THE STATE OF TRIPURA versus THE PROVINCE OF EAST BENGAL UNION OF INDIA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 December 1950 | [1951] 1 S.C.R. 1 | 1950 INSC 35
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 December 1950
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA, M. PATANJALI SASTRI, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SIR SYED FAZL ALI, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 4/1949
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1951] 1 S.C.R. 1
- Neutral citation
- 1950 INSC 35
Text of the judgment
-
Supreme Court Reports
VOL. II -
., '
'i
1951
THE STATE OF TRIPURA
v•
THE PROVINCE OF EAST BENGAL
UNION OF INDIA-INTERVENER
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,
PATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA AND
CHANDRASH'llKHARA AIYAR JJ.)
Indian Independence Act, 1947, s. 9-Indian Independence
'\"(Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, Art. 4-lndian /rzdependence
(Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947, Arts. JO (2), 12
(2)-Notice on Ruler of State for return of income under Bengal
Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944-Suit for declaration of invalidity of Act and injunction restraining Income-tax Officer from proceeding with assessment-prtition of India pending suit-Pro-·
perty falling within Province of East Bengal-/urisdiction of court
in West Bengal to proceed with suit against Province of East
Bengal-Interpretation of Orders-"Liability", "actionable wrong
'1 other than breach of contract", meanings of-Torts and actionabie
wrongs-Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, s. 65-Suit
in civil court for declaration and injunction 1·estraining assessment
proceedings-Maintainability.
The Income-tax Officer, Dacca, acting under the Bengal
Agricutural Income-tax Act, 1944, sent by registered post a
notice to the Manager of an Estate belonging to the T ripura State
but situated in Bengal, calling upon the latter to furnish a return
'!.'. of the agricultural income derived from the Estate during the
previous year. The notice was received by the Manager ;n the
Tripura State. The State, by its then Ruler, instituted a suit in
June, 1946, against the Province of Bengal and the Income-tax
Officer, in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Dacca for ~
declaration that the said Act in so far it purporated to impose a
liability to pay agricultural income-tax on the plaintiff was ultra
vires and void, and for a perpetual injunction to restrain the
defendants from taking any steps to assess the plaintiff. The
.::f suit was subsequently transferred to the Court of the Subordinate
Judge of Alipore. The partion of India under the Indian Independence Act took place on the 15th August 1947, and the
1950
December
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2
[1951]
Province of East Bengal in which the Estate was situated, was
substituted
as a defendant in the place of the Province of Bengal ·"'
The State of
on an application made by it, and in its written statement it
Trip111tJ
contended that the court of Alipore which was situated in W•st
ne Provin,;e of Bengal had no jurisdiction to proceed with the suit. The High
EtvtBenzal
Court of Calcutta, reversing the order of the Subordinate Judge of
Alipore held that the provisions of the Indian Independence (Legal
Proceedings) Order, 1947, and the Indian Independence (Rights,
Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947, did not apply to the case
and, as the matter was accordingly governed by the rules of
international law, the court of Alipore had no jurisdiction to y
proceed with the suit : .
1950
••
C. J., PATANJALI SAsni, MuKHEIJEA and
)J. (FAZL Au J, concum'ng)-Thc
suit was not one with respect to any property transferred to East
Bengal by the Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947, nor was it a suit irr respect of any "rip.ts"
transferred by the said Order, inasmuch as the Province of East
Bengal obtained the right to levy income-iax not by means of any
transfer under the said Order, but by virtue of sovereign rights .,.
which were preserved by s. 18 (3) of the Indian Independence Act,
1947, and Art. 12 (2) of the said Order had no application to the
Held per
KANIA
CHANDRASEKHARA
AIYAR
case.
Held per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRr, MUKHEJ.Jl!.\ AND
CttANDRASEKHARA AIYAll JJ. (FAzL ALI J. tlissenting-(i) Since
the object of the Indfan Independence (Rights, Property and
Liabilities) Order, 1947, was to provide for the initial distribution
of rights, properties and liabilities as between the two Dominions
and their Provinces, a wide and liberal constrUction, as far as the '>language used would admit, should be placed upon the Order, so
as to leave no gap or lacuna in relation to the matters sought to be
provided for. The words "liability in respect of an actionable
wrong" should not therefore be understood in the restricted sense
of liability for damages for completed acts, but so as to cover the
liability to be restrained by injunction from completing what on
the allegations in the plaint arc illegal or unauthorised acts which
have been commenced. As the Province of Bengal was, on the \.
allegations in the plaint, liable to be restrained. from proceeding
with an illegal assessment, that liability was, accordingly, a liaMlity in respect of "an actionable wrong other than breach of
contract" within the meaning of Art. 10 (2) (a) of the abovcsaid
Order; and, as the cause of action arose wholly in Dacca within
the Province of East Bengal, that liability passed to the Province
of East Bengal under Art. 10 (2) (a), the latter must be deemed
to be substituted as a party to the suit and the suit must continue
in· the court of the Subordinate Judge of Alipore, under Art. 'f4 of the Indian· Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947.
(ii) Assuming that the cause of action did not wholly arise
•
S.C..R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3
in Dacca, Art. IO (2) (c) would apply and the Province of East
still be liable, though jointly with the Province of
West Bengal.
~ Bengal would
(ii;) As the suit was not one "to set aside or modify any
assessment made under the Act", s. 65 of the Bengal Agricultural
Income-tax Act, 1944, had no application and the suit was therefore one in respect of an "actionable" wrong within the meaning
of Art. 10 (2) (a).
Per FAZL ALI J.-The words "liability in respect of an
actionable wrong other than breach of contract" in Art. 10 of the
Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order
1947, refer to liability capable of being ascertained in terms of
money such as liability for damages for tort and not liability in
any abstract or academic sense. Even if a meaning, as wide as they
can ~r in a legal context, is given to the words "actionable
wrong" and "liability" two elements arc necessary to constitute
an actionable wrong, namely, (i) an act or omission amounting to
an infringement of a legal right of a person or breach of duty
'>\. towards him, and (ii) damage or harm resulting therefrom.
'(
"
Tiile mere issuing of a notice under s. 4 of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, by the Income-tax Officer is not
an actionable wrong because no right known to law is infringed
thereby and no action for damages can be maintained in respect of
such an act, even assuming that the Income-tax Officer had exceeded his powers or acted under an invalid provision of law. No
"liability for an actionable wrong" was thus involyed in the suit
and no liability in respect of such a wrong could therefore be said
to have been transferred to the Province of East Bengal i.1rithin
the meaning of Art. 10 (2) of the said Order so as to entitle the
plainti11 to continue the suit against the Province of East Bengal
under Art. 10 (2).
For the purpose of understanding the full scope of s. 65
of tbe Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, it is necessary
also to read the latter part which provides that no suit or other
proettding shall lie against any officer of the Crown for anything
in good faith done or intended to be done under the Act." The
latter part of the section clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the
courts to prevent the Income-tax Officer from proceeding with an
assessment which has been started and the section must on a fair
construction be held to bar all suits in connection with such
assessment whether against the State or an Income-tax Officer of
the State. 1£, therefore, no suit or action lies, there can be no
liability for an actionable wrong.
[The nature actionable wrongs and torts discussed.]
Judgment of the· Calcutta High Court reversed.
1950
The State of
Ttipwa
v.
The Province o[
East Bengal
4
1950
The State of
Tri'pura
'"
The Province of
East Bengal
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Case No.
[1951]
IV of 1949.
Appeal from a judgment of the High Court of
Judicature at Calcutta (Harries C. J. and Chakravarthi J. ), dated 30th November, 1948, in Civil Revision
Case No. 712 of 1948.
N. C. Sen Gupta
for the Appellant.
(Ajit Kumar Dutta, with him)
Faiyaz
Ali,
Advocate-General of 'East Bengal
(B. Sen and Noor-ud-din, with him) for the Respondent.
M. C. Seta/vat!, Attorney-General for India (S. M.
Sikri and V. N. Sethi, with him) for the Intervener.
1950. Dec. 4. The judgment of Kania C. J.,
Patanjali Sastri J. and Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.
was delivered by Patanjali Sastri J. Faz! Ali and
Mukherjea JJ. delivered separate judgments.
Patanjali SastriJ.
PATANJALI St.sTRI J.-This is an appeal from a
judgment of the High Court of Judicature in West
Bengal reversing a finding of the Second Subordinate
Judge of 24 Parganas at Alipore that he had jurisdiction to proceed with a suit after substituting the
Province of East Bengal (in Pakistao) in the place of
the old Province of Bengal against which the suit had
originally been brought.
The facts leading to the institution of the suit are
not in dispute. The Bengal Agricultural Incqme-tax
Act was passed by the Provincial Legislature ot Bengal
in 1944. It applied to the whole of Bengal and purported to bring under charge the agricultural income
of inter alia, "every Ruler of an Indian State." Acting under the provisions of that Act, which came into
force on lst April, 1944, the Income-tax Officer Dacca
Range, sent by registered post, a notice to the Manager
of the Zemindari Estate called Chakla Roshanabad
belonging to the Tripura State but situated in Bengal
outside the territories of that State, calling upon him
to furnish a return of the total income derived in the
,_
J.
~
S.C.R.
y
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5
t9SO
previous year from lands in the Estate used for agricultural purposes. The notice was received by the
The State of
Tripura
Manager at Agartalla in Tripura State. Thereupon,
v.
the State, by its then Ruler, Maharaja Sir Bir Bikram The Province of
Ea3tBengal
Bahadur, instituted the suit in question on 12th June,
1945, against the Province of Bengal and the Agricul- Patanjali Sastri J.
tural Income-tax Officer, Dacca Range, in the Court of
the First. Subordinate Judge, Datca, contesting the
validity of the notice and the proposed assessment on
the grounds that the 'Provincial Legislature of Bengal
had no authority to impose tax on any income of an
Indian State or its Ruler" and that, in any case, "the
Income-tax Officer, Dacca Range, had no authority or
jurisdiction to issue the said notice to the Manager of
the Estate outside British India." The cause of action
of the suit was alleged to have arisen in the town of
Dacca within the jurisdiction of the Court on 28th
February, 1945, when the notice was issued. The
reliefs sought were a declaration that the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, in so far as it purported
to impose a liability to pay agricultural income-tax on
the plaintiff as a Ruler of an Indian State was
ultra vires and void and that, in any case, the
notice served by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer,
Dacca Range, was void and no assessment could be
made on the basis of such notice, and a perpetual
injunction to restrain the defendants from taking- any
steps to assess the plaintiff to agricultural income-tax.
Before the defendants filed their written statements
the suit was transferred by the High Court to the
Court of the District Judge, 24 Parganas, and was
again transferred from that Court to the Court of the
Subordinate Judge at Alipore. The ruler who brought
the suit having died, the plaint was amended by the·
substitution in his pface of his son and heir in June
1947, and the suit was pending ill that Court whe1i the
partition of India took effect on the 15th August, 1947.
On 9th December, 1947, the Province of East
BengaJ filed a petition stating that the Province of
Bengal, the original defendant }'lo. -1 in the suit, had
ceased to exist with effect from 15th August, 1947, and
6
1950
The State of
Tripuro
v.
The hovince of
&Mt llefl8a/
Patanjati Sas1ri J.
SYPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
in lieu thereof two new Provinces, namely, the
Province of East Bengal and the Province of West
Bengal had come into existence and that, inasmuch as
the Province of West Bengal was taking no interest in
the suit, it was necessary in the interest of East
Bengal that the suit should be contested and that a
written statement should be put in on its behalf for
such contest. It was accordingly prayed that the
delay should be condoned and the written statement
which was filed with that petition should be accepted.
In the written statement it was pleaded that inasmucl}
as the Province of East Bengal was a Province of the
Dominion of Pakistan and that defendant No. 2 was a
Revenue Officer of that Province, the Court had no
jurisdiction to hear the suit or make an order of
injunction against the defendants. It was stated that "'
the Province of East Bengal appeared only to contest
the jurisdiction of the Court. By another written
statement filed on the same day defendant No. 2 raised
also other pleas in defence but his name was struck off
the record at the plaintiff's instance as not being a
necessary party to the suit. On the 13th December,
1947, the Province of East Bengal was substituted as
the defendant in the place of the Province of Bengal ,.
which had ceased to exist, and the written statement
filed on behalf of the former was accepted.
Thereupon the Subordinate Judge framed a preliminary issue. on the question of jurisdiction and, as
stated already, found it for the plaintiff relying on s. 9
of the Indian Independence Act and article 4 of the
Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947 lr
It may be mentioned in passing that the assessment
of the plaintiff was proceeded with by the Agriculturaf
Income-tax Officer, Comilla Range (East Bengal), who,
by his order dated the 22nd December, 1947, imposed
on the plaintiff a tax of Rs. 1,79,848-12..0 for 1944..45
and Rs. 1,34,326.7-0 for 194546, but the recovery
of the amounts has been deferred under orders
of the Court pending the decision on the preliminary
issue.
As pointed out by the Federal Coun in Midnaporc
,
-
S.C.R.
7
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19SO
Zemindary Co. ,Ltd. v. The Province of Bengal and
Others(1), the orders promulgated on the 14th August,
Tlie State of
Triplll'a
1947, by the Governor-General of India before the
v.
partition in exercise of the powers confened under The Province of
East Bencal
s. 9 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and containing provisions specially designed to remove the Patanjali SaJtri J.
difficulties arising in connection with the transition to
the new situation created by the partition are binding
on both the Dominion of India and the Dominion of
Pakistan. Among such Orders those relevant to the
present
controversy are the Indian Independence
(Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, and the Indian
Independence (Rights,
Property
and
Liabilities) .
Order, 1947. By article 4 of the former Order.
(I) All proceedings peti'ding immediately before
the appointed day in any of the sp.ecial tribunals
specified in col. 1 of the Schedule to this Order shall
be continued in that tribunal as if the said Act had
not been passed, and that tribunal shall continue to
have for the purposes of the said proceedings all the
jurisdiction and powers which it had immediately
before the appointed day;
•
•
•
•
•
(3) Effect shall be given within the territories of
either of the two Dominions to any order or sentence
of any such Special Tribunal as aforesaid and of any
High Court in appeal or revision therefrom as if the
order or sentence had been passed by a court of competent jurisdiction in that Dominion;
and by article 12(2) of the latter Order
•
•
•
•
•
Where. any Province from which property, rights
or liabilities are transferred by this Order is, immediately before the transfer a party to legal proceedings
with respect to that property or those rights or liabilities the Province which succeeds to the property,
rights or liabilities in accordance with the provisions
of this Order shall be deemed to be substituted for the
other Province as a party to those proceedings and the
proceedings may continue accordingly.
!1) [1949) F.C.R.309.
8
1950
The State of
Tlipura
v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Patanjali Sastli J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
On the effect of these provisions the learned Judges
of the High Court observed: "If this provision [i.e.,
article 12(2)] applies to the present case, there can be
no doubt that the Province of East Bengal was
substituted in the suit for the Province of Bengal by
operation of law, a.nd by reason of the Legal
Proceedings Order the suit shall continue in the Court
of the Second Subordinate Judge, 24 Parganas, as a
suit against the suhstit1.1ted defendant." With
that
statement of the position we entirely agreed. The
learned Judges, however, proceeded to exmine, laying
stress on the words "by this Order" in article 12 (2),
whether any property, rights or liabilities could be
said to have been transferred by the Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947,
from the Province of Bengal to the Province of East
Bengal, and they took the view that neither any
property, nor rights, nor liabilities were so transferred
under that Order and that, therefore, the continuation
of the proceedings against the Province of East ·Bengal, which was now part of an Independent Sovereign
State, was governed by the principles of international
law and comity of nations, and that, according to those·
principles, East Bengal, being a Province of a sovereign
state, co1.1ld not be sued against its will in the municipal couns of India, with the result that the suit pending in the Court at Alipore must abate. They· also
negatived a further contention raised before them,
apparently for the first time, to the effect that by
reason of he petition filed on behalf of the Province
ot East Bengal for acceptance of its written statement
condoning the delay involved and also by reason ot
sundry other proceedings for 1nterim relief sou&ht by
the plaintiff which were actively resisted by the
Province of East Bengal, that Provinae must be taken
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court.
On behalf of the appellant, Mr. Sen Gupta challenged
the correctness of the decision on both points.
Betore dealing with these contentions, it will be
convenient to dispose of two preliminary points raised
by Mr. Faiyaz Ali, Advocate-General of East Bengal.
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS.
9
1950
Stafe of
Tripura having ::.ince been merged in the ·Dominion of
The State of
Tripura
India and a Chief Commissioner having been appointed
·v.
to administer its territories, the appeal could no longer The Province of
EtM Bengal
be prosecuted by the present Maharaja through his
mother as his next friend. It was however, repre- Paranjali Sastri J. ·
sented to us on his behalf that under the agreement of
merger the Estate of Chakla Roshanabad was left to
the Maharaja as his personal property and it no longer
formed part of the territories of the Tripura State.
The Attorney-General, appearing on behalf of the
Dominion of India, the intervener, confirmed that
position. There is thus no substance in the objection
as any formal defect in the proceeding could be set
right by suitably amending the cause title.
In the first place, he submitted that the
1.
Mr. Faiyaz Ali next drew our attention to the
Pakistan (Indian Independence Legal Proceedings)
Order, 1948, promulgated by the Governor-General of
Pakistan on 13th November, 1948, with retrospective
eff!!ct from the 15th August, 1947, and pointed out that
in · view of its provisions any decree that might
eventually be passed by the Court at Alipore would
receive no effect in Pakistan and that, therefore, it
was unnecessary for this Court to decide the question
of the jurisdiction of the Alipore Court to proceed
with the suit. We are unable to take that view. The
effect of the Order referred to above on any decree that
may eventually be passed in the pending suit may have
to be taken note of by the Court trying that suit after
hearing arguments on the validity of that Order
which is challenged but we are at present concerned
only with the question of the jurisdiction of that
Court to try the suit and we cannot at this stage
refuse to give our ruling on that question merely
because any decree that might be passed in favour
of the plaintiff might prove ineffectual.
Turning now to the main question, it is clear that
article 12 (2) of the Rights, Property and Liabilities
Order applies only to property rights or liabilities
which were transferred by the Order from
a
Province which. was a party to legal proceedings
10
1930
The State of
Tripu111
••
The Province of
EQJt Bengal
Patanjali Sastrl J.
SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
[1951]
"with respect to" that property or · those rights
or liabilities.
As they suit in question cannot be
said to have been instituted with respect to the property
transferred, namely, Chakla Roshanabad, the appellant cannot rely upon the transfer of that property
from the Province of Bengal to the Province of East
Bengal as part of the territories of Pakistan under the
scheme of partition. Nor was there any transfer of
"rights" such as was contemplated under that article,
for the only right with respect to whicli the Province of
Bengal could be said to have been a party to the
pending proceeding on the facts of this case was the
right to tax the agricultural income of the plaintiff
under the provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, l~, and that right was not derived by
the Province s>f East Bengal by transfer under the
Rights, Property and Liabilities Order. As rightly
pointed out by the High Court, the right of taxation
under the Bengal Act of 1944 passed to the Province of
East Bengal as part of the Sovereign Dominion of
Pakistan by virtue of the provisions of s. 18 (3) of the
Indian Independence Act, 1947, which provided that
"the law of British India and of the several parts
thereof immediately before the appointed day shall,
so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, continue as the law of each of the new Dominions
and the several pai;rs thereof until other provision is
made by the laws of the legislature of the Dominion
in question or by any other legislature or other authority having power in that behalf."
The question next arises whether there was a transfer of any "liability" by the Order as contemplated in
article 12(2). Mr. Sen Gupta relied in this connection
on article 10 (2) (a) which provides that "where immediately before the appointed day the Province of
Bengal is subject to any such liability (i.e., "any liability in respect of an actionable wrong other than breach
-0£ contract") referred to in sub-section (1) that liability
shall, where the cause of action arose wholly within
the territories which as from that day, are the territories of the Province of East Bengal be a liability of
that Province." It was contended that the Province
:I>
•
S.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11
19SO
of Bengal was, according to the plaintiff's case, liable
to be restrained from proceeding with the illegal and
The State of
f"ripura
unauthorised assessment on the basis of the notice
issued under the Bengal Act of 1944, and that liability, 7"e Province
"· of
Btut Be111al
in respect of which the cause of action arose wholly in
Dacca (where the assessment proceeding had been Patonjali-Sastri J.
initiated) within the territories of the Province of East
Bengal, became a liability of that Province. The High
Court rejected this contention on the ground "that article 10(2) is concerned with the liability for an actionable wrong other than breach of contract and it is impossible to say that by serving a notice on the plaintiff
under the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act through
one of its officers the Province of Bengal had committed an actionable wrong. Assuming that it exceeded
its power or acted under an invalid provision of law,
the plaintiff may have a declaration to that effect but
the Act complained of cannot be said to have been a
tortious act. But even assuming that it was, it is to
be remembered that the issue of the notice was an
exercise of powers conferred by the Act in relation to
the sovereign rights of the Crown and it is elementary
that the Crown or the State is not answerable for even
negligent or tortious acts of its officers done in the
course of their official duties imposed by a statute,
except where the particular act was specifially directed and the Crown profited by performance ...... No
liability for an actionable wrong is thus involved in
the suit and Dr. Sen Gupta cannot establish a right
to proceed against the Province of East Bengal on
the basis that the liability was transferred to that
Province under article 10(2) of the Order."
We arc unable to share this view. The learned
Judges have placed much too narrow a construction
on the phrase "liability in respect of an actionable
wrong". They have assumed that the phrase cannotes
only a liability for damages for a completed tortious
act and that the initiation of what according to the
plaintiff was an unauthorised and illegal assessment
proceeding by purporting to serve a notice requiring
the plaintiff to submit a return of his total agricultural income under s. 24(2) of the Bengal Agricultural
12
1950
Th State of
Tripura
..
The Province of
East &nga/
Patanja/i Sa!lti J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
Income-tax Act, 1944, through an appropriate officer
functioning under that Act, the Province of Bengal
had not committed an "actionable wrong." This in
our opinion, is not a correct view of the matter. Under
s. 9( l) (b) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the
Governor-General of British India was directed to
make provision by order "for dividing between the new
Dominions and between the new Provinces to be constituted under this Act, the powers, rights, property,
duties and liabilities of the Governor-General in Council or as the case may be of the relevant Provinces which
under this Act are to cease to exist", and the Indian
Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order
is the only Order by which such provision was made.
The intention being thus to provide for the initial
1istribution of rights, property and liabilities as
between the two Dominions and their Provinces, a wide
and liberal construction, as far as the language used
would admit, should be placed upon the terms of the
Order, so as to leave no gap or lacuna in relation to
the matters sought to be provided for. There is no
reason, accordingly, why the words "liability in respect of an actionable wrong" should be understood in
the restricted sense of liability for damages for completed tortious acts. We consider that the words are apt
to cover the liability to be restrained by injunction. from
completing what on the plaintiff's case was an illegal
or unauthorised act already commenced. The service
of the notice on the plaintiff under s. 24(2) of the Bengal Act amounts to much more than a mere threat in
the abstract to impose an illegal levy. It is the actual
initiation of an illegal assessment proceeding which,
in the normal course, will in all probability culminate
in an illegal levy of tax. The failure to make a return
as required by the notice would result under s. 25(5)
of the Act in the Income-tax Officer making an er parte
assessment to the best of his judgment and determining the sum payable by the assessee on the basis of
such assessment. Such failure would also expose the
plaintiff under s. 32(1) of the Act to· the imposition of
a penalty which may equal the amount of the tax
assessed on him or to a prosecution as for an offence
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
13
1950
before a Magistrate under s. 53(1), at the option· of
the Income-tax authority. It is thus plain that the
The State uf
Tripura
service of a notice requiring a return of income to be
v.
furnished for assessment under the Act is a step The Province of
East Bengal
fraught with serious consequences to the assessee, and
if the assessment proposed was illegal and unautho- Patanjali Sa~trl J,
rised by reason of the Act itself being ultra vires in so
far as it purported to make the Rulers of Indian
States liable to taxation thereunder as contended for
by the plaintiff, the service of such notice marked the
commencement of a wrongful act against the plaintiff
by the Bengal Government under colour of the Act
and there can be no doubt that such wrongful act is
actionable in the sense that an action would lie in a
civil court for an m1unction restraining its completion. That was the liability to which the Province of
Bengal was subject according to the plaintiff's case at
the time when he instituted the suit, and that liability,
in our opinion, passed to the Province of East Bengal
by virtue of article 10(2) (a) of the Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947.
There is no question here of the liability of the Crown
for damages for the negligent or tortious act of its officers. On the allegations in the plaint, which must, for
the p1,1rpose of deciding the question of jurisdiction as
a preliminary issue, be assumed to be well-founded, the
Province of Bengal was undoubtedly · liable to be sued
for an injunction restraining it from proceeding with
the assessment and none the less so because the notice
was served in purported exercise of powers conferred
by the Bengal Act. The name of the Income-tax
Officer originally impleaded as the second defendant
having been struck off the record, no question in
regard to his liability arises.
Reference was made to· certain text-books where
a "tort" is spoken of as an "actionable wrong" and
it was suggested that the two expressions are
synonymous.
Every tort is undoubtedly an actionable wrong but the converse does not necessarily
follow. Indeed, the words "other than breach of
contract" used in article 10 (1) make it plain that the
expression "actionable wrong" is used in a wider sense
2-8 S. C. India/67
14
1950
The State of
Tripura
y.
The Province of
East Bengal
Pat njali Sastri J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1951]
which would have included breach of contract but for
those limiting words.
It was said that even assuming that the service of
the notice calling for a return of income was a wrongful act, it was not "actionable'', as s. 65 of the Bengal
Act barred suits in civil courts "to set aside or modify
any assessment made under this Act". The short
answer to this contention is that the suit in question
is not a suit "to set aside or modify an assessment"
made under the Act, as no assessment had yet been
made when it was instituted, and the subsequent
completion of the assessment was made by the Pakistan
Income-tax authorities on terms agreed to between
the parties and sanctioned by the Court. The decision
of the Privy Council in Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v.
Governor-General in Council (') relied on in support of
the contention is distinguishable, as the main relief
claimed there was repayment of the tax alleged to
have been wrongfully levied under colo~r of an ultra
vires provision in the Indian Income-tax Act. Their
Lordships observed :
"In form the relief claimed does not profess to
modify or set aside the assessment. In substance it
does, for repayment of part of the sum due by virtue
of the notice of demand could not be ordered so long as
the assessment stood. Further, the claim for the
declaration cannot be rationally regarded as having
any relevance except as leading up to the claim for
repayment, and the claim for an injunction is merely
verbiage. The cloud of words fails to obscure the
point of the suit."
The pos11:ton here is entirely different. The gist
of the wrongful act complained of in the present case
is subjecting the plaintiff to the haras5ment and
trouble by commencing against him an illegal and
nnauthorised assessment proceeding which may eventually result in an unlawful imposition and levy of tax.
It was suggested, somewhat faintly, that the cause
of action for the suit, though stated in the plaint to
have arisen in Dacca, now in the Province of East
(I) [1947) F.C.R. 59.
S.C.R.
Iii_
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
15
1950
Bengal, did not arise wholly within the territories of
the Province of East Bengal within the meaning of
The Sta~ of
.J'ripura
Article 10(2) (a) inasmuch as the notice calling for a
. v.
return, though issued from Dacca, was received by The Province of
East Bengal
the Manager of the Estate at Agartalla in Tripura
State. Assuming that the contention has any substance Pattm}ali Sastri J.
it is of no assistance to the respondent, for article 10
(2) ( c) would then be applicable to the case and the Province of East Bengal would still be liable, though
jointly with the Province of West Bengal.
We are therefore of opinion that the Province of
East Bengal having succeeded to the liability to
which the Province of Bengal was subject immediately
before the appointed day, the former Province is to be
·deemed to be substituted for the other Province as a
·pa1 cy to the suit and the suit must accordingly continue in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore,
which has jurisdiction to proceed with it under article
4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings)
Order, 1947.
In this view it is unnecessary to consider the
question of submission to jurisdiction urged in the
alternative by the appellant.
In the result the appeal is allowed, the order of
the Court below is set aside and the suit now pending
in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore will
be heard and determined by it. The respondent will
pay the appellant's costs throughout.
F AZL Au J.-The question to be decided in this
appeal is whether the Subordinate Judge's . Court at
Alipore in the State of West Bengal, has jurisdiction
to try a suit in which the Province of East Bengal was
impleaded as a defendant, after the 15th August,
1947. In what circumstances this · question has arisen
will appear from the facts of the case which may be
briefly stated.
In 1944, the Bengal Legislature passed an Act
called the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944
(Bengal Act IV of 1944), which enabled it to impose
a tax on the agricultural income of various classes
Faz Ali J
16
1950
The State of
Tripura
~
v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Faz/ All J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
of persons including "every Ruler of an Indian State",
holding lands within the territory of Bengal. The
appellant, who is the Ruler of the State of Tripura,
holds a zamindary called Chakla Roshanabad Estates,
whicl1 was situated in the Province of Bengal and
in the District of Sylliet formerly appertaining to the
Province of Assam. On the 28th February, 1945,
the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Dacca Range,
issued a notice under section 24 (2) of the Bengal
Act to the Manager of the Chakla Roshanabad
Estates calling upon him to furnish a return of the
appellant's total agricultural income for the previous
year, derived from lands situated within the Province of Bengal. On the 12th June, 1945, the
appellant instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Dacca, against the Province of Bengal
and the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Dacca Range,
claiming the following reliefs :( 1) For a declaration that the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, so far as it imposes a
liability
to pay agricultural income-tax on the
plaintiff is ultra vires and void and that the plaintiff
is not bound by the same.
(2) For a declaration that in any case the notice
served by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Dacca
Range, above referred to, is void and of no effect and
that no assessment can be made on the basis of that
notice.
(3) For a perpetual injunction to restrain the
defendants from taking any steps to assess the
plaintiff to agricultural income-tax.
On the 15th July, 1945, the suit was transferred
to the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore in
the District of 24 Parganas, by an Order of the
Calcutta High Court. While the ~uit was still pending,
the new Province of East Bengal, whicli forms part of
the territories of the Dominion of Pakistan, came into
existence on the 15th August, 1947, as a result of the
Indian Independence Act, 1947, and it appears that
the whole of Chakla Roshanabad Estates falls within
that Province. After the creation of the new Province,
t
S.C.R.
-f
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
17
a petition was field on the 9th December, 1947, on
behalf of the Province of East Bengal, drawing the
attention of the Court at Alipore to the fact that the
Province of West Bengal, which forms part of the.
territories of the Dominion of India, was taking no
interest in the suit and asking the Court to accept a
written statement which was also filed along with the
petition, and in which the only plea taken was that
the Alipore Court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit
or make any order of injunction against the Province
of East Bengal or defendant No. 2. The last paragraph
of the written statement was to the following effect :"The Province of East Bengal appears only to
contest the jurisdiction of the court and it submits
that the suit should be dismissed on that ground."
Later on, the Province of East Bengal was impleaded as a defendant in the suit and the name of
the Income-tax Officer of Dacca was temoved from .
the category of defendants. The Subordinate Judge
then proceeded to try the question of jurisdiction as a
preliminary issue, and decided that by virtue of the
provisions of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, read with section 9 of the Indian
Independence Act, 1947, the Court had jurisdiction to
try the suit against the new Province. Thereupon,
the respondent (the Province of East Bengal) moved
the High Court at Calcutta under section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, against the order of the
Subordinate Judge, and a Bench of the High Court
consisting of Harries C. J. and Chakravarthi J. allowed the application and set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge, giving effect to the objection of the
respondent that the Court at Aliporc was not competent to try the suit against the Province of East Bengal.
One of the points raised on behalf of the appellant
before the High Court was that the Province of East
Bengal had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Subordinate Judge's Court, but this point was negatived. The appellant was thereafter granted a certificate under section 205 (1) of the Government of
India Act, 1935, and on the basis of it he has preferred
this appeal.
19SO
The State of
Trlpura
v.
The Province of
Ea3tBengal
Fazl ;fli J,
18
1950
The State of
1ilpura
v.
The Province of
Ea'1 Bengal
Faz/ Ali I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19511
On a reference to the judgments of the learned
Subordinate Judge and the High Court, it appears that
three provisions were relied upon by the appellant in
support of his contention that the Court at Alipore had
jurisdiction to try the suit, these being section 9 of the
Indian Independence Act, 1947, article 4 of the
Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947,
[hereinafter referred to as 'the Legal Proceedings
Order'], and section 12 of the Indian Independence
(Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947, [hereinafter referred to as 'the Rights, etc., Order'].
These provisions run as follows :Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act :"The Governor-General shall by order make such
provision as appears to him to be necessary or
expedient( a) for bringing the provisions of this Act into
effective operation;
(b) for dividing between the new Dominions,
and between the new Provinces, to be constituted
under this Act, the powers, rights, property, duties
and liabilities of the Governor-General in Council or,
as the case may be, of the relevant Provinces which,
under this Act, are to cease to exist. ....... "
Section 4 of the Legal Proceedings Order :"Notwithstanding the creation of certain new
Provinces and the transfer of certain territories from
the Province of Assam to the Province of East Bengal
by the Indian Independence Act, 1947,( 1) all proceedings pending immediately before
the appointed day in any civil or criminal court (other
than a High Court) in the Province of Bengal, the
PPnjab or Assam shall be continued in that court as if
the said Act had not been passed, and that court shall
continue to have for the purposes of the said proceedings all the jurisdiction and powers which it had
immediately before the appointed day;
(2) any appeal or application for revision in
respect of any proceedings so pending in any such
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19
court shall lie in the court which would have appellate,
or as the case may be revisional, jurisdiction over that
court if the proceedings were instituted in that court
after the appointed day; and
(3) effect shall be given within the territories . of
either of the two Dominions to any judgment, decree,
order, or sentence of any such court: in the said
proceedings, as if it had been passed by a court of
competent jurisdiction within that Dominion."
Section 12 of the Rights, etc. Order :" ( 1) Where immediately before the appointed
day, the Governor-General in Council is a party to
any legal proceedings with respect to any property,
rights or liabilities transferred by this Order, the
Dominion which succeeds to the property, rights or
liabilities in accordance with the provisions of this
Order shall be deemed to be substituted for the
Governor-General in Council as a party to the proceedings, and the precedings may continue accordingly.
(2) Where any Province from which property,
rights or liabilities are transferred by this Order is,
immediately before the transfer, - a party to legal
proceedings with respect to that property or those
rights or liabilities, the Province which succeeds to
the property, rights or liabilities of this Order shall
be deemed to be substituted for the other Province as
a party to those proceedings, and the proceedings may
continue accordingly.
(3) Any proceedings which, immediately before
the appointed day, are pending by or against the
Secretary of State elsewhere than in the United Kingdom in respect of any liability of the Governor-General
in Council or a Province shall.(b) in the case of proceedings in respect of the
Province of Bengal, the Province of the Punjab, or the
Province of Assam, be continued by or against the
Province which succeeds to the liability ...... "
The learned Subordinate Judge based his judgment entirely upon s. 4 of the Legal Proceedings
19$0
The State of
Tripura
·v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Faz! Ali J.
20
19SO
Th• State of
Tripura
....
77rt Province of
Ea•t Bengal
Faz/ All J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1951]
Order, but the High Court has pointed out that that
Order standing by itself can be of no help to the
appellant. According to the High Court, that section
might have enabled the appellant to prosecute his suit
against the Province of Bengai but it could not enable
him to continue the suit against the new Province
without invoking s. 12 (2) of the Rights, etc. Order,
which provides among other things that the Province
which succeeds to the rights or liabilities of the old
· Province of Bengal by virtue of that Order shall be
deemed to be substituted for the latter as a party to
the pending proceedings. In my opinion, this is the
correct view. It was urged before us that a Court
which had jurisdiction to try a suit against a party
would, by reason of what is provided in s. 4 of the
Legal Proceedings Order, naturally have jurisdiction
to substitute the heir or legal representative of that
party. Generally speaking, this must be so, but, in
the present case, the Province of East Bengal which
forms part of another sovereign State could not be
automatically substituted for the Province of Bengal,
unless the substitution was permitted by some provision of the Indian Independence Act or any of the
Orders issued thereunder. The whole case thus rests on
the proper construction of section 12(2) of the Rights,
etc., Order. In the High Court, it was strenuously
urged on behalf of the appellant that section 12(2) is
fully applicable to the present case on account of certain rights having been transferred to the Province of
East Bengal from the old Province of Bengal. This
argument was reiterated in this Court also, but it is
obviously untenable, for the reasons set out in the
judgment of the High Court. As has been pointed
out by the High Court, s. 12(2) is of no help to the appellant, unless the rights in question were transferred
by the Rights, etc. Order itself. The learned counsel
for the appellant however failed to point out any
provision of this Order, by which any of the rights
referred to by him had been transferred.
He had therefore to fall back upon an alternative
argument based on s. 10(2) of the same Order; and
the point to be decided by this Court has thus
•
S.C.R.
21
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
crystallized into one simple issue, namely, whether s.
10(2) of the Order can be of any avail to the appellant.
Section 10(2) must be read with s. 10(1). and the
material part of these two sub.sections runs as
follows:-
.,
"10(1) Where immediately before the appointed
day the Governor-General in Council is subject to any
liability in respect of an actionable wrong other than
breach of contract, that liability shall,( a) where the cause of action arose· wholly
within the territories which, as from that day, are the
·territories of the Dominion of India, be a liability of
that Dominion; . . . . . . . .
·
(2) Where immediately before the .appointed
day the Province of Bengal is subject to any such
liability as aforesaid, that liability shall,
(a) where the cause of action arose wholly
within the territories which, as from · that day, are the
territories of the Province of East Bengal, be a
liability of that Province;
·
(b) where the cause of action arose wholly
within the territories which. as from that day, are
the territories of the Province of West Bengal, be a
liability of that Province: and
( c) in any other case, be a joint liability of the
Provinces of East and West Bengal."
•
•
•
•
It is quite clear that for the application of section 10(2), it is necessary to show inter alia that the
Province of Bengal was subject to a liability in respect
of an actionable wrong other than a breach of contract.
A reference to any book on tort will show that the
words used in sub.s. (1) are commonly used to define
a tort. A tort has been defined in Stroud's Judicial
Dictionary, Second Edition, page 2072, as a wrong
independent of contract, and it is also so described
in the common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16
Viet., c. 76), in Halsbury's Laws of England and in
many textbooks. The difference between "a wrong
independent of contract" and "a wrong other than a
1950
1le State of
Tripura
v.
The Province of
Ea$tBengal
Fazl All J,
22
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Piovince of
East Bengal
Faz/ Ail J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
breach of contract" is merely verbal and has little
significance. A tort is also often referred to as "an
. actionable wrong" and the two expressions have been
synonymously used by eminent writers including
Sir Frederick Pollock and Professor Burdick of America, who has designated his well-known book on the
law of torts as "a concise treatise on civil liability for
actionable wrongs to person and property". Whether
the expression can be taken to be a complete definition of a tort may be questioned, because as Addison
has pointed out in his book on torts, "to say that a
tort is an actionable wrong leaves undefined the term
'actionable wrong'." But there can be no doubt
that in legal parlance, the two expressions are assumed to be interchangeable.
There is also another matter to be borne in mind
in construing s. 10(2) of the Rights, etc. Order1 and
that is the well-recognized fact that the primary
and most common remedy for a tort is an action for
damages. That this is an important feature of a tort
is shown by the fact that in many textbooks an action
for damages has been made an integral part of the
definition of a tort. A few examples will make this
clear. A tort is defined by Salmond as "a civil wrong
for which the remedy is a common law action for
unliquidated damages and which is not exclusively the
breach of a contract or the breach of a trust or other
meFely equitable obligation."
Professor Winfield, ·
who did not see eye to eye with Salmond on many
matters connected with the law of torts, gives the
following definition of tortious liability :-"Tortious
liability arises form the breach of a duty primarily
fixed by the law; this duty is towards persons generally
and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages." In Underhill's law of torts, the
definition runs as follows:-"A tort is an act or
omission which is unauthorized by law and indepen'
dently of contract infringes (i) some absolute right of
another, etc., and (ii) gives rise to an action for
damages at the suit of the injured party." The learned
author after attempting to define a rort ii1 this wa}
goes on to state: "A tort is described in die. Common
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23
Law Procedure Act, 1852, as a wrong independent of
contract. If we use the word 'wrong' as equivalent
to violation of a right recognized and enforced by law
by means of an action for damages, the definition is
sufficiently accurate, but scarcely very lucid; for it
gives no due to what constitutes a wrong or violation
of a right recognized and enforced by law. It does,
however, emphasize the fact that an essential characteristic of a tort is that the appropriate remedy
for it is an- action for damages. An act or omission
which does not give rise to an action for damages is
not a tort."
It must be recognized that an injunction may also
be an appropriate remedy in a limited number of cases,
but it is not a remedy of universal application, and no
one has yet suggested that it may be treated as an
incident of tort.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it seems
to me to be permissible to infer, firstly, that s. 10 of
the Rights, etc., Order refers to liability for a tort,
and secondly that what · is contemplated there . is
pecuniary liability such as liability to damages. The
word "liability" has a wider meaning and also a
narrower meaning, and the latter would appear to be
the appropriate meaning where the word is used in
contrast to assets or something which corresponds to
or is· in the nature of assets, and where it is used in
plural or is preceded by an indefinite artic:le, e.g., when
the . expression "a liability" is used. We must remember that the purpose of the Rights, etc., Order
was, among other things, to divide or distribute the
rights, property and liabilities of the undivided
Province of Bengal between the two new Provinces.
Therefore, the view that the liabilities referred to in
s. 10 are liabilities capable of being ascertained in
terms of money and not liabilities in any abstract or
academic sense, is in consonance with the purpose of
the Order as well as the well-known fact that for a tort
the most common and appropriate remedy is an action
for pecuniary damages. This view is further confirmed
by rt>ading s. 13 (2) of the Rights, etc., Order, which.
runs thus:-
. 1950
The State of
Tripura
y.
The Province of
East Bengal
Fazl Ali J.
24
1950
The State of
T1ipura
v.
The P1ovince of
Ea3t Bengal
Fa2l A.Ii l.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
"Where by virtue of the preceding provisions of
this Order either of the Dominions or any Province
becomes subject to any liability, and it is just and
equitable that a contribution towards that liability
should be made by the other Dominion, or by another
Province, as the case may be, the other Dominion
shall make to the Dominion or Province primarily
subject to the liability such contribution in respect
thereof as, in default of an agreement, may be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal."
·
It should be noted that the words "becomes subject to any liability" used in the above provision
are practically the words which occur in s. 10 of the
same Order, and the language of s. 13(2) clearly shows
that the word "liability" must have been used in
the narrower sense of pecuniary liability, because
otherwise no question of contribution towards that
liability by the Dominion or Province would arise. It
will be also instructive to refer to Part VII, Chapter
III of the Government of India Act, 1935, the heading
of which is "Property, Contracts, Liabilities, and
Suits" and upon which the Rights, etc., Order appears
to have been moddled. In s. 179 of the Government
of India Act, 1935, which occurs in this Chapter, the
clue to the meaning of the word 'liability' is furnished
by the provision that "any sum ordered to be paid by
way of debt, damages or costs in any such proceedings,
and any costs or expenses .......... shall be paid out
of the revenues of the Federation or the Province, as
the case may be ...... " I think that it will be quite
a fair construction to hold that what is contemplated
in section 10 of the Rights, etc., Order is that the
liability referred to therein would be met out of the
revenues of the Province concerned.
The construction I have suggested appears to me
to represent what the framers of the Order must have
intended to convey by the words "liability in respect
of an actionable wrong'', but, lest it should be said
that it is too narrow a construction, I shall deal with
the matter more fully giving to the words "actionable
wrong" and "liability" as wide a meaning as they can
'
'
S.C.R.
i
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
bear in a legal context. Proceeding on this footing,
the first question to be asked is: What is a wrong
other than a breach of contract? In answering this
question, it is neither possible nor helpful to ignore all
that has been said in authoritative textbooks and
judgments in dealing with the question of a tort,
because the foundation of every tort is a wrong or a
wrongful act. It is true that at one time some of the
writers were inclined to think that "there was no
English law of tort but there was merely an English
law of torts, that is, a list of acts and omissions which
under certain conditions were actionable." But, now,
the view has considerably broadened, and, generally
speaking, it is acknowledged that "torts are infinitely
various-not limited or confined" (see Chapman v.
Pick_ersgill1), and that wherever there is an injury by
the invasion of a right, a wrong or a tort il committed. This is often conveyed by the expression injuria
sine damnum. The word "wrong" has been used in
sections 17, 18 and 19 of the O:xle of Civil Procedure,
and .the following extract from Mulla's commentary
thereon will show how this word has been construed:"Wrong means a tort or actionable wrong, i.e., an
act which is legally wrongful as prejudicially affecting
a legal right of the plaintiff."
Underhill also construes "wrong" in the same
sense, because a wrong is, according to him, equivalent
to violation of a right recognised and enforced by
law by means of an action for damages. I think
therefore that in view of all that has been written and
said on the subject, it may be safely stated that a
wrong must consist of the following elements :( 1) There must be an act or omission amounting to an infringement of a legal right of a person or a
breach of legal duty towards him; and
(2) The act or omission must have caused harm
or damage to that person in some way, the damage being either actual or presumed.
These two elements are denoted by two Latin
expressions, injuria and damnum. I have to include
(1) [1762) 2 Wits. ·146, per Pratt C.J.
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Province oj
East Bengal
Fazl Ali J.
26
19SO
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Pronce of
East Bengal
Faz! Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
presumed damage under the second head, because in
certain cases mch as trespass, assault, false imprisonment, etc., the invasion of a right may be so flagrant
that "the law conclusively presumes damage." See
observations of Lord Wright M. R. in Nicholls v. Ely
Beet Sugar Factory('). Such cases are often described
as cases of absolute liability or cases where a tort is
actionable per se without proof of damage.
Let us then see whether the two elements of an
actionable wrong are present in this case. For this
purpose, we must examine the best and most plausible
statement of the appellant's case which may be put
more or less in the following way :The issue of a notice, which .has been referred to
in paragraph 5 of the plaint calling upon the appellant
to furnisR a return of his total agricultural income
derived from lands situated within the Province of
Bengal, was the first step in the initiation of an illegal
assessment proceeding which was likely to lead to an
illegal levy of tax, and the commencement of an illegal
proceeding in this manner gave a right of action to the
appellant and entitled him to claim an injunction
restraining the defendants from completing the proceeding. Such being the position, the case is covered by
section 10 of the Order under consideration, the words
used there being wide enough to cover liability to be
restrained by an injunction from completing an illegal
or unauthorized act already commenced. Consequently,
the liability to be so restrained must be deemed to
have been transferred to the Province of East Bengal,
by virtue of section 10 of the Rights, etc., Order.
This may appear to be a plausible way of putting
the case, but, when we subject it to a close scrutiny,
we find that even on the above statement the true re- ·
quirements of the material provision are not satisfied.
If we confine ourselves to something which has
happened, as opposed to something which may happen
in future, that is to say, if we look for an act or omission which must be the foundation of every wrong,
we find that all that is said to have. happened in this
(1) [1931) 2 Cb. 84.
'
'
'
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
case is the issuing of a notice, which is not some un- ·
authorised or prim a fade unlawful act but is an act
done under the authority of a statute and enjoined by
it. It has to be borne in mind that the attack in the
plaint is not against the whole Act but all that is contended is that only a particular provision of it is ultra
vires. The contention comes to this, that the issuing
of a notice against every person other than the Ruler
of an Indian State would have been a perfectly legitimate act, but the issuing of a notice against a Ruler is
ultra vires. But that is not enough to constitute a
wron3. What has to be shown is that the issuing of
the notice is a wrongful act,· i.e., it amounts to an
infringement of some right. What known right of
person or property or any other description it infringes is not at all clear; nor has that been stated in the
pleadings. It is conceded that there has been no
assessment and no realization of any tax and it could
not also be disputed that it was open to the appellant
to show to the assessing authority that he was not
assessable at all. To say that a notice is the .first step
in the initiation of an illegal assessment proceeding,
does not carry the matter further, but it would seem
to be merely a piece of verbiage used to obscure the
fund:imental weakness of the appellant's case. Construing "wrong" as it should be construed, the essential thing to find out is in what way a right has
been infringed or there has been a breach of duty. It
is the appellant's own case that the suit is for a threatened or apprehended wrong, but that very expression
shows that the suit has been brought before the alleged
wrong was committed.
The other element· of a wrong, namely, that the
person should have sustained some harm or injury,
is also wanting in this case. It is not the case of the
appellant that the notice has in any way caused any
actual damage to him. Nor is it suggested that this is
one of those cases in which damage should be presumed.
All that is said is that the notice was likely to
entail trouble and harassment to the appellant, but
that by itself will not constitute a wrong.
1950
The State of
Ttiputa
v.
The province of
East Bengal
Fazl Ali J.
28
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Province of
East Bell/la/
Faz/ All J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
The matter may be tested in another way. As Underhill points out, "an act or omission which does
not give rise to an action for damages is not a tort."
To the same effect is the following observation in
Salmond's Law of Torts :-"No civil injury is to be
classed as a tort unless the appropriate remedy for
it is an action for damages. Such an action is an
essential characteristic of every true tort." Again,
Professor Winfield says that an action for unliquidated damages is the one sure test of tortious liability and
has cited cases where this statement has received judicial approval. I think these statements will be equally
true if we drop the word "tort" and substitute the
words "actionable wrong" in its place. It follows
that one of the tests of an actionable wrong is that
while other remedies also may be open to the plaintiff,
an action for damages is the primary remedy for it.
Can the appellant in this case maintain a suit for
damages on the allegations made by him in his plaint ?
As I have already stated, a reference to the plaint
shows that no damages has been either alleged or
claimed and it has also not been stated that the appellant is entitled to any damage. In Rogers v. Ra;endro
D11tt(') the Privy Council stated that "it is essential
to an action in ton that the act complained of
should be legally wrongful as regards the party
complaining ; that is, it must prejudicially affect
him in some legal right." Again, it was observed
in Kali Kischen Tagoor v. /odoo Lal Mullick( 2 ) that
"there may be, where a right is interfered with
injuria sine damno sufficient to found an action ;
but no action can be maintained if there is neither
damnum nor iniuria." It seems to me therefore that
in the absence ·of the two elements to which I have
referred, no case for liability in respect of an actionable wrong has been made out, and it is wholly·
inappropriate to invoke section 10 of the Rights, etc.,
Order in the present case.
It appears that the whole of the appellant's
arguments has been woven round the following two
matters :(I) s. Moore's I. A. 103 at p. 135.
(2) 6 I.A. 190.
a ..
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
29
(1) Injunction is a recognized form of action; and
(2) Injunction has been asked for in the J)t"esent
case, in connection with something which is said to be
likely to culmffiate in a wrong.
1
If
as envisaged
is however very
The situation
different from what is contemplated in section 10 of
the Rights, etc., Order, which is liability for an
actionable wrong and not liability for something which
may become a wrong in future. It is to be remembered
that there are two words used in the section, viz.,
actionable adn wring. The mere fact that a matter is
actionable will not bring the case within the four
corners of section 10 of the Order, unless all the
elements of a wrong are established.
I think it will be appropriate at this stage to say
a few words about the remedy by way of an injunction
in cases where an actionable wrong is said to have
been committed. It cannot be disputed that injunction
is one of the remedies in certain cases of torts. As
Addison has pointed out, "the origin of the remedy by
way of an injunction is to be found in the inadequacy
of the legal remedy by way of damages in many of
the more serious wrongs, such as continuing trespasses
and nuisances, where a wrongful act has been done
and there was an intention to continue doing it.
(See Addision's Law of Torts, 8th Edn. 111). Injunction will also be granted to prevent a threatened injury
or wrong, if it can be shown that the threatened act jf
carried into execution will lead to violation of. a right
and such will be the inevitable result. As was pointed
out in an English case, the interference of the court in
these cases is founded on its jurisdiction to give relief
in the shape of preventive justice in order to protect
properties and rights from that which, if completed,
would give a right of action. These two cases in which
an injunction may be issued stand on two different
footings, and the liability to an m1unction does
not necessarily and always amount to "liability in
respect of an actionable wrong". The two liabilities
may possibly coincide where there is a continuing
wrong and the injunction is intended to stop its
3-8 S. C, Jndia/67
1950
The State of
Tripura
The Province of
East Bengal
Fazl Ali J.
30
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Faz/ Ali J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
LI951J
continuance. But, as I have already stated, where no
wrong has been committed, it would require considerable straining of the meaning of familiar legal expressions to say that "liability in respect of an actionable
wrong" is identical with "liability to an injunction in
respect of an apprehended wrong". "Liability in respact of an actionable wrong" means liability when an
actionable wrong has been committed. It cannot mean
liability to be prevented from a wrong which is apprehended. Nor can the liability which is contemplated
in section 10 of the Rights, etc., Order be created by the
mere filing of a suit in which an injunction is claimed.
I should like to refer here to section 176 (1) of the
Government of India Act, 1935, which provides as
follows:"The Federation may sue or be sued by the name
of the Federation of India and a Provincial Government may sue or be sued by the name of the Province,
and, without prejudice to the subsequent provisions
of this chapter, may, subject to any provisions which
may be made by Act of the Federal Legislature or a
Provincial Legislature enacted by virtue of powers
conferred on the Legislature by this Act, sue or be
sued in relation to their respective affairs in like cases
as the Secretary of State in Council might have sued
or been sued if this Act had not been passed."
This section is d ivisible into two parts. The first
part states as to which authority should be named as
a plaintiff or as a defendant in a suit brought by or
against the Crown or the Government, and the second
part deals with cases in which the Federal or the
Provincial Government may sue or be sued. To
understand the latter provision the section is to be
read with section 65 of the Government of India
Act, 1858, and section 32 of the Government of India
Act, 1915. Section 65 of the Act of · 1858 enacted
that"the Secretary of State in Council shall and may
sue and be sued as well in India as in England by the
name of the Secretary of State in Council as a body
corporate; and all persons and bodies politic shall and
,
•
•
S.C.R.
,'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
31
may have and take the same suits, remedies and
proceedings, legal and equitable against the Secretary
of State in Council of India as they could have done
against the said Company." (East India Co.)
The same provlSlon is substantially made in
section 32 of the Act of 1915. Such being the law,
the question has been posed in a number of cases from
very early days as to whether, and, if so, in what
cases, the Secretary of State would be liable for a
wrong or a tort committed by the servants of the
Crown, end it has now been definitely held that he
may be liable in certain cases. So far as the present
discussion is concerned, the following three points
which emerge from a careful perusal of a large number
of cases be:u:ing on the subject, seem to be
material:(1) The principles of the law of torts have been
consistently applied in all cases dealing with the
liability of the Secretary of State for wrongs committed
by the servants or agents of the Crown or the
Government.
(2) It is settled law that the Secretary of State
cannot be held liable for wrongs committed by the
servants of the Crown in the performance of duties
imposed by the Legislature : [See Shivabhajan v.
Secretary of State for India(1). James Evans v. Secretary of state(2). Tobin v.Reg( 3 ). Ross v. Secretary of
State('), in which this principle is fully explained and
the reasons upon which it is based, are clearly set out].
(3) It is also well-settled that where a statute
specially authorizes a certain act to be done by a
certain person, which would otherwise be unlawful or
actionable, on action will lie for the doing of the act.
1
On these principles, it would appear that neither
the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, who has now
been dismissed out of action, nor the Province of East
Bengal, could be said to be subject to a liability in
respect of an actionable wrong, assuming that an
It must
actionable wrong has been committed.
{I) I.L.R. 28 Born. 314.
(2) A.I.R. 1920 Lah. 364.
(3) 16 C.B.N.S. 310.
(4) I.L.R. 1915 Mad. 434.
1950
The State of
Tripma
v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Faz/ Ali J.
32
1950
The State of
Tripu1a
v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Fail Ali /.
SuPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951)
however be stated that this conclusion rests on the
assumption that my construction of an actionabk
wrong is correct.
It was contended that in deciding the present
3ppeal, we must assume all the facts stated in the
plaint to be correct and therefore assume that the
Bengal Act is ultra vires and the notice issued was
without authority. I have already pointed out that
the whole Act is not attacked, but only one single
provision thereof is said to be ultra vires, and I shall
show later, when I deal with section 65 of the Bengal
Act, that even the assumption we are asked to make
will not bring the case within section 10 of the Rights,
etc., Order.
Mr. Setalvad, the learned Attorney-General of
India, who intervened on behalf of the Union of India
in the appeal, supported the judgment of the High
Court on three main grounds, which may be summed
up as follows :(1) that the words used in section 10 of the
Rights, etc., Order do not cover this case, hecause here
no wrong has been actually committed and a threatened wrong is different from an actual wrong ;
(2) that section 65 of the Bengal Agricultural
Income-tax Act is a bar to the suit; and
(3) that the present suit must in any event end
m an infructuous decree and should not he allowed
to be pursued.
I have already dealt with the first point, and
wish simply to add that the point which is now
pressed is not specifically raised in the Memorandum
of Appeal presented in this Court, nor is there any
trace of it in the Statement of Case filed by the
appellant. The point which is mentioned in the
Memorandum of Appeal and the Statement of Case is
that section 12 of the Rights, etc., Order is applicable
to the present case, because certain rights have been
transferred from the old Province of Bengal to the
Province of East Bengal. There is however no mention of section IO of the Order, nor is it stated that
liability to an injunction brings the case within that
'
•
•
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
33
section.
Thus, a notable feature of the case is that
almost every argument which was advanced in the
courts below is to be discarded, and we are asked to
base our decision on a point, which is not urged in the
Statement of the Case, and which, in accordance
with the rules of practice of this Court, cannot
ordinarily be entertained.
The second point urged by Mr. Setalvad is based
on section 65 of the Bengal Act, which runs as
follows:"No suit shall be brought in any Civil Court to
set aside or modify any assessment made under this
Act, and no prosecution, suit or other proceeding shall
lie against any officer of the Crown for anything in
good faith done or intended to be done under this Act."
Strictly speaking, this section does not apply to
the present case, as there has yet been no assessment and ex facie the appellant's suit cannot be regarded as a suit to set aside or modify any asst:ssment.
Mr. Setalvad however contends that this section must
be read with the decision of the Privy Council in
Raleigh Investment Co. v. Governor-General in
Council(1 ). That was a case under the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, the provisions of which are similar to
the provisions of the Bengal Act and which contains
a section (section 67) which is almost identical in
terms with section 65 of the latter Act. In that case,
an assessee paid under protest the tax assessed on
him and then brought a suit for the following
reliefs :(a) a declaration thdt certain provisions of the
Income-tax Act on which the .assessment was based
were ultra vires and so the assessment was illegal;
(b) an injunction
restraining
the
Income-tax
Department from making the assessments in future ;
(c) repayment of the sum assessed.
It was strongly contended upon the facts of the
case the section 67 of the Income-tax Act had no
application, but it was held by the Privy Council that
"though in form the relief claimed did not profess to
(1) [1947] F.C.R. 59.
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Province of
Ea3t Bengal
Faz/ Ali J.
34
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Faz! All J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Ll951J
modify or set aside the assessment, in substance it did,
because the repayment could not be ordered so
long as the assessment stood". It was further held
that an assessment made under the machinery provided by the Act, if based on a provision subsequently
held to be ultra vires was not a nullity but a mistake
of law in the course of its exercise. Lastly, it was held
that the Act contained machinery which enabled an
assessee to raise the question whether or not a particular provision of the Act bearing on the assessment
made upon him was ultra vires and that jurisdiction
to question the assessment otherwise than by use of
the machinery expressly provided by the Act appeared
to be inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay
arising by virtue of the assessment. The material part
of the judgment' on the last point runs as follows :"In construing the section it is pertinent in their
Lordships' opinion, to ascertain whether the Act
contains machinery which enables an assessee effectively
to raise in the Courts the question whether the particular provision of the Income-tax Act bearing on the
assessment made is or is not ultra vires. The presence of
such machinery, though by no means conclusive,
marches with a construction of the section which
denies an alternative jurisdiction to enquire into the
same subject-matter. The absence of such machinery
would greatly assist the appellant on the question of
construction and, indeed, it may be added that if
there were no such machinery and if the section affected to preclude the High Court in its ordinary civil
jurisdiction from considering a point of ultra vires,
there would be a serious question whether the opening
part of the section so far as it debarred the question of
ultra vires being debated, fell within the competence
of the Legislature.
In their Lordships' view it is clear that the
Income-tax Act, 1922, as it stood at the relevant date,
did give the assessee the right effectively to raise in
relation to an assessment made upon him the question
whether or not a provision in the Act was ultra vires.
Under section 30, an assessee whose only, ground of complaint was that effect had been given in the assessment
....
•
'
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
to a provision which he contended was ultra titres
might appeal against the assessment. If he were
dissatisfied with the decision on appeal-the details
relating to the procedure are immaterial-the assessee
could ask for a case to be stated on any question of law
for the opinion of the High Court and, if his request
were refused, he might apply to the High Court for an
order requiring a case to be stated and to be referred
to the High Court ........ It cannot be doubted that included in questions of law which might be raised
by a case stated is any question as to the validity of
any taxing provision in the Income-tax Act to which
effect has been given in the assessment under review.
Any decision of the High Court upon that question of
law can be reviewed on appeal. Effective_ and appropriate machinery is therefore provided by the Act itself
for the review on grounds of law of any assessment.
It is in that setting that section 67 has to be construed.
In conclusion their Lordships would observe that
the scheme of the Act is to. set up a particular machinery by the use of which alone total income assessable
for income-tax is to be ascertained. The income-tax
exigible is determined by reference to the total income
so ascertained and only by reference to such total
income. Under the Act (s. 45) there arises a duty to
pay the amount of tax demanded on the basis of that
assessment of total income.
Jurisdiction to question
the assessment otherwise than by use of the machinery
expressly provided by the Act would appear to be inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay arising
by virtue of the assessment. The only doubt, indeed,
in their Lordships' mind, is whether an express provision was necessary in order to exclude jurisdiction in
a civil Court to set aside or modify an assessment."
The authority of this decision was not questioned
before us, but it was pointed out firstly that the present suit is not hit by the first part of section 65 of the
Bengal Act, which refers only to suits to set aside or
modify any assessment and secondly, that if the case
is not covered by section 65, the decision of the Privy
Cour1cil, which was based on the construction of section
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Faz/ Ali J.
36
1950
The State of
Tripura
V•
The Province of
East Bengal
Faz/ Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
67 of the Income-tax Act, is not applicable. Mr. Setalvad, replying to the first contention, has urged
that we must not look merely to the letter of the section
but to the principle underlying it, and he has particularly, referred us to the fact that, strictly speaking,
the reliefs claimed in the abovementioned case do not
fall within the letter of section 67 of the Income-tax
Act and hence the Privy Council observed in that case :
"In form the relief claimed does not profess to modify
or set aside the assessment. In substance it does ....... .
The cloud of words fails to obscure the point of the
suit." However that may be, it seems to me that the
Privy Council in arriving at their decision, were influenced not only by the language of section 67 of the
Income-tax Act but also by the complete machinery
furnished by that Act for dealing with all questions
arising in regard to the assessment, including the question of ultttl vires as would appear from the fact that
while laying down that there was no jurisdiction to
question the assessment except by use of the machinery
expressly provided by the Act, their Lordships added :
"The only doubt, indeed, in their Lordships' mind, is
whether an express provision was necessary in order to
exclude jurisdiction in a civil court to set aside or
modify an assessme t." I think that, for the purpose
of understanding tl full scope of section 65. we must
read not only the rst part of the section which bars
suits to sot aside or modify an assessment, but also its
latter part which E ovides that "no suit or other proceeding shall lie ag inst any officer of the Crown for
anything in good fa h ...... intended to be done under
this Act." The la er part of the section clearly excludes the jurisdicti< t of the court to prevent the Income-tax Officer frc ll proceeding with an assessment
which has already be n started. Reference may here be
made to Secretary t
State v. Meyyappa Chettt:zr(')
where it was held tat the expression "intended to be
done" signified futud~y so as to preclude suits for iniunction in respect of proceedings 'intended' to be taken
by the Income-tax Officer. It is true that in terms the
provision concerns the Income-tax Officer only, but it
(1 )[1946] 14 l.T.R. 341, at 3S2.
,..
l
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
,
37
could hardly have been the intention of the Legislature
that though that Officer is not liable to be restrained
from proceeding with an assessment, the provision
which ensures such a result may be rendered nugatory
by permitting an injunction to be claimed against the
Provincial Government or the State. In my opinion,
it will be a strange construction of the section to hold
that although it bars suits to modify or set aside an
:assessment and though it bars all proceedings to restrain the Officer who is making the assessment from
proceeding with it, yet it leaves it open to a party to
stop an assessment by claiming an injunction against
the Provincial Government or the State instead of the
Officer concerned. There is no reference to the Provincial Government or the State at all in the first
for the second part of the section, but the section as a
whole concerns only with excluding the jurisdiction of
the civil court in regard to certain acts done or .
intended to be done in connection with the assessment
-0£ agricultural income-tax, and, on a fair construction, it must be held to bar all suits in connection with
such assessment.
In urging his third point, the learned AttorneyGeneral relied on an Ordinance passed by the
Governor-General of Pakistan on the 13th November,
1948, section 2 whereof runs as follows :"No judgment, decree, order or sentence referred
to in paragraph (3) of Article 4 of the Indian Indepredence ·(Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, shall affect
the legislative or executive right or authority of the
Central or any Provincial Government of Pakistan
and where such right or authority has been at issue,
the judgment, decree, order or sentence shall be
invalid and inoperative subject to any decision that
may be obtained from a competent court of the
Province concerned."
It was pointed out that by reason of this Ordinance, any decree which may be obtained in the present
suit would be wholly infructuous and in this view
this was a meaningless litigation which should not be
allowed to continue. There is force in this argument,
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Province oJ
East Bengal
Faz/ Ali J,
38
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Faz/ Ali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
but the point need not be pursued, as, in my opinion,
the first two points raised by the Attorney-General are
sufficient to meet the principal contention advanced
by the appellant.
The question of submission to jurisdiction
appears to me to be unarguable upon the facts stated,
and it was not seriously argued before us. The
Province of East Bengal did intervene and apply for
permission to file a written statement, but the onli
statement made by it was that the Court had no
jurisdiction to proceed with the suit. It cannot therefore be held that it had submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Court.
I have tried to deal with the question posed in
this appeal in all its material aspects, but it can, I
think, be disposed of on the simple ground that the
mere issuing of a notice under section 4 of the Bengal
Agricultural Income-tax Act by the Agricultural
Income-tax Officer cannot be held to be an actionable
wrong, because no right known to law can be said to
have been infringed thereby. One of the recognized
tests of an actionable wrong is that, while other remedies may also be open to the person to whom the
wrong is done, he can always maintain an action for
damages, on the principle that every injury imports
damage. I am however certain that no action for
damages can be maintained on the allegations made
by the appellant in his plaip.t. I think that the entire
argument urged on behalf of the appellant has been
sufficiently answered by the High Court in , the following passage which appears to me to sum up the legal
position accurately and concisely :"Nor was Dr. Sen Gupta right in relying on
article 10(2) for the fransfer of liabilities. That article
is concerned with liability for an actionable wrong
other than breach of contract and it is impossible to
say that by sen ing a notice on the plaintiff under the
Bengal Agricultural Income-tax· Act through one
of its officers, the Province of Bengal had committed
an actionable wrong.
Assuming it exceeded its
powers or acted under an invalid provision of law, the
plaintiff may ha~e a declaration to that effect, but the
•
•
S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
39
act complained of cannot be said to have been a
tortious act. But even assuming it was, it is to be
remembered that the issue of the notice was in exercise
of powers conferred by the Act in relation to the
Sovereign rights of the Crown and it is elementary
that the Crown or the State is not answerable for even
negligent or tortious acts of its officers done in the
course of their official duties imposed by statute, ex.
cept where the particular act was specifically directed
and the Crown profited by its performance. There is no
such allegation in the plaint in the present case. The
plaintiff could not therefore have sued the Province
of Bengal for an actionable wrong and the suit actual! y brought is not a suit of that character. It is a suit
for certain declarations and an injunction and does not
seek to make the Province liable for any actionable
wrong in any way. No liability for an actionable
wrong is thus involved in the suit and Dr. Sen Gupta
cannot establish a right to proceed against the Province of East Bengal on the basis that the liability was
transferred to that Province under article 10(2) of the
Order."
In the result, I would dismiss this appeal with
costs.
MuKHERJEA J.-1 agree with my learned brother
Patanjali Sastri J. that this appeal should be allowed
and I would desire to indicate briefly the reasons that
have weighed with me in coming to a conclusion
different from that arrived at by the learned Judges of
the Calcutta High Court.
All the material facts in relation to this case have
been set out with elaborate fullness in the judgment of
the High Court and I deem it quite unnecessary to
state them over again. The whole controversy centres
round the point as to whether the suit which was
instituted by the plaintiff appellant against the Province of Bengal , as it was prior to the 15th of August,
1947, and which is still pending in the Court of the
Subordinate Judge at Alipore can be continued against
the Province of East Bengal which has come into existence, as a part of the Dominion of Pakistan, upon the
1950
The State of
Tripura
. v.
TheProvince oJ
East Bengal
Faz/ Ali J.
Mukherjea J.
40
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
partition of Bengal under the Indian Independence
Act ; and whether the court of the Subordinate Judge
of Alipore which is a court in the Dominion of India
has any jurisdiction to proceed with and try such suit.
The Subordinate Judge decided these questions in
favour of the plaintiff appellant basing his decision
entirely upon article 4(1) of the Indian Independence
(Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, read with s. 9 of the
Indian Independence Act. The High Court in revision
set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge holding
. inter alia that neither article 4(1) of the Legal Proceedings Order nor article 12(2) of the Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947,
could confer upon the plaintiff any right to continue
the suit against the Province of East Bengal. The Alipore Court, it has been held, has no jurisdiction to proceed with the suit and no jurisdiction has been conferred upon it by reason of the Province of East Bengal
appearing in the suit and putting in a written statemem only for the purpose . of challenging the competency of the court to try the same. It is the propriety
of this decision that has been challenged before us in
this appeal.
The first point that requires consideration is
whether article 4(1) of the Legal Proceedings Order
has any application to the facts of the present case.
In my opinion, the answer to this question tnust be in
the negative and the view taken by the High Court on
this point seems to me to be perfectly sound and unassailable.
The Legal Proceedings Order as well as several
other orders dealing with various constitutional matters affecting the two Dominions which were to come
into being on and from the 15th of August, 1947, were
promulgated by the Governor-General of India just on
the previous day, that is to say, the 14th of August,
1947, in pursuance of section 9(1) of the Indian Independence Act which made it a duty on the part of the
Governor-General to make suitable provisions for
· removing the difficulties arising in connection with the
transition to the new constitutional order. As the two
•
•
i.
~
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41
Dominions came into existence under the Indian
Independence Act passed by tih.e Britiish Parliament
and these orders were made by the Governor-General
of India in exercise of the authority conferred upon
him by the Independence Act, there cannot be any
doubt that the provisions of these orders are fully
binding on India as well as the Dominion of Pakistan;
and they being provisions made to be applicable only
for the transitional period, the question does not really
arise as to whether or not they are in strict conformity
with the principles of International Law which would
ordinarily govern the relations between two sovereign
States.
Article 4(1) of the Legal Proceedings Order is
worded as follows :
<t
"Notwithstanding the creation of certain new
Provinces and the transfer of certain territories from
the Province of Assam to the Province of East Bengal
by the Indian Independence Act, 1947,( l) all proceedings pending immediately before
the appointed day in any civil or criminal court (other
than a High Court) in the Province of Bengal, the
Punjab or Assam shall be continued in that court as
if the said Act had not been passed, and that court
shall continue to have for the purposes of the said
proceedings all the jurisdiction and powers which it
had immediately before the appointed day."
The clause of the article is couched in very wide
language and under it all proceedings pending in any
civil or criminal court in the Province of Bengal, the
Punjab or Assam immediately before the 15th of
August, 1947, would continue as before and be heard
and tried by the courts before which they are pending
irrespective of the fact that such proceedings might
relate to persons or property situated in the other
Dominion. I agree with the High Court in 1io1ding that
comprehensive though the provision is, by itself it can
render no assistance to the plaintiff appellant. The suit
was commenced here by the plaintiff against the old
Province of Bengal as the party defendant and against
1950
The State of
Ttipura
y.
The Province of
East Bengal
MukherieaJ.
42
1950
The State of
Tripu a
v.
"The Province of
EaJt Bengal
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
that defendant the suit may be continued if the
plaintiff so chooses under article 4 (1) of the Legal
Proceedings Order mentioned above. But this would
be of no benefit or advantage to the plaintiff for what
he wants is to proceed against the Province of East
Bengal which is a part of the Dominion of Pakistan
as a substituted defendant in place of the Province of
Bengal. Dr. Sen Gupta argues that if the court has
jurisdiction to continue the suit, this would necessarily
carry with it the power to make proper orders for
substitution as the court considers necessary. But such
substitution could be made only under the ordinary
provisions of law which regulate the conduct of such
suits. There is no provision of any municipal law which
contemplates or authorises the substitution of one
sovereign state for another in a pending suit. If, therefore, the plaitiff wants to proceed against the new
Province of East Bengal, he must find warrant for it
in some of the provisions made by the GovernorGeneral of India in exercise of the powers vested in
him under the Indian Independence Act. Admittedly
there is no such provision in the Legal Proceedings
Act and reliance is, therefore, placed by the plaintiff
upon article 12 (2) o! the Rights, Property and
Liabilities Orders, 1947, which is in the following
terms:-
•
•
"Where any Province from which property, rights
or liabilities are transferred by this Order is, immediately before the transfer, a party to legal proceeding
with respect to that property or those rights or
liabilities, the Province which succeeds to the property, rights or liabilities in accordance with the
provisions of this Order shall be deemed to be substituted for the other Province as a party to those
proceedings,
and the
proceedings may continue
accordingly."
It is not disputed that in order to attract the operation of this provision, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff
to show that the right or liability to which his suit
relates has been transferred from the Province of
Bengal, as it existed prior to the 15th of August, 1947,
(
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
43
to the Province of East Bengal in Pakistan in accordance with the provisions of this Order. To establish
this, reliance was placed on behalf of the plaintiff upon
several provisions of the Rights, Property and Liabilities Order, 1947, and none of his contentions in this
respect were accepted as sound by the learned Judges
of the High Court. In this court Dr: Sen Gupta took
his stand on a two-fold ground. He argued in the first
place that for the purpose of invoking the aid of
article 12 (2) of the Rights, Property and Liabilities
Order it is not necessary that the transfer of the right
and· liability to which the proceeding relates should
take place under any of the specific articles enumerated
in the Order. It would be enough according to him, if
there is a transfer by or under any machinery which
the Order sets up or authorises. What he says is that
as the Province of East Bengal is proceeding to assess
and levy agricultural income-tax upon the plaintiff in
respect of a period anterior to 15th of August, 1947,
the "right to do so can vest in the Province either under
an agreement between the two Dominions or the two
Provinces or on the basis of an award by an arbitral
tribunal as contemplated by article 3 of the Rights,
Property and Liabilities Order. In either case it would
amount to transfer of rights under the provisions of the
Order and would attract the operation of article 12 (2).
This argument is manifestly unsound and cannot
be accepted. If the right referred to by the learned
Counsel means the right to impose tax on agricultural
income earned within its territory, the State · of Pakistan did not acquire such right by transfer from the Province of Bengal. It is a right inherent in sovereignty
itself which the Dominion of Pakistan got under the
Indian Independence Act.
Again if the right has
been created by the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax
Act, the Province of East Bengal would certainly be
entitled to avail itself of the provisions of that Act
under section 18 (3) of the Independence Act. Apart
from this, Dr. Sen Gupta has not referred us to any
agreement between the two Dominions or the two
Provinces or to the decision of any arbitral tribunal
1950
The State of
Tripura
v.
The P1ovince of
Ea•t Bengal
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1950
The State of
T1ipura
v.
The Province of
East Benaal
Mukherjea J.
[1951]
under which the right in dispute in the present case
was transferred to the Province of East Bengal. This
contention must therefore fail.
I have now to consider the other argument on this
point advanced by the learned Counsel that the
liability of the Province of Bengal in respect to the
cause of action upon which the plaintiff's suit had
been founded became a liability or the Province of
East Bengal under the provision of article 1(2) of the
Rights, Property and Liabilities Order. It is not
disputed that if this contention succeeds, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the benefit of clause (2) of article 12
of the Order.
Clause (2) of article 10 has to be read with clause (1)
of that article and taking the two clauses together the
provision of article 10 (2) would stand thus :"Where immediately before the appointed day the
Province of Bengal is subject to any liability in respect of an actionable wrong other than. a brea~h of
contract, the liability shall( a) when the cause of action arose wholly within
the territory which as from that d~y are the territories
of the Province of East Bengal be a liability of ·that
Province."
If the allegations made by the plaintiff in the plaint
are · assumed to be correct, the Province of Bengal was
liable to be restrained from proceeding to levy
agricultural income-tax upon the plaintiff which was
illegal, as being imposed by a statute which so far as
it affected the plaintiff was unconstitutional and void.
The question is whether this can be said to be a
liability in respect of an actionable wrong other than
a breach of contract within the meaning of that
expression occurring in article 10 set out above. It
may be noted here that the rights and liabilities arising
out of contracts have been dealt with in articles 8 and
9 of the Order. The High Court took the view that
the expression "actionable wrong other than a breach
of contract" is synonymous with 'tort'. It has held that
the act complained of cannot be a tortious act and
•
S.C.R.
_.
'f
<I
~
>
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
45
even if it is so, no action would lie upon it, it being an
established proposition of law that the State is not
answerable for any tortious acts of its officers done in
the course of official duties imposed by a Statute. It
seems to me that the learned Judges have attached a
narrow and somewhat restricted meaning to the words
of the Article mentioned above and that the plain
language of the provision read in the light of the context would demand and justify a wider and more
liberal interpretation. In my opinion, there can be an
actionable wrong which does not arise out of a breach
of contract and at the same time does not answer to
the description of a 'tort' as it is unoerstood in English
law ; and if the plaintiff's allegations are correct, it is
an actionable wrong precisely of that type which we
have in the present case.
The word "wrom( in ordinary legal language means
and signifies "privation of right". An act is wrongful
if it infringes the legal right of another, and "actionable" means nothing else than that it affords grounds
for action in law. Ordinarily, the word "injury" is
used in the same sense of actionable wrong while
"damage in contrast with injury means loss or harm
occurring in fact whether actionable as injury or
not" (1). In English law "tort" is a species of civil
injury and so is a breach of contract ; but it is not
quite correct to say that the two together exhaust all
forms of actionable wrongs known to English law. It
is true that a ton is often described as wrong independent of contract. As a legal definition this description,
as I shall show presently, is not quite accurate and
unless taken with certain limitations is apt to be
misleading.
It is well known that in England the principles of
law of contract and tort emerged solely out of
the intricacies of the old "Forms of Action" under
which they lay buried for ages. The injuries which
in modern law are described as torts were remedied in
early time by certain writs, known as writs of trespass
mod~rn
(1) Vide the observation of Viscount Simon in Crofter, etc., Company
d. v. Veitch {1942] A.C. 43S, 442.
4-8 S. C, Jndia/68
19SO
The State of
Tripura
v.
The Province of
Ea3t Bengal
Mukltetjea J.
46
19SO
The State of
Trlpura
v.
The P1ovince of
Ea:rt Bengal
Mukhcrjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
and trespass on the case. The latter was more elastic
than the former and was capable of being adapted to
new circumstances and to new types of injuries. There
was no clear line of demarcation in those days between
contractual .and tortious liability and in fact the action
of "assumpsit" which was the method of enforcing
simple contracts was a variety of action on the case
and was made use of for recovery of compensation
from a party who failed to perform his agreement on
the ground that su•h failure amounted to a wrong in
the nature of deceit(').
When the principles of substantive law gradually
extricated themselves from the entanglements of formalistic procedure, a distinction was drawn between liability for breach of contract and that for tort. In a
breach of contract the right violated owes its origin to
the agreement of the parties while in tort the right
infringed is one created by the general law of the land.
From about the middle of the 19th century the
assumption current in England was that all civil
causes of action must be founded either on contract or
on tort and all injuries which were not breaches of
contract would come under the category of torts.
This assumption as Sir Frederick Pollock observes has
no historical foundation to rest upon('). In 1852 the
Common Law Procedure Act was passed and a tort
was described in the Act as "a wrong independent of
contract". It cannot be denied that this mode of
expression became very common in legal parlance ;
but as more than one modern writer on the law of
torts have pointed out, the words in such description
would have to be interpreted in a particular way and
with certain limitations; taken literally it would not
be a correct statement of law.
It has been observed by Underhill in his "Law of
Torts" that a description like this would be accurate
in law if the word 'wrong' is taken in the restricted and
technical sense as equivalent to "violation of a right
(I) Vide Pollock on Contract, !2th Edition, p. I JI; Winfield on Tott,
pp. 3-4 (4th Edition).
.
(2) Vide Pollock's Article on Tort, Encyc. Brit., VoL22, p. 307.
•
..
S.C.R.
>
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
47
recognised . and enforced by law by means of an action
for damages". Taken in this form, the definition
though it gives no clue as to what constitutes a wrong,
certainly does lay stress on the essential characteristic
-of a tort, viz., that the appropriate remedy for it is an
action for damages(1). It is really this characteristic
that differentiates a tort froni other forms of civil
injury or actionable wrong even though the latter are
unconnected with any contract. There may be other
remedies besides damages available to the plaintiff
against a tortfeasor in the shape of restitution, injunction, etc., but no. "civil injury" as Salmond observes
"can .be classed as tort unless the appropriate remedy
for it is an action for damages. Such an action is an
essential characteristic of every true tort." (2) Other
remedies like injunction or restitution can be claimed
by the plaintiff but it is solely by virtue ot a right to
damages that the wrong complained of can be regarded
as a tort. By way 0£ illustration the author points
out that a public nuisance is not to be deemed a tort,
because the civil remedy by way of injunction may be
obtained at the suit of the Attorney-General. A refusal to perform a statutory duty is not a tori if the
· remedy is by way of mandamus. Nor would any
wrong be regarded as a tort if the remedy is not an
action for unliquidated damages but for a liquidated
sum of money. A breach of trust is certainly an
actionable wrong independent of contract and the
beneficiaries can claim compensation if the trustee has
misappropriated trust property; but as the claim
cannot be for unliquidated damages, it is not regarded
as a tort( 8 ). According to Salmond, the 'reason for
this exclusion is purely historical as a breach of trust
or any other equitable obligation was considered to
be within the special jurisdiction of equity courts. It
is interesting to observe that although . the difference
between equitable and common law jurisdiction is not
existent at the present day, the old rule is still applied
(1} Vide UnderhilJ's Law of Torts, 16th Edn., p. 4.
(2) VideSalmond'sLaw of Torts, IOthEdn.,pp. 7 & 8.
t3) Vide Winfield's Law of Tort, p. 11.
1950
The Stat~ of
1ilpu a
v.
The .Province of
EmtBengal
Mukherjea J.
48
19SO
The State of
Tr pura
v.
The Province of
East Benaal
Mukherjea J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1951]
to demarcate the boundary of the law of torts m
English common Jaw.
Thus tort is a civil miury other than a breach of
contract which is capable of sustaining an action for
unliquidated damages in a court of law. If the appropriate remedy is not a claim for unliquidated damages
but for injunction or some other relief, it would not
rank as a tort though all the same it would be an
actionable wrong.
By way of illustration I may refer to the case of
Halsey v. Brotherhood(') which was decided by Sir
George Jessel. Both the plaintiff and defendant in
this case were engineers and held patents for the
manufacture of certain types of engines. The plaintiff
brought an action against the defendant alleging that
the latter had threatened to bring legal proceedings
against several persons who were actual or intending
purchasers of engines from the plaintiff asserting that
the engines manufactured by the plaintiff were
infringements of the defendant's patent.
There was
a claim for damages and also for injunction. It was
held by Sir George Jessel that the plaintiff could not
claim damages on the basis of slander of title, as he
nowhere alleged that the defendant's statements ·or
representation were not bona fide. But even though
the statements had been made in good faith, the
plaintiff would be entitled to an injunction against the
defendant if he succeeded in proving that the latter's
allegations of infringement were not true. As no proper case for injunction on this basis was made in the
claim, the action was dismissed ; but liberty was given
to the plaintiff to bring an action in the proper form
claiming an injunction to restrain the defendant frqm
threatening the plaintiff's customers.
This threat to
customers was thus held to be an actionable wrong
but as the remedy was injunction and not damages,
it was not a tort in the legal sense of the term.
In the case before us the act of the Province of
Bengal complained of by the plaintiff is not a tort
according to the technical rnies of English law,
(I) IS Ch. D. SJ4.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
49
but is certainly ·an actionable wrong as ·it can be
sued upon in a court of law and remedied in an
effective manner. The appropriate , remedy for the
wrong is not unliquidated damages which is essential
in a tort but an injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with the ilkgal assessment
or from realising the amount assessed if assessment
has actually taken place.
.,.
:>
If, as the plaintiff alleges, the relevant provision
·of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, under
which the plaintiff is sought to be assessed, is illegal
and ultra tJires, the issuing of the notice by the Incometax Officer is certainly the first and the essential step in
the commission of the wrongful act which furnishes a
sufficient cause of action for the suit. As this is not a
case of tort, the principle of law, according to which
a state is not liable to any damages for tortious acts of
.its servants, cannot be invoked as a bar to the suit. A
remedy by way of injunction can be claimed against
a State or Province unless the act complained of
amounts to an 'act of State' in its strict sense and is
not purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by any municipal law.
As the avowed object of the Rights, Property and
Liabilities Order is to distribute and adjust as far as
possible the rights, properties and liabilities betweeri
the two Dominions which were to come into being
under the Indian Independence Act, the language of
the Order should be construed as liberally as possible, .
and there is no warrant for putting an interpretation
upon the words used more restricted than tliey would
bear in English law.
It is argued that article 10(2) (a) does not apply
to this case as the cause of action did not wholly arise
within the territory of the Province of East Bengal.
The argument does not impress me at all. The notice
was issued by the Income-tax Officer of Dacca which
is in Pakistan territory though it was received by the
plaintiff's manager at Agartala which was outside
British India at that time. In any event, the Province
19~0
The State of
Triplll'a
v.
The Province of
East Bengal
Mukherjea J.
50
19'0
The State ~I
Tripura
v.
The Prow'nce of
East Bengal
Mukhtrj"a J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1951]
of East Bengal cannot escape liability on this ground.
It would be jointly liable with the Province of \Vest
Bengal under article 10(2) (c) of the Rights, Property
and Liabilities Order.
In view of my decision on this point, the other question raised by Dr. Sen Gupta as to whether the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the Alipore
Court or not docs not fall for determination.
The learned Attorney-General, who intervened oh
behalf of the Union of India, put forward certain additional grounds in support of the order made by the
learned Judges of the High Court. One of the points
raised by him is that section 65 of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act constitutes a bar to the suit
which, therefore, should not be allowed to continue.
The other material point is that the suit cannot but result in an infructuous decree, and consequently there is
no justification for allowing it to proceed. It is pointed
out that an Ordinance has been passed by the GovemorGeneral of Pakistan on the 13th of November, 1948
under which "no judgment, decree or order referred
to in paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947, shall, in any
way, affect the legislative or executive right or authority of the Central or any Provincial Government of
Pakistan and where such authority or right has been at
issue, the judgment, decree or order shall be invalid
and inoperative". The first point . has been dealt with
by my learned brother Patanjali Sastri J. in his judgment and I concur with him in holding that section 65
of the Bengal Agricu lmral Income-tax Act has no application to the present case. The second point, I must
say, embarrassed me to some extent 2nd if the effect
of the Ordinance is as has been stated by the learned
Attorney-General, a doubt may legitimately arise
whether it would be worthwhile for the plaintiff to
proceed with the suit and whether it would not be
more to his advantage to seek relief in the court of
Dacca. But as this point was not raised before the
High Court and the question whether an Ordinance of
this character could override the provisions of the
•
•
•
<.
<
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
51
Orders passed by the Governor-General of India under
the Indian Independence Act has still to be decided,
I refrain from expressing any opinion on this point.
In the result, the appeal, in my opinion, should be
allowed and I concur in the order which has been made
by my learned brother Patanjali Sastri, J.
1950
Th• State of
Trip11ra
v.
Tiie ProviHce oj
Eayt Bengal
Appeal allowed.
'
.Agent for the Appellant : R. R. Biswas.
Agent for the Respondent : P. K. Bose.
Agent for the Intervener: P. A. Mehta.
STATE OF BOMBAY
1950
"·
NAROTHAMDASJETIIABAIAND
Dec. 20
-
ANOTIIER
(SAIYID FAZL Au, PATANJALI SAsTRI, MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs
JJ.J
Bombay City Civil Court Act (XL of 1948)-Provi11cial Act
constituting City Civil Court to try suits of civil nature of value up
to Rs, 10,000-Provision empowering Provincial GQl/ernmmt to
invest court with jurisdiction up to Rs. 25,000-Validity of ActPower of Provincial Legislature to make laws relating to ju•isdic·
tion of courts-Delegation of legislative powers-Condition11l lr:gis·
lation-Governmetit of India Act, 1935, Seventh Schedule, List I,
items 28 & 53; List II, items 1 & 2; List Ill, items 15-Powei· to
make laws as to 'Administration of /ustice" and "Constitution
and organisation of courts", whether includes power to define
"/urisdiction and powers" of courts-Interpretatio11 of Lists-Reference to legislative practice-Doctrine of pith and substance.
The Bombay City Civil Court Act of 1948, an Act passed by
the Provincial Legislature of Bombay, provided by s. 3 that the
the
official
Provincial Government may, by notification in
Gazette, establish for the Greater Bombay a court to be called the
, Bombay City Ci,·il Court, and that this court shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, have jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil
nature not exceeding Rs. 10,000 in value arising within Greater
Bombay except certain kinds of suits which were specified in the
tection. Section 4 of the Act provided that subject to the excep-:
tions :specified in s. 3 the Provincial Government may, by notifica-,
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