v.
The State qf
Bombay.
Mahajan].
254
1"1
/Ou,__
Mu-M•..•
v.
Tl•St•ll ef
B,,.ba7.
M•hi•a]•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
sense meant that the law declared void was void ab
initio, i.e., from the very inception of the law it was
bad. If that meaning was given to this word, then it
would mean that all laws existing on the 26th January,
1950, and which were declared void by article 13( 1)
because of their being repugnant to the Constitution
were bad when they were passed by the legislature,
though at the same time the subject enjoyed no fundamenral right. It was sought to give to this word
"void" the same wide meaning as was given to the
word "repeal" by Tindal C.J. in the case above mentioned. With every respect to the great Judges who
administered the common law in England during the
earlier period of British history and in all humility I
venture to say that the rule evolved by them qua
"repeal" was of an artificial nature. The dictum of the
learned Chief Justice that a repeal of a statute obliter·
ates it completely from the records of Parliament a1
if it had never been passed is to my mind based on an
extended meaning of that expression than its ordinary
dictionary sense. When a statute has bcen in operation,
say for a period of fifty years, people have suffered
penalties wider it or have acquired rights thereunder
and the law has been eqforced by courts for such a
long period, then to say that when it is repealed it is
completely obliterated and that it never had any existence and was never passed by Parliament, is rather
saying too much and is ignoring hard real facts and
amounts to shutting one's eyes to the actualities of the
situation. It would be more consonant with reason
and justice to say that the law existed and was good at
the time when it was passed but that since the date of
its repeal it has no longer any effect whatsoever. The
Parliament may however say in the repealing statute
that it will have retrospective operation and it may
also prescribe the limits of its retrospectivity and. to
that extent past transactions may be affected by ir.
Because the rule of common law evolved by the English Judges w;is not incomonance with reason and
justice, a legislative practice was evolved under which
each repealing statute contained a saving clause under
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
which past transactions were not allowed to be affected
by the repeal. Eventually the rule of common law was
completely abrogated by the enactment of the Inter- .
In India in tqe year 1868,
pretation Act, 1889,
section 6 of the General Clauses Act enacted what was
later on enacted in England in the Interpretation Act
and for. over eighty years it is this rule of construc.tion that has been · adopted in this country, the rule
being that past transactions, whether closed or inchoate
cannot be affected _by the repeal of an earlier statute
or by the coming into effect of a new one. In my opinion, the rule contained ln the General Clauses Act
and in the English Interpretation Act is more in consonance with reason and justice and is also a rule of
convenience and should be followed in this country, in
preference to the rule evolved by the English Judges
in the earlier part of English legal history. Be that a~
It may, it is unnecessary in this case to have resort
either to the rule of comµion law or to th,e General
Clauses Act as the language of article 13 itself
furnishes a· solution to the problem.
Reference was also made to the rule of construction
applicable to temporary statutes. In the case of such
statutes, the rule of English law is that after the
expiry of the life of the statute no action can be taken
under the expired statute unless an intention can be
gathered from its provisions to the contrary, but
transactions already completed during the period that
these statutes had the force of law are not in any
way affected. That rule seems to be quite logical and is
consonant with reason and justice. When the life of a
statute is limited and it dies a natural death, then no
question. either of its retrospective or of prospective
nature arises. If the intention of the statute was that
anything done under it has to continue, then it will
be allowed to continue; otherwise nothing done under
it will be continued after its natural death. Any rule
applicable to construction of such a statute has no
application to the interpretation of the Constitution of
India and the reference to this rule, in my opinion, 1s
not relevant for the decision of this matter.
3 -2 SC India/68
1951
KIS!iflllan
M•tilllJIJ4 Meiwn
v.
T/11 Sl4lt qf
.Bowhay.
256
1951
Ktshavan
Madhava M,;,,;•
v.
Tiii Stat< if
Bombay.
-MalitdanJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
Reference was also made to the rule of construction
laid down by the American courts in respect of
statutes declared void because of their being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States of
America. It is obvious that if a statute has been enacted and is repugnant to the Constitution, the statute
is void since its very birth and anything done under it
is also void and illegal. The courts in America have
followed the logical result of this rule and even convictions made under such an unconstitutional statute
have been set aside by issuing appropriate writs. If a
statute is void from its very birth then anything
done under it, whether closed, completed, or inchoate,
will be wholly illegal and relief in one shape or another has to be given to the person affected by such an
unconstitutional law. This rule, however, is not applicable in regard to laws which were existing and were
constitutional according to the Government of India
Act, 1935. Of course, if ap.y law is made after the
25th January, 1950, which is repugnant to the Constitution, then the same rule will have to be followed by
courts in India as is followed in America and even
convictions made under such an unconstitutional law
will have to be set aside by resort to exercise of
powers given to this court by the Constitution.
The only rule of construction applicable to the
interpretation of article 13 of the Constitution is the
one that concerns the determination of the question
whether a statute is intended to have any retrospcc.
tive operation. If the well-known canons of construction on this point are applied, then it has to be held
that article 13 was nnt intended to have any retrospective effect whatever; on the other hand, its language denotes that it recognized the validity of the
existing laws up to the date of the commencement of
the Constitution and even after its commencement
except to the extent of their repugnancy to any
provisions of Part III of the Constitution. On this
construction of article 13 it cannot affect any past
transactions, whether closed or inchoate. Reference in
thls connection may be made to the provisions of
-
S.C.R.
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
257
article 372(2) of the Constitution. Under this article the
President has been given power to adapt existing laws
.and to bring them in accordance with the articles of
. the Constitution by a process of amendment, repeal or
adaptation. The President could have repealed the
Press (Emergency Powers) Act and brought the law
in accordance with the provisions of Part III of the
ConstitUtion and if he had used the powers of repeal
given to him by this article, the provisions of the
General Clauses Act would have been immediately
attracted to that situation and the pending prosecution
of the appellant would have to be continued in view of
those provisions. If in that situation the Constitution
contemplates the continuance of pending proceedings
under existing laws, 1t becomes difficult to place
a different interpretation on the phraseology employed
in article 13 (1) of the Constitution, than the one that
is in accord with that situation. By the construction
that I have placed on this article that incongruous
result is avoided.
In view of the decision above arrived at it seems
unnecessary to pronounce on the alternative argument
of the learned Attorney-General to the effect that the
expression "void'', used in article 13 of the Constitution is synonymous with the word "repeal" and that it
was an apt word used in the context to indicate the
same intention. It was said that the word "repeal" was
not used in the article but instead the expression
"void" was employed therein by the draftsmen in order
to · include within its ambit cases of custom and usage
where such custom and usage were also repugnant to
the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. It was
also urged that by article 13 ( 1) the Constitution in
express terms repealed all laws ·inconsistent with its
provisions and that the only power given to the court
was to find out which of these laws was inconsistent
with the provisions of Part III. The declaration
that these laws were void or repealed was by the force
of the provisions of article 13 itself and did not result
from the decision of the courts. It is also unnecessary
to examine the further argument of the learned
L95J
!Leshatian
Madhaoa.M1n#ll
v•
The State of
Bombaj.
MaliajanJ,
258
1951
JC'nh•so .
Madh11ut1 Menon
v.
Tiu Stst1 of
Bombay.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1!151]
Attorney-General that in any case since 1868 in this
countrv the rule of construction of statutes is 'the one
laid down by section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
1868, and that though in express terms that statute
may not be applicable to the construction of article
13 ( 1) of the Consmution, yet that rule is a rule of
justice, equity and good conscience and has become a
rule of common law in this country and should be applied even to cases where statutes become void by reason of their being repugnant to the Constitution.
For .the reasons given above I see no force in this
appeal and I would accordingly dismiss It.
MuKHERJEA J.-I am in ··entire agreement with the
view taken by my learned brother Faz! Ali J. in his
judgment and I concur both in his reasons and his
conclusion.
Appeal, dismissed.
Agent for the appellant : P. G. Gokha/,e.
Agent for the respondent : P.A. Mehlil.
19il
ARJUN SINGH alias PURAN
"·
KARTAR SINGH AND OTHERS
[SAIYID FAZL Au, MuKHERJEA and
CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR JJ.J
Civil Procedure Code, 1908, 0. XLl. r. 27-Additional evidence
-Improper admission-Finding based on such evidence-Whether
conclusive-lnterference-Puniah Custom Act (II ·of 1920}, s. 7Suit to
ability.
contest
alienation
of
non-ancestral
pr.operty-MOintai"-
The discretion to receive and admit additional evidence iP
appeal is· not an arbitrarv ·one but is a judicial one circum~cribed
bv the limitatiQJll> specified in 0. XL!, r. 27, of ~ Civil Pr<>ccdure Code, and if additional evic!encc was allowed to be adduced
contrarv to the principles
gQverning the reception of . such
evidence. it would be a case of improper exercise of discretion.
and the additional evidence so brought on the rcOOrd will ~ in
be ignored and the case decided as if ·it was non.existent.
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